IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT JOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE I.S. GALADIMA

 

DATE: 10TH DECEMBER 2025                              SUIT NO: NICN/JOS/46/2024

BETWEEN:

1.       FAITH ISI EMMANUEL

2.       DOKBISH LONGWAL GUJOR                               …….  CLAIMANTS

 

AND:

1.       GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE 

2.       ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PLATEAU STATE      …..... DEFENDANTS

3.       PLATEAU STATE COLLEGE OF HEALTH

TECHNOLOGY   

 

REPRESENTATION:

·                     NANTOK DASHUWAR; R.I. PANTUVO; E.S. BUF FOR THE CLAIMANTS

·                     PANSHAK KYAKSE AUDU; K.E. POWAR; ALFRED DANBABA FOR THE 1ST RESPONDENT

·                     P.A DAFFI, ESQ. (HAG OF PLATEAU STATE); SABO LONGJI, ESQ., N.J. MINER; T.P. CHIGERO; K.D. WUYEP FOR THE 2ND AND 3RD RESPONDENTS.

 

1.           At the heart of this dispute is that in 2022 the claimants were offered and accepted appointments at the 3rd defendant institution and duly commenced their duties. Thereafter, the 1st defendant, the Governor of Plateau State, suspended them and subsequently announced their termination. The claimants contend that this action was unlawful, arguing that the 1st defendant had no statutory authority to suspend or terminate their employment. They also allege that they have not received any salary since January 2023 since their employments were halted. Consequently, the claimants have approached this honourable court to challenge the 1st defendant’s unlawful interference, vindicate their employment rights, and obtain orders restoring their employments and entitlements.

 

2.           The defendants contest the suit on several grounds, maintaining that the claimants’ employments were riddled with irregularities. They further deny any obligation to pay salaries and have asked the court to dismiss the case in its entirety.

 

QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION:

3.           On 30 September 2024, the claimants filed an originating summons in which they ask the court to resolve the following questions:

                                         i.    Whether the 1st defendant is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the Claimants through Exhibits D and E, the Claimants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd Defendant. 

                                        ii.    By virtue of the letters of appointment issued to the Claimants attached as Exhibits A1 – A2, whether the Claimants are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd Defendant in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd Defendant.

                                      iii.    Whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd Defendant to pay the Claimants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd Defendant’s duties and obligations.

The Claimants thus seek the following reliefs:

                                         i.        A declaration that the 1st Defendant has no power or authority to suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the Claimants duly engaged in the services and employment of the 3rd Defendant.

                                        ii.        A declaration that the purported termination, nullification and cancellation of the employment and appointment of the Claimants by the 1st Defendant through Exhibits D and E, is unlawful, illegal, null and void with no legal effect whatsoever.

                                      iii.         A declaration that the Claimants are entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd Defendant in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd Defendant.

                                      iv.        A declaration that the failure and refusal of the 3rd Defendant to pay the Claimants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 to date is unlawful, unjust, illegal and in violation of the 3rd Respondent’s duties and obligations.

                                       v.        An order setting aside the purported suspension and subsequent termination, nullification and cancellation of the Claimants’ Appointments/Employments made by the 1st Defendant through the publications made at his instance attached as Exhibits D and E, same having been done ultra vires and therefore unlawful, null and void.

                                      vi.        An order reinstating the Claimants back to their positions as staff and employees of the 3rd Defendant in line with their letters of appointment attached as Exhibits A1 and A2.

                                     vii.        An order directing the Defendants to pay the Claimants their monthly salaries and allowances as specified by the terms of their employments from the month of January 2023 to date, as follows:

a.   1st Claimant: The sum of N1, 360, 160. 86 annually paid in monthly installments of N113, 346. 73.  per month.

b.   2nd Claimant: The sum of N873, 551.00 annually paid in Monthly installments of N72,795.00 per Month. 

                                   viii.        An order of perpetual injunction, restraining the Defendants, whether by themselves, their agents, privies, assigns or representatives howsoever described, from victimizing, terminating or interfering with the Claimants’ appointment and employment with the 3rd Defendant, without any wrongdoing or violations of the terms of service on the part of the Claimants.

                                      ix.        N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira only) as General Damages against the Defendants jointly and severally for the pain and suffering imposed on the Claimants by the Defendants.

                                       x.        Costs of this Suit as may be assessed by this Honourable Court

4.           The originating summons is supported by a 28-paragraph affidavit sworn by the 1st claimant, Emmanuel Isi Faith, to which four documents—marked Exhibits A1, A2, D, and E—are attached. A written address by the claimants’ counsel, Nantok Dashuwar, Esq., also accompanies the affidavit.

 

5.           On 18 October 2024 the 2nd and 3rd defendants filed a Memorandum of Conditional Appearance. Then, on 23 December 2024—albeit out of time—they filed a five-paragraph counter-affidavit, a written address opposing the claimants’ supporting affidavit, and a notice of preliminary objection. Those late processes were thereafter regularized by a motion dated 19 December 2024, also filed on 23 December 2024.

 

6.           On June 5, 2025, the 1st defendant lodged a Memorandum of Conditional Appearance, a Counter-Affidavit consisting of four principal paragraphs, and a written address opposing the claimants’ supporting affidavit. Although these documents were filed after the deadline, they were subsequently regularized by the defendant’s motion dated May 21, 2025, which was also filed on June 5, 2025.

 

CLAIMANTS’ FACTS

7.           Based on the claimants’ pleadings, in 2022, after submitting the required applications, they were appointed by the Plateau State College of Health Technology, Pankshin (3rd Defendant) and accepted their letters of appointment, which were pleaded as Exhibits A1 and A2.

 

8.           Before commencing their duties, they completed all required documentation and faithfully discharged their responsibilities in accordance with their letters of appointment, the staff Conditions of Service, and the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003 (Exhibits B and C).

 

10. After a change in administration, the 1st Defendant – the incumbent governor of the State of Plateau, suspended all newly appointed Plateau State Government staff and agency workers—including the Claimants— who were employed from October 2022 to 29 May 2023. As a result, the Claimants were denied access to their places of work and have not received any salary since January 2023, despite never having faced any disciplinary proceedings or been found in breach of the laws and regulations governing their employment with the 3rd Defendant.

11. The claimants aver that they are owed salaries as follows:

a.   1st Claimant: The sum of N1,360,160.86 annually paid in monthly installments of N113,346.73.  per month.

b.   2nd Claimant: The sum of N873,551.00 annually paid in Monthly installments of N72,795.00 per Month. 

