IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HER LADYSHIP HON. JUSTICE O.A. OBASEKI-OSAGHAE

 

DATE: JULY 15, 2022                                                         SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/142/2022

 

BETWEEN:

 

CHIEF SEBASTINE TAR. HON, SAN, FCIArb. …..…………. CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

1.         NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

2.         REVENUE MOBILISATION ALLOCATION

AND FISCAL COMMISSION (RMAFC)                             DEFENDANTS

3.         ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION

            AND MINISTER OF JUSTICE

4.         NATIONAL JUDICIAL COUNCIL

 

 

JUDGMENT

Introduction and Reliefs

[1] The claimant commenced this action by Originating Summons on 04 May 2022 praying for the determination of the following questions:

(1)      Whether, by a combined interpretation of sections 4(1) & (2) and 81(1)-(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants have unbridled, whimsical and untrammeled powers to arbitrarily and unreasonably refuse, fail or neglect to upwardly review the basic salaries and allowances of the Chief Justice of Nigeria and other Justices of the Supreme Court; the President and other Justices of the Court of Appeal; the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Federal High Court; the President and Judges of the National Industrial Court; the Chief Judges and other Judges of the various State High Courts; the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Federal Capital Territory High Court, Abuja; the Grand Khadi and other Khadis of the States’ and FCT  Sharia Courts of Appeal and the Presidents and Judges of the various Customary Courts of Appeal of the State and of the FCT, Abuja.

(2)      ALTERNATIVELY OR IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE: Whether, by a combined interpretation of sections 4(1) and (2), 6(1), (3), (5)(a)-(j) and (6) and 81(1)-(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, this Honourable Court has jurisdiction or is under duty to compel the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to exercise their constitutional and statutory discretionary powers to upwardly review the basic salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed/named above.

(3)      Whether a combined interpretation of sections 84(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(b) and (d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the 2nd Defendant has not shirked its constitutional responsibility of fixing higher salaries and allowances for the Judicial Officers named above, by  permitting, suffering and even enabling the 1^st Defendant, by the instrumentality of Part II of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) (Amendment) Act, 2008, to stagnate (and or maintain since 2008) extremely low salaries and allowances for the Judicial Officer named above.

(4)      Whether, by a combined reading of the provisions of section 6(1)(b) and (d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, it is constitutional and lawful for the 2^nd Defendant to refuse, fail, neglect or ignore to upwardly review the salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed above, notwithstanding changing local and international socio-economic realities.

(5)      Upon resolution of questions 1, 2 (in the alternative/in addition), 3 and 4 above, whether the current salaries and other emoluments paid the respective Judicial Officers listed above is not embarrassingly too low and unrealistic, given the current socio-economic and other conditions existing in Nigeria and the current global comparative salaries and allowances paid to Judicial Officers of the same or similar cadre listed hereinbefore.

 

[2] Upon the determination of the questions in favour of the Claimant, he is seeking the following reliefs against the Defendants:

(1)      A Declaration that, by a combined interpretation of sections 4(1) & (2) and 81(1)-(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants do not have unbridled, whimsical and untrammeled powers to arbitrarily and unreasonably refuse, fail or neglect to upwardly review the basic salaries and allowances of the Chief Justice of Nigeria and other Justices of the Supreme Court; the President and other Justices of the Court of Appeal; the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Federal High Court; the President and Judges of the National Industrial Court; the Chief Judges and other Judges of the various State High Courts; the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Federal Capital Territory High Court, Abuja; the Grand Khadi and other Khadis of the States’ and FCT  Sharia Courts of Appeal and the Presidents and Judges of the various Customary Courts of Appeal of the State and of the FCT, Abuja.

(2)      A Declaration that by a combined reading of the provisions of section 6(1)(b) and (d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, it is unconstitutional, null and void for the 2^nd Defendant to refuse, fail, neglect or ignore to upwardly review the salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed above, notwithstanding the changing local and international socio-economic realities.

(3)      A Declaration that the current salaries and other emoluments paid by the 2^nd Defendant through the 4^th Defendant to the respective Judicial Officers listed above since 2008 is embarrassingly too low and unrealistic, given the current socio-economic and other realities existing in Nigeria and the current global comparative salaries and allowances paid to Judicial Officers of the same or similar cadre listed hereinbefore.

 

(4)      An Order Of Mandatory Injunction compelling the 1^st-4^th Defendants to, FORTHWITH, put in place or activate legal and administrative machineries to commence payment to the Judicial Officers listed above the following befitting, realistic and commensurate salaries and other emoluments, estimated to be reasonable, having regard to the existing socio-economic and other factors, as follows:

 

(a)             Chief Justice of Nigeria: Minimum of N12 Million monthly;

(b)             Each of the Justices of the Supreme Court: Minimum of N11 Million monthly;

(c)             President of the Court of Appeal: Minimum of N11 Million monthly;

(d)             Each Justice of the Court of Appeal: Minimum of N10 Million monthly;

(e)             Chief Judge of the Federal High Court: Minimum of N10 Million monthly;

(f)               Each Judge of the Federal High Court: Minimum of N8 Million monthly;

(g)             President of the National Industrial Court: Minimum of N10 Million monthly;

(h)             Each Judge of the National Industrial Court: Minimum of N9 Million monthly;

(i)               Chief Judge of each State High Court: Minimum of N10 Million monthly;

(j)               Each Judge of a State High Court: Minimum of N9 Million monthly;

(k)             Chief Judge of the FCT High Court: Minimum of N10 Million monthly;

(l)               Each Judge of the FCT High Court: Minimum of N9 Million monthly;

(m)          Grand Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT

And of each State that has it: Minimum of N8 Million monthly;

(n)            Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT and each State

that has such a Court: Minimum of N7 Million monthly;

(o)             President of the Customary Court of Appeal of the

FCT and each State that has such a Court: Minimum of N8 Million monthly.

 

(5)      An Order of mandatory injunction compelling the 2^nd Defendant (or any other statutory or administrative body that would be subsequently charged with such responsibilities as the 2^nd Defendant) to, in perpetuity, review and continue to embark upon and carry out, in conjunction with the 3^rd Defendant, a yearly or at most a two-yearly review of the salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed above, with a view to making the said salaries and emoluments realistic and befitting of the offices and duties attached to/exercised by such offices.

The Originating Summons is supported by an affidavit of 39 paragraphs sworn to by Claimant on 4^th May 2022 and to which is annexed exhibits marked STH1 to STH18; and a written address dated 3rd May 2022 and filed on 4^th May 2022.

[3] The 1^st Defendant in opposing the Originating Summons filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection (NPO) to the suit dated 24^th June 2022 and filed the same day. The Objection is supported by an affidavit sworn to by Aliyu Garba, Legal Officer, and a written address also dated 24^th June 2022. The 3^rd Defendant in opposing the Originating Summons filed a counter affidavit that was sworn to by Michael Oni, litigation officer, and a written address in support dated 10^th June 2022. The 4^th Defendant in response to the Originating Summons filed a counter affidavit sworn to by Meshack Sunday Pmabi, Principal Legal Officer, on 24^th June 2022, and a written address dated 23^rd June 2022.

In reaction to the 1^st Defendant’s NPO, the Claimant filed a reply address on 24^th June 2022; and to the 3^rd Defendant’s processes, the Claimant on 20^th June 2022 filed a further affidavit and a reply on point of law. On 27^th June 2022, the Claimant filed a reply on point of law in reaction to the 4^th Defendant’s processes.

The 2^nd Defendant failed to enter appearance or file any process in its defence.

 

    THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT

Facts

[4] The facts upon which the Claimant has premised the questions for determination and the reliefs he is seeking are as contained in his supporting affidavit. To state the Claimant’s case concisely, he is a Senior Advocate of Nigeria elevated to the Inner Bar in 2008. He is aspiring to be appointed either a Justice of the Supreme Court, or of the Court of Appeal, or at least a Judge of the High Court; but the salaries and allowances paid the Justices and Judges of these Courts is too poor for him, given the current socio-economic realities. The Claimant states that the poor mode of determining or reviewing salaries and allowances of Judges is also scaring him away from applying to be appointed to any of the Benches even though he is ably and fittingly qualified to so apply and be appointed.

[5] The Claimant states that he knows that the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants have constitutional and statutory powers to review the salaries of Judicial Officers in Nigeria but have not done so since 2008. He states that for about 14 years, the basic salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers has not been reviewed upwards, notwithstanding the loss of value of the Naira vis-à-vis other global currencies like the US Dollars, the British Pound Sterling and the European Union (EU) Euro, etc. The Claimant states that the Chief Justice of Nigeria, and the President of the Court of Appeal have on different occasions, publicly decried the poor pay of Justices and Judges in Nigeria; and that other well-meaning Nigerians, Institutions, and Newspaper Editorials have, in a ceaseless manner, harped on the same issue. The Claimant states that salaries of Justices of the US Supreme Court, and other Judicial Officers are upwardly reviewed on a yearly basis; and that Judicial Officers in Ghana keep enjoying increased salary scales as years pass by.

[7] The Claimant states that he is aware that foreigners who have been hired from time to time to coach Nigeria’s national football teams earn higher than Nigeria’s Judicial Officers. That he knows as a Legal Practitioner who has practiced in all the levels of Courts in Nigeria that poor pay for Judicial Officers is seriously affecting the quality of judgments and rulings that are delivered; and the discharge of other functions associated with their offices.

Submissions of the Claimant

 

[8] The issues submitted are the legal questions the claimant has framed in paragraph [1] above. These questions are numbered as issues (1) to (5); and for ease of reference they are again reproduced seriatim as follows:

 

(1) Whether, by a combined interpretation of sections 4(1) & (2) and 81(1)-(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants have unbridled, whimsical and untrammeled powers to arbitrarily and unreasonably refuse, fail or neglect to upwardly review the basic salaries and allowances of the Chief Justice of Nigeria and other Justices of the Supreme Court; the President and other Justices of the Court of Appeal; the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Federal High Court; the President and Judges of the National Industrial Court; the Chief Judges and other Judges of the various State High Courts; the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Federal Capital Territory High Court, Abuja; the Grand Khadi and other Khadis of the States’ and FCT  Sharia Courts of Appeal and the Presidents and Judges of the various Customary Courts of Appeal of the State and of the FCT, Abuja.

 (2) Whether, by a combined interpretation of sections 4(1) and (2), 6(1), (3), (5)(a)-(j) and (6) and 81(1)-(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, this Honourable Court has jurisdiction or is under duty to compel the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to exercise their constitutional and statutory discretionary powers to upwardly review the basic salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed/named above.

(3) Whether a combined interpretation of sections 84(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(b) and (d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the 2nd Defendant has not shirked its constitutional responsibility of fixing higher salaries and allowances for the Judicial Officers named above, by  permitting, suffering and even enabling the 1^st Defendant, by the instrumentality of Part II of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) (Amendment) Act, 2008, to stagnate (and or maintain since 2008) extremely low salaries and allowances for the Judicial Officer named above.

(4) Whether, by a combined reading of the provisions of section 6(1)(b) and (d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, it is constitutional and lawful for the 2^nd Defendant to refuse, fail, neglect or ignore to upwardly review the salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed above, notwithstanding changing local and international socio-economic realities.

(5) Whether the current salaries and other emoluments paid the respective Judicial Officers listed above is not embarrassingly too low and unrealistic, given the current socio-economic and other conditions existing in Nigeria and the current global comparative salaries and allowances paid to Judicial Officers of the same or similar cadre listed hereinbefore.

[9] In arguing the Originating Summons, learned Counsel to the Claimant Asiwaju S.A. Awomolo SAN relied on all the paragraphs of the supporting affidavit and the exhibits annexed. He adopted all the arguments contained in the written submissions, and argued the 5 issues together.

 

[10] Learned Senior Counsel referred to the provisions of Section 84 (1), (2), (3), & (4) of the 1999 Constitution and submitted that there are three inescapable constructions namely: the Judicial Officers listed in subsection (4) are to, within the facts of this case, enjoy the salaries and allowances as may be prescribed by the 1^st Defendant; that notwithstanding this, the 2^nd Defendant enjoys discretion to ‘determine’ that the said Judicial Officers need and ought to be paid higher salaries and allowances gathered from the phrase “but not exceeding the amount as shall have been determined by the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission” in Section 84(1); and that the salaries and allowances shall be a charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation; and shall not be altered to the disadvantage of the said Judicial Officers.

 

[11] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that by Section 84(1) of the Constitution, the National Assembly is to “prescribe” the salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed in Section 84(4). That in furtherance of this, 1^st Defendant enacted the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) Act No. 6 of 2002, which was amended by the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) (Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2008. He referred to the Ibrahim v. Barde (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt. 474) 513, (1996) 12 SCNJ 1 where the Supreme Court held that when a statute gives power to a person to prescribe rules or regulations, the donee of such power is imbued with authority to make a subsidiary legislation, which if made, becomes binding.

 

[12] Learned Senior Counsel then referred to Section 4 (1) & (2) of the 1999 Constitution as amended, which provides:

(1) The legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for the Federation which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

(2) The National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation….

He questioned what would happen if the National Assembly is either found not to have enacted an Act which amongst other things, is not capable of enthroning or ensuring the peace, order and good government of the Federation. And that related to this is whether the National Assembly, no matter the sociological and economic factors that would evolve several years after enacting an Act, will still hold onto such Act, without amending it; for the same purpose of ensuring the peace, order and good government of the Federation.

[13] Learned Senior Counsel queried whether it is right for the National Assembly to refuse to amend a crucial but obsolete law like the Act of 2008, in spite of the menacing and extremely challenging situations that may arise in the future – in this case, more than 12 years afterwards; and whether the courts have power to intervene in such situations? He cited All Progressives Congress vs. E.S.I.E.C. (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1801) 1 at 65F-66B, and 68C-D SC where the Supreme Court per Salauwa JSC held:

Fundamentally, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended has provided for three distinct branches of Government:

(i)               The Legislature;

(ii)            The Executive; and

(iii)          The Judiciary.

And to each of the formidable arms of Government, the Constitution has assigned well defined, distinct roles and responsibilities. To the Legislature, the distinguished role of enacting laws for the peace, order and good government of the nation. To the Executive, the eminent responsibility and duty for execution and implementation of all laws enacted by the legislature and orders of courts. While to the Judiciary, the Constitution has equally assigned the prestigious and most honourable judicial powers to thereby arbitrate and settle disputes vis-à-vis conflicts arising from the interplay of powers and forces between the Federal and State Governments, between the Government and the citizen, and between individuals and institutions vis-à-vis other feuding parties. See sections 4, 5 and 6 of the 1999 Constitution.

            And 68C-D where the court succinctly expounded the position:

In the course of interpreting the Constitution, it then behooves the court to consider the Constitution in its entirety as a whole. That’s to say, the provisions of the Constitution ought to be construed in such a ways as to justify the aspirations and hopes of the framers thereof vis-à-vis the laudable objectives of promoting good Government and welfare of the citizens on the principles of freedom, equality, justice, peace and unity of the people.

[14] It was the argument of learned Senior Counsel to the Claimant that poor pay for Judicial Officers, who ma the temples of justice, is resulting in poor quality judgments; hence “good Government” on the part of this 3^rd arm of Government is being eroded. He referred to the definition of the word “good” by the Supreme Court in GTB Plc vs. Est Master Construction Ltd. (2019) All FWLR (Pt. 999) 351 at 384F-G SC, and submitted that the working of the judiciary or judicial system cannot be smooth if Justices and Judges of superior courts of record in Nigeria are not well paid; and cited  A.D.H. Ltd. vs. Amalgamated Trustees Ltd (No. 2) (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 392) 1781 at 1824G-H SC.  

[15] Learned Senior Counsel argued that the provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) (Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2008, as far as they apply to the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers who are the only subjects of this suit, have become obsolete. He submitted that the 1^st Defendant, is under obligation to amend the Act to meet up with current socio-economic realities and cited Iloabache vs. Philips (2002) FWLR (Pt. 115) 726 at 747 CA for the meaning of an obsolete enactment or provision. He then urged the court, in the event of all the submissions not being convincing to invoke the doctrine of necessity in granting the Claimant’s reliefs, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Nyesom vs. Peterside (2016) All FWLR (Pt. 824) 38 at 112H-113A SC, and the provisions of Section 6(1), (5) and (6) of the 1999 Constitution as amended.

[16] Learned Senior Counsel stated that the 1^st Defendant enacted the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act (RMAFC Act), Cap. R7, LFN and referred to the provisions of Section 6 (1) (b) and (d):

(1) The Commission shall have power to–

(a) ................................................................................................

(b) review, from time to time, the revenue allocation formulae and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing realities.

(c) ................................................................................................

(d)  determine the remuneration appropriate to the holders of the offices as specified in Parts A and B of the First Schedule to this Act.

 

[17] He stated that both Parts A and B of the 1^st Schedule in the above provision has listed the Judicial Officers who are the subject matter of this suit as represented constitutionally by the 4^th Defendant. He submitted that the 2^nd Defendant is mandated to carry out a periodic review of how revenue will be allocated, and which allocation contemplates payment of the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers in Nigeria. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the provision mandatorily requires the 2^nd Defendant to “review, from time to time” the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers in Nigeria, with the aim of ensuring “conformity with changing realities” citing Attorney-General of Cross River State vs. Attorney-General of the Federation (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 646) 408 at 439C-D. He submitted that this means, the 2^nd Defendant must exercise its discretion to conduct such periodic reviews, which discretion must be exercised as guided by case law on exercise of ministerial discretion.

