IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT JOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE I.S GALADIMA

 

DATE: 10^TH DECEMBER 2025                    SUIT NO: NICN/JOS/9/2022

BETWEEN:

JAMES D. DALAHAM                                                              CLAIMANT

 

AND

1.   THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF PLATEAU STATE

2.   THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF PLATEAU STATE          DEFENDANTS

 

 

REPRESENTATION:

·                     M.J. PAM FOR THE CLAIMANT

·                     P.A. DAFFI (HAG); SABO LONGJI; N.J. MINER; T.P. CHIGERO; K.D. WUYEP FOR THE DEFENDANTS.

 

JUDGMENT:

1.           The claimant is a retired staff member of the Plateau State Radio Television Corporation, having served from 1988 until his retirement in 2017. After securing clearance from the Plateau State Pension Board, he applied for his pension and gratuity but was stalled when the Auditor-General (the 1^st defendant) refused to finalize his entitlements. The Auditor-General insisted that he produce a professional qualification higher than his Higher National Diploma before his benefits could be calculated on the basis of Grade Level 16. This demand was justified by reference to the extant 2000 Scheme of Service, which provides that employees who are engineers may not advance beyond Grade Level 14 without certification from the Council for the Regulation of Engineering in Nigeria (COREN). Unable to supply such certification, the claimant’s pension and gratuity were instead computed at Grade Level 14. Feeling short-changed and alleging discriminatory treatment, he has brought this action for redress. The defendants, in turn, have filed a counterclaim seeking repayment of the sums the claimant received at Grade Levels 15 and 16, on the ground that those promotions were irregular under the Scheme of Service.

 

CLAIMANTS’ RELIEFS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT:

2.           The claimants’ complaint and accompanying processes were filed on 25/2/2022. Within, he seeks the following reliefs:

1.   An ORDER DECLARING the actions of the defendants as discriminatory.  

2.   AN ORDER COMPELLING the defendants to compute the claimant’s benefit, gratuity and pension on salary Grade level 16.  

3.   N10,000,000.00 General Damages

4.   The cost action.

3.           On July 18, 2024, the claimant opened his case by adopting his earlier depositions of February 25 and May 19, 2022. He gave evidence in person as Witness C.W.1, tendered 13 documents (admitted as Exhibits C1–C13), and was cross-examined by the defendants. He then closed his case later that same day.

 

4.           The defendants’ joint Statement of Defence and counterclaim, dated April 14, 2022, was ultimately filed on April 26, 2022. Although lodged out of time, it was duly regularized by the application for an extension of time—also dated and filed April 26, 2022.

 

5.           The claimant then filed a reply and defence to the 2^nd defendants’ counterclaim dated May 19, 2022.

 

6.           The defendants/counterclaimants seek the following reliefs:

1.   A DECLARATION that the claimant was wrongfully promoted to Grade level 15 step 9 in the year 2014 and Grade level 16 step 9 in the year 2017 without the requisite qualification and application for conversion to the Officer Cadre.

2.   A DECLARATION that the reversal of the promotion of the claimant to salary Grade Level 14 step 11 was done in accordance with the scheme of service 2000 and guidelines for appointment, promotion and discipline of the civil service.

3.   AN ORDER DIRCTING that the claimant should refund the sum of Nine Million, Three Hundred Twenty- Nine Thousand, Three Hundred Nine-Eight Naira and Forty-Four Kobo (N9,329,398.44K) being the unmerited and accrued monies/salaries paid to him from January, 2013 to March, 2017 as a result of the wrongful promotion to Grade level 15 step 9 in the year 2014 and Grade level 16 step in the year 2017 without having/attaining the requisite qualification.

4.   The sum of Ten Million Naira (N10,000,000.00) being general damages for various torts committed by the claimant against the counter claimants.

5.   The sum of Two Million Naira (N2,000,000.00) being exemplary damages.

6.   Cost of this action

 

7.           On 7 April 2025 the defendants opened their case by calling Simi D. Chollom, who adopted her deposition of that same date and testified as DW1. She was cross-examined by the claimant’s counsel on 7 April 2025. The defendants then called Godit T. Samuel Tamba on 18 June 2025; he adopted his deposition dated 17 June 2025 and testified as DW2. DW2 tendered 22 exhibits (marked D1–D22) and was also cross-examined on 18 June 2025, after which the defendants closed their case.

 

8.           After the close of the trial, the defendants’ counsel lodged his final written submissions and arguments on 14 August 2025. The claimant’s counsel followed with his own final submissions on 15 September 2025, and the defendants’ counsel filed a Reply on Points of Law on 10 October 2025. On 13 October 2025, counsel for both parties formally adopted their respective arguments and submissions, and the Court thereupon reserved judgment for delivery today.

CLAIMANTS’ FACTS:

9.           The claimant’s Statement of Facts indicates that he was employed by the Plateau State Government as a civil servant with the Plateau State Radio Television Corporation.

 

10.        Before retiring in 2017, the claimant had advanced to salary grade level 16. After leaving service, he applied for his pension and gratuity and received clearance from every office except that of the first defendant. When he asked why the first defendant would not clear him, he was told he did not qualify for grade level 16.

 

11.        The claimant originally joined Plateau Radio Television Corporation on a temporary basis at grade level 06/1 on November 1, 1988; that appointment was converted to a permanent, pensionable role on September 13, 2012. He maintains that neither the first nor the second defendant employed him or had any hand in his promotions.

 

12.        The claimant asserts that the first defendant proceeded to finalize and calculate the benefits of other retirees—including James J. Jang, John Didwak, Henry Lasing, Sunday Gonyok, Davou Bitrus, Kenneth Yazom and Ishaju Bedmoul—at salary grade levels 15 and 16, respectively, all of whom retired between 2014 and 2016.

 

13.        Despite repeated efforts by the claimant to have the defendants clear him and pay his benefits, he was unsuccessful. He then instructed his solicitors, N.I. Darong, Esq., who, by letter dated 14 January 2022 (served that same day), formally demanded that his entitlements be calculated at Grade Level 16.

 

14.        The claimant’s letter to the defendants went unanswered, and he maintains that their actions have inflicted him with severe hardship.

 

15.        As noted above, the claimant submitted the following 13 documentary exhibits in this proceeding:

1.   Offer of Temporary Appointment dated 1/11/1988 (Exhibit C1).

2.   Offer of Permanent/Pensionable Appointment 13/9/12 (Exhibit C2).

3.   Proper Grading dated 5/1/1990 (Exhibit C3).

4.   Promotion Letter dated 15/1/1992 (Exhibit C4).

5.   Letter of Promotion dated 11/5/96 (Exhibit C5).

6.   Promotion letter dated 18/11/05 (Exhibit C6).

7.   3 Letters of Promotions dated 8/9/09, 17/12/14, 19/1/17 (Exhibit C7 (1-3 series).

8.   Confirmation Letter dated 8/7/1991 (Exhibit C8).

9.   Reply letter dated 19/5/22, circular dated 28/3/18, and Payment Spread sheet (Exhibit C9).

10.              CTC of Record of Proceedings (Exhibit C10).

11.              Placement FORM FOR Monthly Pension (Exhibit C11).

12.              Claimant’s Retirement Letter dated 27/9/2016 (Exhibit C12).

13.              Demand Letter dated 14/1/2022 (Exhibit C13)

 

DEFENDANT’S FACTS:

16.        In their Joint Statement of Defence dated 14 April 2022 (filed 26 April 2022), the defendants acknowledge that the claimant was employed by the Plateau State Government and served at the Plateau Radio Television Corporation.

 

17.        The defendants rejected the claimant’s assertion that he had advanced to Grade Level 16 before retiring in 2017. They contend that, under the 2000 Scheme of Service, no civil servant— including one whose highest qualification is an HND— may be promoted above Grade Level 14.

 

18.        According to the defendants, an HND?holder in the civil service may only be promoted beyond grade level 14 under the Scheme of Service if they obtain further qualifications from a professional body that the National Council on Establishment has approved and included in the scheme.

 

19.        The defendants also maintained that HND holders must obtain additional professional certification to qualify for promotion and cadre conversion, and that for the claimant this certification must come from the Council for the Regulation of Engineers in Nigeria (COREN).

 

20.        The defendants contend that, apart from the HND he earned from Federal Polytechnic Bauchi in 2013, the claimant holds no further qualification and therefore did not meet the criteria for conversion from the executive cadre to the officer cadre. They ground their case on the Federal Civil Service Commission’s Guidelines for Appointment, Promotion and Discipline, as adopted into Plateau State law.

 

21.        The defendants also maintained that the Scheme of Service had been updated and was already in effect before the claimant earned his HND in 2013, thereby obliging him to comply with the 2000 Scheme of Service.

 

22.        In response to the claimant’s assertion that he had been cleared, the defendants maintained that no clearance was ever granted. They explained that the Auditor-General of Plateau State instructed the Plateau State Pension Board to obtain the claimant’s COREN certificate before calculating his pension and gratuity at Grade Level 16, given his allegedly erroneous promotion to that grade.

 

23.        The defendants explained that the Auditor-General identified an irregularity in the claimant’s promotion to Grade Level 16 and, as a result, calculated his entitlements at Grade Level 14—the terminal grade under the 2000 Scheme of Service.

 

24.        The defendants maintain that the State Audit Department is responsible for overseeing all computations performed by the Pension Board and other ministries, departments and agencies, verifying pension payrolls, and reporting any irregularities or errors in the Pension Board’s submissions, among other duties. They further assert that the Pension Board prepares the pension, gratuity and benefit calculations for civil servants and then forwards them to the Audit Department.

 

25.        The defendants further contend that the claimant’s promotions from Grade Level 14 to Grades 15 and 16 were made in error, since he possessed only an HND and a certificate from the National Association of Technical Engineers (N.A.T.E), an organization neither approved by the National Council on Establishment nor recognized under the applicable Scheme of Service.

 

26.        The defendants contend that the Auditor-General’s periodic report to the Plateau State House of Assembly flagged the claimant’s improper promotion from Grade 14 to Grade 16.

 

27.        The defendants contend that, while employed, the claimant obtained his HND in Electrical Engineering (Electric Telecommunication) in 1993, at which time the 1984 Scheme of Service was in force. Under that Scheme, HND holders could advance as far as Grade Level 16 in the State Civil Service.

