IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE UYO JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT UYO

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE S. H. DANJIDDA

 

DATE: 25^th June, 2026 

SUIT NO: NICN/UY/49/2022

 

BETWEEN:

ANIETIE ETIM ASUKWO     -        -        -        -        -        Claimant

 

AND:

1. PRUDENTIAL GUARDS LIMITED

2. UMANA J. UMANA                                                            Defendants 

 

REPRESENTATION:

Ben Ndedde with Clement Iziogo, Ifon Emem and Emmanuel Williams for the Claimant 

Cletus Agogo with Samuel Willie for the Defendants

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

By a General Form of Complaint dated and filed on 21/12/2022, the Claimant instituted this action against the Defendants praying for the following reliefs:

 

“1.       A Declaration that the Defendants have violated the employment rights of the Claimant. 

 

2.         A Declaration that the Claimant’s dismissal was oppressive, unjust, arbitrary and unlawful. 

 

3.         Damages for breach of contract of service that the Claimant would have earned for the period of notice agreed for ending the employment of the Claimant. 

 

4.        Specific Damages:

 

5.         Exemplary Damages of Fifteen Million Naira (?15,000,000).

 

6.        General Damages of One Hundred and Fifty Million Naira (?150,000,000) to the Claimant.

 

7.         Legal Cost of this suit assessed at Six Million Naira (?6,000,000).”

 

Upon being served with the originating court processes, the Defendants filed their Joint statement of defence and a counter claim on 22/2/2023. Claimant also filed his reply to the statement of defence on 1/6/2023.

 

CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 

The facts of the Claimant's case is that he was employed as a guard by the 1^st Defendant, a licensed private security company serving Mobil Producing Nigeria. Claimant also claims to have worked for more than three years without any warnings or disciplinary issues until his dismissal. That in March 2022, the Defendants deducted ?1,050 from his salary for an Identity Card, but the card was never provided. He avers that he did not receive the ID card and received no reason for its non-issuance, despite facing occasional police harassment, which required staff transiting during odd-hours to show identification. That after months of silence, on 3^rd October, 2022, the Claimant posted a message in a WhatsApp group asking for an update on the ID Card. Rather than responding, the Defendants issued a query on October 11, 2022, which he replied to and his employment was eventually terminated on 1^st November, 2022.

 

CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS

The Defendants however, contend that the Claimant was employed by the 1st Defendant and posted to Eket, where he served for three years. According to them, the 1^st Defendant arranged for interested staff to pay ?1,050 to register for a National Security number through the NSCDC, which was intended to serve as identification and prevent harassment. The Claimant voluntarily enrolled, signed a consent form authorizing the salary deduction, and the amount was duly taken from his pay.

 

The Defendants maintain that the security number was not issued as quickly as the Claimant expected, prompting him to post questions on the company's WhatsApp platform. He was asked to remove the post but declined. Consequently, he was issued a query, to which he responded, admitted fault, and appealed for leniency. Nevertheless, his employment was subsequently terminated.

 

In their counterclaim, the Defendants/Counter Claimants claim as follows:-

 

“a.      ?4, 750, 000.00 (Four Million, Seven Hundred and Fifty Naira) as legal fees. Legal fees Receipt is attached and shall be relied upon at the trial. 

 

b.        Appearance fee of ?20,000.00 per Appearance in court during the pendency of this suit. 

 

c.         ?10,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as general damages. 

 

d.        Any other or further reliefs as may be deemed fit to make in the circumstances of this case.”

 

On 14/5/2024 and 8/4/2024, the Claimant testified as CW1 where he adopted his two witness statements on Oath respectively as his evidence in chief. CW1 also tendered Exhibits AT1 - AT10a & b in evidence. CW1 was cross-examined by counsel for the Defendants and thereafter discharged.

 

The 2^nd Defendant (Mr. Umana Umana) testified as DW1 in defence of the Defendants and Exhibit PG1 was admitted in evidence through him. He was also cross-examined by counsel for the Claimant and discharged.

