IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LOKOJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT LOKOJA

ON MONDAY 27TH DAY OF JULY, 2026

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE SINMISOLA ADENIYI

SUIT NO: NICN/LKJ/02/2025

BETWEEN:   

1. LINUS ALFRED ONUH
2. DANIE JONAH 
3. DANJUMA ADEJOH
4. UTAJI FRANCSICA 
5. OMALE HELLEN

6. ANTHONIA MAHA 

7. JEREMIAH ODINYA

8. JOHN M. OCHE

9. DOMINIC P. AKOR 

10. MICHAEL BEN AGBO 

11. IKO OJO OMACHOKO 

12. MARY SANUEL

13. EMMANUEL A OGUCHE 

14. HELLEN EMMANUEL 

15. BENJAMIN OGBE 

16. MARY JOHN 

17. MICHAEL STEPHEN 

18. BENJAMIN K. REUBEN                        

19.GRACE IBRAHIM 

20. IDOKO P. ENEDUBIOJO

21. REGINA ALFRED 

22. PHILIP A. ABUH 

23. LADI JOHN 

24. AGADA J. ENEMONA 

25. YUSUFU UKPOJU 

26. OGUCHE EMMANUEL …………CLAIMANTS/RESPONDENTS

27. ECHOFU FRANCIS 

28. OJONUGWA EKELE 

29. BORNIFACE EKELE 

30. ESTHER ONOJA

31. MICHAEL ADOYI

32. REGINA OMALE 

33. ATABO REUBEN 

34. SIMON IKWUJE 

35. IKANI PAUL AMEDU 

36. UNEKWU JOY ANYEBE 

37. STEPHEN EJIGA

38. ALICE ONOJA 

39. DANIEL E. ANYEBE 

40. UNEKWU JOSEPH ANYEBE 

41. EMMANUEL A. OGUCHE 

42. SALOME NATHANIEL 

43. EUCHARIA C. IKWUJE 

44. ISAAC OGWUCHE AMEH

45. SALOME AKPA 

46. HASSAN HAWA

6. ISAAC MOMOH
7. AWAH ABDUL USMAN 
8. ACHENETU ADEMU 
9. ADIJETU ADEMU 
10. LADI BENJAMIN 
11. JACOB AMEH 
12. MATINA ONOJA 
13. ISRAEL AKOGU 
14. MONDAY Y. PAUL 
15. THANKGOD OJONUGWA ADIKWA 
16. PATRICK AKOH 
17. JAMES APOCHI 
18. PAULINE ANAWO 
19. ABRAHAM ONOJA                               
20. SAMUEL OCHOGU 
21. MAL. MALIK ADEM ………. CLAIMANTS/RESPONDENTS
22. ABUTU TALATU 
23. NATHANIEL O. OCHE 
24. ENEMALI OKEWU 
25. ABIMAJE MAJI 
26. MONDAY ANYEBE 
27. UMORU HALIMETU 
28. ACHENETU USMAN
29. SULE OJONUGWA 
30. VINCENT AMEH 
31. REKIYA IDI
32. NATHANIEL OWOICHO 
33. SALOME NATHANIEL 
34. JAMES ABUH 
35. CECILIA OJILE 
36. MARY S. OGUCHE 
37. DANIEL A. OGIDI
38. ACHILE ELEOJO
39. ELIZABETH SHAIBU 
40. ACHENETU ADEMU 
41. ODAUDU MAHA 
42. JAMES ABUH 
43. GODWIN AGADA 
44. JOSEPH OKPE 
45. IBRAHIM ITODO 
46. AHIBETU TJANI 
47. ELIAS IDOKO 
48. HALIMO AMIDU 
49. MOHAMMED ABUH 
50. MOSES OKPANACHI 
51. MR. JAMES ODOH 
52. ABUH IDOKO
53. LARABA OCHAI
54. BONIFACE U. OKPE
55. MOHAMEED MOMOH 
56. MUSA AMODU
57. ALFA AMEH…………………. CLAIMANTS/RESPONDENTS 
58. AGNES ANAWO
59. JONAH ANYEBE
60. GODWIN OHIEMI
61. MARY ANYEBE 
62. MICHAEL OKOAH ADOYI 
63. STEPHEN OHIEMI
64. ALADI AUDU
65. OGWU OSENI                                      
66. JEKELI ABOH 
67. ELAI EMMA 
68. EMMANUEL AGBEDA
69. SIMON NEGEDU
70. PATRICK OKPE
71. IDOKO ONOJA 
72. ONOJAH AGNES 
73. OJOMA OKPANACHI 
74. JANE EKPA 
75. ADEJOH CECILIA 
76. JOSEPH OLOKPO
77. MOSES ADEJOH 
78. ALADI AUDU
79. MARY IKANI AUDU
80. JACOB AMEH 
81. SULE AMEH 
82. ADEMU ADIJETU 
83. EMMANUEL ODOH
84. SAMSON A. OCHEJE
85. SANI ABAH
86. PIUS ABAH
87. ANTHONY IDOKO
88. ESTHER OMALE
89. MOSES APEH
90. AGNES ONOJA 
91. USMAN UKPOJU
92. SHAIBU AMEH
93. GRACE J. ABOGEDE ……. CLAIMANTS/RESPONDENTS
94. PAULLINE JOSEPH
95. OBAJE OGOH                          
96. ABUH J. SULEIMAN 
97. ADAMA HANAH 
98. MALL. IDRISU M. BABA
99. MONICA SALIFU
100. MAMODU AMEH 
101. AGNES S. IYAJI
102. AMAHA MARK ………. CLAIMANTS/RESPONDENTS