 

28.        The defendants pointed to other employees who, like the claimant, had been wrongly promoted. One example is Mr. James J. Jang, who was appointed as an Assistant Technical Officer (Grade 06) and obtained his HND in 1993, at a time when the 1984 Scheme of Service in force allowed HND holders to advance up to Grade 16 in the State Civil Service.

 

The defendants also referred to Mr. John Dickwak, a Technical Officer, who earned his HND in 1999 under the 1984 Scheme of Service—then permitting HND holders to advance to Grade 16. He was mistakenly promoted to Grade 16/9, and by letter dated 16 March 2018 the Plateau State Pension Board was asked to require him to produce either a Postgraduate Diploma (PGD) or a COREN certificate. Failure to do so would result in his reversion to Grade 14/11, since his elevation to Grade 16 was not supported by the 2000 Scheme of Service.

 

29.        The defendants further pointed to comparable promotion errors in the cases of Henry Lasing, Ishaku B. Dexter, and Bitrus G. Davou. As for Sunday Gonyok, they explained that although he was hired in 1982 on the strength of an OND he earned in 1976, he later completed a Postgraduate Diploma in 2007 and an MBA in 2011. Following these qualifications, he was moved from the Executive Cadre into the Officer Cadre, which allowed him to advance through the ranks up to Grade Level 16.

 

30.        The defendants further explain that no discrimination occurred. By letter dated May 17, 2017, the Plateau State Pension Board informed the claimant of his situation and requested that he submit the required professional qualification (i.e., COREN), which he was unable to provide.

 

31.        The defendants contend that, in his application to the Plateau State Pension Board for a monthly pension, the claimant expressly acknowledged retiring at Grade Level 14, Step 11. They therefore maintain that he is not entitled to the reliefs he seeks in this suit.

 

In their counterclaim, the defendants contend that the claimant was elevated to Grade Level 15, Step 9 effective 1 October 2014, despite holding an HND dated 25 April 2002 and a NATE certificate dated 19 October 2013. They further assert that the financial benefits of that promotion likewise took effect on 1 October 2014.

 

32.        The defendants/counterclaimants further submitted that the claimant’s advancement to Grade Level 15, Step 9 directly contravenes the entry and progression rules set out in the 2000 Scheme of Service (Revised Edition), at page 402, section 3, subsection 3.1.1, as well as Circular No. (51) 100/S6/Vol.II/105, HCS/5/OFF/61/Vol.XII/16 issued by the Head of the Civil Service, and any other relevant directives.

 

33.        The defendants/counterclaimants contend that the claimant’s elevations to Grade Level 15, Step 9, and Grade Level 16, Step 9 (the latter effective 1 January 2017) were granted in error. In line with the applicable Scheme of Service, they therefore reverted him to Grade Level 14.

 

34.        The defendants/counterclaimants allege that the claimant, without justification, received benefits due to Grade Level 15 Step 9 and Grade Level 16 Step 9 from 1 January 2013 to March 2017, totaling N7,264,123.26 (Seven Million, Two Hundred and Sixty-Four Thousand, One Hundred and Twenty-Three Naira, Twenty-Six Kobo).

 

35.        The defendants/counterclaimants provided a detailed breakdown of the total sum wrongfully credited to the claimant’s current account at Keystone Bank, which the claimant is to remit to the Plateau State Government as follows:

 

a.   2013 – N178,822.00K by 12 months = N2,145,864.00K

b.   2014- N178,822.00K by 12 months = N2,145,864.00K

c.    2015- N178,822.00K by 12 months = N2,145,864.00K

d.   2016- N178,822.00K by 12 months = N2,145,864.00K

e.   2017- N248,647.48K by 3 months = N745,942.44K

Total= N9,329,398.44k

 

36.        Accordingly, the defendants/counterclaimants request the remedies that were set out earlier in this judgment.

 

37.        As noted above, the defendants/counterclaimants have admitted twenty-two documents into evidence in this action. These are:

 

1.     Letter by the Plateau State Auditor General dated 16/3/2018 (Exhibit D1).

2.     Second Letter of 25/8/2014 (Exhibit D2).

3.     Diploma Certificate in favour of John Dikwak Rimgpang (Exhibit D3).

4.     University of Jos Certificate in favour of John Dikwak Rimgpang (Exhibit D4).

5.     Certificate for Lasing Henry Nanyakfrom PLAPOLY (Exhibit D5).

6.     Certificate from Federal Polytechnic Bauchi to Bedmoul Ishyaku Dexter (Exhibit D6).

7.     Certificate from Plateau State Polytechnic to Bedmoul Ishyaku Dexter (Exhibit D7).

8.     Certificate from Kaduna Polytechnic to Joseph Jang James (exhibit D8).

9.     Another Certificate from Kaduna Polytechnic to Joseph Jang James (exhibit D9).

10.Certificate from ATBU to Gonyok Sunday Maikarfi (exhibit D10).

11.Another Certificate from ATBU to Gonyok Sunday Maikarfi (exhibit D11).

12.Another Certificate from   to Gonyok Sunday Maikarfi for Masters in Business Administration (exhibit D12).

13.Approval for appointment as director issued to Gonyok Sunday Maikarfi dated 17/9/2013 (exhibit D13).

14.Scheme of service published by the H.O.S of the Federation printed by the Federal Government Press C.T.C (Exhibit D14).

15.Recognition of certificate and Diploma from professional bodies in the scheme of service dated 21/4/2008 (exhibit D15).

16.Correspondent to the Auditor General (Internal document) from Plateau State Pension Board. Dated 17/5/2018.(exhibit D16).

17.Letter dated 1986 addressed to all government boards and parastatals (exhibit D17).

18.Guideline For Appointment Promotions etc issued by federal C.S.C dated August 2004 (exhibit D18).

19.Another document titled computation of retirement benefit for the claimant certified 19/5/20 (exhibit D19).

20.Plateau State Pension Board Placement form for monthly pension issued to the claimant C.T.C 19/5/20 (Exhibit D20).

21.Computation of retirement benefit for the claimant dated 8/11/2017 (exhibit D21).

22.Adherence To The Scheme Of Service Revised 2000/23 from Plateau State Civil Service C.T.C (exhibit D22).

 

38.        In all, the defendants urge this court to dismiss the claimants’ suit and grant their counter claims.

 

CLAIMANT’S REPLY AND DEFENCE:

39.        On 19 May 2022, the Claimant filed his Reply and Defence to the Defendants’ Counterclaim. In that Reply, he maintains that by submitting his Higher National Diploma he qualified for promotion to the apex grade. He relies on two circulars issued by the Head of the Federal Civil Service—Circular No. HCSF/EPO/EIR/CND/100/S.T/98 dated 8 September 2016 and Circular No. HCSF/SPSO/ODD/NCE.100/S.8/T dated 28 March 2018—which declare HNDs and university degrees to be equivalent.

 

40.        The claimant asserts that every officer hired before him with the same qualification has received promotions, and that those still in service continue to advance. He cites Philip Maigida as an example, noting that Maigida—allegedly possessing identical credentials—has already reached Grade Level 15.

 

41.        The claimant maintains that, having been validly promoted, the 1st defendant has no authority to demote him. He further contends that he is under no obligation to submit any additional certificates beyond those he has already provided in order to reach Grade Level 16.

 

42.        The claimant argues that auditing state ministries and departments do not have the power to extend, alter, or undermine valid promotions that have already been granted.

 

43.        The claimant maintains that John Dikwak, Ishaku B., and Sunday Gonyok held no additional qualifications yet receive their gratuity and pension at grade level 16. Likewise, Henry Lasing never produced a COREN certificate but also retired on salary grade level 16.

 

44.        According to the claimant, the Plateau State Pension Board had already approved his benefits, but the 1st defendant then persuaded the board to recalculate his entitlement on salary grade level 14.

 

45.        Ultimately, the claimant asks this court to dismiss the counterclaim brought by the defendants, who also stand as counterclaimants.

 

 

 

DEFENDANTS’ COUNSEL’S SUBMISSIONS AND ARGUMENTS:

46.        As previously noted, counsel for the defendants filed his final written submissions on 14 August 2025, in which he identified three issues for this Court’s consideration and determination. They are:

                                  i.      Whether this Suit is not caught up by the provisions of the Public Officers Law CAP III, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 and section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, LFN 2004 and Plateau State of Nigeria, Limitation Edict No.16 of 1988?

                               ii.       Whether in the light of Exhibits D1 to D18 there exist any discrimination by the Defendants against the Claimant?

                             iii.      Whether from the totality of the evidence led by the Claimant before this Honourable Court, the balance of probability tilts in favour of the Claimant so as to entitle the Claimant to Judgment in his favour ?

 

47.         Regarding the first issue, the learned Attorney-General of Plateau State, acting as lead counsel for the defendants, argues that jurisdiction is a fundamental matter that may be raised at any stage of the proceedings—even for the first time before the Supreme Court. He relies on the decision in GEORGE v. FRN (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1208) 248–249.

 

48.        Counsel submits that Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap. III, Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963—which applies in Plateau State—is analogous to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004, which provides as follows:

“where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person, for any person, for any law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any such law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect:

(a)         The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance or damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof.

 

49.                According to learned counsel, if the claimant’s action is statute barred, it affects the legal competence or jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. He relies on the authorities of EGBE V ADEFARASIN (1987) NWLR PT 47 PQI, OBIEFINA V. OKOYE (1964) ALL NLR, PG 357, ADEOGUN V JIBESIN (200I) NWLR 724 PG 290, JULIUS BERGER (NIG) PLC V OMOGU (2001) 15 NWLR PI 736 PG 401.

 

50.        The defendants’ counsel submits that the claimant himself stated—in his pleadings, sworn testimony, and the exhibits—that the alleged wrongful discrimination and demotion occurred in 2017, yet no court action was taken until 25 February 2022. That delay exceeds both the three-year limitation and the three-month notice period mandated by section 2(a) of the Plateau State Public Officers Protection Law (2004). In support, counsel relied on Corporal Effiom Bassey v. Minister of Defence & 2 Ors (2006) ALL FWLR Pt. 343 1806, paras. A and H–B.

