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NICN - JUDGMENT

 

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE BENIN JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT BENIN

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP:  HON. JUSTICE A. A. ADEWEMIMO

 

DATE:  6TH JULY, 2026                                              

SUIT NO: NICN/BEN/12/2024

 

 

BETWEEN

 

 

MR. ONYEMA EJIME PAUL                                              …………. CLAIMANT

 

 

AND

 

 

FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION           …...……DEFENDANT                   

                                                      

 

 

REPRESENTATION

E. S. Osaigbovo, Esq. for the Claimant

J. E. Nzenwata, Esq. for the Defendant

 

 

 

 

 

 

JUDGMENT

 

  1. The claimant initiated this suit against the defendant vide a General Form of Complaint, Statement of Facts and other accompanying processes dated and filed 15th March, 2024, wherein he is seeking the following reliefs against the defendant: 
    1. A declaration that the purported dismissal of the claimant from employment of National Industrial Court vide a letter dated 13th January, 2013 is illegal, null and void.
    2. A withdrawal of the purported notice and an apology to the claimant by the defendant through print and electronic media.
    3. A declaration that the claimant remains staff of the National Industrial Court.
    4. Order directing the defendant to pay the claimant salaries arrears from February 2013 till date.
    5. Order directing the defendant to promote the claimant if he had missed any promotion within the period.
    6. Order directing the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N300,000,000.00 (Three Hundred Million Naira) only as general damage.
    7. Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) only for wrongful dismissal.
    8. Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) only for defamation of character.
    9. Order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) only for willful infection of emotional distress.

 

