IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT LAGOS 

BEFORE HON. JUSTICE JOYCE A. O. DAMACHI 

Date 29^th July 2026                  

In Re:   SUIT NO: NICN/LA/254/2022

SUIT NO:   NICN/LA/56M/2026

 

BETWEEN:

JEAN MARIE LATAIRE             …       JUDGMENT CREDITOR

AND

MANAGEMENT LIMITED                JUDGMENT DEBTORS

RULING 

 

1. This post-judgment interlocutory proceeding arises from the judgment of this Court delivered on 8 May 2026 by Hon. Justice Joyce A.O. Damachi in Suit No. NICN/LA/254/2022, which granted the employment-related claims of the Claimant, Jean Marie Lataire, against the Defendants, Walstrand Aviation Support Management Limited and Walstrand Limited. 
2. Dissatisfied with the decision, the Defendants commenced these proceedings by filing a Motion on Notice for Stay of Execution dated 11 May 2026 under Motion No. NICN/LA/56M/2026, seeking an order keeping the execution of the judgment in abeyance pending their proposed appeal. 
3. In response, the Claimant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15 July 2026, challenging the substantive jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the application on the ground that no valid appeal has been entered and no leave to appeal has been obtained from the Court of Appeal. 
4. The resolution of these applications turns on the conflicting affidavit evidence and critical documentary exhibits filed by the parties. 
5. Representing the Claimant, the deponent Amadi, Margaret-Mary Chiamaka, a Litigation Assistant, stated in her affidavit that "the Judgment Debtors have not exhibited the obtained leave of the court above, and also, have not exhibited any evidence of a validly entered appeal pending determination before the Appellate court." 
6. Conversely, the Defendants' deponent, Ademola Lawson, a Litigation Officer, asserted in his Further Affidavit that "We have now obtained the certified true copy of the judgment and filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal the judgment at the Court of Appeal, attaching the said certified true copy and proposed Notice of Appeal therein," annexing the application as Exhibit A. 
7. However, a major chronological contradiction exists in the Defendants' case, as Ademola Lawson asserted that this motion for leave, filed on 5 June 2026, was served as far back as 13 May 2026, exposing a fundamental inconsistency in the record. 
8. This Court is therefore called upon to determine its jurisdiction to entertain the stay of execution under Order 64 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 and Section 242 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), and whether the Defendants have established the requisite special circumstances to warrant the exercise of this Court's discretion. 

