Samaila Thomas & 4 ORS -VS- Nigeria Security and Civil Defence CorpsNational Industrial Court of Nigeria- Judgment Portal

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NICN - JUDGMENT

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT JOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE I.S.GALADIMA

DATE: Tuesday November 3, 2026,

SUIT NO: NICN/JOS/35/2021

BETWEEN

SAMAILA THOMAS CLAIMANTS
ANTHONY ECHE
ASC FRANCIS ANYINKA
S.C JOSEPH ESAN
S.C ETHEL G. JOSEPH

(For themselves and on behalf of the 229 members/officers of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps).

AND

NIGERIA SECURITY AND CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION:

A.M. Okwori, Esq., A. Omolowu, Esq. for the Claimants.
Thomas Ogbebor, Esq; Olabisi Okanlawan for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT:

The 5 claimants, together with the 224 persons they represent, were enlisted as volunteers in the defendant corps. Their enlistment took place between 1996 and 2005, and they have remained in service since then, with some of them being promoted by the defendant in recognition of meritorious service. Since their enlistment, the claimants were each paid only ?30,000.00 (Thirty Thousand Naira) as salary. However, payment was not regular, and their appointments have not been regularized. In fact, the salary payments were so sporadic that none of the claimants was paid more than five times after joining the defendant.

After several meetings with the defendant, the claimants were assured that their salaries would be paid and their employments regularized, but the defendant failed to fulfill these promises. In further efforts to secure payment, the claimants instructed their solicitor, A.M. Okwori & Co., in 2021 to issue a letter of demand to the defendant for immediate payment of their salaries and regularization of their employment. Having exhausted all efforts to persuade the defendant to meet their demands, the claimants have now approached this court for relief.

This action was therefore commenced on 29 October 2021, before I assumed conduct of the proceedings. The parties also adopted the record of proceedings before my predecessor Hon. Justice P.A. Bassi (now JCA). The claimants, jointly, seek the following reliefs against the defendant:

A Declaration that the willful and persistent refusal of the Respondent to regularize the appointment of claimants is wrongful and a breach of the provision of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003 (As Amended) in relation to the claimants.
A DECLARATION that the willful and persistent refusal of the Respondent to pay the outstanding salaries of the claimants is wrongful and a breach of the provision of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003 (As Amended).
AN ORDER of this honourable court directing the respondent to regularize the appointment of the claimants in accordance with provision and requirement of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003 (As Amended).
AN ORDER of this honourable court directing the respondent to pay the sum of 1,746,716,228. 00 (One Billion, Seven Hundred and Forty-Six Million, Seven Hundred and Sixteen Thousand, Two Hundred and Twenty-Eight Naira) Only to the claimants being the grand total of the outstanding salaries owed by the respondent.
AN ORDER directing the respondent to pay the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) to the claimants as general damages for the trauma, hardship and delay suffered by the claimants as a result of the refusal by the respondent to regularize the claimants’ appointment and to pay the claimants’ salaries due to them.
The cost of this action.

Upon being served with the writ and the accompanying processes, the Defendant entered a conditional appearance on 7 November 2021 and subsequently filed its statement of defence together with the related processes on 7 January 2022.

On 3 March 2022, the Claimants filed a reply to the Defendant’s statement of defence. After the closure of pleadings, the Claimants commenced their case by presenting two witnesses, namely CW1 and CW2.

On 9 December 2025, the claimants opened and concluded their case by calling Anthony Eche as CW1. He tendered a certified true copy (CTC) of the earlier proceedings before P.A. Bassi, J., which this court accepted and relied on his testimony of 18 May 2022. Thereafter, Francis Anyika re-testified as CW2; he also adopted and relied on his evidence given in the previous proceedings on 29 June 2022 before P.A. Bassi, J. Both witnesses were cross-examined by learned counsel to the defendant, after which the claimants closed their case before this Court on 9 December 2025.

On the same 9 December 2025, the defendant opened its case by calling one witness, Aremu Modupe Rachael (DW1), who adopted her 22/1/2025 deposition, and tendered two documents, which were admitted as Exhibits D1 and D2. After the claimants’ counsel concluded cross-examination, the defendant closed its case the same day.

At the conclusion of the trial, counsel for the parties were directed to file their respective final written addresses. Both parties complied. The defendant’s final address, dated February 2, 2026, was filed on February 19, 2026. Although filed out of time, it was subsequently regularised pursuant to an application by the defendant. The claimants’ final address, dated 6 July 2026, was filed on 7 July 2026. It too was filed outside the prescribed period but was later regularised on the claimants’ application. The defendant subsequently filed a reply to the claimants’ final address on October 9, 2026.

Upon adoption of counsel’s respective final addresses on November 3, 2026, this Court immediately made its pronouncement.

CLAIMANTS’ FACTS AND EVIDENCE:

In the pleadings accompanying their writ of complaint and in the sworn statements of their witnesses, the Claimants stated that, at all material times to this suit, they were officers of the Defendant and residents of Bauchi State.

The claimants described the defendant as a statutory body created under the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003 (as amended).

The claimants aver that they obtained the consent of the other 229 members of the defendant to commence this suit on their behalf. They further state that all the claimants were enlisted into the defendant as corps officers between 1996 and 2005. In support of this assertion, they rely on a document containing their names and official particulars.

The claimants enumerated their grievances that gave rise to this suit as non-payment of salaries, irregular payment of salaries, neglect, and failure to pay financial benefits due upon promotion.

The claimants contend that, by virtue of section 26(4) of the NSCDC Act 2003 (as amended), any person who, immediately before the commencement of the Act, was either a volunteer, a regular member, or held office in the dissolved corps is deemed to have been transferred to the corps on terms and conditions no less favourable than those that existed before the Act came into force. They further argue that service in the dissolved corps is to be treated as service in the corps for pension purposes.

The claimants further contend that some of them were enlisted before the NSCDC Act, 2003 came into force, while others were enlisted after its commencement. They also state that, because of their diligence and commitment, several of them were promoted to various ranks, including Superintendent of Corps (SC), Assistant Superintendent of Corps (ASC), Deputy Superintendent of Corps (DSC), Senior Inspector of Corps (SIC), Assistant Inspector of Corps (AIC), Sergeant, and Corporal.

The claimants further state that, in recognition of their distinguished service, some of them were also assigned by the Bauchi State Command of the respondent to supervise and head certain local government areas as Divisional Officers (D.O.s).

The claimants further stated that, in order to ensure efficient service delivery, some of them were sent on training and senior officers’ courses, which they successfully completed.

The claimants state that, from the outset of their enlistment, the defendant was obliged to pay each of them ?30,000 (Thirty Thousand Naira) only. They further contend that, during the course of their service, the defendant deemed it necessary to promote some of them, together with corresponding salary increases.

The claimants further contend that since their enlistment, the defendant has paid some of them only three times, while others were paid only four times, and that none of them received more than five months’ salary.

The claimants state that they repeatedly appealed to the defendant to pay their entitlements, but their efforts yielded no result. They further contend that even if the defendant is unwilling to regularize the appointments of those enlisted after the commencement of the NSCDC Act, 2003, the affected persons are nonetheless entitled to receive salaries for the work already performed and for continuing to serve the defendant up to the filing of this suit.

The claimants contend that the defendant owes them a total of ?1,746,716,228.00 (One Billion, Seven Hundred and Forty-Six Million, Seven Hundred and Sixteen Thousand, Two Hundred and Twenty-Eight Naira only).

The claimants further state that they held several meetings with the defendant regarding the non-payment of their salaries, the failure to regularize their appointments, and the neglect they suffered. According to them, the defendant repeatedly promised that the matter would be resolved and that the outstanding payments would be made, but none of those promises was ever fulfilled.

The claimants contend that the defendant abandoned them, even though their appointments were neither terminated nor were they dismissed from service. They further state that they continue to be deployed by the defendant to provide security at local government elections, state and national programmes, as well as during general elections and the WAEC, NECO, and JAMB examinations.

The claimants contend that their appointments are statutory in nature, and that the defendant’s deliberate refusal to pay their entitlements has subjected them to severe hardship.

The claimants further state that they instructed their solicitor, A.M. Okwori, Esq., to issue a demand letter, which was served on the defendants by courier, but the defendants failed to respond to the letter.

In total, the Claimants tendered 84 documents in evidence in this suit. These are:
1. Warrant of promotion for Anthony Eche - Exhibit C1.
2. Posting of Divisional Officers dated 18/8/2005 - Exhibit C2.
3. Warrant of Promotion, Anthony Eche dated 15/6/2001 - Exhibit C3.
4. Certificate of attendance for Anthony Eche dated 3/5/2006 - Exhibit C4.
5. Three Sky Bank Cheques for Anthony Eche - Exhibits C5 – C7.
6. Identity Card of Anthony Eche - Exhibit C8.
7. UPS courier service document - Exhibit C9.
8. Letter by A.M Okwori & Co dated 4/5/2021 - Exhibit C10.
9. Two Sky Bank cheques for Francis Anyika - Exhibit C11 – C12.
10. Letter of introduction dated 24/8/2011 - Exhibit C13.
11. Identity Card of Francis Anyika - Exhibit C14.
12. Clearance letter for Francis Anyika - Exhibit C15.
13. Personnel Record Form for Francis Anyika - Exhibit C16.
14. Deployment of Officer document dated 7/6/2005 - Exhibit C17.
15. Posting Order dated 18/11/2005 - Exhibit C18.
16. Warrant of Promotion for Francis Anyika - Exhibit C19.
17. 85 Sky Bank Cheques - Exhibits C20 – C84.

CLAIMANTS’ REPLY:

In their Reply filed on 3 March 2022, the claimants reiterated their assertion that they are members of the defendant and that they worked under the defendant’s command and directives.

The claimants contend that the evidence showing salary payments made to some of them for four or five months clearly demonstrates that they rendered services under the defendant.

The claimants maintain that their enlistment was carried out in accordance with the applicable laws, and that, having undergone the required training and studies, they are qualified to serve as officers under the defendant in line with the NSCDC Act.

On the issue of pre-action notice, the claimants stated that the letter written by their solicitor, A.M. Okwori, Esq., and sent to the defendant, also constituted pre-action notice to the defendant.

The claimants further ask this Court to consider and decide the suit in their favour.

DEFENDANT’S FACTS AND EVIDENCE:

From the Defendant’s Statement of Defence, the Defendant contends that the Claimants were never, at any time, members or officers of the Defendant, whether in any of its formations in Bauchi State or in any other part of Nigeria.

The defendant further asserts that the claimants were never enlisted into its service between 1996 and 2005, or at any other time, and that the claimants were never included in the defendant’s nominal roll.

According to the defendant, the claimants cannot be paid salaries or have their appointments regularized because they were never recognized as staff of the defendant, either as regular employees or as volunteers.

The defendant avers that, before its establishment under the NSCDC Act, 2003, it consisted of regular members and volunteers who were engaged through letters of appointment. It further states that, following the commencement of the NSCDC Act, 2003, the defendant’s Board absorbed its regular members and volunteers in accordance with section 26(5) of the Act.

The defendant further avers that the appointment of volunteer members into its establishment is not automatic. Rather, it is subject to the direction of the Corps’ management, which is ordinarily exercised in accordance with the prevailing Federal Government policy on employment into the public service, taking into account factors such as academic qualifications, age, relevant experience, the principle of federal character, equity, fairness, and justice, among others.

The defendant further asserts that the appointment of volunteers is also undertaken by the Board—that is, the Civil Defence, Correctional, Immigration and Fire Service Board—in accordance with the Public Service Rules, while taking into account the prescribed criteria for such appointments.

The defendant states that the National Working Committee on the regularization of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps was constituted by the Board in 2005, and that it issued recommendations in accordance with the Corps’ directive under section 26(5) of the Act, establishing the criteria for the selection and elimination of volunteers.

The defendant asserts that, following the enactment of the 2003 Act, the Board—the body charged with the appointment, promotion, and discipline of the defendant’s officers—visited its commands and other formations to evaluate the manpower and qualifications of the personnel.

The defendant further avers that the Board found that some staff held ranks that were not commensurate with their qualifications and experience and were therefore not suitable for the positions they occupied.

With reference to staff payment, the defendant avers that it regularly pays its staff, but that only those who are not duly documented, due to deficiencies in their records, have their names removed from the defendant’s nominal roll.

The defendants further contend that the claimants neither previously worked for the defendant nor are presently in its service and therefore have no entitlement to salaries from the defendant.

The defendant also categorically denied having any knowledge of any letter from the claimants’ solicitor, by any means whatsoever.

The defendant further avers that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit because the claimants failed to serve any pre-action notice on the defendant before commencing the action.

Finally, the defendant urges the court to dismiss the claimants’ suit as lacking merit.

At trial, the defendant tendered 2 documents in evidence in this case. These are:

Final Report and Recommendation of the National Working Committee - Exhibit D1.
Official Gazette - Exhibit D2.

DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL’S FINAL WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS:

In his final written address filed on 19 February 2026 the Defendants’ counsel frames a total of four issues for decision as follows:
1. Whether, assuming without conceding that the Claimants served as volunteers, the Defendant itself possesses statutory authority to regularize their appointments, having regard to the NSCDC Act and the functions assigned to the relevant Board.
2. Whether the Claimants, having described themselves as volunteers, established an enforceable entitlement to salaries or allowances for services allegedly rendered.
3. Whether the action is incompetent for failure to comply with the pre-action notice requirement in section 20(3) and (4) of the NSCDC Act.
4. Whether the action, or any distinct component of it, is barred by section 20(2) of the NSCDC Act, having regard to the dates on which the causes of action accrued.

