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NICN - JUDGMENT

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN IN ABUJA

ON WEDNESDAY 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2026

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE SINMISOLA O. ADENIYI

SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/187/2018

BETWEEN:

1. MRS. BOLATITO AJIBADE

2. MR. MUILI JUBRIL ADEKUNLE

3. MR. AWOYALE YINKA MICHAEL

4. MR. AFOLABI MOSES

5. MRS. ROSEMARY EMODI

6. MR. AYUBA MUSA

7. MR. WALE AKINBOLA

8. MR. ESETUWAGBAU STEVEN

9. MR. FADEYI O. EMMANUEL                                   CLAIMANTS

10. RAMAT POPOOLA SHITTU

11.MR. YAHAYA MOHAMMED

12.MRS. MARY NELSON

13. MRS. IMMACULATA INYANG

14. MR. OLAJIDE TUNDE

15. MR. BAMIDELE OLUSOLA

16. MRS. DORCAS M. DELIGHT

 

AND

 

1. THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTE

2. THE ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTE

3. THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF NIGERIA AND CHAIRMAN,                        DEFENDANTS

    BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL

    INSTITUTE 

4. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION

 

 

Legal representation:

Olusola Egbeyinka Esq., for Claimants

Chiamaka Nwaiwu, Esq., for 1st – 3rd Defendants

Aliyu Abdulkadir Esq., for 4th Defendant

 

R U L I N G

This case has a chequered history. It was initially instituted at the Federal High Court in 2010 and by the Ruling of the Court of Appeal, the case was transferred to this Honourable Court. Parties were thereby ordered to file processes as prescribed by the Rules of this Court. Upon the demise of Hon. Justice E. N. Agbakoba (of blessed memory), the case commenced de novo on 16/01/2024. The Claimants were employees of the 1st Defendant until the termination of their appointment in February 2010. In a nutshell, the Claimants’ grievance is that the Defendants termination of their appointments is unlawful for breach of the principles of natural justice. The Claimants also alleged that the Defendants did not comply with the procedure prescribed by the extant Rules before their appointment was terminated. 

2. On the basis of the summarized facts, the Claimants instituted the present action by Originating Summons filed on 17/04/2023, and by an Amended Originating Summons filed by the leave of Court on 22/05/2024, they prayed the Court for the determination of the questions set out as follows:

  1. WHETHER in the light of the express, clear and unambiguous provision of Sections 16 and 18 (1), (2), (3) of the National Judicial Institute Act 2004, the 3rd Defendant herein can solely act statutorily in terminating the permanent and pensionable appointment of the Claimants without recourse to the approval by the Board of Governors of the 1st Defendant in this suit?
  2. WHETHER the termination of the permanent and pensionable appointment of the Claimants without affording them an opportunity to defend any allegation before an Administrative Body or Panel in the 1st Defendant’s employment is not a flagrant disregard of the provisions of Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Right (Ratification and Enforcement) Act and other Legislation, Protocols and Convention applicable to labour related matters?

3. Upon the determination of the questions set out in the foregoing, the Claimants thereby claimed against the Defendants the principal reliefs set out as follows:

  1. A DECLARATION that the express, clear and unambiguous provisions of Sections 16, 18 (1), (2), (3) of the National Judicial Institute Act 2004, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria did not statutorily empower the 3rd Defendant herein to solely terminate the permanent and pensionable appointment of the Claimants without the 1st Defendant in this suit.
  2. A DECLARATION that the termination of the permanent and pensionable appointment of the Claimants at the instance of the 3rd Defendant in this suit contravenes the express and unambiguous statutory provisions of Section 16 and 18 (1), (2), (3) of the National Judicial Institute Act 2004, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, as same is illegal, unlawful, null and void.
  3. A DECLARATION that the termination of the pensionable and permanent appointment of the Claimants without affording them an opportunity to defend any allegation before an Administrative Board or Panel in the 1st Defendant’s employment is a flagrant disregard of the provisions of Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), Article 7 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act and other Legislation, Protocols and Convention applicable to labour related matters.
  4. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendants herein to reinstate all the Claimants in this suit into the employment of the 1st Defendant.
  5. AN ORDER of the Honourable Court compelling the Defendants herein to reinstate all the Claimants in this suit into the official positions as to the date of Judgment being occupied by their official contemporaries with whom they were on the same Grade Level as at the year 2010 when their permanent and pensionable appointment were abruptly terminated.
  6. AN ORDER of the Honorable Court compelling the Defendants herein to pay over to the Claimants in this suit all their accrued but unpaid salaries, allowances, fringe benefits from the month of March 2010 until the date judgment is delivered in this suit.
  7. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendants herein to pay over to the Claimants as general damages, the sum of N30,000,000.00 (Thirty Million Naira) only for the illegal and unlawful termination of their permanent and pensionable appointment.
  8. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendants to pay over to the Claimants the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only as exemplary damages following the willful and illegal termination of the permanent and pensionable appointment of the Claimants.
  9. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court restraining the Defendants from further terminating the permanent and pensionable appointment of the Claimants upon reinstatement to work until they attain the biological or statutory age of retirement from active Public Service. 

