IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT JOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE, I.S GALADIMA

 

DATE: Wednesday 20^th August 2025                  SUIT NO.NICN/JOS/27/2018 BETWEEN:

NICHOLAS DOPSAL CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

1. PLATEAU STATE GOVERNMENT
2. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PLATEAU STATE                    DEFENDANTS
3. PLATEAU STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

 

REPRESENTATION:

• S.S. OBENDE; W.S. ABOKI FOR THE CLAIMANT.
• J. I. MANTU FOR THE DEFENDANTS.

JUDGMENT:

 

2. In 2011, while admitted to Bimma Hospital, he was advised to seek further treatment abroad. He therefore traveled to Israel and underwent total hip arthroplasty at Edith Wolfson Hospital in Tel Aviv. While he was away, he received a letter dated August 5, 2011, effecting his compulsory retirement. That letter relied on findings of serious misconduct by a Managerial Disciplinary Committee, yet he alleges he was never informed

 

of the specific allegations nor given an opportunity to defend himself, in breach of Rule 030302 of the Civil Service Rules.

 

 

 

 

6. The claimant thus claims for the following reliefs from this court:
   1. A declaration that the claimant’s employment is pensionable and permanent and cannot be determined either before the claimant’s retirement age or the attainment of 35 years in service save in accordance with the applicable conditions of service, the guidelines for the appointment,

 

promotion, discipline of civil servants and the civil service rules.

 

 

 

4. A declaration that in view of the 3rd defendant’s letters dated 6/3/2018 appointing and promoting the claimant to the rank of deputy director (planning) on GL16 with effect from 1/1/2013 on an initial basic salary of N1,868,025.46 per annum, he is deemed to have been in the service of the 1st

 

and 3rd defendants at the said period and entitled to be paid all his financial benefits by way of salaries, allowances, and emoluments and it is wrongful for the defendants to deny him the said entitlements.

 

 

 

7. An order directing the defendants to pay to the claimant forthwith, all such salaries, allowances, and other entitlements that fell due at such incremental rates commensurate to his rank and promotions as at the 1/8/2011 the date of the purported compulsory retirement till the 27/5/2016 when he is deemed to have retired in the manner set out below:

 

1. The sum of N205,429.00 monthly for a period of 60 months amounting to N12,325,490.00 as at the cumulative sum of salary arrears for 60 months which accrued when he was wrongly compulsorily retired and later reinstated to the 27/5/2016 when he is deemed to have retired lawfully from service.
2. The sum of N442,196.76 as promotion arrears for the claimant for the period of 3 years as contained in the letters of offer and notice of promotion dated 6/3/2018.
3. Annual leave grant for a period of 2 years in the sum of N294,797.89.
4. The sum of N5,620,535.16 as claimant’s gratuity for the period of 26 years which he served in the employment of the 1st and 3rd defendants, and which has not been paid to him.
5. The sum of N3,566,240.25 as the arrears of pension owed the claimant for 2 years and 4 months commencing from the 27/5/2016 to 27/9/2018.
6. N2,000,000.00 general damages against the defendants jointly and or severally.

 

 

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CASE:

 

THE CLAIMANT’S FACTS AND EVIDENCE:

8. In his amended complaint, the claimant, relying on this Court’s Rules, sought judicial redress against the defendants’ unilateral refusal to pay the financial benefits that accrued when they withdrew the compulsory retirement notice dated 5 August 2011 (effective 1 August 2011).

 

 

 

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS:

 

 

13. Upon his return to Nigeria in 2012, the claimant was handed a compulsory retirement letter dated August 5, 2011, which took effect from

 

August 1, 2011. Accordingly, no disciplinary proceedings were conducted against him before this forced retirement.

 

 

 

 

17. Upon receiving the defendants’ letter dated 6 March 2018, the claimant immediately objected to their decision to withhold his financial entitlements, noting that he had been reinstated and his absence condoned. In their reply to his objection, the defendants reaffirmed that the terms of the 6 March 2018 letter would remain in force.

