IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT JOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HONOURABLE JUSTICE I.S. GALADIMA

DATE: 10TH DECEMBER 2025                         SUIT NO: NICN/JOS/19/2024

BETWEEN:

1. GOBEL JOSEPH GOGWIM

2. WAMANNE GRACE HARRY ISHAYA

3. PAM RIFKATU BULUS

4. KWAPS PLACIDA KAATONG

5. DICK DICK GEGE

6. TIMOTHY CHOJI DAGUL

7. TAUPYEN ZINGFA JOSHUA

8. GUWAUM MOSES RYEMSHAK

9. MARK JOSEPH NJEMFA

10. BALA LADI

11. NANCY SIMON YILAGAS

12. GLONGSHAK SIMDI EPHRAIM

13. OLANDA NANMAN EMMANUEL

14. LILIAN MINIAP SHA’ANPET

15. STEPHEN DUNGRIT MUKAN

16. LANDA NANGUN SILAS

17. YILINE N. JENNIFER

18. MULLENGS PANNAN FELIX

19. AARON SUNDAY ZABWO                             

20. DASUN NANKAM KEVIN

21. GAPYIL NAANLUT DANIEL

22. BUGAMMA LAURA SUNDAY

23. NANMWO JOSHUA DAGIAN                  APPLICANTS

24. BULUS YOHANNA AJIJI

25. NDEN MANRIN PRECIOUS

26. SANI GODIYA MADAKI

27. CHANGFA TANKO

28. AVININKAUI NYAM

29. NKPORNWI JANE PAUL

30. NAAMEN LONGMEN

31. ATONG BLESSING AFE

32. DASHUWAR SHAPRET K.                                    

33. MANJI DASHE M.

34. JIKMYEN UFWALAL SUNDAY

35. DAPAK ISRAEL DAPAK

36. FREEJOB ABIGAIL MUNDI

37. JIMMY NANLOP MENSHAK

38. DANJUMA JUDE ROTGAK

39. AKANINYENE EMMANUEL J.

40. MAIGIDA AUGUSTINA ANNOE

41. BENTU SATCHI LADAN

42. GWAKZING JEMNAN WILSON

43. EUNICE PARTRICK POLIT

44. AYUBA ALHERI AKOS

45. NASUK JOHN REBECCA

46. NAANDOET BRIDGET MIGAP

47. ABDULLAHI SAFWAN WAILE

AND

1. PLATEAU STATE CONTRIBUTORY HEALTH

    CARE MANAGEMENT AGENCY (PLASCHEMA) 

2. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL PLATEAU STATE               RESPONDENTS

    CONTRIBUTORY HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT

    AGENCY (PLASCHEMA)

 

REPRESENTATION:

·         NANTOK DASHUWAR, ESQ; R.I. PANTUVO; E.S. BUF, ESQ; FOR THE APPLICANTS.

 

·         P.A. DAFFI, ESQ. (HAG); SABO LONGJI, ESQ; P.N. DASHAK; J.I. MANTU; T.P. CHIGERO; K.D. WUYEP FOR THE RESPONDENTS.

JUDGMENT

1.                      The claimants (to be referred to as the applicants in this judgment), had through an originating summons dated and filed the 17th day of May 2024, sought answers to the following questions:

a.   Having regards to the directive of the Executive Governor of Plateau State contained in Exhibit C, whether the applicants are not entitled to resume work and assume their respective positions as staff and employees of the respondents in line with their letters of appointments attached as exhibits A1-A47 and the instruments governing their appointments and employments.

b.   Whether the respondents or any person or agent acting on their behalf are empowered to prevent the applicants from resuming their respective employments in line with the directive of the executive governor contained in Exhibit C as well as other instruments regulating their appointments.

c.    Whether the substitution of the names of the applicants on the staff list of the 3rd defendant, thereby excluding the applicants from the enjoyment of the benefits of the directive of the Governor is not unlawful, illegal, vindictive, ultra vires and therefore amounts to unfair labor practice.

d.   Whether the applicants are not entitled to be paid their respective salaries withheld by the respondents during the subsistence of their employment, for the months of February 2023 to date in the following amounts, and January 2023 till date:

                                         i.    1st, 3rd - 39th applicants each; the sum of N81,175.30 monthly.

                                        ii.    2nd claimant, the sum of N90.063.55 monthly.

                                      iii.    40th claimant, the sum of N64, 966.68 monthly.

                                      iv.    41st – 47th applicants each, the sum of N41.813.12 monthly.

2.                      Upon determining the answers, they pray for the following reliefs:

                                         i.    A declaration that the prevention of the applicants from resuming work by the respondents, contrary to the directive of the Executive Governor of Plateau State is wrongful, unlawful, illegal and a violation of the Terms Governing the applicants’ employment with the respondents.

                                        ii.     A declaration that the applicants are entitled to resume work in line with the directive of the Governor of Plateau State and by virtue of the substance of their respective letters of appointments.

                                      iii.    A declaration that the substitution of the names of the applicants on the staff list of the 1st respondent with other persons not initially on the staff list and who never had their employments put on hold, is unlawful, illegal, null and void and amounts to unfair labour practice on the part of the respondents.

                                      iv.    A declaration that the applicants are entitled to be paid their respective withheld monthly salaries and allowances from the month of February 2023 till date.

                                       v.    An order of perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from preventing the applicants from resuming work in line with the directive of the Executive Governor of Plateau State and their letters of appointment.

                                      vi.    An order directing the respondents to pay the applicants their monthly withheld salaries and allowances from the month of March 2023 except the 32nd claimant who hasn’t been paid from February 2023 till date in the following amounts:

1.   1st, 3rd - 39th applicants each; the sum of N81,175.30 Monthly.

2.   2nd claimant; the sum of N90.063.55 monthly.

3.   The 40th claimant, the sum of N64, 966.68 monthly.

4.   The 41st – 47th applicants each, the sum of N41.813.12 monthly.

                                     vii.    N50,000,000 (Fifty Million Naira) general damages against the respondents jointly and severally for the collective pain and suffering imposed on the applicants by the respondents.

                                   viii.    Cost of this suit as may be assessed and determined by this Honorable Court.

                                      ix.    35% post judgment interest to accrue monthly until judgment is fully liquidated.

 

SUMMARY OF THE APPLICANTS’ FACTS:

3.                      Here is a summary of the facts contained in the applicants’ supporting affidavit. The deponent states that he is the 1st applicant and, being conversant with the facts herein, avers that in 2022 he and the other applicants were each granted substantive (albeit “temporary”) appointments by PLASCHEMA (the 1st respondent), such appointments having been conveyed by letters marked Exhibits A1–A47 following more than three years of service as ad-hoc staff since the Agency’s inception. He further avers that, pursuant to those letters and in accordance with the Plateau State Contributory Health Care Management Agency Law, 2019, all applicants performed their duties diligently and received monthly salaries and allowances, particulars of which are set out in their respective account statements attached as Exhibits B1–B47.

 

4.                      According to the deponent, after the 2023 gubernatorial election, the incumbent Governor, without lawful basis, suspended all appointments made by the previous administration—including those of the applicants—and thereupon withheld their salaries from February 2023 (in the case of the 32nd applicant, from January 2023). He avers that no further salaries were paid until June 2023 (with the 32nd applicant’s February salary remaining outstanding).