 

At the close of evidence, the matter was adjourned for adoption of final written addresses.

 

DEFENDANTS' FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

Defendants' final written address is filed on 15/5/2025 wherein counsel for the Defendants formulated two issues for determination to wit;

 

“1.       Whether the Claimant's termination was not done in accordance with the terms of his contract. 

 

If so, 

 

2.         Whether the Claimant is not liable to pay the Defendants for the needless litigation.”

 

It is the submission of counsel that the post made by the Claimant on WhatsApp was capable of stirring up a revolt in the guard force. That the Claimant was asked to take down the post but he refused. It was contended that the act of wilfully refusing to take down the post was and can only be interpreted as insubordination, which was sufficient ground for the summary termination of the Claimant’s employment.

 

Counsel contends that the Claimant cannot be heard to be complaining of an act he volunteered for the deduction of money from his salary. That it is also fair to assume that he knew that the 1^st Defendant was not the body responsible for allocating the said identity numbers.

 

Furthermore, that the actions of the Claimant in making that post were capable and in deed actually painted the company in a bad light. That the refusal to take down the post when asked to do so was an act of insubordination. His termination was therefore in line with the terms of the contract as contained in the employment letter. Counsel urged the Court to find and hold that the said termination was not wrongful as it was actually done in accordance with the terms of his employment and in line with equity, justice and good conscience.

 

It is counsel's further submission that although it is trite law that an employer is not obliged to give reason for firing his servant, all the same, it is settled law that where he has proferred any reason at all, he is obliged to satisfactorily prove the same as the onus is on him in that regard, otherwise the termination may constitute a wrongful termination without more. Counsel relies on the case of Institute of Health ABU Hospital Management Board V. Jummai Anyip (2011) LPELR-1517 SC.

 

Counsel also referred to the case of Ziideh V. RSCSC(2007) 3 NWLR Pt. 1022) 554, where the Supreme Court held that, in statutory employment just as in private employment, an employer can summarily dismiss his servant in all cases of gross misconduct provided of course the employee is given the opportunity of fair hearing.

 

Counsel states that the Claimant confirmed in his testimony that he was queried, then given an opportunity to respond to the query and in that response, he pleaded for leniency. Counsel submits that the Defendants having acted as recommended above, has fulfilled its duty to the Claimant and is absolved of any liability. 

 

Counsel submits that the Supreme Court defined Gross Misconduct in PC Eze V. Spring Bank Plc (2011) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1278) Pg. 131-132 as: “conduct of an employee which is of such grave and weighty character as to undermine the relationship of confidence which should exist between the employer and employee.” It was explained to include acts such as disobedience, insubordination, infidelity, negligence, dishonesty, absenteeism etc. 

Counsel urged the Court to hold that the action of the Claimant, impugning the honesty of the Defendants in their promise to deliver his ID Number especially after collecting ?1,050 from him, was capable and indeed actually undermined the relationship of confidence which exists between them.

 

On the second issue, counsel contends that the filing of this suit has caused the Defendants to employ a counsel to represent them in the hearing of the case and the counsel was coming from Calabar every day of the sitting and all these cost a pretty penny.

 

Counsel maintains that all of the Claimant’s claims have been proved to be unfounded. The most bare faced of them was claim No. 4 which indicated clearly that the Fidelity Bonus of ?88,046.40 was owed him. A fact he knew to be false and which he repudiated during cross-examination.

 

Counsel concludes that having knowingly brought the above false claims to this Court, the Defendants are entitled to monetary compensation. Counsel called in aid the cases of Okwu V. Okuzu (2004) 4 NWLR (PT.864) 401; Ugwoke V. A. G Enugu State (2015) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1472) Pg 521.

 

Counsel urged the Court to find and hold as above and grant their counter-claim and award damages in favour of the Defendants in the interest of justice. 