 

 AND

1. KOGI STATE GOVERNMENT………………. DEFENDANT
2. HON. ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND COMMISSIONER

FOR JUSTICE, KOGI STATE…………………. DEFENDANT 

3. KOGI STATE UNIVERSAL BASIC EDUCATION BOARD………………………………………. DEFENDANT/APPLICANT
4. OLAMABORO LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL, OKPO…DEFENDANT
5. OLAMABORO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY, OKPO...DEFENDANT

 

Legal representation:

A. O. Onoja Esq., for Claimants/Respondents

Oluwafemi O. Adegboyega Esq., with V. A. Shaibu Esq., for 3rd Defendant/Applicant

V. F. Arolukaiye Esq., for 1st and 2nd Defendants 

O. W. Obaedo Esq., with K. V. Ayobami Esq., for 4th & 5th Defendants 

 

R U L I N G

In summary, the Claimants’ case is that their names were arbitrarily removed from the payroll by the Defendants in 2009 and that consequently, they have not been paid their salaries till date. The Claimants alleged that the arbitrary stoppage of their salaries by the Defendants without first determining their subsisting employment relationship is an infringement of the Regulations governing the conditions of their service and a violation of their Constitutional right.

2. Being thereby aggrieved, the Claimants instituted the present action filed on 04/03/2025, and by an Amended Complaint and Statement of Facts filed by leave  

of Court on 25/09/2025, they claim severally and jointly against the Defendants, the reliefs set out as follows:

1. An Order of this Honorable Court declaring illegal, unlawful, null and void and unconstitutional all that acts of the Defendants that undermine the subsisting employment right of the Claimants with the Defendants same having not been determined by the laid down requirements of Sections 8 (c), 13, 14 and 25 (1) (b), (c) & (e) of the Kogi State Universal Basic Education Board Law, 2025 and Sections 5 (c), 8 (b) & (c) and 21 of Kogi State Universal Basic Education Board Law, Vol.1, No. 1 of July 2005 and  the Public Service Rules on appointment and conditions of service of the offer of pensionable appointment  of the Defendants.
2. A Declaration that the Claimants are bona fide and subsisting staffs of the Olamaboro Local Government Education Authority, Okpo, agency of the Defendants and are duly entitled to their salaries at all times material to this case.
3. An Order of this Honorable Court directing the Defendants to pay up the total sum of money only owed, being the outstanding arrears of salaries and allowances between the years of September 2009 - date, wherein the Defendants unjustifiable withheld/stopped and thereby owed the Claimants their salaries vide the arbitrary removal of the Claimants’ names from payroll for no just cause and still counting in breach of the Claimants’ right to salaries. 
4. An Order of this Honorable Court directing the Defendants forthwith effect the necessary promotion advice of the Claimants to the rank of their contemporary in the office and position as entitled staffs as provided under the general Public Service Rules governing the conditions of service for the staff Members of the Defendants.
5. An Order awarding the sum of #100,000.000 (One Hundred Million

Naira) only to the Claimants being damages suffered from the shock, trauma and mental torture and illegal deprivation of access to salaries and emoluments and illegal refusal to pay up the Claimants unpaid salaries and allowances from the period of September 2009 to date, by the Defendants.

6. Exemplary and Aggravated Damages of #1,500,000.00 (One Million Five Hundred Thousand Naira) only against the Defendants for the arbitrary infraction, threat of further infractions on the fundamental rights of the Claimants. 
7. #1, 000,000 (One Million Naira only) being the cost of persecuting (sic) this suit by the Claimants.  

