IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT CALABAR

BEFORE: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANUSI KADO

 

23^RD DAY OF JULY, 2024                                                        

SUIT NO. NICN/CA/32/2021

BETWEEN:

DR. OLUWATIMILEHIN T. BABATUNDE …………………………….…………………….. CLAIMANT

AND

FEDERAL NEURO-PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL ……………………..……………………….. DEFENDANT.

JUDGMENT.

1.      The Claimant commenced this action via a general form of complaint accompanied by statement of facts, witness statement on oath, list of witnesses and list of documents to be relied on at the trial. The complaint was on the 23^rd day of March, 2022 amended pursuant to the Order of this court. Vide the amended statement of facts the claimant is claiming against the defendants as follows:

1.      A DECLARATION that the Claimant was in a contract of employment/service with the Defendant and was entitled to notices and emoluments.

2.      A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to emoluments and contributions for services rendered for the period of time he was in the service of the Defendant including Pension contributions, ARD, FNPH and NHF.

3.      A DECLARATION that the act of the Defendant terminating the appointment of Claimant by a letter dated the 29^th July, 2020 but communicated via a letter dated 30^th June, 2021 is wrongful.

4.      AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to pay the Claimant’s monthly salaries of N331,261.67 (three hundred and thirty-one thousand two hundred and Sixty-One Naira Sixty-Seven Kobo) from the month of September, 2020 until 30^th of June, 2021.

5.      AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay N500,000,000.00 (five hundred million) to the Claimant as damages for the wrongful termination of the Appointment and tarnishing his image as a professional medical doctor.

2.      Upon service of the originating process commencing this suit, the Defendant filed its Statement of Defence. Following the amendment of the claimant’s originating process commencing this suit, the defendant filed amended statement of defence.

3.      The claimant testified in proof of his case as CW1, wherein he adopted his witness statement on oath as his evidence in this case. CW1 also tendered 26 exhibits in evidence which were marked as exhibits C1 to C26. CW1 was cross examined by counsel for the defendant at the end of which he was discharged.

4.      Under cross examination CW1, testified that he applied for residency after NYSC, but, before then he served as a locum Sessional Doctor. Exhibit A was issued to him when he applied for residency. He was comfortable with the rules of residency, thus why he accepted the offer, but as time goes on, he discovered that there are other issues. That he read his offer of employment, at some time he was comfortable with the programme until he discovered there are some abuses, more particularly for examination, because one has to go to Ibadan and undue influence came in. He registered for examination five times. He attended four but the 5^th time the letter came at weekend. Before examination at that point something came in to him as he could not coup with the abuses. He wrote for part 1 and part 2, fellowship. He wrote part 1, four times. To some extent he passed. Because, he failed four times he became disgruntled and went to National Human Right Commission. The defendant purportedly terminated his appointment in 2017 as at the time of termination, he had not passed part 1 exam. He is aware defendant is a specialist hospital that also offers general medicine to both in patent and outpatient anybody can attend hospital as it has clinic. The clinic is general place for staff clinic and their relations. The defendant is an accredited training center. He (claimant) is aware of the letter written to the defendant asking defendant to relieve the claimant of his residency as he has not passed part 1 and 2 of the fellowship. He (claimant) is aware of regulations on residency requires passing of part 1 within 3 years. That same regulation gave 3 years to pass part 2 fellowships. The pay slip he tendered is through IPPISS system. The defendant is not his pension administrator, but, is saddled with responsibility of deduction and remittance. His grouse is he was terminated without due process without fair hearing and maliciously up to 2021, he was not aware of termination until 30/6/2021, that was the time he was served with letter of termination. Mr. M Omale is a lawyer who came when he got wind of something is in the offing. He insisted he want come to hospital to plead. Up to 30/6/2022, he was not served with letter of termination. When his lawyer came is not in respect of letter from West Africa College of Medicine.

5.      In proof of its defence, the defendant called three witnesses to testify on its behalf.

6.      The first witness of the defendant is one Deborah Orok Asuquo, who is the Head of Legal Department of the defendant. The witness testified as DW1. DW1 adopted her witness statement on oath as her evidence in this case. Twenty Six documents were tendered in evidence through DW1. They were admitted in evidence and marked as exhibit D1 to D26. DW1 was cross examined at the end she was discharged.

7.      Under cross examination, DW1 stated that she is conversant with claimant’s employment as at the time of his employment on residency, he was a qualified Doctor. He was employed under residency and it has peculiar conditions of service. And the regulatory body for residency programme is post graduate medical college. The regulating body stepped in when defendant derailed in following regulation. The regulatory body do direct who exit the programme. They do tell the doctors to employ as residence. They do not tell which doctor to employ as residence, but when we chose to employ they come under guideline.

8.      The witness confirmed content of exhibit C, and D26. D26 contains termination of employment, exhibit C is termination of employment in 2017. In exhibit C no involvement of regulating body. The appointment on locum and residency technically are the same. The conditions and guideline of appointment are same, exhibits A and D8. By exhibit D8 the claimant is required to take exam for the duration of residency. What was terminated by exhibit C is residency. By exhibit D26, claimant was to exit because he did not pass his examination. Exhibit E has no signature but no is Dr. Timi. By exhibit D22 claimant wrote about his promotion which has nothing to do with reinstatement or termination. The defendant has responded to his letter it was based on the letter his lawyer Mr. M. Omale came from Kaduna to plead on his behalf. The claimant was given notice as per exhibit D26, he was served through his lawyer and DHL.

9.      The second defendant’s witness is Mrs. Ekweni Davies, Director Administration of the defendant, who testified as DW2. DW2 adopted her witness statement on oath as her evidence in this case. No document was tendered through DW2. DW2 was cross examined by the claimant’s counsel and she was discharged after her cross examination.

10. The evidence of DW2 under cross examination is to the effect that the conditions of service are not same. The first letter of offer was when claimant finished his NYSC, he was given exhibit A. The second letter exhibit D8 came as leniency, because he was asked to leave like others. DW2 stated that she spoke with the claimant personally and asked him to change his specialty or facility. However, as a result of begging, following termination of his 2020, he was allowed to stay and pass his examination. The claimant was served with notice of termination. They look for him to serve him with letter of termination, but he changed his address. It was sent to his address it was returned that he was not there and he was not picking calls. Exhibit E was drawn in error. The appropriate person to testify on it is coming. Dr. Timi in 2017 acknowledge his letter of employment.

11. The third witness for the defendant is Dr. Tunjo Osim Onyaku, head of clinical services of the defendant, he testified as DW3. DW3 adopted his witness statement on oath as his evidence in this case. No document was tendered through DW3.

12. Under cross examination DW3 testified that he was aware of claimant’s case after his failure to pass exam. Claimant was withdrawn from residency after locum appointment. The letter of withdrawal was served on the claimant. He is aware claimant was in court because his appointment as locum was terminated and his salary stopped. He is not aware whether termination on locum basis was served on him. It is natural procedure to prepare duty roaster. They don’t sign time. I do go round to check whether doctors are on duty.

 THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT.

13. The Claimant’s case is that he was employed by the Defendant in October, 2010 for the Residency Training Program where he was expected to go through and pass the exams and was on salaries like every other person. See exhibits A and B his Appointment letter and pay slip. The Claimant pleaded that by his appointment he was expected to write and pass post graduate exams under the watch of the National Post Graduate Medical College. On the 9^th day of March, 2017 the Claimant’s appointment of 2010 was terminated by the Defendant without advice from the National Post Graduate Medical College. See exhibits C and L. However, in August, 2017 he was given another appointment by the Defendant, this time, on Locum Tenens basis, and upon the same salary structure. See exhibits D, M and N. according to the Claimant the new appointment was renewable on three monthly bases just as the title of his appointment. The Claimant continued in this employment until sometimes in September, 2020 when the Defendant suddenly ceased to pay his salaries without any explanation and without notice. All entreaties, though verbal by the Claimant to know why his salary was stopped fell on deaf ears. The Defendants had the opportunity of righting this wrong of terminating the Claimant’s salaries without notice when he personally wrote his complain in October, 2020, but they still chose not to notify him formally by serving him with the purported letter terminating his contract or any form of notice howsoever. See exhibit F. It was not until June, 2021 when the purported termination of his appointment was communicated to the Claimant’s Solicitors through a response to the Solicitor’s enquiries. Once again, not directly to the Claimant. The Defendant’s excuses for not serving/communicating the Claimant’s termination is that they could not serve him because he moved out of his address, but they (the Defendants) signed and received correspondences from him. This is absurd because the Claimant’s name was still on the Defendant’s duty roaster even after the purported termination, and staffs of the Defendant were still communicating with the Defendant months after the purported termination. See exhibit E. It is as surprising as it is intriguing, taking a cursory look at Exhibit D25 tendered by the Defendant that the Chief Medical Director of the Defendant will write a reference letter on the 30^th July, 2021 admitting that the Claimant is an employee that he knows, one year after he was purportedly fired and yet the Defendant want this court to believe that the Defendant could not be found to receive his notice of termination of his appointment.

14. The reliance on exhibit D25 by the claimant cannot establish existence of claimant’s appointment with the defendant, as there is nothing in it on existence of employment relationship as at the time the letter of recommendation was written.

15. There is also no evidence or proof of service of the termination letter on the Claimant.

16. It was upon receiving the response of the Defendant through his Solicitors in July, 2021 that the Claimant decided to pursue his predicament/grouse before this honorable court. The main grouse of the Claimant is the validity of the termination of his appointment and non-payment of his salaries.