The learned counsel for the defendant, in his address, drew the attention of this court to the non-service of a pre-action notice on the defendant by the claimants before the filing of this suit, as required by section 20(3) of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, Cap N146, LFN. The section provides as follows:

20(3) No suit shall be commenced against a member of the board or Commandant General or any other officer or employee of the Corps before the expiration of a period of one month after written notice of intention to commence the suit shall be served on the corps by the intending plaintiff or his agent.

(4) The notice referred to in subsection (3) of this section must clearly and explicitly state:

The cause of action;
The particulars of claim.
The name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and
The relief which the plaintiff seeks.

Counsel further submitted that jurisdiction is a threshold issue and the very lifeblood of any adjudicatory authority. Learned counsel relied on NURTW & ANOR v. RTEAN & ORS (2012) LPELR-7840 in support of this position.

Counsel argues that where a court lacks jurisdiction, it has no power to adjudicate the matter. Accordingly, if the law prescribes a condition precedent to the commencement of an action, any suit filed in breach of that requirement is incompetent and the court cannot entertain it. Reliance was placed on Dingyadi & Anor v. INEC (2011) LPELR-950(SC) and FAAN v. Maevins Ltd (2018) LPELR-51108(CA). Counsel further relied on Madukolu & Ors v. Nkemdilim (1962) All NLR 587 at 594, where it was held that a court is competent only where, among other things, all conditions precedent to its jurisdiction have been satisfied.

Learned counsel for the defendant submits that the courts have consistently held that where a pre-action notice is not served, the defendant is entitled to insist that such notice be served before the claimant can properly approach the court. Counsel further notes that failure to serve a pre-action notice affects the court’s jurisdiction and renders the suit incompetent. In support, counsel relies on Nigercare Development Company v. Adamawa State Water Board (2008) LPELR-1997 (SC).

Learned counsel further stressed that the case of NWOBELE & ORS. v. NSCDC (2023) LPELR-60151 (CA) is directly on all fours with the present case, where the Court of Appeal held as follows:

“I have earlier in the course of my judgment reproduced section 20 of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act with respect to service of Pre-Action Notice. It is settled law that where there is a procedure or condition precedent laid down or provided by statute or Rules of court to be complied with or followed before an action is initiated, or commenced, failure to adhere to the laid down procedure will render any action commenced incompetent and the court will lack the jurisdiction to adjudicate or entertain the suit or action.”

Learned counsel further submits that, in its Statement of Defence, the Defendant alleged that the Claimants failed to serve it with a pre-action notice. In response, the Claimants stated that they engaged a courier service to deliver the pre-action notice to the Defendant and, in support, tendered the receipt issued by the courier company, which was admitted in evidence by the Court.

Learned counsel submitted that the Claimants did not place before the court any evidence showing service of the pre-action notice, nor did they provide proof of service by means of an affidavit of service. Counsel argued that, in the absence of such proof, there was no evidence that the alleged pre-action notice was served on the Defendant. Consequently, counsel contended that this non-service deprived the court of jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter.

With reference to section 20(3) of the NSCDC Act, learned counsel for the defendant argued that the law makes it mandatory for a pre-action notice to be served on the defendant before any suit can be validly commenced against it. Counsel further submitted that the claimants failed to demonstrate that such notice was actually served on the defendant before this action was filed.

On his Issue Two, learned counsel for the defendant submits that an action is said to be statute-barred when it is instituted outside the period prescribed by statute. According to counsel, this means the suit was commenced after the time allowed by law for filing such an action, whether under a statute or the Constitution. He further argues that any action filed outside the statutory limitation period is incompetent, even if it is only one day out of time. Counsel also contends that once a suit is found to be statute-barred, it is irrelevant whether it has merit, as no court has jurisdiction to entertain it. In support of this submission, counsel relied on USENI v. ATTA & ORS (2023) LPELR-59880 (SC).

Learned counsel for the defendant submitted that time begins to run from the date the cause of action accrues. He further stated that a cause of action consists of the facts, or the combination of facts, that give rise to a right of action, and that it becomes operative from the date the complained-of act commenced. He cited NWEKE v. UNIZIK, Awka (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1598) 454 in support.

Counsel drew attention to section 20(2) of the NSCDC Act, which states, in effect, that despite anything in any other law, no action may be brought in any court against any member of the Board, the Commandant-General, or any other officer or employee of the Corps for any act carried out in the course of implementing the Act or any other law, or in the performance of any public duty or authority, or for any alleged failure or neglect in carrying out the Act, any other law, duty, or authority, unless the action is commenced:

Three months after the act, neglect or default complained of or,

In the case of a continuation of damage or injury, within six months after the ceasing thereof.

Learned counsel for the defendant drew attention to paragraphs 4 and 15 of the claimants’ statement of facts and submitted that the claimants tendered a document described as “a table”, which was said to indicate the number of months for which salaries were paid as well as the outstanding salaries yet to be paid. According to the claimants’ own estimate in the table, the last salary payments were made sometime between 1996 and 2005, whereas this action was instituted in 2021, at least 19 years after the alleged cause of action arose. Counsel further argued that, by virtue of section 20(2)(a) and (b) of the NSCDC Act, as amended, the claim had become statute-barred in 2006. Consequently, the claimants, having failed to institute the action against the defendant within three months or six months from the date of the alleged non-payment of salaries, are by statute precluded from bringing this suit 19 years after the purported cause of action arose.

Counsel further relies on the authorities of NWOBELE & ORS VS. NSCDC (SUPRA) and urges this court to hold in favour of the defendant on the issues of jurisdiction raised.

On issue three, learned counsel for the defendant submitted that the core of the Claimants’ case, as set out in their statement of facts and in reliefs 25(a) and (c), is that the Claimants are entitled to have their appointments regularized by the Respondent.

It is further submitted that the Claimants cannot confer on the Defendant a statutory power it does not possess, nor can they use this Honourable Court to assign to the Defendant a statutory function belonging to another institution. Counsel refers the Court to section 4(1)(b) of the NSCDC Act, Cap. 146, and further submits that the Defendant is not statutorily empowered to perform the act the Claimants seek to compel it to do.

According to learned counsel, the authority to recruit volunteers and regular members into the Corps is vested in the Civil Defence, Immigration, Correctional, and Fire Services Board. Accordingly, section 4(1)(b) of the NSCDC Act (as amended) provides that the Board shall be responsible for recruiting volunteers and regular members of the Corps.

Learned counsel further refers this Court to Section 4(2) of the Civil Defence, Immigration and Correctional, and Fire Services Board Act (Amendment) Decree No. 14 of 1986, which provides as follows:

The Board shall have power –

To appoint, promote and exercise disciplinary control over all staff of the affected services.
To appoint persons to hold or act in all the offices in the affected services, including power to make appointment or promotion or transfer and to confirm appointment.

Counsel further submits that, having regard to the combined effect of the provisions of the NSCDC Act (as amended) and the Civil Defence, Immigration and Correctional Services Board Act (as amended), the Defendant lacks the legal authority to appoint or regularize the claimants’ appointments into its service.

Learned counsel to the defendant argues that the claimants’ CW1 conceded to this point when he testified thus:

“I am aware that the Board of the Civil Defence, Immigration Services took over the regularization, appointment, promotion of all personnel of Civil Defence”.

Also the CW2 corroborated when he stated during cross examination as follows:

“Yes, I know of the Nigeria Civil Defence, Immigration and Prison services Board. I am not aware that the Board supervises the Defendant.

Yes, I am aware that the Board is in charge of the promotion, appointment and regularization of all personnel”.

Finally, on Issue Three, learned counsel for the defendant submits that, based on the above statutory provisions, which the claimants are fully aware of, and without conceding the allegation that the claimants are volunteer staff of the defendant, the defendant is under no statutory duty to regularize or appoint the claimants into its service. Counsel therefore urges this court to so hold.

On issue four, learned counsel for the defendant began by citing Black’s Law Dictionary, Ninth Edition, particularly the definition of “volunteer”, which is stated as follows: “A voluntary actor or agent in a transaction; especially a person who, without an employer’s assent and without any justification from legitimate personal interest, helps an employee in the performance of the employer’s business.”

Relying on the authority of Ezenwa v. Oko & Ors. (2008) LPELR-1206 (SC), learned counsel submits that the court defined a volunteer in law as a person who enters into a transaction of his own free will, or one to whom property is transferred without valuable consideration.

Counsel contends that the Claimants, through their pleadings and oral evidence, admitted before this Honourable Court that they were volunteers who rendered voluntary services to the Respondent. Counsel further submits that, in its generosity, the Defendant paid them ?30,000.00 as stipends for the services rendered, notwithstanding that, as volunteers, they were not entitled to any remuneration.

Counsel further contends that a volunteer cannot demand salary payments from the organization to which the voluntary services were rendered, since voluntary service does not create any financial obligation on the part of the organization.

In conclusion, learned counsel for the defendant submits that Exhibits C1 to C10 are public documents and, by law, must be certified before they can be admitted in evidence. He argues that since the Claimant failed to comply with the provisions of the Evidence Act regarding the admissibility of such documents, the Claimant cannot validly tender uncertified public documents in evidence. Counsel relies on Onuegbu v. Imo State (2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1962) 419 (SC) and Kubau v. Rilwanu (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1397) 284 (CA).

Counsel urges this Honourable Court to dismiss this suit for being lacking in merit and substance.

CLAIMANTS’ COUNSEL’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS:

Counsel for the claimants filed his final submissions and arguments on 6th July 2026 and submits that the following four issues arise for determination:
1. Whether the Claims of the Claimants was defended by the Defendant having failed to move and argue the Motion on Notice filed on the 22nd day of January 2025 upon which the Witness statement on Oath of Aremu Modupe Rachael is premised/based?
2. Assuming but not conceding that pre-action notice was not served on the Defendant, whether the Defendant can validly rely on the lack of a pre-action notice at this final stage of the trial to defeat a claim for earned salaries and allowances, when the injury is continuous, and when the Defendant has fully participated in the trial on its merits?
3. Whether the action or suit of the Claimants is caught up by statutes of limitation?
4. Whether the Claimants have proved their claims to be entitled to any or all the relief sought?

On the first issue, learned counsel for the claimants submits that the question concerns whether the claims of the claimants were properly defended by the defendant, given the defendant’s failure to move and argue the Motion on Notice filed on 22 January 2025, on which the witness statement on oath of Aremu Modupe Rachael is based.

Learned counsel for the claimants submits that the defendant did not properly defend the suit because it failed to move and argue the Motion on Notice on which the Witness Statement on Oath of Aremu Modupe Racheal was founded. Counsel further argues that although the defendant filed its Statement of Defence on 7 January 2022 and attached the Witness Statement on Oath of Mr. Mohammed J.S. Paiko, that witness statement was, for reasons best known to the defendant, subsequently abandoned.

The Defendant later filed a Motion on Notice seeking leave to call an additional witness and to file the Witness Statement on Oath of Aremu Modupe Rachael. Counsel submits that the motion is dated 21 January 2025 and was filed on 22 January 2025. He further contends that, throughout the proceedings and trial, the Defendant did not consider it necessary to move the motion.

According to learned counsel for the claimants, in flagrant disregard of the purpose of the motion for leave to call an additional witness, the defendant’s DW1 was called to the witness box to adopt a witness statement on oath that derived its validity and effect from the motion on notice, which was never argued and was instead abandoned.

Counsel further argues that a Motion on Notice must be formally moved before the Court; merely filing the motion does not amount to bringing it to the Court’s attention. According to counsel, any motion not moved by the party who filed it is regarded as abandoned. In support, counsel cites the decision in Esoho v. Asuquo (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 359) 1355 at 1370, paras. C–E (CA), where the Court of Appeal held as follows:

An Applicant who fails to move a motion on notice filed in the course of the proceedings up to the delivery of judgment is deemed to have abandoned the purpose which the motion is meant to serve. In effect, both counter –Claim are rendered incompetent. It is normal practice for a counsel to move a motion on notice before the Court seized of the case to entertain it, failing that the motion will not be considered on its merits. See also the case of OBIOZOR V. NNAMUA (2014) LPELR-23041 (CA).

Counsel argues that the Motion filed by the Defendant on 22 January 2025, not having been moved, is incompetent and therefore the Witness Statement on Oath of Aremu Modupe Racheal (DW1) is likewise affected. He submits that the motion should be regarded as abandoned. According to counsel, the purpose of the Defendant’s Motion on Notice, which sought leave to call DW1, has been defeated, and the Court cannot rely on DW1’s incompetent evidence. He further contends that it is a settled principle of law that one cannot place something on nothing and expect it to stand, citing UAC v. Macfoy (1961).

Counsel further argues that in OGLI OKO MEMORIAL FARMS LIMITED & ANOR v. NIGERIAN AGRICULTURAL AND CO-OPERATIVE BANK LIMITED (2008) LLJR-SC, the Supreme Court held that a trial judge cannot treat a procedural step as valid where the motion seeking such regularization was never heard or granted. Counsel also submits that a Witness Statement on Oath does not become evidence automatically; where it is filed out of time or as an additional statement, it must first be regularized by an order of court. Until such motion is granted, the document remains legally nonexistent.

Learned counsel for the claimant cites the decision of this Court in Mrs. Juliet Ubanwa v. Horeth Engineering Limited (2023) NICN/LA/366/2021 and argues that the Court held that where an incompetent witness statement is not properly placed before the Court, the appropriate course is to strike it out from the record. Counsel therefore urges this Court to hold that the Witness Statement on Oath of Mrs. Aremu Modupe Racheal (DW1) is incompetent, should not be considered, and ought to be expunged from the record.