 

5.                      The deponent exhibits a public directive issued by the Governor (Exhibit C) instructing all PLASCHEMA employees whose appointments were put “on hold” to resume duty. He and his fellow applicants reported for work in compliance with that directive but were denied access by the Director-General’s agents. Upon inquiry, they discovered that their names had been removed from the Agency’s approved staff list of 250 persons (Exhibits D1 and D2) and replaced by relatives of senior management. The deponent asserts that the Governor had approved their recruitment to fill genuine vacancies and that PLASCHEMA lacks any legal authority to expunge their names from its registers. Finally, he avers that a pre-action notice was served on 11 March 2024 (Exhibit E) and that the prolonged non-payment of salaries has rendered the applicants destitute, underscoring the necessity of the court’s intervention.

 

6.                      Accompanying the originating summons are six exhibits marked as Exhibits A1-A47, Exhibits B1-B47, Exhibit C, Exhibit D1 & D2 and Exhibit E.

APPLICANTS’ COUNSEL’S SUBMISSIONS:

7.                      A written address filed with the summons outlines four issues for determination, which correspond exactly to the four questions set out for resolution.

 

8.                      Counsel for the applicants begins by asserting that the case rests on the applicants’ individual letters of appointment, which set out the terms of employment with the respondents. Those letters explicitly make their appointments subject to government regulations, general orders and civil service rules. Accordingly, the respondents’ conduct must be judged against those governing provisions and the directives of the Governor, who holds the recognized authority over such appointments.

 

9.                      Their counsel submits that the Governor’s directive in Exhibit C constitutes the definitive and binding statement on the applicants’ employment status. By that directive, His Excellency, Barr. Caleb Manasseh Mutfwang, expressly authorized all newly engaged staff whose appointments were not on hold—including those at the Plateau State Contributory Health Care Management Agency—to return to work immediately. Accordingly, the respondents’ refusal to permit the applicants’ resumption of duty is ultra vires, unfair, and directly contradicts the Governor’s clear instruction.

 

10.                  The applicants also contend that, because the Governor’s directive is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms, the literal rule of interpretation must prevail. Relying on decisions such as Abdul v. Shekolo & Ors (2022) LPELR – 56682(CA), Gana v. SDP (2019) LPELR –(47153) 1 at 45, and Abegunde v. Ondo State House of Assembly (2015) LPELR (24588)1 at 41, counsel argues that when statutory or documentary language is plain, the court is bound to give it its ordinary meaning. They further invoke Levy ex parte Wultin (1881), which confirms that one should only depart from the grammatical sense of a provision to avoid an absurd or inconsistent outcome.

 

11.                  Applying this principle, counsel maintains that paragraph I of Exhibit C is explicit and does not exclude any newly employed worker whose employment was previously on hold. Hence, the applicants are entitled to benefit from the Governor’s protection and directive, and the respondents’ selective implementation is condemned as manifestly wrong, unfair, and wicked.

 

12.                  Finally, counsel urges the Court to apply international labour standards and best practices as guaranteed under Section 254C(1)(f) of the 1999 Constitution (Third Alteration). Relying on NUHPSW v. Outsourcing Services Ltd (2023) and Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola (2020), it is submitted that the applicants deserve reinstatement, payment of all unpaid salaries, and both general and specific damages for the hardships they have endured. The written address closes by pressing the court to enforce the Governor’s resumption directive, restore the applicants to their posts, and grant such reliefs as the law and international best practices require.

RESPONENTS’ DEFENCE:

13.                  On 26 June 2024, upon receiving the originating summons, the defendants—hereafter referred to as the respondents—filed and served their counter-affidavit, together with a motion for leave to file and serve it out of time.

 

14.                  Summary of the Respondents’ Six?Paragraph Counter-Affidavit (deposed by Binjing M. Yildep) is as follows:

                                         i.    Termination Clause in Appointment Letters – The temporary appointment letters expressly allows the Government to terminate any appointee, without compensation, at any time within two years.

                                        ii.    Not All Applicants were Ad-hoc Appointees – Only 120 persons were ever granted substantive (temporary) appointments. Some of the 47 applicants were never part of that cohort and thus never held ad-hoc status.

                                      iii.    Findings of the Government’s Employment-Review Committee:

– Civil Service Commission was not consulted in the hiring process.
– Many employees failed to complete necessary documentation.
– Non-indigenes were improperly employed on a regular basis.
– Salaries were disbursed without requisite Variation Orders.
– Appointments were not evenly distributed across the State’s 17 LGAs.

                                      iv.    Specific Challenges to Applicants’ Allegations

– Paragraph 9: Contrary to their claim, the 32nd applicant’s February 2023 salary was paid in June 2023 (see Annexure MOJ3).

– Paragraph 13: Admitted that the Governor may cancel or ratify any appointment within two years.

– Paragraph 16: Denied that the applicants were neither recruited nor recalled because they failed to meet the prescribed criteria.

– Paragraph 18: Denied and stated that the recruitment process was flawed and, in any event, their appointments were terminable per the two-year clause.

– Paragraph 19: Denied and stated that the applicants were simply unqualified and thus excluded from the final staff list.

– Paragraphs 29 & 30: Denied and stated that non-payment of salaries resulted from lawful termination, not destitution or unfair treatment.

                                       v.    Justification for Termination – The respondents insist that every termination was based on objectively justifiable grounds—either procedural defects or failure to satisfy appointment criteria—and was carried out pursuant to the clear terms of the temporary appointment letters.

RESPONDENTS’ COUNSEL’S ARGUMENTS:

15.                  Also accompanying the counter affidavit is a written address, wherein four (4) issues for determination were formulated thus:

                                         i.    Whether the applicants have placed sufficient evidence before this honorable court to move the court to grant the reliefs claimed by them, on the balance of probability?

                                        ii.    Whether the termination of the employment of the applicants was proper or wrongful given the circumstances of their employment.

                                      iii.    Whether this suit can be properly heard and determined as presently constituted in view of the disclaimer of the 16th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 36th applicants from participation in this suit as applicants, presented to this honorable court as annexure MOJ5.

                                      iv.    Whether the originating summons procedure is the appropriate originating process which ought to be used for the determination of the issues in this suit in view of the contentious depositions in the counter affidavit of the respondents.

16.                  The respondents contend that the applicants have not established the fundamental criteria needed to obtain the remedies they request. They maintain that the applicants have obscured the true nature of their engagement, since their appointment letters explicitly describe their roles as temporary rather than substantive or permanent. Those letters further provided that either party could terminate the appointment on one month’s notice—or by payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice—and confirmed that the appointees remained subject to the government’s regulations governing temporary appointments.

 

17.                  Invoking Section 136 of the Evidence Act, the respondents maintain that the applicants bear the burden of proof and have failed to discharge it. They rely on the Court of Appeal’s decision in Eguridu & Anor v. Ughakpoteni (2023) LPELR-60864 (CA), which held that a party who asserts a fact must prove it.

 

18.                  The respondents also maintain that the applicants have not identified any specific terms of their contracts that were breached. They rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Oforishe v. Nigerian Gas Company Ltd (2017 LPELR-42766 (SC)), which held that in cases of wrongful dismissal the sole remedy is damages calculated by reference to the notice period, and that, except where the employment arises from statute, courts cannot compel an unwilling employer to retain a willing employee.

 

19.                  They argue that because the applicants held only temporary, non-statutory positions, the respondents were within their rights to terminate their appointments, and therefore the dismissal cannot be regarded as wrongful.