THE CASE OF THE DEFENDANT

17. The Defendant is a Federal Government Institution, a Single Specialty Hospital, created to carry on specialized health services, cater for psychiatry related and allied issues and carry-out Residency Psychiatric Trainings. After his youth service, the Claimant applied to be placed under the Residency Training Programme via a letter dated 14^th June 2010, exhibit D1, titled “Application for the post of Residency Doctor Federal Psychiatric Hospital, Calabar”. The Defendant upon the receipt of the Claimant’s application offered him an appointment via a letter dated the 29^th day of October 2010, exhibit D2.  As stated on the face of the letter, the effective date of the Claimant’s appointment was the 1^st day of November, 2010. The Claimant accepted the appointment via his letter dated the 2^nd day of November 2010, exhibit D4. The claimant worked with the Defendant until his appointment was terminated on the 9^th day of March 2017, as per exhibit C (hereinafter called the “first termination”). The Claimant’s employment was terminated at that point because after 7 years of being in the residency programme, the Claimant had still not been able to pass Part I of the Fellowship Examination, requisite for his stay in the Training Programme,  even after more than four (4) sponsorships by the Defendant.

18. Upon the “first termination”, the Claimant began to rally round and held confabs with different Management staff (including the Medical Director at that time, Dr. Joseph Okegbe), on the possibilities of being reabsorbed on a temporary basis. On some occasions, he came with delegation from the Association of Residency Doctors (ARD), Federal Neuro-Psychiatric Hospital, Calabar Branch to hold brief and plead his case, that he be appointed on a temporary basis  under the same regulations and specialty, assuring the management that he would put himself together and write and pass the requisite examinations as soon as the “window” was reopened to him, see his hand-written application titled “Request for Locum Appointment” dated the 15^th day of May, 2017; and the Defendant’s response of the same date appointing him temporarily, exhibit D8.

19. As stated earlier, the Defendant’s offering to the Claimant was on a locum/temporary basis because after his termination, many intercessions were made on his behalf and the letter was supposed to act as a stop-gap to enable the Claimant put his act together by changing specialty and moving to another training center and concentrate to study to pass the examinations. It is pertinent to state here that the Claimant was not appointed as a “Sessional Doctor” but as a Registrar on locum basis (a title which he acknowledged and used in all his applications).

20. That irrespective of the stop-gap and grace period granted to the Claimant, after 10 years he still had not passed the requisite examination thus, via a letter dated the 29^th day of July, 2020, exhibit D26, the Claimant’s Residency Training Programme was terminated and in line with the regulations for the termination of the Residency Training Programme based on the express recommendation of the National Post Graduate Medical College of Nigeria, who had written to the Defendant on the 24^th day of March, 2020, exhibit D21, alongside all other Residency Training Institutions/Centers in the country, wherein they listed Doctors who had not passed their examination and overstayed the system, mandating and instructing that the Residency Training Institutions/Centers to ensure that such Doctors exit the Residency Training Programme to allow new intakes have a shot at the training. Unfortunately, the Claimant’s name was listed in the said letter. See exhibit D21.

21. The truth is that, by the regulations governing the Residency Training Programmes in Psychiatry (particularly paragraph b( ii) – b(iii)), the Claimant had a three (3) year period within which to pass his Part 1 examination and then another three (3) year period within which to pass Part II. In other words, he was to pass Part I and II within six years of joining the programme. These are the strict guidelines for career progression in the Residency Training Programme in Psychiatry which conditions the Claimant and every other Doctor under the scheme agreed to be bound by, when they applied.  The Defendant stood the risk of being blacklisted as a Residency Training Institutions/Centre, if it flouted the order of the Regulatory Body. This was a risk it was not willing to take no matter whose ox would be gored, seeing also as this was the right thing to be done by the training programme scheme to ensure that the training produces worthy candidates. It is against the termination of 29^th day of July, 2020, that the Claimant has brought the instant action seeking the reliefs on the Complaint against the Defendant.

THE SUBMISSION OF THE DEFENDANT.

22. Eno Edet, Esq; who franked the defendant’s final written address, in oral adumbration before the court, relied on the written address as his argument in this case. Counsel urged the court to in view of the argument canvassed dismissed the claim of the claimant for being frivolous, vexatious and abuse of process. In the written address a single issue was formulated for determination, to wit:-

“Whether based on the totality of the evidence in this case, the peculiar facts and circumstances herein and having regard to applicable laws, the Claimant has proved his case to the standard required by law to be entitled to the reliefs sought”?.

23. Counsel submitted that the issue though a single one, plays hosts to adjunct issues each of which itch for a distinct settlement. Counsel craves indulgence of the court to address the sub-issues, which he classify as separate posers.

FIRST POSER –  WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE CLAIMANT?

24. In arguing this poser counsel submitted that the law is trite that he who asserts must prove. The general rule of burden of proof in civil cases lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were adduced on either side; this is settled by Sections 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The Supreme Court stated the law thus: “whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts shall prove that those facts exist.” See CPC v. INEC & Ors. (2011) LPELR- 8257 (SC), Blessed Inoma Ext, Nig. Ltd. & Anor. V. Union Bank of Nig. PLC (2023) LPELR-21234 CA and Jack v. Comm. of Police, Rivers State & Ors. (2023) LPELR-2286 (CA).

25. It is submission of counsel that what the Claimant has proved, which the Defendant agrees with, is that the Claimant was an appointee of the Defendant by virtue of the fact that he applied to be in the Residency Training Programme for which the Defendant was a Training Centre under the supervision of the National Post Graduate Medical College of Nigeria, the Regulatory Body. See Exhibit A, particularly the 1^st paragraph which reads “I write on behalf of the management of the Federal Psychiatric  Hospital, Calabar, to offer you appointment to the post if REGISTRAR IN THE RESIDENCY TRAINING PROGRAMME in the Hospital ..”

26. Counsel submitted that it is pertinent to state that, it is the Regulatory Body that grants Training Accreditation to Centers like the Defendant herein, which is why it is not all Psychiatric Hospitals in Nigeria that are Training Centers. It is based on the accreditation of the Defendant by the Regulatory Body that it can appoint Doctors who apply to it like the Claimant herein, into the Residency Training Scheme. The prerequisite for the continuous employment of the Claimant with the Defendant was based on his passing his examination as spelt out by the Regulatory Body in its Regulations, exhibit D3, which was attached to exhibit D2, the appointment letter. Counsel submitted that the Claimant as CW1 confirmed on the 9^th day of February 2023 during cross examination, that he has not only seen the Regulations, but that he agreed to be bound by them which was why he accepted the Offer. Counsel refers to the Regulations Governing the Residency Training Programmes in Psychiatry (particularly paragraph b(ii) – b(iii))- Exhibit D3. The Claimant made admissions to the existence and knowledge of the Regulations. My Lord, the law is settled that facts admitted need no further proof. See Section 20 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and the case of Mba V. Mba (2018) LPELR-44295 (SC), where the apex court stated thus:

“it is trite law and now fully settled that whatever fact is admitted needs no further proof. Such fact is deemed established. In other words, any admitted facts, or fact not disputed or not specially denied, need no further proof and will be deemed established.’ Similarly, in the case of MTN Nigeria Communications LTD v. Olajire A. Esuola (2018) LPELR-43952 (CA), the court stated thus: ‘The pleading and evidence of the Appellant and its witness are an admission of the facts pleaded by the Respondent. What is admitted in a pleading does not need any further proof”.

27. Counsel continued his submission that under cross-examination, DW1 stated as regards the Claimant’s status thus;

“He was employed solely as a Trainee under residency training programme, it is a peculiar arrangement”.

28. It is submission of counsel that vide exhibit A and exhibit D8 the temporary appointment of the Claimant, the parties are in agreement that the Claimant was an appointee of the Defendant by virtue of the fact that he was in the Residency Training Programme.

SECOND POSER – WERE THERE CONDITIONS AND HAD THE CLAIMANT FULFILLED THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED FOR HIS CONTINUOUS STAY WITH THE DEFENDANT?

29. In arguing counsel submitted the simple answer to the above poser is that by both the letter of 29^th October 2010 and 15^th May 2017 (exhibits D1 which has D3 attached and D8) there were conditions attached to the appointment of the Claimant. As stated earlier the Claimant was appointed in the Residency Training Programme with the Defendant on the conditions stated on the face of the letter and in the Regulations attached to the Employment letter. Counsel at this juncture reproduced paragraphs 5 and 6 of exhibit D1.

30. You will be on probation during the entire period of the Residency Programme. However, the period of residency may be credited for pension purposes. The Hospital is not bound to retain or offer appointment to Residents who successfully complete the programme.

31. If you fail to complete the programme within the stipulated period, you would be asked to withdraw from the programme.

32. Counsel continued his submission that the failure to complete the programme within the stipulated time would be tantamount to being asked to leave the programme. Amongst others those are the conditions. The Regulations exhibit D3 spells it out more appropriately.

33. Counsel submitted that vide the Regulations, the Claimant had three (3) years to pass his Part I and another three (3) years to pass Part II. Counsel also refers to exhibit D3, the Regulations Governing the Residency Training Programmes in Psychiatry particularly paragraph b(ii) – b(iii) –

b(ii).   A period of three (3) years is allowed for Resident to pass the Part 1 Fellowship Examination from the date of joining the programme even if the candidate has passed the primary.

b(iii).  A period of three (3) years is allowed for Residents to pass the Part 11 Fellowship Examination from the date of passing Part 1.

34. It is submitted that the prerequisite for the continuous employment of the Claimant with the Defendant was based on his passing his examination as spelt out above. The Claimant had 6 years to do Part I and II, unfortunately, he did not pass Part I in 10 years. According to counsel the conditions necessary for the stay of the Claimant in the training scheme had not been fulfilled. It is trite law that once a condition is incorporated into an agreement, that condition must be fulfilled before the effect can flow. All conditions are (a) conditions precedent i.e. the sine qua non to getting the thing; or conditions subsequent, which keeps and continues the thing. See Tsokwa Oil Marketing Co. (Nig) Ltd v. Bank of the North Ltd. (2002) LPELR-3268 (SC); (2002) 11 NWLR (Pt.777) 153 @ 196 - 197 H – A.

35. DW3 during his cross-examination has stated thus:

“I went through the Residency Programme and I have personal knowledge of the strict adherence to the Regulations thereat.”