[18] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that section 6 (1) (b) of the RMAFC Act, 2004 is a beneficial piece of legislation, which ought to be interpreted for the benefit of the Judicial Officers and  cited Fajimolu vs. University of Ilorin (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 350) 1361 at 1373D CA. He referred to Onovo vs. Mba (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 765) 298 at 335A-B SC, per Ngwuta, JSC of blessed memory, for the general definition of discretion:

Discretion means equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances or a liberty or privilege to decide and act in accordance with what is fair and equitable under the peculiar case guided by the principles of law: Artra Industries Nigeria Ltd. v. The Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 546) 381 SC; Doherty v. Doherty (1964) 1 All NLR 299.

[19] He also referred to N.S.I.T.F.M.B. vs. Klifco (Nig.) Ltd. (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 534) 73 at 97H-98B SC, for the definition or description of a “ministerial duty” or power as:

The duty undertaken by the director is purely statutory or a ministerial act:

A ministerial act is one which a public officer or agent is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or impropriety of the act so performed. Where a duty of an administrative officer in a particular situation is so plainly prescribed that it is free from doubt and equivalent to a positive command, it is so far “ministerial”: Fawehinmi v. Inspector-General of Police (2002) FWLR (Pt. 108) 1355, (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 767) 606; Amasike v. Registrar-General CAC (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt. 968) 462.

[20] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that from the above definitions, the constitutional and statutory duties or powers of the 2^nd Defendant amount to it performing ministerial duties. That the 2^nd Defendant, in either exercising such discretionary powers or refusing to exercise them, must act fairly and justly, failing which the courts will promptly intervene. He cited Stitch vs. Attorney-General of the Federation (1985) 5 NWLR (Pt. 46) 1007 at 1025 SC, Iwuji vs. Federal Commissioner for Establishment (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 497 at 517 SC, and argued that there are already changing realities as deposed to in the Claimant’ supporting affidavit. He urged the Court to compel the 2^nd Defendant to exercise its discretion forthwith for the benefit of Judicial Officers; and to “review, from time to time,” the salaries of Judicial Officers in Nigeria, “to ensure conformity with changing realities; the 2^nd Defendant having refused, failed or neglected to exercise that discretion since 2008.

[21] Learned Senior Counsel argued that it was not the intention of the framers of the 1999 Constitution that Judicial Officers should be paid peanuts and allowed to wallow in poverty, thereby finding it extremely difficult to discharge their constitutional functions. And that this is why Section 84(1) of the 1999 Constitution, after granting powers to the National Assembly to enact legislation stipulating the said salaries and allowances, still went ahead to expressly permit the 2^nd Defendant to stipulate higher wages as gathered from the words “but not exceeding the amount as shall have been determined by the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission.” It was his contention that the only natural interpretation and intention of this phrase is that, since lawmaking takes a more tedious time to go through, the 2^nd Defendant, utilizing ministerial or administrative powers is to stipulate higher salaries for Judicial Officers.

[22] Learned Senior Counsel stated that the reason the 2^nd Defendant has been zeroed in on, is that the 1^st Defendant, manifesting an intention not to maroon Nigeria’s Judicial Officers, donated wide powers of review of such salaries to the 2^nd Defendant in Section 6 (1) (b) of the RMAFC Act, 2004. On the principles governing construction of statutes, he referred to Uwaokop vs. UBA Plc (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 690) 1316 at 1358F; Isah vs. State (2018) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1621) 346 at 361B-C SC; and Elias vs. FRN (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1800) 495 at 531D-G where the Supreme Court per Eko JSC held as follows:

Courts now adopt the “purposes” approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of the legislation: Nafiu Rabiu v. Kano State (1980) 8-11 SC 130; A.-G., Lagos State v. A.-G., Federation (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 833) 1 at 187. In so doing they ascertain the intention of the parliament from the language used in statute; Buhari v. Yusufu (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt. 841) 446 at 535. To ascertain the true purpose of the statutory provision of the intension of the lawmaker for enacting the provision resort is usually had to the ordinary and natural meaning of the words of the statute Okumagba v. Egbe (1965) 1 ALL NLR 62; Ifezue v. Mbadugba(1984) 1 SCNLR 427. By this approach courts avoid the narrow construction of the statutory provision that ultimately defeats the intention of the lawmaker and the purpose of that statutory provision.

[23] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that Section 6 (1) (b) of the RMAFC Act, 2004 has mandatorily required the 2^nd Defendant to effect the review “from time to time,” to “ensure conformity with changing realities;” and that this is the intention of the lawmaker. He referred to Gana vs. SDP (2020) All FWLR (Pt. 1066) 318 at 348D-E SC, and urged the court to apply a certain amount of common sense and to rule that changing realities in Nigeria and globally require the 2^nd Defendant to review the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers.

[24] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that Section 6 (1) of the RMAFC Act contains both rights and obligations. That the rights of Judicial Officers, pursuant to and under section 6 (1) (b) of the RMAFC, is to have their salary allocations ‘reviewed from time to time,’ having regard to ‘changing realities’ in Nigeria and globally; and their entitlement to a good salary is of right in law. He referred to Oko vs. Attorney-General of Ebonyi State (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1795) 63 at 99G for the definition of what is “right” in law; and submitted that a statute “must be interpreted and applied to meet the circumstances, issues, conditions or situations for which they are made,” citing Nigerian Army vs. Aminun-Kano (2010) 1 SCNJ 250 at 276 SC. He further submitted the courts must lean towards the interpretation that would serve the objects and aims of a statute, rather than leaning towards the interpretation that would overthrow them citing James vs. INEC (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 787) 652 at 705G-706B.

 [25] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the court is enjoined to provide a remedy where a legal right is established ubi jus ibi remedium citing BFI Group Corporation vs. BPE (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 676) 444 at 473G SC. He urged that the court should look into the substance of the action rather than the form, and that Judicial Officers in Nigeria have a right that needs to be enforced by the instrumentality of the latin maxim.

 

 

 

                                    THE CASE OF THE 1^ST DEFENDANT

NOTICE OF PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

[26] The 1st defendant in opposition to the Originating Summons filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection pursuant to Section 21 of the Legislative Houses (Powers & Privileges) Act, 2017 and the inherent jurisdiction of the court contending that this suit as presently constituted against the 1^st Defendant is incompetent and ought to be struck out or dismissed for want of jurisdiction by this Honourable Court.

 

[27] The grounds upon which the objection is made are as follows:

1.                  The Claimant is not a Judge of any Court of record in Nigeria and is not in any way affected by the salaries and allowances payable to Judges of Courts of records in Nigeria.

2.                  The Claimant has not shown specifically how the remuneration of the Judges of Courts affects him or his legal rights and obligations.

3.                  The Claimant lacks the locus standi to institute this suit.

4.                  The suit being against a legislative house ought to have been preceded with a pre action notice as required under section 21 of the Legislative Houses (Powers & Privileges) Act, 2017.

5.                  The Claimant did not give the requisite 3 (three) months pre-action notice to the 1^st Defendant before the institution of this suit.

6.                  The 1^st Defendant is not a proper party in this suit.

7.                  This Honourable Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain this Suit as presently constituted against the 1^st Defendant.

The Objection is supported by an affidavit sworn to on the 24^th June 2022 by Aliyu Garba, Legal Officer and a written address dated 24^th June 2022.

Submissions of The 1^st Defendant

[28] Learned Counsel to the 1^st Defendant Charles Yoila Esq in his introduction began by stating that upon being served with the Originating Summons, the 1^st Defendant representative could not summon enough officers to arrange for settlement of this matter among all parties due to dearth of time. That the 1^st Defendant decided it is best to raise issues of jurisdiction before going into the merit of the matter in dispute, and cited Arowolo v. Akaiyeyo (2012) 4 NWLR 286 (CA). He stated that this matter is of interest to all concerned, including the legislature (1^st Defendant) and that the facts in the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons shows clearly that this matter concerns all Nigerians and ought to be given good, timely and well considered conclusion. He submitted that  the suit was improperly instituted as the requisite pre-action notice was not issued, and the Claimant is wanting in locus standi.

 

[29] The 1^st Defendant submitted two issues for determination as follows:

 

1)    Whether the Claimant/Respondent has the locus standi to institute this Suit.

 

2)    Whether the 1^st Defendant was properly made a party in this suit.

 

[30] Learned counsel in arguing issue 1, submitted that the onus is on the Claimant to disclose ex facie in his case that he has locus standi to institute this action. That in the realm of public law which this matter falls under, it is trite law that a litigant can only have locus standi if he shows sufficient, exceptional interest in the case instituted or threat of any injury that he will suffer as a result of violation of such interests. He submitted that the claimant must show to the satisfaction of the Court that his rights and obligations are affected or in danger of being affected; and that want of locus standi in a matter is fatal to the matter citing Gombe v. P.W Nigerian Limited (1995) 6 NWLR (Part 402) 402, 423. He argued that the Claimants depositions has not disclosed specific facts to show his legal interest in the matter aside from his aspirations to the Bench and concerns about the plight of the Judicial Officers. That most of the issues raised by the deponent are emotional issues that have no place in our laws; and he cited Owoduni v. Registered Trustee of Celestial Church of Christ (2000) 10 NWLR (Part 675) 315, 345A-B, Adesanya v. The President (1981) 2 NCLR  358.

 

[31] Learned counsel submitted that in determining locus standi, the Courts in Charles v. Governor Ondo State (2013) 2 NWLR 294; and Inakoju v. Adeleke 92007) 4 NWLR (Pt.1025) 423, inclined our minds to question whether the Claimant ordinarily could have been joined as a party in a suit of this nature; and that in this instance it is No. He argued that the Claimant in a suit of this nature would be considered an improper party. It was his contention that the Claimant is merely being remorseful of the condition of the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers and has brought his good self out to help salvage the situation; but has not shown any special interest over and above the interest of other members of the Nigerian Bar on the matter citing R v. Commissioner of Customs and Excise, Ex parte Cook & Stevenson (1970) 1 All ER 1068. He submitted that since the question of locus questions the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain an action, it should be first considered. He cited relying Bewaji v. Obasanjo (2008) 9 NWLR (Part 1093) 540, 569C – E, Baido v. Independent National Electoral Commission & 4 Ors (2008) 12 NWLR (Part 1101) 379, 403G-H.

 

[32] It was the submission of the 1^st Defendant, that the Claimant lacks locus standi to institute this suit in the circumstances of this case as the entire affidavit of the Claimant clearly demonstrate that for now, he remains a successful practicing Lawyer of high repute with the hope of joining the judiciary. That this suit is premature and deprives the Claimant of competence until he probably joins the Bench.

 

[33] On issue 2, learned counsel referred to Section 21 of the Legislative Houses (Powers & Priviledges) Act, 2017:

 

A person who has cause of action against a Legislative House shall serve a three months written notice to the office of the Clerk of the Legislative House disclosing the cause of action and relief sought.

 

He submitted that the prerequisite notice was not served before this suit was instituted against the 1^st Defendant. That this failure goes to the root of procedure in this matter and robs court of jurisdiction with regards to the 1^st Defendant. He submitted that the use of the word ‘shall’ in the Legislative Houses (Powers & Privileges) Act 2017 shows that the required procedure stated in the statute is mandatory. Learned counsel submitted that the usage of the word ‘shall makes it mandatory and not directory, and it is the duty of the Court to ensure that such mandatory steps are taken before the institution of any suit that smacks of legislative duties. He cited Alashe v. Ilu & Ors (1964) ANLR 383 at 390, Raji v. University of Ilorin & 4 Ors (2007)15 NWLR (Part 1057)259, 275E, Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007)4 NWLR (Part 1025) 427, 661 D – E, and urged the court to hold that the Originating Summons filed by the Claimant is without due process and void ab initio.

 

[34] Learned counsel submitted that a Court cannot assume jurisdiction on the basis of a process containing features that prevent the Court from exercising its jurisdiction, as where there is no locus standi, and issuance of requisite pre-action notice. He cited Forestry Research Institute of Nigeria v. Gold (2007) 11 NWLR (Part 1044) 1, 18-19 H-A, and Madukolu v.  Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 and urged the Court to hold that since the 1^st Defendant was not issued proper pre-action notice, the 1^st Defendant was not properly made a party and this goes to the issue of jurisdiction. It was his submission that since the Claimant is wanting in locus standi, the suit is an abuse of the process of the Court; and that the necessary consequence is that the suit be dismissed, or the name of the 1^st Defendant be removed. He cited Akindele v. Abiodun (2009) 11 NWLR (PART 1152) 356, 387D-F and urged the court to dismiss the entire suit against the 1^st Defendant for want of jurisdiction.

 

Claimant’s Submissions In Opposition

[35] The Claimant adopted the two issues formulated by the 1^st Defendant in its Notice Of Preliminary Objection. On personal locus standi, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the 1^st Defendant has misunderstood the facts giving rise to the Claimant’s locus standi, and has also applied the restrictive and narrow meanings. He referred to paragraph 8 of the Claimant’s supporting affidavit and argued that the deposition alone confers locus standi on the Claimant, who has been a Senior Advocate of Nigeria since 2008; and   belongs to the class of persons who could are legitimately entitled to show such genuine interest in being appointed. He stated that the 1^st Defendant has not argued that the Claimant is not qualified to be appointed a Justice or a Judge; and that that the 1^st Defendant’s position is a resort to arid restrictiveness and does not enjoy the support of decisions of superior courts of record.  He cited Regd. Trustees, A.S.O.&M.D.A. vs. John (2020) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1753) 189 at 230E-F CA, Nyame vs. FRN (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1193) 344 at 400F-H, and Radiographers Registration Board, Nigeria v. M.&H.W.U.N. (2021) 8 NWLR (Pt.1777) 149  at 210 -211C.

[36] On public interest litigation, learned Senior Counsel referred to the Supreme Court decision in Centre for Oil Pollution Watch vs. NNPC (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1666) 518 SC at 570 A-E, 574 D-G, 596A-597G and 591C-F per Okoro, JSC as follows:

In all these, the courts in this country insisted that for a person to have locus standi, the plaintiff must show sufficient interest in the suit before the court. The criterion is whether the plaintiff seeking for the redress or remedy will suffer some injury or hardship arising from the litigation. However, in public interest litigation, it is instituted in the interest of the general public. As was rightly submitted by one of the amici curiae, Asiwaju Adegboyega Awomolo, SAN, an application to the court in this regard, is initiated by one or more persons on behalf of some victims who cannot apply to the court for redress for themselves due to one reason or the other. It is intended to improve access to justice to the poor when their rights are infringed and for the protection of the public affected. Again, such public interest litigation serves as medium for protecting, liberating and transforming the interest of marginalized groups. It raises issues against non personal interest of the applicant and I agree that public interest litigation is a catalyst for sustainable development. The above reasoning may have undoubtedly weighed on the minds of some commonwealth and other country’s courts, which made them to depart from their rigid application of the concept of locus standi particularly when litigation on public interest is concerned. As was rightly observed by the court below, countries like England, India, Australia etc have expanded their jurisprudence of locus standi to take care of situations such as we have at hand in this appeal. See R v. Inspectorate of Pollution & Anor; ex parte Green Peace Ltd (1994) All ER 329, Reg v. Greater London Council, Ex parte Blackburn (1976) 1 WLR 550.

[38] Learned Senior Counsel stated that a fully empanelled Supreme Court was unanimous in granting locus standi to a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), to sue the NNPC – a public body – for the enforcement of rights not accruing to members of the NGO but the affected communities/persons. He also cited Citec International Estates vs. Francis (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1768) 148 SC, and submitted that all the authorities cited by the 1^st Defendant on this issue, being earlier than Centre for Oil Pollution Watch vs. NNPC supra and Citec International Estates vs. Francis supra; and not being strictly on public interest litigation, are not applicable to the facts of this case, hence should be discountenanced.

[39] On the 2^nd issue raised that the 1^st defendant is not a proper party and that a pre-action notice was not served, the Claimant submitted that Section 21 of the Legislative Houses (Powers & Privileges) Act, 2017 is not applicable as it is the National Assembly that is the 1^st Defendant and not “a Legislative House”. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the 1999 Constitution has segmented between the National Assembly as a juristic personality; the Senate (a “Legislative House” in the National Assembly) and the House of Assembly (another “Legislative House” in the same National Assembly). He argued that even the Act cited by the 1^st Defendant admits that there are more than one “Legislative Houses” – from its title to all its provisions; and that section 21 of the Act, talks of “a Legislative House.” He submitted that the mention of this phrase as against “National Assembly” means the legislature did not intend to include the latter in the provision requiring pre-action notice.

[40] Learned Senior Counsel argued that even if the National Assembly is contemplated/covered by that provision (which is not conceded), the 1^st Defendant waived its right of objection when it appeared before the Court twice through the same Counsel (Charles Yoila, Esq.), without raising the objection. He submitted that statutes that take away/limit access to court must be strictly interpreted citing Nigerian Army vs. Yakubu (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1355) 1 at 17 SC. He further submitted that the law is settled that failure to serve a pre-action notice only raises an issue of procedure as opposed to substantive jurisdiction; hence any party not so served who has taken a step in the proceedings is deemed to have waived his right of objection citing Mobil Producing (Nig.) Unlimited vs. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1 SC. He finally submitted that the 1^st Defendant’s Preliminary Objection lacks merit and should be dismissed with substantial costs.