 

20.                  Regarding consent, the respondents argue that a number of applicants have withdrawn from the proceedings, thereby rendering the suit incompetent—no one can be designated a claimant/applicant without their express permission. They cite the Court of Appeal’s decision in Akinbobola v. Oyebamiji & Anor (2014) LPELR-24410 (CA), which held that a person cannot be made a plaintiff absent their consent.

 

21.                  Lastly, the respondents contend that the applicants’ choice of an originating summons is misplaced because the dispute raises contested factual questions. They rely on MNYIM & Ors v. Registered Trustees, Assemblies of God, Nigeria (2021) LPELR-54209 (P-5154) for the proposition that an originating summons is only appropriate where the facts are agreed and the sole issue is one of law or interpretation.

 

22.                  In closing, the respondents ask the court to dismiss the applicants’ suit as unfounded, since their appointments were temporary, lawfully ended, and the procedures followed were proper.

APPLICANTS’ REPLY:

23.                  On July 12, 2024, the applicants deposed to and filed a further and better affidavit of 39 paragraphs in response to both the counter-affidavit and the respondents’ preliminary objection. Dr. Fabong Jemchang Yildam, the erstwhile Director General of the 1st respondent agency, deposed to this affidavit. The most pertinent passages—paragraphs 13, 16, 17, 18 and 27—are summarized below:

13. – “I was the Director General of the 1st defendant when the Governor of Plateau State suspended the employment of all 250 staff of the 1st defendant including the claimants, and I was still Director General when the Governor directed that the suspended 250 staff of the 1st defendant be restored back to resume work including all the claimants.”

 

16. – “Contrary to paragraph 4(e) of the defendants’ Counter-Affidavit, all claimants were granted temporary appointment along with others in the list in Exhibit D2.”

 

17. – “The payment voucher exhibited by the defendants as Exhibit MOJ1 actually shows the exact salaries and allowances due to each of the claimants with their other colleagues allowed to resume work.”

 

18. – “The payment voucher is for the period the claimants worked as substantive temporary staff of the 1st defendant not Adhoc Staff. The claimants were offered substantive temporary appointment in December 2022 while Exhibit MOJ1 is for February 2023 by which time all the staff of the 1st Defendant contained in Exhibit D2 including the claimants were already working as substantive staff.”

 

27.    – “I have seen Exhibit MOJ2 attached to the defendants’ Counter-Affidavit and nothing on it shows that it is indeed a white paper report submitted to the Plateau State Government.”

 

24.                  Also accompanying the further affidavit is a written address.

RESPONDENTS’ PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:

25.                  The respondents thereafter filed a notice of preliminary Objection, dated the 10th day of July 2025 but filed on the 11th day of July 2025. The said preliminary objection prays the Court for the following:

 

a.   AN ORDER dismissing this suit for want of requisite jurisdiction.

b.   AN ORDER nullifying the employments of the 1st – 47th applicants.

c.    AND FOR SUCH FURTHER ORDER(S) this Honorable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance.

 

26.                  Accompanying the preliminary objection is a 7-paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Binjing M. Yildep. In paragraphs 4a, 5a-5d, the deponent averred as follows:

a.    – “That the applicants in this suit were employed by the 1st defendant without a subsisting Governing Board and the consent of the Plateau State Civil Service Commission but were not yet confirmed.”

b.    – “That the consent of the 10th (Bala Ladi), 16th (Landa Nangun Silas), 21st (Gapyil Naanlut Daniel), 22nd (Bugamma Laura Sunday), 23rd (Nabmwo Joshua Dagian) and 36th (Freejob Abigail Mundi) claimants were not sought before the filing of this suit on their behalf.”

c.    – “That the 10th, 16th, 21st, 22nd and 36th claimants have never engaged the service of the claimants’ counsel to file any suit against the defendants.”

d.    – “That the 10th, 16th, 21st, 22nd and 36th claimants have deposed affidavit to that effect. Their affidavits of withdrawal or non-participation are hereby marked as MOJ5.”

e.    – “That this suit was filed not in good faith as the aim is to frustrate the actions of the defendants in employing new Staff for the 1st defendant.”

27.                  Also accompanying the preliminary objection is a written address, wherein three issues for determination were formulated as follows:

                                         i.    Whether this honorable court can hear this matter in view of the fact that the claimants were employed without a subsisting governing board of the 1st defendant and involvement of the Plateau State Civil Service Commission?

                                        ii.    Whether this honorable court can hear this matter in view of the fact that the 10th, 16th, 21st, 22nd and 36th claimants have disassociated themselves from the suit?

                                      iii.    Whether this honorable court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear this matter in view of the fact that the employment of the claimants have not been confirmed?

 

28.                  In their reply the applicants flatly reject the respondents’ suggestion that they were only temporary staff rather than substantive appointees. They say this allegation is baseless and directly contradicted by the record—most notably Exhibit MOJ-1, the respondents’ own February 2023 payment voucher—which shows the applicants received exactly the same pay as confirmed employees, with no distinction. As a matter of law, documents annexed to affidavits serve to test the truth of contested assertions, and in fact Exhibit MOJ-1 supports the applicants’ case, not the respondents’.

 

29.                  The applicants explain that temporary or probationary appointments are simply the normal initial phase in public service—usually followed by confirmation after two years—and do not diminish the employment’s status. Therefore, labeling their roles as “temporary” does not undermine their substantive nature.

 

30.                  Regarding the Governor’s directive and the White Paper report, the applicants note that Exhibit C clearly shows the Governor approved resumption for all newly employed workers whose appointments had been suspended. Nothing in Exhibit MOJ-2 excluded the applicants, and the respondents have produced no evidence of any lawful directive cancelling their appointments. Consequently, the applicants are entitled to resume duty with their colleagues.

 

31.                  On the respondents’ argument that due process was not followed in their employment, the applicants maintain that the respondents—being a juristic corporate body—cannot rely on their own alleged wrongdoing to avoid liability. Citing Turner v. Obordo & Ors (2020) LPELR-60080 (CA), they emphasize the settled principle that a party cannot benefit from its own illegality. Allowing the respondents to do so would amount to the court endorsing injustice.

 

32.                  The applicants also respond to the issue of alleged withdrawal by the 16th, 26th, 27th, and 36th applicants, asserting that all applicants willingly submitted their appointment letters and have not debriefed counsel. Even if a few have withdrawn, that cannot invalidate the entire action or prejudice the remaining applicants. The respondents’ reliance on such procedural objections is described as a resort to technicalities, contrary to the courts’ modern commitment to substantial justice, as affirmed in Simbajo General Enterprise Ltd v. Anor (2023) LPELR-61130 (CA).

 

33.                  Finally, on the procedure adopted, the applicants defend the use of the Originating Summons process. They argue that the main issues are purely legal and documentary—particularly the interpretation of the Governor’s directive —and that the material facts are largely undisputed. Citing MNYIA & Ors v. Registered Trustees Assemblies of God, Nigeria (2021) LPELR-54209 (CA), they submit that Originating Summons is appropriate where facts are not contentious and the dispute centers on the interpretation of documents or law.

 

34.                  The applicants concluded by urging the court to reject the respondents’ counter-affidavit and written address as unfounded and misleading.

 

35.                  After filing and exchanging their respective processes, counsel for the parties appeared in court on 15 October 2025 and adopted their submissions. The court then reserved its decision and delivered judgment today.