Counsel further argues that the Court cannot move a motion suo motu, since it cannot assume the role of counsel for a party by adopting or reviving a filed process without that party first moving it. Reliance is placed on AJUWA v. N.P.D.C. Ltd (2021) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1791) 421, where it was held, among other things, that a judge must not descend into the arena by championing a party’s case or moving motions on its behalf, as this would violate the basic principles of the adversarial system of justice.

Learned counsel submits that, following the finding that DW1’s Witness Statement on Oath is incompetent, the Defendant’s pleadings have become inoperative and without evidential support. This is because pleadings not backed by evidence are deemed abandoned and do not raise any issue for determination. Accordingly, he argues that the Defendant’s Statement of Defence, being unsupported by evidence, should be treated as abandoned. He relies on DOMINIC v. EGBA (2022) 25 E-WRN/07 at 14–15 paras. B–B (CA), where the Court of Appeal held that:

…the effect is that the appellant's statement of claim was not supported by any written statement on oath as required by the Rules of the trial Court and, in the eyes of the law, the appellant did not have any valid statement of claim in the trial Court… It is an elementary principle of law that bare averments in a party's pleadings do not constitute evidence upon which a trial Court can evaluate and base its decision. As rightly stated by the learned counsel to the respondent, pleadings upon which no evidence is adduced or led is deemed abandoned." Per ADUMEIN, J.C.A in Dominic v. Egba (Pp. 14-15 paras. B-B).

Counsel further argues that, since the Defendant’s pleadings were not supported by a competent witness statement on oath, they are deemed abandoned. As a result, the Defendant is left with no valid defence to the Claimants’ claims and is therefore deemed to have admitted the reliefs sought by the Claimants.

Counsel for the claimants further submits that assuming but not conceding that the Claimant’s claims was defended, the DW1 made damaging admission on serious issue of law when she testified under cross examination when she was asked thus:

“Did you sign your witness Statement in your lawyer’s office?”. And she answered: “Yes”.

On the issue of the impropriety of a deposition allegedly signed in a lawyer’s office, learned counsel for the claimant submits that the law is settled: a Witness Statement on Oath executed in a lawyer’s office is incompetent and cannot be relied upon. Counsel cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Buhari v. INEC (2008) 12 SCNJ 1 at 91, where the apex court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s striking out of the appellant’s witnesses’ depositions, which were sworn before a Notary Public who was also counsel in the chambers of the appellant’s senior counsel, in breach of section 19 of the Notaries Public Act and section 83 of the Evidence Act (now section 112) – see also MUHAMMAD & ORS V. GANI (2019) LPELR-47190(CA).

In concluding on Issue One, learned counsel for the claimants submitted that the above decisions are fatal to DW1’s Witness Statement on Oath. Counsel further argued that since the defendant called only DW1 as its witness, the statement of defence is unsupported by evidence and, as a result, the defendant has placed nothing before the court.

On issue two, learned counsel argues that, even if it is assumed without conceding that the Defendant was not served with a pre-action notice, the real question is whether the Defendant can properly invoke that omission at the final stage of trial to defeat a claim for earned salaries and allowances, where the injury is ongoing and the Defendant has already fully participated in the trial on the merits.

Counsel further contends that the Defendant was duly served with the pre-action notice through courier service and, in fact, received the said letter. Counsel also argues that the denial of service contained in the evidence of DW1 should not be relied upon. First, learned counsel submits that under cross-examination, DW1 admitted that she did not know whether any letter from the Claimants’ solicitor was sent to the Defendant. Counsel maintains that this testimony is inconsistent with her witness statement on oath, in which she denied receiving any such letter.

Still on the issue of non-service of pre-action notice, learned counsel for the claimants further submitted that, even if it is assumed without conceding that the defendant was not served with a pre-action notice, the defendant cannot rely on that omission as a defence to avoid liability where the injury or damage is continuous. Counsel referred to section 20(3) and (4) of the NSCDC Act and argued further that the law is settled by the apex court that statutory limitation periods and procedural preconditions do not apply where the injury or damage is ongoing and has not stopped. He also contended that the withholding of the claimants’ monthly salaries and allowances is a clear example of a continuing injury.

Learned counsel relies on A-G Rivers State v. A-G Bayelsa State (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123, where the Supreme Court held that where a wrong or deprivation is continuing in nature, a fresh cause of action arises each day the injury remains unresolved. Accordingly, any statutory protection or condition precedent is suspended and cannot be invoked to defeat a citizen’s claim so long as the injury continues.

Counsel also places reliance on GOVERNOR OF OYO STATE v. AKINYANJU (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 598) 951, in which the Court of Appeal clearly held that the withholding of an employee’s salary, allowances, or other entitlements constitutes a continuing economic injury. The appellate court further stated that it would be unjust to permit a statutory employer to rely on procedural requirements as a shield while it continues to inflict an ongoing financial loss on its employees.

Learned counsel further argues that statutory bodies cannot rely on pre-action notice provisions to avoid labour-related liabilities. Counsel also contends that the Supreme Court has clearly distinguished ordinary civil claims from claims arising out of labour contracts or services rendered. Public policy, counsel submits, does not permit government agencies to benefit from a person’s labour and then evade payment by resorting to procedural technicalities.

Learned counsel further argues that in NRMAFC v. Johnson (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247, the Supreme Court unequivocally held that statutory protections and technical immunity provisions do not extend to employment contracts, claims for salary, or actions for work already done. Counsel also submits that in FGN v. Zebra Energy Ltd (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) 162, the apex court stated that pre-action notice provisions are meant to give public bodies time to investigate claims and seek amicable settlement outside court. They are not intended to become an “engine of fraud” or a means of evading the payment of legitimate debts or liquidated contractual obligations.

Learned counsel for the Claimants further submits that the Claimants have given credible testimony and adduced evidence before this Court demonstrating that they rendered active services to the NSCDC. Having benefited from the services of the volunteers, the NSCDC cannot rely on section 20 of its Act to evade payment for labour already performed.

Counsel further submitted that the Defendant is deemed to have waived its right to object after participating in a full trial. According to counsel, pre-action notice is not a constitutional requirement that goes to the root of a claim; rather, it is a statutory privilege intended to prevent a public body from being taken by surprise. The Defendant did not halt the proceedings but instead allowed the Claimants to fully open their case, call witnesses, tender evidence, and close their case. By fully participating in the trial on the merits, the Defendant, in counsel’s view, has overtaken the purpose of the pre-action notice. Counsel added that the Defendant ought to have filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection before the reception of evidence but failed to do so.

Learned counsel for the claimant argues that in EDE v. ACCESS BANK PLC (2020) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1715) 417, the Court of Appeal expressly held that pre-action notice is a procedural requirement that can be waived. Where a defendant does not properly and promptly raise the objection by appropriate pleading or motion, but instead fully participates in the trial, the defendant is taken in law to have waived that procedural defence.

Counsel cites this Court’s decision in Mr. Patrick Joseph Akpan v. FRSC (2022), where the NICN reaffirmed that failure to comply with a pre-action notice requirement amounts only to a procedural irregularity. At the stage of final address, the Court is expected to prioritize substantive justice over technical objections, particularly where the Defendant has fully defended the suit on the merits.

Learned counsel submits and urges the Court to place substantive labour justice above an outdated procedural technicality, dismiss the Defendant’s objection, and grant the Claimants’ reliefs on the merits.

On issue three, learned counsel began by submitting that the claimant’s suit is not barred by the statute of limitation. Counsel further argued that limitation laws do not apply to claims for the recovery of salaries, labour entitlements, or contracts of service. In support, counsel cited National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (NRMAFC) v. Ajibola Johnson (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247, where the Supreme Court settled the point conclusively by holding that the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to actions relating to contracts of service, salaries, and allowances of employees.

Counsel further submits that this Court correctly applied the Supreme Court’s position in Lilian Nnenna Akumah v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (Suit No. NICN/LA/402/2018) and Mr. Godson Ikechukwu Nkume v. First Bank of Nigeria Limited (Suit No. NICN/LA/242/2017), where the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN) held unequivocally that claims for unpaid salaries and other employment-related disputes amount to continuous injuries and are therefore not caught by the harsh operation of limitation laws.

Learned counsel submits that the passage of time cannot extinguish the debt owed to the Claimants. Their right to institute this action for their hard-earned money remains subsisting, valid, and fully enforceable before this Honourable Court. He thus urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the Claimants.

On issue four, learned counsel for the claimants submits that the claimants have proved their case on the preponderance of evidence and are therefore entitled to the reliefs sought.

Counsel submits that a reading of the Claimants’ statement of facts shows that the reliefs sought are declaratory in nature. It is settled law that a party claiming declaratory relief must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on any weakness in the defendant’s case. Counsel relies on ADAMA v. K.S.H.A. (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 501 at 530–531, paras. H–A, where the Supreme Court held that:

“...it is basic law that a Plaintiff has the onus to show that in a declaratory action he is entitled as per his claim. To this end, he has to succeed on the strength of his own case, and not on the weakness of the Defendant’s case, and where he defaults in discharging this onus, his case will be dismissed.”

Learned counsel for the claimants referred to the reliefs sought in this suit and submitted that, in proving the claims, the claimants were first required to establish that they were enlisted by the defendant as volunteers. Counsel further submitted that CW1 and CW2 each testified in paragraphs 4 and 5 of their respective witness statements on oath as follows:

4. The Claimants aver that the Claimants were enlisted into the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps between 1996-2005 as Corps members. The documents bearing and containing the particulars of the respective Claimants are hereby pleaded and shall be relied upon at the trial.

5. The Claimants aver further to paragraph 4 above, that the names, Ranks, year of enlistment and effective date of promotion for the Claimants are tabulated below in paragraph 13. Other documents bearing the particulars of the Claimants are hereby pleaded.

Counsel further submits that, during cross-examination, CW1 stated that he was born in June 1971 and was enlisted into the Corps in 1996. It was also abundantly clear that CW1, CW2, and the other claimants were enlisted as volunteers. Exhibit C2, which is the posting of Divisional Officers/21/CS for the claimants, lists CW1 as number 6. The other names in that posting also appear in the table of names set out in paragraph 15 of CW1’s witness statement on oath.

Learned counsel for the Claimants further submitted that the table listing the Claimants’ names and the salaries owed to them was attached to the letter or pre-action notice served on the Defendant, which was admitted as Exhibit C10. He also submitted that Exhibits C1 and C3 are the promotion warrants of CW1. Exhibit C4 is the Certificate of Attendance issued to ASC1 Anthony Eche (CW1), confirming that CW1 successfully completed the Senior Officers Course 1 of the Northeast Region. He further noted that Exhibit C8 is CW1’s identity card, and that these exhibits, together with the relevant paragraphs of the Claimants’ witnesses’ witness statements, were not materially contradicted.

In addressing the court on the claimants’ evidence, learned counsel for the claimants further submitted that, at the time this suit was filed, CW1 and CW2 had clearly stated that the claimants were still being engaged by the defendant. Reference was made to paragraph 16 of the witness statements on oath of both CW1 and CW2, and it was contended that their testimony on this point was not contradicted in any way.

Counsel further argues that the Defendant exerted considerable effort to show that the Claimants were unknown to it and had never been enlisted as volunteers. Reference is made to paragraph 4 of the DW1’s witness statement on oath, and it is submitted that DW1’s denial was undermined and shattered under cross-examination.

Learned counsel for the Claimants further relies on the testimony of DW1 under cross-examination and submits that the basis for denying the Claimants’ membership as volunteers in the Defendant’s service, as stated in paragraph 4 of the Witness Statement on Oath, is allegedly a record said to be in the Defendant’s possession. However, that record was not produced before the Court. More importantly, she also admitted that she did not have the Letter of Appointment which she claimed was in the Defendant’s possession. Counsel further submits that at best, this Court can only speculate that there is a record which does not bear the names of the Claimants as volunteers. It is trite that the Court cannot speculate. He relies on the authority of JOHN HOLT PLC V. ALLEN (2014) 17 NWLR (PT. 437) 443 AT 466 PARA. A-B, in support of his said submissions.

Learned counsel for the claimants urges this Court to disregard the evidence of DW1 and hold that the claimants are volunteers in the service of the defendant, as the testimony of the claimants’ witnesses and the exhibits admitted in evidence are credible and unassailable.

Learned counsel for the claimants further drew the court’s attention to the cross-examination of DW1 on questions relating to Exhibits C5, C6, C7, C8, C11, C12, and up to C83. Counsel submitted that the exhibits in question are bank cheques issued by the defendant to the claimants, each showing the sum of ?30,000.00. Counsel further argued that DW1 admitted under cross-examination that the cheques bore the defendant’s name and reflected payment of ?30,000 to the claimants. In support, counsel relied on Ebo v. Amadi (2012) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1301) 69 at 84 paras. D–F, where it was held, among other things, that evidence of an admitted fact is unnecessary and irrelevant.

Counsel further argues that the Claimants have shown that some of them were promoted. He cites Exhibits C1, C3, and C19 as evidence of these promotions. Learned counsel for the Claimants also contends that the testimony of the witnesses, together with the admission by the Defendant’s witness (DW1), has established that the Claimants were volunteers and are therefore entitled to payment.

Learned counsel for the claimants posed the question of whether the defendants had, in fact, been paying the claimants regularly and as due. In response, counsel referred to the depositions of CW1 and CW2 and also drew the court’s attention to the testimony of DW1 under cross-examination on the issue of whether the defendant was indebted to the claimants.

Learned counsel for the Claimants further submitted that DW1 confirmed that the Defendant has no record showing that the Claimants were fully paid before their regularization. Counsel also stated that the table in paragraph 15 of the Claimants’ witnesses’ witness statement on oath, which sets out the names of the Claimants, the salaries payable to them, the months for which they were paid and unpaid, and the total outstanding salary, was not challenged or contradicted.