CLAIMANT FORMULATED 2 ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

9. LCC submitted that this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the Defendants’ application for stay of execution in light of the relevant statutory, constitutional, and procedural rules.
10. On Issue 1: Whether or not this Court in light of the provisions of Order 64 Rule 8 (1), (2), (3), (9), Rule 13 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure Rules) 2017; Section 47 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006; and Section 242 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) has the jurisdiction to hear and determine the pending application for Stay of Execution
11. LCC  submitted that under Section 242(1) of the CFRN 1999 (as amended), except for judgments arising from fundamental human rights proceedings, every appeal against the final decision of the National Industrial Court requires the prior leave of the Court of Appeal. In tandem with this constitutional requirement, Counsel contended that Order 64 Rule 8(2) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 explicitly provides that the mere filing of an application for stay of execution shall not operate as a stay of proceedings or execution. 
12. He further argued that under Order 64 Rule 8(3)(a) and (b), the mere filing of an application is insufficient to grant a stay, and that a stay of execution pending appeal can only be granted upon sufficient grounds where an appeal has been filed, all records of proceedings have been transmitted, and the appeal has been entered and issued an appeal number.
13. He supplemented this argument by referencing Section 47 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, which provides that an appeal to the Court of Appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution. On the strength of these provisions, 
14. Counsel submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court cannot be validly invoked by the mere filing of an application for leave to appeal or a stay of execution, nor by the mere filing of an appeal, unless and until the appeal has been properly entered following the grant of leave by the Court of Appeal. 
15. Furthermore, Counsel pointed out that Order 64 Rule 13(2) of the National Industrial Court Rules 2017 mandatorily requires an applicant seeking a stay of execution to file a notice of appeal, pay for the compilation of records, exhibit a certified true copy of the judgment, exhibit evidence that the appeal has been entered, and exhibit evidence that leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of Appeal. 
16. Counsel contended that, contrary to the Defendants' assertions, there is no validly filed Notice of Appeal or validly entered appeal before the Court of Appeal, as the Defendants only attached a certified true copy of the judgment and their application for leave to appeal, that under Order 64 Rule 9 of the National Industrial Court Rules 2017, an applicant must compile the records of appeal within (21) twenty-one days from the date of filing the Notice of Appeal, and that despite the motion being filed on 13th May 2026, more than twenty-one days have elapsed without any compilation of records. 
17. Consequently, Counsel maintained that there is no validly entered appeal to invoke the court's jurisdiction. In support of this stance, Counsel relied on the Supreme Court decision in Governor of Lagos State v. Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 621, Attorney General of Anambra State v. Attorney General of the Federation (2005) All NLR 90, and the Court of Appeal decision in Ibrahim v. C.O.P Zamfara State & Anor (2025) LPELR-82791(CA) for the proposition that a pending appeal does not restrain a judgment creditor from enjoying the fruits of their judgment, nor does it suspend a subsisting judicial decision unless and until it is discharged by due process of law. He therefore urged the Court to decline jurisdiction, as the injunctive relief sought by the Defendants is completely unfounded in law in the absence of any order from a higher court setting aside the judgment, granting leave to appeal, or entering the appeal.
18. On Issue 2: Whether or not the Judgment Debtors/Respondents has sufficiently disclosed the specific nature of the existence of the alleged special circumstances to warrant an Order of this Court restraining the Judgment Creditor from the execution of this court’s judgment
19. LCC submitted that the grant of a stay of execution is not automatic but is a discretionary remedy that arises only upon strict compliance with the conditions precedent, such as obtaining leave to appeal and entering the appeal. Counsel submitted that while the Court may exercise its equitable jurisdiction on grounds of special circumstances, the Defendants have failed to disclose or establish any specific, exceptional, or special circumstances in their application. He relied on the Supreme Court decision in UBN Ltd v. Odusote Bookstores Ltd (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 558 to argue that a valid appeal does not operate as a stay of execution and that a judgment creditor is entitled to the fruits of their judgment unless exceptional circumstances are demonstrated. 
20. Counsel further cited the Court of Appeal decision in Mobil Producing Nig. Ltd v. Monok (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 744) 212 for the proposition that mere financial hardship is insufficient to qualify as an exceptional circumstance to warrant a stay of execution, and that where no special circumstances are shown, the application should be dismissed or, in the alternative, granted only conditionally upon the provision of adequate security. 
21. Counsel observed that under Order 64 Rule 10(2) of the NIC (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, the court is empowered to impose conditions on an order for stay of execution, including ordering that the judgment debt be deposited into court or paid into an interest-yielding account in the name of the Chief Registrar. 
22. He submitted that since the Defendants have failed to discharge the burden of establishing any special circumstances, this Court should decline to exercise its discretion in their favor and should strike out the application. 
23. Alternatively, Counsel urged the Court to grant a conditional stay by ordering the Defendants to provide a credit guarantee in the amount of the total judgment sum and costs, to be paid into an interest-yielding account in the name of the Chief Registrar of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, and to award costs of five hundred thousand Naira (N500,000.00) in favor of the Claimant.

 