RESOLUTION OF THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION:

36.                  In any cause before this court, preliminary objections go to the very competence of the proceedings. As this Court has often held, jurisdiction is the very life-blood of judicial power; if the Court lacks jurisdiction, everything done thereafter is a nullity. Jurisdiction is a fundamental and critical aspect of judicial power in Nigeria. It is the legal authority a court possesses to hear and determine cases brought before it. Without jurisdiction, a court's actions are null and void, as highlighted in the cases and legal provisions provided. The Supreme Court of Nigeria has consistently emphasized the importance of jurisdiction, affirming that it is the lifeblood of judicial proceedings. Several cases underscore this principle. In LOKPOBIRI v. OGOLA & ORS (2015) LPELR-40838(SC), the Supreme Court reiterated that if a court lacks jurisdiction, any actions taken are a nullity. Similarly, IHIM v. MADUAGWU & ANOR (2021) LPELR-53906(SC) emphasizes the critical importance of jurisdiction. The case of OYEKAN & ORS v. ABERUAGBA & ORS (2023) LPELR-62196(SC) further reinforces this stance. In PETROLEUM (SPECIAL) TRUST FUND v. FIDELITY BANK & ORS (2021) LPELR-56625(SC), the court highlighted the consequences of proceedings conducted without jurisdiction and specified when the issue of jurisdiction can be raised. The Court of Appeal in ADEOGUN-PHILLIPS v. GATEWAY PORTLAND CEMENT LTD & ANOR (2024) LPELR-62108(CA) also stressed the importance of jurisdiction and what confers it on a court.

 

37.                  Accordingly, the preliminary objections filed on 11 July 2025 must be addressed before turning to the originating summons or any other substantive issues. The respondents have raised three distinct limbs of objection, namely: (1) that this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain the claims because the applicants’ appointments were not confirmed by a governing board or the State Civil Service Commission; (2) that several of the named applicants have disassociated themselves from the suit and therefore the originating summons is incompetent; and (3) that as a consequence of the unconfirmed status of the appointments, the applicants have no cause of action capable of sustaining this proceeding. Each will be taken in turn.

 

38.                  Issue one is with respect to jurisdiction and validity of the applicants’ appointments. The respondents contend that the absence of a statutory governing board or the Civil Service Commission’s imprimatur rendered the appointments null and void and thereby ousted this Court’s jurisdiction.

 

39.                  It is settled law that the mere fact of an employment being “temporary” and liable to termination within two years does not strip the appointee of all judicial remedies once the employer treats the appointment as live and benefits from the appointee’s services. Even if an employment is designated as temporary or subject to termination within a specific period, the employee is not automatically stripped of all legal recourse if the employer treats the appointment as ongoing and benefits from the employee's services. This position is reinforced by several judicial pronouncements.

 

40.                  In OLUWATUYI v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ONDO STATE & ANOR (2021) LPELR-54587(CA), the Court underscored that when an employment relationship derives its authority from statute, any dismissal must strictly follow the prescribed procedure. A failure to do so renders the termination improper and entitles the employee to pursue legal remedies.

 

41.                  In cases where employment is terminated without the requisite notice, the employee is entitled to remedies, as seen in SULAIMAN v. NBC PLC (2015) LPELR-25911(CA). This principle applies regardless of whether the employment is termed temporary or permanent.

 

42.                  Additionally, SHUAIBU & ORS v. NBC PLC (COCA-COLA) (2020) LPELR-52110(CA) clarifies that even a private limited liability company cannot terminate an employee's appointment arbitrarily, reinforcing the need for justifiable reasons and adherence to legal principles.

 

43.                  Therefore, the mere designation of employment as temporary does not negate an employee's right to judicial remedies if the employer acts in a manner inconsistent with that designation. The courts will consider the substance of the employment relationship and the employer's conduct in determining whether the employee is entitled to legal recourse.

 

44.                  The respondents’ own payment vouchers (Exhibit MOJ-1) plainly show that PLASCHEMA treated the applicants as “substantive temporary appointees.” Any lack of formal variation orders or Commission approval may affect internal disciplinary or administrative remedies, but it cannot oust the Court’s jurisdiction once the employer itself has recognized the appointments as valid. Accordingly, this limb of the objection is dismissed.

 

45.                  On issue two respecting the disassociation by some applicants, the respondents/objectors urged that five of the applicants did not swear in the originating affidavit and have since filed affidavits disclaiming interest, with the result that the suit is incompetent for want of authority on the part of those five. It is a fundamental principle that a suit cannot proceed in the name of persons who have neither authorized it nor remain active parties. Yet the disavowals in MOJ-5 are inconsistent with the principal affidavit evidence, which clearly identifies all forty-seven as aggrieved former employees.

 

46.                  In AMEFULE & ANOR v. NMECHA & ORS (2013) LPELR-20632(CA), the Court of Appeal distinguished between a claimant who dissents from ongoing proceedings at the very outset and one who merely seeks to withdraw at a later stage; the latter does not nullify the suit so long as a sufficient number of applicants remain to sustain it. The court also addressed the circumstances under which a plaintiff can withdraw a case and the effect of such withdrawal. The court's decision provides guidance on how withdrawals are treated in appellate proceedings.

 

47.                  Similarly, ERONINI & ORS v. IHEUKO (1989) LPELR-1161(SC) touches on the position of the law regarding the withdrawal of an action, offering further insight into the legal implications of such actions.

 

48.                  Furthermore, the case of D.I.D. AL-AMAN CO (NIG) LTD & ANOR v. MINKO & ORS (2020) LPELR-52108(CA) clarifies the legal position when a case is withdrawn against a party, providing additional context for understanding the consequences of withdrawal in legal proceedings.

 

49.                  The principle articulated by the Court of Appeal distinguishes between applicants who dissent from ongoing proceedings at the outset and those who seek to withdraw later. This distinction is crucial in determining the effect of a claimant's withdrawal on the continuation of the suit. The court acknowledges that while initial dissent may fundamentally undermine the suit, a later withdrawal does not necessarily nullify it, provided a sufficient number of applicants remain to sustain the action.

 

50.                  The National Industrial Court Rules also address discontinuance, stating that a party desiring to discontinue a claim or withdraw any part of it before the date fixed for hearing or judgment must give written notice to the Court and the other party. The Court, upon such discontinuance or withdrawal, shall make orders as may seem just.

 

51.                  These rules and cases collectively highlight that while a claimant has the right to withdraw from a suit, the timing and circumstances of the withdrawal can significantly impact the proceedings. The court's discretion and the remaining applicants' ability to sustain the suit are critical factors in determining whether the suit continues or is terminated.

 

52.                  Here, forty-two of the original forty-seven continue to pursue the claim. Nothing in the Rules of this Court requires unanimity of applicant status where a representative array of applicants persists and no specific relief is sought on behalf of the withdrawn parties. The suit is therefore not rendered incompetent by the dissociation of these five.

 

53.                  Besides, on the date the arguments of the parties’ counsel were adopted on October 15, 2025, the applicants’ counsel, Nantok Dashuwar, Esq. stated in open court that those parties who had initially indicated disinterest in the case, later filed affidavits to rejoin the suit and that this process alone, nullifies the respondents’ objection on this issue. The respondents’ counsel represented by the Honorable Attorney General of the State and Commissioner of Justice, Mr. P.A. Daffi, did not raise any objection to the applicants’ counsel’s statement. This court is satisfied with the applicants’ process to which there is no counter. Same is given positive regard in ruling against this preliminary ground of objection. The second objection is hereby rejected and dismissed.