Counsel further argues that, in attempting to refute the claimants’ case, DW1 contradicted herself. According to counsel, she stated at one point that the defendant pays monthly stipends to the claimants, while at another point she claimed that only regularized persons are paid.

Learned counsel for the claimants further argues that there are clear inconsistencies in the evidence of DW1 regarding whether the claimants were paid their monthly allowance. Counsel submits that, in such circumstances, the Court cannot selectively decide which part of the witness’s evidence to believe. On this point, counsel contends that the only consistent evidence establishing the defendant’s indebtedness to the claimants is that of CW1 and CW2, which, on the preponderance of evidence, should be preferred. Counsel therefore urges the Court to reject the evidence of DW1 concerning the amount allegedly owed by the defendant to the claimants.

Learned counsel for the claimants relies on the authority of OGUNJIMI v. STATE (2017) LPELR-42768(CA), where the Court had held as follows:

"Indeed, it is the law that, a piece of evidence is said to be contradictory of another when it affirms the opposite of what that evidence has stated. Pieces of evidence are said to be contradictory of each other if they are inconsistent to each other and therefore mutually repulsive to each other and thus cannot stand in the presence of the other. In other words, where the Court accepts the other, it means that it has to reject the other, since both cannot be true. The other must be true while the other false or untrue. In such a circumstance, the Court cannot accept one and rely on the other. NO, it must reject both. See Stephen v. State (2009) All FWLR (pt.49) p.962; and Dagayya v. The State (2006) 7 NWLR (p.980) p. 637 at 677; and Gabriel v. The State (1989) 5 NWLR (pt.977) p.545. Thus, in the case of Nwankwoala v. State (2006) 14 NWLR (pt.1000) p. 663, Tabai, JSC said: "The settled principle is that where the evidence of a witness is materially contradictory of his earlier statement to the Police the witness should be regarded as unreliable and his evidence ignored..." Per HARUNA SIMON TSAMMANI, JCA (Pp 39 - 40 Paras C - C).

Learned counsel for the claimants further submits that, on the issue of regularization of the claimants, the claimants’ witnesses testified in paragraph 7 of the CW1 and CW2 Witness Statements on Oath as follows:

That I know that based on the provision of Section 26(4) of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act 2003 as amended, a person who immediately before the commencement of this Act was a volunteer or regular member of or held office in the Dissolved Corps shall be deemed to have been transferred to the Corps on terms and Conditions not less favourable than those obtaining immediately before the commencement of this Act, and service in the dissolved Corps shall be deemed to be service in the Corps for the purpose of pension.

Learned counsel further submits that the meaning of section 26(4) is clear and unambiguous, and that the Claimants’ appointments ought to have been regularized if that provision had been complied with. Counsel also contends that the Claimants have duly established their case. Nevertheless, he submits that even if the Defendant is unwilling to regularize the Claimants’ employment, the Claimants are still entitled to their salaries on the equitable basis of quantum meruit.

Finally, learned counsel for the claimants urges this Court to find that the claimants have established their case and are therefore entitled to the reliefs sought before this Court.

DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW:

The Defendant, in its Reply on Points of Law, responded to the arguments raised by the Claimants in their final written address on three issues, namely, the competence of the Defendant’s evidence, the non-service of pre-action notice, and the applicability of the limitation law to the Claimants’ action.

On the first issue, concerning whether the Defendant defended the suit despite the alleged failure to move the motion on notice filed on 22 January 2025, upon which the witness statement on oath of Aremu Modupe Rachael was premised, learned counsel for the Defendant submitted that the Court is bound by its records. Counsel referred to Patrick Ochapa Ogbu & Ors v. Obi Local Government Traditional Council & Ors (2025) LPELR-80888(CA). He contended that the Defendant had filed an additional witness statement on oath together with a motion on notice, both dated 22 January 2025, seeking leave to call an additional witness. According to counsel, the motion was moved and granted by the Court in December 2025. Counsel therefore submitted that the witness statement on oath of DW1, Modupe Aremu, having been filed, adopted by the witness in open court and subjected to cross-examination, was properly before the Court and ought to be considered.

In the alternative, counsel argued that, even assuming without conceding that the motion to regularize the witness statement was not moved, any irregularity had been cured by the fact that DW1 took the oath, adopted the witness statement and was thereafter cross-examined by the Claimants. In support of this submission, counsel relied on Katagum v. Umar (2026) 8 NWLR (Pt. 2046) 457 at 490–491, paras. B–F, where the Supreme Court held that the failure to take an oath or make an affirmation could not be construed as affecting a witness’s liability to state the truth under Section 4 of the Oaths Act. Counsel further referred to the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in that case that failure to administer an oath before a witness gives evidence is a mere irregularity which does not affect the decision reached on the evidence, unless it is shown to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

Counsel also relied on Sections 4(2) and (3) of the Oaths Act, which provide that no irregularity in the form in which an oath or affirmation is administered or taken shall invalidate the performance of official duties or proceedings in any court, or render inadmissible evidence in respect of which the irregularity occurred; and that failure to take an oath or make an affirmation shall not affect a witness’s liability to state the truth. Counsel further cited the pronouncement of Agim, JSC, in Katagum v. Umar (supra), at pages 41–42, paras. F–A, to the effect that where a witness takes an oath in open court and adopts a written statement of relevant facts, whether previously sworn or not, the statement becomes the witness’s oral evidence in examination-in-chief, upon which the witness may be cross-examined, and such admitted oral evidence on oath cannot be expunged on the ground of a defect in the written statement preceding it. Counsel also referred to Anatogu v. Iweka II (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 415) 547, where the Court held that even if a written statement was not made on oath or sworn at all, it could still serve as the witness’s written statement intended to be given as evidence on oath, and nothing precluded the witness from adopting it as testimony when testifying on oath in examination-in-chief in open court. On the strength of these authorities, counsel urged the Court to hold that DW1’s witness statement was properly before it and could lawfully be relied upon, particularly as the Claimants had failed to demonstrate that such reliance would occasion a miscarriage of justice.

On the second issue, relating to the non-service of pre-action notice, counsel for the Defendant submitted that the Defendant did not raise the issue for the first time in its final written address and that the issue could not have taken the Claimants by surprise. Counsel maintained that non-service of pre-action notice had been pleaded in paragraph 16 of the Defendant’s statement of defence, and that the Defendant had also led evidence on the issue before advancing its arguments in the final written address. Counsel relied on Ntiero v. NPA (2008) LPELR-2073(SC), in which the Supreme Court held that a party raising the defence of non-service of pre-action notice could do so either by motion or by pleading it in the statement of defence. Counsel submitted that once the issue was raised, service of the notice became a condition precedent that had to be satisfied before the Court could exercise its jurisdiction. He also relied on Katsina Local Authority v. Makudawa (1971) 1 NWLR 100.

Counsel further submitted that where a person or institution denies receipt of a document, delivery may be established by any of three legally recognized means: a dispatch book indicating receipt; evidence of dispatch by registered post; or the testimony of a credible witness capable of establishing that the document was served. In support, counsel cited Ventukura v. Jatau & Ors (2024) LPELR-61774(CA) and Shoprite Checkers (PTY) Ltd & Anor v. A.I.E. Ltd (2020) LPELR-49905(CA). He argued that, upon the Defendant’s denial of receipt of the alleged pre-action notice, the burden rested on the Claimants to establish that the notice had actually been delivered. According to counsel, the Claimants failed to produce a dispatch or receipt book showing that the Defendant received the notice, failed to prove that it had been sent by registered post, and failed to call any credible witness to establish due service. Counsel consequently urged the Court to hold that service had not been proved.

Counsel additionally relied on Sanda v. C.O.P. (2025) LPELR-82714(SC), submitting that courts are bound to enforce mandatory provisions of substantive law, including the Constitution, and that parties cannot, by consent, acquiescence or failure to object, nullify the effect of a statute or constitutional provision. On that basis, counsel urged the Court to enforce the provisions of Sections 20(3) and (4) of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, as amended. Counsel further cited Bokkos Local Government Council v. Gabaya (Nig.) Ltd (2025) LPELR-82130, in which the Court of Appeal held that where service of pre-action notice is mandatory, compliance is a condition precedent to the commencement of an action, and non-compliance renders the action incompetent and deprives the court of jurisdiction to entertain it.

On the third issue, concerning the applicability of the limitation law, counsel responded to the Claimants’ contention that the action related to the recovery of salaries and contracts of service and was therefore exempt from the operation of the statute of limitation. Counsel submitted that the principal basis of the Claimants’ action was not a claim founded on contracts of service or the recovery of salaries, but the alleged failure of the Defendant to regularize their appointments in accordance with Section 26(5) of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, as amended.

Counsel argued that the action was not one for wrongful dismissal, in which the Claimants might seek unpaid salaries by relying on their contracts of service. He further contended that the Claimants had not placed any contract of service before the Court to support their contention that the action fell within the protection claimed under the limitation law or to establish an entitlement to salaries should they succeed. In support, counsel relied on Ovivie & Ors v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd (2023) LPELR-60460(SC), where the Supreme Court held that, in an action for wrongful dismissal, the contract of employment forming the foundation of the action must be pleaded. Without the contract and its particulars being pleaded, evidence of the terms allegedly breached would be inadmissible, and the action would be fatally defective for want of foundation.

Counsel further submitted that the exemption from limitation in respect of contracts of employment was not absolute. He relied on AMCON v. Astone Quarries Ltd & Anor (2021) LPELR-54146(CA), which, according to counsel, established that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply where the matter concerned the day-to-day operations of a public corporation as provided for by the statute governing that corporation. Counsel maintained that it was on this basis that employment contracts involving staff of public corporations were governed by the limitation law.

Applying that argument to the instant case, counsel contended that the act complained of by the Claimants, namely, the failure to regularize their appointments in 2007 pursuant to Section 26(5) of the NSCDC Act, as amended, became statute-barred three months after the Defendant’s Board completed the regularization process in 2007. He submitted that any action commenced after the expiration of that three-month period was statute-barred. Accordingly, counsel argued that the Claimants’ action, commenced in 2022, was statute-barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Statute of Limitation and Section 26(5) of the NSCDC Act, as amended. He further referred to Udo v. Civil Service Commission, Akwa Ibom State & Ors (2006) LPELR-11564(CA), and urged the Court to so hold.

COURT’S DECISION:

I have carefully reviewed the pleadings, witness testimonies, evidence, and final written submissions of counsel. In my view, two principal issues arise for determination:

Whether, having regard to the facts and evidence placed before the court, the claimants’ suit is incompetent, and this court therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine it; and

Whether, on the basis of the material evidence before the court, the claimants have established their entitlement to the reliefs sought in this action.

ISSUE ONE:

This issue arose from the defendant’s counsel’s submissions, which challenged the competence of the claimants’ suit and the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine it. It encapsulates two sub-issues as follows:

Whether the claimants’ alleged failure to serve a pre-action notice on the defendant deprived this court of the jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit;

and whether the claimants’ action, as constituted, is statute-barred, thereby also ousting the jurisdiction of this court to entertain it.

This Court has taken advantage of the first opportunity to set out, in full, the submissions of learned counsel on both sides regarding the objection that the claimant allegedly failed to serve the required pre-action notice on the defendant before commencing this action. However, for the sake of emphasis and clarity, it should be reiterated that the defendant pleaded in paragraph 16 of its statement of defence as follows:

“the defendant shall contest at the trial of this suit that the court lacks the jurisdiction to here the matter as the claimant failed to serve a pre-action notice on the defendant as contained in the Act establishing the defendant”.

The defendant’s counsel, in the final address filed on 19 February 2026, relied on section 20(3) of the NSCDC Act, Cap N146, LFN, in submitting that the claimants failed to comply with the provisions of the said law.

The learned counsel for the defendant correctly submitted that jurisdiction is a fundamental threshold issue. Reference may be made to the well-known authority of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 NLR (Pt. 4) 587, where it was held that, for an action to be properly constituted, the following requirements must all be present:

The suit must be brought or commenced by due process
The subject matter must be within the court’s jurisdiction, and
The court must be properly constituted.

Such issues, like the one presently under consideration, are threshold matters. It is a well-settled principle, often repeated, that a court acts in vain where it proceeds without jurisdiction. See Oloriode v. Oyebi (1984) 1 SCNLR 390; Adefulu & Ors. v. Oyesile & Ors. (1989) 20 NSCC (Pt. III) 371 at 393; and Oredoyin v. Arowolo (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 114) 172. This makes it necessary to determine, as learned counsel for the defendant contends, whether the claimants’ suit is incompetent.

The defendant’s counsel argued emphatically that the claimants were required to serve a pre-action notice on the defendant before commencing this suit, and that their failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to their case, as it affects the jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine the matter.

It is settled law that where the service of a pre-action notice is required, failure to serve it renders the action incompetent. In other words, if the necessary pre-action notice is not properly served in a case where it is mandatory, the suit cannot be validly instituted or maintained. See Ntiero v. NPA (2008) LPELR-2073 (SC); Eze v. Okechukwu (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 348.

The claimants and the defendant appear to be in clear agreement that section 20(3) of the NSCDC Act 2003 provides for a pre-action notice. For emphasis and clarity, section 20(3) of the NSCDC Act 2003 is reproduced below:

“20(3) – No suit shall be commenced against a member of the board or Commandant General or any other officer or employee of the Corps before the expiration of a period of one month after written notice of intention to commence the suit shall be served on the corps by the intending plaintiff or his agent.”

The immediate questions are whether section 20(3) applies to this action as constituted, and, if so, whether the Claimants complied with its requirements.