24. Defendant raised 2  Issues for Determination
25. LDC submitted that the Defendants have met all requisite conditions for the grant of a stay of execution and that the Claimant's Preliminary Objection constitutes an incompetent abuse of court process.
26. On Issue 1: Whether the Applicant has satisfied the requirements of the law for the favourable exercise of the discretion of this court to be granted the application sought
27. LDC Submitted that the Defendants have satisfied all the legal requirements necessary to warrant the favorable exercise of this Court’s discretion to grant a stay of execution of the judgment delivered on 8th May 2026. 
28. Counsel submitted that the application is brought pursuant to Order 17 Rule 1 and Order 64 Rule 8(1) of the NICN (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 and under the Court's inherent jurisdiction. He argued that a stay of execution pending appeal will be granted where the applicant establishes the necessary conditions. Relying on the Supreme Court decisions in Vaswani Trading Co. v. Savalakh (1972) 1 All NLR 483, Nika Fishing Co. Ltd v. Lavina Corp. (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1114), F.R.N v. Abacha (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1081), and Mobil Producing (Nig) Unltd v. Ayeni (2008) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1067) to establish that the primary requirements for a stay of execution include: the filing of a Notice of Appeal; the presence of grounds of appeal raising substantial questions of law and fact; the existence of special circumstances, the absence of which would render the judgment of the appellate court nugatory; the preservation of the res or subject matter; and the careful consideration of the conflicting rights of the parties. Of which the Defendants have satisfied these conditions. 
29. Counsel cited the Supreme Court decision in Agbaje v. Adelekan (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 164) 595 at 608-609 to argue that the grounds of appeal in the proposed Notice of Appeal raise substantial issues of law, satisfying the requirement that the appeal must not be frivolous. 
30. Furthermore, he relied on the decisions in CCMAC Investments Ltd v. F.F & Securities Limited (1995) 8 NWLR (Pt. 411) 113 and Balogun v. Balogun (1969) 1 All NLR 349 to argue that the affidavit in support has demonstrated the existence of special circumstances demonstrating that the balance of convenience favors the Defendants and that the ends of justice would be better served by granting the application. 
31. Counsel also cited Oteju v. Magma Maritime Services Ltd (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 640) 331 at 344 for the proposition that a court is duty-bound to consider and determine all applications presented before making any pronouncement. Counsel therefore urged the Court to grant the application to prevent the judgment of the Court of Appeal from being rendered nugatory.

 

32. On Issue 2: Whether this Honourable Court ought to dismiss the Applicant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15th July 2026
33. LDC submitted that the Claimant's Notice of Preliminary Objection is incompetent, represents an abuse of court process, and should be dismissed with substantial costs. Counsel argued that the Claimant’s objection is a deliberate attempt to "arrest the ruling" of this Court, which has already been reserved for 28th July 2026 after the Defendants' motion for stay of execution was fully argued and adopted by both parties. 
34. Counsel contended that the practice of seeking to stall or arrest the delivery of a court’s ruling after a matter has been concluded is entirely alien to Nigerian civil jurisprudence. He relied on the Court of Appeal decisions in Adewinle & Anor v. Araromi Ayesan Oil Palm Plc (2025) LPELR-82106(CA) and Ojonye v. Onu & Ors (2018) LPELR-44212(CA) to argue that any application aimed at stalling or arresting a court's judgment or ruling after it has been duly heard is unknown to law, repugnant, and must be rejected. He further cited the Supreme Court decision in Shettima & Anor v. Goni & Ors (2011) LPELR-417(SC), as well as the Court of Appeal decisions in Oviarobo v. Ogboe (2015) LPELR-25690(CA), Forgo Battery Company Ltd v. Adebayo & Anor (2014) LPELR-22530(CA), and Diga v. Tony (2013) LPELR-20768(CA), for the proposition that rules of court do not contain any provision for the arrest of judgments or rulings about to be delivered. He argued that Section 47 of the NIC Act 2006 expressly confers statutory jurisdiction on this Court to entertain and grant applications for stay of execution, and that this jurisdiction is recognized in Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 to support the argument that this Court is properly constituted, possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that the matter was initiated by due process. 
35. LDC contended that the Defendants complied with Order 64 Rule 8 of the NICN Rules 2017 by filing a Motion on Notice, and that the Claimant, having failed to file a counter-affidavit or challenge the motion before it was heard and adopted, has waived the right to oppose the stay. He cited the Supreme Court decision in Ariori v. Elemo (1983) 1 SCNLR 1 to argue that delay defeats equity and that a party who sleeps on their rights and fails to respond before adoption cannot reopen proceedings after a ruling date has been fixed. Counsel submitted that the Claimant's NPO constitutes an abuse of court process, which involves the improper or tortious use of judicial processes to pervert the course of justice, irritate, or delay the administration of justice. He cited Mohammed v. Kuchita & Ors (2026) LPELR-83242(SC) and Obasanjo & Anor v. Olugbode & Ors (2025) LPELR-81518(SC) to support this definition of abuse. 