 

THE CASE OF THE 3^RD DEFENDANT

Facts

[35] The facts upon which the 3^rd Defendant has premised its opposition to the Originating Summons are as contained in the counter affidavit. The 3^rd Defendant states in opposition that there are laid down procedures for applying for the position of a Judicial Officer and aspiration is not one of such. The 3^rd Defendant states that it is a fact that the mode of determining salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers are statutory in nature and the Claimant’s state of mind in applying to be appointed a Judicial Officer has nothing to do with the performance of such statutory duty. The 3^rd Defendant states that the review of the salary of Judicial Officers in Nigeria are tied to other factors like the state of the economy, and that the 2^nd Defendant cannot be mandated through a Court process to exercise its constitutional duties in any specific manner. The 3^rd Defendant states that it is a fact that the 2^nd Defendant has a discretion in the exercise of its statutory duty, and that the statutory powers of the 2^nd Defendant are not ministerial in nature.

 

[36] The 3^rd defendant states that the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Establishment Act is the extant law that guides the 2^nd Defendant in the performance of its duties; and that the body saddled with the responsibility of administering Judicial Officers’ salaries in Nigeria is the National Judicial Council. That the 2^nd Defendant sometime in 2015 constituted a committee to re-determine the salaries of Political, Public and Judicial Officers in Nigeria, and that Judicial Officers in Nigeria are in the same salary bracket with other corresponding public officers in the executive arm of government. The 3^rd defendant states that increase in salaries of an employee is not a right but a negotiated process between an employee and employer; and that the body saddled with formulating policies as it concerns review of wages in Nigeria is the National Salaries, Wages, and Incomes Commission. The 3^rd Defendant states that there is no law regulating increase of worker’s salaries in Nigeria except as it concerns minimum wage. 

Submissions of the 3^rd Defendant

[37] The 3^rd Defendant raised two preliminary issues as follows:

a)     Whether the Plaintiff’s has the requisite locus standi to institute this suit?

b)    Whether the proper party has been joined in this suit?

Learned counsel to the 3^rd Defendant Elodimuo Ekene Esq, submitted that jurisdiction of a court is the pillar or foundation upon which the entire case stands, and that once it is established that the court has no jurisdiction, the foundation of the case is entirely broken. The 3^rd Defendant submitted that  jurisdiction is a fundamental issue that can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. That in order to determine when a court is competent the following factors established in the locus classicus Madukolu v Nkemdilim (1962)2 SCNLR Pg. 341 must be present:

a)     It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of the indigenes of the bench, and no indigene is disqualified for one reason or another; and

b)     The subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction.

c)      The case comes before the Court initiated by due process of                        law and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.

[38] The 3^rd Defendant submitted that where an action is instituted it is important that there must be a breach of a legal right or obligation of the Claimant for the case to be triable. He further submitted that for a Claimant to be said to be inured with the locus standi to institute a suit, especially in public law, the Supreme Court in the case of Diamond Pet. Int. Ltd. v Gov C.B.N. & Ors (2015) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1473) 179 at 201 held :

“For a person to establish locus standi to sue he must show substantial or tangible interest in the outcome of the litigation. For an individual to have locus standi in public law, he must establish personal interest over and above the generality of the public. He must show he would incur injury over the justiciable issue(s) he intends to ventilate in court in private law, locus standi collapses into the cause of action.”

[39] The 3^rd Defendant then stated that the Claimant does not possess the locus standi to institute this suit and that the claimant’s affidavit and reliefs must be looked into citing Paul Odimegwa & Ors v Daniel Ibezim & Ors (2019) LPELR-46939(SC). He contended that it is only paragraph 8 where the Claimant states that he is aspiring to become a Justice or Judge that remotely seems to disclose his interest in filing this suit. The 3^rd Defendant further submitted that the above fact is not sufficient to vest on the Claimant the legal standing to commence this suit; and that there is no personal interest disclosed by the Claimant that has been affected by the non-review of the salaries of Judicial Officers in Nigeria to have commenced this action for the enforcement of such review.

[40] The 3^rd Defendant argued that the Claimant has equally failed to establish by way of material facts the peculiar individual interest he has over and above the generality of the public rights of the Judicial Officers in Nigeria and the National Judicial Council, to institute this suit and the corresponding injury he has or will suffer for the non-review of the salaries of Judicial Officers in Nigeria. That assuming but not conceding there is an interest to be pursued for the non-review and implementation of Judicial Officers’ salaries in Nigeria, the proper party to institute this suit for or on behalf of judicial officers are a judicial officer or the National Judicial Council, which is the statutory body saddled with the welfare responsibility of judicial officers in Nigeria.  He cited Prince Ladejobi & 2 Ors. v. Otunba Oguntoro & 9 Ors (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 904) 135 for the meaning of locus standi.

[41] The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the Claimant does not have the requisite right to institute this suit as he has not shown that he is a Judicial Officer, or has applied for the job of a Judicial Officer and has been selected as a qualified candidate for such job. In addition, the Claimant has not also shown that he has the authority of a Judicial Officer to institute this suit. He submitted that the Claimant is only seeking for public right which has not accrued to him and thus unenforceable in law citing Inakoju v Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423; and that the Claimant has not disclosed the injury he has suffered or will suffer. The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the right to approach the Court for legal redress is personal in nature and that this is reflected in Section 6 (6) (b) of the 1999 Constitution and the Supreme Court decisions A-G Anambra State v. A-G Fed (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt.1047), A-G Lagos State v. Eko Hotels Ltd (2006) NWLR (PT. 1011) 378.

[42] The 3^rd Defendant submitted that even though the Court in Fawehinmi v Akilu (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 797 held that public litigation should be encouraged, the factor that can inure to any person other than a person directly affected by the breach of a civil right or obligation, is that the suit was instituted on behalf of persons who are unable to access the Court by themselves. That this was well espoused in the Supreme Court decision in Centre For Oil Pollution Watch v. NNPC (2019) 5 NWLR 518 while defining the nature of public interest litigation:

Public interest litigation in the interest of the general public. An application to the court in this regard is initiated by one or more persons on behalf of some victims who cannot apply to the court for redress for themselves due to one reason or the other. It is intended to improve access to justice to the poor when their rights are infringed and for the protection of the public affected. Again, such public interest litigation serves as a medium for protecting, liberating and transforming the interest of marginalized groups. It raises issues against non-personal interest of the Plaintiff.” (P. 591, paras. C-E)

[43] The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the Claimant has not established that Judicial Officers are so marginalized and poor, that they do not have access to justice to remedy this wrong that it now behooves on the Claimant to institute this action on their behalf. It was his further submission that this position will be most unreasonable owing to the fact that the said judicial officers are the “Chief Priest of the temple of justice, themselves”. He submitted that the key factors that must be present in a Claimant’s suit to clothe himself with locus are: the right sought to be enforced must be personal to him; If the suit were to be instituted by another person, the Claimant would have been a necessary party; the Claimant stands to suffer some great damage should the duty sought to be performed is not fulfilled; whether as a public interest litigant, the persons he is instituting the suit on behalf of are incapable of accessing the Court by themselves for one reason or the other. The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the Claimant has not met any of the factors. He then urged the Court to strike out the suit with a substantial costs against the Claimant citing Adetona V Zenith Int’l Bank Plc (2011) LPELR-8227(SC), and Gamioba v Esezi (1961) 1 ANLR 584 at 588.

[44] On issue 2, the 3^rd Defendant submitted that the proper party in this suit is the National Wages and Salaries Commission. He referred to Section 3 of the National Salaries, Incomes And Wages Commission Act and submitted that the Commission is the statutory body vested with the duty of formulating policies as regards increase in wages. He cited All Progressive Congress v Air Vice Marshall Terry Omatsola Okorodudu & Anor (2019) LPELR-47762 (CA) for the meaning of proper party. The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the proper party on the issue of salary increase is not before the court and thus any conclusion of the matter will not binding on the party. He then urged the court to strike out the Claimant’s suit, or in the alternative suo motu join the National Salaries, Wages and Incomes Commission as a party; and cited Lemna Energy Resources Limited v. Engr Mukaila Musa (2013) LPELR-20367(CA), Ekpenyong v. Nyong (1975) 2 SC.

[45] On the substantive issue for determination, the 3^rd Defendant raised the following question:

Whether by the states of facts adduced by the claimant he is entitled to the grant of declaratory reliefs sought in this suit?

He submitted that the discretionary powers of the court to grant declaratory reliefs must be exercised judiciously and judicially, and that declaratory reliefs are not granted as of course or right but based on certain conditions of law, and credible evidence citing Central Bank Of Nigeria v. Jacob Oladele Amao & 2 Ors (2011) Vol 201 LRCN; Oduyoye & Ors v. Lawal & Ors (2002) LPELR-5473 (CA), Ibrahim v. Suleiman (2020) LPELR-52747(CA). The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the Claimant has not adduced credible facts to the affirmative that the non-review of the salaries of judicial officers in Nigeria by the 2^nd Defendant is of such nature to have breached the provisions of the Constitution, or Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Allocation Establishment Act.

[46] The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the Claimant has not met the conditions of law for the grant of a declaratory relief as stated in Central Bank Of Nigeria v. Jacob Oladele Amao supra which are as follows:

A declaration will be granted even when the relief has been rendered unnecessary by lapse of time for the action to be tried, if at the time the action was brought, it raised substantial issues of law.

The 3^rd Defendant submitted that this condition is not applicable in this suit.

The claim to which the declaratory relief relates must be substantial; that is, the plaintiff must be entitled to the relief in the fullest meaning of the word,

The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the Claimant’s right has not been infringed by the non- review of the salaries of judicial officers, and that even it did, there are no facts to support same. He further submitted that the right to increase worker’s salary is not a legal right under any law in Nigeria. 

[47] A declaration will only be granted where there is a breach.

The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the power of the 2^nd Defendant pursuant to Sections 84 (1) of the 1999 Constitution and 6 (1) (d) of the RMFAC Act to determine salaries of public and judicial officers are statutory in nature. That the 2^nd Defendant has exercised such duty which has culminated in the amendment of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances ) Act, which reflected the salaries and allowance  of judicial officers in  Schedule part 11 of the said Act. The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the 2^nd Defendant is not in breach of its statutory duties of determining such salaries; more so where consideration should be given to the fact that the 2^nd Defendant has constituted a committee for the re-determining of the salaries of judicial officers in Nigeria.  

[48] The Plaintiff must establish a right in relation to which the declaration can be made hence the court will not generally decide hypothetical questions.                   

The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the questions have not posited any live issues for determination as the Claimant has not adduced by way of facts how the statutory duties vested on the 2^nd Defendant is of such nature to be compellable by a party citing NCP v National Assembly (2015) LPELR-25990. He submitted that this case is not one found on real facts as there is no real dispute to be determined; and that the right the Claimant is asking for is not known in law in Nigeria. 

[49] The relief claimed must be something which would not be unlawful or unconstitutional or inequitable for the court to grant.

The relief should also not be contrary to the accepted principles upon which the court exercises its jurisdiction. See Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.289) 12.

The 3^rd Defendant argued these two conditions together and submitted that the power to determine salaries of Judicial Officers is not a ministerial duty in which no discretion is to be exercised by the 2^nd Defendant and in which refuse (sic) of exercising same is compellable by way of judicial process. The 3^rd Defendant submitted that it will be unlawful and contrary to the principles upon which the Court exercises its jurisdiction for the machinery of court to be used to compel the 2^nd Defendant to perform a task it has already set out to perform. He further argued that a court of law cannot grant a right that is not known to law, and that the Claimant has not met with any of the conditions for the grant of declaratory reliefs as laid down by the Supreme Court.

[50] The 3^rd Defendant submitted that in the performance of a statutory function vested on a body, what is pertinent is that the statutory body must act within the scope of its statutory powers and nothing more citing Bernard Amasike v. The Registrar General, Corporate Affairs Commission & Anor (2010) LPELR-456 (SC). That assuming but not conceding that the power to review salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers is vested on the 2^nd Defendant, the performance of such a statutory duty as bestowed on the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants cannot be equated to ministerial duty which is compellable in law. He submitted that the Supreme Court defined ministerial duty in Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board v. Klifco Nigeria Limited (2010) LPELR-2006 (SC) per Adekeye JSC at 39 paras D-F as follows:

 A ministerial act is one which a public officer or agent is required to perform upon a given state of facts, in a prescribed legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or impropriety of the act to be performed. Where a duty of an administrative officer in a particular situation is so plainly prescribed that it is free from doubt and equivalent to a positive command, it is so far "ministerial. Fawehinmi v. I.G.P. (2002)7 NWLR pt. 767 pg. 606; Amasike v. Registrar-General, CAC (2006) 3 NWLR pt. 968 Pg. 462." 

[51] The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the National Assembly in prescribing the salaries and allowances of judicial officers, and the 2^nd Defendant in determining the scale of salaries and allowances to be paid to Judicial Officers will not have recourse to its discretion on the matter. He argued that this position is strengthened by the fact that the law makers in enacting the provisions of Section 84 (1) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 6 (1) (d) of the RMAFC Act did not state the procedure to follow in the prescription and determination of the said salaries under context. He submitted that it is trite that the Court will give the literal interpretation to a statute where it is clear and unambiguous and cited Basinco Motors Ltd v. Woermann-Line (2009) LPELR-756 (SC). The 3^rd Defendant submitted that it flows and follows that the intention of the law makers as can be construed from the provisions of Sections 84 (1) of the Constitution and Section 6 (1)(d) of the RMAFC Act is that both institutions are to exercise discretion subject to the dictates of the law.

[52] The 3^rd Defendant argued that a statutory duty cannot by any imagination be said to be performed in a prescribed legal authority and without regard to the institutions own judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or impropriety of the act to be performed. He urged the Court to take judicial notice that the process of lawmaking and administration as it concerns prescription and determination are done in committees, which process is robust and filled with arguments. The 3^rd Defendant further submitted  that ministerial duty will not apply when the exercise of a vested power is discretionary citing Chief Gani Fawehinmi v. Inspector-General Of Police & Ors (2002) LPELR-1258 (SC). He submitted that the statutory duties of both the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants cannot be construed as ministerial duty whose non-performance is compellable in law.

[53] The 3^rd Defendant referred to the provisions of Section 6 (1) (d) of the Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Act, that states that “The Commission shall have power to determine the remuneration appropriate to the holders of the offices as specified in Parts A and B of the First Schedule to this Act” and submitted that the ordinary meaning of the word ‘appropriate’ is being suitable or proper in the circumstances. He argued that discretion must be exercised to find that right scale of salary suitable for judicial officers.

[54] The 3^rd Defendant submitted in the alternative that increase of salary is not a right known to any law in Nigeria. He referred to Section 84 (1) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 6 (1) (d) of RMAFC Act and submitted that they do not make any provisions for  increase of salaries of judicial officers or any other person for that matter. He submitted that the words of both statutes are clear and unambiguous, and that neither the Claimant or the Court cannot can input review into the said statutes. The 3^rd Defendant referred to  the provisions of subsection 1 (b) of Section 6 of the RMAFC Act and submitted that the legislators purposefully intended periodic review from time to time to conform with changing realities. That the same cannot be said to apply to subsection 1(d) of Section 6 of RMAFC Act, where the duty is only to determine and not review. That the court of law should stop where the statute stops in the exercise of its interpretative jurisdiction citing Braithwaite v. STB (Nig.) Ltd (2012) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1305) 304 at 319-320.

[55] The 3^rd Defendant submitted that the only legal right that exists concerning salary increases is as it relates to minimum wage, is Section 3 (4) of the National Minimum Wage Act 2019 which is not an issue under consideration in this case. He further submitted that since there is no statutory provision in relation to increase of worker’s salary in Nigeria, “a cause of action accrues from such right cannot be construed to be unconstitutional”.

[56] The 3^rd Defendant stated that he commends the zeal of the Claimant pushing for the welfare of judex in Nigeria, and equally supports the improvement of the welfare of judicial officers; but that sentiments have no place in our legal jurisprudence. He cited Mrs T. O Juwah & Ors v. Honourable Justice I.E. Okogwu (2020) LPELR-50761(CA). It was his submission that the duties of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendant have no relation with increment of worker’s salaries as it concerns judicial officers in Nigeria. That assuming such right exists, the Claimant has not adduced sufficient facts to the affirmative that such right is accruable to judicial officers.   

Claimant’s Reply on Points of Law  

[57] In responding to the submissions of the 3^rd Defendant, the Claimant relied on his further affidavit and the annexed exhibits STH19 and STH19A. He submitted that that the only material deposition in the 3^rd Defendant’s counter-affidavit is its paragraph 6 which is incompetent in law or has proved nothing. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the depositions in paragraphs 6(c)-(j) and (m)-(o) are argumentative and ought to be struck out; and that paragraphs 6(k) and (l) of the counter-affidavit are not matters within the personal knowledge of the deponent, and lack material facts or documentary evidence to establish them citing Veepee Industries Ltd. vs. Cocoa Industries Ltd. (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 425) 1667 at 1685 SC.