The Amended Originating Summons is supported by an Affidavit of 56 paragraphs to which twelve (12) documents were annexed as exhibits. The written submission of legal arguments of the Claimants’ counsel was filed alongside. 

4. In opposition, the 19 – paragraph Counter-Affidavit of the 1st – 3rd Defendants and the written address of their counsel were deemed filed on 01/11/2024. A Further and Better Counter-Affidavit and Reply on Points of Law were filed on 07/04/2025. On 21/01/2025, the Claimants filed a Further and Better Affidavit of 63 paragraphs with Annexures L1 – O. A 2nd Further and Better Affidavit of 63 paragraphs with 4 Annexures was also filed by the Claimants on 11/07/2025. I should remark that the 11- paragraph Counter-Affidavit of the 4th Defendant and the counsel’s written submission filed on 13/08/2024 were filed out of time and without regularizing the processes. In the circumstances, the said Counter-Affidavit and written address are hereby struck out as being improperly filed.

5. The 1st - 3rd Defendants also filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on 12/05/2025, wherein the following reliefs were sought:

AN ORDER striking out and/or dismissing the Claimants’ suit for being incompetent and therefore divesting the Court of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE

AN ORDER of this Honourable Court striking out and/or dismissing the suit of the 2nd – 16th Claimants against the Defendants for want of jurisdiction of the Honourable Court same having been filed outside the prescribed time allowed by statute.

6. The Objection is premised on the following grounds:

i.    The 1st Defendant is a public institution administered and managed by public officers.

ii.   The 2nd and 3rd Defendants are public officers.

iii.  The purported cause of action of the 2nd – 16th Claimants arose on the 22nd day of February, 2010 when the letters of termination of appointment were authored and issued being the date the executive action was carried out.

iv.   The Claimants however approached this Hon. Court by a Motion seeking for an Order joining the 2nd – 16th Claimants as Claimants in this present suit filed on 12th July, 2021.

v.    The 2nd – 16th Claimants refused, failed and neglected to commence the suit against the Defendants until a period of 11(eleven) years between the date the cause of action accrued and when they filed a Motion for Joinder on 12th July, 2021, which the Court granted and joined by Order of Court on 16th December, 2021 CORAM Hon. Justice E. N. Agbakoba (of blessed memory).

vi.  Section 2 of the Public Officer’s Protection Act stipulates the Claimants’ action shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within three (3) months next after the act, neglect or default complained of.

vii. The suit of the 2nd – 16th Claimants is statute barred and liable to be dismissed by this Honourable Court.

viii. The 2nd – 16th Claimants have no valid and live cause of action against any of the Defendants to justify the filling of this suit to seek the reliefs claimed in the Amended Originating Summons.

ix.  The suit has not been commenced by due process of law with all the conditions precedent thereto.

x.   The 2nd – 16th Claimants suit is academic, opinion-seeking and merely speculative, having regard to the fact that they have not disclosed or shown any prejudice or loss suffered by them in the matter as a result of the Defendants’ executive action.

xi.  The conditions precedent necessary to clothe the Honourable Court with jurisdiction to exercise judicial powers in the case have not been met by the Claimants/Respondents.

xii. The suit cannot be sustained by the use of Originating Summons.

xiii. There is no disclosed cause of action against the 2nd Defendant.

xiv. The 3rd Defendant being an agent of the 1st Defendant cannot rightly be joined where the principal is being sued already.

xv. The Claimants’ claims arose from different causes of action.

xvi. The condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by this Hon. Court was not fulfilled by the 13th Claimant.

In response to the Notice of Preliminary Objection, the Claimants’ written address was filed 11/07/2025; whilst the Reply on Points of Law of the 1st – 3rd Defendants was filed on 13/01/2026. 