He also relied on Ezenwo v. Festus & Ors (2019) LPELR-81573(SC) and Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) to argue that when a court is satisfied that a process is an abuse, it must exercise its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss it immediately. 

Counsel therefore urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant's NPO with substantial costs.

 

COURT RESOLUTION 

38. Issue 1: Whether or not this Court, in light of the provisions of Order 64 Rule 8 (1), (2), (3), (9), Rule 13 of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure Rules) 2017, Section 47 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, and Section 242 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), has the jurisdiction to hear and determine the pending application for Stay of Execution.

39.ISSUE 2: Whether the Defendants have satisfied the requirements of the law and disclosed the existence of special circumstances to warrant the favourable exercise of this Court's discretion in granting a stay of execution of the judgment delivered on 8th May 2026.

40. In this post-judgment interlocutory proceeding, the burden of proof rests on the Defendants/Applicants (the Judgment Debtors) to establish the existence of special or exceptional circumstances and to demonstrate compliance with the mandatory constitutional and statutory conditions precedent required to warrant the exercise of this Court’s judicial discretion in their favour for the grant of an order staying the execution of the judgment delivered on 8th May 2026, 

41. While the burden of proof in respect of the Notice of Preliminary Objection rests on the Claimant/Respondent (the Judgment Creditor) to establish that this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the Defendants’ application; the standard of proof required of both parties in these application proceedings is on the balance of probabilities, to be determined by a preponderance of the affidavit evidence and documentary exhibits placed before this Court.

42. The Claimant's evidence in opposition to the stay of execution and in support of the NPO is comprised of the affidavit depositions of the deponent Amadi, Margaret-Mary Chiamaka, who deposed to the Counter Affidavit against the Motion on Notice for Stay of Execution and the Affidavit in Support of the Notice of Preliminary Objection, to the fact that 'by the Rules of this Court, the Court is expected to exercise jurisdiction over an Application for Stay of Execution, only when the leave of the higher court has been sought and obtained.' 

43. The deponent further stated that 'the Judgment Debtors have not exhibited the obtained leave of the court above, and also, have not exhibited any evidence of a validly entered appeal pending determination before the Appellate court.' 

44. She also deposed that 'the Judgment Debtors stated that they had validly filed a Notice of Appeal, but there is no evidence of compliance with the Rules of this Court on compilation of records within twenty-one (21) days from the date of filing of the Notice of Appeal, which would have triggered the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine their application for stay of execution.' 

45. Additionally, she deposed that 'the Court remains functus officio to hear and determine an Application for Stay of Execution except and until the leave of the higher Court is obtained as expressly mandated under Section 242 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended)' and that 'the Judgment Debtor/Applicant failed to disclose the specific special or exceptional circumstances necessitating their application before this Court.' This court has evaluated these depositions and finds that they represent a direct challenge to the competence of the Defendants' application based on the absence of essential jurisdictional exhibits.

46. The Defendants' evidence is contained in the affidavit depositions of the deponent Ademola Lawson, who deposed to the Affidavit in Support of the Motion on Notice for Stay of Execution, the Further Affidavit in Support of the Motion, and the Counter Affidavit to the Judgment Creditor's Notice of Preliminary Objection. In the initial Affidavit in Support, he stated that he was informed by Muiz Olabode Shodunke, a counsel, on 8th May 2026 that 'the court gave judgment in favour of the Claimant granting the claims of the Claimant coram Hon. Justice Joyce A.O Damachi.' He deposed that 'The Respondent/Applicant being dissatisfied with the judgment dated 8th May 2026 as applied for the certified true copy of the judgment in anticipation of filing a Motion for Leave to Appeal at the Court of Appeal,' and that 'it has become imperative to bring this application pending the determination of the hearing of the appeal filed by the Applicant/Appellant in order to prevent the judgment from being declared nugatory.' 