 

54.                  Issue three touches on the cause of action and competence. Finally, the respondents argue that because the applicants’ status remained unconfirmed they have no actionable right and thus no cause of action, rendering this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction improper. This Court notes that in Oforishe v. NGC (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1575) 264 the Supreme Court emphasized that where a claim is predicated on breach of a validly executed document—in that case an employment letter—the existence of a cause of action is complete once the document is breached, even if the contract is terminable. The applicants here allege that their letters of appointment were unilaterally suspended, their names removed from the approved list of employees to be recalled, and their salaries withheld. These are all positive acts said to breach the contractual and constitutionally-anchored rights under section 254C of the Constitution to fair treatment and lawfulness in public employment. Whether the appointment could lawfully be terminated on certain technical grounds is a matter for trial, not a basis for stripping this Court of jurisdiction at the outset.

 

55.                  Also in their preliminary objection, the respondents contend that the applicants erred in commencing this suit by originating summons. Counsel argues that because there are alleged disputes of fact between the parties, a formal general writ of summons should have been employed. I respectfully disagree. This action turns solely on questions of law – namely, the 1st and 2nd respondents’ statutory authority to terminate the applicants’ employment and to replace them with new employees contrary to the directive made by the state’s Governor, the nature and terms of the applicants’ employment, and the proper interpretation of the terms of their letters of employment and the relevant statutes and regulations.

 

56.                   These questions are precisely the sort of matters suited to an originating summons. Under Order 3(1)(b) and 3(3) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, proceedings may be initiated by originating summons whenever the main issue is the interpretation of any constitution, statute, agreement or other instrument relating to employment, labour or industrial relations, within this Court’s jurisdiction under section 254C of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) or any other applicable law.

 

57.                  Please note that this Court has previously addressed identical objections in these unreported matters:

– Dake Emmanuel Chendu & Ors v. Governor of Plateau State & Ors, NICN/JOS/08/2024 (delivered 18 November 2024)

– Wulkwap Hoomen Danjuma & Ors v. Governor of Plateau State & Ors, NICN/JOS/09/2024 (delivered 26 September 2024)

– Bulus George Lambert & 55 Ors v. Governor of Plateau State & 2 Ors, NICN/JOS/07/2024 (delivered 5 June 2025)

Those rulings may be cited in this judgment, as appropriate, either to bolster or to distinguish the issues before the Court.

 

58.                  Having considered the authorities and material before the Court, none of the preliminary objections succeeds in ousting its competence. They fail both as a matter of law and on the facts. Accordingly, the Court holds that it has jurisdiction to hear the Originating Summons, that the partial disassociation of some applicants does not render the suit incompetent, and that a cause of action has been duly disclosed. The preliminary objection is therefore dismissed.

 

59.                  In view of that, the Court will now proceed to the four substantive issues raised in the Originating Summons and one issue raised in the respondents’ Counter Affidavit.

RESOLUTION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE SUIT:

60.                  The question of whether the applicants are entitled to resume work and assume their respective positions as staff and employees of the respondents, having regard to the directive of the Executive Governor of Plateau State (Exhibit C), their letters of employment (Exhibits A1-A47), and the instruments governing their employments, requires a detailed analysis of the nature of their employment and the legal framework governing it.

 

61.                  Firstly, the nature of the applicants' employment is paramount. If their employment is said to have 'statutory flavour,' it means that their terms and conditions of service are governed by statute or regulations derived from statute. In such cases, the employment is not a mere master-servant relationship but one protected by law, requiring strict adherence to the prescribed procedure for appointment, discipline, and removal. Any termination or removal that does not strictly comply with these statutory provisions would be declared null and void.

 

62.                  Both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have made clear that when an employment relationship is created or regulated by statute, any dismissal must follow to the letter the procedures set out in the governing law or regulations. A failure to observe those steps renders the termination unlawful, void ab initio, and entitles the employee to reinstatement. This rule was authoritatively restated in GILE & ORS v. UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE MAKURDI & ORS (2015) LPELR-45808(CA) at pages 32–40, Paras. C–A), where the court explained the legal requirements for ending employment with a statutory flavour and the consequences of non-compliance.

 

63.                  Secondly, the directive of the Executive Governor of Plateau State (Exhibit C) must be considered. While the Governor has powers of appointment for certain offices as stipulated in Section 208 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), these powers are generally for high-level state offices (e.g., Secretary to the Government, Head of Civil Service, Permanent Secretaries). For staff of statutory bodies like state agencies, parastatals, universities or medical centers, the power to appoint and remove typically vests in the governing council or board of that institution, subject to the specific provisions of their enabling statutes.

 

64.                  Although a Governor’s directive carries considerable authority, it cannot by itself override the clear requirements of the statute that governs the employment relationship—especially when that statute prescribes precise procedures for removal or reinstatement. If the applicants were originally dismissed in breach of those statutory procedures, the Governor’s order may serve as an administrative step toward correcting the wrong. Yet its legal force to restore them hinges on whether it aligns with or activates the proper reinstatement mechanisms within the agency. Where the directive functions merely as an instruction to the statutory body, that body must still follow its own established reinstatement procedures—unless the directive itself is issued under a legally recognized power to intervene, which is uncommon for individual staff members of autonomous statutory entities.

 

65.                  Thirdly, the applicants' letters of appointments (Exhibits A1-A47) and the instruments governing their appointments and employments are crucial. These documents form the contractual basis of their employment. In cases where a contract involves several documents, the court will interpret them holistically to determine the issues before it, as highlighted in NNPC & ANOR v. EFEBO (2019) LPELR-47904(CA). If these instruments, read in conjunction with the relevant statutes, establish a clear right to due process before removal, and that process was not followed, then the applicants have a strong case for reinstatement.

 

66.                  If the applicants' removal was indeed unlawful, they would be entitled to resume work. The effect of an order of reinstatement is to restore the employee to their original position as if they were never removed, with all rights and privileges, including payment of salaries and allowances for the period they were unlawfully kept out of office. This was affirmed in NCS BOARD & ORS v. IJACHI (2024) LPELR-62285(CA).

 

67.                  Ultimately, the applicants’ right to return to work depends on whether their initial termination complied strictly with the relevant statutory provisions and the terms of their appointments as set out in the respondent institutions’ enabling laws. If that removal is found to have been unlawful, reinstatement is mandatory. While the Governor’s directive is important in prompting the institutions to correct an unlawful situation, it does not by itself supplant the formal statutory procedures for reinstatement. The respondent bodies must still follow their enabling statutes in effecting the applicants’ return to duty.

 

68.                  How, then, were the applicants engaged by the 1st and 2nd respondents, and what was the nature of their employment? The applicants affirm that, in 2022, each received an individual letter of employment. They claim that before their substantive employment, they were ad hoc staff of the 1st respondent agency for over three years from the inception and creation of the agency until the grant of their substantive appointments which were conveyed to each of them via letters of employment – see paragraph 4 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons.

 

69.                  To prove this, they have tendered 47 letters, marked Exhibits A1 through A47, each confirming a respective applicant’s appointment to a position within the first respondent agency. One of those letters—which is identical in form to the other 46—appears below:

To:

 

Gobel Joseph Gogwim

 

1st December, 2022.