7. I had carefully considered the totality of the Objection and I had also taken due

benefits of the totality of the written and oral arguments vigorously canvassed by the respective counsel with regards to the Objection. I should be permitted to state that I shall make specific reference only to the submissions of the respective counsel that I consider as very salient to the determination of the various issues raised as I deem necessary.

8. Now, the age long settled principle of law is that the question of jurisdiction goes to the root, fiber and foundation of a case and thus must first and foremost be considered as it forms the basis upon which a Court can entertain a suit. Jurisdiction gives life or otherwise to a suit. When it is raised at any stage of trial, the Court will have to determine whether the subject matter is within its adjudicatory power. See NURTW & Anor Vs RTEAN [2012] LPELR 7840; Mbas Motel Vs Wema Bank PLC [2013] LPELR 20736; Anyanwu Vs Ogunlewe [2014] LPELR 22184; Raha Vs Ige [2017] LPELR 43916.

9. In her arguments, counsel for the 1st – 3rd Defendants, Chiamaka Nwaiwu Esq., raised several jurisdictional issues namely: that the Claimants’ action is statute barred; that the action was wrongly commenced by Originating Summons; that there is no cause of action against the 2nd Defendant; that the 3rd Defendant acts as an agent of the 1st Defendant; that the Claimants’ claims arose from different causes of action; that the 13th Claimant did not fulfill the condition precedent to the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction and that the present case as constituted is an abuse of court process. In urging the Court to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction, counsel further submitted that the Claimants’ action is a brazen attempt to bring in the 2nd – 16th Claimants without fulfilling the preconditions of instituting the action.

10. The argument of counsel for the Objectors on the issue of statute bar is that the Claimants commenced the action after the time for filing an action against the acts of a public officer as prescribed by Section 2 (a) of the Public Officer’s Protection Law (POPA) had lapsed. The cases of Egbe Vs Adefarasin [1987] LPELR 1032; Owodunni Vs Registered Trustees of Celestial Church of Christ [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt 675) 315; Gyang Vs NSC [2002] 15 NWLR (Pt 791) 654, were cited by counsel in support of her propositions.

11. Counsel further argued that as disclosed in the Affidavit in Support of Originating Summons, the Claimants’ cause of action arose on 22/02/2010, the date the Claimants were served with the letters of termination of appointment; that the 2nd – 16th Claimants filed a Motion for Joinder on 12/07/2021, a period of eleven (11) years and contends that this action is thereby statute barred, having been instituted outside the statutory period allowed by the POPA, that is, from the date of the accrual of the cause of action till the date the Motion for Joinder of the 2nd -16th Claimants was filed.  

In reaction to the issue of statute bar, the submission of counsel for the Claimants is centrally on the position held by the Court in the cases of National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission & 2 Ors Vs Ajibola Johnson & 10 Ors [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt 1656) 247 and The Rector, Kwara State Polytechnic & Ors Vs Mr. Adefila & Ors [2024] 9 NWLR (Pt 1944) 529, that the provision of Section 2(a) of the POPA is inapplicable to contract of employment. Counsel therefore urged the Court to dismiss the Objection on this issue. 

12. At this juncture, it imperative to state that on 16/12/2021, this Honourable Court in its Ruling, made a pronouncement on the issue of statute bar. In the said Ruling, relying on the case of National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission & 2 Ors Vs Ajibola Johnson & 10 Ors (supra) the Court held that this action is not statute barred. The current position of the Apex Court on the issue and as correctly submitted by the counsel for the Objectors in the Reply on Points of Law, is that Section 2 (a) POPA applies to employment contracts with statutory flavor. See Okoronkwo Vs INEC [2025] LPELR 80425.

13. By virtue of Section 287 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court is bound by the latest decision of the Supreme Court. However, this Court is competent to revisit the issue of whether or not this action is statute barred, particularly since the facts were not considered by the Court in its earlier decision. It is settled that an earlier decision based on an overruled authority is a decision per incuriam and this Court is not bound to perpetuate it. See Rossek Vs ACB Ltd [1993] LPELR 2955; Dalhatu Vs Turaki [2003] LPELR 2955. 

14. Now, in the determination of the issue at stake, the argument of counsel for the Objectors at paragraph 4.03 of the written submission is that the cause of action arose/accrued on 22/02/2010, the date the 2nd – 16th Claimants received their letters of termination of appointment. Counsel further argued that a Motion to be joined as Claimants in this suit was filed on 12/07/2021, that is, eleven (11) years after the cause of action accrued.  Counsel submitted that the Claimants’ case is statute barred having not being filed within the period of filing against public officers as prescribed by Section 2 (a) of POPA.