36. It is further submitted that, even if the Claimant had successfully completed his programme with the Defendant, they are by virtue of the agreement and clauses in exhibit D1 not bound to retain or offer appointment to Claimant. See paragraph 5 reproduced above. Counsel submitted that it is trite law that parties are bound by the terms of their agreement. See also AG Nassarawa State v. AG Plateau State (2012) LPELR -9730 (SC).

37. Counsel submitted that even the Claimant as CW1 under cross examination stated as follows:

“I was comfortable with the employment and terms which is why I accepted the offer until I began to have issues, because I failed four times so I became disgruntled and went to the National Human Right Commission.”

38. According to counsel the Claimant stated expressly that he was comfortable with the terms; the terms could not later have changed solely because the Claimant has now found them inconveniencing.  It is also trite law that where a contract is made subject to the fulfillment of certain specific terms and conditions, as in the instance case, the contract is not formed and not binding unless and until those terms and conditions are complied with or fulfilled.  See BPS Construction & Engineering CO. Ltd v. FCDA (2017) LPELR-42516(SC) and Best (Nig) Ltd v. Blackwood Hodge Nig Ltd. & Anor (2011) LPELR-776(SC).

39. Counsel also submitted that the Claimant’s attempt at relying on exhibit D8 is untenable because as stated earlier and at the risk of repetition, the said Letter of 15^th May 2017, which is Exhibit D8 which had the same conditions as the D1, is by its very wordings and nature a temporary one which is time based and which was issued as a stop gap to help the Claimant put himself in order. To buttress the point being made counsel reproduced the first paragraph of exhibit D8 as follows:-

“I am directed to refer to your application dated 15^th May, 2017, and to convey approval to you, for your appointment as a Registrar, on three (3) monthly Locum basis, in Federal Neuropsychiatric Hospital, Calabar”.

40. Counsel argued that even by virtue of exhibit D8, the Claimant temporary appointment should have lapsed in August 2017, after three months, but for the benevolence of the management team who kept him on hoping he would change institutions or put himself together and pass his examinations.

41. Finally it is pertinent to take note of the fact that even CW1 acknowledged that he had not met the conditions when he stated under cross examination that:

“At the time the Defendant terminated my appointed in 2017, I had still not passed Part one of my examination”.

THIRD POSER: WAS THE TERMINATION OF THE CLAIMANT VALID AND COULD THE DEFENDANT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO EXERCISE ANY DISCRETION AFTER MARCH 2020?

42. Counsel’s answer to the first part of the poser is yes and the second part is no. This is because the termination of the Claimant was valid, because it was done in compliance with the terms of the Claimant’s appointment. The termination of claimant’s appointment did not breach the terms of employment. Indeed the law is trite that the terms of disengagement must come from the terms of engagement to support this contention counsel relied on the case of Eze v. N.A.M.A. & ORS. (2016) LPELR-41453(CA) where the Court of Appeal held thus:

"It is therefore clear from above that the employment of the Appellant was terminated according to the terms and conditions of service of the 1^st Respondent as per the employment letter (Exhibit F1)… see LAYADE v PANALPINA WORLD TRANSPORT NIG LTD (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt.456) 544 where the Court held: "In all contracts of employment, the Courts must be wary of looking outside their terms, for the terms that govern the relationship between the employer and employee and where the terms spell out unambiguously how and when to terminate the employment and the termination is carried out in the manner provided by the terms that termination is not wrongful. Parties must be bound by their contract and to look outside the terms of the contract to avoid termination makes no meaning of the contract". The termination of employment did not breach the terms of employment and consequently, I find it lawful." Per YARGATA BYENCHIT NIMPAR, JCA (Pp 13 - 14 Paras B - A).

43. Counsel urged the court to hold that the termination of the Claimant’s appointment was done in compliance with the rules of his engagement. It is important to note DW’s  evidence in chief as follows:

“By the Regulation, it was expected that from the date of joining the Programme, a Resident had a period of three (3) years to pass Part 1 Fellowship Examination and another period of three years from the date of passing the said Part 1 Fellowship Examination to pass Part II Fellowship Examination. To my knowledge up until now, he has still not passed the Examination which is a pre-requisite for stay in the Residency Programme.”

44. Finally counsel reproduced the 2^nd paragraph of Exhibit C (the Letter dated 9^th March, 2017) as follows:

“This is because you have overstayed the stipulated period of your training programme due to your inability to pass the prescribed examinations.

45. Counsel submitted that both the first termination and the final termination were valid.

46. As the next plank of argument is that the Defendant, like other Training Institutions receives instructions from the Regulatory Body – the National Postgraduate Medical College of Nigeria. It suffices to restate that it is the mother body that gives the accreditation to the Defendant, as it pertains to the training, the Defendant cannot work in isolation, it would have been fool hardy for the Defendant to continue in wrong doing and flaunt the regulations having received a direct order. It could not risk the continuous stay of the Claimant under its employ, which was why when the Regulatory Body gave express orders, the Defendant had to let the Claimant go. See exhibit D21, the letter of 24^th March 2020.

47. Counsel submitted that the said exhibit D21 was not a request, it was an express order by the Regulatory Body; this order was also not made recklessly, it was made in compliance with the Regulations to accommodate more Trainees. Even the Claimant as CW1 under cross-examination confirmed this when he stated thus:

“the Defendant is an accredited training center and they receive information and instructions as regards the psychiatric training from the regulatory body.”

48. On her part, DW1 stated that it was when they, that is the Defendant refused to follow strictly the Regulations, that the Regulatory body stepped in by sending exhibit D21. In her words:

“The regulating body for Residency Programme is National Postgraduate Medical College of Nigeria and they stepped in when we derailed in following the regulations to send the Claimant away even after 10 years.”

She stated further that:

“Exhibit D26 was made as a result of D21 for the Claimant to exit the Defendant because the Claimant had not passed his exam.”

49. According to counsel it is by the joint effects of exhibits D8 and D21 that the Claimant’s termination in exhibit D26 was valid and in compliance with D1 and D3 and the Defendant had no discretion to exercise in the matter.

POSER FOUR: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF SOME DOCUMENTS TENDERED BY THE CLAIMANT?

50. In arguing this poser counsel submitted that the Claimant’s exhibits B, E, M & N which were wrongly admitted being computer generated documents that did not comply with Section 84 of the Evidence Acts, 2011 be expunged from the Court’s record and no probative value whatsoever placed on them as the conditions stipulated in Section 84 were not complied with by the Claimant. Counsel submitted that the said provisions of section 84 are mandatory. In support of this contention counsel refers to the case of Kubor vs. Dickson, (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 676) 392 at 429 para H. The said exhibits B, E, M & N should not have been admitted in the first place. However, the Courts do not leave us hopeless as the court envisaging this legal faux-pas upheld that a document wrongly admitted can be expunged and should be expunged and not relied on. This issue counsel relied on the decision in the cases of Brossette Manufacturing (Nig) Ltd. v. M/S Ola Ilemobola Ltd & Ors (2007) LPELR-809 (SC) and Loben Investment Co-operative Multipurpose Society Ltd. vs.  FRN (2019) LPELR-47325(CA) at 37-38 paras A-A.

51. On exhibit E which is an unsigned document, the law is trite that unsigned document is a worthless document for which no weight is to be attached. Counsel urged the court not to attach any weight to it. In all counsel urged the court to expunged exhibits B, E, M & N from it records.

52. Counsel proffer arguments on the merit as regards the documents in the event that the court decides to the contrary.

POSER FIVE: IS THE CLAIMANT ENTITLED TO ANY OF THE 5 RELIEFS SOUGHT?

53. In arguing this poser counsel submitted that the answer to this question is a resounding NO. The law is trite that a plaintiff has to first prove his own case with cogent and credible evidence before the burden or onus shifts to the Defendant; in the instant case that was not remotely done.

54. According to counsel having regards to the pleading and evidence of Claimant, he has not proved any of the sub-heads of his reliefs. It is important to note that the crux of this case is that the Claimant is purportedly contesting the validity of his termination and making claims for payment of his unpaid salaries.

55. Counsel submitted that in law the duty is on employee alleging wrongful termination of employment, to prove such assertion, this is in line with the decision of the Court of Appeal Owerri Division per Mbaba, J.C.A held is that:

“It is the duty of an employee complaining of wrongful termination of employment to state the provisions of the statute that have not been complied with by the employer in the course of the discipline, whether terminating of his appointment or dismissal was wrong. Therefore, where an employee alleges wrongful termination or dismissal, the onus will usually be on him to prove wrongful termination or dismissal as the case may be”.

See also Onwusukwu V. Civil Service Commission (2020) 10 NWLR   1731) 179 @ 200 Paras. D-F.

56. Counsel submitted that flowing from the above judicial decision, the logical issues to be considered in the circumstance of this case is, what are the terms of his employment/condition of service as mutually agreed upon by himself and the Defendant and as contained in his employment letter? The Claimant although pleaded his employment letter which was admitted as Exhibit A. He did not lead evidence as to the way and manner the terms and conditions of his employment was breached rather he based his assertions on the frivolous claims and comparison with other Colleagues.

57. Counsel placing reliance on sections 131, 132 and 133(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 which deals with burden of proof resting on the person who asserts the existence of a claim to prove same and who must fail, if he does not succeed in establishing the claim, it is clear that the Claimant from his pleading and evidence, has not proved why this Honourable Court should grant his prayers as contained in his statement of facts. He did not even tender the document (that is his termination letter of 29^th July 2020) which was the crux and his major grouse against the Defendant. Counsel submitted that on its own even without a defence from the Defendant, this suit ought to fail. Counsel urged the court to so find and hold.

58. Counsel submitted assuming without conceding that the court would still want to consider the reliefs sought by the Claimant for whatever it is worth, counsel will proceed to consider the reliefs sought by the Claimant in this case:

59. A DECLARATION that the Claimant was in a contract of employment/service with the Defendant and was entitled to Notices and emoluments.