 

CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS 

Claimant's final written address is filed on 19/5/2025 wherein counsel formulated three issues for determination to wit;

 

“1.       Whether the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful and unlawful. 

 

2.         Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought. 

 

3.         Whether the Defendants’ counter-claim is legally sustainable.”

 

On Issue One, Claimant's counsel submits that no misconduct was proven. That the Defendants claim insurbodination due to a WhatsApp post but the said WhatsApp post contains no offensive language.The message was courteous and sought transparency. Counsel cited the Supreme court case of Imonikhe V. Unity Bank Plc (2011) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1262) 624, where the Court held that an employee's civil expression of grievance does not amount to gross misconduct, absent disruption or breach of duty. That the WhatsApp message was written politely. 

Counsel contends that DW1 under cross-examination confirmed there was no express company policy governing staff conduct on the WhatsApp platform. The group remained open to comments and was only restricted after the Claimant's post.

 

Counsel continues that the only alleged reaction was a ‘clap emoji’. But, no other staff joined in protest. There was no interference with operations. That the court is respectfully enjoined to reject this line of defence as speculative.

 

Counsel further contends that the Defendants issued a query but never convened a disciplinary panel. Counsel referred to the case of Bamgboye V. University of Ilorin (1999) 10 NWLR (Pt. 622) 290, where the Supreme Court held that where no disciplinary panel was convened, the termination is void for lack of fair hearing.

 

Counsel maintains that the letter from the Labour Committee recommending a replacement is dated 5^th October 2022, while the query came on 11^th October, 2022 and the termination followed on 1^st November, 2022. That the Supreme Court in Ekundayo V. Bank of the North Ltd (2001) 10 NWLR (Pt. 721) 340, condemned decisions taken before giving the accused employee a hearing.

 

It is counsel's submission that even where an employer has power to terminate with or without notice, it must be exercised in good faith. Counsel cited the case of U.B.N V. Soares (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1312) 550, where it was held that while an employer may terminate with or without notice, such power must not be exercised vindictively or in bad faith.

 

On Issue Two, counsel submits that DW1 admitted under cross-examination that the Claimant was only paid the Fidelity Bonus after this suit had commenced. This aligns with the contractual clause entitling the Claimant to the bonus at exit. That still, the delay confirms a breach.

 

Counsel contends that the Defendants offered no contrary records on the Claimant's testimony that he worked for 13 days in October. In law, where a fact is not rebutted, it is deemed admitted. Counsel relies on the case of Akinlagun V. Oshoboja (2006)12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 60, reaffirming that where a decision is taken to remove a person from office before affording them an opportunity to be heard, such decision amounts to a nullity; the Audi alteram partem rule is inviolable. That it was held in Onumajuru V. Afribank Nigeria Plc (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt. 760) 234, that even under contracts permitting dismissal without notice, such dismissal must not offend due process or natural justice.

Counsel states that the Defendants' counterclaim alleges that the suit is vexatious. But the Claimant brought his grievance lawfully and supported it with evidence. Counsel submits that the counterclaim lacks merit and should be dismissed.

 

It was contended that the Defendants' claim of ?4.75 million as legal fees is laughable, as there is no receipt or invoice tendered. Counsel urged the Court to follow the Court of Appeal in Guiness Nigeria Plc V. Nwoke (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 135, by refusing to award professional fees not backed by evidence such as invoice, receipt or agreement and reject claims for unproven professional fees. Counsel asserts that the Claimant brought this suit under his constitutional inalienable right to have redress in court under Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution.

 

Counsel maintains that the Claimant did not sue the NSCDC. His complaint is against his employer who deducted salary and failed to deliver. That attempting to shift liability is untenable.

 

Counsel further contends that DW1 had admitted that no staff handbook or social media guideline existed. On this, counsel maintains that for the 1^st Defendant company with a supposed robust HR in a security contract with a multinational energy company such as Exxon Mobil, vague verbal briefings during work cannot form legal ground for disciplinary action.