 

 

 

 

1. Employment Letter Exhibit C1.
2. Confirmation Letter as Exhibit C2.
3. Civil Service Rules as Exhibit C3.
4. Employment Files of the Claimant as Exhibit C4 (A), C4 (B) and C4 (C).
5. Letter of Compulsory Retirement as Exhibit C5.
6. Letters of appeal as Exhibit C6 and C7.
7. Letters of Appeal in Paragraphs 20 and 21 as Exhibit C8.
8. Solicitor’s Letters as Exhibit C9 and C10.
9. Letters of Promotions as Exhibit C11 and C12.
10. Letter from Civil Service Commission as Exhibit C13.

 

 

DEFENDANTS’ FACTS AND EVIDENCE:

21. At the close of the claimant’s case, the defendants jointly called a witness as DW1 – one Alex Damen Longkop. He adopted his sworn deposition on 17/1/2023 and was duly cross examined before the defendants closed their own case. DW1 identified and relied on all the

 

documents already tendered by the claimant’s witness and so no more documents were tendered by him.

 

 

 

 

 

26. That upon the termination of the claimant’s employment with effect from August 2011, he was paid 3 months’ salaries in lieu of notice as required by his letter of employment.

 

 

 

 

 

31. At the close of the hearing, the court directed counsel for both parties to file their final written addresses in accordance with its rules. Again, the defendants’ address was filed on 25 November 2025, while the claimant’s was filed on 28 January 2025. It should be noted that both sets of addresses had been previously lodged before the former judge but were never adopted. Accordingly, counsel were summoned to appear before this court today to adopt their final addresses orally, whereupon this judgment was immediately delivered.

 

DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL’S FINAL SUBMISSIONS AND ADDRESS:

 

 

 

 

where the queries, warnings and disciplinary measures imposed on the claimant are recorded.

 

35. He also referred to pages 310–316 of Exhibit C4(C), noting that pages 314–315 contain the minutes of the Managerial Disciplinary Committee meeting held on 29 January 2010, at which the MDC recommended the claimant’s termination. Pages 317, 318, 319, 320, and

 

323 of the same exhibit comprise the letters inviting the claimant to appear before the MDC.

 

 

 

 

 

40. Counsel for the defendants argues that the claimant received a fair hearing before his compulsory retirement, as evidenced by the exhibits before this court. He was repeatedly invited to appear before the Managerial Disciplinary Committee and submitted representations concerning his alleged victimization, which the defendants duly considered. Under the Public Service Rules, the claimant was found guilty of misconduct warranting termination of his employment. Nevertheless,

 

the MDC graciously opted to recommend compulsory retirement rather than outright dismissal.

 

at page 221-222 paras. G-C. per Niki Tobi, JSC (of blessed memory) held as follows:

 

“I have seen in recent times that parties who have bad cases embrace and make use of the constitutional provision of fair hearing to bamboozle the adverse party and the court, with a view to moving the court away from the live issues in the litigation. They make so much weather and sing the familiar song that the constitutional provision is violated or contravened.

 

They do not stop there. They rake the defence in most inappropriate cases because they have nothing to canvass in their favour in the case. The fair hearing provision in the Constitution is the machinery or locomotive of justice; not a spare part to propel or invigorate the case of the user. It is not a casual principle of law available to a party to be picked up at will in a case and force the court to apply it to his advantage. On the contrary, it isa formidable and fundamental constitutional provision available to a party who is really denied fair hearing because he was not heard or that he was not properly heard in the case. Let litigants who have nothing useful to advocate in favour of their cases, leave the fair hearing constitutional provision alone because it is not available to them just for the asking.

 

42. Accordingly, in a more recent decision, the Supreme Court in Gov., Imo State v. E.F. Network Nig. Ltd (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1676) 95 held that

 

fair hearing as a constitutional provision is designed for both parties in the litigation, in the interest of fair play and justice. The apex Court held that:

“fair hearing is not a cut-and-dry principle which parties can, in the abstract, always apply to their comfort and convenience. Itis principle which is based and must be based on the facts of the case before the court. Only the facts of the case can influence and determine the application or applicability of the principle. The principle of fair hearing is helpless or completely dead outside the facts of the case.”