 

12. The Claimants contend that afterward the 1st defendant formed a committee to review the employments of those hired during the same period, yet the Claimants were neither invited nor heard, nor were they informed of the committee’s findings.

 

13. Thereafter, through public announcements, the 1st defendant purported to terminate and nullify the Claimants’ appointments without serving them any formal notice or letter of termination via Exhibits D and E.

 

14. The Claimants assert that, under the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003 and the College’s Conditions of Service, the 1st Defendant has no power to suspend or terminate their appointments. They were appointed by the 3rd Defendant—a statutory body governed by its own council—and hold permanent, pensionable positions. They remain prepared and willing to continue discharging their duties.

 

THE CLAIMANTS’ COUNSEL’ S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:

16. The Claimants’ counsel filed along with their originating summons, a written address dated 9/9/2024 and filed on 30/9/2024 wherein they formulated 3 issues for determination as reproduced below:

a.   Whether the 1st Defendant is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employment and appointment of the Claimants through Exhibits D and E, the Claimants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd Defendant.

b.   By virtue of the letters of appointment issued to the Claimants by the 3rd Defendant attached as Exhibits A1 and A2, whether the Claimants are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd Defendant in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd Defendant.

c.    Whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd Defendant to pay the Claimants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd Defendant’s duties and obligations.

 

17. The learned counsel addressed the three issues he had identified, arguing that the 1st Defendant lacks any legal authority to suspend, terminate or otherwise interfere with the Claimants’ employment. Their appointments were made exclusively by the 3rd Defendant through its Governing Council. As shown in Exhibits A1 and A2, their employment is governed by the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003, and the College’s Scheme of Service—statutory instruments that vest all powers of appointment, suspension and termination solely in the Governing Council, not in the 1st Defendant. Indeed, paragraph 2(vii) of each letter of appointment states: “That you will be subject, in all respects, to all conditions of service stipulated in the Scheme of Service and other College Regulations and Instructions, as may be reviewed by the Council from time to time.”

 

18. The Claimants contend that Sections 6(1)(r), 10(1) and (2)(g), and 18(1) of the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law exclusively vest appointment, suspension and termination powers in the College’s Governing Council. The 1st Defendant is not granted any authority over employment matters by the statute. Accordingly, the actions taken by the 1st Defendant under Exhibits D and E improperly usurp the Council’s jurisdiction, and any suspension or termination he purported to effect is ultra vires and void.

 

19. To underscore this principle, the Claimants refer to Bob v. The Council, Abia State University Uturu & Anor (2015) LPELR-25611 (CA), Haruna v. Uniagric, Makurdi (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 912) 233 at 275, and Mobile Producing Nigeria Unlimited v. Okon Johnson & Ors. (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) 329 at 359. These authorities establish that where an employment relationship is defined by statute, only the body empowered by that statute may validly discipline or terminate the employee, and any action taken outside that statutory authority is null and void.

 

20. The Claimants argue that their engagement with the 3rd Defendant is governed by statute rather than a simple master–servant contract. Consequently, any dismissal must follow the exact procedures laid down in the enabling law and the College’s Conditions of Service. They maintain that once employment acquires a statutory character, any departure from the prescribed procedure nullifies the termination. Because only the Governing Council has authority to appoint or dismiss staff and the 1st Defendant acted without such power, the Claimants’ employment remains valid and subsisting.

 

21. They refer to OMIDIORA v. FCSC (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1053) p. 17 at 32–33; MOGAJI v. BENUE STATE UNIVERSITY (2022) LPELR-56727 (CA); and UAM & ORS v. ANONGO (2021) LPELR-57912 (CA), contending that where an employment relationship is governed by statute, any wrongful or illegal dismissal automatically gives rise to a court-ordered reinstatement. Finally, learned counsel for the claimants urges this court to grant all of the reliefs they have sought.

 

2nd and 3rd DEFENDANTS’  FACTS:

22. After service of the originating summons and accompanying documents, the 2nd and 3rd defendants filed a five-paragraph counter-affidavit on 23 December 2024. It was sworn by Binjin Yildep, a litigation secretary at the Plateau State Ministry of Justice, with the defendants’ consent. Although this filing was technically out of time, the defect was cured by an application dated 19 December 2024 and filed on 23 December 2024.

 

23. In their counter-affidavit, the 2nd and 3rd defendants stated that they never barred the Claimants—or anyone else—from entering the office, emphasizing that as a public institution it has always remained open.

 

24. They explained that the Claimants’ salaries were halted because their appointments were suspended and placed under review by a committee established by the 1st Defendant. The Defendants contend that this committee found the recruitment process to be flawed and not in compliance with the Constitution’s Federal Character requirement.

 

25. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants further contend that the Claimants were invited and subsequently suspended because their appointments were found irregular—having been made without the required advertisement and proper interviews by the Appointment and Promotion Committee under the law governing the College. They maintain that the Claimants were serving a two-year probationary term rather than holding permanent positions, and that their dismissal was carried out lawfully and in full accordance with the institution’s regulations.

 

26. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants maintain that the Claimants delayed to approach the court precisely because they were aware their appointments were flawed. They stressed that no interviews were ever held, rendering the entire hiring process invalid. They also pointed out that the suspension was formally announced by press release, which constituted sufficient notice to all concerned.

 

27. They further argue that because the Claimants remained on probation, the 3rd Defendant’s Rules of Service did not fully apply to them, and their employment could therefore be terminated at any time without completing the full procedural requirements. They maintain that the dismissals were properly effected and that the College is not understaffed. Even if there were vacancies, any new appointments would be made strictly in accordance with the established procedures.

 

28. The 2nd and 3rd defendants further maintain that the Claimants’ willingness to work does not replace the institution’s formal approval, and that their failure to comply with the College’s employment regulations warranted termination. They further argue that granting the reliefs sought by the Claimants would substantially prejudice them – the defendants.

 

THE 2ND AND 3RD DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL’ S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:

29. Together with their counter-affidavit, the 2nd  and 3rd defendants lodged a written address dated 19 December 2024 (filed on 23 December 2024) by the learned Attorney General of the State, in which they posed three issues for determination:

1.   Given the apparent facts deposed in the Affidavit evidence of the Parties, whether this suit can be properly determined via Originating Summons?