 

On Issue Three, counsel contends that the Defendants' Counterclaim is unsustainable. Counsel reiterates that the Claimant acted within his legal rights and that the Defendants failed to prove special damages as their legal fees. That no harassment was proven, as such the claim is vindictive and ought to be dismissed.

 

Counsel concludes that this case is not about emojis or grievances whispered in the group chat, it is about whether a company can preemptively dismiss a worker, then scramble to invent a cause. The facts speak for themselves - and they speak loudly in favour of justice. 

 

Counsel finally urged the Court to grant the reliefs sought.

 

DECISION OF THE COURT

Having studied the facts and evidence of this case as shown in the various processes filed and the submissions of counsel, the issues I will address to determine this suit are:

 

1.         Whether in the circumstances of this case the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful?

2.         Whether the Defendants’ counterclaim has merit? 

 

Before addressing the substantive issues, it must be noted that during the trial, defence counsel raised an objection to the admissibility of one of the Claimant’s documents, and that objection was deferred for argument in the final written address. However, counsel failed to pursue that objection in the final address. As such, the objection is considered abandoned, since the Court will not undertake a speculative search or construct arguments on behalf of any party. Accordingly, the court will proceed to determine the issues as presented.

 

The Claimant seeks a declaratory relief that the Defendants wrongfully terminated his employment contract. The parties disagree on both the manner and the reason for the end of the Claimant's appointment. While the Claimant contends that he was denied fair hearing, the Defendant disputes this and maintains that the termination complied with the terms of the employment contract.

 

As rightly contended by counsel, parties are bound by the terms of agreement voluntarily entered by them, and the duty of the Court is to give meaning or effect to the terms of such an agreement and not to create another agreement for the parties. See Obanye V. UBN Plc (2018) 17 NWLR Pt. 1648) 375.

 

In considering whether the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful and contrary to the Defendants' employment contract and the principle of natural justice, I wish to refer to the long line of cases such as Kato V. CBN (1999) 6 NWLR Pt. 607) 390; Ibama V. S.P.D.C (Nigeria) Limited (2005) 17 NWLR Pt. 954) 364 and Ziideeh V. RSCSC (2007) 3 NWLR Pt. 1022) 554. The underlining principles in all these cases and many more, is to the effect that an employee seeking the declaration that the termination of his employment is wrongful must plead and prove the following material facts; (a) the nature of the employment(b), The condition of service(c), the circumstances under which the appointment can be terminated.

 

It can be observed that, the nature of employment in this case is master-servant relationship.

 

Generally, in the law relating to master and servant relationship, one of the ancient rules applicable is that an employer has an unfettered right to terminate the appointment or dismiss an employee for gross misconduct in accordance with the conditions of service. See Nwobosi V. ACB Ltd (1995) LPELR-2121 (SC), where the Court held thus: “An employer has a common law right to dismiss any employee without notice on the ground of the employee’s gross misconduct”.

The caveat here is that the employee be given fair hearing. See Mr. Syed Qamar Ahmed V. Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) & Anor (2016) LPELR-4026(CA)”, per Wambai, JCA.

 

However, where a contract is one with statutory flavour, for it to be properly determined, there must be strict compliance with the laid down procedure for dismissal or termination. See Fakuade V. O.A.U.T.H.C. Mgt. Board (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 291)47 and Shitta-Bay V. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) ISC 40 @ 56.

 

It is also trite position of the law that in an action for wrongful dismissal of appointment like the case at hand, the main issues calling for determination or in contention are; Whether the dismissal/termination is in compliance with the contract of employment. But where it is found not to be, then the next issue is what is the measure of damages recoverable in the circumstances of the case. See Ekeagwu V. The Nigerian Army & Anor. (2010) LPELR-1076(SC).