 

 

 

 

46. He submitted that it is settled law that any fact not disputed or challenged is deemed admitted and therefore treated as established. In support, he relied on PALI v. ABDU & ORS (2019) LPELR-46342(SC); ODULAJA v. HADDAD (1973) 11 SC 35; OGOLO v. FUBARA (2003) 11

 

NWLR (Pt. 831); and FUTMINA & ORS v. OLUTAYO (2017) LPELR- 43827(SC).

 

 

 

49. On issue number two—whether the claimant has proven his case and is entitled to judgment—counsel for the defendants submitted that the claimant has utterly failed to substantiate any of his allegations before this Honourable Court. He has produced no evidence to show that he merits the reliefs he seeks, all of which carry financial implications, and therefore there is no basis for this Court to grant them.

 

 

…By Gabriel Ativie v. Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd [2008] LPELR-591(SC); [2008] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1095) 399; [2008] 5 - 6 SC (Pt. II) 47, a claim

is circumscribed by the reliefs claimed; and the duty of a plaintiff, therefore, is to plead only such facts and materials as are necessary to sustain the reliefs and adduce evidence to prove same. What all the reliefs of the claimants portend is that the case of the claimants is a claim for end of service benefits i.e. special damages. See 7UP Bottling Company Plc v. Augustus [2012] LPELR-20873(CA), which held thus:

 

The claims for gratuity, pension, housing fund, salary up to 24th October 2002 are all special damages and must be strictly proved. That is, each of the said items must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court as the Court is not entitled to make its own estimate of same. It must be proved with credible evidence and without such proof no special damages can be awarded…

 

 

51. Counsel submits that the reliefs claimed by the claimant, as outlined in the statement of facts accompanying the complaint, are purely monetary. It is well settled that monetary claims fall under the category of special damages. Furthermore, the claimant has failed to provide this Honourable Court with any evidence of what his rights and benefits consist of. He has not supplied any details of his salary or other entitlements that would allow for the calculation of his gratuity, pension or any other accruable allowances. The law clearly requires a claimant to

 

plead and prove all particulars of his entitlements before a court may grant them.

 

 

 

 

CLAIMANT’S COUNSEL’S FINAL WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS AND

ADDRESS:

 

55. According to counsel, the material facts in this case are essentially undisputed. What remains for the court to decide is purely a question of law applied to those established facts. In particular, the issue is: how does the defendants’ letter of March 6, 2018, affect the claimant’s status as a

 

civil servant and his entitlement to retirement benefits from the Plateau State Government?

 

 

 

58. He argues that reinstating the claimant simply reaffirms his continuous service with the defendants. By rescinding the compulsory retirement order and condoning his absence, the defendants implicitly recognize that his employment persisted from the date he was originally retired until his reinstatement, or until he reached the statutory retirement age or completed 35 years of service, whichever is applicable.

 

 

 

V. NATIONAL EAR CARE CENTER & ANOR (2014) LPELR-22910 (CA) per Ita

George Mbaba, J.C.A Pg. 23-24, Para. And N.I.W.A & ANOR v. IBRAHIM & ORS (2019) LPELR-47825(CA).

 

45848(CA), the court accordingly decided that:

 

 

"…The Appellant cannot be dismissed retrospectively. In other words, the Respondents have no powers under the Public Service Rules to back date the dismissal of Appellant to 24th November 1999 after he had been promoted and also invited for another promotion interview.”

 

 

 

“I am directed to inform you that the Commission has approved your promotion to the post of Director (planning). The initial salary for the post is N1,868,025.00 per annum on GL 16 and your promotion takes effect from 1/1/2013.”

 

65. He contends that the real question is: what meaning can be attached to exhibit C11, which is said to take effect on December 1, 2013, when another exhibit establishes that the claimant’s compulsory retirement began on January 1, 2012? It is plainly inconsistent for the claimant to

 

receive a promotion effective 2013 if he had already been compulsorily retired.