47. In his Further Affidavit, the deponent Ademola Lawson sought to cure the absence of a pending appeal by stating that 'We have now obtained the certified true copy of the judgment and filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal the judgment at the Court of Appeal, attaching the said certified true copy and proposed Notice of Appeal therein,' annexing the copy of the Motion on Notice for Leave to Appeal filed at the Court of Appeal on 5th June 2026 as Exhibit A.

48. In the Counter Affidavit to the NPO, the deponent Ademola Lawson stated that he was informed by Mr. Chinedu Udeh, Esq, on 22nd July 2026 that 'The Application of the Applicant is incompetent because the Respondents’ Motion for Stay of Execution has been argued and adjourned for Ruling, thus it is a completed act,' and that 'This is an abuse of Court processes and an attempt by the Applicant to arrest the ruling of the Court after they had adequate time to file a response to the motion for stay of execution but elected not to file.' 

49. He further deposed that 'contrary to paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support, the Judgment Debtor/Respondent filed a Motion at the Court of Appeal for Leave to Appeal in line with the constitutional requirement for judgments from this Honourable Court and attached a proposed Notice of Appeal' and that 'The said motion and the affidavits were attached to the Motion for Stay of Execution serve on the Applicant as far back as 13th May 2026, and they elected not to respond to same.'

50. On the material issue of whether a valid and competent appeal is pending before the Court of Appeal to support the application for stay of execution, the two versions of affidavit evidence stand in direct conflict. The Claimant’s deponent Amadi, Margaret-Mary Chiamaka, asserted that 'the Judgment Debtors have not exhibited the obtained leave of the court above, and also, have not exhibited any evidence of a validly entered appeal pending determination before the Appellate court.' 

In contrast, the Defendants’ deponent Ademola Lawson initially asserted in the grounds of their application that 'A Notice of has Appeal been validly filed,' but subsequently conceded in his Further Affidavit that they had only filed an application for leave to appeal, stating that 'We have now obtained the certified true copy of the judgment and filed a Motion for Leave to Appeal the judgment at the Court of Appeal, attaching the said certified true copy and proposed Notice of Appeal therein.' 

 

51. The Defendants' own evidence, specifically Exhibit A, confirms that they have merely filed an application for leave to appeal at the Court of Appeal on 5th June 2026, and no order granting leave has been obtained, nor has any appeal been validly entered at the Court of Appeal. Under Section 242 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), an appeal from the final judgment of the National Industrial Court on grounds of mixed law and fact requires the leave of the Court of Appeal. The filing of an application for leave to appeal is not the equivalent of a filed or entered appeal, and a proposed Notice of Appeal annexed to a motion for leave remains an inchoate document that cannot satisfy the legal requirement of a pending appeal. Thus, the deponent Amadi, Margaret-Mary Chiamaka’s statement that there is no validly entered appeal is credible and supported by the documentary evidence. This conflict is resolved in favour of the Claimant. 

 

52. On the material issue of whether the Claimant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection is incompetent as an abuse of court process or an attempt to arrest the court's ruling, the deponent Ademola Lawson for the Defendants asserted that 'The Application of the Applicant is incompetent because the Respondents’ Motion for Stay of Execution has been argued and adjourned for Ruling, thus it is a completed act,' and that the objection represents an attempt 'to hijack and arrest the ruling of the Court.' On the other hand, the deponent Amadi, Margaret-Mary Chiamaka for the Claimant asserted that 'the jurisdiction of this Court is regulated by the Rules of the Court, the Act, and the ground norm (Constitution)' and that the court remains without jurisdiction to hear the stay in the absence of the leave of the higher court. 