15. In his response, counsel for the Claimants made reference to the Affidavit in support of Motion on Notice for Joinder of Parties filed by the 2nd - 16th Claimants on 12/07/2021. The summary of the facts deposed in the said Affidavit is that the instant suit was filed by the 1st Claimant; that prior to the filing of the suit, the Claimants had filed two suits at the Federal High Court in Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/387/2010 and Suit No: FHC/ABJ/348/2010; that Suit No: FHC/ABJ/348/2010 was discontinued on 04/04/2012 and by  the records of the Court, the application of the 2nd -16th Claimants to be joined with the 1st Claimant in this suit was granted by this Honourable Court on 16/12/2021. Counsel therefore submitted that Statute of Limitation does not apply to joinder of parties.

16. Now, the principles that guide the Court in determining whether an action is statute barred are well settled and well too known. These principles have also been adequately captured and canvassed by counsel for the Objectors in her written address. Without having to recapitulate the said principles, it suffices to restate that the overriding factor or consideration is that the essence of a limitation law is that the legal right to enforce an action is not a perpetual right but a right generally limited by statute. As correctly submitted by counsel, where a statute of limitation prescribes a period within which an action should be brought, legal proceedings cannot be properly or validly instituted after the expiration of the prescribed period. Therefore, a cause of action is statute-barred if legal proceedings are not commenced in respect of same because the period laid down by the limitation law had lapsed. See Yare Vs National Salaries, Wages and Income Commission [2013] LPELR 20520 (SC).

17. As I stated earlier, this case was transferred to this Court from the Federal High Court. Parties are not in dispute that the cause of action arose in February 2010; that the two suits had previously been filed at the Federal High Court; that one of the suits was discontinued and that leave was granted by this Honourable Court to join the 2nd – 16th Claimants in this suit. I should state that the cases of Flogret Ltd & Anor Vs The MV Dongxin 8 & Ors [2018] LPELR 45348; Omeh Vs Okoro [1999] 8 NWLR (Pt 615) 356, cited by the counsel for the Objectors are distinguishable with the instant case. The 2nd – 16th Claimants had filed the case at the Federal High Court within the period prescribed by the POPA and same was discontinued on 04/04/2012.  It is trite that once an action is filed within time, the running of limitation stops and voluntary discontinuance does not erase the effect of a timeous filing. See Oshodi Vs Eyifunmi [2000] 11 NWLR (Pt 799) 437; Elike Vs Nwankwoala [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt 1221) 253. Therefore, the 2nd -16th Claimants’ action was filed within the time prescribed and they were properly joined as parties to this suit. Put differently, this action is not statute barred. And I so hold. 

18. Perhaps at this point, it is appropriate to consider the argument of the Objectors at paragraph 4.09 of the written address that the Claimant’s claims arose from different causes of action. Order 13 Rule 3 (1) of the NICN Rules, 2017 permits joinder of parties at any stage of proceedings. The purpose is to avoid multiplicity of suits and conflicting decisions.  As correctly submitted by Claimants’ counsel, where it is necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate upon all questions involved, the Claimants may file one action. In the instant case, the Claimants share a common interest arising from the same cause of action being the termination of their appointment in 2010. The fact that the suit at the Federal High Court was discontinued to avoid multiplicity of actions further supports having their claims in the same action. The argument of the Objectors on this issue is hereby discountenanced.

19. The Objectors are also challenging the competency of the action on the ground that the mode of commencement of the Claimants’ case by Originating Summons is not suitable for the action. With reference to paragraphs 39 - 51 of the Affidavit in Support of the Originating Summons, counsel argued that oral evidence becomes a necessity for the Claimants to prove that their right to fair hearing was violated by the Defendants in terminating their appointment. Counsel further argued that the questions raised for determination and the reliefs sought by the Claimants goes beyond interpretation of Statute and submitted that by Order 3 Rules 13 and 17 of the Rules of this Court, the action ought not to have been commenced by Originating Summons. In support of her propositions, counsel placed reliance on the cases of Inakoju & Ors Vs Adeleke & Ors [2007] LPELR 1510; Sani Vs Kogi State House of Assembly [2019] 4 NWLR (Pt 1661) 172.