2.   Whether the Claimants have deduced sufficient facts to warrant this Honourable Court grant their claims?

3.   Whether as employers, this Honourable Court can force the Claimants on the Defendants?

 

30. On issue one, the defendants argued that the suit cannot be properly determined by Originating Summons because there are serious disputes of facts in the parties’ affidavits. They relied on the cases of Macfoy v. Chola (2023) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1912) 155, Zakirai v. Muhammad (2017) LPELR-42349(SC), and Famfa Oil Ltd. v. A-G Fed. (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 453, which emphasize that Originating Summons is only suitable for cases involving simple issues of law or interpretation of documents not where there are conflicting facts.

31. They argue that the Claimants insist they were validly employed and wrongfully dismissed, while the Defendants counter that the appointments were irregular and politically motivated. Those opposing assertions give rise to significant factual disputes that cannot be resolved on affidavit evidence alone. Relying on Oguebego v. PDP (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1503) 446 and Ezeigwe v. Nwalulu (2010) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1183) 159, they submitted that the case is not suitable for determination by Originating Summons.

32. Regarding the second issue, the defendants argue that the Claimants had not submitted sufficient documentation to support their case. They maintained that lawful recruitment into the 3rd Defendant’s institution must follow a process of public advertisement, application submission, candidate interviews, and formal approval. The defendants noted that the Claimants produced no proof they were subjected to or successfully completed any of these statutory procedures.

33. Relying on Borishade v. N.B.N. Ltd. (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1015) 217 and Morohunfola v. Kwara State College of Technology (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 506, they emphasized that a claimant in a wrongful termination suit must prove how the employment was made, the terms and conditions, and who has authority to appoint or remove them. The defendants contend that the appointments were made at the tail end of the previous administration without due process, prompting the incumbent Governor to review and nullify irregular employments. Therefore, the Claimants failed to provide sufficient facts for their reliefs to be granted.

34. Regarding the third issue, defence counsel submitted that a court cannot compel an employer to retain unwanted staff. They argued that the Claimants’ appointments were procedurally flawed—having been made without the Governor’s authorisation—and thus void ab initio. In support, they relied on Heritage Bank Ltd v. Bentworth Finance (Nig.) Ltd (2018) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1625) 420, at 434.

35. Counsel contends that an employee serving a three-year probationary term can be lawfully dismissed during that period, which itself may be extended. He relied on Rule 020303 of the Civil Service Rules in support of his argument.

 

36. Counsel also argues that no matter how willing an employee may be, he cannot compel an unwilling employer to retain him, relying on Nwoye v. FAAN (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1665) 193 and Chukwuma v. Shell Petroleum (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512.

37. Relying on Nwosu v. A.P.P. (2020) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1749) 28, they contended that any procedure grounded in illegality is void and unenforceable. Consequently, the Court has no jurisdiction to compel the Defendants to appoint or retain the Claimants, and the suit ought to be dismissed.

 

2nd and 3rd DEFENDANTS PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

38. Although dated 19 December 2024, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ notice of preliminary objection was actually filed on 23 December 2024. It was accompanied by a seven-paragraph affidavit sworn by Binjing M. Yildep, a litigation clerk in the Plateau State Ministry of Justice. That affidavit simply repeats the facts set out in their 23 December 2024 counter-affidavit opposing the originating summons, which in turn duplicates the assertions made in the earlier counter-affidavit.

 

39. Within, they seek the following orders:

i.             An order dismissing this suit for want of requisite jurisdiction.

ii.            That this suit cannot be sustained by the claimants jointly claiming the reliefs against the defendants individually.

iii.          That this suit is contentious and therefore ought to be brought under the normal writ.

iv.          And for further or other orders of this court.

 

40. Alongside their notice of preliminary objection, the 2nd and 3rd defendants submitted a written address in which they framed three issues for determination as follows:

                                         i.    Whether this honourable court can hear this matter in view of the fact that the claimants were employed separately, at different times and for different position?

                                        ii.    Whether this honourable court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear this matter in view of the fact that the employments of the claimants have not been confirmed?

                                      iii.    Whether it will be appropriate for this honourable court to determine this suit under originating summons considering that the facts of the suit are contentious and hostile?

 

41. In addressing the first issue, counsel for the 2nd and 3rd defendants led by P.A. Daffi, the Honorable Attorney General of Plateau State, began by disputing the court’s jurisdiction. He argued that this type of action must be brought by a single party rather than jointly, relying on Ebo-Ade & Ors v. Ojo-Oniro & Ors (2018) LPELR-51498 (CA) at pages 7–10, paragraph A. He added that, because each applicant was engaged under a separate appointment, they should have commenced individual suits, citing Padawa & Ors v. Jatau (2002) LPELR-5380 (CA) at pages 9–11, paragraph D.

 

42. On the second point, counsel argued that an employee serving a three-year probation may be dismissed at any time during that term and that the probationary period itself can be extended. He relied on Rule 020303 of the Civil Service Rules to support this submission.

 

43. Counsel also argues that no matter how eager an employee may be, he cannot compel an employer who does not wish to retain him. He points out that these claimants had served the 3rd defendant for only two years and were still on probation. In support, counsel relied on Ibrahim & Anor v. National Commissioner for Colleges of Education & Anor (2017) LPELR-45497 (CA).

 

44. On his issue 3, learned Counsel submitted that it is not proper for the Claimants to institute this suit through Originating Summons. That the purpose of instituting a suit through originating summons is to resolve issues expeditiously and such issue often bothers on interpretation of law, deed or contract and the issues before the court must be non-contentious. Counsel relied on the case of Jev & Anor V. Iyortyom & Ors (2014) LPELR-23000 (SC), Zakirai V. Muhammad & Ors. (2017) LEPELR – 42349 (SC), Dapianlong & Ors V. Dariye & Anor (2007) LPELR-928 (SC).

 

45. Counsel contended that there are genuine factual disputes before the Honourable Court. A careful review of the affidavits filed by the complainants and by the second and third defendants/objectors, he submitted, demonstrates serious points of contention that can only be resolved by adducing oral evidence. He relied on the decision in Military Administrator, Federal Housing Authority & Anor v. Aro (1991) LPELR-3185 (SC).

 

46. In closing, counsel argued that resolving this dispute necessitates hearing oral evidence from the parties, which can only occur if the action is commenced by writ. Counsel therefore submits that:

a.    The Claimants having been employed individually cannot sustain a joint suit against the defendants:

b.    The Claimants being under a probative period cannot sustain a claim against the defendants.

c.    The suit being contentious and hostile in nature can only be dully adjudicated upon through the writ of summons.