60. With regard to relief 1 counsel submitted that the Claimant was in a conditional relationship with the Defendant and the Claimant was given the requisite notices informing him of the termination of that contractual relationship. This according to counsel is due to a plethora of reasons, in no particular order, counsel state that during cross examination CW1 confirmed that he briefed a certain M. Omale Esq., of the Fauz Law Firm to write the Letter of 12^th August to the Defendant – Exhibit D22. He further agreed that he saw the response of the Defendant written on the 25^th day of September 2020, exhibit D23. Counsel submitted that the issue of termination  was mentioned in the said Exhibit D23, the DW1 even stated during her cross examination that she attached the terminations letter to the said Exhibit D23 by which the Claimant was further made aware of his termination. See paragraph 5 of the second page of Exhibit D23.

61. Again DW1 under the heat of cross examination maintained that a copy of the letter was sent to the Claimant to his home address since he had stopped coming to work, she said another copy was sent through DHL and another copy given to him through his Lawyer M. Omale via the Defendant’s letter of 25^th September 2020. See DW1’s evidence given on 10^th May 2023. Counsel contended it is not true as stated by the Claimant that he got wind of his termination on the 30^th of June 2021.

62. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to all his emoluments and contributions for services rendered for the period of time he was in the service of the Defendant.

63. It is submission of counsel that the Claimant was paid his dues. Exhibits M and N tendered by him prove this. Counsel contend that even the payment evidenced by Exhibits M and N were paid out of the magnanimity of the Government and indeed the Defendant who did not query the Claimant because he had become disgruntled and stopped working way before D26 was made.

64. During his cross examination DW3 stated thus:

“I know that over time the Claimant became discouraged and stopped attending to clients when he was at work or stayed away totally on other occasions. “

65. Counsel further submitted that even by the Pay slips Exhibits B, M, N, it is not the Defendant that is the Pension Fund Administrator of the Claimant furthermore, it is not the Defendant who pays the Claimant, rather the Claimant is captured under the IPPIS.

66. During the cross examination of CW1 the following occurred -

a.      Q – is the Defendant your Pension Administrator.

b.      A -  No, the Defendant is not my Pension Administrator but they are saddled with the responsibility of deduction and remittance.

67. A DECLARATION that the act of the Defendant terminating the appointment of Claimant by a letter dated the 29^th July, 2020, but communicated via a letter dated 30^th June, 2021 is wrongful.

68. As stated earlier the termination of the Claimant’s appointment was communicated to him via 3 channels. DW1 stated under cross-examination that “a copy of the letter was dropped a day after it was written, on the 30^th day of July 2020, at the Claimant’s home address since he had stopped coming to work, another copy was sent through DHL and another copy given to him through his Lawyer M. Omale via the our letter of 25^th September 2020.

69. It is not true as stated by the Claimant that he got wind of his termination on the 30^th of June 2021 because apart from the reasons already stated, the Claimant confirmed during his cross examination that his lawyer M. Omale visited the Defendant in December 2020 to discuss his termination.

70. DW3 also stated this under cross examination thus:

“I am aware after failure to pass exam claimant was withdrawn from his residence after locum appointment. The letter of withdrawal and termination was served on Claimant; I am his direct Supervisor so I know”.

71. AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to pay the Claimant’s monthly salaries of N331,261.67 (Three hundred and thirty one thousand two hundred and sixty One Naira Sixty-Seven Kobo) from the month of September, 2020 until 30^th of June, 2021.

72. Counsel adopted his argument in respect of reliefs A, B and C and  by extension state that the Claimant is not entitled to any salary for September, 2020 until 30^th of June, 2021, because he rendered no services to be entitled to them. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of Olatunbosun V. NISER Council (1988) LPELR-2574(SC), where it was held is that:

“The law is that a servant who has been unlawfully dismissed cannot claim his wages for services he never rendered; Denmark Production Ltd. vs. Boscobel Productions Ltd. (1968) 1 All ER 513 at p. 524”.

73. Thus, in the case of Mr. C.C. Nwafor v. Anambra State Education Commission & Ors. (2017) LPELR-42026(CA), the Court of Appeal, per Joseph Tine Tur, JCA cited with approval the above case of Olatunboson v. NISER Council (supra), and held thus:

“An employee is entitled to wages and salaries/allowances during the period of his or her lawful engagement in service. No employer is under any obligation to pay salaries/wages/allowances to an employee who has not worked for the period of his employment. For example, a dismissed employee can only claim emoluments he had worked for in the course of his employment. What the appellant was entitled to was the arrears of his emolument for the period he actually worked for the employer. See Olatunbosun v. NISER (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25; N.M.B. vs. Adewunmi (1972) 11 SC. 111 and Adekunle v. WRFC (1963) WRNLR 6”.

74. Counsel further submitted that an employee is only entitled to wages and salaries/allowances during the period of his or her lawful engagement in service and not otherwise. On this reliance was placed on the cases of Mr. C.C. Nwafor v. Anambra State Education Commission & Ors. (2017), Olatunbosun v. NISER Council (Supra), N.M.B. v. Adewunmi (1972)11 SC 111 and Adekunle v. W.R.F.C (1963) W.R.N.L.R 6.

75. Counsel urged the court to hold that the Claimant is not entitled to this relief.

76. AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay N500,000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) to the claimant as damages for the wrongful termination of the Appointment.

77. Counsel submitted that the claimant is not entitled to this claim because none of the terminations of the Claimant in exhibits C and D26 were wrongful as they were actually long overdue.

78. It is also submission of counsel that for damages to be awarded to the Claimant, he must have been wrongfully dismissed. In support of this submission counsel relied on the Supreme Court decision, per Chukwuma-Eneh J.S.C where he held thus:

“...damages in an action of wrongful determination of employment can only follow events where termination is wrongful.” In OSOH V. UNITY BANK PLC (2013) 9 NWLR (PT. 1358) 1 @ 34 PARA E.

79. Counsel submitted from the above facts, totality of the evidence adduced, arguments canvassed and the authorities cited, it is clear that the claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought in this suit, as he was dismissed in line with the provision of the terms and conditions contained in his employment letter. The Claimant as such is not entitled to general damages as claimed by him. The Claimant failed woefully to prove his entitlement to the reliefs sought by him.

80. In concluding his submission counsel argued that the claimant has not proved his case to the standard required by law thus, counsel urged the court to dismiss this suit with ignominy whilst  awarding cost to be paid to the Defendant.

THE SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT.

81. Counsel for the claimant formulated single issue for determination to wit:

Whether considering the pleadings, the evidence led and the documents before the court, the Claimant has not made out sufficient ground to entitle him to damages for termination of his employment without notice.

82. Counsel began his submission by submitting that what the Claimant had with the Defendant was a contract of employment which conditions are contained in the letter of appointment given to the Claimant. See exhibits A & D. The Claimant’s appointment letters did not show or indicated that notice shall be given in the event that the Defendant resolves to terminate his appointment, on the other hand, where the Claimant intends to leave the employment he was expected to give notice to the Defendant.

83. The Claimant has shown by his pleadings that he was an employee of the Defendant and by his exhibits A and D there is no dispute between the parties that the Claimant was employed by the Defendant. The terms and conditions of the service are as contained in the Claimant’s appointment letters. Also, by his pleadings and evidence the Claimant did show that the first appointment was terminated by way of a Notice, see exhibit C though without the advice of the Regulating authority which retains the powers to advise. The Claimant also pleaded and gave evidence that he was further retained by way of another appointment via exhibit D which by its very nature was practically the same thing as the earlier one and placed on the same conditions. These pieces of evidence were not disputed and or controverted by the Defendant. counsel submitted that the Claimant need not further prove that he was indeed employed by the Defendant who at some point terminated his appointment by way of notice (exhibit C), but further gave him another one in another instance. To buttress the point being made counsel relied on the time tested doctrine of our law that facts admitted needs no further proof. See Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011, thus:

“No facts need be proved in any civil proceeding which the parties to the proceedings or their agents agree to admit at the hearing or which before the hearing they agree by writing under their hands or which by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings: Provided that the court may in its discretions, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions”. See the case of AJI vs ABBA & ORS (2014) LPELR 24362 CA where the court held thus, "... Therefore, what is admitted needs no further proof at the trial. See Andony vs. Ayi II & Ors. (2004) All FWLR (Pt.227) 444 at 482 and Elendu vs. Ekwoaba (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt.386) 704 at 747. No one sets out to prove that which is admitted. See Olale vs. Ekwelendu (1989) 7 SCNJ (Pt.2) 62 at 102. The exception is if the facts admitted could not have been within the knowledge of the party. See Seismograph Services vs. Eyuafe (1976) 1 FNLR 162 at 169; Okesuji vs. Lawal (1991) 2 SCNJ 1 at 9-10 and Isa vs. Okeke (1973) NNLR 69. If that happens, the oral testimony might be in conflict with the evidence on record. The appellant was entitled to take advantage of the facts admitted in paragraphs 12-17 of the amended statement of claim in the given circumstances. See Awote vs. Owodunmi (1987) 5 SCNJ 1; Faleju vs. Amosu (1983) 10 SC 1; Ojiegbe vs. Okwaranyia (1962) 1 All NLR 605 at 610 and Nwawuba vs. Enemuo (1988) 5 SCNJ 152."

84. According to counsel the admission above though rife and replete both in the pleadings and evidence by both parties, the Claimant did do justice to these facts when he led evidence and was cross-examined. He maintained without equivocation that he was an employee of the Defendant, he showed by pleading documentary evidence of his employment and did not mince words in showing that his first appointment was terminated via a notice, but was given another appointment in different name, but the same conditions, all of which were not denied nor controverted during cross-examination. The Claimant showed without ambiguity the authorities over him, who were to appoint and dismiss. The Claimant by his pleading also showed that the second appointment was terminated by the Defendant without notice. He went ahead to demonstrate this pleading in his evidence when he adopted his witness statement on oath and was cross-examined. The Claimant showed that he only knew about the termination of his appointment when his lawyer wrote the Defendant in June, 2021 despite his haven written to the Defendant in October, 2020 and May, 2021. He led evidence to show that despite the receipt of his complaint since October 2020 the Defendant maliciously decided not to notify him, if at all, that his services were no longer required. In fact the Defendant did not take steps to notify him personally until the commencement of this action.