  1. The defendant entered appearance vide a memorandum of appearance dated and filed 6th June, 2024, while the extant Statement of defence with accompanying processes is dated and filed 17th July, 2024. Upon receipt of the Statement of defence, the claimant filed a Reply to the Statement of defence on 10th September, 2024. 
  2. The case of the claimant is that he was employed by the defendant on 25th July, 1989 and served with the National Industrial Court of Nigeria. Sometimes in 2011, the defendants embarked on a promotion exercise during which the claimant tendered a certificate issued by the Lagos State University (LASU). The defendant subsequently wrote the University to verify the certificate, and they responded claiming that the certificate is a forgery. The claimant was accused of forgery and eventually dismissed  by the defendant vide letter dated 17th January, 2012. 
  3.  Claimant pursued internal remedies with the hope of reversing his dismissal to no avail, as a result, he wrote a petition to the House of Representatives Committee on Public Petition, who investigated the matter, and recommended his reinstatement. Notwithstanding the above, the defendant refused to comply with the resolution, rather, he was issued with a letter ratifying his dismissal. He alleged that the dismissal contravenes his conditions of service, rules of fair hearing, was done in bad faith and amount to an abuse of defendant’s powers, hence his decision to institute this suit seeking the aforestated reliefs.
  4. It is worthy of note that the defendant brought a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated and filed 18th of October, 2024, contesting the jurisdiction of this court on the ground that the suit is statute barred in the course of hearing in this case. The objection was brought pursuant to Section 6(6), Section 254 of the CFRN, 1999 (as Amended); OR. 17 R. 1 of NICN (Civ. Pro.) Rules, 2017 and under the Inherent Jurisdiction of this Court. 
  5.  The defence counsel moved the objection on 27th January, 2025, when both counsel adopted their written submissions in respect of same, and the court adjourned for Ruling on the objection. On 10th March, 2025, the court read the ruling and struck out the objection on the ground that it was premature.
  6. Trial commenced on 17th July, 2025, with the claimant testifying as CW1, he adopted his written statement on oath, and tendered several documents which were admitted and marked Exhibits A1-A6. CW1 was cross-examined by defence counsel, and admitted he was issued with two queries by the defendant which were frontloaded with the processes in this suit, but when asked to bring out same from the Exhibits tendered by him, he could not. 
  7. He admitted that the allegation levied against him was that he forged his certificate but same was unfounded. He also confirmed that he responded to the queries issued to him, and after he was dismissed, he wrote letters of appeal to defendant, and former CJN (Justice Aloma Mukhtar) but to no avail. CW1 acknowledged that these facts are not contained in his pleadings, and this may be an oversight on the part of his counsel as he gave him all the details. CW1 maintained that as a result of his petition, the defendant (FJSC) appeared before the National Assembly committee twice while the University attended thrice. The Claimant closed his case after his evidence, and the matter was adjourned for defence. 
  8. The defendant opened its defence on 30th October, 2025, when Aliu Issah, (Asst. Chief Executive Officer) in the defendant testified as DW1. He adopted his written statement on oath and tendered documents which were admitted and marked Exhibits D – D5 and D7 - D18. Under cross-examination, DW1 confirmed that claimant was in the defendant’s employment for 28 years without blemish, but denied he was dismissed unlawfully. He maintained that CW1 was dismissed because he tendered a forged certificate allegedly issued by LASU (Exhibit D) based on the information received from the University in question. DW1 pointed out that the allegation of forgery is disclosed in column 27 in Exhibit D2, and he maintained that the certificate issued to CW1 was not properly obtained. He referred to Exhibit D2 and other unspecified documents issued by the University wherein they maintained that the Certificate with CW1 was not issued by them, while he confirmed that Exhibit D8 was issued by the University. 
  9. Upon being asked to show the court where the University denied that claimant’s certificate was issued by them, DW1 reiterated that the Commission wrote to the University for re-confirmation after receiving Exhibit D8, and their response was that the certificate was improperly obtained. He acknowledged the fact that CW1 attended the school, but maintained that it is the Certificate presented that was the issue. DW1 reiterated that reference was made to the Lagos State University in Exhibit D3, though the document was issued by Risk Control, while he confirmed that Risk Control and LASU are the same, but he does not have any document to back up this fact.
  10.  DW1 confirmed that Exhibit D15(letter of dismissal) issued to the claimant predated the defendant’s resolution, i.e. Exhibit D14, and that while Exhibit D14 is dated 14th January, 2013, Exhibit D15 was issued to CW1 on 17th January, 2012. He nonetheless  maintained that Exhibit D15 was issued immediately after the meeting in Exhibit D14, as the minutes was written thereafter. He denied the suggestion that Exhibit D15 was maliciously issued, and maintained that due process was followed in the claimant’s dismissal. DW1 agreed that forgery is a criminal offence, and admitted that CW1 was never charged for same, but the defendant recommended that he should be handed over to ICPC for investigation in Exhibit D18, and a letter was written to the Inspector General of Police and ICPC to that effect, but he was nowhere to be found. 
  11. The defendant closed its case after the evidence of DW1, and the court adjourned for adoption of final written address. Counsel for both parties filed their respective final address, and same was adopted on 23rd April, 2026.
  12.  The defendant’s final written address dated and filed 24th December, 2025, was argued by J. E. Nzenwata Esq. Counsel for the defendant, wherein he formulated four issues for determination to wit:   
    1. Whether from the available evidence before this Court, whether the Claimant has succeeded in proving that his dismissal from employment by the Defendant was illegal, null and void, as to entitle to him to the reliefs sought.