47. Finally, learned counsel respectfully asked this Honourable Court to dismiss the suit in the interests of justice.

1ST DEFENDANT’S FACTS:

48. After receipt of the originating summons and related processes, the 1st defendant, on 5 June 2025, filed a five-paragraph counter-affidavit sworn by Azumi John, a litigation secretary at A.D. Ringsum & Co., counsel for the 1st defendant. Although this affidavit was filed out of time, the defect was cured by an application dated 21 May 2025, which was also filed on 5 June 2025.

 

49. In its counter-affidavit, the 1st defendant avers that the claimants never formally accepted their appointments, failed to complete the required documentation, and did not report for duty with the College. It further alleges that the incoming State leadership uncovered a series of last-minute recruitments across ministries, departments, and agencies that were marred by irregularities. As a result, a Panel of Investigation was established, and the Governor issued a white paper suspending the entire employment process on the grounds of those irregularities.

 

50. The 1st defendant further asserted that, as a public institution, the 3rd defendant never barred the claimants—or anyone else—from entering its premises. In response to the claimants’ demand for salaries, he maintained that they were not entitled to any payment, since they had neither completed the necessary documentation nor resumed their duties. He also explained that the investigating committee saw no need to summon or interview the claimants, as all required data and information had already been supplied by the 3rd defendant.

 

51. The counter-affidavit also pointed out that the publication concerning the Claimants’ employment was based on the White Paper’s findings, which revealed that the appointments exceeded the number approved by the then Governor. The Defendants maintained that the recall of workers through Exhibit E was based on the recommended and approved number for implementation. They also stated that the notice of suspension was properly made public through a broadcast and press release, which served as sufficient notice to the Claimants.

 

52. It was further deposed that the Claimants’ appointments to the third Defendant did not comply with the laws governing its recruitment. When they were suspended, they remained on probation and had not yet fallen fully under the third Defendant’s Scheme of Service. The first Defendant added that their appointments were purely temporary and conditional, and that their willingness to work could not cure the procedural irregularities in their hiring. Thus, non-compliance with the third Defendant’s employment rules justified their termination.

 

53. Lastly, the 1st defendant pointed out that the Claimants have produced no evidence of receiving any salary from the third defendant and argued that granting their requested reliefs would cause the defendants substantial prejudice.

THE 1ST DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL’ S WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:

54. The 1st defendant filed along with their counter-affidavit, a written address dated 15/5/2025 and filed on 5/6/2025 wherein they formulated a sole issue for determination thus – “Whether the Claimants have proved their case and are entitled to the reliefs sought”.

 

55. The 1st defendant argues that the claimants have failed to discharge the burden of proof and therefore are not entitled to any of the reliefs they seek. In a civil action, the burden lies squarely on the claimants to establish their case by credible evidence rather than to depend on any weakness in the defence. Because the claimants have not adduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate their entitlement, the defendant submits that the court should decide against them. The defendant further relies on the decision in Akanmode v. Dino (2009) All FWLR Pt. 471 at 929, 958-959 paras. H–A, which confirms that a defendant need not call any witnesses where the claimant has not made out a prima facie case.

 

56. The 1st defendant further submits that the Claimants did not comply with the laid down procedures for valid employment as provided in the applicable conditions of service. Section iii (i) states as follows: “Every appointment to an established posts shall be conveyed in writing by the Registrar, or by the Officer authorized by him on his behalf shall not be valid until it has been accepted in writing”. The Claimants accordingly failed to produce sufficient materials showing that their employments were properly processed or formally accepted in accordance with the law. On this basis, the 1st Defendant maintains that their appointments were irregular and invalid.

 

57. The 1st defendant contends that the claimants’ appointments were made at the tail end of the previous administration without following the required procedures. He therefore constituted an investigative committee, whose white paper uncovered procedural irregularities and prompted the suspension of the appointment exercise. Relying on settled authorities, the 1st defendant submits that any action taken outside prescribed procedures is irregular and void.

 

58. Moreover, the first defendant notes that the Claimants remained within the two-year probationary period set out in their appointment letters, meaning their posts had not yet been confirmed as substantive. On that basis, he argues the Claimants have failed to establish valid employment or any entitlement to relief and therefore urges the court to dismiss the suit for lack of merit.

COURT’S DECISION:

59. In light of the parties’ submissions, the materials before the court, and the questions framed for determination, this court is of the view that there are two principal issues—each embracing the remaining matters—that must be resolved:

1.                 Does this court have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and determine this case?

2.                 Whether, in view of the facts and evidence presented before this honourable court, the Claimants have successfully established their claims in this suit?

ISSUE 1

60. The first issue relates to jurisdiction and arises from the second and third defendants’ notice of preliminary objection. It is both appropriate and well-settled that this objection be addressed at this stage, since it questions the court’s power to hear and decide the matter.

 

61. Accordingly, issue No. 1 must be taken first since it involves a fundamental question of law—as established in Bronik Motors Ltd & Anor v. Wema Bank Ltd (1983) 1 SCNLR 296 and Okoya v. Santilli (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 131) 172. The defendants have challenged this court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit on the grounds set out in their notice of preliminary objection. Those grounds are:

1.    That the Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to hear this suit, given that the claimants’ employment was still within their probationary period.

Particulars

a.   That the claimants were employed by the 3rd defendant, but their appointment was yet to be confirmed.

 

2.    That this suit cannot be maintained as a joint action by the claimants.

Particulars

a.   That the claimants were employed separately and not jointly.

b.   That the claimants were employed at different times.

c.    That the claimants were employed for different positions.

 

3.    This action is contested and should therefore be commenced by the ordinary writ of summons.

Particulars

a.   That the facts of this suit are in opposite direction in terms of that of the Claimants and the Defendants.

b.   That the procedure in Originating Summons is only applicable in suits that are not contentious and basically bothers on interpretation.

 

63. I carefully reviewed the first ground of the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ preliminary objection. The preliminary objection raised by the defendants, asserting that this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the suit because the claimants' employment were still within their probationary period and their appointment was yet to be confirmed, is misconceived and ought to be dismissed. This court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over labour and employment matters, irrespective of the probationary status of an employee.