 

51.        Counsel contends that although this suit was filed in 2022, the claimant’s pleadings, sworn witness statement, and exhibits establish that the cause of action arose in 2017, when the defendants allegedly committed the wrongful demotion and discriminatory act.

 

52.        Regarding when the limitation period starts to run, learned counsel relies on Bank of the North v. Alhaji Haruna Garba Gana (2006) All FWLR Pt. 296, 878–887, where the Court held, among other things, that one determines the limitation period by identifying the date on the writ of summons and in the statement of claim specifying when the wrongful act occurred, and then comparing that date to the date on which the writ was filed.

 

53.        Counsel for the defendants contend that because the claimant commenced this action more than three months after the alleged wrongful act—in breach of the statutory limitation for suits against public officers—the claim is statute-barred and should not be heard. They rely in support on Nigeria Ports Authority Plc v. Lotus Plastics Ltd & Ors (2006) All FWLR Pt. 297 at 1039, paras. B–C, and Obiefuna v. Okoye (1961) 1 All NLR 357.

 

54.        The defendants’ counsel argues that the defendants qualify as public officers under the law. The term “public officer” is defined both in the Constitution and in the Interpretation Act, and Part I of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution states that a public officer is any person holding an office listed in Part II of that Schedule.

 

55.        Counsel also notes that Part II of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution classifies as public officers the Attorneys-General of the Federation and of the States, State Commissioners, and the first defendant in this case. He further relies on section 18 of the Interpretation Act for the statutory definition of “public officer.”

 

56.        Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dr. Moses U. Anolam v. The Federal University of Technology, Owerri & Ors (2025) LPELR-80027(SC), learned defence counsel contend that the Public Officers’ Protection Act governs employment relationships of a statutory character, including the claimant’s engagement in this case.

 

57.        Learned counsel argues that the cause of action is time-barred by Limitation Edict No. 16 of 1988 and relies on Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 at 69, paragraphs A–D.

 

58.        Counsel for the defendants argues that the pleadings, oral testimony and documentary exhibits already before the court demonstrate that the Claimant and the Defendants have been engaged in ongoing negotiations, communications and related actions—and that such negotiations do not suspend the running of the limitation period. He relies on the decision in L.G.S.C., Ekiti State v. Bamisaye (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1514) 375–376.

 

59.        On the second issue, counsel for the defendants argues that the Claimant’s allegation of discrimination is unsupported. He points out that the Claimant relies on the 1st Defendant’s clearance and calculation of benefits, gratuity and pension for James J. Jang, John Didwak, Henry Lasing, Sunday Gonyok, Davou Bitrus, Kenneth Yazom and Ishaju Bedmoul—each of whom retired at Levels 15 and 16 between 2014 and 2016—and refers to paragraph 12 of the Claimant’s affidavit sworn on 25 February 2022 and paragraphs 10 and 11 of his affidavit sworn on 19 May 2022.

 

60.        Learned counsel submits that the sworn testimonies of DW1 and DW2, together with Exhibits D1–D18, conclusively demonstrate that the Claimant’s allegation of discrimination by the First Defendant in calculating his gratuity and pension is without merit. The Claimant has adduced no evidence meeting the legal test for discrimination. Counsel relies on the authority of CIL RIS & Asset Mgt. Ltd v. Ekiti State Govt. (2020) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1738) 203.

 

61.        Defendants’ counsel, invoking Article 1(1) of ILO Convention No. 111 (Employment and Occupation, 1958), submits that the claimant has failed to establish any discriminatory treatment by the defendants. He further argues that, for the defendants’ actions to negate or impair the claimant’s equality of opportunity or treatment, those actions must involve comparable characteristics or circumstances—something the claimant has not shown.

 

62.        Moreover, the Claimant’s evidence to support his allegation of discrimination—namely that the benefits, gratuities and pensions of James J. Jang, John Didwak, Henry Lasing, Sunday Gonyok, Davou Bitrus, Kenneth Yazom and Ishaju Bedmoul were calculated at Grade Levels 15 and 16—is insufficient to substantiate that claim. Counsel further submitted that Exhibit D1, issued by the 1st Defendant on 16 March 2018, shows the 1st Defendant acted in accordance with the law establishing her office.

 

63.        Finally, on the second issue, counsel for the defendants argues that the applicable legal framework and the Auditor-General’s exercise of his powers in calculating the benefits, gratuities, and pensions of James J. Jang, John Didwak, Henry Lasing, Sunday Gonyok, Davou Bitrus, Kenneth Yazom, and Ishaju Bedmoul at Grade Levels 15 and 16 are highly relevant to determining whether the defendants’ actions were discriminatory.

 

64.        Regarding issue three, learned defence counsel contends that it is a long-standing and settled principle of law that, in civil proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the party who makes the assertion, relying on sections 131 to 134 of the Evidence Act.

 

65.        Regarding the claimant’s obligation to establish his case on its own merits—and not merely by exposing weaknesses in the defendants’ case—learned counsel relies on AKANIWON v. NSIRIM (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 520) 225, at 226, and ISHOLA v. AJIBOYE (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt. 512) 71.

 

66.        Learned counsel further submits that the claimant must address the following critical questions:

1.   Assuming he is indeed an employee of the Plateau State Government (Plateau Radio Television Corporation), was his appointment governed by the Public Service Rules, the applicable Scheme of Service, the Guidelines for Appointments, Promotions and Discipline, and the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law 1985—thereby authorizing the Defendants to exercise their regulatory powers? (See Exhibits C1, C2, D2, D14, D15, D17, D18 & D22.)

2.   Does the Claimant’s engagement with the Plateau State Government bear a statutory character?

3.   In light of Exhibits D1, D14, D15, D16, D17 & D21 and the statutory powers, duties and functions of the 1st Defendant, is the Auditor-General empowered to calculate the Claimant’s benefits, gratuity and pension at Grade Level 16?

67.        Defendants’ counsel argues that employment contracts fall into three types: (1) the classic master-and-servant model; (2) positions held at the employer’s pleasure; and (3) contracts imbued with a statutory element. He explains that, under a pure master-and-servant arrangement, the employer may terminate the relationship at will, so long as he observes any procedural requirements set out in the contract.

 

68.        Counsel submits that when an employment contract carries a statutory character, as in this case, the position is governed and protected by the statute that created it. Accordingly, any appointment or promotion under such a contract must strictly conform to the enabling legislation. In support of this proposition, counsel relied on OVIVIE v. DELTA STEEL CO. LTD. (2023) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1904) 203; LONGE v. F.B.N. PLC (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1187) 1; MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG.) UNLIMITED v. JOHNSON (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) 379; and OFORISHE v. NIGERIAN GAS CO. LTD. (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 35.

 

69.        Counsel relies on paragraphs 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of the Claimant’s witness statement sworn on 25 February 2022, and paragraph 18 of his witness statement sworn on 19 May 2022 (adopted on 18 July 2024). From these passages, he submits, it is clear that the Claimant’s employment with the Plateau State Government is statutory in nature and, as a public servant, his terms of service and promotions fall solely under the Plateau Radio Television Corporation’s Conditions of Service, to be applied in strict accordance with the governing law.

 

70.        Counsel argues that determining whether the Claimant’s service with the Plateau State Government (through the Plateau Radio Television Corporation) carries a statutory character requires a comprehensive examination of the employer’s establishment, the terms and conditions of employment, and the applicable disciplinary framework.

 

71.        Counsel argues that Section 3 of the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law, 1985 creates the Plateau Radio Television Corporation as a statutory body. He further submits that simply being formed by statute does not, by itself, give every employment agreement entered into by that body a statutory character. In his view, an employment contract only takes on a statutory complexion if the founding statute expressly prescribes how appointments and terminations are to be carried out. He relies on the cases N.I.I.A. v. Ayanfalu (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1018) 246, Fakuade v. O.A.U.T.H. (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 291) 47, and Imoloame v. WAEC (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 303.

 

72.        Learned counsel for the defendants further submits that, to his knowledge, the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law, 1985 contains no specific provisions governing appointments or promotions of its employees, except for Section 35. That section provides:
“The Corporation may, with the approval of the Military Governor and subject to the provisions of this Edict, make regulations with respect to the appointment, promotion, transfer, attachment, dismissal and disciplinary control of its employees, and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, may make regulations on any of the following matters…

a.           The qualification to be required for any appointment;

b.           The method of appointment (including probation and confirmation)

c.            The form of any agreement to be entered into between the  Corporation and its employees;

d.           The terms and conditions of service (including dismissal and termination of appointments) of its employees ;

e.           The procedure and requirement for promotion;

f.            The maintenance of discipline (including dismissal and the termination of appointment);

g.           The transfer of employees between the corporation and the Government the Government of any other state; local government or the federal government of Nigerian or any other statutory corporation.

h.           Such matters relating to departmental procedure and duties and responsibilities of employees as the Corporation considers can be best provided for by regulations .”

 

73.        Counsel for the defendants submits that Section 35 of the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law 1985 empowers the Corporation, with the Plateau State Government’s approval, to prescribe regulations governing the conditions of service for its employees, including the claimant. He further notes that the claimant’s pleadings fail to identify any specific conditions of service under which he was employed by either the Corporation or the Plateau State Government.

 

74.        Defendants’ counsel contend that the claimant placed undue reliance on his 2 November 1998 appointment under the 1984 Scheme of Service to argue that the 2000 Scheme should not govern his employment and that he owed no obligation to obtain additional qualifications for promotion to Grade Level 16—overlooking the fact that Staff Regulations and Public Service Rules are subject to periodic amendment.

 

75.        Counsel further argues that Exhibit C2 makes it clear the Claimant was on notice that the Public Service Rules and related regulations governing his employment could be amended periodically, and he cannot plead ignorance of that fact. Moreover, it was the adoption of the 2000 Scheme of Service that introduced the requirement for additional qualifications for those appointed at the Assistant Technical Officer (ATC) GL.06/1 entry point, and the Claimant is not exempt from its provisions.

 

76.        Learned counsel for the defendants notes that, in paragraph 8 of his Statement of Facts, paragraph 7 of his Witness Statement on Oath, and Exhibit C1, the claimant asserts that he was offered a temporary appointment with the Plateau Radio Television Corporation on 1 November 1988 and relies on that appointment letter. Yet in paragraph 2(e) of his Reply to the Defendants’ Joint Statement of Defence and Defence to Counter-Claim, he pleads that he has been employed since 2 November 1998 under the 1984 Scheme of Service.