    2. Whether the Claimant was lawfully dismissed in accordance with the Rules and Regulations guiding his employment.
    3. Whether a slip, a typographic error or mistake on the date on the letter of dismissal of the Claimant is fatal in view of other facts and exhibits in the case.
    4. Whether the Defendant is legally bound to comply the recommendation of the Committee on Public Petition of the House of Representatives.
  13.  On issue one, counsel submitted that the claimant from the totality of evidence adduced by him has failed to establish he was wrongfully dismissed by the Defendant, and cited S. 131(1) & S.134 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended). Counsel noted that CW1 withheld vital evidence from this court and the Notification of Final Year Result for 2007/2008 Session (Exhibit D) presented to the commission was sent to Lagos State University (LASU) for authentication/verification, but was adjudged as a forgery. 
  14. The defence counsel referred the court to Exhibits D1, D2 & D3 and noted that the Claimant failed to inform the court about the two queries issued to him. He further noted that his response to the queries were unsatisfactory as a result of which he was dismissed, and referred to Exhibits D4, D5, D7, D11 and D12. Counsel pointed out that it was under cross-examination that CW1 admitted the existence of these letters, and referred court to S. 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended). He submitted that the claimant has failed to prove that his dismissal by the defendant was unlawful and is therefore not entitled to the reliefs sought in this suit.
  15.  On issue two, counsel contended that CW1 was dismissed in accordance with Regulation 213 of the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations which prohibits false statement, tendering false documents; or concealment of any material fact, which if disclosed would militate against his appointment, and render same liable to dismissal. He argued that CW1 was dismissed with due process, was issued two queries, Exhibit D4 and Exhibit D11, and responded via Exhibits D5, D7 and Exhibit D12, which were not to the satisfaction of the Defendant. 
  16.  Counsel noted that Claimant requested for time to sort himself out in Exhibit D5 while in Exhibit D7, he was able to discover the anomaly in the document he submitted???, that same was not properly obtained, while in Exhibit D12, he acknowledged the mess and appealed for time to sort out the certificate presented to the Defendant. Counsel submitted that admitted facts need no further proof, and cited Section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011, and several other cases, he urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the defendant.
  17.  On issue three, counsel noted that there was a typographic error or mistake in the file copy of the dismissal letter issued to the Claimant, he stated that Exhibit D15 was erroneously dated 17/01/2012 instead of 17/01/2013. He further noted that the correct date is stated in the original copy issued to the Claimant which he maliciously refused to present or tender before the court Counsel submitted that CW1 stated the correct date of the dismissal letter in Exhibit D17, i.e. an appeal letter for re-instatement written to Hon. Justice Aloma Maryam Mukhtar, a former Chief Justice of Nigeria, wherein he stated the date i.e. 17/01/2013 thrice in paragraphs 3, 4 & 8 of Exhibit D17. He urged the court to dispense with the claimant’s contention on this issue as it borders on technicality which has no foothold in this age and time.
  18.  On issue four, counsel contended that recommendations of the Committee on Public Petitions of the House of Representatives are not court orders, and the Defendant is not bound to comply with same. He noted that resolutions express the collective sentiment of the House on a particular issue, person or event, and urged the court to dismiss this suit for lack of merit, with substantial cost against the Claimant.
  19.  The Claimant’s final written address is dated and filed 4th March, 2026, wherein E. S. Osaigbovo of counsel for the defendant formulated five issues for determination therein, to wit: 
    1. Whether this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit, having regard to when the Claimant’s cause of action arose. 
    2. Whether the Defendant can rely on the Public Officers Protection Act to defeat a claim founded on a contract of service and a continuing injury. 
    3. Whether the Defendant lawfully proved the allegation of certificate forgery against the Claimant so as to justify his dismissal from employment. 
    4. Whether the Defendant complied with the Claimant’s conditions of service, the rules of fair hearing, and the duty to act in good faith, particularly in the light of the Resolution of the House of Representatives directing the Claimant’s reinstatement. 
    5. Whether, upon the facts and evidence before this Honourable Court, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought.
  20.  On issue one, counsel submitted that this suit is an employment matter which is squarely within the jurisdiction of this Court by virtue of Section 254C(1) of the Constitution. He argued that the action having commenced within months of the final decision, and being a continuous injury is not statute-barred, he urged the Court to resolve issue one in favour of the Claimant by holding that this court is fully vested with the jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit on the merits.
  21. On issue two, he submitted that this suit is founded on a contract of service, and is therefore outside the scope of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, as the complaint is a continuous injury while the actions taken was in bad faith, and forms an exception under the Act. Counsel argued that the contention is misconceived and unsustainable urging the Court to resolve this issue in favour of the claimant, by holding that the Act does not oust the jurisdiction of this Court.
  22.  On issue three, claimant’s counsel submitted that the allegation of certificate forgery against the Claimant was never proved legally based on the standard required in a criminal allegation. He argued that the defendant failed to place credible, primary evidence from the relevant institution or any competent witness linking the Claimant to forgery before this court. Claimant’s counsel noted that the disciplinary conclusion of “forgery” was reached without proper proof, while the Claimant was not afforded a fair opportunity to challenge adverse materials, as such, same cannot stand in law. He posited that a dismissal based on an unproven allegation of forgery, in an employment with statutory flavour, is unjustified and cannot be allowed to stand as a valid exercise of disciplinary power. He therefore urged the Court to resolve issue three in favour of the Claimant, and to hold that the allegation of certificate forgery was not established to justify his dismissal from the defendant’s employment.