 

OFFER OF TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT:

I have the honor to offer you temporary appointment as Higher Executive Officer Accounts on salary N507,594.96, CONHESS 07 STEP 2 per annum with effect from 2nd December, 2022 on the following conditions:

 

That although you or the government may terminate your engagement by a month’s notice or by payment of a month’s salary in lieu of notice, the government may dismiss or terminate your appointment without compensation.

 

That so long as you remain in government service, you will be deployed to any part of Plateau State.

 

That you will be subject in all respect to all condition of service stipulated in the general order and government regulations and instruction pertaining to temporary…(words missing).

 

If you wish to accept this offer, I am to request you submit a written acceptance through the Director-General, Plateau State Contributory Healthcare Agency, plateau State within two weeks from the date of this letter.

 

I have the honor to be

Sir/madam

 

Your obedient servant

                                                                  

(signature)

 

Vicky J Gyang (Mrs.)

Director, Human Resources & Admin

For Director – General

PLASCHEMA

 

70.                  In their 26 June 2024 counter-affidavit, the respondents deny that the 47 applicants were validly appointed as staff of the 1st respondent agency. They contend (at paragraph 4(c)) that because the Plateau State Civil Service Commission—the body statutorily empowered to recruit into the State Civil Service—was not involved in the temporary?staff recruitment, those appointments are void. They further assert (paragraph 4(d)) that any such temporary appointment could be terminated by government at will, without compensation, within two years; and (paragraph 4(e)) that although all 47 began as ad hoc staff, not all were given substantive appointments thereafter. Moreover, they say the entire exercise rested on a flawed foundation: the Commission was never consulted, no governing board was in place at the agency, personnel files and proper documentation for each appointee were missing, non-indigene quotas were ignored, salaries were paid without the required variation orders, and the appointments were unevenly distributed across the State’s local government areas (paragraphs 4(g)(i)–(v)). According to the respondents, a review committee covering all hires from May 2022 to June 2023 confirmed these defects, and those findings appear in the committee’s white paper marked MOJ2 on pages 39–40.

 

71.                  Notably, the counter-affidavit is sworn by Binjing M. Yildep, a Ministry of Justice staff member, who traces much of his information to a single briefing involving Sabo Longji and Mrs. C.U. Tongman, the 1st respondent’s litigation officer. Because all of his evidence comes from those two sources on the same day, the court must be wary of how reliable his testimony is. In assessing the affidavit’s probative value, the court is obliged to determine the likelihood and trustworthiness of the information presented.

 

72.                  In the applicants’ further and better affidavit sworn on 12 July 2024, Dr. Fabong Jemchang Yildam—who served as the first and immediate past Director-General of the 1st respondent agency—directly refuted the respondents’ account of how the applicants were engaged. He explained that, under the statute creating PLASCHEMA, the Plateau State Civil Service Commission has no power to oversee, supervise, or independently carry out recruitment for that agency. Rather, the validity of these appointments depended on the Governor’s approval, which was obtained before 250 staff members—including the applicants—were taken on. In paragraph 11 of his affidavit, Dr. Yildam states: “It was pursuant to section 20 of the PLASCHEMA law that the first defendant proceeded to conduct the employment exercise, whereby all the claimants and others on the list in Exhibit D2 were employed as temporary staff of the first defendant.” Ultimately, the deponent stated that no known law was breached in the employment exercise that employed all the applicants contrary to the respondents’ deposition in their paragraph 4(x) of their counter affidavit.

 

73.                  This court makes the following observations before assessing the probative weight of the parties’ evidence. First, although both sides repeatedly invoked the PLASCHEMA law 2019, neither actually lodged the statute for the court’s physical reviewal or interpretation. Second, Exhibit MOJ-2, tendered by the respondents as a public document under the Evidence Act, lacks the required certification and thus fails to meet the standard for admissibility. At just two pages and uncertified, it is an insubstantial exhibit upon which this court cannot safely rely. Accordingly, Exhibit MOJ-2 is hereby expunged and shall play no part in this court’s determination.

 

74.                  The evidence makes plain that each of the 47 claimants was first engaged as an ad?hoc staff member of PLASCHEMA for more than three years and then, on 1 December 2022, was given a formal letter of temporary appointment (Exhibits A1–A47) on CONHESS terms (e.g. Higher Executive Officer–Accounts, CONHESS 07 Step 2 at ?507,594.96 per annum, terminable on one month’s notice or salary in lieu). Those letters expressly conferred on each applicant a contractual right to salary, deployment within the State and protection under the general conditions of service, subject only to the express termination clause.

 

75.                  Under Section 20 of the PLASCHEMA Law, the Agency—subject to the Governor’s approval—alone has the power to recruit its staff. The unrebutted affidavit of Dr. Fabong Yildam (the former Director?General) establishes that the Governor’s approval was obtained before all 250 temporary appointments (including the 47 applicants) were made. The Plateau State Civil Service Commission was never vested with any role in PLASCHEMA’s recruitments and its absence from the process does not void the appointments.

 

76.                  In contrast, the respondents’ evidence (MOJ-2 white paper and the counter-affidavit of Mr. Yildep) is, at best, hearsay based on second-hand briefings, and is contradicted by the documentary record (salary vouchers, Exhibit MOJ-1) and the direct evidence of the former Director-General.

 

77.                  This court therefore finds that the respondents’ allegations that the applicants’ appointments were defective rest on nothing more than unsubstantiated assertions. They have produced no convincing evidence to satisfy this Court that, at the time of engagement, there was no governing board to approve those appointments, that approval or supervision by the State Civil Service Commission was legally required, or that any statutory quota for indigenes and non-indigenes was breached. A careful review of the PLASCHEMA Law No. 10 of 2019 shows no provision mandating Civil Service Commission involvement in the agency’s staff appointments.

 

78.                  The concepts of 'temporary substantive employment' and 'employment with statutory flavour' are distinct but can sometimes overlap, particularly in the context of public service in Nigeria. Understanding their nuances is crucial for determining the rights and obligations of both employers and employees.

 

79.                  So, what is a temporary substantive employment? To my mind, a 'temporary substantive employment' refers to an employment relationship that is established for a defined period or a specific project, rather than being permanent or indefinite. The term 'substantive' implies that the role is not casual or ad-hoc; it involves significant responsibilities, requires specific qualifications, and is an integral part of the employer's operations, even if for a limited duration. For instance, a university might employ a lecturer on a two-year contract to cover a sabbatical leave, or a government agency might hire a project manager for the duration of a specific infrastructure development project. Such employment is typically governed by a contract that specifies the terms, conditions, duration, and remuneration. Unlike casual employment, which is often irregular and lacks formal terms, temporary substantive employment is characterized by a formal agreement and a defined scope of work, albeit for a non-permanent tenure.

 

80.                  What is an employment with statutory flavour? An employment is said to have 'statutory flavour' when the terms and conditions of service are not merely contractual but are governed by statute, rules, or regulations made pursuant to a statute. This type of employment offers a higher degree of protection to the employee, as the employer's power to hire, discipline, or terminate is circumscribed by the relevant statutory provisions. The Nigerian courts have consistently held that for an employment to have statutory flavour, certain elements must exist. As established in SHUAIBU & ORS v. NBC PLC (COCA-COLA) ((2020) LPELR-52110(CA) Pp. 38-40, Paras. D-E) and reiterated in C. B. N. V. OHIKU ((2020) LPELR-51274(CA) Pp. 62-67, Paras. F-A), the criteria include:

a.   Statutory creation of the employer: The employer must be a public body or institution established by statute.

b.   Statutory regulation of employment: The terms and conditions of service, including appointment, discipline, and termination, must be contained in a statute or subsidiary legislation (e.g., rules, regulations, schemes of service) made pursuant to a statute.

c.    Compliance with statutory provisions: The employee's appointment must have been made in strict compliance with these statutory provisions.