 

Now to determine whether the termination of the claimant in this case was right or wrong, the terms of employment governing the employment of the Claimant must be examined to see whether the correct procedure was followed. Where there is a departure from the prescribed procedure or a violation of the elementary rules of natural justice, then the termination is wrongful. See Olaniyan V. University of Lagos (1985) 3 NWLR Pt. 9 P. 599; Adedeji V. Police Service Commission (1968) N.M.L.R P, 102; Nwobosi V. ACB (supra)”. Per Rhodes-Vivour, JSC (as he then was); Eze V. Spring Bank Plc (2011) LPELR-2892(SC).

 

Next is the circumstances under which the appointment can be terminated. Generally, the onus is on the Claimant to prove that the termination of his employment is wrongful. But where, as in this case the employer gives a reason or cause for the termination of the appointment, the law imposes on the employer the duty to establish the reason to the satisfaction of the Court. See the cases of Shell V. Olarewaju (2008) 12 SCNJ (Pt. 11) 696-697 and Institute of Health ABU V. Anyip (2011) 5 SCNJ 262, where C.M. Chukwuma-Eneh JSC put it succinctly thus:

 

“Although it is trite that an employer is not obliged to give any reason for firing his servant, all the same it is settled law that where he has proffered any reason at all, it is obliged to satisfactorily prove the same as the onus is on him in that regard, otherwise the termination/dismissal may constitute a wrongful dismissal without more.”

 

Nevertheless, International best practice establishes the core principle that an employer cannot dismiss a worker without a "valid reason", which must be connected to the worker's capacity, his conduct or operational requirements. See Article 4 of ILO Convention No. 158.

 

The reason given by the Defendants for the termination of the Claimant's employment can be found in Exhibit AT7 thus: “Services no longer required. (Made inciting post to stir up and provoke the workforce against peaceful operation)”. 

 

Under the circumstance, the onus is on the Defendants to prove not only the allegations against the Claimant but also that his termination was in accordance with the conditions of service. See the case of Mgt. Board V. Ejitagha (2000) 6 SCNJ N280, 244 per Ayoola, JSC.

 

Let me refer to clauses 10 and 11 of Exhibit AT1a & b which state thus:-

 

“10. TERMINATION WITH NOTICE: Prior to the expiration of the contract period, either party to this contract may terminate the contract by giving the other notice as follows:

i       One day where the employment has continued for a period of three (3) months or less.

ii       One week where the employment has continued for a period of more than three (3) Months.

 

iii.      One month where the employment has continued for a period of one (1) year or more.

 

11. TERMINATION WITHOUT NOTICE: The Company reserves the right to terminate your contract of appointment without notice and you may be dismissed summarily in any of the following circumstances:

ii        Incompetence or poor/unsatisfactory performance.

 

iii       If the client to whom you are assigned at any time requests your withdrawal for any reason.

 

iv.       If the superior contract under which your services are required becomes frustrated in any way or is terminated for any reason.”

 

Let me also refer to the post (Exhibit AT4) said to be made by the Claimant on the 1^st Defendant's WhatsApp platform. 

 

“October 3, 2022

 

Good Morning All!

 

Precisely on March 28^th, 2022 a succinct explanation was given as to why a sum of ?1,050 was deducted from our March, 2022 salary across entire workforce.

Though we consented to it.

 

On the month of April, a shadow training was conducted which hasn't justify (sic) reason we consented to such form.

 

With due respect, I humbly use this platform to remind authority to see to reason such amount was deducted from individual March, 2022 salary within time frame or make a U-turn by refunding.

 

People are no longer afraid to seek redress legitimately whenever they feel their right has been infringe (sic) upon.

Thanks @ all!”

 

The pertinent question now is, can the Defendants be said to establish a case of incitement which later metamorphosed to insubordination against the Claimant to justify his termination. To answer this, it is imperative to take a tour of the evidence of the Defendants.

 

To prove the allegation of insurbodination, the Defendants relied on the letter of query dated 11/10/2022 (Exh. AT5) and the reply to the query.