53. It is trite that an objection to the jurisdiction of a court can be raised at any stage of proceedings before the final decision is delivered.  The timeless principle established in the locus classicus Madukolu v. Nkemdilim is that jurisdiction is a threshold issue, and a court is only competent when the case comes before it initiated by due process of law and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent. Because any order made by a court lacking jurisdiction is a complete nullity, a challenge to the court's substantive jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of proceedings, including after a matter has been adjourned for judgment or ruling. The court remains in complete control of its proceedings and has an overriding duty to first determine whether it possesses the power to speak the law on the matter before it. The fact that the Defendants’ Motion for Stay of Execution had been argued and adjourned to a date for ruling does not constitute a completed act or a fait accompli because the court has not yet rendered its decision and remains in control of the proceedings. A court cannot proceed to deliver a ruling on a matter where its jurisdiction has been formally challenged, and it is duty-bound to first determine the jurisdictional challenge. Therefore, the filing of the Preliminary Objection before the scheduled ruling date is a competent and valid exercise of the Claimant's right to challenge the court's jurisdiction, and it does not amount to an improper 'arrest' of the court’s ruling. I resolve this conflict in favour of the Claimant. I so hold.

54. A critical evaluation of the Defendants' affidavit evidence reveals fundamental inconsistencies and chronological contradictions that severely undermine the credibility of their case. First, there is a glaring contradiction between the grounds of the Defendants' Motion on Notice, which assert that 'A Notice of Appeal has been validly filed,' and the deposition of Ademola Lawson in his initial Affidavit in Support, where he admitted that they had only 'applied for the certified true copy of the judgment in anticipation of filing a Motion for Leave to Appeal at the Court of Appeal.' This inconsistency is compounded by the deponent's Further Affidavit, where he stated that they only filed their Motion for Leave to Appeal on 5th June 2026. This means that as of 11th May 2026, when the Motion for Stay of Execution was filed, no Notice of Appeal had been filed or could have been filed. 

Second, a major chronological contradiction exists in paragraph 4 of the deponent Ademola Lawson's Counter Affidavit to the Preliminary Objection, where he asserted that 'The said motion and the affidavits were attached to the Motion for Stay of Execution serve on the Applicant as far back as 13th May 2026.' It is factually and physically impossible for the Motion for Leave to Appeal, which was only dated and filed on 5th June 2026 as shown in Exhibit A, to have been attached to and served with a Motion for Stay of Execution on 13th May 2026. 

55. This irreconcilable gap demonstrates that the deponent Ademola Lawson made false assertions under oath, which completely destroys the evidential weight of his depositions on this point.  

56. This court must now directly address the Defendants' defense and alternative explanations regarding the doctrine of waiver and the statutory power of this Court under Section 47 of the National Industrial Court Act. The deponent Ademola Lawson asserted that 'The Judgment Creditor cannot, after electing not to oppose the Motion, seek to defeat the Motion through a Notice of Preliminary Objection filed after adoption' and that 'the applicant waived its right to respond by not responding before the application was heard and adopted.' While a party may be deemed to have waived procedural irregularities by failing to object in a timely manner, it is a foundational principle of Nigerian jurisprudence that a party can never waive an objection to the substantive or constitutional jurisdiction of a court. The Claimant’s objection is not a mere procedural response; it is a direct challenge to this Court's jurisdiction to grant a stay of execution in the absence of a valid appeal and the required leave of the Court of Appeal. Consequently, the doctrine of waiver is wholly inapplicable here. 

57. Furthermore, the Defendants' reliance on Section 47 of the National Industrial Court Act and Order 64 Rule 8 of the Rules of this Court to argue that this Court has absolute jurisdiction to grant a stay must be weighed against the mandatory provisions of Order 64 Rule 13(2) of the same Rules. Rule 13(2) explicitly commands that an applicant for a stay of execution must 'Exhibit evidence that leave has been granted by the Court of Appeal where leave is required by law or by the rules of Court of Appeal.' The Defendants' alternative explanation that they complied with the rules by merely filing a Motion on Notice is flatly contradicted by their failure to comply with this mandatory requirement. The court's statutory power to grant a stay is not exercised in a vacuum but is strictly conditioned upon compliance with the governing rules of court and the Constitution.