 

 

 

“I am pleased to convey to you the Governor’s approval for

your re-instatement into the Plateau State Civil Service…”

 

 

where it was held that:

 

"…Compulsory retirement of a civil servant compels the inference that the civil servant is being subjected to disciplinary action for the commission of any crime or misconduct. In the case of the appellant

 

in this appeal, there is no evidence that he committed any crime, offence or misconduct. If any disciplinary action is to be taken against him it must be in full compliance with the relevant statute, rule or regulation. See Iderima vs. RSCSC (supra) and Shitta-Bey vs. Federal Public Service Commission (supra). Obviously, the appellant was not retired in accordance with the civil service" rules and regulations, and neither was the proper procedure for the compulsory retirement of the appellant followed in this matter. The appellant is a civil servant therefore; he cannot be retired at the pleasure of the Governor or without compliance of the Cross River State Civil Service Rules and Regulations which governed his appointment.

 

….Since the respondents did not comply or refuse to follow the procedure provided by the civil service rules and regulations of the Cross River State 1975, their action in purporting to retire the appellant is a nullity." Per OMOKRI, J.C.A in (Pp. 14-22 paras. F).

 

 

 

71. Accordingly, in Chief J. L. E. Duke v. Government of Cross River State & Ors (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1356) 347 at 366 B-C, Galadima JSC stated then that:

 

“By the term fair hearing within the context of Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution is that a trial ought to be conducted in accordance with all legal norms designed to ensure that justice is done at all cost to all parties. The principle of fair hearing is that both sides must be given an opportunity to present their respective cases. It implies that each side has the right to know what case is being made against it and be given ample opportunity to react or respond thereto.”

…“Likewise, in Healey v. Société Anonyme Francoise Ribastic (1917) 1 KB 946—as applied in the reported judgment of Ige JCA (pp. 22– 35 paras. A)—the Court held that a summary dismissal takes effect only from the date the dismissal is formally communicated (28 June 1979 in that case), not from an earlier, uncommunicated date. Consequently, the employee was entitled to recover his salary or claim arrears for the period between 29 December 1978 and 28 June 1979”.

 

 

73. Counsel pointed out that under cross examination, CW 1 admitted that there is nothing showing that the claimant agreed to the decision to deprive the claimant of his financial Benefits.

 

 

 

 

 

78. The claimant maintains that his date of birth is May 27, 1956, as recorded in the statutory declaration of age he submitted with his appointment papers (see page 361 of exhibit C4c). The defendants have

 

not disputed that declaration, which was sworn on September 27, 1983. Instead, they contend only that the claimant at various times gave different birth dates while in their service, pointing to multiple APERS forms. However, they have not identified which of those dates they now rely on to determine when he was due to retire at age 60 under the Civil Service Rules.

 

 

 

 

82. Learned counsel contends that in paragraph 9 of his statement of facts, the claimant says that, according to the defendants’ own records, he was due to retire on May 27, 2016—when he reached sixty years of

 

age, having been born on May 27, 1956—as shown in the files of the 1st and 3rd defendants. He relies on his employment file in the defendants’ possession and gives notice that it must be produced at the trial of this suit.

 

 

“In further answer to paragraph 9, a civil servant’s employment can be terminated. The claimant was compulsory retired following the Recommendation of the Managerial Disciplinary Committee, after giving fair hearing to the claimant that considered the cases of serious misconduct of the claimant…”

 

In further denial and answer to paragraph 9 of the statement of facts, the defendants state that retirement in the Civil Service is either voluntary or compulsory. In the case at hand, the claimant’s retirement was compulsory and as such was not entitled to voluntary retirement either by years of service, age or voluntary resignation. Moreso, the claimant had severally falsified his date of birth as can be seen in the APER filled by himself and the two declarations of age submitted him in the course of his employment. The defendants shall rely on all his APERs, and Declarations of Age deposed to and submitted by the claimant.”

 

 

85. In paragraph 2 of Exhibit C8, the claimant appealed for reinstatement and asked that his promotions, effective from January 1,

 

2009, to January 1, 2013, be approved. In response, the defendants issued Exhibit C9, in which they stated:

 

“I am pleased to convey to you the Governor’s approval for your re-instatement into the Plateau State Civil Service without Financial Benefits.