 

According to the Defendants, the Claimant's conduct suggests that he began to put up an attitude that was somewhat not in conformity with corporate ethical standards in his bid to press home his point of dissatisfaction with the non-issuance of the Identity card. That the Claimant was required to take down the WhatsApp post but he declined, neglected and or failed to do so without any justifiable reason. 

Now, Insubordination is the quality or a state of being insubordinate; it means disobedience to lawful authority like an employee’s refusal or failure to comply with a request or an assignment given by his supervisor. The defence alleges that when the Claimant posted Exhibit AT4, the Defendants requested him to take down the post which he refused, and gave no reason for his refusal which smacks insubordination or a misconduct deserving of punishment.

 

There can be no doubt that where an employee is guilty of gross misconduct, he can be dismissed summarily without notice and without wages. Gross misconduct has been described as a conduct that is of a grave and weighty character as to undermine the relationship of confidence which should exist between an employee and his employer. An employee working against the deep interest of the employer will be guilty of gross misconduct which entitles the employer to summary dismissal of the employee. See Babatunde Ajayi V. Texaco Nigeria Ltd and others (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.62) 577; Teliat Sule V. Nigerian Cotton Board (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.5) 17.

 

It is to be noted that in exercising the power of dismissal/termination, the law no longer draws any distinction between an ordinary master-servant employment and an employment with statutory flavour with respect to the right of the employer to summarily dismiss an employee for acts of gross misconduct. See Yusuf V. UBN Ltd (1996) 6 NWLR (Pt. 457) 632. It is now settled that an employer can summarily and without much ado, dismiss an employee in all cases of gross misconduct provided that the affected employee is given a fair hearing, whether the affected employee is in private employment or statutory employment. See Ziideeh V. Rivers State Civil Service Commission (2007) All FWLR PT. 243) 265, 266. Francis Arinze V. FBN Ltd (2004) 12 NWLR Pt. 888) 663.

 

It is however not every wrong doing, mistake or misconduct on the part of the employee that entitles the employer to use the big whip of dismissal or termination on the employee. See Ahmed V. ABU & Anor (2016) LPELR-4026(CA), Per Wambai, JCA.

 

In the case on hand, the gist’s of the facts leading to the challenge of termination of the Claimant's appointment are that, employees were being harassed by the police on their way to and from work and when they complained, the 2^nd Defendant made arrangements for those who were interested to pay ?1,050, and be registered for a National Security number from NSCDC which would serve to identify them and stop the harassment. The said number was however not given to the claimant as soon as he expected and so he made a post on the 1^st Defendant's WhatsApp platform demanding answers. But the Defendants said that the post was capable of stirring up a revolt in the guard force, and according to them, the Claimant was asked to take down the post, but he refused which amounted to insubordination.

 

The Claimant insisted however that the Defendants in terminating his appointment did not follow due process as he was denied fair hearing. For the Defendants, they insisted that the termination of the Claimant's appointment followed the proper procedure for the disengagement of erring staff.

 

The law is well settled that before an employer can dispense with the services of his employee under the common law, all he needs to do is to afford the employee an opportunity of being heard before exercising his power of summary dismissal/termination. To satisfy the rule of natural justice and fair hearing a person likely to be affected directly by disciplinary proceedings must be given adequate notice of the allegation against him to enable him make representation in his own defence. The complaint against him must not necessarily be drafted in the form of a formal charge. It is sufficient if the complaint as formulated conveys to him the nature of the accusation against him.

 

The claimant was issued with Exhibit AT5 (query letter) and he gave his reply to the said query in Exhibit AT6.

 

The query reads:

 

“On 3^rd October, 2022 you posted in Eket Location WhatsApp group an information capable of disrupting the peace and order among the guard force.

 

By this action you failed to follow proper channel of enquiring on issues you are in doubt with in line with the company laid down rules and regulations as you were trained on.

 

Could you explain within 24 hours why a disciplinary action should not be taken against you.”