[58] Learned Senior Counsel responding to issue No 1, submitted that the 3^rd Defendant has misunderstood the facts giving rise to the Claimant’s locus standi and has also applied the restrictive and narrow meanings attached to the phrase, to argue that the Claimant lacks locus standi. He submitted that the 3^rd Defendant has admitted that this is both a personal and a public interest litigation combined. He referred to paragraph 8 of the Claimant’s supporting affidavit and argued that the deposition alone confers locus standi on the Claimant, who has been a Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) since 2008; and belongs to the class of persons who could be/are legitimately entitled to show such genuine interest in being appointed. He stated that the 1^st Defendant has not argued that the Claimant is not qualified to be appointed a Justice or a Judge; and that that the 1^st Defendant’s position is a resort to arid restrictiveness and does not enjoy the support of decisions of superior courts of record.  He referred to Regd. Trustees, A.S.O.&M.D.A. vs. John (2020) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1753) 189 at 230E-F CA, Nyame vs. FRN (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1193) 344 at 400F-H, Radiographers Registration Board, Nigeria v. M.&H.W.U.N. (2021) 8 NWLR (Pt.1777) 149  at 210 -211C.

 [59] On locus standi in public interest litigation, learned Senior Counsel stated that the  Attorney-General of the Federation placed reliance on some dicta favourable to him in the case of Centre for Oil Pollution Watch vs. NNPC (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1666) 518 SC, but refused to admit that the overall unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in that matter was that a person or a group of persons embarking on a public interest litigation has/have the requisite locus standi to sue, to enforce performance of statutory duties. He hereby reiterate that the Supreme Court was fully empanelled; and that the Justices were unanimous in granting locus standi to a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), to sue the NNPC – a public body – for the enforcement of rights not accruing to members of the NGO but the affected communities/persons.

[60] On public interest litigation, learned Senior Counsel referred to the Supreme Court decision in Centre for Oil Pollution Watch vs. NNPC (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1666) 518 SC at 570 A-E, 574 D-G, 596A-597G and 591C-F per Okoro, JSC as follows:

In all these, the courts in this country insisted that for a person to have locus standi, the plaintiff must show sufficient interest in the suit before the court. The criterion is whether the plaintiff seeking for the redress or remedy will suffer some injury or hardship arising from the litigation. However, in public interest litigation, it is instituted in the interest of the general public. As was rightly submitted by one of the amici curiae, Asiwaju Adegboyega Awomolo, SAN, an application to the court in this regard, is initiated by one or more persons on behalf of some victims who cannot apply to the court for redress for themselves due to one reason or the other. It is intended to improve access to justice to the poor when their rights are infringed and for the protection of the public affected. Again, such public interest litigation serves as medium for protecting, liberating and transforming the interest of marginalized groups. It raises issues against non personal interest of the applicant and I agree that public interest litigation is a catalyst for sustainable development. The above reasoning may have undoubtedly weighed on the minds of some commonwealth and other country’s courts, which made them to depart from their rigid application of the concept of locus standi particularly when litigation on public interest is concerned. As was rightly observed by the court below, countries like England, India, Australia etc have expanded their jurisprudence of locus standi to take care of situations such as we have at hand in this appeal. See R v. Inspectorate of Pollution & Anor; ex parte Green Peace Ltd (1994) All ER 329, Reg v. Greater London Council, Ex parte Blackburn (1976) 1 WLR 550.

[61] Learned Senior Counsel stated that the Supreme Court was fully empanelled; and that the Justices were unanimous in granting locus standi to a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO), to sue the NNPC – a public body – for the enforcement of rights not accruing to members of the NGO but the affected communities/persons. He also cited Citec International Estates vs. Francis (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1768) 148 SC, and stated that the apex Court was to adopt most of the views in Centre for Oil Pollution Watch vs. NNPC, supra, to grant the respondents locus standi in the more recent decision of Citec International Estates vs. Francis (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1768) 148 SC. He stated that Centre for Oil Pollution Watch vs. NNPC supra remains the reigning authority on locus standi in public interest litigations; and that having not being overruled by the Supreme Court, it remains the binding authority on the issue, pursuant to section 287(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. He submitted that all the authorities cited by the 1^st Defendant are not applicable to the facts of this case, hence should be discountenanced.

[62] Learned Senior Counsel responding to the 3^rd Defendant’s arguments on the non-joinder of the National Salaries, Incomes and Wages Commission (NSIWC), submitted that there is nothing in section 3 of the NSIWC Act that makes it mandatory to have the NISWC a necessary or even a desirable party to this suit. He argued that paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 3, merely talks of the NSIWC ‘recommending’ or ‘advising’ and not fixing such wages. He submitted that the bodies that are statutorily imbued with power to fix such wages are the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants only.

[63] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in a large swathe of decisions, superior courts of record have held that “recommendation” amounts merely to ‘advise’ and that it is not binding on the person so advised. He cited Cookey vs. Fombo (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 271) 25 at 41D SC, Olagunji vs. Oyeniran (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 453) 127 at 143C-D SC and Tangale Traditional Council vs. Fawu (2002) FWLR (Pt. 117) 1137 CA, Nigerian Army vs. Dodo (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1331) 151 at 167H-168D. He submitted that the Supreme Court in Nwokedi v. Anambra State Government (2022) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1828) 29 at 55G-57A, affirmed the power of the 2^nd Defendant to fix the salaries and emoluments of Justices and Judges. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that it is settled that only necessary parties should/must be joined to a suit, not desirable or unnecessary ones; and that the NSIWC is not even a desirable party, it is an unnecessary party.

[64] Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that even if the NSIWC is a necessary party (which is not conceded), its non-joinder will not render this suit incompetent or affect the jurisdiction of the Court – as mere non-joinder of a necessary party does not rob the court of jurisdiction, if there are parties before it whose presence would determine the matter to finality. He cited Chicason Group of Companies Ltd. vs. Oteri (2021) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1772) 222 at 243F-G CA; CBN vs. Interstella Communications Ltd. (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 at 337G SC; Anyanwoko vs. Okoye (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 497 at 515G-516A and 519F-520B SC; Iyere vs. B.F.F.M. Ltd. (2008) LPELR-1578(SC).

 [65] Learned Senior Counsel in reaction to the 3^rd Defendant’s substantive issue (No 3) adopted all the arguments above in support of the Claimant’s locus standi in reaction to  contrary submissions. He argued that the 3^rd Defendant, the A-G failed to demonstrate that the evidence adduced by the Claimant in his supporting affidavit is ‘not credible’ as claimed by him. He referred to the case of CBN v. Amao, supra, relied on by the 3^rd Defendant and submitted that even though condition (a) of the listed six conditions does not apply to the facts of this suit, the remaining 5 conditions not only apply, but also favour the declarations sought.

[66] Learned Senior Counsel relied on the authorities cited in the Claimant’s written address that have to do with the jurisdiction and power of courts of law to correct the wrongful exercise of a public or a statutory duty; or to sanction the refusal or unwillingness to exercise discretion vested on public authorities. He submitted that the   Attorney-General has contradicted himself on the issues of performance of a public duty and the exercise of a ministerial duty. That in paragraphs 4.07-4.12, the A-G has argued that the duties on the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants are statutory duties; while in paragraph 4.13, he claims those duties are “ministerial” duties, citing Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board vs. Klifco Nig. Ltd., supra.  That another self contradiction can be found in paragraph 6(h) of the 3^rd Defendant’s counter-affidavit, which states: “That it is a fact that the statutory powers of the 2^nd Defendant are not ministerial in nature”.

[67] That in spite of the above contradictions, the 3^rd Defendant learned Attorney-General proceeded to admit in paragraph 4.14 that both the 1^st and the 2^nd Defendants must have recourse to exercise of discretion in determining or fixing the salaries of Judicial Officers. Learned Senior Counsel argued that this posturing affirms what was deposed to in paragraph 6(g) of the counter-affidavit: “That it is a fact that the 2^nd Defendant has discretion in the exercise of its statutory duty”. He submitted that in view of the admissions above that the 2^nd Defendant’s statutory powers are discretionary in nature, the decisions of the Supreme Court in Stitch vs. Attorney-General of the Federation, supra; Iwuji vs. Federal Commissioner for Establishment, supra, cited by the Claimant where the apex Court held that such ministerial discretion can be challenged in court – and the recent decision of that Court in Ajuwon vs. Governor of Oyo State, supra are apposite.

[68] Learned Senior Counsel argued that supposing the Claimant is even wrong in instituting this suit which seeks to compel performance of a public constitutional or statutory duty (which is not conceded), how would legal arguments about “ministerial duty” advanced by the Attorney-General lead to the dismissal of this case, when proof has been rendered in the supporting affidavit (without an effective challenge to the facts deposed to) that there is such breach by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants? He referred to  Ajuwon vs. Governor of Oyo State (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1803) 485 at 531D.

 [69] Learned Senior Counsel argued that the 3rd Defendant is wrong to seek to differentiate between section 6(1)(b) and 6(1)(d) of the same Act having submitted that under section 6(1)(b) of the RMAFC Act, revenue allocation can be reviewed. That this contradicts paragraph 6(g) of his counter-affidavit “that it is a fact that the 2^nd Defendant has discretion in the exercise of its statutory duty”. He submitted that it is settled law that all subsections or paragraphs of a particular section ought and must be read together citing Umeano vs. Anaekwe (2022) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1827) 509 at 532B-E SC and Orakul Resources Ltd. vs. NCC (2022) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1827) 539 at 598G-599A SC. That section 6(1)(b) talks of “revenue allocation formulae,” which is plural and which entails distribution of revenue or the formulae for such distribution. It was his submission that this is the only acceptable definition of the phrase; that determination of salaries and allowances “as appropriate” in section 6(1)(d) of the Act will definitely fall under “revenue allocation formulae.”

[70] Learned Senior Counsel referred to the definition of the word “revenue” in section 162(10) of the 1999 by the Supreme Court in the case of A-G Bauchi vs. A-G Federation (2018) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1648) 299 at 352B-C:

Revenue, in the context of section 162(10) of the Constitution, means the money or income the Government of the Federation receives from its businesses or taxes including duties, customs and excise, investments, royalties and the like.

He submitted that this definition should be accorded to the word “revenue” in section 6(1)(b) of the RMAFC Act; and that it shows that the 2^nd Defendant will be performing a public duty if it is then ‘allocating’ such revenue as prescribed in the Act.

[71] Learned Senior Counsel referred to the definition of ‘allocation’ in The Black’s Law Dictionary, 9^th Edition, page 88: “A designation or appropriation for a specific purpose; esp, the crediting of a receipt or the charging of a disbursement to an account allocation of funds”; and submitted that read together with the definition of “revenue” in A-G Bauchi vs. A-G Federation, supra, there can be no argument that section 6(1)(b) of the RMAFC Act, which provides for the “review, from time to time, the revenue allocation formulae and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing realities,” and section 6(1)(d) of the same Act, which peremptorily mandates it to “the remuneration appropriate” payable to Judicial Officers, ought and must be read together. He submitted that the duty to “review from time to time,” taking into consideration changing conditions, and the duty to determine “as appropriate” mean the same thing. That this is in agreement with the long title of, or preamble to, the RMAFC Act.

[72] Learned Senior counsel submitted that the law is settled that the Court should take into serious consideration the preamble of an Act and the objects and purposes of the provisions sought to be interpreted. He cited A-G Abia vs. A-G Federation (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 275) 414 at 450, A-G Ondo vs. A-G Ekiti (2001) FWLR (Pt. 79) 1431 at 1472-1473. He submitted that it is settled law that when there are two possible interpretations of a provision, the interpretation that suits or agrees with the preamble to the statute should be preferred, as against the interpretation that does not suit it referring to Ogbonna vs. A-G Imo State (1992) 2 SCNJ 26 and Osawe vs. Registrar of Trade Unions (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 755 at 769 SC. He argued that since the Preamble to the RMAFC Act does not distinguish between “allocation of revenue” [section 6(1)(b)] and ‘determination of salaries and allowances’ [section 6(1)(d)]; and since the Preamble has brought these two together under one canopy of “revenue allocation formulae,” this interpretation, rather than the one advanced by the 3^rd Defendant (which seeks to separate them), should be preferred.

[73] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Attorney-General failed to distinguish between the two, and contradicted his position that “remuneration” could not be reviewed by his submission in paragraph 4.18:

4.18 The ordinary meaning of the word ‘appropriate’ being suitable or proper in the circumstances, which discretion must be exercised to find that right scale and salary which is suitable for judicial officers. We so submit.

He argued that if section 6(1)(d) contemplates “discretion” to review the salary scale as admitted above – it being the provision that has used the word “appropriate” – how then can the learned A-G argue that section 6(1)(b) and (d) are different? It was his contention that discretion exercisable by a public body is subject to the rules on exercise of public service discretion as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Ajuwon vs. Governor of Oyo State (cited above) and Stitch vs. Attorney-General of the Federation, supra; Iwuji vs. Federal Commissioner for Establishment, supra.

[74]Learned Senior Counsel then submitted that stemming from the above, the submission in paragraph 4.19 of the 3^rd Defendant’s written address that “increase of salary is not a right known to any law in Nigeria” again contradicts his submissions in paragraph 4.18 that under the law, the 2^nd Defendant has discretion to review. Review includes ‘increase’ or ‘increment’. He referred to paragraph 6(e) of the 3^rd Defendant’s counter-affidavit where the following deposition was made:

e) That the 3^rd Defendant in reaction to paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 23, 24 and 25 of the Claimant’s affidavit states that the review of the salary of judicial officers in Nigeria are (sic) tied to other factors like the state of the economy aside statutory provision.

He stated that this contradiction should be viewed seriously by the Court, particularly in view of exhibits STH19A and STH19B which show the learned Attorney-General promising increase in the wages of Judicial Officers in Nigeria, “to reflect the current realities of our time”. He wondered why the stout opposition of the learned Attorney-General to this suit and submitted that a party cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time relying on CBN vs. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608) 130 at 168B-C, 170G-171A SC.

[75] Learned Senior Counsel urged the Court to consider and hold that stiff opposition to this suit by the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation, who occupies a unique position and is indeed the official leader of the Nigerian Bar, is not salutary, especially as his pre-litigation and post-litigation positions on the issues raised are highly contradictory. He stated that exhibits STH19 and STH19A have exposed the inner recesses of the heart of the Honourable Attorney General on the pitiable conditions of service and remuneration of Judicial Officers in Nigeria. That he took a positive position that admits no equivocation; hence the shock at the sudden change of heart on his part – expressed in the defence he has filed in this suit. That the Honourable Attorney General should be held bound by his words in the said Exhibits STH19 and STH19A.

[76] He referred to Hon. Justice Raliat Elehu-Habeeb & Others vs. Attorney General of the Federation (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt.1318)423 @ 511, where the Honourable Attorney General of the Federation was described per Adekeye, JSC, in the following words:

Section 150(1) of the 1999 Constitution stipulates that there shall be an Attorney-General of the Federation who shall be the Chief Law Officer of the Federation and a Minister of the government of the Federation. The Federal Attorney-General is the Chief Law Officer of the Federation; he is the custodian and protector of the Constitution. He is competent to be sued in any suit against the Federal Government or any of its agencies. Any case involving the (1) interpretation of the Constitution as it affects our democratic system of governance and (2) the doctrine of separation of powers entrenched in our Constitution, or any suit which poses a threat to the independence of any arm of government, must have the Attorney-General of the Federation as an inevitable party.

[77] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that this suit has to do with the independence of the Judiciary and to a large extent, the doctrine of separation of powers. He stated that considering the pre-eminent and incontestable position of the Attorney General under the Common Law and the Constitution, as the Chief Law Officer and the Chief Legal Adviser, the powers exercised/exercisable by him are no doubt gravely ministerial and are coupled with great responsibilities. That it is shocking, to say the least, that the Honourable Attorney General would turn his back to the good work of review of salary of Judicial Officers in Nigeria. He then urged the Court to dismiss the preliminary objection of the 3^rd Defendant and then discountenance or dismiss his arguments on all the issues submitted.

CASE OF THE 4^TH DEFENDANT

Facts

[78] The 4^th defendant states that it is in agreement with the facts deposed to by the Claimant in his supporting affidavit and that it is aware that the issue of poor remuneration of Judges in Nigeria has been a subject of public debate, agitations and disputes. The 4^th defendant states that the failure, refusal or neglect by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to review the remuneration and salaries payable to Judges in Nigeria is a deliberate effort to alter their remuneration, salaries and conditions of service to their disadvantage in light of inflationary trends prevalent in the country and continuing devaluation of the country’s currency.

Submissions of the 4^th Defendant

[79] The 4^th Defendant relied on its counter affidavit and submitted one issue for determination as follows:

Whether or not the reliefs sought in this suit ought to be granted by this Honourable Court in view of the inconsistency between the provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc.) Act No. 6, 2002 as amended by the Act No. 1, 2008 and Section 84(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

 

[80] Learned Counsel to the 4^th Defendant Kunle Adegoke SAN referred to the provisions of Section 84(3) of the 1999 Constitution  (as amended), which provides:

 

The remuneration and salaries payable to the holders of the said offices and their condition of service, other than allowances, shall not be altered to their disadvantage after their appointment.