 

77.        Counsel argued that the law condemns any party—whether a natural person or a corporate entity—that shifts its position unpredictably, like changing shadows or a weathervane. He relied on the decision in FOLKSYNTHESIS LTD. v. GAPUMA (UK) Ltd (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1566) 150 to support this point. He described the claimant’s inconsistencies as irreconcilable on those points and as manifestly unreliable.

 

78.        Counsel for the defendants argues that the 1^st Defendant alone has the authority and responsibility to calculate benefits, gratuity and pension of the claimant at Grade Level 14. In support of this position, he relies on section 125(4) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).

 

79.        Counsel also relies on section 125(4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) together with sections 22(1)(b), (d), (e), (6) and (12)(a) of the Plateau State Audit Law 2021. He submits that those provisions vest the 1st Defendant with broad authority to audit public accounts and, upon discovering any irregularity in the expenditure of public funds, to report the matter to the Governor or the Accounting Officer of the Plateau Pension Board—as was done in this case concerning the Claimant.

80.        Defendants’ counsel argues that the Claimant’s demands for pension, gratuity and other post-retirement benefits all fall within the category of special damages. He points out that special damages must be expressly pleaded and particularized so the defendant knows exactly what is being claimed. In 7UP Bottling Company Plc v. Augustus [2012] LPELR-20873(CA), it was held that benefits, gratuities and pensions are special damages that must be strictly proven, and any failure to meet that standard leads to the claim’s dismissal. Counsel also relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd [2011] LPELR-2022(SC).

 

 

81.        Counsel argues that the Claimant has failed to strictly and specifically prove his case. Learned counsel submits that the first Defendant’s refusal to calculate the Claimant’s pension, gratuity and other benefits at Grade Level 16—and the decision to assess his post-service entitlements at Grade Level 14—was made jointly by both Defendants, and that the Claimant did not challenge that determination.

 

82.        Counsel argues that the law is settled: if the Originating Process does not specifically seek to challenge the 1st Defendant’s refusal to calculate the Claimant’s benefits, gratuity and pension at Grade Level 16, that decision remains valid, subsisting and binding on all parties. He further submits that one cannot read into the Claimant’s request for a declaration an implied demand that the Defendants must compute those benefits at GL 16. In support, learned counsel relies on F.J.S.C. v. Thomas (2013) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1384) 503 at 545, paras. F–H.

 

83.        Learned counsel further contends that a court is bound to grant only those remedies that have been specifically pleaded in clear and unambiguous terms. To do otherwise, counsel argues, would be to convert the court into a charitable body, which it is not. He relies on the decisions in Uwagbin v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 91 at 114C; 118C and Abenga v. Benue Judicial Service Commission & Anor (2015) 56 NLLR (Pt. 192) 342 (C.A.).

 

84.        In conclusion, counsel for the defendants submits that the Court should decide all three issues in the defendants’ favor.

 

CLAIMANT’S COUNSEL’S SUBMISSIONS AND ARGUMENTS:

85.        The Claimant’s counsel distilled the matter into a single question for the Court: given the constitutional guarantee that his pension and gratuity not be diminished, did the Defendants—who neither employed nor promoted him—act unconstitutionally when they refused to calculate his benefits based on his last promotion?

 

86.        Addressing the sole issue, the Claimant’s counsel argues that his employment contract is statutory in nature and accordingly can only be governed by the enabling legislation. He relies on the decision in Mustapha & Ors. v. NITDA (2021) LPELR-55505(CA) at pages 19–21, paragraphs B–F.

 

87.        The claimant’s counsel argues that the governing statute is the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law, 1985, which expressly defines the terms and nature of the Claimant’s employment.

 

88.        Counsel submitted that the Plateau Radio Television Corporation, acting under the authority conferred by the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law 1985, validly promoted the Claimant on several occasions, including to Salary Grade Level 16 on January 19, 2017 (see Exhibit 7(c)). At no time did the Corporation rely on any law or scheme of service not authorized by the 1985 Law. Learned counsel further pointed out that the Claimant’s engagement was pursuant to section 33 of that Law, as evidenced by the letter of temporary appointment (Exhibit 1). That letter contains no provision barring the Claimant from eventual elevation to Director, nor does it incorporate the Plateau State Civil Service Rules as governing his service. Counsel relied on the principle that terms not expressly included are excluded (Amaka v. A.G. Ondo State & Ors. (2012) LPELR-8478 (CA) pp. 23–24, paras. G–B).

 

89.        Counsel for the claimant argues that because the letter of employment and the offer of a permanent, pensionable appointment make no reference to civil service rules, those rules cannot govern the claimant’s service. He further submits that the 1st Defendant has no authority to import civil service regulations into the contractual relationship between the claimant and his employer. Counsel points to Exhibits C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C7(a–c) and C8, contending that only these documents are relevant to determining the nature of that relationship. He relies on the decision in ADEKUNLE v. UBA PLC (2016) LPELR-41124 (CA) at pages 19–20, paragraphs C–A.

 

90.        Learned counsel for the Claimant submits that Section 33 of the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law, 1985 plainly vests the Plateau Radio Television Corporation—being the Claimant’s employer—with exclusive authority over his recruitment and discipline and alone empowers it to determine his terms and conditions of service.

91.        Counsel for the claimant argues that the Claimant was never employed by the Plateau State Civil Service Commission, so the Civil Service Rules do not apply to him during his tenure with PRTVC, from which he retired as Director of Engineering. Having accepted and benefited from his role, PRTVC cannot now demote him after retirement. It is settled law that a party who has enjoyed the benefits of an agreement cannot later challenge its validity, and counsel relies on Anyanwu v. Emmanuel (2025) 14 NWLR (Pt. 2006) 531.

 

92.        Counsel for the claimant points out that, in paragraph 10 of his sworn statement, the claimant expressly stated that the 1st Defendant never employed him and had no part in his promotions. He further submitted that the 1st Defendant lacks any authority to downgrade a person’s grade when computing benefits based on their most recent promotion.

 

93.        Regarding the first defendant’s demotion of the claimant, learned counsel points out that the claimant testified none of his predecessors had been demoted by the first defendant, yet the defendants quickly cited Mr. John Dikwak and Mr. Henry Lasing as examples of such demotions.

 

94.        Learned counsel argues that the Defendants’ sudden decision to demote long?retired directors is both insensitive and inhumane. He further submits that any measures taken or documents created solely because this suit was pending are inadmissible. In support, he relies on Bukola v. Oshundahunsi & Ors (2012) LPELR-8546 (CA) at pages 61–64, paras. d–b.

 

95.        He also contends that there is no evidence showing Mr. John Didwak or Mr. Henry Lasing were ever asked to submit additional qualifications. Counsel further alleges that the Defendants fabricated and back-dated those documents solely for use in this case.

 

96.        Counsel for the claimant points out that on 7 April 2025, under cross-examination, DW1 admitted she was unfamiliar with the claimant’s terms and conditions of service. In her evidence-in-chief she had identified herself as the Acting Director of Administration at the Plateau State Civil Service Commission, but she went on to concede that, having never worked for the Plateau Radio Television Corporation, she did not know the claimant’s service terms.

 

97.        Counsel noted that DW1 admitted she has never read the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law, 1985. Her evidence confirms that the Claimant is not an employee of the Plateau State Civil Service Commission. It would therefore be manifestly unfair and unjust to subject him both to the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law, 1985 and to the Civil Service Rules.

 

98.        Counsel argues that the Claimant cannot be regarded as a civil servant governed by the Civil Service Rules. His engagement was under the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law, 1985 and the terms of his appointment letter, not the Civil Service Rules that apply to statutory civil servants.

 

99.        Counsel for the claimant argues that the defendants have missed the point by treating him as a civil servant. In reality, his complaint is that the statute governing his employment does not subject him to the Federal Civil Service Rules or Schemes of Service.

 

100.    Counsel further argues that the 1^st Defendant, not being the Claimant’s employer and lacking knowledge of his employment terms and conditions, has no authority to challenge or declare the Claimant’s promotion invalid.

 

101.    Counsel for the claimant also argues that his final promotion was to salary grade level 16, and the defendants are legally obliged to calculate his pension and gratuity on that basis.

 

102.    Counsel pointed out that although the Defendants lodged a counterclaim, they produced no evidence in its support. He noted that none of the counterclaim pleadings were incorporated into the sworn statements of the two Defendant witnesses. In his submission, a counterclaim lacking any evidential foundation must be deemed abandoned. He relied on the decision in HELP (Nig.) Ltd v Silver Anchor (Nig.) Ltd (2006) LPELR-1361 (SC) at p.12, paras. D–F.

 

103.    In response to the Defendants’ first issue, the Claimant’s counsel argues that the Defendants never pleaded limitation of action in either their statement of defence or their counterclaim and cannot introduce that defence for the first time in their written address.

 

104.    Counsel argues that the limitation law cannot trump section 210(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which guarantees that the Claimant’s statutory benefits may not be withheld or reduced to his detriment, except where the Code of Conduct authorizes such action following a conviction.

 

105.    Counsel for the claimant argues that a plea of limitation is, by its very nature, a defense that renders an action unmaintainable. He points out that under this Court’s rules—specifically Order 30, Rule 8(1)—the defendants are required to plead limitation of action expressly. In support, he relies on the decision in Adeosun v. Governor of Ekiti State & Ors (2012) LPELR-7843 (SC) at page 23, paragraphs F–G.

 

106.    Learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Defendants’ case is wholly defective, as they have neither filed proper pleadings nor adduced any evidence in support. He further argued that, even if any pleadings existed, they must be regarded as abandoned for want of evidence. In support of this contention, counsel relied on Order 30, Rule 8(1) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017.

 

107.    Learned counsel for the claimant submits that the defendants’ statement of defence contained no preliminary objection; accordingly, the issue raised later in the defendants’ counsel’s submissions amounts to an afterthought. Counsel relied on the authority of First Nation Airways (SS) Ltd. & Anor. v. Polaris Bank Ltd. (2022) LPELR-58728 (CA) at 54 paras. C–E.

