IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE AWKA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT AWKA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE J.I. TARGEMA,
PhD
DATE:
16 October 2024 SUIT
NO: NICN/AWK/32/2023
BETWEEN
Dr. Peter Ngoesina
Ekemezie - Applicant/Claimant
AND
1.
Nnamdi Azikiwe University
2.
Council, Nnamdi Azikiwe University
3.
Pro-Chancellor, Nnamdi Azikiwe University
4.
Vice Chancellor
5.
Prof. Charles Okechukwu Ezimone
6.
Registrar, Nnamdi Azikiwe University
7.
Pro. John K. Nduka
8.
Dr. Chigozie J.O. Anarado - Respondents/Defendants
REPRESENTATION
Dr. Peter Ngoesina Ekemezie represents
himself.
Reginald Uzoechi for the 1st- 6th
Respondents/Defendants.
K.N. Ogba for the 7th and 8th
Respondents/Defendants.
RULING
INTRODUCTION
1.
The Claimant’s
Motion on Notice brought pursuant to Order 47 Rule 22 of the National Industrial
Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 (NICN Rules 2017) and under the
inherent jurisdiction of this Court prayed the Court for the following:
1)
An order to
rescind the judgment delivered on Thursday, 19th October 2023 by
Hon. Justice John I. Targema, PhD dismissing the claimant’s referenced suit for
been made in error.
2)
An order to grant
all the reliefs sought by the claimant in the referenced suit on merits.
3)
And for such
further order(s) the Court may deem fit to make in this circumstances.
2.
In the affidavit
in support of Motion on Notice re: Suit No. NICN/AWK/47/2019 the claimant
stated that he is the claimant in the referenced suit for which the judgment is
being sought for a rescind; that 1st defendant did not follow due
process in his dismissal; that the Joint Council/Senate Disciplinary Committee
(JC/SDC) was unilaterally constituted by the 4th defendant which is ultra vires his powers; that it is the
Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee (SSDC) that ought to investigate the
claimant as was the case in the 29 January 2015 Report of 1st
defendant’s Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee that absolved the claimant of
any misconduct (see Exhibit “A”). That as a matter of fact the irregular JC/SDC
violated the gamut of section 13 (1) (7) (vii) & (viii) of the 1st
defendant’s Senior Staff Conditions of Service which 1st defendant
did not deny or contradict in its evidence.
3.
The claimant went
on that he was, above all, denied the constitutionally guaranteed right to fair
ing (sic) being investigated by an
irregular JC/SDC unilaterally constituted by the Vice Chancellor for which
claimant has been charged for abuse of office in Charge No. FHC/AWK/410/2023 at
the Federal High Court, Awka. See Exhibit “B”.
4.
On whether or not the
1st defendant followed the due process stipulated under section 13
(1) (7) (vii) & (viii) of its Senior Staff Conditions of service before the
purported dismissal of the claimant, it is submitted by the claimant that the 1st
defendant did not tender any evidence to contradict or discredit the impeccable
evidence of the claimant that 1st defendant violated the gamut of
section 13 (i) (7) (vii) and (viii) of
its Senior Staff Condition of Service in the dismissal of the claimant whereas
the law is that a trial Court has little or no choice but to accept the
unchallenged and uncontroverted evident (sic) placed before it by the claimant
it is not discredited by the defendants during cross examination. See Monkom v. Odili (2010) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1179)
419 SC.
5.
In conclusion, the
claimant urged the Court to grant the reliefs sought in this present suit.
THE CASE OF THE 1ST - 6TH DEFENDANTS
6.
It is the case of
the 1st-6th defendants that judgment in Suit No.
NICN/AWK/47/2019 between the claimant and the defendants was delivered on 19
October, 2023; that by the judgment order, the Court dismissed the claimant’s
claims; that the said judgment determined with finality the claimant’s cause of
action relating to his dismissal from the 1st defendant. That the
deposition of the claimant in paragraph 2, 3 and 4 of the affidavit in support
of Application has been resolved and determined by the Court contrary to the
false position alleged by the claimant; that the 4th defendant who
hold (sic) the position of the 5th
defendant has not been charged for any abuse of office as falsely alleged by
the claimant; that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to rescind its decision;
that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to sit on appeal against its own
decision.
THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE 1ST TO 6TH
DEFENDANTS
7.
The 1st-6th
defendants submitted a sole issue for determination i.e. whether this Court has
jurisdiction to rescind its judgment in the circumstances of this Application.