 

He stated that this provision has to be juxtaposed with the provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc.) Act No. 6, 2002, as amended by the Act No. 1, 2008, by which the last review of judicial officers’ salaries was more than 12 years ago. He submitted that it is the unalterable provision of Section 1(3) of the Constitution that:

 

If any other law is inconsistent with the provision of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.

 

[81] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the un-reviewed provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc.) Act No. 6, 2002 as amended by the Act No. 1, 2008 are inconsistent with the provisions of Section 84(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and cannot withstand the dictum of the Supreme Court per Kekere-Ekun, JSC in Mohammed v. F. R. N. [2018] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1636) 229 at 258 paras E:

 

The Constitution is the grundnorm and fundamental law of the land. It is supreme and prevails over any other legislation enacted by the National Assembly…. Section 1(3) of the Constitution provides that if any law is inconsistent with the provision of the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail and that other law, to the extent of the inconsistency shall be void.”

 

[82] Learned Senior Counsel stated that it is the 4^th Defendant’s position that the facts deposed to in Paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the Claimant’s affidavit reveal clearly that the remuneration and salaries payable to the holders of the Judicial Offices, which are the subject of this suit, have been grossly altered to their disadvantage after their various appointments contrary to the provisions of Section 84(3) of the 1999 Constitution as amended. He submitted that it is clear from the affidavit of the 4^th Defendant that the failure of, refusal or neglect by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to upwardly review the salaries of the judicial officers mentioned in the provision of the Constitution to reflect their respective seniorities, rank and entitlements in line with the prevalent economic and social realities is inconsistent with the Constitution which forbids such failure, refusal or neglect.

 

[83] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the operative word in Section 84(3) is the word “Shall,” and that the Supreme Court in the case of Corporate Ideal Ins. Ltd. v. Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd [2014] 7 NWLR (Pt. 1405) page 165 at 193 paras. D-E, per Okoro JSC stated as follows:

 

It is now well settled that where the provisions of a statute is garbed with the word “shall” as in the instant provision, it connotes that it is imperative for the provision to be obeyed. The word “shall” makes the provision mandatory, imposes a duty and is a word of command.

 

He submitted that the law is clear that when the wordings of a statute is simple and clear, they should be given their natural, simple and ordinary meaning; and he cited Nwankwo v. Yar’adua [2010] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1209) 518 at 589 paras. C-E, Ogbonna v. AG Imo State [1992] 1 NWLR (Pt. 220) 647.

 

[84] Learned Senior Counsel stated that the first prescription of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) is that “This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” He submitted that any infraction of the Constitution shall be null and void so far it violates the Constitution. He submitted that the failure, refusal and neglect by the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants to review the salaries and remuneration of the judicial officers is a breach of their constitutional duty not to alter the “the remuneration and salaries” of judicial officers mentioned in the Constitutio “and their conditions of service”… “to their disadvantage after their appointment” is a gross violation of the Constitution.

 

[85] He argued that it is indisputable that the purchasing power of an average Nigerian has been plummeting considerably ever since the Naira devaluation policy of the government started in the 1990’s. That this trend has been a matter of judicial recognition by the Supreme Court way back in 1999 in the case of Ifeanyi Chukwu Osondu Company Ltd. & Anor. v. Akhigbe (1999) LPELR-1433(SC) p. 21 para A, when their Lordships observed as follows:

From experience, there can be no argument that the naira has been considerably devalued, causing a devastating effect in the purchasing power of the individuals and the worth of the naira as compared to what it was before the process of devaluation began.

It was his submission that this decision is a platform to reasonably conclude that the fact that the country’s currency has been falling since then without a halt or reverse is a matter of judicial notice.

 

[86] Learned Senior Counsel referred to the provisions of Section 124(1) (a) of the Evidence Act, 2011: 

Proof shall not be required of a fact the knowledge of which is not reasonably open to question and which is:

a.      Common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding is being held;

And S.T. Hon’s Law of Evidence in Nigeria, 3^rd Edition, particularly at page 1224, Kamba v. Ndagi (2020) LPELR-50245(CA) when His Lordship, Agim, JCA, (as he then was) observed as follows:

“...It is obvious that the cost of erecting the building in the 1st respondent's approved building plan would be far more today than it would have been in May, 2007 (13 years ago) because the naira has undergone massive devaluation between May, 2007 and today and the persisting inflation. This fact which is common knowledge in Nigeria and is not reasonably open to question does not require proof by virtue of S.124 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011 which provides that-

"1) Proof shall not be required of a fact the knowledge of which is not reasonably open to question and which is;

a) Common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding is being held, or generally; or

b) Capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot reasonably be questioned.

2) The Court may acquire, in any manner it deems fit, knowledge of a fact to which Subsection (1) of this Section refers, and shall take such knowledge into account.”  Per AGIM, J.C.A. (Pp. 103 paras. A)

 

[87] Learned Senior counsel argued that it is clear that unrestrained devaluation of the Naira and the erosion of the purchasing power of Nigerians is a notorious fact that cannot be disputed. That this affect Judges as well, as they live in the same society over which they perform the functions of adjudication. He argued that the implication is that the social and economic realities have considerably altered the purchasing power of such Judges and the only way they shall not be subjected to undue disadvantage is for the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to perform their duty under the law to ensure that the remunerations and salaries of judicial officers shall not be altered to their disadvantage after their appointment.

 

[88] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that where a legislature is derelict in the performance of its functions as to make relevant adjustments to the law, it shall only succeed in confining society to its previous stage of antiquity and lack of progress. That this is forbidden by law itself in its nature that is required to be progressive; and is the dictum of perfection as stated by Edozie, JSC in Buhari v. Obasanjo (2003) LPELR-813(SC) (Pp. 68 paras. C) when His Lordship, stated as follows:

 

The beauty of law in a civilized society is that it owes its respect and due observance to the society. It should be progressive and act as a catalyst to social engineering. Where it relies on mere technicality or out-moded or incomprehensible procedures and immerses itself in a jacket of hotchpotch legalism that is not in tune with the times, it becomes anachronistic and it destroys or desecrates the temple of justice it stands.

 

[89] He submitted that an impoverished judiciary can never be independent, and that it is imperative that the judicial machinery and wheel of justice shall continue to grind and grind effectively in a manner that can sustain the confidence of the masses. He submitted that the Court ought to grant the reliefs sought in this suit save for Relief No. 4, which ought to be amended to reflect the appropriate seniority and rank of the judicial officers concerned thus:

 

i.                    Chief Justice of Nigeria: Minimum of N12 million monthly;

ii.                 Each of the Justice of the Supreme Court: Minimum of N11 million monthly;

iii.               President of the Court of Appeal: minimum of N11 Million monthly;

iv.               Each of the Justice of the Court of Appeal: Minimum of N10 million monthly;

v.                  Chief Judge of the Federal High Court; Minimum of N10 million monthly;

vi.               Each of the Justice of the Federal High Court: Minimum of N9 million monthly;

vii.             President of National Industrial Court: Minimum of N10 million monthly;

viii.          Each of the Justice of the National Industrial Court: Minimum of N9 million monthly;

ix.                Chief Judge of each State high Court; minimum of N10 million monthly;

x.                  Each of the Judge of the State High Court: Minimum of N9 million monthly;

xi.                Chief Judge of FCT High Court; Minimum of N10 million monthly;

xii.             Each of the Judge FCT High Court: Minimum of N9 million monthly;

xiii.           Grand Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT and of each State that has it: Minimum of N8 million monthly;

xiv.           Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT and each State that has such Court: Minimum of N8 million  monthly;

xv.              President of the Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT and each state that has a Court: Minimum of N8million monthly;

xvi.           Justice of the Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT and each State that has a Court; Minimum of N7million monthly.

 

 

 

 

[90] Learned Senior counsel submitted that it is within the powers of the Court to direct that a provision of an existing law that is inconsistent with the Constitution be modified to bring the law into conformity with the Constitution. He referred to Section 315(1) and 315(3) of the 1999 Constitution:

(1) Subject to the provision of this Constitution, an existing law shall have effect with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution…

and shall be deemed to be an Act of the National Assembly or Law of a State House of Assembly as the case may be.

(3) Nothing shall be construed as affecting the power of a court of law or any tribunal established by law to declare invalid any provision of an existing law on the ground of inconsistency with the provision of any other law, that is to say-

……………………..

(d) any provision of this Constitution.

 

[91] Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Court can declare invalid the provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc.) Act No. 6, 2002 as amended by the Act No. 1, 2008 based on inconsistency with the provisions of Section 84(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) in the light of the prevalent socio-economic situation of the country, and direct the appropriate authority to carry out an amendment to the said Act to bring it into conformity with the Constitution as suggested by the 4^th Defendant herein. He contended that the Court can direct the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to carry out their responsibility of ensuring avoidance of inconsistency between the Constitution and the Act by ensuring regular and constant review of the salaries and remunerations of judicial officers.

 

[92] The 4^th Defendant responding to the issue of locus standi raised by the 1^st and 3^rd Defendants, stated that the from the Claimant’s affidavit evidence, all he has deposed to are facts its Chairman the Honourable, the Chief Justice of Nigeria has ventilated on many occasions. Learned Senior Counsel stated that the implication is that the entire society, the Claimant inclusive, is affected by the plight of the judiciary and hence can bring an action to ventilate this common grievance. It was his submission that judicial approach to the determination of locus standi has gone beyond what the 3^rd Defendant is urging on the Court with respect to locus standi of the Claimant, and that the scope of locus standi has been widened now beyond the shoehorning traditional contemplation under which scope the 3^rd Defendant is considering this issue. He stated that the trend worldwide now is to prevent State violation of public interest through public interest litigation.

 

[93] The 4^th Defendant stated that the judiciary in Nigeria is not insensitive to this growing trend and that the Court of Appeal has pronounced on the need for this fundamental progressive development in our law referring to the decision in Alhaji Salihu Wukari Sambo & Anor. v. Capt. Yahaya Douglas Ndatse (Rtd.) & Ors, at pages 41 – 43. Learned Senior Counsel submitted further that in further consideration of what should govern the determination of locus standi in modern times, and relying further on Rose LJ in Secretary of State, Ex Parte World Development Movement Limited (reported in [2000] 21 W.R.N.), the Court of Appeal per Agube, posited at pages 44 – 45 of the decision in Sambo v. Ndatse (supra) as follows:

On factors that are considered in determining the issue of locus standi in modern times, the learned Justice further held:

Furthermore, the merits of the challenge are an important, if not dominant factor when considering standing. In Professor Sir William Wades words in Administrative Law (7^th edition, 1994) p 712.

'...the real question is whether the Applicant can show some substantial default or abuse, and not whether his personal rights or interest are involved.'

Leaving merits aside for a moment, there seem to me to be a number of factors of significance in the present case: the importance of vindicating the rule of law, as Lord Diplock emphasized in IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Limited (1981) 2 ALL ER 93 at 107, (1982) AC 617 at 644; the importance of the issue raised, as in Ex p Child Poverty Action Group; the likely absence of any other responsible challenger, as in Ex p Child Poverty Action Group and Ex p Green peace Ltd; the nature of the breach of duty against which relief is sought (see IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and small Businesses Limited (1981) 2 ALL ER 93 at 96, (1982) AC 617 at 630 per Lord Wilberforce); and the prominent role of these applicants in giving advice, guidance and assistance with regard to aid (see Ex p Child Poverty Action Group (1989) 1 All ER 1047 at 1048, (1990) 2 Q.B. 540 at 546. All, in my judgment, point in the present case, to the conclusion that the applicants hereto have a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates within S. 31 (3) of the 1981 ACT and Order 53, R 3(7).

 

[94] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the principles that ought to guide the court in determining sufficiency of interest as stated in the brilliant pronouncements of both local and foreign Courts are:

a.      the merits of the challenge; (it is indisputable that a national and monumental issue like the welfare of Judges by which only the independence of the judiciary can be guaranteed and in the absence of which there can never be rule of law, is clearly significant to consider in according the Claimant locus standi to institute and maintain this action;

b.      the importance of vindicating the rule of law; (no case better vindicates the rule of law than the present one in which the Claimant is saying that destruction of the judiciary will only render our nation to the vagaries of jungle justice and complete devastation of treasured values of justice);

c.      the importance of the issue raised; (no issue is more important than to bring the woes of the judiciary to a stop. The national and international agitations on the status and conditions of Nigerian judges can only be redeemed where we have individuals like the present Claimant who is interested in championing the cause of elevated members of society who can only be seen but cannot be heard;

d.      the likely absence of any other responsible challenger; (it is certain that no other group is likely to challenge this shameful situation as this particular case is unprecedented in our jurisprudence);

e.      the nature of the breach of duty against which relief is sought; (it is irrefutable that the duty of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to ensure that the remunerations and salaries of Judicial officers and their conditions of service are not altered to their disadvantage or detriment is of such nature that justifies the intervention of any conscious and conscientious individual and institution.

 

[95] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that based on all of these, no jurisdiction in the He stated that there is no jurisdiction adopting the type of atavistic approach to locus standi like the one urged on the court, and that the court should reject such an accessory-after-the-fact sophistry. He submitted that the issue submitted by the 4^th Defendant  leveraging on the case submitted by the Claimant, calls for the Court’s immediate intervention. That the issue is whether the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants can continue to enjoy the untrammeled freedom to violate the constitutional provision of Section 84(3) forbidding them to alter the remunerations, salaries and conditions of service of judicial officers to their disadvantage after their appointments. He submitted that it is important to conclude that the un-reviewed provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc.) Act No. 6, 2002 as amended by the Act No. 1, 2008 are inconsistent with the provisions of Section 84(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and cannot withstand the infallible dictum of Peter-Odili, JSC in  Amadi & Anor. v. INEC (2012)  LPELR-7831(SC) at 62 paras B where His Lordship stated as follows:

It is also settled law that the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are supreme and have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria and that any other law which is inconsistent with its provisions is void to the extent of the inconsistency as the Constitution must prevail over such Act/law.  Per PETER-ODILI, J.S.C.

 

Claimant’s Reply on Points of Law

 

[96] Learned Senior Counsel to the Claimant submitted that section 84(3) of the Constitution cannot be read in isolation of section 84(1), which is one of the cornerstone statutory provisions relied upon by the Claimant and has spelt out the duties of both the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants. He stated that the 4^th Defendant’s position on the importance of compelling the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants to review upwards the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers in Nigeria is very consistent with the position taken by the Claimant. And that this can be done without harm to the provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) Act No. 6 of 2002, as amended in 2008 – since both the Claimant and the 4^th Defendant are in agreement that the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants (especially the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants) have, over a long stretch of time, refused, failed or neglected to exercise their constitutional and statutory discretion to do so.

 

[97] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that both the provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) Act No. 6 of 2002, as amended in 2008, and the provisions of section 84(3) of the 1999 Constitution as can still work or be interpreted together for the purposes of this suit, without the former being modified or nullified, as suggested by the 4^th Defendant. That it is settled law that an intention to legislate in contravention of the Constitution should not be imputed to the lawmaker; hence where an enactment can be construed and can operate in such a way as not to be inconsistent with the Constitution, such a construction and manner of operation should be preferred to any other construction that would lead to inconsistency, citing Okechialam vs. Nwamara (2003) FWLR. (Pt. 176) 635, (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 835) 597 SC.

[98] He submitted that a law is said to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, only when/if it is contradictory to the provisions of the latter and cited Hon. Minister for Justice & Attorney General of the Federation vs. Attorney-General of Lagos State (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 704) 1 at 62 SC, I.T. Muhammad, JSC (as he then was), held as follows:

“Inconsistency,” in law, to me, can be taken to be a situation where two or more Laws, enactments and/or rules are mutually repugnant or contradictory, contrary, one to the other so that both cannot stand and the acceptance or establishment of the one implies the abrogation or abandonment of the other. It is thus a situation where the two or more enactments cannot function together simultaneously.

[99] Learned Senior Counsel argued that the Claimant has shown that both the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) Act No. 6 of 2002, as amended in 2008, and the provisions of section 84(3) of the 1999 Constitution as amended can work or be interpreted together, hence the former is not in conflict with the latter. He commended the industry and maturity exhibited by the 4^th Defendant, and urged the court to grant the Claimant’s Reliefs.

 

COURT’S DECISION

        PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

[100] The issue of jurisdiction is a fundamental and threshold issue raised by the 1^st and the 3rd Defendants. No matter how well conducted the proceedings and judgments of a Court are, they become a nullity where it is shown that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the action. The jurisdiction of the Court is challenged by the 1^st Defendant on three grounds; locus standi of the Claimant, failure to serve a pre-action notice, and not being a proper party. The 3^rd Defendant challenges the jurisdiction of the Court on the grounds of locus standi of the Claimant, and the non joinder of a proper party to the Suit.

[101] The gravamen of the Claimant’s case as revealed in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the supporting affidavit is that he is Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) aspiring to be appointed either a Justice of the Supreme Court, or of the Court of Appeal, or at least a Judge of the High Court; but the salaries and allowances paid the Justices and Judges of these Courts is too poor for him given current socio-economic realities. Furthermore, that the poor mode of determining or reviewing such salaries and allowances is also scaring him from applying to be appointed to any of the Benches, even though he is ably and fittingly qualified to so apply and be appointed. These depositions confer locus standi on the Claimant in that he is interested in being appointed a Justice or at least a Judge. The Claimant has shown sufficient interest to be accorded a hearing. See Regd. Trustees, A.S.O.&M.D.A. vs. John  (2020) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1753) 189 at 230E-F CA, Nyame vs. FRN (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1193) 344 at 400F-H SC, B.B Apugo & Sons Ltd. v OHMB (2016) LPELR – 40598 (SC) 85, Pacers Multi Dynamics Ltd v. M.V. Dancing Sister (2012) 1 SC (Pt. 1) p.75.