  23.  On issue four, counsel contended that where an employment is regulated by statute, the employer must comply with the statute or rules in the disciplinary process to remove the employee. He added that any departure from these rules will render the disciplinary action null and void, and cited Iderima v. R.S.C.S.C. (2005) 16 NWLR (Pt. 951) 378 (SC); UNICAL V. UGOCHUKWU (No. 2) (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1063) 248 (CA). Counsel cited OGWUE v. B.S.C.S.C. (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt.1406) 374 (CA), and pointed out that the defendant’s refusal to implement the House of Representatives Committee resolution, and re-confirmation of claimant’s dismissal amount to bad faith and abuse of power, citing Saraki V. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156 (SC).   
  24.  On issue five, counsel argued that the Claimant’s dismissal is unlawful, null and void, and his employment must be treated as subsisting. Counsel maintained that the claimant is entitled to payment of arrears of salaries and entitlements from February 2013 till reinstatement, promotions, and substantial damages, with orders to withdraw the dismissal letter and to tender a public apology. He submitted that the Court should grant all the reliefs sought by the claimant as no public authority is above the law, and a statutory employment cannot be extinguished by suspicion, administrative fiat, or institutional defiance.
  25.  J. E. Nzenwata of counsel for the defendant filed a Reply on Point of Law dated and filed 11th March, 2026. He cited Section 121 of the Evidence Act, 2011, and submitted that this court has the power to decide whether an allegation was proved or not, and not the claimant’s counsel. He cited Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act and maintained that the claimant was dismissed in accordance with Regulation 213 of the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations 2010, made pursuant to Section 160(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). 
  26.  Counsel noted that the claimant has failed woefully to prove his case of wrongful dismissal, and is therefore not entitled to the reliefs sought, he referred the court to Echendu vs. Omene (2016)14 NWLR (PT. 153) 431; and A.B.U. V. KALEJAIYE (2018) 11 NWLR (PT. 1629) 1, where the Supreme Court emphasized that the court will not grant a relief that is not supported by evidence. He concluded by urging the court to dismiss this suit with substantial cost. 
  27.  I have read all the processes in this suit, studied the exhibits tendered and the evidence adduced by witnesses called by both parties. I have also well considered the final submissions of counsel to both parties. Thereafter, I have distilled two issues for the effective determination of this case, to wit:
    1. Whether or not dismissal of the claimant by the defendant is lawful to entitle the Claimant to the reliefs in this suit.
    2. Whether or not the Public Officers Protection Act operate as a bar to this action.
  28. On the first issue formulated for determination. It is trite law that an aggrieved employer bears the burden to establish his/her case against the employer in an employment dispute, and in so doing, he must prove the following: (i) employment relationship with the defendant, (ii) place the terms and conditions of employment before court, and (iii) prove in what manner the terms were breached. 
  29.  The claimant pleaded his letter of appointment and an official gazette to this effect, but failed to tender his offer of employment or the official gazette. It is however uncontroverted by the defendant that the claimant was in an employment relationship with the defendant until the incident in this case as such, the employment relationship between parties is not in doubt. Claimant also failed to plead the terms and conditions guiding his employment, but the defendant in paragraphs 19 and 21 of its Statement of defence pleaded that CW1 was dismissed pursuant to Regulation 213 of Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations. 
  30.  Furthermore, the defendant in this case is a statutory body created by Section 153(1) of the Constitution with powers to appoint, promote, and discipline judicial staff, and in so doing is guided by the Regulations issued for the performance of these functions. It is therefore reasonable to take judicial notice of the fact that defendant is guided by the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations in the performance of its statutory duties. In this vein, I find that the terms and conditions guiding the employment relationship between parties is the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations. 
  31.  On the 3rd ingredient to be established by the claimant, i.e. proof that the defendant is in breach of the terms and conditions guiding the employment, CW1 pleaded and led evidence that he was accused of presenting a forged certificate during a promotion exercise, and was dismissed without due process. He alleged that the decision to dismiss him was unjustifiable, and that despite several appeals for the defendant to rescind its decision, but all were to know avail. He also accused the defendant of failure to comply with the resolution of the House of Representative Committee on Petitions which recommended his reinstatement.
  32. The defence on its part contended that the certificate presented by CW1 was sent to the issuing institution (Lagos State University) for verification, and it was during that process that it was discovered that same is a forgery, upon which CW1 was issued with two queries. The defendants’ led evidence that CW1 responded to the queries, but his responses were found to be unsatisfactory, as a result, both responses and the verification exercise report were forwarded to the defendant, and at its 56th Statutory Meeting held on 14th January, 2013, the commission resolved to dismiss CW1.
  33.  It is trite law that the burden of proof rest on a party who will fail if no evidence is adduced in a case, as he who asserts must proof, see Section 131-133 of the Evidence Act, 2011. see 1ST BANK NIG. PLC V. S.M.P. AKIRI 2013 LPELR 21966, per Denton-West JCA, where his lordship held as follows:

“It is now settled law that the issue as to whether a document is received or not is purely an issue of fact to be proved by evidence. In law, the burden of proving the existence of the material issue in controversy is on a party who will lose if no evidence is adduced” 

  1.  The burden to establish the breach of the terms of employment therefore rest on the claimant in this instance, while it is left for the court to decide whether or not there was a breach in the disciplinary procedure set out in the Federal Judicial Service Commission Regulations. The defendant has alleged that the claimant’s action was in breach of Regulation 213 of the Regulation which is reproduced as follows:

Regulation 213 “Any person who obtains appointment under or in pursuance of these Regulations by making:

  1. A false statement;
  2. Tendering false documents; or
  3. Concealing any material fact

Which, if disclosed, would militate against his being offered the appointment, may be liable to dismissal notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of these Regulations.”

  1.  It is clear from the above provision that tendering of false or forged documents is punishable with a dismissal, and in this instance, the allegation that CW1 forged his certificate and presented same during a promotion exercise is a dismissable offence, see Exhibits D4 and D11 (Queries), as well as Exhibits D2 and D3 wherein the forgery was confirmed. In the face of this allegation, the claimant has contended that his dismissal was unjustifiable, for various reason. On the claimant’s contention that the defendant failed to comply with the resolution of the House of Representative Committee for him to be reinstated, I find that the position of the law is that a Resolution of the National Assembly does not have a force of law, until same is enacted into law, and signed by the President, failing which it is merely advisory, persuasive, and a political instrument, see S.P.D.C.N. LTD V. AJUWA 2015, 14 NWLR (Pt. 1480) 403 CA. As a result, the reliance placed on the resolution (Exhibit A3) is devoid of merit, I find that the defendant is constitutionally endowed with the power to discipline its staff without any form of interference. 
  2.  On the allegation that claimant’s dismissal is unjustifiable, it is again the responsibility of CW1 to establish the breach alleged against the defendant with cogent evidence, the claimant however failed to cite the Regulation that was breached or lead any evidence on the breach leading to his dismissal. The law is settled that in a case of wrongful/unlawful dismissal of a statutory employee as in this instance, the only duty of court is to ensure strict compliance with the statute guiding the employment. 
  3.  The court is therefore not expected to retry the claimant on the allegation levied against him by his Employer, but must determine that the procedure laid down in the statute guiding the employment was followed, and the employee was given fair hearing. In this regard, one of the allegations is that the date on his letter of dismissal predated the statutory meeting where his dismissal was approved (Exhibit D14), he further alleged that this disclosed malice, and renders his dismissal unlawful. 
  4.  In addition, claimant contended that forgery is a criminal offence which can only be tried by a court of law empowered to do so, and that his dismissal for forgery without trial by a court of law is unlawful. It is the current position of the law that an Employee can be dismissed for misconduct bordering on crime, and it is no longer the norm that such an employee must be tried for the offence before a disciplinary proceeding can commence against him, however, the employer must ensure he is given fair hearing, see ARINZE  VS. FBN Ltd (2004) 12 NWLR (PT. 888) 663. 
  5. In the same vein, the position of the law on fair hearing in employment cases is clear, see OBONGANWAN MARY NTEWO V. UNICAL TEACHING HOSPITAL & 1 OR 2013 LPELR 2033, where the court held that fair hearing in employment cases requires that:

The employee must know the allegation against him.

He must be present when every evidence against him is tendered.

He must be given full opportunity to correct or contradict such evidence.