 

108.    Counsel for the claimant further argues that the Public Officers Protection Law of Northern Nigeria, or the Public Officers Protection Act, exists to shield public officers who act in good faith and cannot be invoked to cover abuses of office. He cites Sule & Ors. v. Orisajimi (2019) LPELR-47039 (SC) at p. 9, paras. A–E, in support of this submission.

 

109.    Counsel for the Claimant argues that the Defendants acted in bad faith and committed a clear abuse of office, one for which there is no legal justification. The 1st Defendant calculated the pension and gratuity of the Claimant’s predecessors at Grade Level 16 without enforcing any civil service rule or demanding a COREN certificate. Yet, in the Claimant’s case, they insisted on production of a Council for the Regulation of Engineering in Nigeria (COREN) certificate. This inconsistent requirement amounts to an impermissible abuse of office.

 

110.    Counsel for the claimant argues that the harm alleged is continuous and that a new cause of action arises each time the defendants infringe the claimant’s rights, relying on ADEJUMO v. OLAWAIYE (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 425) 436 at 445.

 

111.    Learned counsel for the claimant argues that the defendants are mistaken in asserting the cause of action began only in 2017. He submits that the defendants’ conduct—especially that of the first defendant—amounts to a continuing breach of his rights, and therefore a fresh cause of action arises each day their unlawful behavior persists.

 

112.    Learned counsel further argues that the Claimant’s case raises pure constitutional issues under the 1999 Constitution, which are not subject to any limitation period. In his submission, nowhere does the Constitution prescribe a three-month time limit for claims of discrimination under section 42 or for claims to pension and gratuity under section 210(2) of the 1999 Constitution.

 

113.    Counsel for the claimant argues that any document suggesting a demotion of—or imposing extra qualification requirements on—John Didwak, Ishaku B. Dexter, Sunday Gonyok, Henry Lasing, or anyone else is purely an afterthought. None of those individuals has been demoted, nor do they hold a Council for the Regulation of Engineering in Nigeria (COREN) certificate. It is discriminatory to single out the claimant alone for a COREN certificate in order to calculate his pension, gratuity, and other benefits correctly.

 

114.    Learned counsel for the Claimant argues that the Plateau Radio Television Corporation has never applied civil service rules or schemes of service in promoting its staff. Therefore, only the Corporation—the body that conferred the promotion—can challenge it. If the Defendants believe the Claimant’s promotion was improper, they cannot question the Corporation’s internal promotion practices; their proper remedy would be to amend the statute establishing the Corporation so it falls under the Civil Service Commission, and its rules would then govern the Claimant.

 

115.    The claimant’s counsel submits that the defendants have effectively abandoned their counterclaim and asks the court to dismiss it, and, since the claimant has proved his case on the balance of probabilities, to grant all of his claimed reliefs.

 

REPLY TO CLAIMANTS’ COUNSEL’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

116.    Defendants’ counsel filed a reply to the claimant’s final address, dated 7 October 2025 and lodged on 10 October 2025. In reply to paragraph 4.2 of that address, counsel points out that the claimant asserted his employer relied on its powers under the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law 1985 to promote him to Grade Level 16 on 19 January 2017 (see Exhibit 7(c)), and that no law or scheme of service outside the scope of the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law was ever applied.

 

117.    Counsel for the defendants submits that the combined effect of section 125(4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), together with sections 22(1)(a), (b), (d) & (e)(6)(12) and 23(1) & (2) of the relevant statutes, vests in the first defendant both the duty and the power to verify and maintain the accuracy and integrity of the financial records and reports of the Plateau Radio Television Corporation (and, by extension, any ministry, department or agency of the Plateau State Government) and to correct any errors as soon as they are discovered.

 

118.    Learned counsel for the defendants further submits that, in this case, Plateau Radio Television Corporation failed to comply with its own Conditions of Service—including staff regulations, public service rules, circulars and the Scheme of Service. As a result of this administrative irregularity, the Corporation neglected to follow section 35 of the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law 1985, which prescribes the procedure and requirements for promotion. Exhibits C1, C2, D14, D15, D17 and D18 are mandatory instruments governing the claimant’s employment, yet the 1st Defendant acted in a manner prejudicial to the claimant by ignoring them. Counsel also observes that, despite the claimant’s submissions, no exhibit 7(c) appears on the court record.

 

119.    The defendants’ counsel argues that the issue of Mr. Chollom Dung Zi was already raised in NICN/Jos/19/2021 and that each case rests on its own distinct facts and must be decided solely on its individual merits.

 

120.    Counsel for the claimant contends that the claimant’s appointment at the Plateau Radio Television Corporation arose under section 33 of the Plateau Radio Television Corporation Law, 1985, and that his terms of service are governed exclusively by the offer of Permanent and Pensionable Appointment, as evidenced by Exhibits C1–C8. Counsel for the defendants, however, submits that, under section 35 of the same Law, the Governor validly approved and issued Exhibit D17 to the claimant’s employer, and that Exhibit D17 duly alters the claimant’s conditions of service.

 

121.    Learned counsel further submits that exhibit D17 underscores the need to align the service conditions of parastatals and other scheduled bodies with those applicable in the public service.

 

122.    Counsel further contends that the Claimant’s employment is indisputably governed by the Scheme of Service, the 14 June 2018 circular, and the Guidelines for Appointment, Promotion and Discipline (exhibits D14, D15 and D18). These instruments are mandatory components of his conditions of service, as incorporated in exhibit C2, and must be read together. Reliance is placed on OKOIT v. FEDPOLY BAUCHI (2024) 15 NWLR Pt.1961 293 at 293 C–E, which holds that where several documents regulate one transaction, they must be construed as a whole, not in isolation.

 

123.    In the unreported suit No. NICN/JOS/09/2024—WULKWAP HOOMEN DANJUMA & 181 ORS v. THE GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE & 2 ORS—relied on by learned counsel for the claimant, learned counsel for the defendants contends that the decision is readily distinguishable from the present case. He points out that Wulkwap arose from the Governor’s termination of the claimants, and the court held that the Governor’s actions were improper. By contrast, this case turns on the first Defendant’s statutory authority to review pension computations made by the Plateau State Pension Board under section 125(4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and sections 22(1), (6) and (12) of the Plateau State Audit Law, 2021.

 

124.    In sum, learned counsel for the defendants urges this Court to allow the defendants’ counterclaims and dismiss the claimant’s suit.

 

COURT’S DECISION

125.    I have reviewed the filed processes, evaluated the evidence, considered the witness testimony, and carefully read the written submissions of learned counsel in relation to the matters they have raised for determination. I am satisfied that the four issues identified are appropriate to resolve the subsidiary questions framed by counsel. Accordingly, I adopt those issues, reformulated as follows:

                      i.    Whether this suit is barred by the limitation provisions of the Public Officers’ Protection Law (Cap. III, Law of Northern Nigeria 1963), section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (LFN 2004), and Plateau State Limitation Edict No. 16 of 1988?

 

                     ii.     Whether, in light of the evidence before this Court, the Defendants discriminated against the Claimant.

 

                   iii.     Whether, when the entirety of the Claimant’s evidence is considered, the balance of probabilities lies in his favour, thereby entitling him to judgment?

 

                   iv.     Have the defendants proven their counterclaim and thereby established their right to the reliefs they seek from this Court?

 

ISSUE ONE:

126.    The first issue concerns a jurisdictional challenge raised by counsel for the defendants in his final address. He argues that this court lacks jurisdiction because the claimant’s cause of action arose in 2017, yet the suit was not filed until 2022—well beyond the three-month limitation period prescribed by section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law, Cap III, Laws of Northern Nigeria 1963 (which parallels section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, LFN 2004) and similar Plateau State statutes.

127.    The relevant provisions of the statute under consideration (i.e. Public Officers Protection Act) is contained in section 2(a) and I deem it imperative to reproduce same seriatim as follows:

where any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any law or of any public duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect-

 

(a) The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury, within three months next after the ceasing thereof…”

 

128.    With respect to the nature and application of the statute of limitations, I find it appropriate to quote the learned Justice Oputa JSC (of blessed memory) in Egbe v. Adefarasin (1987) LPELR-1032 (SC); (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1, where he observed:

“A cause of action is said to be statute-barred if in respect of it the proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the limitation law or Act had elapsed. How does one determine the period of limitation. The answer is simply by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the plaintiff a cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses. If the time on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law then the action is statute barred.”

See also: Shell Petroleum Development Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Abel Isaiah and Ors (2001) 7 SCM 143, (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt.723) 168, and Peenok Investments Ltd v. Motel Presidential Ltd. 1983 4 NLLR page 1.

 

129.    It is now firmly established that section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act applies equally to natural persons and to legal entities (see IBRAHIM v. Judicial Service Commission of Kaduna State (1998) LPELR-1408 (SC)). The only areas exempted from that Act’s protection are disputes over land, actions for breach of contract, and claims for work or labour done (see Soule v. L.E.D.B. (1965) LIR 118; FGN v. Zebra Energy Ltd. (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 162 at 196).

 

130.    The claimant’s counsel insisted that the defendants were barred from raising this point for the first time in their address, since it resembles a defence that ought to have been pleaded earlier. However, that is not the law. Whether a suit is time-barred by the Public Officers’ Protection Act is a question of jurisdiction and court competency and so may be taken up by the defence at any stage of the proceedings—although, as a practical matter, it is ordinarily and most effectively raised as early as possible.

 

131.    A defendant may invoke the Public Officers’ Protection Act as a preliminary objection—commonly by way of a motion on notice—either before filing a Statement of Defence or upon close of pleadings but prior to trial. A preliminary objection targets the suit’s competence or the court’s jurisdiction, relying solely on legal points evident from the originating documents or undisputed facts. Under Section 2 of the Act, any lawsuit against a public officer for acts done in execution of statutory duties must be initiated within three months of the act’s occurrence. Commencement beyond this statutory window divests the court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.

 

132.    When such an objection is raised, the court has a duty to determine its applicability. As held in MOHAMMED v. FCDA & ORS ((2022) LPELR-57594(CA), the court must consider whether the defendant is a public officer, whether the act complained of was done in the execution of public duty, and whether the action was instituted within the prescribed three-month period. If these conditions are met, the court must uphold the objection and strike out or dismiss the suit.