[102] The Claimant’s case is one challenging a constitutional infraction, and it is also a public interest litigation. There has been a paradigm shift on the technicality of locus standi in suits founded on constitutional issues, and the public interest both locally and internationally, see Alhaji Salihu Wukari Sambo v Capt Yahaya Douglas Ndatse (2013) LPELR-20857 (CA), Fawehinmi v Akilu (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt 66) 797 at 832 and 847-848. It is now settled that the technical requirement of locus standi is unnecessary where a suit is brought to challenge a violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution and/or any other statute; and where it is instituted by a person, or persons, embarking on public interest litigation as in this instance, see Centre for Oil Pollution Watch vs. NNPC (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1666) 518 SC. The Claimant’s suit challenges constitutional and statutory breaches by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants. Consequently, locus standi automatically inures in his favour. The Claimant has the locus standi to institute this Suit. I so rule.

 

[103] On the issue of pre action notice, section 21 of the Legislative Houses (Powers & Privileges) Act, 2017 is not applicable to this suit. The 1st Defendant sued is the National Assembly a juristic person. The 1999 Constitution has segmented between the National Assembly as a juristic person, the Senate (a “Legislative House” in the National Assembly) and the House of Assembly (another “Legislative House” in the same National Assembly). The Act admits that there are more than one “Legislative Houses” – from its title to all its provisions, and section 21 of the Act which talks of “a Legislative House.” The mention of this phrase as against “National Assembly” means the legislature did not intend to include the latter in the provision requiring pre-action notice.

 

[104] The failure to serve a pre-action Notice only raises a procedural issue as opposed to substantive jurisdiction. Any party not so served who has taken a step in the proceedings is deemed to have waived his right of objection, see Mobil Producing (Nig.) Unlimited vs. LASEPA (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 1 SC. The 1^st Defendant waived its right of objection when it appeared before this Court on 6^th June 2022, and 22^nd June 2022 through the same Counsel (Charles Yoila Esq) without raising any objection.

 

[105] The 3^rd Defendant has objected to this suit on the grounds that the non-joinder of the National Salaries, Incomes and Wages Commission (NSIWC) has robbed the Court of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He has relied on section 3 of the National Salaries, Incomes and Wages Commission Act (NSIWC Act). There is nothing in that provision that makes it mandatory to have the NISWC a necessary or even a desirable party to this Suit. The bodies that are constitutionally and statutorily imbued with power to fix remuneration, and salaries of judicial office holders are the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants only. The Constitution has not given the NSIWC a role, and so it is not a necessary party. The law is settled that only necessary parties should be joined to a suit, see Green v Green, (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt 61) 480, Peenok Investment Ltd v Hotel Presidential Ltd (1982) 12 SC. In any event, non-joinder of a necessary party does not rob the Court of jurisdiction, if there are parties before it whose presence would determine the matter to finality, see Chicason Group of Companies Ltd. vs. Oteri (2021) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1772) 222 at 243F-G CA; CBN vs. Interstella Communications Ltd. (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1618) 294 at 337G SC; Anyanwoko vs. Okoye (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1188) 497 at 515G-516A and 519F-520B SC; Iyere vs. B.F.F.M. Ltd. (2008) LPELR-1578(SC). The NSIWC is an unnecessary party.

[106] I rule that this Court is not deprived of jurisdiction to entertain and determine this action. I therefore assume jurisdiction in this matter.

 

        ORIGINATING SUMMONS

 

[107] I have carefully considered the Originating Summons, the affidavit evidence of the parties, arguments, submissions and authorities cited by counsel. I will begin with the preliminary issue raised by the Claimant on the validity of the 3^rd Defendant’s counter affidavit. Michael Oni, a litigation officer deposed to the counter affidavit. He states that he has the consent and authority of the 3^rd Defendant, and his employer to make the depositions. He states that he was informed by Maimuna Lami Shiru (Mrs), the lead counsel handling this matter about the facts, which he believes to be true and correct. Whilst section 115(4) of the Evidence Act 2011 permits a deponent to swear to facts derived from a third party in an affidavit in so far as the source of his information is properly disclosed, such depositions are of little material value as they constitute hearsay evidence. The factum that such information was given is all that there is to the information. The truth of such information is an entirely different thing. That is why it is always ill advised for a lawyer’s clerk/litigation officer to depose to facts intended to prove a case, as they are not matters within his personal knowledge, he lacks material facts or documentary evidence to establish them, and he is not in any position to vouch for the truth or accuracy of the information so obtained, see Ibeto & Anor v Oguh (2022) LPELR-56803(CA) 77-80 Paras E-F.

 [108] I note that paragraph 6 (b) of the 3^rd Defendant’s counter affidavit states: “that all the averments in the Claimant’s affidavit are denied by the 3^rd Defendant except where it is expressly admitted.” This is not a proper traverse; and has not contradicted those facts in the supporting affidavit. Denial of depositions in an affidavit must be specific and unequivocal, see Messrs Lewis Peat (N.R.I.) Ltd v. A.E. Akhimien (1976) 7 S.C. 167; Akintola v. Solano (1986) NWLR 598, Ola v University Of Ilorin [2014] 15 NWLR 453. The depositions by Michael Oni, litigation officer are incapable of sustaining the 3^rd Defendant’s case,

[109] Before I proceed to the questions submitted by the Claimant for determination, it is pertinent to state the facts that I find to have been established. It is not disputed by the parties that the period between 2008 and 2022 is 14 years; and the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers has not been reviewed upwards by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants. It is also not disputed that Naira has over the years lost value vis-à-vis other global currencies like the US Dollars, the British Pound Sterling and the European Union (EU) Euro, etc as a result of devaluation, and the downturn in the economy.  There is also no dispute between the parties that the Hon, the Chief Justice of Nigeria, the Hon, the President Court of Appeal have decried the poor pay of Judicial Officers, and other well meaning Nigerians have ceaselessly harped on the same issue, including the 3^rd Defendant. These salient facts are the foundation of this Suit and have been established by the affidavit evidence placed before the Court.

[110] At this juncture, it becomes imperative to state and clearly define the status of a Judicial Officer in Nigeria. This is because the 3^rd Defendant, in paragraphs 6(m) and 6(o) of his counter affidavit, and paragraphs 4.06, 4.19, 4.25, and 5.00 of his written address has equated the status of Judicial Officers with “worker’s” as shown below:

6        (m) That it is a fact that increase in salaries of an employee is not a right but a negotiated process between an employee and employer.

 

6        (o) That it is a fact that there is no law regulating increase of worker’s salaries in Nigeria except as it concerns minimum wage.  

 

 4.06: We so submit that the right to increase worker’s salary is not a legal right under any law in Nigeria. 

4.19: The 3^rd Defendant will argue in the alternative that increase of a worker’s salary is not a right known to any law in Nigeria.

4.25:  The 3^rd Defendant submits further that since there is no statutory provision as it relates (sic) increase of worker’s salary…..

 

5.00: The duties of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendant have no relation with increment of worker’s salaries as it concerns judicial officers in Nigeria.

 

[111] Section 91 of the Labour Act CAP L1 LFN 2004 defines ‘worker’ as follows:

 

“worker” means any person who has entered into or works under a contract with an employer, whether the contract is for manual labour or clerical work or is expressed or implied or oral or written, and whether it is a contract of service or a contract personally to execute any work or labour,…..

 

 Chapter VII of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides for The Judicature. Part I and Part II of the chapter has made provisions for the establishment of the superior courts of record listed in section 6 (5) (a-i) of the Constitution. Furthermore, section 6 (1) of the Constitution states as follows: “The judicial powers of the Federation shall be vested in the courts to which this section relates, being courts established for the Federation”. Part I and Part II of Chapter VII has also made provisions for the appointment of Justices and Judges to the courts, and the qualifications of a person to hold the office of a Justice or a Judge.

 

[112] By virtue of the provision of Section 318 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, “Public service of the Federation” means service of the Federation in any capacity in respect of the Government of the Federation”…(underlining mine). Justices and Judges (Judicial Officers) exercise the judicial power of the State. They are holders of public office in the same way as Ministers and Legislators. The Hon, The Chief Justice of Nigeria is the Head of the Third Arm of Government, the Judiciary. Justices and Judges are the repositories of the Judiciary. Their parity as constitutionally provided is definitely with Ministers (representing the Executive), and Legislators (representing the Legislature). The question to be asked is whether Ministers (representing the Executive) and Legislators (representing the Legislature) are “worker’s/employee” who should enter into ‘negotiation’, and ‘collective bargaining’ for increase in their salaries as the 3^rd Defendant, the Honourable Attorney-General of the Federation has stated that Judicial Officers should do? There is the need to state that ‘negotiation’ and ‘collective bargaining’ are incidental to trade unionism. Ministers and Legislators are not members of trade unions, and none is registered to advance their interests or struggles; ditto  Judicial Officers. 

 

[113] Furthermore, Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc.) Act No. 6, 2002 as amended by the Act No. 1, 2008 expressly mentions Judicial Office Holders and so it is specific to Judicial Officers. The salary of “worker’s”, in the context used by the 3^rd Defendant is not by legislation. It is therefore very wrong for Justices and Judges (Judicial Officers) who are elevated to a high status by the 1999 Constitution to be referred to as “worker’s” by the 3^rd Defendant, the Attorney-General of the Federation. Justices and Judges (Judicial Officers) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are definitely not “worker’s” in the context used to address them in the 3^rd Defendant’s affidavit and written address. It is not permissible under any circumstances for Justices and Judges (Judicial Officers) to engage in ‘negotiation’ or ‘collective bargaining,’ over their remuneration. To do so, would be at odds with judicial independence, and the dignity of Judicial Officers. The 1999 Constitution has made provision on how the service conditions and salaries of Judicial Officers are to be determined.

 

[114] In answering the questions/issues submitted for determination, it is necessary to begin with the following salient provisions for a proper understanding of what the1999 Constitution (as amended) represents, and how it works. Section 1 (1) of the Constitution provides:

 

This Constitution is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

 

By this provision, the supremacy of the Constitution is settled law. The Constitution is the grundnorm. Its provisions have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federation, see Eze v Gov, Abia State (2010) 15 NWLR (Part 1216) at 324, Mohammed v F.R.N. [2018] 13 NWLR (Pt 1636) 229 at 258 Para E. All persons and authorities exercised in the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria are derived from the Constitution.

 

[115] Where the Constitution expressly provides for the doing of a thing or creates an obligation such persons or authorities are not at liberty to neglect to discharge the responsibility or obligation as it is binding. The Courts will require the thing, obligation, and duty to be performed as the powers of the Courts are unfettered, see Iwuji v. Federal Commissioner for Establishment (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt 3) 497. Also, where any arm of government, agency, department or organization deriving power from the Constitution exceeds such powers, the Courts have an obligation to declare such action as ultra vires its powers, null, void and of no effect, see Alhaji Dododo v EFCC (2013) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1336) 468, AGF & Ors v Alhaji Atiku Abubakar (2007) SC 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1. The failure of persons and authorities to act in accordance with the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, (as amended) or to abide by them render those actions of non-compliance un-constitutional, see A-G Abia State v A-G Federation (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 265 SC, Eze v. Gov Abia State (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt 1216) at 324.

 

 [116] In determining the questions/issues, I will reproduce sections 4 (1) & (2), and section 84 (1) to (4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), and section 6(1) (b) & (d) of the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act (RMAFC ), CAP R7, LFN 2004.

4. (1) The legislative powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall be vested in a National Assembly for the Federation which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

(2) The National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation….

84. (1) There shall be paid to the holders of the offices mentioned in this section such salaries and allowances as may be prescribed by the National Assembly but not exceeding the amount as shall have been determined by the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission.

(2) The remuneration, salaries and allowances payable to the holders of the offices so mentioned shall be charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation.

(3) The remuneration, salaries payable to the holders of the said offices and their conditions of service other than allowances shall not be altered to their disadvantage after appointment.

(4) The offices aforesaid are the offices of President, Vice-President, Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice of the Supreme Court, President of the Court of Appeal, Justice of the Court of Appeal, Chief Judge of the Federal High Court, Judge of the Federal High Court, Chief Judge and Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Chief Judge of a State, Judge of High Court of a State, Grand Kadi and Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, President and Judge of the Customary Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Grand Kadi and Kadi of Sharia Court of Appeal of a State, President and Judge of the Customary Court of Appeal of a State, the Auditor-General for the Federation and the Chairmen and members of the following executive bodies, namely, the Code of Conduct Bureau, the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Independent National Electoral Commission, the National Judicial Council, the Federal Judicial Service Commission, the Judicial Service Committee of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, the Federal Character Commission, the Code of Conduct Tribunal, the National Population Commission, the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission, the Nigerian Police Council, and the Police Service Commission.

 [117] The provision of Section 4 (2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) has empowered the National Assembly to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation at all times and in all seasons. There can be no doubt that the purpose of this provision, and the intention of the framers is to ensure peace, order and good government in the entire Federation. The test of ‘good government’ is that of the ordinary and reasonable man. It is therefore the duty of the National Assembly to make laws that so promote, so as to justify the aspirations and hopes of both the framers, and the citizenry, see All Progressives Congress v E.S.I.E.C (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt 1801) at 68C-D SC. Obsolete laws that do not promote peace, order and good government of the Federation ought to be amended or out rightly abrogated by the National Assembly. The Court of Appeal in Iloabache v. Philips (2002) FWLR (Pt. 115) 726 at 747 CA, per Tabai, JCA (as he then was) held thus:

An enactment or its provision is said to be obsolete where the state of things contemplated by the provision has ceased to exist or the provision is of such a nature as to be no longer capable of being put into force, regard being had to any alteration of political or social circumstances. See Lipede v. Sonekan (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 373) 668 at 669.

[118] By Section 84 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, the Judicial Officers listed in subsection (4) are to enjoy the salaries and allowances as may be prescribed by the 1^st Defendant. The 2^nd Defendant is to determine the amount that Judicial Officers need, and ought to be paid. The said salaries and allowances shall be a charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation and shall not be altered to the disadvantage of the Judicial Officers. In prescribing the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers, the 1^st Defendant enacted the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) Act No. 6 of 2002, which was amended by the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) (Amendment) Act No. 1 of 2008.

[119] The salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers in Nigeria, as prescribed in the 2008 Act is deposed to in paragraph 17 of the Claimant’s supporting affidavit and is reproduced as follows:

17.       That by Part IIB of the Schedule to the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) (Amendment) Act, 2008, the basic annual salaries of the above-named Judicial Officers are as follows:

 

(i)               Chief Justice of Nigeria                             N3,363,972.50

(ii)            Justice of the Supreme Court                    N2,477,110.00

(iii)          President of the Court of Appeal                N2,477,110.00

(iv)          Justice of the Court of Appeal                   N1,995,430.18

(v)             Chief Judge of the Federal High Court       N1,995,430.18

(vi)          Chief Judge of the FCT                             N1,995,430.18

(vii)        President, National Industrial Court          N1,995,430.18

(viii)     Judge of the Federal High Court                N1,804,740.00

(ix)           Judge of the National Industrial Court       N1,804,740.00

(x)             Judge of the FCT High Court                     N1,804,740.00

(xi)           Grand Khadi FCT Sharia Court of Appeal   N1,995,430.18

(xii)        President, FCT Customary Court of Appeal N1,995,430.18

(xiii)      Khadi Sharia Court of Appeal FCT              N1,804,740.00

(xiv)      Judge FCT Customary Court of Appeal       N1,804,740.00

(xv)         Chief Judge of State                                   N1,995,430.18

(xvi)      Judge of State High Court                          N1,804,740.00

(xvii)    Grand Khadi State Sharia Court of Appeal  N1,995,430.18

(xviii) President State Customary Court of Appeal N1,995,430.18

(xix)       Khadi State Sharia Court of Appeal             N1,804,740.00

(xx)         Judge State Customary Court of Appeal      N1,804,740.00

 

[120] The un-contradicted evidence of the Claimant and the 4^th Defendant is that since 2008, the inflationary trends, and the devaluation of the Naira have adversely affected the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers. The Claimant’s evidence in paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 28 and 34 of his affidavit are reproduced:

18. That Part IIB of the same 2008 Act has made provisions for “Allowances and Fringe Benefits for Judicial Officers (Federal and State),” where the allowances and fringe benefits accruable to Judicial Officers are spelt out to be paid in US Dollars.

 

19. That between 2008 and now is about 14 years; yet the basic salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers named above has not been reviewed upwards, notwithstanding the loss of value of the naira vis-à-vis other global currencies like the US Dollars, the British Pound Sterling and the European Union (EU) Euro, etc.       

 

20. That as at November, 2008 when the Amended Act was in force, the exchange rate between the Naira and the US Dollar was N117.74 to USD1. Hereto attached to prove this is a Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) online publication, which is marked Exhibit STH1.