20. In his response, counsel for Claimants argued that the Claimants are seeking the interpretation of the Court on the express provisions of Sections 16 and 18 (1), (2) and (3) of the National Judicial Institute Act; that by the provisions of Order 3 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court, Originating Summons is the mode of commencement of action for matters relating to the interpretation of Constitution, enactments and instruments and submitted that documents attached to the processes by parties are adequate and sufficient for the purpose of resolving all issues formulated for determination by the parties.

21. Now, in the present case, the Claimants have opted to commence this suit by Originating Summons. It is trite that in such cases, the depositions in the Affidavit filed constitute both the pleadings and the evidence at the same time. See Keyamo Vs House of Assembly Lagos State & Ors [2002] 18 NWLR (Pt 799) 605. In Famfa Oil Ltd Vs A G Federation [2003] 18 NWLR (Pt 852) 453, the Apex Court held that the very nature of an Originating Summons is to make things simpler for hearing. It is available to any person claiming interest under a deed, will or other written instrument whereby he applies by Originating Summons for the determination of any

question of construction arising under the instrument for a declaration of his interest.

22. By instituting the case by Originating Summons, the Claimants shall succeed or fail on the basis of the facts they presented to support their claims. The overall consideration, is for the Court to ensure, within the confines of the case made out by the Claimants, that the Defendants are not denied the opportunity or constrained or restrained, as a result of the procedure the Claimants have adopted to commence the action, to adequately defend the suit. In other words, once the Court comes to the conclusion that justice could be done to the parties on the basis of the facts presented before it in an action commenced by Originating Summons, it should not decline to hear the suit under that procedure, since, one of the attractions in commencing a suit by Originating Summons is that it makes for quicker and simpler adjudication.

23. In Pam Vs Mohammed [2008] 40 WRN 67 at 147, the Supreme Court, per Tobi, JSC (of very blessed memory) elucidated on the issue at stake in the following pronouncement:

“It is not the law that once there is dispute on facts, the matter should be commenced by Writ of Summons. No! That is not the law. The law is that the dispute on facts must be substantial, material, affecting the live issues in the matter. Where disputes are peripheral, not material to the live issues, an action can be sustained by Originating Summons. After all, there can hardly be a case without facts. Facts make a case and it is the dispute in the facts that give rise to litigation.”

Without any further ado, this Court finds that the present action was properly commenced by Originating Summons and is thus competent to be determined on that 

platform. And I so hold.

24. I do not wish to waste time resolving the further contention of the Objectors that as an agent of the 1st Defendant, the 3rd Defendant cannot be sued along with the principal since this issue has been adequately determined by the Court in its Ruling delivered on 16/12/2021. It was held at paragraph 46 of the Ruling, that the Claimants have unfettered right to bring an action against any person they deem as Defendants subject only to the onus they have to establish and succeed in their claim against the said Defendants. The law is settled that a party who is aggrieved by an interlocutory decision must appeal. The Court cannot overrule itself without fresh grounds, otherwise, it would amount to abuse of court process. The earlier Ruling remains binding since the decision has not been appealed. And I so hold.    

25. Now, in the famous decision of Thomas Vs Olufosoye [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 669], “a reasonable cause of action” is defined as, a cause of action with some chance of success when only the allegations in the pleadings are considered. In another sense, a contention that a Claimant's suit discloses no reasonable cause of action postulates that there is nothing in the Statement of Claim that is fit for the adverse party to respond to and for the Court to adjudicate upon. The Apex Court further held that so long as the Statement of Claim disclose some cause of action or raise some question fit to be decided by the Court, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is no ground for striking it out; and that where no question as to the civil rights and obligations of the Claimant is raised in the Statement of Claim for determination as against the Defendant, the Statement of Claim is bound to be struck out and the action dismissed. 

26. The further contention of the Objectors is that there is no cause of action against the 2nd Defendant and therefore urged the Court to strike out the name of the 2nd Defendant. In his reaction, Claimants’ counsel made reference to paragraphs 43, 46 and 52 of the Affidavit in support of the Amended Originating Summons as well as reliefs 4 and 5 of the Claimants, and submitted there is a reasonable cause of action against the 2nd Defendant and he is a necessary party in this suit. Upon a proper appreciation of the applicable principles and the facts as gleaned from the Affidavit in Support of the Amended Originating Summons, it is the view of this Court, that the question as to the reasonableness of the Claimants’ grounds in believing that the 2nd Defendant committed the infraction in the termination of their appointment, indeed, is what this Court has been called upon to determine in this suit. In other words, the Claimants have a reasonable cause of action against the 2nd Defendant. And I so hold.