 

81.                  The Court of Appeal in SAIBU v. KWARA STATE POLYTECHNIC, ILORIN ((2008) LPELR-4524(CA) P. 38, Paras. D-F), and BAKO v. BRITISH COUNCIL (NIG) & ANOR ((2022) LPELR-58127(CA)) further emphasized that where these conditions are met, the employment transcends a mere master-servant relationship and becomes one with statutory flavour. This means that any termination of such employment must strictly adhere to the prescribed statutory procedure, failing which the termination will be declared null and void, and the employee may be reinstated, as highlighted in A.B.U., ZARIA & ANOR v. IDENYI ((2024) LPELR-61760(CA) Pp. 35-37, Paras. F-C).

 

82.                  The germane question to ask therefore is should temporary substantive employment be considered as one with statutory flavour?

 

83.                  Generally, a 'temporary substantive employment' does not automatically acquire statutory flavour merely by virtue of its 'temporary' or 'substantive' nature. The critical determinant is not the duration of the employment but whether the terms and conditions governing that specific engagement are derived from and regulated by a statute or subsidiary legislation. If a public institution, established by statute, employs an individual on a temporary basis, and the rules governing such temporary appointments (including their duration, renewal, and termination) are explicitly laid out in a statute or statutory instrument, then that temporary employment would indeed possess statutory flavour.

 

84.                  However, it is more common for temporary engagements, even within statutory bodies, to be governed by specific contractual agreements that do not incorporate or refer to comprehensive statutory schemes of service. In such cases, the relationship remains purely contractual, a master-servant relationship, despite the employer being a statutory body. The courts will look at the specific instrument creating the employment and the terms contained therein. If the contract itself does not derive its force from a statute or statutory regulations, then it lacks statutory flavour, irrespective of the employer's nature or the 'substantive' nature of the temporary role. The focus remains on whether the appointment and conditions of service are directly regulated by statute, not merely whether some statutory protections apply to the employee generally.

 

85.                  As such, a statutory body may hire someone on a temporary substantive basis, but that employment only takes on a statutory character if its terms and conditions are set out in a statute or subsidiary legislation rather than in a private contract. Whether the role is temporary or permanent is less important than the legal source and regulatory framework that governs the employment relationship.

 

86.                  In light of the foregoing framework, it is plain to this court that the applicants’ letters of appointment confer no statutory protection beyond their own terms, which clearly label them as temporary employees of the first respondent. Their appointments remain unconfirmed by the Agency. Although section 20 of the PLASCHEMA Law, 2019 which states—“without prejudice to extant laws and subject to the approval of the Governor, the agency shall have the power to appoint or employ such contract or permanent employees … as it may require to carry out its functions”—vests the Agency with authority to engage staff, it does not, by itself, elevate the applicants to a status protected by statute merely because they were designated “temporary substantive employees.” No other provision of the Law creates or defines their positions. The law contains no provisions on appointing, disciplining, or dismissing its employees, nor does it refer to any specific statute or regulation setting out procedures for hiring, disciplining, or terminating staff.

 

87.                  Even if one were to look to the public service rules to decide how these employees should be treated, the applicants have already admitted that their employment is not doctored by the State Civil Service Commission – read paragraphs 6 and 7 of the applicants’ further and better affidavit. A party cannot both adopt and repudiate the same position at the same time – see FRN v. IWEKA ((2011) LPELR-9350(SC) Pp. 56-57, Paras. F-A); GLOBE MOTORS HOLDINGS NIG. LTD v. IBRAHEEM (2021) LPELR-54550(CA); ADESOLA v. ABIDOYE & ANOR (1999) LPELR-153(SC) P. 22, Paras. C-D; a party cannot resile or abandon an issue already admitted. AJUWON & ORS v. GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE & ORS (2021) LPELR-55339(SC) Pp. 34-35, Paras. F-A again underscored that a party is not permitted to approbate and reprobate at the same time.

 

88.                  To clarify the legal position for the parties: when a person’s role in a government agency is temporary and unconfirmed, it is treated as a master-servant relationship rather than one “clothed with statutory flavour.” Under Nigerian labour law, employment contracts generally fall into two categories. The first is the pure master-servant contract, governed by common law and the terms the parties themselves agree. The second is employment with a statutory flavour, where specific statutes, regulations or rules set out the terms and conditions of service. Distinguishing between these two is vital, especially in determining an employee’s rights and the remedies available if their dismissal is wrongful.

 

89.                  A contract of employment is said to possess a “statutory flavour” when both the appointment and the terms of service are set out by statute or subsidiary legislation. This typically arises in the case of staff of government parastatals, statutory corporations or other public bodies whose founding laws specify how they are to be employed, promoted, disciplined and dismissed. Once employment takes on this character, any termination must follow to the letter the procedures laid down in the relevant statute or regulations. A failure to comply renders the termination void, and the employee may be entitled to reinstatement. The Supreme Court, in cases such as OLANIYAN & ORS v. UNILAG & ANOR (1985) LPELR-2565(SC), has held consistently that where employment is safeguarded by statute, removal from office can only occur in strict accordance with the statutory procedure. In such circumstances, the usual remedy for a wrongful termination is to reinstate the employee, on the basis that the employment relationship continues unless validly brought to an end.

 

90.                  A pure master-servant relationship arises when the rights and obligations of employment flow solely from the contract agreed by employer and employee, rather than from any statute. Such engagements are governed by the common law of contract. Under this arrangement, the employer may dismiss the employee so long as the contractual terms on notice—or payment in lieu of notice—are honoured. If the employer breaches those terms, the employee’s remedy is limited to damages for breach of contract; the courts will not order an employer to retain an employee it no longer wishes to employ. This principle was confirmed in OVIVIE & ORS v. DELTA STEEL CO. LTD ((2023) LPELR-60460(SC)), which reviewed different categories of employment contracts.

 

91.                  In the case of a temporary, unconfirmed appointment with a government agency – like in the instant case, the relationship is treated as a straightforward contractual master-servant one. Simply working for a government body does not, on its own, give the employment any “statutory flavour.” That status only arises once the appointment is formally confirmed and the terms of service are laid down or protected by statute or subsidiary regulation. Until an employee can point to such statutory authority—whether before confirmation or even afterwards—their contract remains governed solely by its own terms. As the Court of Appeal confirmed in OAK PENSIONS LTD & ORS v. OLAYINKA (2017) LPELR-43207(CA) and in DAMABARA v. A-G OF THE FEDERATION & ANOR (2021) LPELR-56480(CA), an employment relationship gains statutory force only when its conditions are set out in a statute or regulations made under one. The employee bears the burden of proving that their service was ever clothed with that statutory flavour.