In addition, your period of absence from service from 1st August 2011-31st December 2011, has been condoned.

 

Consequently, your retirement is now 1st January 2012 and not as stated in our earlier letter dated 5th August 2011 please.”

 

 

 

 

89. Moreover, the claimant was not compulsorily retired for falsifying his age (see exhibit C5, the retirement letter). His grievance is that, in both his retirement and subsequent reinstatement, the defendants failed to recognize his true date of birth—27 May 1956—as pleaded in paragraph

 

C4(c) of the amended statement of claim and evidenced by exhibit C4 (his age declaration).

 

 

….

 

…The Appellant cannot be dismissed retrospectively. In other words, the Respondents have no powers under the Public Service Rules to back date the dismissal of Appellant to 24th November 1999 after he had been promoted and also invited for another promotion interview.

 

AGBAJE, JCA later JSC who said: -

 

The letter of dismissal of 20th June 1979 from the Bank to the plaintiff was said to be with effect from 29th December 1978. Dealing with this aspect of the letter which made the effective date of the dismissal 29th December 1978, the learned trial Judge said;

 

"The plaintiff's appointment with the Bank subsisted until the 20th June 1979 when the letter of dismissal was written and presumably served on the plaintiff and not the 29th December 1978 (the retrospective date)."

 

I entirely agree with the learned trial Judge on this view of hers. In this passage from the judgment of the learned trial Judge, in my view, held that the effective date of the dismissal of the plaintiff from the services of the defendant was 28th June 1979 and not 29th December 1978 which was indicated in the letter of dismissal written to the plaintiff. " Per IGE, J.C.A (Pp. 22-35 paras. A-A).

 

 

 

95. Under the Civil Service Rules, the claimant was obliged to retire upon reaching the mandatory age on May 27, 2016, which marked the final date he was permitted to serve. Accordingly, his retirement can only take effect from that statutory date, and the letter of reinstatement cannot be given retrospective effect.

 

 

"I do not take the word reinstatement to be a term of art. - See Hodge

v. Ulter-Electric Ltd. (1943) I KB. 462, 466. Its ordinary and primary meaning is to replace the person to the exact position in which he was before his removal.

 

That is to restore him to his status quo ante. It is therefore retroactive in effect and involves a revocation of the act of dismissal and restoration of payment of wages for the intervening period…" Per KARIBI-WHYTE, J.S.C (Pp. 165 paras. B).

 

 

court held:

 

"The question that comes to mind is whether the 3rd Appellant can hold the office of Registrar of 1st Appellant after the date of his mandatory retirement which is September 2010. In order to answer the question, it would be necessary to examine Rule 020810 (i) and

(ii) of the Public Service Rules 2008 Edition which provides as follows:

 

"1. That compulsory retirement age for all grades in the service shall be 60 years or 35 years of pensionable service, whichever is earlier.

 

2. No officer shall be allowed to remain in service after attaining the retirement age of 60 years or 35 years of pensionable service, whichever is earlier." A careful examination of the above set out rules of civil service would show that it is mandatory for a public servant to retire upon attaining 60 or 35 years in the Public Service. The keyword in the above provision is "SHALL" which denotes mandatories as distinct from discretion. It is a word of command and denotes an obligation." Per BADA, J.C.A. (Pp. 21-22 paras. C).

 

 

 

to which both parties are bound. Counsel submits that, as a civil servant,

 

the claimant could only retire upon reaching the statutory age of sixty or completing thirty-five years’ service with the defendants. Since by January 1, 2012, he had satisfied neither condition, the defendants had no authority to fix that date as his retirement. Consequently, the letter of March 6, 2013, designating January 1, 2012, as his retirement date is null and void. Counsel therefore urges the court to grant the reliefs sought in paragraphs 38(a) and (e) of the Amended Statement of Facts.