Although subsection (3) is framed by reference to a suit against a member of the Board, the Commandant-General, or another officer or employee of the Corps, it directs that notice be served on the Corps. In Nwobele & Ors v. Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (2023) LPELR-60151(CA), the Court of Appeal considered section 20(3) in the context of an action involving the NSCDC and treated compliance with the statutory pre-action notice requirement as material. That decision is in pari materia with the circumstances before this Court and so it must be followed. On the present record, the Claimants have not established a basis for distinguishing it; I therefore proceed on the footing that section 20(3) applies to this action.

The claimants took the opportunity provided by their reply to the defendant’s statement of defence to state as follows:

“Contrary to paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18 of the statement of defence, the claimants aver that the letter from A.M Okwori Esq. was indeed sent to the defendant who did not deem it fit to reply same. The said letter also served as pre-action notice as the issue of pre-action notice was clearly stated in the said letter…”.

The learned counsel for the claimants, in his final address, similarly submitted that the defendant was duly served with the pre-action notice by courier, and that the said letter was in fact received by the defendant (Exhibits C2 and C10).

I carefully read Exhibit C10. The letter was written by A.M. Okwori & Co., dated 4 May 2021, and addressed to the Commandant-General of the defendant. It is titled: “Complaint on the Irregular Payment of Salaries, Non-Regularization of Appointments, Neglect and Demand for Immediate Payment of Salaries and Regularization of Appointment.”

As the text was reviewed, the closing paragraph appeared particularly significant, and it reads as follows:

“Finally, be it known to you sir, that if we do not hear from you within 30 days of the receipt of this letter, we shall be left with no other option than to take legal action against you in order to seek justice for our clients. Kindly regard this letter as a pre-action notice towards commencement of action in court if we do not hear from you accordingly”.

The fact that the letter describes itself as a pre-action notice is relevant but does not, without proof of service and compliance with the statutory contents, establish that the condition precedent was fulfilled.

Exhibit C10 expressly identifies the dispute as one concerning irregular salary payments, non-regularization of appointments, neglect, and a demand for payment and regularization. Its concluding paragraph gives notice that legal action may follow if no response is received within 30 days of receipt. The Court must, however, distinguish the intention to give notice from proof of actual service and from compliance with the specific contents required by section 20(4) of the NSCDC Act – refer to NWOBELE AND ORS V. NSCDC (supra).

In paragraph 15 of its Statement of Defence, the Defendant expressly denied receiving the letters said to have been sent by A.M. Okwori, Esq. That denial placed the burden on the Claimants to establish service through admissible evidence. The Court must consider the evidence of dispatch and delivery as a whole. Although the absence of a signature or stamp on the courier document is relevant, it does not, by itself, establish that delivery did not take place.

Exhibit C9, a UPS Courier Service document dated 24 April 2021, names A.M. Okwori, Esq. as the sender and the Commandant-General as the recipient. However, Exhibit C10—the letter purportedly sent— is dated 4 May 2021, ten days later. The evidence does not explain this discrepancy or establish that Exhibit C9 relates to the dispatch of Exhibit C10. Nor does Exhibit C9 contain an acknowledgment of receipt by the Defendant or an identified representative, and the evidence in the record does not otherwise establish when Exhibit C10 was received. I therefore find that the actual service of Exhibit C10 before the commencement of this suit has not been proved. In the absence of proof of the date of receipt, the Claimants have also failed to establish that the statutory waiting period of 30 days elapsed before their action was commenced.

The NSCDC Act, 2003 did not merely provide for a pre-action notice; it also went further in subsection (4) to expressly set out the contents of such notice as follows:

20(4) The notice referred to in subsection (3) of this section shall clearly and explicitly state:

The cause of action;
The particulars of claim;
The name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and
The relief which the plaintiff claims.”

Upon considering Exhibit C10 in light of section 20(4), and taking account of the evidential deficiencies relating to its annexure and proof of delivery, this Court hereby finds that the Claimants have not shown compliance with the statutory pre-action notice requirement on three distinct grounds: service before commencement was unproved; the date of receipt and expiry of the 30 days before the commencement of the action was not proved; and compliance with the statutory particulars was not established. This conclusion rests on the evidence and the statutory requirements, rather than solely on the absence of a particular form of acknowledgment on Exhibit C9.

Meanwhile, learned counsel for the claimants relied on several arguments in response, including the following: statutory limitation periods and preconditions do not apply where the injury or damage is continuous; a statutory body cannot invoke pre-action notice provisions to avoid liability for labour-related debts; and the defendant is deemed to have waived any objection after participating fully in the trial, especially since it did not prevent the proceedings from continuing.

The detailed arguments of learned counsel for the claimants on these issues have already been set out in the preceding portions of this judgment. It is important to stress that the statutory requirement of pre-action notice in several enactments is not a mere decorative or technical formality. Equally, it must be noted that pre-action notice provisions do not operate in the same way as statutes of limitation. Although such provisions do not constitute an absolute bar, they merely suspend the enforcement of the right of action until the required precondition has been satisfied. See: Chief B. E. Nnonye v. Anyichie (2005) 1 SCM 133 at 145; Amadi v. NNPC (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt. 674) 76 at 110–111.

It is a settled principle of law that, for a suit to be properly maintainable, it must, among other requirements, be instituted in accordance with due process of law. MADUKOLU & ORS v. NKEMDILIM (supra). Likewise, where a statute prescribes the procedure for initiating an action, any failure to comply with that procedure renders the suit incompetent. AGIP (NIG) LTD v. AGIP PETROLI INTERNATIONAL & ORS (2010) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1187) 348 at 419H–420A–B.

If the question of whether the right to be served with a pre-action notice can be waived were genuinely in issue, the Court of Appeal has already answered it clearly in LUSHANN ETERNIT ENERGY LTD & ANOR v. AMCON & ANOR (2024) LPELR-61768 (CA), where the court held, among other things, as follows:

"On the second contention of the Appellant that the Respondents had waived the pre-action notice by filing their counter affidavit to the originating summons and the motion for interlocutory injunction, it is clear that every waiver must be clear and unambiguous. Even though pre-action notice is mandatory, the party like the Respondents herein who are the beneficiary of the pre-action notice can waive it by conduct. This situation is permissible and it is also deducible from the conduct of a party. Service of pre-action is a personal, private or domestic right of the party to be served. He is the beneficiary of the service and can so waive it at will or on his terms. The right is not shared by members of the public or the public at large but is one specific to the party. If he decides to respond to the writ without service on him, he has the right to do so and the Courts cannot hold that as the issue affects jurisdiction, he cannot waive his right to be served. In my humble view, where an issue of jurisdiction, like the issuance of pre-action notice is domestic to the parties, it can be waived at the pleasure and choice of the beneficiary. See Feed & Food Farms Nigeria Limited v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2009) LPELR-1274 (SC) Pages 14-17, paras. A-D. Per TOBI, JSC."

It follows, therefore, that waiver of the right to pre-action notice may be inferred from the conduct of the party entitled to it. As such, whether that right has in fact been waived depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. In this regard, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lushann Eternit Energy Ltd & Anor v. AMCON & Anor is both guiding and instructive. The court held, among other things, that for waiver to be established, the respondent must either have failed to raise the issue at all or filed a counter-affidavit and allowed the appellants to join issue by way of a further affidavit.

In this suit, the Claimants have not proved that Exhibit C10 was received by the Defendant before the action was commenced. Nor is there sufficient evidence that the Defendant was served with the identities of all the intended Claimants and details of their respective claims. Accordingly, the Court is not satisfied that the notice met the requirements of section 20(4).

The defendant made it clear that it was challenging this Court’s jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim on the basis that no pre-action notice was served. As noted earlier in this judgment, the claimants joined issue with the defendant on this point in their Reply to the defendant’s Statement of Defence.

The Defendant pleaded non-service in its Statement of Defence, and the Claimants joined issue on that question in their Reply. The Defendant maintained the objection in its final address. The Claimants argue that the Defendant waived the objection by participating in the trial and that it should have raised the matter by preliminary objection before evidence was taken.

I do not accept that participation in the trial, viewed in isolation, establishes waiver. I have considered Lushann Eternit Energy Ltd & Anor v. AMCON & Anor (supra), which recognizes that a pre-action notice requirement may be waived where the conduct of the beneficiary clearly establishes unequivocal waiver. In this case, the Defendant expressly pleaded non-service, led evidence on the issue and maintained the objection in its final address. The Claimants were therefore aware of the objection and joined issues on it. In these circumstances, the Defendant’s participation in the proceedings does not amount to a clear and unequivocal abandonment of the right to rely on the statutory notice. I find that waiver has not been established. The conduct recorded in this case does not establish such a waiver.

Therefore, having found non-compliance with a statutory condition precedent, the ordinary and appropriate order is to strike out the action as incompetent, rather than dismiss it on the merits.

For completeness, and in the event that this finding is reversed on appeal, the Court will examine the limitation issue and the substantive claims in the alternative. Those alternative observations shall not displace the operative order made on the threshold issue.

The second sub-issue under Issue One is whether the claimants’ suit is statute-barred, as learned counsel for the defendant urges this Court to hold. In support of that argument, learned counsel for the defendant relied on the provisions of Section 20(2)(a) and (b) of the NSCDC Act, 2003.

A civil action is statute-barred when it is filed after the time permitted by law for bringing such an action. On the nature and application of the principle of limitation of actions, it is useful to reproduce the pronouncement of the learned Justice Oputa, JSC of blessed memory in EGBE v. ADEFARASIN (1987) LPELR-1032 (SC); (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 47) 1, where his Lordship stated as follows:

“A cause of action is said to be statute-barred if in respect of it the proceedings cannot be brought because the period laid down by the limitation law or Act had elapsed. How does one determine the period of limitation? The answer is simply by looking at the writ of summons and the statement of claim alleging when the wrong was committed which gave the plaintiff a cause of action and by comparing that date with the date on which the writ of summons was filed. This can be done without taking oral evidence from witnesses. If the time on the writ is beyond the period allowed by the limitation law then the action is statute barred.”

See also: Shell Petroleum Development Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Abel Isaiah and Ors (2001) 7 SCM 143, (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt.723) 168, and Peenok Investments Ltd v. Motel Presidential Ltd. 1983 4 NLLR page 1.

The application of limitation legislation to employment disputes has been the subject of differing judicial pronouncements. The earlier decision in National Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission v. Ajibola Johnson (supra) which was cited by the learned claimants’ counsel, must now be read alongside the subsequent Supreme Court decisions in Dr. Moses U. Anolam v. Federal University of Technology, Owerri & Ors (2025) LPELR-80027(SC) and Chukwuka Okoronkwo v. Independent National Electoral Commission (2025) LPELR-80425(SC), which reaffirm the application of limitation legislation to employment claims in the circumstances addressed in those cases. The Court must apply the binding appellate position to the particular statutory provision and cause of action before it, rather than treating employment claims as categorically exempt from limitation.

It is self-evident that a statute of limitation deprives a litigant of the right to approach the court to seek determination of a claim filed after the period prescribed by law for bringing such an action. The apex court, in OKO v. Attorney-General of Ebonyi State (2021) LPELR-54988(SC), explained the meaning of a cause of action and the possible exceptions to the rule of limitation in the following terms:

“A cause of action means the factual situation stated by the plaintiff and if substantiated entitles him to a remedy against the defendant. See Latana vs. Cooper (1964) 2 ALL E.R 929. The claim must rest on and be supplied a cause of action. Of course, the foregoing trite fundamental doctrine is not devoid of an exception thereto. As aptly pontificated by this court in Hassan s. Aliyu (2010) LPELR – SC 170/2009, the exception duly applies: where the public officer concerned fails to act in good faith or acts in abuse of office or maliciously. Or with no semblance of legal justification as decided in the cases of Lagos City Council Vs. Ogunbiyi (1969) All NLR 297 at 299; CBN VS. OKOJIE (2004) 10 NWLR (PT 882) 448 AT 52; NWANKWO VS ADEWUNMI (1966) ALL NLR 119 AT 192; AFFOBECHE VS. OGOJA LOCAL GOVERNMENT (2001) 16 NWLR (PART 739) 458. Per Onnoghen, JSC (as he then was). Most instructively, as aptly postulated above, the effect of limitation on the action is that it takes away the plaintiff’s right to institute the action but leaving him with his cause of action intact albeit devoid of the right to some judicial relief.”

In determining whether a suit is statute-barred, the court examines the originating process to ascertain when the alleged wrong occurred and then compares that date with when the suit was filed. See Bank of the North v. Alhaji Haruna Gana (2006) All FWLR Pt. 296.

It is important to stress that, in deciding whether an action is statute-barred, the court must first identify the cause of action and determine when it actually arose. A cause of action refers to the set of facts complained of by the claimant as giving rise to a legal right to relief, as stated in Oko v. Attorney-General of Ebonyi State. In simple terms, a cause of action arises once there is a party capable of being sued and a legal wrong requiring redress.

The Defendant relies on section 20(2)(a) and (b) of the NSCDC Act. Section 20(1) separately refers to the application of the Public Officers Protection Act to suits against officers or employees of the Corps. These provisions must not be conflated. The Court must first identify the provision governing each claim, construe its language, and then determine whether the facts establish an applicable exception.

In deciding when the cause of action arose in the present suit, reference can be made to the relevant portions of the Claimants’ facts pleaded in paragraphs 4, 6, 8, 15, and 18 as follows:

4. the claimants aver that they were enlisted into the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps between 1999-2005 as corps members. The documents bearing and containing the particulars of the respective claimants are hereby pleaded and shall be relied upon at the trial.

6. the claimants aver that they commenced this suit against the defendant as a result of nonpayment of their salaries, irregular payment of their salaries, non-regularization of their appointments and neglect, lack of payment of financial benefits accruable on promotions.