  1.  It is on record that the claimant was purportedly dismissed vide letter dated 17th January, 2012 (Exhibit A1), but the minutes of the defendant which approved his dismissal is dated 14th January, 2013(Exhibit D14). The claimant’s counsel made a heavy weather about this when he submitted that the dismissal letter having predated the defendant’s approval invalidates same. DW1 however led evidence that CW1 was dismissed after the defendant had their meeting in January 2013, see Exhibit D14, and the letter was issued thereafter.
  2.  In the quest to resolve this issue, I find no evidence that the dismissal letter issued to the claimant was received by him in 2012, in the light of the evidence adduced in this case, rather, all the evidence points to the fact that claimant received the dismissal letter on 30th January, 2013, see Exhibit D16 and D17(claimant’s letters of Appeal). It is trite law that a dismissal takes effect only when it is communicated to an employee, see the Unreported case of Anyaehie v. Fidelity Bank Plc Suit No. NICN/LA/622/2012 delivered by his lordship Oyewumi J. (as he then was) where his lordship held that:

“The law is well settled that a notice of termination/resignation takes effect from the date the letter was received by the employee or its agent, See WAEC V OSHIONEBO [2006] 12 NWLR (PT 994) 258; ADEFEMI V ABEGUNDE [2004] 15 NWLR (PT 895) 1; The apex Court reiterated and reaffirmed this position of the law in CHRISTIANA YARE V NATIONAL SALARIES AND WAGES COMMISSION [2013] LPELR 20520, S.C. Both parties are ad idem that the claimant was lawfully employed however, the point of divergence is on the mode and effective date of termination. It is trite law that where an employee's contract of employment is terminated without notice, the effective date of termination is the date on which the letter was communicated. In an English case of HORWOOD V LINCOINSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL [2012] U.K.E. @ 0462/11.; it was held that where an employee's contract of employment is terminated without notice as it is in this case, the effective date of termination is the day that notice is communicated.”

  1.  It would have been a different case if the dismissal letter was received by CW1 in 2012, but having admitted in Exhibits D16 and D17 that he received the letter on 30th January, 2013, the claimant can no longer reprobate by saying he was notified of his dismissal in 2012. In this vein, the argument of defence that the letter was issued after the meeting and the 2012 date on same was an error is more plausible. Consequently, I find that the claimant’s contention that his dismissal was preconceived and founded on malice cannot be sustained, and is hereby discountenanced. 
  2.  In line with the above, what is pivotal is disciplinary steps the defendant is mandated to  follow before it can dismiss an officer in this instance. I have stated earlier that the allegation levied against CW1 is punishable by dismissal, however, this will be after the defendant must have followed the disciplinary steps provided in Regulation 61 of the Federal Judicial Service Regulation (FJSC):

Procedure for Dismissal of an Officer

61. (1) Whenever the Chief Justice of Nigeria or the President or the Chief Judge,

             as the case may be, considers it necessary to institute disciplinary

            proceedings against an officer and he is of the opinion that the misconduct

           alleged against the officer is such as would, if proved, justify the officer’s

           dismissal from the service, the following provisions shall apply:

  1. the Chief Registrar/Secretary shall prepare and forward to the officer a brief statement of the facts on which the allegation against him is based and shall call on him to state in writing before a day to be specified (which day shall allow a reasonable interval for the purpose) any grounds upon which he relies to exculpate himself; and
  2. the Chief Registrar/Secretary shall, immediately after the specified day forward to the Commission with his comments or recommendation any such statement as the officer may have furnished or report to the Commission the fact that the accused officer has failed to furnish an exculpatory statement.