27. It is equally trite that the purpose of pre-action notice is to enable the Defendant know in advance the anticipated action and to decide what to do in the matter; whether to negotiate or reach a compromise or have another hard look at the matter in relation to the issues and decide whether it is more expedient to submit to jurisdiction and have a pronouncement on the point in controversy. See Amadi Vs NNPC [2000] 10 NWLR (Pt 674) 76.  The argument of the counsel for 1st – 3rd Defendants is further that the issuance of a pre-action notice on the 1st Defendant is required by Section 11 (2) of the NJI Act; that the name of the 13th Claimant was not included in the pre-action notice in the letter of the Claimants’ solicitors and submitted that the jurisdiction of the Court is ousted to hear the 13th Claimant by her failure to serve the 1st Defendant a pre-action notice.

28. However, the Objectors have not denied that the 13th Claimant is not an employee of the 1st Defendant or denied that her appointment was terminated. I am of the firm view that having filed their Counter-Affidavit to the Originating Summons inclusive of facts relating to the 13th Claimant, the 1st – 3rd Defendants have waived their rights to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court against the claim of the said 13th Claimant. In the circumstances, the Objection on this issue is hereby overruled.

29. In the final analysis, on the basis of the totality of the facts placed before the Court by the Claimants; it is safe to hold, that the present action is not frivolous or abuse of court process, but deserves judicial determination as prayed for by the Claimants. The decision of the Court is that the concerted objections hurled on the Claimants’ suit by the 1st – 3rd Defendants is devoid of merit. The Objections shall be and is hereby accordingly overruled and dismissed. Consequently, the Claimants’ suit is hereby handed a clean bill of competence to be determined by this Court on its merits. I now proceed to determine the substantive action.

30. From the facts deposed in the Affidavit by the 3rd Claimant and on behalf of other Claimants, the Claimants’ alleged that the termination of their permanent and pensionable appointment on 22/02/2010, based on the reports of the various committees set up by the 3rd Defendant was unlawful. According to the Claimants, different committees and panels were set up at the instance of the 3rd Defendant to investigate the various problems militating against the smooth administration of the 1st Defendant. The Claimants further alleged that their employment with the 1st Defendant was terminated without indicting any of them or inviting them to appear before any disciplinary committee and that despite the letters written by their solicitors, the interventions and recommendations made by the Public Complaint Commission and the National Assembly, the Defendants have refused to reinstate them. 

31. In further support their case, the following documents were annexed to the Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons: 

a.         Letters of Termination of Appointment of the 3rd, 2nd and 10th Claimants - Exhibits A, B and C

b.         Letter dated 09/04/2010 written by the Claimants’ solicitors to the 1st and 2nd Defendants- Exhibit D  

c.         Reply of the 1st Defendant to the letter of the Claimants’ solicitors – Exhibit E.

d.         Recommendations of the Panel - Exhibits F and F1.

e.         Letters of the Public Complaints Commission and Senator Victor Ndoma- Egba, Reports on the Petition of the National Assembly and Senate Committee on Ethics, Privileges and Public Petitions - Exhibits G, H, I, J and K.

32. Upon a proper examination of the Counter-Affidavit of the 1st - 3rd Defendants, the defence advanced is that under the National Judicial Act (NJI Act), the Board of Governors of the 1st Defendant has power to appoint committees to carry out their functions; that the termination of appointment of the Claimants was not based on committee report but on the decision of the Board of Governors as provided by the Condition of Service of the 1st Defendant, and stated that the decision of the Board of Governors is not subject to review by the Public Complaints Commission. The 1st - 3rd Defendants maintained that the appointment was terminated on the ground that the services of the Claimants were no longer required; that the termination of their appointment was not based on allegation of misconduct; that as required by the Conditions of Service of the 1st Defendant, the Claimants were paid their salaries for the month of February 2010 and a month salary in the lieu of notice. The 1st – 3rd Defendants maintained that the Claimants’ appointment was terminated in accordance with the relevant law and Conditions of Service of 1st Defendant. Copies of UBA e-payment mandate in respect of the accounts of the Claimants were attached as Exhibit NJI 1.  

33. In the Further and Better Affidavit, the Claimants alleged that as at the date their appointment was terminated, one Mr. Ogbe Simon who deposed to the 1st – 3rd Defendants’ Counter-Affidavit was not a member of staff of the 1st Defendant. The Claimants maintained that the appointment of all the Claimants is permanent and pensionable and that the appointment was approved by the Board of Governors of the 1st Defendant. The Claimants further contend that the committees set up by the 1st Defendant did not recommend the termination of their appointment.