58. In conclusion, based on the foregoing rigorous evaluation of the affidavit evidence and exhibits, this Court makes the following net evidential findings:

first, on the issue of the NPO, the Claimant’s objection is competent and sustainable because a challenge to the court's jurisdiction can be raised at any stage before the delivery of a decision, and it is not barred by the doctrine of waiver or the fact that the motion for stay of execution had been adjourned for ruling; 

second, on the issue of the stay of execution, the Defendants have failed to prove that they have a validly filed and entered appeal pending before the Court of Appeal, having only established that they filed an application for leave to appeal which has not yet been granted, and they have failed to comply with the mandatory jurisdictional requirements of Order 64 Rule 13(2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure Rules) 2017 which mandatorily requires that an applicant seeking a stay of execution must "Exhibit evidence that leave has been granted by the Court of Appeal where leave is required by law or by the rules of Court of Appeal” and Section 242 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), thereby leaving this Court without the requisite jurisdiction to grant the stay of execution. The Defendants' argument that this Court has absolute statutory jurisdiction to grant a stay under Section 47 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 must be rejected, as the statutory power to grant a stay is not exercised in a vacuum but is strictly regulated by the rules of court, specifically the mandatory requirements of Order 64 Rule 13(2).

59. The grant of a stay is an equitable, discretionary remedy. The Claimant's deponent, Amadi, Margaret-Mary Chiamaka, deposed that "the Judgment Debtor/Applicant failed to disclose the specific special or exceptional circumstances necessitating their application before this Court." In response, the Defendants’ deponent, Ademola Lawson, simply asserted in his initial affidavit that "it has become imperative to bring this application pending the determination of the hearing of the appeal filed by the Applicant/Appellant in order to prevent the judgment from being declared nugatory." To the mind of this court, this bare assertion does not suffice. A monetary judgment is not rendered nugatory by execution unless there is cogent and verifiable evidence that the judgment creditor is a person of straw who would be unable to refund the judgment sum if the appeal ultimately succeeds. The Defendants' affidavits are entirely silent on the financial standing of the Claimant and offer no evidence of financial hardship or insolvency. 

60. Furthermore, the credibility of the Defendants' application is deeply compromised by critical chronological contradictions within their own case. As found during the evaluation of the evidence, the deponent Ademola Lawson asserted in his Counter-Affidavit that "The said motion and the affidavits were attached to the Motion for Stay of Execution serve on the Applicant as far back as 13th May 2026." However, Exhibit A clearly reveals that the Motion for Leave to Appeal was only filed at the Court of Appeal on 5 June 2026. It is physically and logically impossible for a document filed on 5 June 2026 to have been attached to and served with a motion on 13 May 2026. This irreconcilable gap demonstrates that the Defendants' deponent made false assertions under oath, which completely destroys the evidential weight of his depositions. An applicant seeking the exercise of the court's equitable discretion must approach the seat of justice with clean hands and absolute candour. The presence of such glaring inconsistencies, coupled with the complete absence of any actual special circumstances, leaves this Court with no basis upon which to exercise its discretion in favor of the Defendants. On the second issue, I find that the Defendants have failed to disclose or establish any special circumstances to warrant the grant of a stay of execution.

61. Overall, the Claimant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15 July 2026 succeeds, and the Defendants’ Motion on Notice for Stay of Execution dated 11 May 2026 is struck out for want of jurisdiction and lack of merit. 

-It is hereby ordered that the Claimant's Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15 July 2026 is sustained.

-The Defendants' Motion on Notice for Stay of Execution dated 11 May 2026 (Motion No. NICN/LA/56M/2026) is hereby struck out.

-The alternative prayer of the Defendants for an injunction restraining the Claimant from enforcing the judgment of this Court delivered on 8 May 2026 is refused.

62. Flowing from the above decision, having read the Exparte application, the affidavit deposed to and the written address this court herby grants   Relief 1 “AN ORDER of the Honourable Court granting leave to the Judgment Creditor/Applicant to commence Garnishee proceedings on the Respondents for the enforcement of the monetary judgment awarded by this Honourable Court against the Judgment Debtor and in favour of the Applicant.”  

 

Hon. Justice Joyce A. O. Damachi 

JUDGE 

 

C. C IKENNA …For the Claimant 

C Udeh…For the Defendant