To the 1st-6th defendants, the claimant sued the
defendants in Suit No NICN/AWK/47/20219 challenging his dismissal from the 1st
defendant; that on the 19th day of October, 2023, this Court in a
well considered judgment dismissed the claims of the claimant and thereby
became functus officio as far as the
Suit No. NICN/AWK/47/2019 is concerned. That in a rather ridiculous move to get
the Court to sit on appeal against its own decision, the claimant brought the present
Application urging the Court to rescind its decision, for according to the
claimant, the judgment was ”made in error.” It is the contention of the 1st-6th
defendants that even though the Rules of this Court permits the Court to set
aside a default judgment or to rescind its well considered decision in a
contested case as in the instant case ; the law however, abhors the Court from
sitting on Appeal against its own decision. That as it relates to the powers of
the Court to set aside its own decision, in the celebrated case of Mark v. Eke (2004) LPELR-1841 (SC), the
Supreme Court dispassionately appraised the conditions when a Court would set
aside its own judgment and held as follows per Musdapher, JSC at page 24, para
D-F;
“The law is
settled that any Court of record including the Supreme Court, see Olabanji v. Odofin (1996) 2 SCNJ 242 at
247; (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 435) 126, has this inherent jurisdiction to set aside
its own judgment given in any proceeding in which there must have been a
fundamental defect such as one which goes to the issue of jurisdiction and
competence of the Court. See Scenconsult
ACS Pic. V. Losada (Nig) Ltd (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 405) 206; (1995) 7 SCNJ 158
at 168. Such a judgment is a nullity. A person affected by it is therefore entitled
or debito justitiae to have it set
aside. The Court can set aside suo motu
and the person affected may apply by motion and not necessarily by way of
appeal. See Adeigbe v. Kusimo (1965)
NWLR 284; Ezeokafor v. Ezeko (1999) 6
SCNJ 209 at 225; (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt. 619) 513. This is common sense that if a
Court makes an order which it has no jurisdiction or competence to make, it has
the jurisdiction to rescind the order so as to restore the status quo. See Akinbobola v.
Plisson Fisko (Nig) Ltd (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt. 167) 270. A judgment or order
which is a nullity owing to failure to comply with an essential provision such
as service of process can be set aside by the Court which gave it or made the
order…”
8.
That in Barrister Oriker Jev & ors v. Iyortom & ors
(2015) NWLR (Pt. 1483) 484, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“The Supreme
Court possesses inherent power to set aside its judgment in appropriate or
deserving cases such cases are as follows:
a)
When the judgment
is obtained by fraud or deceit either in the Court or of one or more of the
parties such a judgment can be impeached or set aside by means of an action
which may be brought without leave;
b)
When the judgment
is a nullity such as when the Court itself was not competent and a person
affected by an order of Court which can properly be described as a nullity is
entitled ex debito justitiae to have
it set aside.
c)
When it is obvious
that the Court was misled into giving a judgment under a mistaken belief that
the parties consented to it.
d)
Where the judgment
was given without jurisdiction; and
e)
Where the
procedure adopted is such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the
character of legitimate adjudication.”
9.
That Order 47 Rule
22 (1) and (2) of the NICN Rules 2017 allows the Court to vary or rescind its
order or ruling:
a)
Where the order
was erroneously sought or granted in the absence of any party affected by it.
b)
In which there is
an ambiguity or patent error or omission but only to the extent of that
ambiguity or patent error or omission.
c)
Granted as result
of mistake common to the parties.
2.
The Court may also
rescind an order made in the absence of any party who the order may be affected
or made in error.
10.
The 1st-6th
defendants’ went on that even though the claimant purported to have brought
this Application under Order 47 Rule 22 (1) and (2) of NICN Rules 2017, a
thorough perusal of the Application makes it glaring that facts and
circumstance of the claimant’s Application do not come under any conditions
listed under Order 47 Rule 22 (1) and (2) of NICN Rules 2017. That in effect,
the claimant is unwholesomely urging the Court to rewrite its judgment and
reverse itself; that this explains why the claimant’s relief (2) is for “An
order to grant all the reliefs sought by the claimant in the referenced suit on
merit”; and the facts in support of the Application, as seen in the Affidavit
in support of the Application, relates to facts and issues upon which the Court
has already considered, resolved and made final determination on.
11.
That the principle
of law is clear, as held in the case of Kolo
v. NPF & ors (2018) LPELR-43635 (CA) that, a Court cannot sit on appeal
over its own decision as to overrule its ealier decision; that in Fawase v. Adekanbi & ors (2013)
LPELR-21954 (CA), the Court of Appeal reiterated that Courts lack the requisite
jurisdiction to revisit their ealier order under any other imaginable
circumstances except where the decision is shown to be a nullity or to have
been obtained by fraud. That this elementary principle of law is predicated on
the doctrine of functus officio,
which numerous judicial authorities confirm to the effect that once a Court has
delivered its ruling on a matter, it cannot re-open it for the purpose of
overruling itself. See Mohammed v. APC
& ors (2019) LPLER-48061 (CA) (pp 26-27, paras B-D); Mohammed v. Husseni & ors (1998)
LPELR-1896 (SC) (pp 42-43, paras E-A); Edo-Osagie
& ors v. Commissioner for Lands, Mid-Western State of Nigeria (1973)
LPELR-24937 (SC) and Nigeria Army v. Iyela
(2008) LPELR-2014 (SC) (pp. 28-29, paras E-D).