 

 

 

effect of the defendants’ May 6, 2018 reinstatement letter and whether,

 

in light of that document, the claimant may lawfully be denied his financial benefits and entitlements. It is not disputed that before the defendants’ March 6, 2018, letter, the claimant’s employment had already been terminated. After that dismissal, the claimant made multiple efforts to remedy the injustice stemming from the termination of his appointment.

 

 

 

107. He maintained that once an act has been annulled or reversed, it loses all legal effect and is treated as if it never existed. Accordingly, in this case the defendants promoted the claimant under exhibits C12 and C11, expressly recognizing the period he spent out of service due to their wrongful compulsory retirement.

 

 

 

 

111. Counsel argues that withholding the claimant’s promotion-related benefits and the entitlements for the period August 1 to December 31, 2011—without giving him any hearing—violated his constitutional rights and must be set aside. In cross-examination on this issue, DW 1 conceded that the claimant was neither consulted nor involved in the decision to reinstate him without financial benefits, even though DW 1 agreed that a civil servant who retires is entitled to retirement benefits as at the date of retirement. DW 1 also admitted that those benefits were withheld because the claimant was on suspension before his retirement and reinstatement.

 

 

 

 

115. Consequently, the claimant’s rights were wrongfully violated by the defendants’ conduct, entitling him to compensation in damages. Having established that infringement, he is entitled to recover damages. (See BGP/CNPC Int’l Nig. Ltd & Anor v. Okoro & Ors (2021) LPELR-55958 (CA)). Counsel cited and relied on the case of CBN V IGWILLO (2007) LPELR- 835(SC) where the apex court decided that if an employee whose tenure is safeguarded by statute is wrongfully dismissed, he is entitled both to reinstatement in his former position and to damages equal to the salary

 

he would have earned during the period of his dismissal (see Shitta-Bey

v. Federal Public Service Commission; Olaniyan v. University of Lagos; Udo v. Cross River State Newspaper Corporation). – per Akintan, J.S.C. (pp. 20–21, paras. G).

 

 

COURT’S DECISION:

117. I carefully reviewed all the processes submitted by counsel, considered the witnesses’ testimony, and evaluated the evidence presented. The key issues for the court’s determination in this case are as follows:
     1. Validity of the compulsory retirement – Whether the August 1, 2011, retirement notice was lawful under the applicable Civil Service Rules, having regard to the claimant’s right to fair hearing and the procedural safeguards for misconduct allegations.

 

 

3. Effect of the March 6, 2018, reinstatement – Whether Governor Lalong’s reinstatement on “compassionate grounds” (i) nullified the 2011 retirement as if it never happened and (ii) revived

 

the claimant’s entitlement to all financial benefits

from August 1, 2011, up to the date of actual exit.

 

 

 

 

119. Under the Public Service Rules (PSR) in force in Plateau State in 2008, a civil servant cannot be compulsorily retired for misconduct or inefficiency without strict compliance with both substantive and procedural safeguards. Two broad requirements must be met before a compulsory retirement notice can lawfully issue: (1) there must be a valid ground under the Rules (e.g. proven misconduct, inefficiency, or certified medical incapacity), and (2) the officer must be afforded the full panoply of fair-hearing rights prescribed by those Rules – rules 030302 to 030306.

 

 

 

 

123. Because the Public Service Rules build in several procedural safeguards, before taking any punitive step short of summary dismissal, an officer must receive a written statement of the precise allegations against him and be given a genuine opportunity to answer them—either by submitting a written explanation or by appearing before the appropriate authority or tribunal. The officer also has the right to legal representation and to appeal any adverse finding through established internal channels (for example, the Public Service Commission or the Governor), without prejudice to his right to pursue judicial review.