8. the claimants aver that some of them enlisted as volunteer and were enlisted before the commencement of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act 2003 (as amended) while some were enlisted after the commencement of the Act.

15. the claimants aver that since the time they were enlisted into the respondent; they have diligently performed their duties however the defendant only paid some of them for about four months while some of them were paid salaries for only three months. In all, it is averred that none of the claimants were paid more than five months salaries. The payments are hereby pleaded.

The claimants state that they held several meetings with the defendant’s appropriate authorities regarding the non-payment of salaries, failure to regularize their appointments, and neglect. During these meetings, the defendant repeatedly assured them that their salaries would be paid and their appointments regularized. However, the defendant has failed to fulfill these promises and its statutory duties.

Paragraph 6 of the claimants’ statement of facts clearly shows that they instituted this action against the defendant on account of the non-payment and irregular payment of salaries, as well as the failure to regularize their appointments.

The claimants’ statement of facts does not specify the exact month in which their salaries stopped. What is, however, prima facie evident from their averments is that they were employed by the defendant at different times between 1996 and 2005, and that since their employment, they have received no more than five months’ salary.

The Court must treat the claim for regularization separately from the claim for unpaid remuneration. The cause of action for regularization may arise when the competent authority refuses or fails to take a step required by law; subsequent demands or unfulfilled assurances do not, by themselves, restart the limitation period. The Defendant’s assertion that a regularization exercise was completed in 2007 is not by itself, proof that such an exercise occurred or that each claimant was affected by it. The court must determine accrual from the pleadings and evidence rather than assume the asserted date.

On the other hand, a claim for remuneration may arise each time a payment falls due, provided a legally enforceable obligation to pay is established. Each category of relief must therefore be tested against the precise terms of section 20(2) and the evidence of the relevant accrual.

Regarding regularization therefore, the Claimants’ pleadings and evidence do not identify a specific statutory decision, the date on which regularization was refused, or an enforceable promise from which the Court could determine precisely when the claim arose. The Defendant, however, maintains that the relevant regularization exercise took place in or around 2007. If the evidence establishes that fact, a challenge to the completed decision would have accrued then, subject to the precise wording of the applicable statute and any exception properly proved. This Court cannot treat the continuing effects of the alleged refusal, without more, as giving rise to a later accrual date.

Meanwhile, this action was filed on 29 October 2021. If the claim for regularization accrued in or around 2007, then it was certainly brought well beyond the three-month limitation period prescribed by section 20(2)(a), unless a relevant statutory exception applies. This issue should be distinguished from any claim for remuneration that allegedly fell due in subsequent months.

Limitation statutes must be applied according to their language and the binding appellate authorities. The Court of Appeal in Ojediran v. Governor of Oyo State & Anor (2013) LPELR-21116(CA) considered recognized exceptions to limitation. However, an exception must be grounded in the facts and the statute in issue; it cannot be assumed simply because the Defendant is a public body or the claim concerns employment.

On the doctrine of continuing injury, which constitutes one of the exceptions to the defence of statute of limitation, the apex court considered such exceptions in relation to the Public Officers Protection Law in Attorney-General of Rivers State v. Attorney-General of Bayelsa State & Anor (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at pp. 148–149, where Galadima, JSC stated as follows:

“In cases of continuance of damage or injury, the Act permits actions to be brought on the cessation thereof outside three months. From the Amended Statement of Claim and as equally deposed to in his Counter-affidavit, the Plaintiff averred that he continues to be deprived of the allocation he is entitled to every month and the same has not ceased. I am of the respected view that in such a situation of continuance of damage or injury which has not ceased the Defense is not available to the 1^st Respondent.”

The distinction between a continuing injury and the continuing effect of a completed act is material. In INEC v. Onowakpoko (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 134, the Supreme Court explained that continuance of injury means continuance of the legal injury and not merely the continuing effects of an injury already committed. The same distinction must be applied here, in conjunction with section 20(2)(b) of the NSCDC Act, which addresses continuation of damage or injury and the period following its cessation.

“Continuance of injury or damage means continuance of the legal injury and not merely the continuance of the injurious effects of a legal injury….it is clear from the record that the cause of action was the suppression of the constituency in question by statute, in 1996 following the promulgation of the Civil Rule (Political) Decree, No.1, 1996. The instant suit was filed on the 16/5/2014. Between 1996 when the cause of action arose and 2014 when the action was filed it is little over 18 years, which by the provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act renders the action so commenced outside the statutory period of three months statute barred.” See also INEC V. Ogbadibo Local Government (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1498) 167.

In the present suit, the claimants averred in paragraph 21 of their statement of facts as follows:

21. The claimants aver that the defendant has abandoned them, but the claimants were never dismissed or disengaged from service at any time, till [to] date, the defendant still engages the services of the claimants to provide security for local government elections, state, and national programs, including general election. In addition, the claimants are also engaged in the provision of security during WAEC, NECO, JAMB Exams and other national examination up till the time of the commencement of this suit.

The pleaded assertion that the Claimants continued to perform duties up to the commencement of the action raises a question whether there were recurring payment defaults, but it does not, without proof of the relevant service and payment terms, establish that every component of the action is a continuing injury. The claim for regularization concerns a different alleged wrong from the failure to pay a particular month's remuneration. Each must be tested against the applicable limitation provision and the evidence.

The doctrine of continuing injury must be applied to the legal injury itself, not merely to the continuing consequences of an act or omission already completed. See INEC v. Onowakpoko (supra). The pleaded assertion that the Claimants continued to perform duties may raise the possibility of recurring payment defaults, but it does not, without proof of the relevant service and payment terms, establish that every component of the claim is a continuing injury. The regularization claim is distinct from any claim for a particular month’s remuneration.

I therefore reject a blanket proposition that all historical salary arrears constitute a continuing injury. The regularization claim, if founded on a completed refusal or omission in or about 2007, is prima facie outside the three-month period, subject to any legally established exception. Any separate claim for recurring remuneration must be assessed by reference to the work proved, the applicable payment obligation, the date each payment fell due and the operation of section 20(2)(a) and (b). The decisions in Anolam v. FUTO (2025) LPELR-80027(SC) and Okoronkwo v. INEC (2025) LPELR-80425(SC) do not permit employment-related claims to be treated as automatically immune from limitation legislation.

So, if as previously stated, the alleged failure to regularize the Claimants’ appointments became actionable when the relevant exercise concluded in 2007, the continued lack of regularization does not, by itself, give rise to a fresh cause of action each month. The Claimants have not established that the original cause of action remained subsisting when they commenced this suit; pointing to the continuing consequences of the alleged omission is insufficient.

I therefore find that, to the extent that the Claimants seek declarations and orders founded upon the alleged failure to regularize them in 2007, the cause of action accrued at the time of that alleged refusal or omission. The suit, having been commenced many years thereafter, was not brought within the three-month period prescribed by the applicable limitation legislation. I so hold.

I must, however, distinguish that claim from any properly pleaded claim for payment for work or labour already performed. In Chukwuka Okoronkwo v. INEC (supra), the Supreme Court explained the recognised exception for claims seeking payment or compensation for labour, services or work already completed.

Where a monetary claim is genuinely for remuneration or allowances due for work already performed, the Court must determine whether it falls within that exception, and whether the particular Claimants have pleaded and proved the work performed, the applicable entitlement and the amount due. Where, however, the monetary relief depends entirely upon first establishing an entitlement to regularisation which is itself time-barred, the exception cannot automatically be invoked to revive the barred claim.

Accordingly, the limitation issue is determined in the Defendant’s favour insofar as the claim concerns the alleged failure to regularize the Claimants’ appointments in 2007. Any separate claim for payment for work or labour already performed shall be considered independently, but only if it is properly pleaded and falls within a recognised exception. The final order shall preserve this distinction and limit the finding of limitation to the reliefs to which it properly applies. It is so held.

ON ISSUE TWO:

On this issue, the Court is called upon to determine whether, in light of the evidence before it, the claimants have established their entitlement to the reliefs sought in this suit.

Before considering the exhibits, the Court will address the Defendant’s objection to Exhibits C1–C10. The Defendant submits that these exhibits are public documents and, under sections 102–105 of the Evidence Act 2011, their contents may be proved only by duly certified copies. It argues that, because the Claimants tendered the documents without certification, they were inadmissible. In support, the Defendant relies on Onuegbu v. Imo State (2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1962) 419 (SC) and Kubau v. Rilwanu (2014) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1397) 284 (CA).

A document does not become a public document for every evidential purpose merely because it was sent to, issued by, or held by a public institution; nor does the certification requirement apply indiscriminately to every document associated with a public body. The Defendant’s general objection does not establish that each of these exhibits is a secondary copy of a public document whose contents could be proved only by a certified copy. The authorities cited by the Defendant do not displace the need to examine the documents individually. On the material before the Court, the objection has not sufficiently identified which exhibits fall within the statutory category of public documents and, in each such instance, why the form tendered required certification. Having examine those documents carefully, the Court rejects the contention that Exhibits C1–C10 are, as a class, inadmissible or incapable of reliance for want of certification. The objection is overruled; the exhibits will be considered, subject to the weight properly given to each in light of the evidence as a whole.

It is important to emphasize that, in civil proceedings, the court is required to weigh the competing evidence on an imaginary scale. It is well settled that such matters are determined on the basis of the preponderance of evidence. See WACHUKWU v. OWUNWANNE (2011) 25 WRN 1 at 9 R.6. Accordingly, the court has a duty to evaluate the evidence by placing both sides on an imaginary balance to see where the weight of evidence lies. See MOGAJI v. ODOFIN & ORS (1978) 4 SC 91 at 93.

Before considering the evidence placed before the Court by both parties, it is necessary to note that the claimants’ counsel, in his final address, raised a preliminary objection regarding the defendant’s evidence. Learned counsel contended that the defendant has no valid defence to the claimants’ case before the Court.

Counsel based his submissions on several grounds, including the contention that the claimants’ sole witness statement on oath is incompetent before this Court. Learned counsel argued that the defendant did not move or argue the motion on notice filed on 22 January 2025, which formed the basis of Aremu Modupe Racheal’s witness statement on oath.

It is important to note that the defendant’s counsel filed a reply to the claimants’ final address in order to contest the claimants’ assertions.

It is part of this Court’s record that the Defendant filed a motion on notice dated 21 January 2025 and filed on 22 January 2025. By that motion, the Defendant sought leave of Court to file an additional list of witnesses, together with the sworn statement of the proposed witness, Aremu Modupe Rachael.

It is also clear from the record of this Court that on 9 December 2025, Aremu Modupe Rachael, appearing as DW1, adopted the same statement on oath that was allegedly brought before the Court by the motion dated 21 January 2025. The observation made by learned counsel for the claimants is therefore correct: the defendant never moved, at any point on the record of this Court, the Motion on Notice filed on 22 January 2025.

Learned counsel for the claimants relied on the authority of Essoho v. Asuquo (supra), where the court held, among other things, that an applicant who fails to move a motion on notice before judgment is delivered is deemed to have abandoned the purpose for which the motion was brought. Counsel therefore urged the court to find that the defendant’s motion in question, as well as the witness statement on oath of DW1, is incompetent.

I am minded to refer to Order 17 Rule 10 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2017, which provides that: “Every motion filed before the court shall be set down and ruled upon, and no motion shall be left in abeyance.” As stated earlier in this judgment, the defendant’s sole witness, DW1, duly adopted the witness statement on oath filed on 22 January 2025 before the court and was properly cross-examined by learned counsel for the claimants.

It should be reiterated that the defendant’s motion seeks leave of this Court to file an additional list of witnesses and the witness statement on oath of DW1, together with an order deeming same as properly filed and served, since they had in fact already been filed and served on the claimants. On the other hand, the claimants neither filed a counter-affidavit nor a written address opposing the defendant’s motion on notice. The defendant’s motion is, to say the least, non-contentious in nature.

This Court is always disposed to doing substantial justice, particularly where the demands of justice so require. By virtue of section 13 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, the Court administers law and equity concurrently. It is well settled that equity regards as done that which ought to have been done. In the present circumstances, the Court shall therefore take into account the witness statement on oath of DW1 and all evidence flowing from it.

Furthermore, Order 17 Rule 13 of the NICN Rules 2017 states that, in exercising its powers, performing its functions, or dealing with incidental matters, the court may proceed in whatever manner it considers appropriate in the circumstances in order to achieve the objectives of the Act and the Rules of the court.

The issue arising from the failure to move the motion for leave to substitute or add a witness is whether that omission, by itself, renders DW1’s evidence incompetent and liable to be expunged from the record. I have considered the circumstances in which the evidence was received. DW1 appeared before this Court, adopted her witness statement as her evidence, and was subjected to cross-examination by the Claimants’ counsel. The Claimants did not file a counter-affidavit or written address opposing the motion. These circumstances are relevant in determining whether the procedural omission occasioned any prejudice or miscarriage of justice.

In Katagum v. Umar & Anor (2026) 8 NWLR (Pt. 2046) 457, the Supreme Court, in considering the effect of an irregularity relating to the oath of a witness, reaffirmed the principle that a failure to administer an oath, or an irregularity in its form, does not necessarily invalidate the evidence where no miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. The Court’s reasoning underscores the importance of distinguishing a curable procedural irregularity from a defect that renders evidence legally inadmissible. See also Anatogu v. Iweka II (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 415) 547 and Solola v. State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 460.

I am mindful that those authorities concern defects relating to the oath or the deposition of a witness and do not dispense with compliance with the applicable Rules of Court governing leave to call a witness. The failure to move the motion must therefore be considered on its own facts and in the light of the applicable procedural requirements.