 

Where an employee is dismissed or his appointment is terminated on grounds of misconduct all that the employer needs to establish to justify his action is to show that the allegation was disclosed to the employee and that he was given an opportunity to be heard in his defence. That is to say that the requirements of fair hearing were met and that the disciplinary panel followed any laid down procedure. See University of Calabar V. Essien (1996) LPELR-3416(SC).

 

Now, is the post made by the Claimant on the 1^st Defendant's WhatsApp platform capable of disrupting peace and order in the Defendants' operation going by Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution? 

Section 39(1) of the 1999 Constitution guarantees every person the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference. It also protects the right to own and operate media mediums for disseminating information.

 

The freedom to hold opinions are right accruing to Nigerian citizens under section 39(1) of the 1999 Constitution but they are not a blanket right. 

 

The right must not be utilised or invoked in such a way, that it offends public safety, order, morality and health, and it must not be injurious to the rights and freedom of other persons. Once a person lives in a community, his rights stop where the rights of the other members of the community begin. He has to behave according to the norms of that society, otherwise his conduct will be injurious to the well-being and continued existence of that community. He cannot, in the guise of exercising his freedom of expression or imparting information, trample upon the rights of other persons in the society. He must not act in such a way, that he defames their character or endanger their safety, health, order or morality. The Constitution recognizes the fact that if such a person acts to the detriment of others, he can be liable in both civil and criminal action. See Section 45(1) of the 1999 Constitution and the case of Aviomoh V. COP (2014) LPELR-23039 (CA), Per Yahaya JCA.

 

Arising from the above, there is no question that Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution extends to the digital realm, safeguarding privacy, freedom of expression, and access to information when using internet-connected devices. 

 

These rights are not novel concepts; rather, they represent the adaptation of established human rights - such as privacy and free speech - to the digital environment.

 

Freedom of expression under section 39 of the Constitution guarantees this right for both speech and the press. In the online context, it functions as a fundamental human right applied to digital platforms, permitting individuals to freely seek, receive, and disseminate information via the internet. As a digital entitlement, it supports activities like online protests, debates, and opinion-sharing, ensuring that offline liberties are preserved online.

 

Similarly, International frameworks reinforce this principle, affirming that rights recognized offline must also be protected online. This includes freedom of opinion and expression, as endorsed by the United Nations and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Freedom of expression is foundational to digital rights, underpinning the exercise of related rights such as privacy, information access, and protection from surveillance. See a Keynote address delivered on 13^th May, 2026 by Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, the President of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria at Judges' engagement on Digital Rights organized by the National Human Rights Commission.

 

However, freedom of expression as a digital right is not without constraints as it was earlier said. Under Sections 39(3) and 45 of the 1999 Constitution, this right is not absolute. It may be restricted by lawful measures aimed at protecting reputations, safeguarding privacy, or curbing content that encourages violence. Given the considerable power of online platforms, striking a balance between content regulation and preserving free speech is essential.

 

But despite these hurdles, digital rights remain vital for exercising fundamental freedoms in a society that increasingly conducts social, economic, and political activities online. Courts must therefore play an indispensable role in enforcing these rights by interpreting constitutional provisions in light of emerging technologies, ensuring that freedom of expression aligns with legal norms. They must fairly weigh innovation, national security, and individual privacy, often by extending existing human rights principles to online contexts.

 

Specifically, courts are expected to defend fundamental online freedoms, including freedom of expression, and interpret laws for the digital era, applying constitutional principles to new technologies even when specific digital legislation is absent, and ensuring digital rights are recognized as human rights.

 

Within the context of section 39 of the 1999 Constitution, I am of the opinion that the Claimant's post on the 1^st Defendant's WhatsApp platform did not disrupt the Defendants' operations. Although the Defendants contended that the post provoked a reaction, specifically clap emojis which they claimed threatened work place peace, but there is nothing in the Court's record to confirm that any staff member actually sent those emojis. Even assuming, it was established that other staff members did send the clap emojis on the WhatsApp platform, there remains no proof that the Defendants ever directed the Claimant to remove his post contrary their assertion. No written instructions, whether on the WhatsApp platform or through any other channel was presented to the Court to show that the Claimant was ordered to take down the post in Exhibit AT5 so that his failure to comply would constitute insubordination. 