12.
In conclusion,
learned senior counsel to 1st- 6th defendants prayed the
Court to dismiss this claimant’s Application for lacking in merit and for want
of jurisdiction.
COURT’S DECISION
13.
I have carefully
considered the processes filed by the Claimant/Applicant and the 1st-6th
Defendants/Respondents. The motion on notice filed by the claimant prays for an
order of Court to rescinding the judgment of this Court delivered on 19th
October 2023 dismissing the claimant’s case for being made in error; and for an
order of Court granting all the reliefs sought by the claimant in Suit No.
NICN/AWK/47/2019 and for such further order(s) the Court may deem fit to make
in the circumstances of the suit. The Claimant/Applicant’s affidavit in support
of his application rather dwelt on the 1st defendant not following
due process in his dismissal; that the Senior Staff Disciplinary Committee is
the body that ought to have investigated claimant as was the case in 29 January
2015 Report of the 1st defendant’s Senior Staff Disciplinary
Committee that absolved him of any misconduct; that he was denied the
constitutionally guaranteed right of fair hearing being investigated by an
irregular JC/SDC unilaterally constituted by the Vice Chancellor. In none of
these did the claimant cite the errors or slips contained in the judgment of
this Court in Suit No. NICN/AWK/47/2019; worse still is claimant’s omission,
neglect or refusal to attach/annex the said judgment in question/issue.
14.
In response Learned Senior Counsel to 1st-6th
defendants/respondents succinctly submitted especially in paragraph 3.8 and 3.9
of their written address that even though the claimant purported to have
brought this Application under Order 47 Rule 22 (1) and (2) of NICN Rules 2017,
a thorough perusal of the Application makes it glaring that, facts and circumstance
of the claimant’s Application do not come under any conditions listed under
Order 47 Rule 22 (1) and (2) of the NICN Rules 2017; that, in effect the
claimant is unwholesomely urging the Court to rewrite its judgment and revert
itself, that this explains why the claimant’s relief No. 2 is for “An order to
grant all the reliefs sought by the claimant in the referenced suit on merits.”
Learned senior counsel went on that in the case of Nigerian Army v. Iyela (2008) LPELR-2014 (SC), Akintan, JSC held
clearly that: “The position of the law is that once a Court or Tribunal
delivered its final judgment in a case before it, it became functus officio with respect to that
case… what can be altered under the slip rule not as to the substance of the
judgment ealier delivered but limited to minor errors, such as spelling errors,
typographical or mathematical errors wherein correct figures can be entered…”
15.
The Court has
power to correct errors or slips contained in the judgment in order to give the
judgment judicial efficacy. This is called the “slip rule.” Denton-West, JCA
reiterated this well-settled rule of law in FRCN
v. Iwuoha (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1335) 207 CA. According to the Learned Justice
of the Court of Appeal:
“It is not trite that, after delivering
judgment/ruling in a matter, the Court becomes functus officio. It cannot revisit the judgment by giving a second
judgment. The only remedy available to an aggrieved party is to appeal. See Onwuchekwa v. Co-operative & Commerce
Bank Plc (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 603) 409; Peter
Chieshe & anor v. NICON Hotels Ltd & anor (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 388)
1152 @ 163 Paras G-H
Therefore, once the intention of the Court is
clear, there would be nothing to correct in the ruling, as the only corrections
allowed are clerical mistakes in judgment or orders, or errors arising therein
from any accidental slip or omission…”
16.
Having considered
the submissions of the claimant and the defendants, the authorities and law as
stated, I have come to the conclusion that the entirety of the claimant’s Application
is totally misconceived. It does not serve any purpose whatsoever. I so hold.
In effect, it tantamounts to abuse of the Court process. The claimant’s Motion
on Notice seeking three reliefs being entirely frivolous and bereft of any
modicum of value. I so hold. Same is accordingly dismissed.
17.
The claimant shall
pay to the defendants the sum of ?50,000 (Fifty Thousand Naira) as general
damages within 30 days of this judgment failing which it shall attract 10%
simple interest per annum until fully liquidated.
18.
Ruling is entered
accordingly.
Hon. Justice
J.I. Targema, PhD