 

64. Firstly, it is fundamental to understand the expansive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. By virtue of Section 254C (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the NICN is vested with exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations, and matters arising from the workplace, conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith. This constitutional provision establishes the NICN as the primary forum for resolving all disputes arising from an employment relationship. The mere fact that an employee is on probation does not remove the employment relationship from the ambit of the NICN's jurisdiction.

 

65. Secondly, an employment relationship, whether probationary or confirmed, is still a contractual relationship. Section 81(1) of the Labour Act, Cap L1 LFN 2004, explicitly grants jurisdiction to a court to hear complaints where "any question, difference or dispute arises as to the rights or liabilities of a party to a contract or touching any misconduct, neglect, ill-treatment or injury to the person or property of a party to a contract." This provision clearly indicates that disputes arising from an employment contract, even during a probationary period, are justiciable. The existence of a contract of employment, regardless of its stage (probationary or confirmed), is sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, particularly the NICN, which specializes in such matters.

 

66. Furthermore, the argument that an unconfirmed appointment divests the court of jurisdiction conflates the merits of the case with the court's power to hear it. While the terms of a probationary employment may allow for termination with less formality or notice, as seen in cases like NITEL PLC & ANOR v. AKWA ((2005) LPELR-5971(CA) Pp. 24-26, Paras. B-A), where the Court of Appeal acknowledged an employer's right to terminate during probation, this does not mean the court cannot inquire into whether such termination was done in accordance with the terms of the probation or the law. The court's jurisdiction is to determine whether the rights and obligations under the probationary contract were breached or properly exercised. The question of whether the termination was lawful or wrongful is a matter for the substantive hearing, not a jurisdictional bar.

 

67. In ASCA BITUMEN CO. LTD v. ISAH (2016) LPELR-40778(CA), the Court of Appeal emphasized what a party needs to plead when their cause of action is founded on a contract of employment. This underscores that the existence of a contract, even if probationary, forms the basis of the action, and the court has the jurisdiction to interpret and enforce its terms. The conditions of service, even for probationary employees, constitute the terms of their engagement. The failure to confirm an appointment or the termination during probation are actions taken within the framework of an existing employment contract, which the NICN is empowered to adjudicate.

 

68. Hence, this ground of preliminary objection fails. The court’s jurisdiction depends not on formal confirmation of an appointment but on the presence of an employment relationship and a dispute arising from it. Even as probationary staff, the claimants qualify as employees entitled to invoke the National Industrial Court’s jurisdiction for any alleged breach of their contract or infringement of their labour rights. The court is fully empowered to hear the case and decide whether the third defendant acted consistently with the terms of probationary service and the applicable labour laws.

 

69. On the second ground of the defendants' preliminary objection, it is noteworthy that it is not in dispute that the claimants were offered employment by the 3rd defendant on different dates. The Claimants expressly stated in paragraph 3 of the affidavit supporting the originating summons that, "We were granted employment by the 3rd respondent at various times within the year 2022 via our respective letters of appointments issued to us upon our respective applications….”

 

70. Their letters of employment tendered as (Exhibits A1 and A2) leave no doubt as to the factuality of that position. These documents speak for themselves, as it is well established principle that documentary evidence is the best evidence, for the reason that it speaks for itself - A.G Bendel State v. U.B.A Ltd (1986) 4 NWLR (PART 37) 547; Akinbisade V. The State (2006) 17 NWLR (PART 1007)184 SC.

 

71. The 2nd and 3rd defendants contend that these claimants cannot sue jointly since they were employed separately and not jointly. They also based their argument on the ground that the claimants were employed in different positions in the 3rd defendant institution.

 

72. The sustainability of this ground of objection raised by the 2nd and 3rd defendants, contending that the claimants cannot sue jointly due to separate employment and different positions, hinges on the principles governing joinder of parties in civil litigation. While the defendants' argument highlights individual contractual relationships, the overarching consideration for joinder of plaintiffs is whether their claims arise from the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions, and whether there would be common questions of law or fact if separate actions were brought.

 

73. It should be noted at this point that the stipulations of Order 13 Rule 1 of the court's Rules clearly address the matter of joining parties as claimants/claimants. These Rules state the following: “All persons may be joined in one action as claimants in whom any right to relief is alleged to exist whether jointly or severally and judgment may be given for such claimant(s) as may be found to be entitled to relief and for such relief as the claimant may be entitled to without any amendment.” See also: Ibigbami & Anor V. Military Governor, Ekiti State & Ors. (2003) LPELR- 5619 (CA); Registered Trustee, N.A.C.H.P.N V. M.H.W.U.N (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 412) P.1013. This court, like all courts, is obligated to use its authority to prevent multiple lawsuits by employing the joinder of parties to resolve such issues in a single case. See: Akpamgbo Okadigbo & Ors. V. Chidi & Ors. (2015) LPELR- 24564 (SC).

 

74. The defendants' objection focuses on the individual nature of the employment contracts and the differences in positions. However, this does not automatically preclude joint action. The critical factor is the nexus between the claims. If the claimants' grievances, despite their separate engagements and differing roles, stem from a common policy, a series of related actions by the defendants, or a single event that affected them all in a similar legal manner, then joinder would be permissible. For instance, if all claimants were victims of a mass layoff, a discriminatory policy, or a breach of a general condition of service applicable to a class of employees, their claims, though individually proven, would share common questions of fact and law.

 

75. The Court of Appeal in ENUGUNUM & ORS v. CHEVRON (NIG) LTD ((2014) LPELR-24088(CA) Pp. 23-24, Paras. B-C), addressed the question of whether employees with the same conditions of service have a collective right to sue or to be represented in a suit. While the present query mentions 'different positions', the underlying principle from Enugunum case is that a commonality in the cause of action or the nature of the grievance can justify collective action. If the claimants, despite their different positions, are challenging a common act or omission by the defendants (e.g., a wrongful termination policy, a breach of a general employment agreement, or a failure to pay certain entitlements that apply across various roles), then the objection based solely on separate employment and different positions may not be sustainable. The court will look beyond the superficial differences in employment terms to the substance of the claims.

 

76. Furthermore, the case of UNION BANK v. UGBE & ORS ((2019) LPELR-47893(CA) P. 24, Paras. B-C), highlights that while plaintiffs can join in an action, they cannot set up conflicting claims between themselves. This implies that if the separate employment and different positions lead to claims that are inherently contradictory or mutually exclusive, then the joinder might be problematic. However, if the claims, though distinct in their individual details, are consistent in their overall objective and do not conflict, this case would not support the defendants' objection.