 

28. That the official exchange rate between the Nigerian Naira and the US Dollar released by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) as at 27/4/2022 was N415.83 to one (1) US Dollar. Hereto attached is the CBN online publication, which is marked Exhibit STH17.

34. That I know as Legal Practitioner who has practiced in all the levels of courts in Nigeria that poor pay for Judicial Officers is seriously affecting the quality of judgments and rulings those Officers are delivering; and the discharge of other functions associated with their offices.

 

[121] The evidence of the 4^th Defendant in paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of its counter affidavit is as follows:

 

9. I am aware that the issue of poor remuneration of Judges in Nigeria has been a subject of public debate, agitations and disputes.

 

10. The failure, refusal or neglect by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to review the remuneration and salaries payable to Judges in Nigeria is a deliberate effort to alter their remuneration, salaries and conditions of service to their disadvantage in light of inflationary trends prevalent in the country and continuing devaluation of the country’s currency.

 

11. I know as a matter of fact that the provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc.) Act No. 6, 2002 as amended by the Act No 1, 2008 are inconsistent with the provisions of Section 84 (3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) in the light of recent socio-economic circumstances and ought to have been modified to bring them in conformity with Section 84(3) of the Constitution.

 

[122] There is abundant evidence to show how, and why the salaries and allowances paid to Judicial Officers since 2008 cannot be sustained. Indeed, the Claimant has in his further affidavit deposed to the fact that the 3^rd Defendant in April 2021 stated that there is a need to increase the salaries of Judicial Officers in Nigeria, “to ensure that welfare of our judicial officers reflects current realities of our time” as seen in exhibits STH19 and STH19A. And the following fact is deposed to in paragraph 6 (e) of the 3^rd Defendant’s counter affidavit:

 

That the 3^rd Defendant in reaction to paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 25 of the Claimant’s affidavit states that the review of the salary of judicial officers in Nigeria are tied to other factors like the state of the economy aside the statutory provision.  

 

[123] This corroborates the evidence of the Claimant and 4^th Defendant that the downturn in the economy and devaluation of the Naira has completely eroded its purchasing power since 2008. The Supreme Court took judicial notice of the devaluation of the Naira in the case of Ifeanyi Chukwu Osondu Company v Akhigbe (1999) LPELR-1433 SC, 21. Following this precedent, this Court also takes judicial notice of the fact of the devaluation of the Naira, the official exchange rate of N415.83 to one (1) US Dollar (investors and exporters window), and the general gradual economic downturn since 2008. I find that the provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc.) Act No. 6, 2002 as amended by the Act No 1, 2008 as it relates to Judicial Officers who are the subject matter of this suit is now obsolete because the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants failed, neglected, refused to perform their constitutional and statutory duties. See the Court of Appeal definition of obsolete in Iloabache v. Philips supra (paragraph 117 above). By this failure, there is no shadow of doubt that the remuneration, salaries and allowances paid to Judicial Officers was altered to their disadvantage after their appointment. The 4^th Defendant, the National Judicial Council has asserted that the “failure, refusal or neglect by the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to review the remuneration and salaries payable to Judges in Nigeria is a deliberate effort to alter their remuneration, salaries and conditions of service to their disadvantage in light of inflationary trends prevalent in the country and continuing devaluation of the country’s currency”.

 

[124] The 4^th defendant has submitted that Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc.) Act No. 6, 2002 as amended by the Act No 1, 2008 is inconsistent with the provisions of section 84 (3) of the 1999 Constitution and that the Court can direct that it be modified to bring it into conformity with the Constitution, or it be declared invalid. The question is whether an obsolete provision in a statute as in this instance, also means inconsistency with the constitutional provisions? Inconsistency is a rule that relates an Act to the Constitution to determine inconsistency. In other words, a law is said to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution when and if it is contradictory to the provisions of the Constitution. Section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) provides thus:

 

If any other law is inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution, this Constitution shall prevail, and that other law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.

 

[125] In the case of Hon. Minister for Justice & Attorney General of the Federation vs. Attorney-General of Lagos State (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 704) 1 at 62 SC, I.T. Muhammad, JSC stated:

Inconsistency,” in law, to me, can be taken to be a situation where two or more Laws, enactments and/or rules are mutually repugnant or contradictory, contrary, one to the other so that both cannot stand and the acceptance or establishment of the one implies the abrogation or abandonment of the other. It is thus a situation where the two or more enactments cannot function together simultaneously.

[126] Section 84 (1) and 84 (3) of the Constitution must be read together. The 1^st Defendant in furtherance of prescribing the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers as stipulated in section 84 (1) enacted Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) Act No. 6 of 2002, as amended in 2008. Now, both the Claimant and the 4^th Defendant are in agreement on the dire need of compelling the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to review upwards the salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers since they have for fourteen (14) years refused, failed, or neglected to exercise their constitutional and statutory discretion to do so. I find that it is the failure of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendant’s to perform their constitutional and statutory duties that has resulted in the obsoleteness of the provisions regarding Judicial Officers in the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) Act No. 6 of 2002, as amended in 2008.

 

[127] In my humble view, applying the definition of inconsistency in Hon. Minister for Justice & Attorney General of the Federation vs. Attorney-General of Lagos State supra, Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) Act No. 6 of 2002, as amended in 2008, is not inconsistent with section 84(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). I agree with learned Counsel to the Claimant Asiwaju S.A. Awomolo SAN that both the provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) Act No. 6 of 2002, as amended in 2008, and the provisions of section 84 (3) of the 1999 Constitution as can still work or be interpreted together for the purposes of this Suit, without the former being nullified, see Okechialam vs. Nwamara (2003) FWLR. (Pt. 176) 635, (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 835) 597 SC.

 

[128] Section 6(1)(b)& (d) of the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act provides as follows:

6(1) The Commission shall have power to–

(b) review, from time to time, the revenue allocation formulae and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing realities.

 (d) determine the remuneration appropriate to the holders of the offices as specified in Parts A and B of the First Schedule to this Act.

Now, both Parts A and B of the First Schedule in the above provision has listed the Judicial Officers who are the subject matter of this suit represented constitutionally by the 4^th Defendant. These duties of the 2^nd Defendant have been re-stated by the Supreme Court in Attorney-General of Cross River State vs. Attorney-General of the Federation (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 646) 408 at 439C- per Adekeye, JSC thus:

The RMAFC has the power by section 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(b) of the RMAFC Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation, 2004, to monitor the accruals to disbursement of revenue from the Federation Account and review from time to time, the revenue allocation formula and principles in operation to ensue conformity with changing realities.

 [129] The 3^rd Defendant, has tried to make a distinction and/or distinguish between sections 6(1)(b) and 6(1)(d) of the Act. It is settled law that all subsections of a particular section must be read together, see Umeano v Anaekwe (2022) 6 NWLR (Pt 1827) 509 at 532 B-E SC, Orakul Resources Ltd v NCC (2022) 6 NWLR (Pt 1827) 539 at 598G-599A SC. There is no argument that section 6(1)(b) of the RMAFC Act, which provides for the ‘review, from time to time, the revenue allocation formulae and principles in operation to ensure conformity with changing realities’, and section 6(1)(d) which peremptorily mandates it to ‘determine the remuneration appropriate’ payable to Judicial Officers, ought and must be read together. In paragraphs 4.07-4.12, the 3^rd Defendant has argued that the duties on the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants are statutory duties; while in paragraph 4.13, he argues that those duties are “ministerial” duties, citing Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund Management Board vs. Klifco Nig. Ltd., supra.

[130] Again, the 3^rd Defendant Honourable Attorney-General stated in paragraph 4.14 that both the 1^st and the 2^nd Defendants must have recourse to exercise of discretion in determining or fixing the salaries of Judicial Officers. What exactly is the position of the Hon Attorney General as his submissions are contradictory? From the constitutional and statutory provisions, I am not in any doubt that the duties or powers of the 2^nd Defendant amount to it performing ministerial duties, see N.S.I.T.F.M.B. v Klifco (Nig) Ltd (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt 534) 73 at 97H-98B SC, and I so hold. A ministerial discretion is vested in the 2^nd Defendant by section 6(1)(b) and 6 (1)(d) of the RMAFC Act; and the 2^nd Defendant must properly exercise its discretion to conduct such periodic reviews in a fair and equitable manner, failing which the Court will require it to be exercised, and compel compliance. See Stitch vs. Attorney-General of the Federation (1985) 5 NWLR (Pt. 46) 1007 at 1025 SC, Iwuji vs. Federal Commissioner for Establishment (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) 497 at 517 SC, Artra Industries Nigeria Ltd. v. The Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industries (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 546) 381 SC, Onovo vs. Mba (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 765) 298 at 335A-B SC.

[131] The intention and true purpose of the framers of section 84(1)-(4) of the 1999 Constitution, and section 6(1)(b) and 6 (1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission Act is to ensure that Judicial Officers are adequately remunerated and that their salaries, allowances, and conditions of service are not altered to their disadvantage after appointment. Wide powers of review of salaries, allowances and conditions of service have been donated to the 2^nd Defendant; yet it has failed in its constitutional and statutory duty to do so for 14 years. The 3^rd Defendant has in paragraph 6(k) of his counter affidavit stated that “it is a fact that the 2^nd Defendant sometime in 2015 constituted a committee to re-determine the salaries of political, public and judicial officers in Nigeria”. There is no evidence of this before the Court. The period 2015 to date is seven (7) years and yet the said committee is still trying to “to re-determine” the salaries of Judicial Office holders! Does the Hon Attorney-General of the Federation expect this Court to believe this, or the reasonable man on the street to believe this?

[132] It is the un-challenged evidence of the claimant that he has searched and discovered the earnings of Justices of the US Supreme Court and some other jurisdictions. Paragraphs 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32 of the Claimant’s affidavit are reproduced:

26. That I have also searched the web and discovered that Justices of the US Supreme Court and other Judicial Officers earn annual salaries as follows:

(a)       Chief Justice $286,700 (up from $270,700 in 2019 – with yearly increases of $277,700 in 2020 and $280,500 in 2021);

(b)      Associate Justice $274,000 (up from $258,900 in 2019 – with yearly increases of $265,600 in 2020 and $268,300 in 2021).

(c)       Circuit (Court of Appeal) Judges $236,900 (up from $223,700 in 2019 – with yearly increases of $229,900 in 2020 and $231,800 in 2021);

(d)      District (High Court) Judges $223,400 (up from $210,900 in 2019 – with yearly increases of $216,400 in 2020 and $218,600 in 2021);

27. Hereto attached to prove the above is a document headed “Judicial Compensation/United States Courts,” downloaded and printed from the internet. It is marked Exhibit STH16.

28. That the official exchange rate between the Nigerian Naira and the US Dollar released by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) as at 27/4/2022 was N415.83 to one (1) US Dollar. Hereto attached is the CBN online publication, which is marked Exhibit STH17.

29. That with this exchange rate, the following would have been the salaries of Judicial Officers of the Nigerian Courts, if the earnings of their counterparts in the US were to converted to Naira at the exchange rate of 27/4/2022:

            (a)       Chief Justice of Nigeria: $286,700xN415.83=N119,218,461

            (b)      Justice of the Supreme Court: $274,000xN415.83=N113,937,420           

            (c)       Justice of Court of Appeal: $236,900xN415.83=N98,510,127

            (d)      Judge of the High Court: $223,400xN415.83=N92,896,422

30. That as can be seen in Part IIB of the Schedule to the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) (Amendment) Act, 2008, the Chief Justice of Nigeria, even though the highest-earning Judicial Officer in Nigeria, earns an annual salary of N3,363,972.50.

31. That as can be seen in Exhibit STH17, the annual basic salaries of the above-listed Judicial Officers of the US Court has been on an upward review since 2013, unlike in Nigeria where the Judicial Officers thereof have been on the same basic salary since 2008.

32. That in a similar upward review, Judicial Officers in Ghana whose economy is not as big as that of Nigeria keep enjoying increased salary scales as years pass by. Hereto attached is an online publication from “Ghananewsonline.com.gh” of 1/7/2021, which has confirmed this; and it is marked Exhibit STH18.

[133] The 4^th Defendant has in paragraphs 10 and 11 of its counter affidavit made the following depositions:

10. Contrary to the contention of the Claimant in his Originating Summons, I know as a matter of fact that it will be in line with justice and recognition of the rank of the officers referred to hereunder if the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants are directed to effect a modification to the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Officer Holders(Salaries and Allowances, Etc.) Act No. 6, 2002 as amended by the Act No. 1, 2008 as stipulated hereunder or in such other manner as will bring the Act in conformity with the Constitution as follows:

i.                    Chief Justice of Nigeria: Minimum of N12 million monthly;

ii.                 Each of the Justice of the Supreme Court: Minimum of N11 million monthly;

iii.               President of the Court of Appeal: minimum of N11 Million monthly;

iv.               Each of the Justice of the Court of Appeal: Minimum of N10 million monthly;

v.                  Chief Judge of the Federal High Court; Minimum of N10 million monthly;

vi.               Each of the Justice of the Federal High Court: Minimum of N9 million monthly;

vii.             President of National Industrial Court: Minimum of N10 million monthly;

viii.          Each of the Justice of the National Industrial Court: Minimum of N9 million monthly;

ix.                Chief Judge of each State high Court; minimum of N10 million monthly;

x.                  Each of the Judge of the State High Court: Minimum of N9 million monthly;

xi.                Chief Judge of FCT High Court; Minimum of N10 million monthly;

xii.             Each of the Judge FCT High Court: Minimum of N9 million monthly;

xiii.           Grand Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT and of each State that has it: Minimum of N8 million monthly;

xiv.           Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT and each State that has such Court: Minimum of N7 million  monthly;

xv.              President of the Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT and each state that has a Court: Minimum of N8million monthly;

xvi.           Justice of the Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT and each State that has a Court; Minimum of N7million monthly.

11.       I know as a matter of fact that future violation of the Constitution can be prevented by this Honourable Court mandating the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants to ensure regular review of the provisions of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, Etc) Act No. 6 2002 as amended by the Act No. 1, 2008 to constantly bring the Act into conformity with the Constitution based on socio-economic circumstances as may be prevalent from time to time.   

[134] Now, Section 254C (1) (f) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) stipulates that:

Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters-

(f) relating to or connected with unfair labour practice or international best practices in labour employment and industrial relation matters;

Then Section 7 (6) of the National Industrial Act stipulates as follows:

The Court shall, in exercising its jurisdiction or any of the powers conferred upon it by this Act or any other enactment or law, have due regard to good or international best practice in labour or industrial relations and what amounts to good or international best practice in labour or industrial relations shall be a question of fact.”

[135] The above provisions enjoin this Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to have due regard to good or international best practices, and this shall be a question of fact. In considering the provisions of section 254C (f) of the 1999 Constitution as (amended), the   Court of Appeal in the case of Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v Oyebola (unreported) CA/L/1091/2016 (Judgement 3 December 2020) has without equivocation held that this Court has a duty to apply international best practices from other jurisdictions with regard to the issues submitted in labour and employment disputes. The Claimant in paragraphs 26 to 32 of the supporting affidavit, and exhibits STH 16, STH 17, and STH 18 has adduced un-controverted evidence of international best practices in other jurisdictions in respect of review of salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers. In the United States, the fact as revealed is that there is a yearly increase of the salaries of Judicial Officers. I take judicial notice of the fact that Nigeria has adopted the Presidential democratic system of governance of the United States of America.

[136] In this regard therefore, due regard must be had to the practice in the United States of America as it concerns salaries, allowances, and service conditions of Justices and Judges. Now, the fact before the Court is that salaries and allowances of Justices and Judges are reviewed upwards every year in the United States of America, whose democratic system Nigeria has adopted. It is only logical that salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers in Nigeria must be reviewed upward yearly, (underlining mine). This accords with international best practice. This will also be is in conformity with the constitutional and statutory provisions of periodic review provided in section 84 (1)-(4) of the 1999 Constitution, and section 6(1)(b) and 6 (1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act; to ensure conformity with changing realities, and that the salaries, allowances and conditions of service of Judicial Officers are not altered to their disadvantage.

[137] To my mind, I am certain that the intention and true purpose of the framers of section 84(1)-(4) of the 1999 Constitution, and section 6(1)(b) and 6 (1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act is to ensure that Judicial Officers are adequately remunerated and that their conditions of service, salaries and allowances are not altered to their disadvantage after appointment. This is why section 84(1) of the Constitution, after granting powers to the National Assembly to enact legislation stipulating the said salaries and allowances, still went ahead to expressly permit the 2^nd Defendant to stipulate higher salaries “but not exceeding the amount as shall have been determined by the Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission.” The only natural interpretation and intention of this phrase is that since lawmaking takes a more tedious time to go through, the 2^nd Defendant, utilizing ministerial or administrative powers is to stipulate higher salaries for Judicial Officers. Wide powers of review of salaries, allowances and conditions of service have been donated to the 2^nd Defendant to achieve its ministerial duties.

[138] There is no doubt from the evidence adduced that the salaries and allowances payable to Judicial Officers and their conditions of service have been altered to their disadvantage after appointment. Regrettably, the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants whom the 1999 Constitution entrusted with the task of promoting the welfare and general well being of Judicial Officers neglected, refused, and failed to do this since 2008. Judicial Officers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria have by this failure been impoverished with the devaluation of the Naira. By their status as Justices and Judges (Judicial Officers), there is no doubt that they must suffer financial embarrassment, and financial harassment as a result of their current salaries. It is a national shame! There can be no doubt that the poor salary will have an effect on the quality of work, and general well being of Judicial Officers. In spite of this, Justices and Judges (Judicial Officers) have in their quiet dignity, continued to serve the nation, dispensing justice without fear or favour in accordance with the judicial oath of office.