 

92.                  In situations involving temporary or unconfirmed employment, the parties’ rights and obligations are set out in the offer letter or temporary engagement contract, which defines the term of service, conditions of engagement, and termination provisions. Those provisions are contractual in nature and do not spring from any statute. As a result, if the employer terminates the engagement, the employee’s remedy is ordinarily a breach-of-contract claim for damages, not an assertion that the dismissal is void or a demand for reinstatement. In AMOS & ORS v. UI (2002) LPELR-12157(CA), the Court made clear that, without statutory rules on appointment and removal, the relationship remains one of master and servant. Thus, a temporary, unconfirmed worker in a government agency stands in a purely contractual master-servant relationship and lacks the statutory safeguards enjoyed by confirmed staff whose terms are prescribed by law.

 

93.                  Accordingly, this court finds without reservation that the applicants’ relationship with the 1st respondent was a simple contractual master-and-servant arrangement, not one endowed with statutory safeguards.

 

94.                  The issue at this stage is whether the respondents violated the applicants’ employment terms and, if so, what remedies the applicants can seek.

 

95.                  The facts clearly show that the respondents breached the applicants’ employment agreements, amounting to a fundamental (repudiatory) breach of contract. By dismissing all preliminary objections, this court cleared the path to examine the merits of that breach.

 

96.                  All 47 applicants began their service as ad-hoc staff and were later issued “temporary” appointment letters (Exhibits A1–A47). Those letters made clear that their employment was on CONHESS terms and could be terminated by either party giving one month’s notice or by payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice. In other words, a straightforward contractual relationship was created, with specific provisions governing how and when the appointments could end and how remuneration would be handled. Nowhere did the letters authorize an indefinite suspension of work or pay.

 

97.                  After the change in administration, the new Governor purported to suspend all PLASCHEMA appointments and ordered that salaries be stopped as of February 2023. That measure amounted to a fundamental breach of the parties’ employment contracts. Absent an express contractual provision and the observance of any agreed process, an employer may not unilaterally suspend an employee’s appointment or withhold wages—particularly when the contract specifies how termination is to occur. By withholding pay from February 2023 (and, in the case of the 32nd applicant, from January 2023) and barring several applicants from the workplace, the employer effectively repudiated its core obligation to supply work and pay remuneration under the contract.

 

98.                  In February 2024, the Governor publicly directed all suspended employees to return to duty. When the applicants tried to comply, however, they found that their names had been removed from PLASCHEMA’s officially approved staff list (Exhibits D1–D2) and replaced by others. They received no pay until June 2023, at which point all but the 32nd applicant were paid their January salary; the 32nd remains unpaid to date. This amounts to an unfair terminstion. Their temporary appointment letters expressly required either one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu of notice before termination. By providing neither and by appointing others in their stead, the respondents breached this fundamental contractual term.

 

99.                  The respondents invoked a "two-year without compensation" clause, a white paper report exposing procedural defects (e.g., no Civil Service Commission approval, quota breaches), and argued that some applicants never held "substantive" status. While these are arguments the respondents may raise to justify their actions or limit liability, they do not negate the fact that the employer's actions (suspension, non-payment, and termination without notice/pay) prima facie constituted a breach of the existing contractual terms.

 

100.             Even a temporary employment agreement creates binding legal obligations. If either the employer or the employee fails to fulfill those obligations without a valid excuse, that failure amounts to a breach of contract. Under section 81(1)(a) of the Labour Act 2004, any party who feels aggrieved by an employer’s or worker’s refusal or neglect to honour the contract may bring the matter before a court of competent jurisdiction. This statutory provision empowers this court to adjudicate such disputes. Moreover, labeling a position “temporary” does not authorize arbitrary dismissal in disregard of lawful directives (see SHUAIBU & ORS v. NBC PLC, 2020 LPELR-52110(CA)).

 

101.             Assuming without conceding that the appointments were irregular due to procedural defects, as alleged by the respondents, the employer cannot unilaterally terminate the contracts without following the agreed-upon terms or due process, especially after the employees have rendered services. The principle of wrongful termination therefore applies where an employer terminates an employee's contract in a manner inconsistent with its terms. The Supreme Court and Court of Appeal have consistently held that in a simple contract of master and servant, the employer can terminate the contract for any reason or no reason, provided the terms of the contract relating to notice or payment in lieu of notice are complied with. Failure to do so renders the termination wrongful, entitling the employee to damages but not necessarily to reinstatement. This was reiterated in cases like KWARA STATE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & ORS v. ABIODUN & ORS (2009) LPELR-8900(CA).

 

102.             Since the applicants were hired solely under a master-and-servant contract and although I find that the respondents failed to follow the agreed termination procedure, none of the applicants’ claims as sought will succeed. This court therefore addresses their four questions and nine reliefs sought against the applicants, and I so hold.

 

103.             However, having found that the respondents are in breach of the terms of the applicant’s letters of employments:

 

a.   The court hereby declares that the respondents’ refusal to reinstate the applicants pursuant to the Plateau State Governor’s February 2024 directive was wrongful and amounted to a repudiation of the valid temporary employment contracts conferred upon them in December 2022.

b.   Having terminated the applicants’ employments without the required one-month notice, they are entitled—under the clear terms of their temporary employment letters—to one month’s salary in lieu of that notice. Such payment is the customary remedy for wrongful termination under a simple employment contract.

c.    Although courts will not usually order reinstatement in simple employment contracts—reluctant, as they are not to compel an unwilling employer to take back a willing employee—the applicants remain entitled to general damages for wrongful and unfair termination. Ordinarily, these damages equal the salary the employee would have earned during the notice period. The court may also factor in losses directly arising from the breach, such as the hardship caused by the abrupt suspension, unlawful termination and the difficulties in securing alternative work. In ASCA BITUMEN CO. LTD v. ISAH (2016) LPELR-40778(CA), the Court of Appeal stressed that a claimant must plead its cause of action in cases grounded on employment contracts, which the applicants have done by asserting a breach. Accordingly, this court awards the applicants N50,000,000.00 in general damages against the respondents.

d.   The court will decline to award any outstanding salary (save from granting an order for the payment of the 32nd applicant’s February 2023 salary), where doing so would result in double compensation—a principle firmly established in Thompson & Anor v. Akingbehin (2020) LPELR-58287(SC) pp. 27–28, paras. D–C and Taraba State Govt & Ors v. Orume & Ors (2022) LPELR-57606(CA). In Adeogun-Phillips v. Gateway Portland Cement Ltd & Anor (2024) LPELR-62107(CA), the Court clarified that one must ask whether separate heads of claim or payment sources really compensate the same loss. Likewise, in GTB PLC v. Tabik Investments (Nig) Ltd (2022) LPELR-57047(CA) p. 61, paras. B–D, the Court underscored its duty to examine claims closely and guard against overlapping awards. As the Supreme Court posed in Agu v. General Oil Ltd (2015) LPELR-24613(SC), the key question is whether a plaintiff may recover under one head of damage and again for that identical injury under another. The settled answer is no, for that would amount to double recovery.

 

e.   The court shall order the respondents to pay all monetary awards within 60 days of this judgment which in default shall accrue 5% interest per month until final liquidation of the entire sums.

 

f.    The sum of N1,000,000.00 is awarded as cost to the applicants.

 

104.             Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

DELIVERED IN JOS THIS 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2025.

 

 

 

Hon. Justice I.S. Galadima

Judge.

 

 

Public access to NICN decisions:

Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://nicnadr.gov.ng. NICN decisions are available to the general public shortly after a copy each has been sent to the claimant(s) and defendant(s) in a case.