85. According to counsel up till the date of filing this suit there has not been any form of personal service of the ‘letter of termination” to the Claimant by the Defendant.

86. Counsel submitted that the Claimant has proved all that he is required of him to entitle him to the grant of his prayers as stated in his Statement of Facts. The requirement of the law and what the Claimant needs to show is not far-fetched, and as succinctly put by the Court in a plethora of cases. In contract of employment or service generally, where an employee alleges wrongful termination of the employment by the employer, the onus lies on him, in law to prove that the termination of his appointment was wrongful or unlawful in order to succeed in the claims he makes against the employer. To discharge the burden, he must prove that:- a) He is an employee of the employer b) Place before the Court the facts by way of pleadings, the terms and conditions of the employment, c) Who can appoint and who can terminate the appointment, d) In what situations or circumstances the appointment can properly be determined. In support of this submission counsel placed reliance on the cases of OKOMU OIL PALM CO. LTD. V. ISERHIENRHIEN (2001) 6 NWLR (710) 660; EMOKPAE V UNIBEN (2002) 17 NWLR (795) 139; NIG. GAS CO. LTD. V. DUDUSOLA (2005) 18 NWLR (751) 292.

87. It is also the submission of counsel that the law is settled that the terms and conditions of a contract of employment or service are the bedrock of any case where the issue of wrongful termination of employment is the basis of the claims made by the plaintiff. Such terms and conditions of contract of the employment are required to be pleaded and placed before the Court in evidence. In support of this submission counsel relied on the cases of AMODU V. AMODE (1990) 5 NWLR (150) 356; NIGERIAN GAS CO. LTD. V. DUDUSOLA (2005) 18 NWLR (957) 292; NITEL PLC. V. AKWA (2006) 2 NWLR (964) 391. Also in WAEC & ORS vs IKANG (2013) LPELR 20422 CA the court of Appeal decided that it is also the requirement of law that in a claim for wrongful termination of employment the plaintiff must establish some particulars such as: i. That he is an employee of the defendant; ii. That terms and conditions of his employment; and iii. The way and manner and by whom he can be removed.

88. Counsel submitted that the claimant has proved, without ambiguity, that he was an employee of the Defendant, he has also pleaded, proved and placed before the court his condition of service by proving that he was offered an appointment on Locum Tenens basis. The Claimant went ahead to plead and prove that his appointment which had crystallized to an ordinary master servant relationship was not properly terminated when the Defendant purportedly did so without service of any form notice to the Claimant. This failure invariably translated to wrongful termination of the employment. It has been settled in a plethora of cases that the Claimant’s remedy lies in damages which he now claims.

89. It is submission of counsel that the Claimant does not dispute that the Defendant has the powers to terminate his appointment, but his grouse is that the termination was not done in accordance with any known law, as he was not notified of this termination.

90. It is the submission of counsel that in the case of ADIBUH vs MOBIL OIL (NIG) PLC (2015) LPELR 40987, which is almost on all fours with the case in hand, the court held thus:

"Additionally, though in law, a master has an unfettered right to terminate the appointment of his servant at any time with or without advancing any reason for so doing, it must be borne in mind that the exercise of that right must be done strictly in the manner provided by the law. The 1^st -11^th Respondent maintained that they were never served with letters of termination of their appointment but were only aware of the said termination when they were served with Court processes. Though the Appellant tried to argued otherwise evidence elicited through its only witness showed that C.W.I did not deliver the said termination letters to the 1^st -11^th Respondent and could not say what method was employed to serve the 1^st -11^th respondent with termination letters; the Appellant did not call any witness who served the 1st-11^th Respondent with Exhibit C, C1-C10. The law is that where there is a dispute on the service or non-services of a document proof of service or delivery of such document to such person is established by evidence of the person who served or attempted to serve the document, by dispatch book acknowledging the receipt of the document or by evidence of dispatch by a registered post. See THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF ACTS OF APOSTLE CHURCH V. FATUNDE (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 510) 662 @ 668. In the present appeal, there is no such evidence from the Appellant. In fact the only witness for the Appellant admitted that he did not serve the 1^st -11^th Respondent personally and did not say how they were served with the letters of termination of their appointment. The learned trial Judge was therefore right to hold that there was no proof that the letters of termination of appointment of the 1^st -11^th Respondents were served on them and this negated any notion that they were aware that their various appointments were terminated prior to the institution and service of the process of this suit against them."                                                         Italics ours for emphasis

91. Counsel argued that for all that the Claimant has cried to this court about and the services he rendered to the Defendant, the complaints which is before this court is to determine whether in terminating the Claimant’s appointment the Defendant was reasonable in notifying the Claimant of her resolve to retrench him. What constitutes reasonable notices has also been construed by the courts in plethora of cases. Counsel submitted that the Defendant was wrong and ought to be damnified in damages. In support of this view counsel relied on the case of ADVANCED MARITIME TRANSPORT NIG LTD vs OJUGBOLI & ORS (2018 LPELR) 46265 CA, where the Court of Appeal held thus:

"The law is that, generally, the length of notice required for termination of contracts of employment depends on the intention of the parties as can or may be gathered from their contract and in the absence of any express provision, the Courts will always imply a term that the employment may be terminated by a reasonable notice (from either of the parties); and even where (as clearly provided in clause 21(c) of "Exhibit "B" for persons still under probation) the employer has power to terminate the contract in his absolute discretion, the law enjoins the employer to give reasonable notice to the employee (see Re-African Association and Allen (1910) 1 KB 396)."

92. Counsel also relied on the case of SULAIMAN vs UBA PLC (2015) LPELR 25911, where it was held that:

"What is reasonable notice must vary with facts of each given case; and in determining what amounts to reasonable notice regard must be taken of the circumstances and type of employment, local, professional or trade customs; and, generally, decided cases can only be looked upon as guides for they do not, in the circumstances, lay down any rule of law. The cases of Gabertini v. Waller (1947) 1 All ER 746 and Davson v. France (1959) 109 LJ 526 show that in the circumstances of these cases and the facts therein received in evidence, professionals (theatrical performers in the one case and, in the other, musicians not employed for a fixed term) and their respective service employments terminated in each case with two weeks’ notice. There is hardly anything stated in evidence in the case in hand which makes it unreasonable to terminate the employment of a legal secretary on probation (in this case, the appellant) whose performance was hardly satisfactory to the respondents, with three months' notice which the trial Court felt disposed to allow in favour of the appellant."

93. According to counsel the Claimant who was not served any form of notice of the termination of his employment is entitled to remedy for the wrongful termination of employment. To support this contention counsel cited and relied on the case of MIAPHEN vs UNIJOS CONSULTANCY LTD (2013) LPELR 21904 CA wherein the court decided thus:

"The remedy for wrongful termination in an ordinary contract of employment without statutory flavor is damages in lieu of notice. See IBAMA V. S.P.D.C. (NIG) LTD (2005) 17 NWLR (PT.945 I agree with the view) 364 where Onnoghen JSC held: "Except in employment governed by Statute wherein the procedure for employment and discipline (including dismissal) of an employee are clearly spelt out, any other employment outside the Statute is governed by the terms under which the parties agreed to be master and servant. Employment with statutory backing must be terminated in the way and manner prescribed by the statute, and any other manner of termination inconsistent with the relevant statute is null and void and of no effect. In other cases governed only by agreement of the parties and not by statute, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed to; any other form connotes only wrongful termination or dismissal but not to declare such dismissal null and void, the only remedy is a claim for damages for that wrongful dismissal. This is based on the notion that no servant can be imposed by the Court on an unwilling master even where the master’s behavior is wrong. For this wrongful act, he is only liable in damages and nothing more."

94. Counsel argued that this is the main grouse, and perhaps the crucial grouse that this honorable court has to determine, i.e whether it was proper for the Defendant herein to have terminated the Claimant’s appointment without notice. Incidentally this court, by the evidence already advanced and the pleadings before the court, this court is bound to enter judgment for the Claimant, as doing so justice would have been served.

95. Counsel submitted that going through the arguments canvassed by the Defendant in the final address, it shows a complete misconstruction of the Claimant’s case. However, counsel agrees with the Defendant’s arm of argument that an employee is entitled to his wages/salaries only for the times he worked. According to counsel this is what the Claimant is asking this court for, and then further damages for wrongfully terminating his appointment. Wrongful, as we have argued above, because he was not served any form of notice terminating his appointment. To support his contention counsel relied on the case of C.C. NWAFOR v ANAMBRA STATE EDUCATION COMMISSION & ORS (Sopra).

96. In response to the submission of the defendant on admissibility of some of the documents tendered in evidence, counsel submitted that they all passed the test of admissibility as they are all relevant to the facts in issue. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the arm of the Defendant’s argument which seeks to impugn the same documents which they admitted in their pleadings.

97. In concluding his submission counsel submitted that by the pleadings and authorities cited and relied upon, the Claimant who was not notified of the termination of his appointment is entitled to the arrears for the months he had worked without the notice, and for damages as non-notification amounts to wrongful termination.

        COURT’S DECISION:

98. I have taken time to calmly read through the copious pleadings and evidence adduced by the parties. I have also taken time to scrutinize the several documents tendered and admitted in evidence. I have equally considered the enlightening and verbose submissions of learned counsel for the parties, as well as the several decided cases relied upon by them.