I carefully considered this submission alongside the record of proceedings and the applicable principles of law. It is settled that the mere filing of a motion does not amount to the grant of the reliefs sought therein. In Osuji Okoro Oforkire & Anor. v. John Maduike & Ors. (2003) 5 NWLR (Pt. 812) 166 (SC), the Supreme Court considered the effect of an application by way of a preliminary objection which had not been moved and recognised the general rule that an un-moved motion is ordinarily treated as abandoned, subject to the exception applicable to an unopposed application.

Similarly, in Hon. Christian O. Aga & Ors. v. Jeremy C. Onah & Ors. (2012) LPELR-20688(CA), the Court of Appeal considered the consequence of a motion which had not been moved.

Those authorities establish the general procedural rule; they do not, however, dispense with the duty of the Court to examine the particular circumstances of the case before determining the consequence of the default.

In the instant case, although the Defendant’s motion was not formally moved, the record shows that DW1 subsequently appeared before this Court, testified on oath, adopted her witness statement and was subjected to cross-examination by learned counsel for the Claimants. The Claimants were therefore afforded the opportunity to test her evidence through the recognised process of cross-examination. The Court must consider these circumstances in determining whether the procedural omission should result in the exclusion of her entire testimony.

I am mindful that the absence of a formal order granting leave cannot be cured merely by presuming that the reliefs sought in the motion were granted. Nevertheless, the question whether the motion was abandoned is distinct from the question whether the evidence subsequently received from DW1 must necessarily be expunged. The latter question must be resolved by reference to the applicable rules of procedure, the nature of the irregularity and the circumstances in which the evidence is received.

In Barr. Ihuoma E. Udeagha & Anor. V. Matthew Omegara & Ors. (2010) 11 NWLR (pt. 1204) 168 (CA), the Court of Appeal considered the effect of the adoption of a witness statement on oath in open court and the subsequent cross examination of the witness in the context of defects affecting the deposition. Although that case is distinguishable from the present one because the complaint here concerns an un-moved application for leave, it reinforces the need to examine the nature and effect of a procedural irregularity rather than treating every defect as automatically fatal to the evidence.

In the circumstances of this case, I am not persuaded that the failure to move the motion, standing alone, necessarily requires the exclusion of DW1’s testimony. Her evidence was received in open court, she adopted her statement on oath, and the claimants exercised their right to cross examine her. No specific denial of that opportunity or miscarriage of justice arising from the manner in which her testimony was received has been established merely by pointing to the un-moved motion.

I must emphasize however, that cross examination does not retrospectively and automatically convert the un-moved motion into an order of this court. This court’s conclusion is not that the motion was granted by implication, but that the procedural default must be distinguished from the separate question of the evidential status of testimony already received by the court.

Thus, having regard to the circumstances in which DW1 testified, the opportunity afforded to the Claimants to challenge her evidence, and the need to determine the dispute on its merits without imposing a disproportionate procedural sanction in the absence of demonstrable prejudice, I decline to expunge or discountenance DW1’s testimony solely on the ground that the motion for leave was not formally moved by the Defendant’s counsel in open court.

Accordingly, the objection by the Claimants is hereby overruled. The testimony shall remain part of the evidence before the court and shall be evaluated, together with the evidence of the other witnesses and the exhibits admitted at trial, in determining the issues in controversy. Its ultimate weight and probative value shall depend on the credibility of the witness, the consistency of her evidence, its admissibility under the applicable law, and its relationship to the other evidence on record, and I so hold.

The second limb of the claimants’ counsel’s argument in support of the issue challenging the competence of the defendant’s witness evidence concerns the testimony of DW1 during cross-examination. On 9 December 2025, the following question was asked of DW1:

“Question: Did you sign your witness statement in your lawyer’s office?

Ans: Yes”.

From DW1’s testimony, it is clear beyond doubt that she stated that her depositions on oath were signed in her lawyer’s office. Under the Rules of this Court, a claimant is required, when filing a complaint, to attach a statement of facts setting out the cause of action, a list of witnesses, and the written statements on oath of all witnesses to be called, among other processes. See Order 3 Rule 9. Similarly, a defendant who intends to file a defence to a complaint must accompany the statement of defence with the written statement on oath of all witnesses listed to be called, together with the other relevant processes. See also Order 15 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court Rules, 2017.

On the issue of the person before whom an affidavit or deposition on oath may be taken, section 10(1) of the Oaths Act provides as follows:

“It shall be lawful for the Chief Justice of Nigeria, a Justice of the Supreme Court, the President and Justices of the Court of Appeal and any judge of the Federal High Court, a notary public, and any commissioner for oaths, to administer any lawful oath or to take any lawful affirmation or affidavit which may be required to be taken or made for the purpose of complying with the requirements of any law for the time being in force throughout Nigeria or elsewhere, except where such procedure is expressly or by necessary implication manifestly excluded by the terms of such law as aforesaid and the presumption shall be against any such exclusion”.

Section 111 of the Evidence Act provides, in effect, that where an affidavit appears to have been sworn in the manner required by the preceding provisions of the Act, this shall constitute prima facie evidence of the seal or signature of the court, judge, magistrate, or other officer or person named in or endorsed on the affidavit, as well as of that person’s authority to administer oaths.

Furthermore, the Act provides in section 112 as follows:

“An affidavit shall not be admitted which is proved to have been sworn before a person on whose behalf the same is offered, or before his legal practitioner, or before a partner or clerk of his legal practitioner.”

The decisive question is whether the admission by DW1, Aremu Modupe Rachael, that she signed her witness statement on oath in her lawyer’s office renders the statement incompetent and requires the Court to expunge it from the record, notwithstanding her subsequent adoption of the statement in open court and her cross-examination by learned counsel for the Claimants. The answer must now be considered in the light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Katagum v. Umar (supra), particularly at pages 490–491, paragraphs B–F, which addresses the legal consequences of defects in the administration of an oath and the adoption of a written witness statement at trial.

The Claimants’ objection raises a valid concern about compliance with the statutory rules governing the administration of oaths. Section 10(1) of the Oaths Act specifies the judicial officers and other persons empowered to administer oaths, affirmations and affidavits. Section 112 of the Evidence Act 2011, in turn, bars the admission of an affidavit shown to have been sworn before the person relying on it, that person’s legal practitioner, or a partner or clerk of that practitioner. These provisions must nonetheless be interpreted in context, particularly by distinguishing affidavit evidence from a witness statement intended to be adopted as oral evidence at trial.

In Buhari v. INEC (2008) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1078) 546, the Supreme Court considered the validity of depositions made before a Notary Public who was also counsel to the party relying upon those depositions. The Court rejected the contention that adoption of a deposition in open court automatically cured every defect in its execution. That decision informed the subsequent strict approach to defective witness depositions, particularly in Nammagi v. Akote (2021) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1762) 170, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed the requirement that a deposition be signed in the presence of a person authorized by law to administer oaths.

The Court of Appeal subsequently considered a similar question in Biu v. Dahiru (2021) LPELR-55718 (CA), where it favored a more liberal approach to the adoption of a witness statement on oath. However, in Umar v. Katagum & Anor. (2022) LPELR-58147 (CA), the Court of Appeal, relying on Buhari v. INEC and the relevant provisions of the Oaths Act and the Evidence Act, held that the admission by a witness that he had deposed to his statement in his lawyer’s office rebutted the presumption of regularity and rendered the statement and documents attached to it incompetent. The latter decision reflected the strict line of authority prevailing before the Supreme Court’s subsequent pronouncement in Katagum v. Umar.

It is necessary to emphasize that this Court is not at liberty to choose whichever of these competing approaches it considers more attractive. The decisions of the Supreme Court bind this Court, and an earlier decision of the Supreme Court cannot be treated as having been displaced merely because a subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal adopts a different view. The relevant question is whether the Supreme Court has since authoritatively clarified or altered the applicable principle.

That question is answered by Katagum v. Umar (supra). In that case, the Supreme Court revisited the precise controversy concerning a witness who admitted under cross-examination that his written statement had been signed in his lawyer’s office. The Court allowed the appeal against the decision to expunge the witness’s evidence and explained the legal significance of the subsequent oath and adoption of the statement in open court.

In the lead reasoning on the effect of adoption, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between a written witness statement, which is intended to become evidence at trial, and evidence actually given by a witness under oath in open court. The essential principle is that, once a witness takes the oath in open court and adopts the written statement as his evidence-in-chief, the adopted statement becomes the witness’s oral evidence and is subject to cross-examination. A defect in the earlier preparation or swearing of the written statement does not, of itself, justify expunging the evidence subsequently given under oath in open court.

The Supreme Court further held, per Adumein, JSC, at pages 490–491, paragraphs B–F, that:

“The failure to take an oath or make an affirmation can in no case be construed to affect the liability of a witness to state the truth. By Section 4 of the Oaths Act, the failure to administer an oath on a witness before giving evidence is a mere irregularity which does not affect the decision arrived at on that evidence, unless it is shown to have occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”

The Court proceeded to explain that even where a written statement was not sworn at all, the witness could adopt it as testimony while giving evidence under oath in examination-in-chief in open court. Where the witness had taken an oath before the trial court and had been duly cross-examined, the Court held that any purported defect in the written statement was cured by the oath taken before the trial court.

The significance of this pronouncement cannot be overstated. It demonstrates that the inquiry is no longer confined to whether the written statement was properly sworn at the time it was signed. The Court must also examine what occurred when the witness gave evidence at trial. A written statement is intended to facilitate the presentation of evidence; its evidential function is fulfilled when the witness adopts it under oath in open court and submits to cross-examination. It is the evidence so given that the Court must evaluate, subject to the ordinary rules governing relevance, admissibility and probative value.

This does not mean that the statutory provisions regulating the administration of oaths have become redundant, nor that legal practitioners and persons authorized to administer oaths are at liberty to disregard them. Rather, Katagum v. Umar case establishes that a defect in the execution of a written witness statement must not automatically be equated with the absence of competent evidence where the witness subsequently gives the evidence under oath in open court. The decision is concerned with the legal consequence of the defect in the circumstances of the trial, not with dispensing generally with the obligation to comply with the law.

A further and equally material consideration in Katagum v. Umar is the application of section 4 of the Oaths Act. The Supreme Court treated the failure to administer an oath in the prescribed manner before the witness gave evidence as an irregularity which would not invalidate the evidence or the decision founded upon it unless a miscarriage of justice was demonstrated. This approach is consistent with the statutory distinction between an irregularity in the administration of an oath and the substantive obligation of a witness to tell the truth. The Court’s reasoning was also informed by Adejugbe v. Aduloju (2022) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1816) 131.

It follows that the reliance placed by the Claimants’ counsel on Buhari v. INEC and Umar v. Katagum & Anor. must be assessed against the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Katagum v. Umar. The latter is the more recent pronouncement of the apex court on the precise issue now before this Court. To the extent that the earlier authorities support the proposition that every witness statement signed in a lawyer’s office is necessarily incompetent, notwithstanding its subsequent adoption under oath in open court, that proposition cannot prevail over the clarification subsequently made by the Supreme Court.

The distinction between Buhari v. INEC and the present case is also material. In Buhari, the objection concerned depositions sworn before a Notary Public who was also counsel to the party relying upon them. In Katagum v. Umar, the Supreme Court distinguished the circumstances before it and emphasized the significance of the witness’s subsequent oath and adoption in open court. The mere fact that a witness signed a statement in counsel’s office is not, without more, equivalent to proof that the oath was administered by counsel in circumstances prohibited by section 112 of the Evidence Act. More importantly, where the witness has subsequently adopted the statement under oath in open court and submitted to cross-examination, the Court must apply the rule stated in Katagum v. Umar.

I must also consider the procedural conduct of the parties. The record shows that DW1 adopted her witness statement on oath on 9 December 2025 and was cross-examined by learned counsel for the Claimants. It was during that cross-examination that the witness admitted signing the statement in her lawyer’s office. The Claimants proceeded with the cross-examination and subsequently relied on their objection in their final address. There is no indication in the records placed before this Court that the Claimants objected to the adoption of the statement at the point it was tendered as DW1’s evidence-in-chief.

Accordingly, the Claimants’ objection cannot be sustained solely on the basis that DW1 signed her witness statement at her lawyer’s office. For the reasons stated, the objection is overruled. I so hold.

For clarity, this conclusion does not remove the obligation under the National Industrial Court Rules, 2017, to file witness statements on oath in compliance with the applicable procedural requirements. Nor does it validate an affidavit shown to have been sworn before a person expressly disqualified under section 112 of the Evidence Act. The issue determined here is narrower: whether DW1’s admission that she signed her written statement at her lawyer’s office, followed by her adoption of it under oath in open court and her subsequent cross-examination, renders her evidence incompetent. In light of the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement, that question is answered in the negative.

A claimant seeking declaratory relief must establish the claim on the strength of their own case; any weakness in the defence cannot make up for a failure to do so. See Jumez Nigeria Ltd v. Nwakhoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 119) 361 and Emenike v. PDP (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1315) 556. The claimants, by way of a writ of complaint in this suit, seek the following reliefs from the Court:

A DECLARATION that the willful and persistent refusal of the Respondent to regularize the appointment[s] of the claimants is wrongful and a breach of the provision of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003 (As Amended) in relation to the claimants.
A DECLARATION that the willful and persistent refusal of the Respondent to pay the outstanding salaries of the claimants is wrongful and a breach of the provision of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003 (As Amended).
AN ORDER of this honourable court directing the respondent to regularize the appointment[s] of the claimants in accordance with provision and requirement of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act, 2003 (As Amended).
AN ORDER of this honourable court directing the respondent to pay the sum of N1,746,716,228. 00 (One Billion, Seven Hundred and Forty-Six Million, Seven Hundred and Sixteen Thousand, Two Hundred and Twenty-Eight Naira) only to the claimants being the grand total of the outstanding salaries owed by the respondent.
AN ORDER directing the respondent to pay the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) to the claimants as general damages for the trauma, hardship and delay suffered by the claimants as a result of the refusal by the respondent to regularize the claimants’ appointment and to pay the claimants’ salaries due to them.
The cost of this action.