 

124. In his own letter of 18 September 2012 (exhibit C6), the claimant responded to the defendants’ compulsory retirement notice (exhibit C5) by admitting that he was aware of the State Planning Commission’s allegations against him. He acknowledged that those allegations prompted the formation of a disciplinary committee, chaired by Moses Gwom, which first sat on 9 February 2010, and he even attached the committee’s invitation letter. He conceded that the grounds for his appearance included:
     1. An allegation that on 3 February 2009 he challenged the then– Permanent Secretary of the SPC, the late C.C. Gobum, to a physical duel;
     2. An allegation that he forged the former chairman’s signature on his

APER forms for the years 2003 to 2006; and

 

125. In paragraph 5 of the letter, he described how the committee adjourned its hearing on 9 February 2010 and told him he would be summoned again to continue. He says no further invitation arrived; instead, on 5 August 2011 he received a compulsory retirement letter— apparently delivered by courier while he was abroad for medical treatment. He claims that by so doing, he was robbed of defending himself of the allegations before the committee determined that he should be retired compulsorily. He then appealed the Head of Service’s decision to withhold his promotions to GL14 and GL15 and sought payment of the ten months’ salary (March to December 2010) that the commission had retained when it suspended him for refusing to report to his transferred duty post.

 

10 month’s owed salaries were later approved and effected by the defendants as seen in Exhibit C4(c) that was tendered by the claimant.

 

127. One might ask whether the court still needs to go into the facts of the hearing before the managerial?disciplinary committee. The answer depends on precisely what remains live in the dispute. There are really two distinct issues here:
     1. The validity of the compulsory retirement decision itself (i.e. was it procedurally fair? did it comply with the Civil Service Rules?); and
     2. The entitlements that flow from his employment (i.e. back pay, promotions arrears, pension, gratuity, etc.) once he has been reinstated.
128. Because the Plateau State Government subsequently “re-absorbed” and “reinstated” the claimant, there is an argument that the first issue – the quashing of the retirement decision – has in practical terms been overtaken by events. In other words, he no longer needs an order setting aside that retirement because, on March 6, 2018, he was reinstated back but without financial benefits. If his only remedy were reinstatement, then his claim to quash the original decision is arguably moot.

 

129. However, the claimant is not content with mere reinstatement; he is claiming full retrospective benefits. Whether or not he is entitled to back pay, promotion arrears, leave allowances, gratuity, pension contributions and so on, still turns on whether the retirement was wrongful in the first place. This court cannot properly compute “what he lost” unless it knows whether he was ever validly retired. A valid compulsory retirement (even if later reversed on compassion grounds) might carry the consequence that he is not owed decades of back pay. An invalid retirement, by

 

contrast, means he should have remained in active service, earning salary and accruing other emoluments.

 

 

 

 

133. Accordingly, this court will almost certainly need to inquire into whether the initial retirement was in breach of the Civil Service Rules (i.e. whether he was denied a fair hearing), because that inquiry underpins the entire claim for back pay, arrears and other benefits. If the court concludes that he was retired without due process, then it must quantify

 

his loss. If, on the other hand, the original retirement was procedurally and substantively valid, then his claim for retrospective benefits must fail.

 

 

committee’s recommendation, was the claimant given a fair hearing?

 

 

137. Two leading authorities illustrate this point: In Okocha v. Civil Service Commission (Edo State) & anor (2003) LPELR-7268(CA), the Court of Appeal held that once a civil servant attains permanent and pensionable status, his employment relationship transcends an ordinary master- servant contract and is governed by statutorily entrenched Civil Service Rules. Citing Shitta-Bey v. F.P.S.C., the court affirmed that these Rules, having constitutional force, confer a legal status on public servants and

 

prescribe a detailed procedure for dismissal or retirement. Key requirements include:

 

1. Written notice of proposed dismissal and specified grounds, with reasonable time to respond;
2. Investigation by the appropriate authority, including witness examination and access to documentary evidence;
3. Opportunity for the officer to be heard, call witnesses, and, in exceptional cases, be represented by counsel;
4. A multi-stage inquiry process culminating in a committee report to the Civil Service Commission, which must   approve   any   punitive   action. Because the respondents failed to follow all the prescribed steps under Rule 04107, the court declared the appellant’s dismissal null and void.

 

 

139. Rules 04305 and 04306 prescribe the disciplinary procedure. Under Rule 04305, lesser misconduct is investigated by the Civil Service Commission, the officer is informed of allegations and given a defense opportunity; proven misconduct may attract penalties short of dismissal.