99. Coming to the determination of the claim before the court, it has been established by a long line of decided cases that the burden of proof in civil cases like the case at hand rests always on he who asserts. Therefore, the burden is on the Claimant in the instant case to prove that he is entitled to the reliefs being sought. It is when the Claimant has adduced sufficient cogent, credible and admissible evidence establishing their claim that the burden shift to the Defendant. This is because the Burden of proof in civil cases or matters is not static and may shift in the course of proceedings in a case, depending on the state of pleadings at various stages, the initial evidential Burden of introducing evidence to prove a claim to a legal right or liability based on the assertions of facts upon which right or liability is claimed, is placed on the Claimant and until it is satisfactorily discharged on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence as required under section 134 of the Evidence Act 2011, it does not shift pursuant to section 133(1) of the Act. In this case, the Claimant is the one that desired this court to enter judgment in his favour on his claim. Therefore, the Claimant bore the initial evidential Burden of proving the facts he had asserted and on which he based his claim, if judgment is to be entered in his favour. See Adegoke v. Adibi (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt.242) 410; Agu v. Nnaji (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 103; Onwuama v. Ezeokoli (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt.760) 353; Oyovbiare v. Omamurhonu (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 621) 23; Ike v. Ugboaja(1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.301) 539; Onobruchere v. Esegine (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.19) 799; G. & T. (Inv.) Ltd. v. Witt & Bush Ltd. (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1250) 500; UTC Nigeria Ltd. v. Phillips (2012) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1295) 136; Ikogu v. L.P.D.C. (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1171); Nduul v. Wayo (2018) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1646) 548; U.B.N. Plc v. Ravih Abdul & Co. Ltd (2019) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1659) 203.

100.                     In determining a case the court is enjoined by law to restrict its consideration of the case to the reliefs contained in the claim. Put it differently the court has no power to deviate or jettison the claim of the claimant as adumbrated by the reliefs. In otherwords the claim is determined by the reliefs being sought. See  Gabriel Ativie V Kabelmetal (Nig.) Ltd (2008) LPELR-591(SC); (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt.1095) 399; (2008) 5-6 SC (Pt.ii) 47, where the apex has this to say:-

                                                              i.      ‘‘A claim is circumscribed by the reliefs claimed. The duty of a Plaintiff therefore is to plead only such facts and materials as are necessary to sustain the reliefs and adduce evidence to prove same. He may, at the end of the day obtain all the reliefs claimed or less. He never gets more. Nor does he obtain reliefs not claimed. A court is therefore bound to grant only the reliefs claimed. It cannot grant reliefs not claimed.’’

101.                     In line with the above dictum this court in determining the case of the claimant will be guided by the reliefs being sought. In the circumstances, I shall now consider the reliefs sought by the Claimant vis-à-vis the evidence adduced before the Court so as to see whether the Claimant has justified granting of any of the reliefs being sought.

102.                     A careful perusal of the five (5) reliefs being sought by the claimant from the court shows that, they are of a mixture of declarations and monetary in nature. This means the reliefs can be categorized into two. The first sets of reliefs; a, b and c are praying for declarations. They are the main reliefs. While reliefs d and e, are monetary in nature. They are ancillary claim dependent on grant of the main reliefs.

103.                     In law the court does not make declaration of right either on admission or in default of defence. Therefore, where the court is called upon to make a declaration of a right, it is incumbent on the party claiming to satisfy the court by evidence, not by admission in the pleadings of the defendant, that he is entitled to the declaration. The necessity for this arises from the fact that the court has discretion to grant or refuse the declaration and the success of a claimant in such an action depends entirely on the strength of the claimant’s own case and not on the weakness of the defence. Kodilinye v. Odu 2 WACA 336; Akinola v. Oluwo (1962) 1 SCNLR 352; Bello v. Eweka (1981) 1 SC. 101.

104.                     In any event, the burden of proof on the claimant                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              in establishing declaratory reliefs to the satisfaction of the court is heavy in the sense that such declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course for the asking or even on admission of the defendant where the claimant fails to establish his entitlement to the declaration by his own evidence. In other words, a declaration of right as sought by the claimant against the defendant cannot be made on the reliance on the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses but only if the court is satisfied by evidence. see Motunwase v. Sorungbe (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 90; Dumez Nig. Ltd. v. Nwakhoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt.1119) 361; Omera V NRC (2022) NWLR (Pt.1853).

105.                     In the case at hand the claimant has the onus of proof on him to show that he is entitled to declaration as per his claim.

106.                     The grouse of the claimant against the defendant as can be gleaned from the pleading and evidence adduced before the court is that the defendant vide exhibit C terminated his appointment without notifying him of same until when he was served with a letter in response to his lawyer’s letter of demand for payment of his salaries with the letter of termination attached to it. In view of lack of giving him notice of termination, the claimant want the court to declare that he was in service and entitled to salary. The claimant also want the court to declare that he is entitled to emoluments and contributions for services rendered for the period of time he was in the service of the Defendant including pension contributions, ARD, FNPH and NHF. The last declaration is that the act of the Defendant terminating the appointment of Claimant by a letter dated the 29^th July, 2020, but communicated via a letter dated 30^th June, 2021 is wrongful.

107.                     Based on the declarations, the claimant wants the court to grant an order compelling the Defendant to pay the Claimant’s monthly salary of N331,261.67 (three hundred and thirty-one thousand two hundred and sixty-one Naira sixty-seven kobo) from the month of September, 2020 until 30^th of June, 2021. He also want the court to as well make an order directing the Defendant to pay N500,000,000.00 (Five Hundred million) to the Claimant as damages for the wrongful termination of the claimant’s appointment and tarnishing his image as a professional medical doctor.

108.                     The law regarding declaration is well settled that evidence to support a claim for declaration can be oral or documentary. However, the court would not make declarations or grant declaratory reliefs unless such reliefs have been proven by evidence by the party seeking such relief, regardless of whether or not the party on the other side filed evidence or not. In the instant case, the claimant relied on its documentary evidence tendered to support his claim for declarations.

109.                     It is in evidence that the claimant did his National Youth Service with the defendant. Following advertisement in Punch Newspaper the claimant applied for appointment as a resident doctor with the defendant. Vide the letter dated 29/10/2010, the defendant offered appointment to the claimant as Registrar in the residency programme of the defendant. There is attached to the offer of employment regulation for the programme. The claimant whole heartedly accepted the appointment on residency offered to him by the defendant. This is evidenced by exhibits A, D1, D2, D3 and D4. However, the appointment of the claimant was terminated vide letter dated 9/3/2017, exhibit C. The reason given for the termination was that the claimant overstayed the stipulated period of his training programme due to his inability to pass the prescribed examinations. This means exhibit C, had ended the claimant’s appointment on residency programme of the defendant.

110.                     In another twist, the claimant on 15/5/2017 applied for appointment as a registrar on locum. The defendant approved the application of the claimant for appointment as a registrar on locum on the said date vide exhibit D8. This appointment was for a period of three months effective from the date of the letter of appointment i.e. 15/5/2017. The conditions for the appointment were spelt out in exhibit D8, the letter of appointment.  At the expiration of the locum appointment, the claimant applied for a renewal of appointment as Sessional doctor. The defendant approved the application for renewal as evidenced by exhibit D, the renewal was for a period of three months with effect from 1/9/2017.

111.                     Having regard to the reliefs being sought and the pleading , it will be correct to state that the claim of the claimant as per his amended statement of facts are in respect of his appointment as a registrar on locum. For proper appreciation I hereby reproduced the content of exhibits D8 and D, which are the relevant letters of appointments in question. They are:-

Exhibit D8, read:-

FEDERAL NEURO-PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL

123 CALABAR ROAD

PMB 1052, CALABAR, CROSS RIVER STATE

Dr. Joseph Okegbe                                                                Tel:+234087,232125, 232266

Medical Director                                                                  Fax 087-236208

MB.Bch, FMPsych, FIPDM                                                 E-mail

O8025388388, 08037049476                                    fphcal@alpha.linkserve.com

Dr. Ekpe Esien Epe                                                              jokegbe@yahoo.com

Head (Clinical services)                                                  ekpeesien@yahoo.co.uk

Our Ref. FPH/PF/692?54                                                           15^th May, 2017

 

Dr. Oluwatimilehin T. Babatunde

Clinical Services Department

Federal Neuropsychiatric Hospital

Calabar.

OFFER OF APOINTMENT AS A REGISTRAR ON LOCUM

I am directed to refer to your application dated 15^th May, 2017, and to convey approval to you, for your appointment as a Registrar, on three (3) monthly Locum basis, in Federal Neuropsychiatric Hospital, Calabar.

2.         The appointment takes effect from 15^th May, 2017.

3.         You are entitled to full salary on COMMESS 3 step 8.

4. You are also entitled to full call duty, hazard and teaching allowances.

5. You will however, be required to abide by all the rules and regulations of the Hospital, during the period of your engagement.

6. By a copy of this letter, the Head of Finance and Accounts has been directed to calculate your remuneration.

7. Accept our congratulations,

SGN

E. G. Davis (Mrs.)

Head of Administration

For: Medical Director

CC:     Head, Clinical Services

Head, Finance & Accounts

Head, Audit

Above for your information and necessary action please.

E. G. Davis (Mrs)

Head of Administration

For: Medical Director.

Exhibit D, read as follows:-

FEDERAL NEURO-PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL

123 CALABAR ROAO

PMB 1052, CALABAR, CROSS RIVER STATE

Dr. Joseph Okegbe                                                                Tel: +234087,232125, 232266

Medical Director                                                                  Fax 087-236208

MB.Bch, FMCPsych, FIPDM                                                           Email:

08025388388, 08037049476                                      fphcal@alphaJinkserve.com

Dr. Ekpe Esien Ekpe                                                                        jokegbe@yahoo,com

Head (Clinical services)                                                    ekpeesien@yahoo.co.uk

MB.Bch, FMCPsych

08033389865, 08051094055

Our Ref: FNPH/ADM/016/TF/97                                                16^th August, 2017

 

Dr Oluwatimilehim Babatunde

Department of Clinical Services

Federal Neuro Psychiatric Hospital,

Calabar

RE: APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL OF APPOINTMENT AS A SESSIONAL DOCTOR

I am directed to refer to your application dated 1^st August, 2017 on the above subject matter, and to inform you that your appointment as a Sessional Doctor on Locum basis, has been renewed for the next three months, with effect from 1^st September, 2017.