 

133.    A defendant may invoke the Public Officers’ Protection Act by specifically pleading it in the Statement of Defence when key facts—such as the defendant’s status as a public officer or whether the act occurred in the course of official duty—are unclear or contested in the claimant’s originating documents. By doing so, the defendant formally notifies the claimant and preserves the right to present evidence at trial to establish the Act’s applicability. The court then resolves the issue as a question of law either at the end of the trial or sooner if the material facts become undisputed through admissions or other procedural steps.

 

134.    A defendant may, even if the Public Officers’ Protection Act was not raised as a preliminary objection or specifically pleaded in the Statement of Defence, still invoke it as a point of law during trial once the evidence makes its applicability clear. However, raising the Act’s protection late is suboptimal, as it can lead to unnecessary expenditure of time and resources on proceedings that are fundamentally incompetent. Early invocation—ideally before or in the pleadings—promotes procedural efficiency and avoids the needless progression of a suit that should properly have been dismissed at an earlier stage.

 

135.    Since the Public Officers' Protection Act raises a jurisdictional issue, it can, in exceptional circumstances, be raised for the first time on appeal, even if not raised in the trial court. This is because a defect in jurisdiction renders the entire proceedings a nullity, and a court can always raise the issue of its own jurisdiction suo motu. However, raising it for the first time on appeal usually requires leave of the appellate court, especially if it involves fresh evidence. The Court of Appeal in NIGERIAN ARMY v. ABAYOMI (2019) LPELR-47084(CA) emphasized the effect of a statute of limitation, stating that it extinguishes the right of action, not merely the remedy, and thus affects the court's jurisdiction.

 

136.    It is crucial to note that the protection offered by the POPA is not absolute. As highlighted in OJEDIRAN v. THE GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE & ANOR (2013) LPELR-21116(CA), the court must ask specific questions to determine its applicability. The Act does not apply in cases of continuing injury or damage, actions based on contract, or where the public officer acts outside the scope of their statutory or official duty, or where the act is done maliciously or in bad faith. TAJUDEEN v. FIRS ((2018) LPELR-43856(CA) discusses circumstances under which a public officer can be sued outside the statutory time limit, such as in cases of continuing cause of action.

 

137.    Therefore, while the defence of the Public Officers' Protection Act can technically be raised at various stages, the most effective and procedurally sound approach is to raise it as a preliminary objection at the earliest opportunity. This allows for a swift determination of the court's jurisdiction, potentially saving time and resources for all parties involved.

 

138.    Fundamentally, the statute of limitations prevents a claimant from bringing a suit once the time frame prescribed by law for that kind of action has passed. In OKO v. Attorney General of Ebonyi State (2021) LPELR-54988(SC), the Supreme Court clarified the scope of this doctrine and identified its potential exceptions in the following terms:

 

“…the exception duly applies where the public officer concerned fails to act in good faith or acts in abuse of office or maliciously. Or with no semblance of legal justification as decided in the cases of Laos City Council Vs. Ogunbiyi (1969) All NLR 297 at 299; CBN VS. OKOJIE (2004) 10 NWLR (PT 882) 448 AT 52; NWANKWO VS ADEWUNMI (1966) ALL NLR 119 AT 192; AFFOBECHE VS. OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2001) 16 NWLR (PART 739) 458. Per Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was). Most instructively, as aptly postulated above, the effect of limitation on the action is that it takes away the plaintiff’s right to institute the action but leaving him with his cause of action intact albeit devoid of the right to some judicial relief. ”

 

139.    On the question as to whether a suit is statute barred (i.e. caught by the statute of limitation) the learned counsel for the defendants rightly relied on the authority of BANK OF THE NORTH V. ALHAJI HARUNA GANA (2006) ALL FWLR PT. 296 wherein it is pronounced that the period of limitation is determined by considering the originating summons and determining when the wrong alleged by the applicant was committed and comparing same with the time or date of filing of the suit.

 

140.    It is important to emphasize that for the purposes of determining whether a suit is statute barred, the task of determining the cause of action and when it actually arose must be discharged. The cause of action is the factual occurrence which the applicant alleges as giving rise to his entitlement to a remedy- OKO V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF EBONYI STATE (supra). In the simple terms, cause of action is said to arise once there is a person to sue and a wrong to address.

 

141.    The claimant stated in paragraph 5, 6, 16 and 17 of his statement of facts as follows:

“(5) The claimant avers that he rose through the ranks to salary grade level 16 before he retired in 2017…

 

(6) The claimant avers that when he retired from service, he started pursuing his pension and gratuity and has been cleared in all offices except that of the 1^st defendant.

 

(16) The claimant avers that he caused his lawyer, N.I Darong, Esq. to write a demand letter to the defendants to compute his benefits on grade level 16.

 

(17) The claimant avers that the demand letter was served on the defendants on 4/1/2022 but no response was made.

 

142.    Based on the claimant’s own statement of facts, he obtained clearance from every relevant office regarding his benefits—except the first defendant, who refused to calculate them. It is also evident that he began pursuing payment of those benefits immediately after his 2017 retirement.

 

143.    The claimant’s statement of facts does not specify when the 1^st defendant formally declined to calculate his retirement benefits at Grade Level 16. It can be inferred that the cause of action arose the moment that refusal occurred.

 

144.    From the pleadings of the claimant it is clear that the germane and principal claim of the claimant in this suit is centered on the refusal of the 1^st defendant to compute his entitlement on grade level 16, in which the 2^nd relief of the claimant before this court is for an order of the court compelling the defendants to compute his entitlements on grade level 16.

 

145.    The question of whether a suit challenging the reduction of gratuity and pension, particularly one involving a public officer, is barred by limitation provisions such as the Public Officers’ Protection Law (Cap. III, Law of Northern Nigeria 1963), section 2(a) of the Public Officers’ Protection Act (LFN 2004), and Plateau State Limitation Edict No. 16 of 1988, is a critical legal point in Nigerian jurisprudence. Generally, these laws prescribe a three-month period within which actions against public officers for acts done in pursuance or execution of any law or public duty must be commenced.

 

146.    However, Nigerian courts have consistently carved out significant exceptions to the application of the Public Officers' Protection Act (POPA) and similar limitation laws, especially in cases involving contracts of employment, salaries, pensions, and gratuities. The prevailing judicial position is that the Public Officers' Protection Act does not apply to claims arising from a contract of employment, including claims for terminal benefits like gratuity and pension. This is because, in such instances, the public officer or body is acting in its capacity as an employer under a contract, rather than in the direct execution of a public duty or statutory power.

 

147.    Several landmark cases support this position. In NNPC & ANOR v. SULEIMAN & ORS (2016) LPELR-45504(CA) Pp. 18-26, Paras. E-A), the Court of Appeal unequivocally held that the Public Officers’ Protection Act does not apply in cases of pension, gratuities, and outstanding salaries. The rationale is that the Act is intended to protect public officers from frivolous and vexatious litigation arising from the performance of their statutory duties, not to shield them from contractual obligations or breaches of employment terms. Similarly, in UGBECHE v. NNPC (2016) LPELR-42033(CA) Pp. 12-18, Paras. D-F), the Court of Appeal reiterated that limitation law does not apply to claims based on terminal benefits. These benefits are considered entitlements arising from the contract of employment and relevant pension schemes, not acts done in the execution of a public duty in the strict sense contemplated by the Act.

 

148.    The claimant's case, concerning his gratuity and pension, falls squarely within this exception. His claim is essentially for an entitlement arising from his employment with the Plateau Radio Television Corporation, a public body. The dispute revolves around the calculation and payment of his terminal benefits, which is a contractual and statutory obligation of the employer. The Auditor General, as the 1st defendant, in citing civil service regulations to reduce the claimant's benefits, is acting in a capacity related to the administration of employment terms, not necessarily in the execution of a public duty that the POPA is designed to protect.

 

149.    See this court’s reasoning in SUIT NO: NICN/JOS/25/2023 (unreported) between Martha Pam v. Plateau State Govt and 2 ors delivered on 2^nd OCTOBER 2025 on the effect of section 210 of the constitution.         

 

150.    In addition, the claimant’s allegation that his HND qualification was used to downgrade his benefits from GL-16 to GL-14 raises a potential breach of his employment terms or an unlawful, discriminatory act. Where an employer’s conduct is found to be unlawful, discriminatory, or in violation of the employment contract, the immunity provided by the Public Officers’ Protection Act does not apply. In KOMOLAFE v. NNPC (2021) LPELR-55792(CA) (pp. 47–50, paras. E–F), the Court of Appeal reiterated that an employer cannot arbitrarily withhold or deny a retiree’s gratuity, pension, or other terminal benefits.

 

151.    Thus, a claim challenging the reduction of pension or gratuity—especially one arising from an employment relationship and alleging discrimination or breach of contractual or statutory rights—is ordinarily not caught by the three-month limitation in the Public Officers’ Protection Law, the Public Officers’ Protection Act, or comparable state statutes. Such disputes are distinct from actions against public officers for acts performed strictly in the exercise of their official duties and so may be brought even after the prescribed period has passed. I so affirm.

 

152.    The defendants’ objection is hereby dismissed and issue one resolved in favour of the claimant.  

 

ISSUE TWO:

153.    The next issue to be addressed is the claimant’s allegation that the defendants acted in bad faith by discriminating against him. In support of this claim, the claimant averred in paragraphs 12 and 13 of his written deposition dated 25 February 2022:

“12. The same 1^st defendant has cleared and computed the benefit, gratuity and pension of James J. Jang, John Didwak, Henry Lasing, Sunday Gonyok, Davou Bitrus, Kenneth Yazom and Ishaju Bedmoul on Salary Grade Level 15 and 16 respectively, all of them retired between 2014 to 2016.

13. The action of the defendants is ultra vires and discriminatory and has caused untold hardship to me”

154.    The question whether the defendants discriminated against the claimant, in light of the evidence before the court, is fundamentally a matter of fact and law that the court must determine after a thorough evaluation of all presented evidence. In civil cases, the burden of proving an allegation of bad faith, bias, and discrimination rests squarely on the party asserting it, which in this instance is the claimant. This principle was clearly articulated in the case of LIBERTY BANK & ORS v. CBN & ORS (2019) LPELR-50238(CA) Pp. 32-35, Paras. B-F, where the Court of Appeal emphasized that the claimant must not only allege discrimination but must also adduce credible and cogent evidence to substantiate such a claim. Failure to discharge this burden of proof will result in the claim of discrimination not being established.