(2)  Upon receiving the report or statement after the specified day the Chief

      Registrar/Secretary shall forward to the Commission with his comments and

      recommendations referred to in sub-paragraph (ii) of paragraph (1) of this

     Regulation and the Commission may:-

  1. decide the issue depending on the clarity of the facts disclosed;
  2. seek further clarifications of any doubtful point or call on the officer submit fresh representations through the Chief Registrar/Secretary who shall add his own comment and recommendation as to punishment, if any, to be awarded;
  3. appoint a Committee comprising such persons as it shall specify, being not less than three in number, to hold an inquiry into the matter provided that the Chief Registrar/Secretary shall not be a member of the Committee.
  1.  This provision disclosed the mandatory steps to be taken in a disciplinary action against an officer which can be summarized as follows: Firstly, the officer is expected to be issued a query on the allegation, after which the response to the query will be forwarded to the defendant by the Chief Registrar/Secretary if found unsatisfactory. It is only after this that the defendant will  decide the case on the merit or make further clarifications or call on the officer to make fresh representations; or appoint a Committee of not less than 3 members to an inquiry into the matter. 
  2.  The law is settled that a statutory employment can only be terminated in a way and manner prescribed by statute, as any other manner inconsistent with the statute will be declared null, void and of no effect see TSEMWAN & ORS V. GOVERNOR OF PLATEAU STATE & ANOR 2012, LPELR 7922(CA); and UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN V. CLEMENT EDEM BASSEY 2016 LPELR- 41117 (CA) PG 15 -18, where Daniel-Kalio, JCA held as follows;

“Now it is settled law that if any disciplinary action is to be taken pursuant to any statute, law or rule, there must be full compliance with such statute, law or rule before such disciplinary action can be justified… “

  1.  In this instance, the defendant issued two (2) queries to the claimant, and investigated the matter by writing the relevant institution for verification of the certificate, upon which the institution disclosed that the certificate presented by CW1 is a forgery. The defendant therefore considered claimant’s response to the queries which were found unsatisfactory and the verification report before deciding on the merit to dismiss the claimant. In this regard, I find that the procedure in Regulation 61 was duly complied with by the defendant. 
  2. On account of the above, the claimant has failed to establish the breach committed by the defendant in the disciplinary process leading to his dismissal, as a result, issue one is resolved against the claimant and in favour of defendant. I so hold. 
  3.  On the 2nd issue for determination, It is worthy of note that in the Notice of Preliminary Objection brought by the defendant which was argued before trial commenced in this suit, this court ruled that the objection was premature, and struck out same to give way for the claimant to prove his case on the merit. In this wise, the objection can be revisited in line with the evidence before this court, i.e.  whether or not this suit is statute barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004, based on the three (3) months limitation period within which an action can be instituted against a public officer for any action or default of a public duty. 
  4.  The claimant’s counsel submitted on this issue in his final written address, wherein he argued that there are exceptions to Section 2(a) of Public Officer Protection Act, 2004, if the public officer acted outside the scope of his office, or where his action is motivated by malice or same is a case of continuous injury. He submitted that the instant case forms an exception to the Act, as his grievance is continuous, he therefore urged the court to dismiss the claim that the suit is statute barred as same is an abuse of court processes.
  5.  It is trite law that a case is statute barred when a limitation law such as the Public Officers Protection Act specifies the period within which an action can be instituted, and the action is initiated after the prescribed period. In this regard, see MILAD, EKITI STATE & 2 ORS. V. ALADEYELU & ORS (2007) 4-5 SC; 201 @ 232 and IBRAHIM V. JSC KADUNA STATE (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 584)1. In determining whether a matter is statute barred, the court is enjoined to consider the complaint and statement of facts, as well as the enabling law that confers jurisdiction on the court. In this regard, the court must determine when the cause of action arose, and compare the date to the time this suit was initiated, and if it is found that the date of filing the originating process compared with when the cause of action arose is outside the stipulated period in the limitation law, the suit is automatically statute barred.
  6.  It must again be emphasized that the defendant is a creation of the Constitution, and is charged with the appointment, discipline and removal of officers in the Federal Judicial Service, and though an artificial person, it is covered by the provisions of the Public officer Protection Act, see IBRAHIM V. J.S.C. KADUNA STATE supra. In other words, the defendant is protected from any proceeding or litigation for any official act within three months next after same, see Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA), CAP P14 LFN, 2004,  which provides as follows: 

S. 2 “Where any action, prosecution, or other proceeding is commenced against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law, or any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such Act, Law, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect-

(a)The action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three months next after the act, neglect or default complained of, or in case of a continuance of damage or injury within three months next after the ceasing thereof: provided that if the action, prosecution or proceeding be at the instance of any person for cause arising while such person was a convict prisoner, it may be commenced within three months after the discharge of such person from prison.” 