By this letter, the Accounts Department has been directed to take necessary action.

      SGN

J. Uweh (Mrs)

Assistant Director/ Head of Human Resources

For: Medical director.

112.                     It is to be noted that apart from exhibit D there is no any other document tendered by the claimant to show that his contract as a locum doctor has been formerly renewed by the defendant.

113.                     Let me return to the consideration of exhibits D8 and D which are the letters of appointment of the claimant relevant to the present consideration. In a contract of employment, the general principle is that the letter of appointment must be tendered as it is the document that the Court will look at in considering the rights and obligations of the Parties. See MOROHUNFOLA VS KWARA STATE COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY (1990) 4 NWLR (PT. 145) PAGE 506, ORGAN & ORS. vs. N. L. N. G. (2013) LPELR 2094 (SC), EFURIBE VS UGBAM & ORS. (2010) LPELR 4079 (CA). Though the general principle is that the letter of appointment is the bedrock upon which a claimant in an action for wrongful termination of employment must build his case, the application of the general principle must necessarily depend on the pleadings, the evidence led and the issues which call for determination in a particular case. In the instant case, a community reading of the pleadings of both parties clearly shows that both parties are ad idem that the claimant was an employee of the defendant. The law is settled that what is admitted needs no further proof. The area of difference is on the issue of termination of claimant’s appointment. The claimant is of the view that his appointment was wrongful as he was not notified or served with requisite notice of termination. According to the claimant on 2/10/2020 he noticed an anomaly i.e. non-inclusion of his name in duty roaster even when he has continued to report for duties. Consequently, he wrote demanding payment of his September 2020 salary, but, the defendant refused to respond in writing. However, the claimant was informed verbally that it was being looked into. The claimant continued to report for work for months and defendant failed and neglected and refused to address the complaints of the claimant. He further alleged that the stoppage of his salaries was malicious as it was not done in line with the rules regulating his service to the defendant and Federal Government. As his salaries were terminated before he was disengaged and notified. The claimant stated that he got wind of his termination when the defendant replied the letter his lawyer wrote to the defendant demanding payment of his unpaid salaries.

114.                     The defendant on its part is of the view that termination of claimant’s appointment in 2017 was not wrongful as it was done in line with the guidelines governing residency programme which claimant was aware of, because as it was attached to his letter employment of 2010, wherein the duration of residency was clearly stated which he had long exhausted. The claimant’s lawyer one M. Omale came to the defendant in respect of termination of claimant’s appointment. According to the defendant there was no anomaly as claimant’s appointment had been terminated and he was aware of that. But, wrote letter after termination out of his usual mischief and entitlement mentality. The defendant maintained no such promise was made that his request was being looked at. As the claimant had even stopped coming to work and performing his duties at the hospital. The defendant stated that on 24/3/2020 the National Postgraduate Medical College of Nigeria had written to the defendant wherein they listed doctors who have not passed their examination instructing that they exit residency training programme. See exhibit D21. When the claimant got wind of the letter he stopped coming to work, it was against this background that the defendant wrote to the claimant via letter dated 29/7/2020 terminating his residency training programme wherein it annexed the letter from postgraduate medical college.

115.                     A careful perusal of the reliefs being sought by the claimant will clearly show that the claimant’s reliefs were restricted to the period of his appointment as per exhibits D8 and D. There is no any relief respecting the claimant’s service with the defendant as per exhibit A and its termination as per exhibit C. Therefore, all the averments of the claimants as contained in his pleading as well as evidence adduced regarding those averments are of no moment as far as this suit is concerned as there is no relief sought by the claimant. The law is trite that claim before the court is circumscribed by the reliefs being sought. See Gabriel Ativie v Kabel Metal Co Ltd (supra). In view of this authority the responses of the defendant also goes to no issue as the contract of the claimant as per exhibit A is not the focal point of the claim before the court.

116.                     Let me say here that both the claimant and the defendant seem to be confused regarding the claimant’s appointments or service with the defendant. At the expense of being repetitive, the claimant first did his mandatory National Youth Service (NYSC) with the defendant in 2007. Thereafter, the claimant was given appointment as a Sessional staff, the position which the claimant held till 2010, when vide exhibit D the claimant was given opportunity to serve in the residency programme of the defendant. This appointment was terminated in 2017 as per exhibit C. Vide exhibit D8, the claimant was offered appointment as a Registrar on Locum for a period of three months and vide exhibit D the appointment of claimant as a sessional doctor was renewed for the next three months effective 1^st September, 2020. It is patently clear from these exhibits that the appointment of the claimant with the defendant was first as a Sessional Doctor, then residency in the residency programne of the defendant, then as a locum tenens and finally a renewal of claimant as a sessional doctor for a period of three months with effect from 1^st September, 2020. However, there is no evidence to show the initial appointment on Sessional doctor was renewed in 2020

117.                     For proper appreciation of the nature of claimant’s appointments with the defendants there is need to consider the definition of appointment as Medical Residency, Locum tenens and sessional doctor.

118.                     On medical residency, I refer to definition accessed on line provided at American University of the Caribbean School of Medicine https://www.aucmed.edu access on 20/7/2024 @ 16:45pm

a.      ‘’A medical residency takes place in a hospital or clinic and provides in-depth training within a specific medical specialty.

119.                     Also at https://www.inspiraadvantage.com medical resident means:-

a.      ‘’Residency is a period of work usually in a hospital, for a doctor to get practical experience and training in a special area of medicine’’.

b.      A resident doctor was described as a medical school graduate and doctor in training who is taking part in a graduate medical education (GME) program health care facility commonly referred to as resident doctor. Resident doctor work at hospital or doctor’s office to continue his education training and training in a specialized field of medicine.

120.                     A locum tenens was defined by Wikipedia on line https:www.wikipedia.org accessed on 20/7/2024 @ 17:40pm

a.      ‘’A locum or locum tenens, is a person who temporarily fulfills the duties of another; the term is specially used for physicians who works in a place of regular physician. A locum doctor provides an excellent service to the medical community, covering for regular doctors when they are on leave’’.

121.                     For meaning of Sessional Doctor I refer to https://www.app.cronet.co.uk accessed on 20/7/2020 @ 18:05pm, where it was stated:-

a.      ‘’Sessional Doctor is any doctor who does not work as a principal within a practice. They work a number of sessions for the practice, ranging from full time to a single locum session. They are of two categories; i.e.  salaries GPs Locum/freelance GPs and Locum/freelance GPs.

122.                     It is clear from the above definitions of the various positions held by the claimant that they are distinct from each other.

123.                     Before returning to the letters of appointments of the claimant let me say that in law a contract of employment or appointment between an employer and an employee is the legal document governing the relationship between the employer and the individual employee, on the terms and conditions specifically and freely agreed to by them. The conditions of service issued by an employer in respect of all categories of employees in its employment generally relate to and regulate the performance of the obligations, duties and rights of the parties under their individual categories of the contract between them and the employer. Conditions of service are therefore issued on the basis of the terms and conditions of the contract between an employee and the employer. Conditions of service are designed primarily to support the contractual rights and obligations created and agreed to by the parties themselves. See Baba v. N.C.A.T.C. (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388; Omera v NRC (supra).

124.                     Ordinarily, the terms and conditions that regulate and govern an employment for services are embodied and contained in the letter offering the appointment or employment from the employer addressed to the employee which, if accepted freely and unconditionally by him, would constitute a valid, binding and legally enforceable agreement or contract of employment between them. It is therefore the free and unqualified acceptance of all the terms and conditions set out in the letter of appointment of the employee that forms the basis for the existence of a legally binding and enforceable relationship between him and the employer. In any action in which any of the parties claims a breach of any of the terms or conditions agreed to by the parties as set out in the letter of appointment, the letter of appointment becomes a sine qua non to the maintenance and success of the action. See Katto v. C.B.N. (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390; Amodu v. Amade (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356; Iyere v. Bendel Feed & Flour Mill Ltd. (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 300; Olalekan v. Management Board U.M.T.H. (2017) 11 ACELR 199; Raji v. O.A.U. (2018) 12 ACELR 182; Ekunola v. C.B.N. (2013) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1377)224; Okomu Oil Palm Co. Ltd. v. Iserhienrhien (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 660; Iwuchukwu v. Nwizu (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 357) 379 .

125.                     It is without any doubt that a letter of appointment is the bedrock on which a claimant can lay claim to being an employee of an employer and without the production of such a document, no employment can be inferred. The employee “Hand Book” is not a substitute for a letter of employment.

126.                     In law, the very foundation of an action by an employee against an employer for alleged wrongful or unlawful determination or termination of his employment without notice is his letter of appointment or employment which contains the terms and conditions that form the basis of the employment and the contract or agreement between the parties. In this case, the claimant has tendered exhibit A and D as his letters of employment with the defendant. While the defendant tendered exhibits D8 as an additional letter of employment. It is letter of employment that will show the agreement of the parties as to how the contract of employment can be dispensed with. Even on the face of admission of claimant being an employee or served as employee the letter of employment is sine quo non for determining the rights and obligations of the parties. Therefore; exhibits A, D and D8 being the claimants letters of appointment are very essential and crucial for the determination of whether the claimant’s employment or appointment was wrongly or properly determined.

127.                     As earlier stated in this judgment, the employment of claimant as per exhibit A is of no moment as per this case, for the simple reason that there is no relief sought by the claimant in respect of employment as encapsulated in exhibit A. For exhibit D8 which is evidence of appointment of claimant on locum tenens, the said appointment was for a period of three months with effect from 15/5/2017. This means the appointment had elapsed as far back as 14/8/2017. This appointment having elapsed by effeluxion of time is dead and cannot be revived, more so when there is no evidence of its renewal tendered before the court. It may be the reason why the claimant cleverly refused to tender the said letter of appoint for inspection of the court.