 

77. Therefore, the defendants’ objection is unlikely to succeed if the claimants’ separate disputes, though based on different appointments and positions, actually arise from the same act or series of acts by the defendants and turn on common questions of law or fact. The court will look to the substance of the claims and the efficient administration of justice rather than technical distinctions between individual contracts. If the claimants can show a shared link or nexus in their causes of action, the joinder objection will probably fail. It is for the defendants to prove that trying the claims together would cause embarrassment or delay, or that the claims are so unrelated they cannot be conveniently heard in one proceeding. In the absence of such a showing—and given the court’s preference to avoid multiple suits—the objection is unlikely to stand.

 

78. It should be noted that the 2nd and 3rd defendants both misconstrued and misapplied the ruling in Ebo-Ade & Ors v. Ojo-Oniro & Ors (supra), upon which they heavily relied. In fact, that decision affirms the propriety of joint proceedings, even though its facts differ from those in the present case. The second ground of objection is hereby dismissed. It is indeed ironic that the 2nd and 3rd defendants invoke this objection when they themselves used a single instrument to terminate both claimants, despite each having a separate employment. On that basis alone, upholding their objection would be unjust.

 

79. Regarding the third issue, Counsel to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants argued that the Claimants initiated this case using an originating summons, which they believe is an incorrect procedure. Counsel contends that, given the contentious issues between the parties in this case, a formal writ of complaint should have been used instead.

 

80. Meanwhile, ORDER 3 (1)(b) NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT (CIVIL PROCEDURE) RULES 2017 and specifically, Order 3(3) of the said Rules states and I quote: “Civil proceedings that may be commenced by way of originating summons include matters relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreements or any other instrument relating to employment, labour, industrial relations in respect of which the court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or Law in force in Nigeria.”

 

81. The legal stance outlined in the court's rules has been consistently upheld in various judicial decisions. For instance, in the case of Pam & Anor V. Nasiru Mohammed & Anor (2008) 16 NWLR (PART 1112)1, Justice Oguntade articulated the following: “It is trite therefore that originating summons is the appropriate procedure where what is in dispute is the simple construction or interpretation of document in respect of which pleadings are unnecessary”.

 

82. Even if the defendants contend there are factual disputes, the real issue is legal: who is empowered to appoint or remove staff at the third defendant institution. The claimants rely on uncontested documents—their letters of appointment, the Conditions of Service, and the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003—and the sole question is how those instruments should be interpreted in light of the first defendant’s statutory powers.

 

83. I therefore conclude that this matter is predominantly a legal question rather than a factual one and was correctly initiated by Originating Summons since it seeks to interpret the statutory and administrative powers of the 1st Defendant rather than resolve conflicting facts. Accordingly, the Claimants’ use of Originating Summons is appropriate, and the jurisdictional objections raised by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are dismissed.

 

ISSSUE TWO:

84. On this point, the court must determine whether the claimants have established their case and are entitled to the remedies they request. In examining this second issue, the court will focus on the specific questions the claimants have raised and address each in turn. The three questions set out in the originating summons are:

1.    Whether the 1st Defendant is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the Claimants through Exhibits D and E, the Claimants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd Defendant. 

2.    By virtue of the letters of appointment issued to the Claimants attached as Exhibits A1 – A2, whether the Claimants are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd Defendant in line with the extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd Defendant.

3.    Whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd Defendant to pay the Claimants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd Defendant’s duties and obligations.

 

85. Because questions 1 and 2 are interrelated, the court will consider them together. At bottom, the issue is whether the 1st defendant had authority to terminate the claimants’ employment. If he did not, the court must then determine whether the claimants have the right to remain in their positions at the third defendant’s institution and to recover their unpaid salaries – if any.

 

86. It is a well-settled rule that in civil proceedings the claimant carries the burden of proof; until that burden is discharged, the defendant need not call any evidence. A party asserting infringement of rights or seeking a remedy must succeed on the strength of its own case, proving facts on a balance of probabilities as prescribed by sections 131 and 135 of the Evidence Act 2011. In wrongful-dismissal suits specifically, the claimant must first establish the contractual terms and conditions governing the employment relationship and then show how the employer breached them – refer to Katto v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390–394.

 

87. The claimants based their case on the affidavit filed in support of the originating summons and on their counsel’s submissions. In paragraph 6 of that affidavit, they averred that they duly discharged their duties under the third defendant in line with their respective letters of appointment, the third defendant’s Conditions of Service for Staff, and the Plateau State College of Health Technology Law, 2003, all of which were annexed as Exhibits B and C.

 

88. By contrast, the defendants maintained that the claimants’ appointments were vitiated by procedural irregularities and thus never validly constituted. They further asserted that the Governor lawfully terminated the claimants’ employment after following the proper process, which included establishing a preliminary committee both before and after their suspension and dismissal.

 

89. It is important to highlight that there are three categories of employments relationships;

1.   a simple master-servant relationship governed by common law;

2.   employment in which the office is held at the pleasure of the employer

3.   employment protected by statute.

See: Iderima v. R.S.C.S.C. (2005) 7 SC (PART 111) 135; Olaniyan v. UNILAG (1985) 2 NWLR (PART 9) 599.

 

90. Where an employment is held at the pleasure of the employer, it is regarded as one at will. In such a case, the employer retains the discretion to terminate the employment at any time, irrespective of the of the tenure stated in the contract. This principle was clearly restated in the case of Olaniyan & Ors V. University of Lagos (Supra) at 599/612.

 

91. On the other hand, it is settled law that where an employment enjoys statutory flavor, the relationship between the employer and employee relationship is regulated by the provisions of a statute or regulation derived from a statute. The Supreme court elaborated on this principle in the case of Imoloame V. West African Examinations Council (1999) 9 NWLR (265) 303 stated as follows:

“there is an employment with statutory flavor when the appointment and termination is governed by statutory provision. It is accepted that where the contract of service is governed by provision of statute or where the conditions of service are contained in regulation derived statutory provisions, they invest the employee with a legal status higher than the ordinary one of master and servant. They accordingly enjoy statutory flavour.”

 

92. It suffices to ask at this juncture the following questions:

(a). Is the 3rd defendant a body created by statute?

(b). Does the enabling statute or a regulation derived from it make express provisions regulating the employment of the category of these claimants in question?