 

Rule 04306 governs dismissal: the officer receives a precise written query stating allegations, relevant rules and possible penalty, must respond in writing, and may access evidence. If unsatisfactory, the Commission may convene a board of inquiry (minimum three members) where the officer can call and question witnesses. The board reports back, and the Commission decides on dismissal, alternative penalties, or reinstatement with back pay. The court concluded that “there was clear evidence of culpability by the appellant in what she did and the explanation she gave is untenable. Learned counsel for the respondents rightly submitted that the act of the appellant in forging letters of appointment was not only against the deep interest of the respondents, it was of a grave and weighty character bordering on dishonesty and falsification of official documents as to the confidence which the Local Government Service Commission reposed in her. It is an act of serious misconduct which entitled the respondents to dismiss her from service.”

 

 

141. Additionally, the complete minutes and report of the managerial disciplinary committee meeting held on March 3, 2010, are found in exhibit C4(c), pages 367–370. A careful review of those minutes shows that the claimant attended the hearing and was given a full opportunity

 

to answer the allegations of: (1) failing to respond to a query within the required time; (2) refusing a posting; (3) falsifying or altering his date of birth; and (4) using abusive language and attempting to assault a superior. The session was chaired by Mr. Moses D. Gwom, with six other members in attendance, including the secretary, Mrs. Ayika Hassana, who signed the record. These were all admitted by the claimant himself in his letter of 18/9/2012.

 

 

 

 

 

permanent  and  pensionable  so  that  any  valid  retirement would

 

automatically give rise to pension, gratuity and other statutory benefits— this court, having declined to overturn the managerial disciplinary committee’s 2010 findings and recommendation, finds that the defendants validly retired him in line with the Civil Service Rules governing his employment. Instead of dismissing him for the serious misconduct, the defendants carried out the committee’s recommendation for a lesser sanction which is to compulsorily retire the claimant. As a result, his service, which began in 1990, ended in 2011, a date later adjusted to January 1, 2012, by the letter of March 6, 2018.

 

 

 

149. Under Civil Service Rules 030305 and 030601, compulsory retirement is available as a disciplinary sanction. Rule 030305 provides that when an officer is found guilty of misconduct deemed not serious enough to trigger dismissal proceedings under Rule 030306, the commission may investigate the matter in any manner it considers appropriate. If, following that investigation, the commission concludes the allegations are proven, it may impose alternative penalties—such as

 

demotion, withholding or deferral of salary increments, or other disciplinary measures.

 

 

 

 

153. By not challenging the committee’s findings, the claimant has effectively conceded that his retirement fell squarely within the misconduct exclusion. It follows, as a matter of law, that he is not entitled to pension or gratuity beyond the date of that compulsory retirement. Even if his first retirement were later declared procedurally flawed (which the State denies), the nature of the misconduct would still have disqualified him from the benefits he now claims.

 

 

 

 

157. For the avoidance of doubt, the claimant is entitled to gratuity and pension at Grade Level 16 as of 2012, when he was compulsorily retired for misconduct. However, the decision refusing him any financial

 

benefits—whether salary or allowances—for the period from 2010 through January 1, 2012, is affirmed. I so hold.

 

 

findings and need not be revisited.

 

 

161. The court notes that, even as these proceedings were ongoing, the defendants discharged the claimant’s retirement benefits at the GL16 level in accordance with their statutory obligations. Although the claimant accepted those payments, he did so with evident dissatisfaction. Had the

 

defendants chosen otherwise, they might have withheld all such benefits until a final determination of this dispute. It is nevertheless regrettable that resolution took so long—from 2018 until 2025—but I trust that my honest efforts to conclude the matter within the period I took over the case in 2024 until judgment is rendered today will be appreciated by both parties.

 

claimant’s case fails and none of the reliefs sought are granted.

 

 

Delivered in Jos this 20th day of August, 2025.

 

 

 

HON. JUSTICE I.S GALADIMA, JUDGE.

 

Public access to NICN decisions:

Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://nicnadr.gov.ng. NICN decisions are available to the general public shortly after a copy each has been sent to the claimant(s) and defendant(s) in a case.