34. Attached to the Further and Better Affidavit are the Report on the special assignment given to the Federal Judicial Service Commission on National Judicial Institute - Annexures L, L1 and L2; Condition of Service of the 1st Defendant – Annexure N, Copy of Letter issued to 10th Claimant – Annexure O, Letter of the 2nd Defendant - Annexure P, Letters relating to the appointment of the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th Claimants – Annexures Q, Q1, Q2, R, S, T, U, V, V1, V2, W, W1, X. Also annexed are letters attesting to the competence of some of the Claimants as well as their certificates of honour, academic and professional qualifications.

35. Perhaps, it is important to remark that contrary to the Claimants’ contention that the Further Counter- Affidavit of the 1st – 3rd Defendant was filed out time, the Claimants’ Further and Better Affidavit was deemed filed on 08/04/2025, and consequently, the Further Counter-Affidavit was deemed properly filed on the same day. In the said Further Counter Affidavit, the deposition of the said Ogbe Simeon is that he has been in the employment of the 1st Defendant since 2010 and that by virtue of his employment, he has knowledge of the facts in his depositions.

36. The 1st – 3rd Defendant maintained that the termination of the Claimants was due to the reorganization of the 1st Defendant which was considered by the Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee of the 1st Defendant on 18/02/2010; that the Board of Governors also considered, approved and ratified the termination of their appointment at the meeting held on 3rd and 4th February, 2010 and 25th May, 2010; that the Claimants were paid all their entitlements which they accepted as full and final payment and contend that the 1st Defendant is not willing to employ the Claimants as their services are still not required.

37. Attached as Exhibits NJI2, NJI3 and NJI4 are the Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Governors held on 2nd and 3rd February, 2010; Minutes of the Appointments, Promotions and Disciplinary Committee held on 18th February, 2010 and Minutes of the meeting of the Board of Governors held on 25th May, 2010. The Defendants further contend that the Claimants did not attach their letters of appointment to the Originating Summons. However, the Claimants in the 2nd Further and Better Affidavit annexed documents relating to their appointments.

38. Now, Section 16 of the NJI Act posed for determination by the Claimants provides 

as follows:

Staff Regulations

“Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Board may make staff regulations relating 

generally, to the Conditions of Service of the employees of the Institution and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing such regulations may provide for

(a) the approval, promotion and disciplinary control (including dismissal) of employees of the Institute.”  

39. The submission of the Claimants’ counsel is that the Claimants’ employment as provided under Section 7 of NJI Act was pensionable and as such, that their appointment is statutory. As correctly submitted by Claimants’ counsel, the Claimants’ employment is statutory as same is protected by the NJI Act. It is trite that statutory appointment is protected by statute or regulations made to govern the procedure for employment and discipline of an employee. See Olaniyan Vs University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt 9) 599; Fakuade Vs OAUTH [1993] 5 NWLR (Pt 291).

40. Counsel for the Claimants’ argument is further that being statutory employment, any form of disciplinary matters in the affairs of the 1st Defendant shall be strictly regularized by the Board of Governors and not by an individual; that there is no provisions in the NJI Act that the 3rd Defendant can act solely and without recourse to and consultation with the Board of Governors to terminate the permanent and pensionable appointment of the Claimants; that the Claimants are entitled to be heard by a Panel or Administrative Body of Enquiry duly set up by the 1st Defendant before their appointment was terminated and a decision of a Committee constituted by the Board shall be of no effect until it is confirmed by the Board of Governors.

41. In their defence, it was stated by the 1st – 3rd Defendants in the paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the Further Counter-Affidavit, that the Appointments, Promotion and Disciplinary Committee and the Board of Governors held meetings to consider the termination of appointment of the Claimants. To prove that the termination of the Claimants was based on the decision of the Board of Governors of the 1st Defendant, the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Governors were annexed as Exhibits NJI 1, NJI 3 and NJI 4.

42. Now, by Section 136 of the Evidence Act (supra), the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence but the burden may in the course of a case be shifted from one side to the other. This provision of the Evidence Act has been considered by the Courts in a plethora of authorities. See Onovo Vs Mba [2014] 14 NWLR (Pt 1427) 391; Itauma Vs Akpe-Ime [2000] LPELR 1557 (SC); Ezemba Vs Ibeneme & Anor [2004] LPELR 1205(SC). The Defendants have discharged the burden that the Board of Governors approved the termination of appointment of the Claimants. And I so hold. 