93. There is no gainsaying that the 3rd defendant institution, the claimants’ employer, is a creation of statute. The claimants aver that their employments are subject to the 3rd Defendant’s Condition of Service for Staff and the Plateau State Health Technology Law, 2003. [See – Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit in Support of the Originating Summons]. This fact is unchallenged. The said averment is in consonance with paragraph 7 of the letters of offer of employment of the claimants (Exhibits A1 – A2), which state clearly as follows:

“That you will be subject, in all respects, to all conditions of service stipulated in the scheme of service and other College Regulations and Instructions, as may be reviewed by the Council from time to time.”

 

94. Regarding the claimants’ positions at the 3rd defendant’s institution, I am satisfied that their appointments are statutorily protected. That protection is not undermined by the defendants’ assertion that the claimants were still on probation when they were purportedly terminated. The appellate court’s decision in Babatunde v. Governing Council, Federal Polytechnic, Ede & Anor is directly on point, and I will set out the relevant passage from that judgment below:

 

“the question that determines whether an employment has statutory flavour is not whether the status of the employee is on the higher echelon or low ladder of the service. It is also not determined by whether an employee is on probation or a permanent or a confirmed employee. It is rather whether the terms of engagement are controlled and determined by statute as relating to engagement and termination.”

 

95. Having determined that the claimants are statutory employees of the 3rd defendant whose employment can only be terminated in accordance with its enabling statute or any regulations or subsidiary instruments, it is therefore necessary to examine how the defendants actually brought their employment to an end.

 

96. The affidavit evidence shows that the 1st defendant allegedly suspended the claimants and, by means of published notices, purported to terminate their employment. That suspension lies at the heart of this dispute and raises the question whether the 1st defendant was entitled, both lawfully and properly, to bring the claimants’ service to an end.

 

97. Accordingly, the claimants firmly reject the first defendant’s claimed power to bring their employment to an end. It is a well-settled principle—reflected in section 11 of the Interpretation Act (Cap.192, 1990)—that the authority to appoint carries with it the authority to dismiss. Yet this Court has already found that the College (the third defendant) is, and always has been, the claimants’ only employer. The defendants, by contrast, contend that the Governor, as Visitor of the College, validly exercised his visitorial prerogative to terminate their appointments.

 

98. Having considered the claimants’ evidence, the burden of proof has plainly shifted to the defendants. They must now demonstrate that the 1st defendant validly exercised the authority under which the claimants’ employments were terminated.

 

99. In explaining a litigant’s duty to establish his case, the Court of Appeal in Aliyu & Ors v. Yola & Ors (2022) LCN/16188 (CA) stated, inter alia, as follows:

“the burden is on the plaintiff to establish his claim. This is the evidential burden of proof. It is only after the plaintiff has adduced sufficient credible evidence that the burden of proof would shift to the defendant. The shifting burden of proof is enacted in Section 136 of the Evidence Act 2011, and it provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. But the burden may in the course of a case be shifted from one side to the other. As explained in ADIGHIJE v. NWAOGU (2010) 12 NWLR (PT.1209) 419 @ 463: “Section 137 of the Evidence Act, 2004 (now Section 133 (1) Evidence Act, 2011)”.

100. I have reviewed the entire record to identify any authority showing that the 1st defendant lawfully possessed power to suspend and terminate the claimants—who were employees of the 3rd defendant—but I find no provision in the statute establishing the College that vests such authority in the Governor.

 

101. In response to the defendants’ contention that the claimants remained on probation with the 3rd defendant at the time their employments were terminated, Exhibits A1 and A2 shed light on probationary terms and related provisions. Paragraph 3 of each letter of appointment reads in material part:
“That you serve on probation for two years or for such longer period as may be deemed available.”

 

102. The claimants did not specify the precise dates of their suspension or dismissal. However, their appointment letters (Exhibits A1–A2) are dated 2022, and this suit was filed on September 30, 2024—approximately one year and ten months later, i.e. under two years. It follows that their employment was terminated during their probationary period.

103. It is important to state that the fact that the claimants were still on probation does not negate the statutory nature of their employments. Their employments can only be determined in accordance with the statutes and relevant instruments of the 3rd defendant institution. See Babatunde V. The Governing Council Federal Polytechnic, Ede & Anor (supra).

104. For the avoidance of any doubts, the contents of exhibits A1 – A2 are clear on issues of discipline or termination during probationary periods. The excerpt below from exhibits A1 – A2 is relevant to resolving the issue at hand:

(iv). That within your probationary period, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Governing Council/College Management that you are not qualified for efficient service, your appointment may be terminated at any time without compensation.

(v) That while you remain on probation, unless you are summarily dismissed, your engagement may any time be terminated by you or by the College subject to one Calendar Months’ Notice or, with the consent of the College, by the payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice.

105. The wording of those instruments is plain and unambiguous. They clearly allow for termination without compensation during the probationary period, but only if the Governing Council/College Management—whose duty it is to determine an employee’s unfitness for efficient service—so directs. There is no evidence before this court that the College’s Governing Council or Management participated in the claimants’ suspensions or dismissals without notice or pay. It therefore rings hollow for the defendants to insist that, because the claimants held different positions, each must bring a separate action.

106. I find, without hesitation, that the defendants have failed to establish that the first defendant retains any residual authority to suspend or terminate the claimants’ employment when, under their terms and conditions of employment, that power lies exclusively with the Governing Council/College Management.

107. The defendants maintain that a committee was set up both before and after the claimants’ suspensions. According to the 2nd and 3rd defendants, the claimants were asked to appear before that committee but did not do so. The 1st defendant, however, insists no invitation or interview was necessary since all pertinent information had already been supplied by the 3rd defendant. The claimants strongly deny these assertions. Notably, there is no evidence before this court that the claimants—or anyone acting on their behalf—were ever summoned to such a committee, nor is there any record of the committee’s resolutions. Accordingly, the court is not satisfied that any invitation to appear was issued to the claimants either before or after their alleged terminations.

108. I am also aware that the defendants stated further in their defence that the claimants’ employments were not advertised and that the employments were marred by irregularities. In my mind, what the defendants failed to prove is the fact that the purported failure (if any), to adhere to the employment procedures or guidelines, is the claimants doing and not the defendants’.