 

Furthermore, while the Defendants claimed that a grievance procedure existed which the Claimant bypassed by voicing his concern in Exhibit AT4, they failed to produce any regulation before the Court outlining how staff members can channel their grievances.

 

In the light of foregoing, I am of the opinion that the Claimant did not make any inciting comments on the 1^st Defendant's WhatsApp platform in Exhibit AT5 capable of disrupting peace and order. I do no share the view that the Claimant was asked by the Defendants to remove his post in AT5 which he allegedly refused. I so find and hold. 

 

I do not therefore think that the Defendants are justified in terminating the Claimant's employment on the alleged insubordination.

 

From the foregoing reasons, I have no hesitation in finding and holding that the termination of the Claimant's employment on the allegation of insubordination was not justified. 

 

For the counterclaim, generally speaking counterclaim is a distinct cause of action and has all the tapestry of an action. It is a weapon of offence which enables a Defendant to enforce a claim against the plaintiff as effectively as an independent action. See Nsefik & Ors V. Muna & Ors (2013) 12 (Pt.1) MJSC P.116.

 

The law is trite that a counterclaimant has the burden to establish his counter claim, failure of which the counter claim will be liable to dismissal. The Evidence Act is clear on this, that the burden of proof in a suit or proceedings lies on that party who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. See Duru V. Nwosu (1989) 4 NWLR Pt. 237) 527 and Dangote V. Civil Service Commission Plateau State (2001) 4 SC (Pt.11)43.

 

The counterclaimants here have not shown by credible evidence that they are entitled to receive the sum claimed from the Defendant to the counterclaim. In any event, the law does not generally allow claim for legal fees to be made against a defendant in a case. See Nwanji V. C.S.N.L (2004) 11 NWLR PT. 885) 552, (2004) LPELR-2106 pg.17-18 D-F, Ihekwoaba V. A.C.B Ltd (1998) 10 NWLR PT. 571) 590 at 610-611.The contract for legal services was one entirely between the counterclaimants and their counsel. They are the parties bound by the terms of the contract. The counterclaimants here are not asking for cost for defending a suit but asking for a separate independent claim in a separate suit which from even a cursory look at the pleadings and evidence before the Court are unproven. Therefore the counterclaim is hereby dismissed in its entirety.

 

For the avoidance of doubt, the case of the Claimant succeeds substantially and it is hereby declared and ordered as follows:-

 

1.       A Declaration that the 1^st Defendant has violated the employment rights of the Claimant. 

2.       A Declaration that the Claimant’s dismissal was oppressive, unjust, arbitrary and unlawful. 

 

3.       The 1^st Defendant is ordered to pay the Claimant one month salary in lieu of notice to terminate the Claimant's employment.

 

4.       The 1^st Defendant shall also pay the Claimant the sum of ?1,050 debited from the Claimant's account for identity card which was not issued to the Claimant.

 

5.       The claim for the sum of Eighty-Eight Thousand and Forty-Six Naira, Forty Kobo(?88,046.40) being fidelity bonus entitlement, having been admitted to have been paid to the Claimant is accordingly struck out.

 

6.       The 1^st Defendant is ordered to pay the Claimant the equivalent of his one year salary as general damages for wrongful termination of employment which is computed at ?80,399 per month totalling ?963,678. 88 for the year.

 

7.       Cost of ?100,000 is awarded in favour of the Claimant against the 1^st Defendant.

 

8.       The Judgment sum shall attract 10% interest per annum until it is fully liquidated. 

 

Judgment is entered accordingly. 

 

 

 

.................................................................

HON. JUSTICE S. H. DANJIDDA

(PRESIDING JUDGE)