[139] Indeed, Justices and Judges who man the Temple of Justice are themselves victims of a great injustice. What an irony!

[140] The failure of the 1^st and  2^nd Defendants to act in accordance with the provisions of Section 84(1)-(4) of the 1999 Constitution 1999 (as amended) render their actions of non-compliance un-constitutional, see A-G Abia State v A-G Federation (2006) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1005) 265 SC, Eze v. Gov Abia State (2010) 15 NWLR (Pt 1216) at 324.

 

[141] It is the duty of this Court to see that the law accomplishes its ultimate goal of ‘doing right’. In this regard, the “purposes” approach to interpretation of legislation is adopted to ensure that the intention of the framers of the 1999 Constitution, and the intention of the lawmakers is not defeated, see Elias vs. FRN (2021) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1800) 495 at 531D-G SC, James vs. INEC (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 787) 652 at 705G-706B. The 3^rd Defendant has argued that Judicial Officers have no legal right to upward review of their salary and allowances. This is not the position of the law. I hold that by the combined provisions of section 84 (1)-(4) of the 1999 Constitution and Section 6(1)(b) and 6 (1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act, Judicial Officers who are the subject matter of this suit have a constitutional and statutory right to have their salaries and allowances reviewed upwards periodically.

[142] Consequently, I have carefully looked at the Relief 4 and the salaries the Claimant is praying the Court to compel the 1^st – 4^th Defendants to put in place. I note that there is a salary disparity between the Chief Judges, the Grand Khadis, and the Presidents of the Customary Court of Appeal who are all ranked as Heads of Court. There is also a salary disparity between the Judges, Khadi’s and Judges of the Customary Court of Appeal who are ranked equally. Now, ensuring equal remuneration for work of equal value is one of the Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy stipulated in Section 17 (3) (e) of the 1999 Constitution. It is settled that the Court cannot grant what is not sought for; or grant a monetary sum higher than what is claimed. This is because the Court is not Father Christmas. However, the Court can grant a lower monetary sum. In order to attain pay parity, and not undermine the principle of equal pay for work of equal value, the salaries proposed by the Claimant to be put in place will be adjusted and reduced across the board so that Judges on the same rank earn the same salary.

 

 [143] The Claimant has urged the Court to consider and hold that stiff opposition to this Suit by the 3^rd Defendant, the Attorney General of the Federation, who occupies a unique position and is indeed the official leader of the Nigerian Bar, is not salutary, especially as his pre-litigation and post-litigation positions on the issues raised are highly contradictory. The 3^rd Defendant, the Attorney-General of the Federation after his firm opposition to this Suit, concluded by stating in paragraph 4.26 of his written address that he “equally supports for the improvement of the welfare of judicial officers”, but sentiments “have no place in our legal jurisprudence”.

[144] The law is settled that a party cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time as the Attorney-General of the Federation has chosen to do as seen from his arguments and the documentary evidence (Exhibits STH19 and STH19A) placed before the court, see CBN v Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt 1608) 130 at 168B-C, 170G-171A SC. The position of the 3^rd Defendant is very clear from his processes, and it admits no equivocation. He is opposed to upward review of salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers even after 14 years of stagnation on the same salary, and he does not believe Judicial Officers have a legal right to upward review of their salaries.

[145] The Honourable Attorney General of the Federation was described in the case of Hon. Justice Raliat Elehu-Habeeb & Others vs. Attorney General of the Federation (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt.1318)423 at 511, per Adekeye, JSC, in the following words:

Section 150(1) of the 1999 Constitution stipulates that there shall be an Attorney-General of the Federation who shall be the Chief Law Officer of the Federation and a Minister of the government of the Federation. The Federal Attorney-General is the Chief Law Officer of the Federation; he is the custodian and protector of the Constitution. He is competent to be sued in any suit against the Federal Government or any of its agencies. Any case involving the (1) interpretation of the Constitution as it affects our democratic system of governance and (2) the doctrine of separation of powers entrenched in our Constitution, or any suit which poses a threat to the independence of any arm of government, must have the Attorney-General of the Federation as an inevitable party. (underlining mine).

[146] As already held above, Justices and Judges (Judicial Officers) who are the subject matter of this suit have a Constitutional right to have their salaries and allowances reviewed upwards periodically. This is the provision of the 1999 Constitution, the grundnorm of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The 3^rd Defendant, the Hon Attorney-General of the Federation who is the custodian and protector of the Constitution is legally and morally bound to give effect to its provisions. This Judgment upholds the 1999 Constitution and gives effect to the intention of the framers of the 1999 Constitution regarding the remuneration, salaries and allowances of Judicial Officers.       

[147] I answer the questions/issues submitted to the Court as follows:

(1) By a combined interpretation of sections 4(1) & (2) and 81(1)-(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants do not have unbridled, whimsical and untrammeled powers to arbitrarily and unreasonably refuse, fail or neglect to upwardly review the basic salaries and allowances of the Chief Justice of Nigeria and other Justices of the Supreme Court; the President and other Justices of the Court of Appeal; the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Federal High Court; the President and Judges of the National Industrial Court; the Chief Judges and other Judges of the various State High Courts; the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Federal Capital Territory High Court, Abuja; the Grand Khadi and other Khadis of the States’ and FCT  Sharia Courts of Appeal and the Presidents and Judges of the various Customary Courts of Appeal of the State and of the FCT, Abuja.

 (2) By a combined interpretation of sections 4(1) and (2), 6(1), (3), (5)(a)-(j) and (6) and 81(1)-(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, this Honourable Court has jurisdiction and is under duty to compel the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants to exercise their constitutional and statutory discretionary powers to upwardly review the basic salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed/named above.

(3) By a combined interpretation of sections 84(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(b) and (d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the 2nd Defendant has shirked its constitutional responsibility of fixing higher salaries and allowances for the Judicial Officers named above, by   permitting suffering, and even enabling the 1^st Defendant, by the instrumentality of Part II of the Certain Political, Public and Judicial Office Holders (Salaries and Allowances, etc) (Amendment) Act, 2008, to stagnate and/or maintain since 2008 extremely low salaries and allowances for the Judicial Officer named above.

(4) By a combined reading of the provisions of section 6(1)(b) and (d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, it is unconstitutional and unlawful for the 2^nd Defendant to refuse, fail, neglect or ignore to upwardly review the salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed above, notwithstanding changing local and international socio-economic realities.

(5) The current salaries and other emoluments paid the respective Judicial Officers listed above is embarrassingly too low and unrealistic, given the current socio-economic and other conditions existing in Nigeria and the current global comparative salaries and allowances paid to Judicial Officers of the same or similar cadre listed hereinbefore.

[148] Following from all of the above, I hereby Declare and make the following Orders:

 1.       I DECLARE that, by a combined interpretation of sections 4(1) & (2) and 81(1)-(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, read in conjunction with section 6(1)(d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants do not have unbridled, whimsical and untrammeled powers to arbitrarily and unreasonably refuse, fail or neglect to upwardly review the basic salaries and allowances of the Chief Justice of Nigeria and other Justices of the Supreme Court; the President and other Justices of the Court of Appeal; the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Federal High Court; the President and Judges of the National Industrial Court; the Chief Judges and other Judges of the various State High Courts; the Chief Judge and other Judges of the Federal Capital Territory High Court, Abuja; the Grand Khadi and other Khadis of the States’ and FCT Sharia Courts of Appeal and the Presidents and Judges of the various Customary Courts of Appeal of the State and of the FCT, Abuja.

2.         I DECLARE that by a combined reading of the provisions of section 6(1)(b) and (d) and Parts A and B of the First Schedule to the Revenue Allocation Mobilization and Fiscal Commission Act, Cap. R7, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004, it is unconstitutional, null and void for the 2^nd Defendant to refuse, fail, neglect or ignore to upwardly review the salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed above, notwithstanding the changing local and international socio-economic realities.

3.         I DECLARE that the current salaries and other emoluments paid by the 2^nd Defendant through the 4^th Defendant to the respective Judicial Officers listed above since 2008 is embarrassingly too low and unrealistic, given the current socio-economic and other realities existing in Nigeria and the current global comparative salaries and allowances paid to Judicial Officers of the same or similar cadre listed hereinbefore.

 

4.         AN ORDER OF MANDATORY INJUNCTION compelling the 1^st to 4^th Defendants to, FORTHWITH, put in place or activate legal and administrative machineries to commence payment to the Judicial Officers listed above the following befitting, realistic and commensurate salaries and other emoluments, estimated to be reasonable, having regard to the existing socio-economic and other factors, as follows:

 

(a)             Chief Justice of Nigeria: Minimum of N10 Million monthly;

(b)             Each of the Justices of the Supreme Court: Minimum of N9 Million monthly;

(c)             President of the Court of Appeal: Minimum of N9 Million monthly;

(d)             Each Justice of the Court of Appeal: Minimum of N8 Million monthly;

(e)             Chief Judge of the Federal High Court: Minimum of N8 Million monthly;

(f)               Each Judge of the Federal High Court: Minimum of N7 Million monthly;

(g)             President of the National Industrial Court: Minimum of N8 Million monthly;

(h)             Each Judge of the National Industrial Court: Minimum of N7 Million monthly;

(i)               Chief Judge of each State High Court: Minimum of N8 Million monthly;

(j)               Each Judge of a State High Court: Minimum of N7 Million monthly;

(k)             Chief Judge of the FCT High Court: Minimum of N8 Million monthly;

(l)               Each Judge of the FCT High Court: Minimum of N7 Million monthly;

(m)          Grand Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT

And of each State that has it: Minimum of N8 Million monthly;

(n)            Khadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the FCT and each State

that has such a Court: Minimum of N7 Million monthly;

(o)             President of the Customary Court of Appeal of the

FCT and each State that has such a Court: Minimum of N8 Million monthly.

(p)             Justice of the Customary Court of Appeal of the FCT and each State that

          has such a Court: Minimum of N7 Million monthly.

5.         AN ORDER of MANDATORY INJUNCTION compelling the 2^nd Defendant (or any other statutory or administrative body that would be subsequently charged with such responsibilities as the 2^nd Defendant) to, in perpetuity, review and continue to embark upon and carry out, in conjunction with the 3^rd Defendant, a yearly or at most a two-yearly review of the salaries and allowances of the Judicial Officers listed above, with a view to making the said salaries and emoluments realistic and befitting of the offices and duties attached to/exercised by such offices.

6.     The 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants are to pay costs of N500,000.00 each to the Claimant.

Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

                                                _____________________________

                                                 Hon Justice O.A.Obaseki-Osaghae

 

COUNSEL FOR THE CLAIMANT

1.      Asiwaju Solomon A. Awomolo, SAN

2.      J.B. Daudu, SAN

3.      OCJ Okocha, SAN

4.      Prince Lateef Fagbemi, SAN

5.      Kanu Agabi, SAN

6.      E.C. Ukala, SAN

7.      Charles Uwensuyi-Edosomwan, SAN

8.      Emeka Ngige, SAN

9.      Dr. Onyechi Ikpeazu, SAN

10. K.T. Turaki, SAN

11. Chief Chris Uche, SAN

12. Tayo Oyetibo, SAN

13.  Chief Mamman Mike Osuman, SAN

14.  I.A. Adedipe, SAN

15.  Pius Akubo, SAN

16.  Kemi Pinheiro, SAN

17.  D. Adeyele, SAN

18.  N.O.O Oke, SAN

19.  Prof. E.C. Azinge, SAN

20.  Dr. Babatunde Ajibade, SAN

21.  Dele Adesina, SAN

22.  Israel O. Olorundare, SAN

23.  M. Essien, SAN

24. Okey Wali, SAN

25.  Paul Erokoro, SAN

26.  D.C. Denwigwe, SAN

27.  Ken Njemanze, SAN

28.  Rabana Lawal, SAN

29.  Chief C. Ekomaru, SAN

30.  Chief (Dr.) Mike Ozehkome, SAN

31.  Kunle Ogunba, SAN

32.  Offiong O.E.B. Offiong, SAN

33.  Ikechukwu Ezechukwu, SAN

34.  Garba Paul, SAN

35.  J.S. Okutepa, SAN

36.  Dr. Hassan Liman, SAN

37.  S.E. Umoh, SAN

38.  Prof. Peter Akper, SAN

39.  Femi Falana, SAN

40.  Ogwu J. Onoja, SAN

41.  Prof. Paul Ananaba, SAN

42.  Ahmed Raji, SAN

43.  R.O. Oguneso, SAN

44.  A.T. Kehinde, SAN

45.  Chief Godwin Obla, SAN

46.  Prof. Ernest Ojukwu, SAN

47.  Prof. Joash Amupitan, SAN

48.  S.A. Ogwemoh, SAN

49.  Tawo .E. Tawo, SAN

50.  Chief E.K Ashiekaa, SAN

51.  Dr. Muiz Banire, SAN

52.  Olumumuyiwa Akinboro, SAN

53.  Prof. P.O.Idornigie, SAN

54.  Gordy Uche, SAN

55.  Emeka Etiaba, SAN

56.  E.Y. Kurah, SAN

57.  Dr. (Mrs) V.O.Azinge, SAN

58.  Ajibade Kamaldeeb Adeyemi , SAN

59.  Kehinde Ogunwumiju, SAN

60.  N.A. Dangiri, SAN

61.  Dr. Joshua Y. Musa, SAN 2017

62.  Wilcox A. Abereton, SAN

63.  Ashika M. Dikko, SAN 2018

64.  Oba Maduabuchi, SAN

65.  A.C. Ejesieme, SAN

66.  D.C. Enwelum, SAN

67.  Ebun-olu Adegboruwa, SAN

68. J.O Asoluka, SAN

69.  Anthony Malik, SAN

70.  Paul Harris Ogbole, SAN

71.  Dr. Stephen Musa, SAN

72.  U.O. Sule, SAN

73.  O.M. Atoyebi, SAN

74.  Abdul Muhammad Rafindadi, SAN

75.  Abdulwahab Muhammed, SAN

76.  Afam Osigwe, SAN

77.  Aliyu Saiki, SAN

78.  E.E. Eko, SAN

79.  Festus Idepefo, SAN

80.  Mahmud Adesina, SAN

81.  H.O. Akunebu, SAN

82.  T.D. Pepe, SAN

83.  Abdullahi Yahaya, SAN

84.  Jean Anishere, SAN

85.  Moses Ebute, SAN

86.  Yusuf Akirikwen, SAN

87.  Uwemedimo Nwoko, SAN

88.  Funmilayo Qadr, SAN

89.  Yakubu Hussaini-Ruba, SAN

90.  Ayo Dedipe, SAN

91.  D.A. Mustapha, SAN

92.  Dr. Ehiogie West-Idahosa, SAN

93. Eyitayo Fatogun, SAN

94.  F.E. Itula, SAN

95.  George Audu Anuga, SAN

96.  J.J. Usman, SAN

97.  Matthew Burkar, SAN

98.  Phillipe Emeka Obegulu, SAN

99.    R.O. Atabo, SAN

100.                        John Adele, SAN

101.                         Olumide Akpata, Esq (NBA President)

102.                        John Aikpokpo-Martins, Esq. (NBA 1^st Vice-President)

 

JUNIOR COUNSEL

1.        Nguemo Uja, Esq

2.        Daniel A. Ane, Esq

3.        Joshua T. Adi, Esq

4.        Christian S. Hon, Esq

5.        Aisha Z. Hon, Esq

6.        O.F. Samuel, Esq

7.        Adanu E. Ogwiji, Esq

8.     Ogaku Kanu Agabi, Esq

9.        Toheeb A. Adeagbo, Esq

10.   Adeboyin Olurunnyi, Esq

11.   Francis Agunbiade, Esq

12.   Andrew S. Ansha, Esq

13.   Nwokike O. David, Esq

14.   Miriam S. Atser, Esq

15.   Ojatande D. Runsewe, Esq

16.   N.O.Okeke, Esq

17.    Kelvin Ugiagbe

18.    Olajide Olaleye-Kumuyi

19.    Obinna Onya

20.    Chiamaka Nwakwu

21.    U.C. Njemanze

22.    M.L. Young-Ainee

23.    B.I. Ogar

24.    Sanusi Musa

25.    Adanu Emmanuel Ogwiji

26.     Patience O. Omiri

27.    Patrick Emmanuel

28.     Faith Sarki

29.     Hon. Michaelson

30.     David T. Agashua

 COUNSEL FOR THE 1^ST DEFENDANT

1.      Charles Yohila

2.      P.C Nwenyi

3.    Selman Dashe

4.    Aliyu Garba

COUNSEL FOR THE 3^RD DEFENDANT

1.      Ekene V. Elodinmwo (Principal State Counsel)

COUNSEL FOR THE 4^TH DEFENDANT

1.      Kunle Adegoke, SAN

2.      Oluwaseye Afolabi Esq.

3.      A. Alumbugu Esq.

4.      Ebuka Nwaeze, Esq.

5.      Ayotunde Ogunleye, Esq.

6.      Linus O. Oko, Esq.