109. In Nigerian labour law, the general principle is that 'he who asserts must prove.' This principle is fundamental to the adversarial system and is enshrined in the Evidence Act. So, when a claimant asserts wrongful termination of employment, the initial burden lies on the claimant to prove the existence of the contract of employment, the terms and conditions of that contract, and that the defendant is their employer. This position was affirmed in cases such as AJI v. CHAD BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANOR (2015) LPELR-24562(SC) and INEC v. OMOTOSHO & ORS (2021) LPELR-56626(CA). Once the employee establishes these foundational facts, the burden then shifts to the employer to justify the termination or to prove any alleged breach of the contract by the employee, or, as in this scenario, to prove the alleged irregularities in the employment process.

110. In the scenario presented, the defendants are alleging that the claimants' employments were not advertised and were 'marred by irregularities.' For these allegations to hold any legal weight, the burden of proving these irregularities rests squarely on the defendants. It is not enough for the defendants to merely state these facts in their defence; they must adduce credible, cogent, and admissible evidence to substantiate their claims. This includes providing evidence that the employment procedures or guidelines existed, that they were breached, and crucially, the nature and extent of these irregularities. The Court of Appeal in MAINSTREET BANK REGISTRARS LTD v. AHAIWE ((2019) LPELR-47057(CA) emphasized the effect of failure to prove conditions of service in a claim for its breach, which by analogy, extends to proving the conditions or procedures that were allegedly breached during employment.

111. Furthermore, even if the defendants succeed in proving that there were procedural irregularities, they must go a step further. They need to demonstrate that these purported failures to adhere to employment procedures or guidelines are attributable to the claimants, or that these irregularities fundamentally vitiate the employment contract itself. If the irregularities were a result of the defendants' own internal administrative failings, or a breach of their own internal rules, it would be difficult for them to use such failings as a defence against the claimants, especially if the claimants were not complicit in or aware of these irregularities. An employer cannot typically benefit from its own wrong or negligence in following due process.

112. It must be stated unequivocally that the reasons for terminating the claimants—or, put differently, the justification for their suspension and termination—are irrelevant to this suit. The real issue is whether the proper procedure was followed and whether the authority to suspend or terminate their employment properly lies with the 1st defendant, the State Governor and Visitor of the 3rd defendant.

113. After reviewing all the evidence, this Court finds that the defendants did not observe the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements when purporting to suspend and terminate the claimants’ employment. Those suspensions and terminations are therefore unlawful, illegal, null and void. The 1st defendant, as Governor or Visitor of Plateau State College of Health Technology, had no power to suspend or terminate the claimants’ appointments in that manner. I so hold, and answer question one in the claimants’ favor.

114. Respecting the claimants’ claim for unpaid salaries, they assert that before the announcement of their suspension, the 3rd defendant had paid their respective salaries all through to the month leading to January 2023 and ceased to pay their salaries from January 2023 till the date of filing this suit. It is important to note that the 1st defendant deny this assertion made and stated that there is no proof that the claimants received any salary from the 3rd defendant based on the claimants assertion.

115. Apart from the claimants’ averments in their affidavit, which the defendants denied in their counter affidavit, there is no other evidence whether in the form of an account statement or salary/payment slip to establish the claim that the claimants were not paid their salaries or to show the last month when the claimants received their salaries. It is trite that evidence is the medium of proof, and proof is the essence of evidence - Anekwe V. State (2014) ALL FWLR (PART 744) 92 AT 109 (SC). The dearth of evidence to support the claims of salary arrears by the claimants is fatal to them. Consequently, this court is not convinced that the claimants have provided satisfactory evidence of arrears of owed salaries from January 2023 – to date. I so hold.

116. Essentially, question three for determination is resolved partly in favour of the claimants.

117. Consequently, question 1 of the originating summons which is “whether the 1st respondent is possessed of or clothed with the powers or authority to unilaterally suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments and appointments of the claimants through Exhibits D and E, the claimants having been in the service and employment of the 3rd defendant”, is answered in the negative.

118. Question 2 of the originating summons which is, “by virtue of the various letters of appointment issued to the claimants attached as Exhibits A1 – A2, whether the claimants are not entitled to maintain and retain their employment with the 3rd defendant in line with extant laws regulating their employment with the 3rd defendant”, is answered in the affirmative.

119. Question 3 of the originating summons which is “whether the failure and refusal of the 3rd defendant to pay the claimants their salaries and allowances thereby retaining same from the month of January 2023 till date or any period of time at all is not unlawful, unjust, illegal and a violation of the 3rd defendant’s duties and obligations,” is resolved in the negative in the absence of specific prove.

120. Therefore, for the sake of clarity and the avoidance of any doubt whatsoever, this court hereby grants only the following reliefs sought:

a.            A declaration that the 1st defendant has no power or authority to suspend, terminate, nullify or in any way interfere with the employments/appointments of the claimants duly engaged in the services and employment of the 3rd defendant.

 

b.            A declaration that the purported termination, nullification and cancellation of the employments and appointments of the claimants by the 1st defendant  through exhibits D and E, is unlawful, illegal, null and void with no legal effect whatsoever.

 

c.            A declaration that the claimants are entitled to maintain and retain their respective employments with the 3rd defendant in line with the extant laws regulating their employments.

 

d.            An order setting aside the purported suspensions and subsequent terminations, nullifications and cancellations of the claimants’ appointments and employments made by the 1st defendant through the publications made at his instance attached as exhibits D and E, same having been done ultra vires and therefore unlawful, null and void.

 

e.            An order reinstating the claimants back to their respective positions as staff and employees of the 3rd defendant in line with their respective letters of appointments attached as exhibits A1 – A2) respectively.

 

f.             N2,000,000.00 (Two Million Naira) general damages against the defendants jointly and severally for the collective pain and suffering imposed on the claimants by the defendants. The judgment, including the monetary awards, must be satisfied within 30 days of this decision. Should the defendants fail to comply, interest will accrue on the unpaid money at 5% per month until full payment is made.

 

121. In view of the findings and decisions of this court as reflected above, reliefs numbers 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the originating summons are granted, while reliefs 4, 7, 8 and 9 are hereby denied. Cost of this suit is awarded in favour of the claimants in the sum of N250,000.00 only.

 

122. Based therefore on the above findings, this court is satisfied that the claimants’ case succeeds in part. I hereby enter judgment for the claimants as stated hereinbefore.

 

 

Delivered in Jos this 10th December  2025.

 

 

Hon Justice Ibrahim Suleiman Galadima

Judge.

 

Public access to NICN decisions:

Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://nicnadr.gov.ng. NICN decisions are available to the general public shortly after a copy each has been sent to the applicant(s) and respondent(s) in a case.