128.                     We are now left with exhibit D, this is a letter for a renewal of appointment of the claimant as a Sessional Doctor for a period of three months with effect from 1/9/2020. It can be gathered from the wording of the letter that there was in the past an appointment given to the claimant as a Sessional Doctor to which it is being renewed for next three months with effect from 1/9/2017. This means there was an appointment given to claimant as a Sessional Doctor to which exhibit D renewed. However, the claimant has not tendered that initial letter of his appointment as a Sessional Doctor. The refusal or neglect by the claimant to tender the letter of his appointment as a Sessional Doctor to which exhibit D is renewing is fatal to the claimant case. It was thus clear from exhibit D that the terms and conditions specifically agreed to by or between the defendant and the claimant for the appointment or employment of the claimant to be looked at in determining the relationship between them is absent. Exhibit D having stated three months as the duration of the appointment, the appointment had elapsed on 30/11/2017. The expiry of three months brought to an end the appointment of the claimant as a Sessional Doctor with the defendant.

129.                     However, the claimant going by the reliefs being sought is claiming to have continued to serve the defendant based on which he is claiming payment of his salaries from September 2020 to 30/6/2020. The claimant tendered exhibit B his pay slip for July, 2020 to show that the defendant was paying him salary of a registrar up to that month. The evidence the claimant is relying to support his case is the refusal of the defendant to serve him notice of termination of his appointment. Under cross examination CW1 stated that M. Omale is his lawyer whenever he had something he is in the offing. He insisted he want come to the hospital to plead on his behalf. The claimant insisted that up to 30/6/2021 he was not served with letter of termination. And when he came is not in respect of the letter from Post Graduate Medical College. I note claimant did not state the reason for the visit of M. Omale, his counsel.    

130.                     An insight into the reason for the visit of M. Omale to the office of the defendant was given by DW1 i.e. to plead on behalf of the claimant.. The defendant on its part maintained that claimant was duly served as the notice was delivered to him via courier service DHL. DW1 also under cross examination testified that the claimant was notified of his termination via reply to his letter written by his lawyer M. Omale who also visited the office of the defendant as a result of exhibit D26 to plead on behalf of the claimant.

131.                     DW2 on her part regarding service of letter of termination stated under cross examination that they looked for the claimant to serve him but he changed his address, the letter was returned and he was not picking calls. But the defendant has not tendered evidence from the courier service provider showing that the claimant was duly served with the letter of termination. The defendant has also stated that the letter of termination was brought to the attention of his counsel in a reply to the letter of demand. See exhibit D23. In view of the claimant’s denial of having been served or notified of his termination of appointment the defendant ought to have tendered evidence of service on the claimant’s lawyer of the letter of termination, it may be said that the defendant failed to prove service.

132.                     An appraisal of the evidence of the parties regarding issue of service or non-service or notification of letter of termination of claimant’s appointment exhibit D26, will show that claimant was not personally served with the letter of termination exhibit D26. The pieces of evidence available more particularly evidence of DW1, DW2 and that of the claimant under cross examination, would lead to coming to conclusion that the claimant was aware of termination of his appointment. As he had stated that his layer M. Omale was aware and insisted to come and plead on his behalf. This has corroborated the evidence of the witnesses of the defendant who testified that claimant was notified through reply to his letter of demand sent to his lawyer. Exhibit D23. The evidence of the claimant to the effect that his lawyer Mr. M. Omale visited the defendant’s office all goes to support the claim that claimant was aware of termination of his employment.

133.                     Now, a thorough examination of exhibit D26 letter of termination will revealed that what the said letter purported to have terminated was the claimant’s appointment as per exhibit A which was the appointment in respect of residency training. Having found that the termination of claimant’s residency appointment is not in issue in this case, so also exhibit D26 since its aim was to terminate non-existent residency appointment.

134.                     The claimant is relying on exhibits B, M and N to show his appointment as a registrar continued despite the expiry of the appointment made as per exhibit D8 and exhibit D, respectively. The counsel for the defendant had in his address submitted that these exhibits are not admissible in law because they are computer generated and have not complied with section 84 of the Evidence Act as amended. I have scrutinized the document and it is clear to me that these documents i.e. exhibits B, M and N are electronically generated evidence. In the circumstances for them to be apportion any weight they have to comply with section 84 of the evidence Act, in the absence of certification as required by section 84 of the evidence Act, these documents lacked evidential value and they are hereby discountenanced for the purpose of this suit.

135.                     It is pertinent to point out here that this court has found that the claimant’s appointment into the residency program of the defendant had been terminated vide exhibit C and there is no relief sought regarding that appointment, the said termination is of no moment. And the appointments of the claimant as per exhibits D8 and D, have all elapsed due to effluxion of time, there is nothing left to lay any claim in so far as those appointments are concerned.

136.                     It is also pertinent to state that the termination of appointment as far exhibit D26 is no termination as there is no subsisting or valid residency appointment in existence when the said termination was purportedly made. It is ultra vires the powers of the defendant to make two terminations in respect of one appointment. The first termination as per exhibit D has ended claimant’s residency appointment and it cannot be terminated again for the second time, as far exhibit D26.

137.                     In view of the foregoing, the irresistible conclusion that one can reach regarding the case of the claimant is that the clamant has woefully failed to establish his reliefs more particularly when no letter of employment has been tendered to establish existence of renewal of locum appointment or re-appointment of Sessional Doctor. The letter of appointment that will establish continued engagement of the claimant has not been tendered the letter of employment being bedrock based on which claim on wrongful termination can be anchored having not been tendered there is nothing before the court with which the court can determine rights and obligations of the parties.

138.                     The ipse dixit of the claimant merely repeating his pleading in the statement of facts is not capable of establishing any employment between the parties. In the absence of disclosing any of the terms and conditions of the purported continued appointment of the claimant the claimant cannot succeed. This is more so when the main reliefs being sought are for declarations. And the monetary claim ancillary. See  Morohunfola v. Kwara State College of Tech. (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 145) 506; Organ v. N.L.N.G. (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1381) 506; Bello v. Iweka (1981) 1 SC 101; Umesie v. Onuaguluchi (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 515; Obawole v. Williams (1996) 10 NWLR (Pt. 477) 146; Edozien v. Edozien (1998) 13 NWLR (Pt. 580) 133; Maja v. Samouris (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt. 765) 78; Ezeokonkwo v. Okeke (2002) 11 NWLR (Pt. 777) 1; Udo v. C.R.S.N. (2001) 14 NWLR (Pt. 732) 116; Ogunjumo v. Ademolu (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 389) 254; Nwokidu v. Okanu (2010) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1181) 362; Abdullahi v. Mil. Admin., Kaduna State (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 866) 232; Ayanru v. Mandilas Ltd. (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 462; Amodu v. Amode (1990) 5NWLR (Pt. 150) 356.

139.                     From the reliefs sought by the claimant, that the action was predicated on the appointment of the claimant by the defendant on the basis of an agreement between them. In other words, the action by the claimant against the defendant arose out of the agreement of the parties by which the claimant was appointed as an employee by the defendant who was the employer, for the provisions of services on the terms and conditions specifically set out in the offer for and acceptance of the appointment between them. Offer and acceptance which constitute the contract of employment is the foundation, the platform and pivot upon which a case for wrongful or unlawful termination of employment by an employee against an employer is completely founded, predicated and its success or failure is entirely dependent on the terms and conditions agreed to by the parties in their contract for the employment. See Ideh v. Univ. of Ilorin (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.330) 81; Ibama v. S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 364;Imoloame v. W.A.E.C. (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 303; UBN Ltd. v. Edet (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 167) 369; Amodu v. Amode (1990) 5NWLR (Pt. 150) 356; U.B.N. Ltd. v. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt.333) 385; Layade v. Panalphina World Transp. Ltd. (1996) 7 SCNJ1; (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 456) 544; (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 456) 544;.Angel Spinning & Dyeing Ltd. v. Ajah (2000) FWLR (Pt.23) 1332,(2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 685) 532.

140.                     The position was affirmed by the court in the case of Fiicharles Organ v. Nig. L.N.G. Ltd. (2016) 8 ACELR 35 at 66, reported as Organ v. N.L.N.G. (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1381) 506 per Akaahs, J.S.C, who stated that:-

a.      “The letter of appointment is the bedrock on which the appellants can lay claim to being employees of the respondents and without the production of such a document, no employment can be inferred. The employees “Hand Book” issued by the 1st respondent is not a substitute for the letter of employment.”

141.                     From all I have been saying above the clamant failed in his duty to convince the court of his entitlement to declaration in the fullest as he had not tendered the letter of his appointment after the expiration of the last two appointments. He has also not tendered any evidence to show that renewal was granted to him.

142.                     Relief 1; must fail as there is nothing before me to establish that claimant was in a contract of employment/service with the defendant and was entitled to notices and emoluments.

143.                     Relief 2; cannot be granted due to lack of evidence of the appointments subject matter of this case. As pension contributions.

144.                     Relief 3 is not grantable in that the purported termination did not terminate anything, as there was no contract to be terminated.

145.                     Relief 4; in the absence of proof of entitlement of existence of employment between September 2020 to June 2021 is fatal to the case of the claimant. The relief failed same is hereby refused.

146.                     Relief 5 is for N500,000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira), for wrongful termination depend on success of declarations sought the declarations having failed relief 5 claiming damages for wrongful termination must also failed.

147.                     From my finding above the claimant has woefully failed to prove entitlement to any of the reliefs sought. All the reliefs sought failed and are hereby refused and accordingly dismissed for lacking in merit.

148.                     I make no order for cost. Parties to bear their respective costs.

149.                     Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

 

 

 

Sanusi Kado,

Judge;

REPRESENTATION.

A. G. Amanze, Esq; for the claimant

Eno Edet, Esq; for the defendant.