  1.  It is on record that this suit was initiated on the 15th of March, 2024, whereas the action that gave rise to this cause of action occurred in January, 2013, vide a letter of dismissal dated 17th January, 2012, but received on 30th January, 2013. In this wise,  it took the claimant 11 years after the cause of action arose before this suit was filed, this clearly falls outside the prescribed period of three(3) months stipulated by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act.  
  2.  The claimant has argued that this case falls under the exceptions to the general provision in the POPA, and that the defence is not available for public officers who abused the powers of their office. I am not unmindful of my position in the ruling entered in the Notice of Preliminary objection in this suit, it must be restated here that the decision of the court on the objection is that the preliminary objection is premature, as such, same can be revisited and resolved after parties must have adduced evidence at trial. In line with the above, the evidence placed before this court will be considered in arriving at a decision on whether or not this suit is statute barred or whether this suit is an exception to the Public Officers Protection Act. 
  3.  In this regard, I find that negotiations, letters of appeal or internal administrative review or Legislative intervention as in this instance cannot pause, suspend or bar time from running, see ETIEMONE VAPINA 2019 15NWLR (Pt. 1696) 557 @ 587-588 (G-C) CA. The only situation where time will stop running is where there is an admission, however, in this instance, there is nothing of such, thus the exception is not available to the claimant. In this vein, the letters of appeal and claimant’s petition to the National Assembly did not pause the limitation period, as claimant’s dismissal in 2013 was a completed act, and for him to institute this suit on 15th March, 2024, eleven(11) years thereafter,  he is clearly outside the limitation period under the Public Officers Protection Act. 
  4.  Thus, claimant’s reliance on letters of appeal to the defendant, and former Chief Justice of Nigeria, as well as Resolution of House of Representative Committee on Public Petition, which the defendant refused to comply with did not stop time from running.  I found earlier that a resolution of the Legislature does not have a force of law, as same is merely advisory, persuasive, and a political instrument, see S.P.D.C.N. LTD V. AJUWA 2015, 14 NWLR (Pt. 1480) 403 CA. As a result, the argument that the defendant refused to comply with the resolution is of no moment. 
  5.   As an aside, even if it is considered that the cause of action in this case arose upon denial of claimant’s appeal for reinstatement vide letter dated 27th November, 2023, this suit will still fall outside the three months prescribed under Act. The period between 27th November, 2023 to 15th of March, 2024 (when this case was filed) if calculated its about three and half months is still outside the period stipulated in the Act.
  6.  It is worthy of note that claimant’s counsel relied on several authorities and also argued that the Public Officers Protection Act is inapplicable to contracts of employment, in this regard, he made reference to the case of RMFAC V. AJIBOLA JOHNSON & ORS (2019) 2NWLR (Pt. 1656) 247 SC. However, a more recent position of the Supreme Court espoused otherwise, see OKORONKWO V. INEC 2025, 8 NWLR (Pt. 1991) 131 SC; and DR. MOSES U. ANOLAM V. FUTO & ORS (2025) LPELR-80027 (SC), where his lordship Stephen Jonah Adah, JSC held inter alia as follows:

“The Limitation Statute called into question in this matter is the Public Officers’ Protection Act. By Section 2(A) of this Act, it is provided that there is limitation of three months for commencement of action against any public officer who is protected by the Act……Whatsoever might have been brewed between the appellants and the respondents, what I have before me is that the appellants’ appointments with the 1st respondent were terminated sometime around 30/4/1999. By the above provision, they, appellants were by law supposed to institute their grievances, if any, within 3 months of the purported termination of their employment…”

 

  1.   In the light of the above, the principle of stare decisis mandates this court to follow the latest position of the Supreme Court in the circumstances of this case. Thus, having found that this case does not fall under the exceptions to the Public Officers Protection Act, I hold that this suit is statute barred by virtue of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (POPA) Cap P14 LFN, 2004.
  2.  In conclusion, I find that the claimant’s case is statute barred, devoid of merit and unproven with the preponderance of evidence adduced before this court. As a result, the claimant’s case is accordingly dismissed.      

 

Parties to bear their respective cost.

 

 

Judgment is entered.                             

                          

 

   

 

                          Hon. Justice A. A. Adewemimo

                                      Presiding Judge