 

155.    To establish discrimination, the claimant must show they were treated differently or suffered an adverse effect because of a protected characteristic—such as race, gender, religion, ethnicity, disability, or any other category covered by the relevant anti-discrimination rules. That proof can be direct (for example, explicit remarks or written policies revealing bias) or circumstantial, where a court infers discrimination from a pattern of behavior or unequal outcomes. Circumstantial evidence often involves comparing the claimant’s situation with that of similarly situated individuals who lack the protected characteristic. The court will then assess whether there is a causal connection between the alleged discriminatory act and the harm the claimant experienced.

 

156.    The court's role in evaluating the evidence is critical. As established in OKUVWERI & ORS v. UNUGHABOR & ANOR (2021) LPELR-53334(CA) Pp. 25-32, Paras. E-B, a proper evaluation of evidence is essential to ensure that justice is not only done but is also seen to be done, thereby preventing any miscarriage of justice. The court will assess the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be attached to documentary evidence, and the overall consistency and coherence of the claimant's case. It must consider whether the evidence presented by the claimant, when viewed holistically, establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, and if so, whether the defendants have provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their actions. If the defendants offer such a reason, the burden may shift back to the claimant to prove that the stated reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.

 

157.    Furthermore, the court must ensure that all relevant evidence is properly admitted and considered. The case of OKANLAWON & ORS v. NKANU INTERBIZ (NIG) LTD & ORS ((2020) LPELR-51793(CA) Pp. 34-37, Paras. A-B highlights the instance of wrongful exclusion of evidence and its effect. If evidence crucial to proving discrimination is improperly excluded, it could lead to a miscarriage of justice and potentially a ground for appeal. Therefore, the court must be meticulous in its evidentiary rulings.

 

158.    In situations where the alleged discrimination arises within an employment context, the court may also examine whether established disciplinary procedures and codes of conduct were adhered to. While SAHARA ENERGY RESOURCES LTD v. OYEBOLA (2020) LPELR-51806(CA) Pp. 38-40, Paras. A-C specifically addresses instances where disciplinary procedures were not followed in dismissal, the underlying principle is relevant. A deviation from established fair procedures, especially if it disproportionately affects individuals with protected characteristics, could be indicative of discriminatory practices, even if not explicitly stated. The court will consider whether the defendants' actions were consistent with their own internal policies and whether any inconsistencies point towards discriminatory intent.

 

159.    Ultimately, the determination of whether discrimination occurred is a judicial finding based on the totality of the evidence presented. The court will weigh the evidence, apply the relevant legal principles concerning discrimination, and make a finding of fact. If the claimant successfully discharges the burden of proof by presenting compelling evidence that satisfies the court, then the claim of discrimination will be upheld. Conversely, if the evidence is insufficient or unconvincing, the claim will fail.

 

160.    According to the Cambridge Dictionary, “discrimination” means treating a person or group differently—and especially less favorably—than others. In other words, it is the unequal treatment of people who are in the same position. It should be noted that the claimant’s assertion that the entitlements of the individuals named in paragraph 12 of his deposition were calculated at Grades 15 and 16 rests solely on his oral testimony. The burden of proving that fact lies with the claimant, yet none of those individuals has testified before this court to substantiate the claim.

 

161.    Regarding the claimant’s allegations of discrimination, the defendants denied any discriminatory conduct. They submitted Exhibit D1 – a letter dated 16 March 2018 from the first defendant to the Plateau State Pension Board – which states:

“With reference to our letter NOPEN/C/OFF/VOL.1/1 and PEN./C/OFF/VOL./1 of 27/1/2016 and 14/7/2017 respectively, we wish to observed that the benefits of JOHN R. DIKOWAK and  HENRY LASING was erroneously passed on GRADE LEVEL 16/7 instead of GRADE LEVEL 14/11, based on page 404 NOTES 3.1,1 and 3.6.1 of the scheme of service 2000 which state as follows: “By direct appointment of a candidate possessing a degree in Engineering or equivalent qualification registrable with Council for the Regulation of Engineering in Nigeria (COREN) and NOTE 3.6.1 By promotion of Assistant Chief Electrical Engineer, who have spent at least Three years on the grade and registered with COREN.”

162.    The claimant’s counsel submitted that the defendants have not shown that John R. Dikwak, Henry Lasing or any of the other individuals mentioned by the claimant were demoted by them. Demotion was never pleaded by the defendants; instead, in paragraph 2(d) of his statement, the claimant asserted that the defendants hold different roles and therefore lack the power to demote him after his proper promotion. He made the same point in paragraph 2(n) of his Reply, stating that none of the persons listed in paragraphs 20(b) and (c) of the statement of defence were ever demoted.

 

163.    The defendants relied solely on the letter of 16 March 2018, in which the 1^st defendant informed the Plateau State Pension Board that it regarded John Dikwak’s promotion to Grade Level 16/9 as erroneous and directed that he either submit a higher qualification or be reverted to Grade Level 14/11. On that basis, I reject the claimant’s counsel’s invitation to shift the burden of proving the claimant’s demotion—or that of any other individual—onto the defendants.

 

164.    I find that the claimant has not produced adequate evidence to show that the individuals referred to in paragraph 12 of his deposition—who allegedly held the same qualifications and whose pensions and gratuities were said to have been calculated at Grade Levels 15 and 16—were in fact so treated. There is nothing before this court that definitively demonstrates their benefits were assessed at those grades. To conclude otherwise would rely on hearsays, speculation, conjecture or assumption, none of which can form a proper basis for a judicial decision.

 

165.    Having found that the claimant failed to prove that the defendants computed and paid pensions and gratuities to other equally qualified individuals, that aspect of his claim must fail. In short, he has not established that the defendants discriminated against him, and I so hold. Issue two is resolved against the claimant.  

ISSUE THREE:

166.    The third issue for determination is whether, when the entirety of the claimant’s evidence is considered, the balance of probabilities lies in his favour, thereby entitling him to judgment? The allegation made by the claimant is that the laws which the defendants rely on in demanding that he must have COREN certification before his status as a GL16 officer can be recognized, do not apply to him.

 

167.     The court will need to meticulously evaluate all evidence and legal arguments presented by both parties to determine if the action is a legitimate exercise of administrative power or not.

 

 

168.    For the purpose of addressing the issue, I will set out the four reliefs the claimant is asking this Court to grant:

1.   AN ORDER DECLARING the actions of the defendants as discriminatory.  

2.   AN ORDER COMPELLING the defendants to compute the claimant’s benefit, gratuity and pension on salary Grade level 16.  

3.   N10,000,000.00 General Damages

4.   The cost action.

169.    The claimant averred that he retired from the civil service in 2017 at Grade Level 16 and, by virtue of that exit grade, was entitled to have his pension and gratuity calculated on the basis of Grade Level 16. He relied on Exhibits C3, C4, C5, C6 and C7(1–3 series), all of which are copies of his promotion letters. Each document clearly shows that the promotions were issued by the Plateau State Radio Television Corporation, Jos.

 

170.     It is also pertinent to note that both the claimant’s temporary appointment letter (Exhibit C1) and his permanent, pensionable appointment letter (Exhibit C2) were issued by the same employer—Plateau Radio Television Corporation, Jos. I consider it necessary to set out the contents of Exhibit C7 (3rd series), which is the claimant’s most recent promotion letter dated 19 January 2017. The letter reads as follows:

“I am pleased to inform you that having passed your promotion exams 2016, approval has been given for your promotion to the ran of Director of Engineering on salary Grade level 16 Step 9. The effective date of your promotion is 1/1/2017.

The promotion is also in recognition of your service. It is therefore hoped that you will continue to perform the duties of this higher office with greater zeal.” (underlined for emphasis)

171.    It seems the defendants’ primary concern centers on the claimant’s promotions to Grade Levels 15 and 16. Accordingly, in paragraphs “k” and “o” of her sworn deposition dated 7 April 2025, DW1 stated:

“k. that I noticed there was a defect in the claimant’s promotion to Grade Level 16 consequent upon which we calculated the claimant’s gratuity and pension on Grade Level 14 which ought to be his terminal level as provided by the Scheme of Service 2000.

o. …the claimant was promoted but his promotion from Grade Level 14 to Grade Level 15 and 16 respectively was erroneously done as he was a holder of only Higher National Diploma (HND) who later obtained a Certificate with National Association of Technical Engineers (N.A.T.E) which is not recognized by the Scheme of Service for further advancement and or conversion in the service and subsequent promotion to Grade Level 15 and 16.”

172.     In their pleadings, the defendants named the 1^st defendant and set out its duties. In paragraphs “m” through “s” of her affidavit dated April 7, 2025, DW1 stated that the 1^st defendant is charged with auditing all Plateau State ministries, departments, and agencies, and with receiving the computed pension and gratuity figures from the Plateau State Pension Board. DW1 further testified that the 1^st defendant oversees the placement of new retirees and reviews and reconciles the pension and gratuity payroll.

 

173.    Both parties’ evidence makes clear that the first defendant had no role in the claimant’s promotions and is not responsible for promoting civil servants. It should also be emphasized that the defendants have shown they are not the body tasked with calculating retirees’ pensions and gratuities. In particular, DW1 stated in paragraph q of her deposition dated 26 April 2022:

“the computation of pension, gratuity and benefit of civil servants are done by the Pension Board and sent to the Audit whose duty is to be an eagle eye, to cross check pension payroll”.

174.    Notably, neither of the defendants’ witnesses—DW1 nor DW2—comes from the Plateau State Pension Board, which alone is charged with calculating pensions and gratuities. DW1 presented herself as the Acting Director of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and, when cross-examined, conceded she has never worked for the Plateau State Radio Television Corporation. DW2 is simply a civil servant in the office of the first defendant.

 

175.    I wish to underscore that the core dispute in the claimant’s case is the calculation of his pension and gratuity on Grade Level 14 instead of Grade Level 16, which he maintains was his merited final grade before retirement. On the evidence before the court, his promotion to Grade Level 16 is not in dispute; the defendants merely contend that the step from Grade Level 15 to Grade Level 16 was done in error.