43. As correctly submitted by counsel for the 1st – 3rd Defendants, the Board of Governors of the 1st Defendant is empowered by Section 16 of the Act to make regulation relating to the Conditions of Service of the employees. By the provision of Chapter X of the Conditions of Service of the 1st Defendant, attached as Annexure N to the Further and Better Affidavit of the Claimants, the Institute can at any time terminate the appointment of the employees when his services are no longer required by giving one month notice in writing of its intention to do so or by paying the employee one month’s salary in lieu of notice.

44. In the determination of the issues canvassed by the Claimants, it is imperative to examine the letter of termination of the Claimants. I have taken liberty to reproduce the relevant portion of Exhibits A, B and C, the letters of termination of the Claimants that states as follows:

“On the authority of the Hon. Chief Justice of Nigeria and Chairman, Board of Governors of the National Judicial Institute, I write to inform you that in view of the on-going re-organization of the National Judicial Institute, your services are no longer required with effect from 18th February, 2010.

……………………………………………………………………………..

The Institute is to ensure payment of all your legitimate entitlements including one month’s salary in lieu of notice.”

45. As explicitly stated in the letters of termination of appointment, their appointment was terminated on the ground of “services no longer required” due to the on-going re-organization of the 1st Defendant and not allegation of misconduct.  The law is settled that in the case of termination of employment; the Court must confine itself to the letter terminating the appointment and not go outside it to see if the termination is in accordance with the conditions of service and letter of appointment.  See Iwuoha Vs Mobil Producing Nig. Unltd [2011] LPELR 4477; Morohunfola Vs Kwara State Technology [1990] LPELR 1912. 

46. By Chapter X, 1.00 of the Conditions of service, the 1st Defendant is not required to comply with the disciplinary process as prescribed in its Rules to terminate the appointment when the services of an employee are no longer required. The only pre-condition is the payment of legitimate entitlements including one month’s salary in lieu of notice of such an employee. The allegation of the Claimants that their right to fair hearing was breached before their appointment was terminated is not relevant to their case. It is only when the disciplinary process is required that the breach of the principles of fair hearing will be applicable. In other words, the Claimants’ right to fair hearing has not been violated in terminating their appointment. And I so hold.

47. The Defendants have further proved that they complied with the condition for the terminating the Claimants’ appointments by attaching Exhibit NJI 1 to the Counter-Affidavit, as proof of payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice to the Claimants and contend that the Claimants are not entitled to their claims having been paid one month’s salary in lieu of notice. Now, the knotty question, begging for an answer is, having collected one months’ salary in lieu of notice as provided in the Conditions of Service and as stated in the letters of termination of appointment, can the Claimants reasonably complain or be heard to say that the termination of their appointment

was unlawful? I suppose not.

48. The law is trite that where parties to a contract mutually agree that the condition for determination is the giving of notice or payment of equivalent salary in lieu of notice, once the employer gives the notice or pays the equivalent salary in lieu of notice, he has discharged his obligation under the contract. Having accepted one months’ salary in lieu of notice, it seems to me that the Claimants have put to rest any claim real or imagined which they have or thought that they had with the Defendants. The Claimants have no legal justification to assert that the termination of their appointment was unlawful. The Claimants appointment was validly determined in accordance with the Conditions of Service. And I so hold.

49. Ordinarily and consistent with common law principle, the Court will not impose an employee on an employer. A willing and able employee (servant) cannot be imposed on an unwilling employer (master). Where the employer decides to discharge the obligation of an employee by giving the due notice or paying the equivalent salary in lieu of notice, an unwilling employer cannot be compelled to have a willing employee remain in his/its employment and vice versa. See Garuba V K.I.C. Ltd & Ors [2005] LPELR 1310 (SC); Morohunfola Vs Kwara State College of Technology [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt 145) 506; Dr. O. Ajolore Vs Kwara State College of Technology [1986] 2 SC 277. See also the cases of Iloabachie Vs Phillips [2002] 14 NWLR (Pt 787) 264; Alhassan Vs ABU Zaria [2011] 11 NWLR (Pt 1259) 417.

50. On the basis of the foregoing analysis therefore, I must and I hereby resolve the issues for determination in this suit against the Claimants. Accordingly, it is the judgment of this Court that the Claimants’ case is unmeritorious. It shall be and it is hereby accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their respective costs.

Ruling is hereby accordingly entered.

 

SINMISOLA O. ADENIYI

(Hon. Judge)

08/07/2026