There are five Claimants before the Court, suing for themselves and on behalf of 224 other NSCDC members and officers. In paragraph 3 of their respective depositions, CW1 and CW2 stated that the five Claimants had obtained the consent of those members and officers to institute the action.

The Claimants tendered Exhibit C10, a letter dated 4 May 2021 from their solicitors, A.M. Okwori & Co., to the Commandant-General of the NSCDC. Attached to the letter was a schedule listing the 229 members/officers who are parties to this action, with particulars including their respective years of enlistment, ranks, monthly salaries, promotion dates and other employment-related details. The Claimants also tendered further documentary evidence in support of their case. The question is whether, having regard to the reliefs sought, the evidence before the Court establishes their entitlement to those reliefs.

Furthermore, Exhibits C1 and C19 are promotion warrants issued in respect of the 2^nd and 3^rd claimants, respectively. These are documents said to have emanated from the defendant, with Exhibit C1 dated 25 June 1997 and Exhibit C19 dated 21 July 2011.

Exhibit C2 records the postings of Divisional Officers/21/CS and includes the 2nd Claimant’s name. Exhibit C4 is a Certificate of Attendance issued to the 2nd Claimant, signed by the Defendant’s Commandant-General and dated 16 August 2001. Exhibit C8 is the 2nd Claimant’s identity-card form/document. Exhibit C13 is a letter dated 24 August 2011, addressed “To Whom It May Concern” and signed by Auwal Mohammed Hassan, Acting Head of Department, Finance. The letter identifies the 3rd Claimant as a member of the Defendant’s Volunteer Corps under its Bauchi State Command.

Exhibit C14 is a photocopy of the 3rd Claimant’s identity card. Exhibit C15 is the 3rd Claimant’s clearance letter, dated 8 February 2008, while Exhibit C16 is the 3rd Claimant’s Personnel Records Form for the 2004 Manpower Budget. Exhibit C17, issued by the Defendant’s Bauchi Command and titled “Deployment of Officers,” is dated 7 June 2005 and lists the 3rd Claimant among the officers whose postings were approved.

Exhibit C18, titled “Posting Order” and dated 18 November 2005, lists the 3rd Claimant among the personnel posted by the Defendant’s Bauchi State Command. Exhibits C20–C84 are photocopies of cheques made payable in the Defendant’s name.

Upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole, the documentary exhibits support the conclusion that certain named Claimants rendered services to, or otherwise had dealings with, the Defendant. That conclusion does not establish that all 229 Claimants were employed on identical terms. The evidence concerning each Claimant, and the legal status under which that Claimant served, must be assessed individually. The fact that five named Claimants sue in a representative capacity does not relieve them of the burden of proving the material facts necessary to establish the reliefs claimed for the persons represented.

Exhibit C10 and its annexure are relevant to identifying the persons said to be represented in this action. However, the annexure is undated and bears neither a signature nor a stamp, while the evidence does not establish its source or link it to the Defendant. These deficiencies reduce its evidential weight and limit its ability to establish the identity, status, and individual claims of all 229 represented persons. Further, the annexure is not the document pleaded by the Claimants in their Statement of Facts.

For example, the document pleaded in the Statement of Facts sets out columns for the number of months for which salary was paid; the number of months of unpaid salary from the year of enlistment; the total unpaid salary; the date of promotion; salary payable from the date of promotion; unpaid salary following promotion; the total unpaid salary following promotion; and the grand total. Although the annexure to Exhibit C10 contains the same columns, it provides no information for any individual in those fields.

The issue is not simply whether some of the Claimants rendered services to the Defendant, but whether they have established an enforceable right to the specific amounts claimed. CW1 and CW2 testified that the Defendant continued to deploy them for elections and examinations. While relevant, that evidence must be assessed alongside the documentary and defence evidence to determine whether it proves service by each Claimant and, if so, whether that service gives rise to a corresponding obligation to pay.

The Claimants’ witness testified that, although the Defendant had abandoned them, they had never been dismissed or disengaged from service. He stated that, up to the commencement of the action, the Defendant continued to use their services to provide security at local government, state and national events, including general elections, as well as WAEC, NECO and JAMB examinations and other national examinations.

Furthermore, in paragraph 13 of their respective sworn statements, the Claimants’ witnesses stated that, upon their enlistment into the Defendant Corps, the Defendant was required and had agreed to pay each Claimant a monthly salary of ?30,000.00 (Thirty Thousand Naira) only.

The Claimants’ witnesses also testified that the individuals concerned were enlisted between 1996 and 2005. However, the alleged arrangement was not produced before the Court, and the Claimants did not disclose its form or terms. This omission does not alter the Court’s finding that the cheques tendered in evidence establish that some Claimants received cheques for ?30,000.00 from the Defendant, particularly between 2006 and 2008, as shown in Exhibits C20 to C84. The cheques do not state the purpose of those payments, and, apart from the evidence of the Claimants’ witnesses, no evidence establishes that the payments were salaries.

For clarity, “salary” means a fixed amount of compensation paid at regular intervals for services, according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. While the Labour Act does not define “salary,” it defines “wages” as monetary remuneration or earnings, however described or calculated, that are fixed by agreement or law and payable by an employer to a worker under a contract for work performed or to be performed, or for services rendered or to be rendered.

During cross-examination, CW1 and CW2 acknowledged that volunteers were not paid stipends according to the work they performed. However, the NSCDC Act’s provisions on the salaries and entitlements of volunteers and other employees suggest otherwise. In particular, section 9 of the NSCDC Act 2003 provides as follows:

“(1) The Board shall appoint for the Corps such number of Deputy Commandants-General, Assistant Commandants-General, Commandants and such officers and other ranks and employees as it may, from time to time, deem necessary for the purposes of the Corps.

(2) The terms and conditions of service (including remuneration, allowances, benefits and pensions) of regular members and employees of the Corps shall be as determined by the Board using same criteria as Immigration and Prisons Services with the approval of the Minister.

(3) The volunteers or the Corps shall, for any period they are on duty for the Corps, be paid such allowances and other benefits as may be approved by the Minister”.

It must be emphasized that the claimants bear the burden of proving their entitlement to salary, or any other relief sought, on the basis of the terms of their employment, and not on mere speculation. CW1 and CW2 both stated in paragraph 14 of their depositions that some of the claimants were promoted to higher ranks, which attracted a higher rate of salary.

In this regard, Exhibit C1 is the promotion warrant promoting the 2nd claimant to the rank of Inspector with effect from 25 June 1997. Exhibit C3 records his subsequent promotion to Assistant Superintendent of Corps, effective 3 May 2001. Similarly, Exhibit C19 is the promotion warrant for the 3rd claimant, promoting him to the rank of Assistant Superintendent of Corps with effect from 3 May 2001.

The exhibits, which are promotion warrants, make no reference to salary increases or specify any monetary amounts payable to the officers. The Court cannot supply information the parties have not established in evidence or speculate as to its existence. A court determines cases on evidence, not conjecture. See Kimdey & Ors. v. Military Governor of Gongola State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 77) 445; Ochi v. State (2018) LPELR-45064(CA).

A claim for a specified amount of alleged salary arrears must be supported by credible evidence proving both the claimant’s entitlement to payment and the basis for calculating the sum claimed. See Okulaja v. Haddad (1973) 11 S.C. 357. The Court must distinguish evidence that a payment was made from proof that it constituted monthly salary, the applicable salary rate for each period, the duration of service, and the outstanding balance after accounting for payments received.

As far as this court is concerned, the evidence on record does not provide sufficiently precise and credible proof of how the Claimants calculated the alleged salary arrears of ?1,746,716,228.00. For the amount to be verified, the evidence would need to establish for each person claiming, the applicable rate or approved allowance, the period during which that person rendered service, the payments already received and the balance outstanding. The schedule does not supply reliable individual calculations, and the promotion warrants do not establish the remuneration rates applicable to each Claimant. Section 9(3) of the NSCDC Act separately provides that volunteers on duty are to be paid such allowances as may be approved by the Minister. The evidence before the court does not establish the relevant approval, applicable rates, duration of duty or individual balances from which an award could be calculated.

I therefore find that the claim for the aggregate sum is not proved. This conclusion is not a finding that a volunteer can never have an entitlement to an allowance; it is a finding that the specific monetary claim before this court has not been established by sufficiently precise evidence. The Court cannot substitute a speculative lesser amount or assume that each Claimant’s entitlement is the same.

The Claimants seek an order regularising their appointments and rely on section 26(5) of the NSCDC Act. The provisions of that subsection have already been set out in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. Although referred to earlier as section 26(4), the relevant provisions are in fact contained in subsection (5), which provides as follows:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, but subject to such directions as may be issued by the Corps, a person who immediately before the commencement of this Act was a volunteer or regular member of or held office in the Dissolved Corps shall be deemed to have been transferred to the Corps on terms and conditions not less favourable than those obtaining immediately before the commencement of this Act, and service in the Dissolved Corps shall be deemed to be service in the Corps for purposes of pension.”

On its plain wording, section 26(5) provides for the transfer to the Corps of anyone who, immediately before the Act commenced, was a volunteer, regular member or office-holder of the dissolved Corps. That transfer is on terms and conditions no less favourable than those previously applicable, and prior service with the dissolved Corps is treated as service with the Corps for pension purposes. The provision does not confer a general right to regularisation on all persons who served as volunteers after the Act commenced.

The Claimants’ central complaint is that their appointments were not regularised. The Court must distinguish between those who belonged to the dissolved Corps immediately before the 2003 Act came into force and those who were enlisted later. A payment made in 2006, 2007 or 2008 may help show that a service relationship existed, but, on its own, it does not prove that the recipient was transferred under section 26(5) or appointed to a regular position.

In light of the clarity of the claimants’ case concerning the alleged failure to regularize their appointments, it is appropriate to set out the relevant provision of the NSCDC Act. Section 2 of the NSCDC Act 2003 provides as follows:

“The Immigration and Prisons Services Board established under the Immigration and Prisons Services Board Act 1986, as amended, shall be the Governing Board of the Corps and shall, subject to this Act, have general control of the Corps.”

The said Act further provides in section 4(1) as follows:

The Board shall be responsible for-
1. providing the general policies and guidelines relating to major expansion programmes of the Corps;
2. the overall management and general administration of the Corps;
3. recruiting volunteers and regular members of the Corps;
4. organizing basic development and refresher courses for members of the Corps; and
5. fixing, with the approval of the Minister, the terms and conditions of service of members and employees of the Corps, including their remuneration.”

The claimants’ awareness of the Immigration and Prison Service Board’s role under the NSCDC Act 2003 is evident from CW2’s cross-examination. CW2 acknowledged that the Board is responsible for the appointment, promotion and regularization of personnel, but confirmed that it was not joined as a party to the action and had not been served.

Similarly, under cross-examination, CW1 acknowledged that the Civil Defence, Immigration and Prisons Services Board had assumed responsibility for regularizing appointments and promoting Civil Defence personnel.

Sections 2 and 4(1) of the NSCDC Act identify the governing Board and define its functions, including recruitment and the determination of terms and conditions of service, with the Minister’s approval and or subject to the Act’s requirements. The Court must distinguish that statutory appointment and regularization function from any separate obligation to pay for services actually rendered. On the evidence and statutory provisions cited, the Board is the body whose participation is necessary for an effective order compelling regularization if that power is vested in it. The Board was not joined, and the evidence does not establish that the defendant alone can give effect to the specific regularization order sought. Its absence is therefore material to that relief. It does not however, automatically dispose of any distinct claim for remuneration or allowances which must stand or fall on its own legal and evidential basis.

The proper identification and joinder of all necessary parties is fundamental to litigation. A party is necessary where the judgment will bind that party and the dispute cannot be fully and effectively resolved without their participation. See Bello v. INEC (2010) All FWLR (Pt. 526) 397.

The absence of the relevant Board is significant to the claim for regularisation if the Board has statutory authority to appoint or regularise the claimants. A necessary party is one whose participation is required to enable the court to resolve the issues fully and effectively.

In employment and labour disputes, the court’s decision rests primarily on the terms of the employment relationship established by credible and compelling evidence. A claimant must therefore identify the applicable terms and explain how the employer allegedly breached them. See Shena Security Co. Ltd. v. Afropak (Nig.) Ltd. & Ors. (2008) LLJR-SC. In the present case, however, the claimants’ evidence leaves much to be desired. They have failed to prove their entitlement to the total amount claimed or to an order compelling their regularisation under section 26(5) of the NSCDC Act.

Although this court addressed the substantive claims in the alternative, its conclusions on the merits do not constitute a separate operative dismissal. The suit is struck out because the claimants failed to comply with the statutory pre-action notice requirement.

So, for the reasons set out in this judgment under Issue One, I ultimately find that the Claimants have failed to establish compliance with the mandatory pre-action notice requirement prescribed by section 20(3) and (4) of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps Act. The condition precedent to the valid institution of this action has therefore not been fulfilled.

Consequently, this suit is incompetent for failure to satisfy the mandatory pre-action notice condition precedent and it is hereby struck out.

I make no order as to costs.

Delivered in Jos this 3^rd day of November 2026.

Hon. Justice I.S. Galadima,

Judge.

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Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://nicnadr.gov.ng. NICN decisions are available to the general public shortly after a copy each has been sent to the claimant(s) and defendant(s) in a case.