 

176.     There remain unresolved questions about the claimant’s promotions. In particular, if his elevations to Grade Levels 15 and 16 were wrongly granted for failing to comply with the 2000 Scheme of Service, then the validity of all his promotions awarded after that Scheme came into force must also be examined.

 

177.    The defendants do not dispute the Plateau State Radio Television Corporation’s authority to promote the claimant. The court’s records (Exhibits C6 and C7) show he received four promotions under the 2000 Scheme—in 2005, 2009, 2014 and 2017. This naturally leads to the question whether the 2005 and 2009 promotions to Grade Levels 13 and 14 were made in error or were correctly applied under the Scheme of Service 2000.

 

178.    These issues remain unresolved not only because the body that oversaw the claimant’s promotions is not a party to this action, but also because no witness testimony or documentary evidence from the Plateau State Radio Television Corporation has been presented to explain those promotions.

 

179.    The evidence shows that the first defendant questioned the claimant’s qualifications and instructed the Plateau State Pension Board to recalculate his benefits at Grade Level 14 on the ground that he lacked the requisite higher qualification. Exhibit D1 is the letter in which the first defendant formally notified the Pension Board of this issue. The final paragraph of Exhibit D1 states:

“Based on this, could you request the officer to produce the professional certificate (COREN) which is a condition for Promotion beyond GL14 or you should re-compute his benefit on Grade Level 14/11 to enable us process his file in good time.”

180.    Exhibit D19 of the Plateau State Pension Board, titled “Computation of Retirement Benefit Due to Dalaham D. James, Formerly of PRTVC (File No. NO/PSPB/PEN/156800/RB),” clearly shows that the 1st defendant calculated the claimant’s pension and gratuity at Grade Level 14.

 

181.    Counsel for the claimant maintained that his employment was not governed by the Scheme of Service. Paragraph 7 of the Offer of Permanent and Pensionable Appointment (Exhibit C2) expressly provides that either the appointee or the corporation may terminate the appointment by written notice in accordance with the corporation’s staff regulations and the Public Service Rules and Regulations.

 

182.    It is undisputed that the claimant was a civil servant bound by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, as well as by the various guidelines and circulars issued from time to time. The defendants relied on Exhibit D14, titled “Federal Republic of Nigeria, Scheme of Service for use in the Civil Service of the Federation of Nigeria,” which was published by the Office of the Head of Service of the Federation.

 

183.      Page 406 of exhibit D14 states in paragraph 3.1.1 states thus:

“Electrical Engineer Grade II, Grade level 08

3.1.1 by direct appointment of a candidate possessing a degree in electrical engineering or equivalent qualification registrable with the Council of Registered Engineers of Nigeria (COREN).”

 

184.    The defendants also relied on the provisions of the Scheme of Service paragraph 3.6.5, which states thus;

“Chief Electrical Engineer, Grade Level 12

3.6.1 by promotion of a suitable Assistant Chief Electrical Engineer who has spent at least three years on the Grade and registered with COREN”.

 

185.     With respect to exhibit D14, it is important to point out the clear inconsistencies between it and the claimant’s promotion letters. A brief review of exhibit C7 shows the following:

– In the first series, effective 1 July 2009, the claimant was promoted to Assistant Director, Engineering, at Salary Grade Level 14, Step 5.

– In the second series, effective 1 October 2014, he advanced to Deputy Director, Engineering, at Salary Grade Level 15, Step 9.

– In the third series, effective 1 January 2017, he was elevated to Director of Engineering, at Salary Grade Level 16, Step 9.

 

186.     Comparing the ranks and grade levels in Exhibit D14 against their stated requirements and the claimant’s promotion letters raises several questions. For instance, paragraph 3.4.1 of Exhibit D14 specifies that the position of Principal Electronic Engineer (Grade Level 12) may only be filled by a confirmed Senior Electrical Engineer who has completed at least three years at that grade and is registered with COREN.

 

187.    Exhibit D14, paragraph 3.5.1, states that to be promoted to Assistant Chief Electrical Engineer (Grade Level 13), a candidate must be a confirmed, suitably qualified Principal Electrical Engineer who has served in that grade for at least three years and is registered with COREN.

 

188.    It is surprising that in 2009—under the 2000 Scheme of Service—the claimant was elevated to Assistant Director Engineering at Grade Level 14, even though Exhibit D14 clearly mandates COREN certification for promotion to Grade Level 14 (Chief Electrical Engineer), Grade Level 13 (Assistant Chief Electrical Engineer under paragraph 3.5.1), and Grade Level 12 (Principal Electrical Engineer under paragraph 3.4.1).

 

189.    The defendants’ sole objection concerns the claimant’s lack of COREN certification in his promotions to Grade Levels 15 and 16. The evidence before the court, however, shows that under the 2000 Scheme of Service the claimant was promoted to PTO Grade Level 12 effective February 1, 2002, and later to Controller of Engineering at Grade Level 13, Step 3, effective January 1, 2006.

 

190.    This then raises the question whether the claimant’s earlier promotions to Grade Levels 12, 13 and 14—also granted without COREN certification under the 2000 Scheme of Service—can legitimately stand. If those unchallenged promotions were valid, why have the identical promotions to Grade Levels 15 and 16 become so controversial?

 

191.    Undoubtedly, the evidence before this Court shows that the claimant was promoted to Grade Level 16 by letter dated 19 January 2017, with effect from 1 January 2017. Exhibit C12, the retirement letter dated 27 September 2016, confirms his retirement took effect on 3 March 2017. Accordingly, it is indisputable that he retired at Grade 16 and his benefits must be calculated on that basis. I so hold!

 

192.      There is no record before this Court of any official action cancelling or withdrawing the Claimant’s promotion to Grade Level 16. Exhibit C11, which is the Claimant’s Placement Form for monthly pension, expressly states that he retired at Grade Level 14, Step 11. This document was put in evidence by the Defendant during the Claimant’s cross-examination, and the Claimant himself acknowledged it as his.

 

193.    Counsel for the defendants contended that, by virtue of Exhibit C11, the claimant had admitted retiring at Grade Level 14. However, it is well settled that documents speak for themselves (see A.G. Bendel State v. U.B.A. Ltd (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 37) 547; Akinbisade v. The State (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1007) 184 SC), and that an admission under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not conclusive.

 

194.    In light of the array of credible evidence before this Court, Exhibit C11 cannot be regarded as determinative of the claimant’s retirement grade. Instead, Exhibits C4, C5, C6 and C7 (series 1–3) unmistakably establish that the claimant was promoted to Grade Level 16 before his retirement. I so affirm.

 

ISSUE FOUR:

195.    On the fourth and final issue, the defendants, by way of their counterclaim, ask the court to declare that the claimant’s promotions to Grade Level 15 Step 9 in 2014 and Grade Level 16 Step 9 in 2017 were wrongful, having been made without the required qualification or conversion application to the officer cadre. They also ask the court to declare that reverting the claimant to Salary Grade Level 14 Step 11 was in full compliance with the 2000 Scheme of Service and the civil service’s appointment, promotion and discipline guidelines.

 

196.    The defendants also request an order compelling the claimant to refund ?9,329,398.44, being the unearned salaries and allowances he received from January 2013 to March 2017 following his wrongful promotions to Grade Level 15 Step 9 in 2014 and Grade Level 16 Step 9 in 2017, for which he did not possess the required qualifications.

 

197.    In this judgment, I already found that the 1^st defendant had no involvement in the claimant’s promotions, which were granted solely by the Plateau State Radio Television Corporation. There is no fact or evidence to suggest the 1^st defendant had any primary or supervisory role in reviewing those promotions. Moreover, the Plateau State Radio Television Corporation is not a party to this suit, and no witness from that body was called to explain the claimant’s career advancements.

 

198.    It must be emphasized without reservation that there is no evidence before this court showing that the claimant’s promotion was actually reverted to Grade Level 14. What the record does show is that the 1^st defendant instructed the Plateau State Pension Board to recalculate the claimant’s benefits at Grade Level 14, citing the claimant’s alleged non-compliance with the 2000 Scheme of Service.

 

199.    Exhibit C7 (series 2 and 3) expressly confirms that the claimant’s promotions to Grade Levels 15 and 16 were granted in recognition of his meritorious service and his ability to discharge the duties of the higher office with increased zeal. He was elevated to Grade Level 15 effective October 1, 2014, served three years at that level, and was thereafter promoted in 2017 to Grade Level 16.

 

200.    At this point, I note that the entitlement to one’s pension or gratuity is expressly guaranteed by section 210 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Subsection (2) of that provision goes on to state that any benefit due under subsection (1) “shall not be withheld or altered to [a person’s] disadvantage except to such extent as is permissible under any law, including the Code of Conduct.”

 

201.    Having discharged the responsibilities of grade levels 15 and 16 nearing the end of his career, it would plainly be to the claimant’s serious detriment if his pension and gratuity were calculated at grade level 14. Indeed, reverting him to grade level 14 would amount to a breach of his rights under section 210 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

 

202.    The defendants ask the Court to order the claimant to repay all salaries and allowances he received between January 2013 and March 2017 on account of his allegedly improper promotions—to Grade Level 15 Step 9 in 2014 and then to Grade Level 16 Step 9. One might fairly ask in response: should the defendants not also be required to restore the extra labour, responsibilities and personal sacrifices the claimant undertook at those higher grades? And if it is deemed impracticable to return the services themselves, then by the same logic the financial rewards he earned for performing them ought not to be clawed back.

203.    In light of the foregoing, issues three and four are decided in the claimant’s favour and against the defendants. Consequently, the claimant’s second relief—directing that his pension and gratuity be computed at Grade Level 16—is granted, and the defendants’ counterclaim is dismissed in its entirety.

 

204.    Accordingly, the claimant’s action is only partially successful. Relief 2 is granted, and the claimant is awarded ?1,000,000.00 as the costs of this suit. All sums awarded must be paid within thirty (30) days of this judgment, and any unpaid balance thereafter will attract interest at 2% per MONTH until fully liquidated.

 

205.    Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

DELIVERED IN JOS THIS 10^TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2025.

 

 

Mr. Justice I.S. Galadima,

Judge.

 

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Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://nicnadr.gov.ng. NICN decisions are available to the general public shortly after a copy each has been sent to the claimant(s) and defendant(s) in a case.