3. However, upon being served with the Originating processes, the 3rd Defendant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection on 25/04/2025. The Objection supported by an Affidavit of five (5) main paragraphs is praying for an Order of the Court dismissing/striking out the suit for being statute barred. The written submission of counsel was also filed with the Notice of Preliminary Objection. In reaction, the Claimants filed a Counter-Affidavit of 27 paragraphs on 02/05/2025. The Objector’s Reply on Points of Law was deemed properly filed on 25/09/2025.

4. I have proceeded to carefully consider the Objection; the facts deposed in the Affidavit filed to support the same and the Counter-Affidavit in opposition. I had also taken due benefits of the totality of the written and oral submissions canvassed by the respective counsel in support of the positions they held. The argument of the counsel for the 3rd Defendant, Oluwafemi O. Adegboyega Esq, is that the Claimants commenced the present action against the Defendants, after the time permitted by the Public Officer Protection Law, Cap 158 Laws of Northern Nigeria,1963 (POPL) for filing an action against the acts of a public officer complained of and the time for instituting a case founded on contract had lapsed. Counsel argued that the Claimants’ complaint/alleged cause of action as shown on the face of the Statement of Facts stems from the alleged removal of their names from the payroll by the Defendants and the alleged consequent non-payment of their salaries that arose on 30th September, 2009 had become extinguished.

5. Counsel made reference to the provisions Section 2(a) of the Public Officers (Protection) Law, Cap 158 Laws of Northern Nigeria, 1963 (POPL) and Section 18 of the Limitation Law of Kogi State 1991, and argued that the alleged act by the Defendants was done in pursuance of law, public duty or authority. Counsel submitted that limitation laws protect Defendants from indefinite threat of litigation and it also prevents the Claimants from litigating stale claims after undue delay. The cases of Egbe Vs Adefarasin [1987] 1 NSCC 1; Merchantile Bank (Nig) Ltd Vs Feteco [1998] 5 NWLR (Pt 540) 143; Ibrahim Vs JSC [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt 584) 1; Edosomwan Vs ACB [1999] 7 NWLR (Pt 408) 472, were cited to buttress his submissions. Counsel finally urged the Court to dismiss the Claimants’ case for want of jurisdiction for being statute barred.

6. Counsel for the Claimants A. O. Onoja Esq. in reaction, made reference to paragraphs 8, 17-22, 48, 50 of the Statement of Facts and argued that the action of the Defendants violates the provisions of Sections 33, 36 (1) & 44 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Counsel further argued that limitation laws do not apply to actions founded on rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution. Counsel contends that the Defendants acted outside their statutory or constitutional duty and submitted that the right to fair hearing and fair trial is sacrosanct. The provision of Order 3 Rule 1 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009 and the case of Elf Petroleum Vs Umah [2006] LPELR were cited in support of his propositions.

7. The further argument of Claimants’ counsel is that Section 2(a) Public Officers Protection Law (POPL), allows exceptions where there is continuance of damage or injury; that the injury in the instant case is continuing until it ceases; that the Claimants are still in the employment of the Defendants because their employment have not 

been terminated and their salary remains unpaid. 

8. With reference to paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 48 of the Statement of Facts, counsel for the Claimants further argued that acts founded from malice, abuse of powers, illegal actions of officials and or wrongful actions such as arbitrary withholding of salary by the Defendants as in the instant case, does not enjoy the protection of Limitation Law and also argued that Limitation Act or Law is inapplicable to cases founded on contract. The cases of AG Rivers Vs AG Bayelsa [2012] LPELR-9336; Nestello Gateway Group Ltd Vs JSC, FCT Abuja [2019] LPELR 47929, NRMAFC Vs Johnson [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt 1656) 247; KSJSC Vs Tolani [2020] All FWLR (Pt 1025) 480; Ibeto Cement Co Ltd Vs AG Federation [2008] 1 NWLR (PT 1069) 470; Lagos City Council Vs Ogunbiyi [1969] 1 All NLR 297 were inter-alia cited to support his propositions. Counsel finally urged the Court to dismiss the Objection and hold that the Claimants’ case falls within the exception to the applicability of Section 2 (a) POPL, as sufficient facts have been disclosed by the Claimants that the actions of the Defendants are arbitrary, an abuse of power, mala fide, unlawful without semblance of legal justification.

9. Now, the pre-eminent status of jurisdiction in the scheme of legal proceedings is well ingrained in our jurisprudence. One would therefore be restating the obvious that jurisdiction is the first test in the legal authority of a Court and its absence disqualifies the Court from determining the substantive issues submitted to it for adjudication. This is so because jurisdiction is the very lifeline of judicial power without which any proceedings would constitute a nullity however well conducted. Indeed, 

jurisdiction is everything: without it a Court has no power to take one step in the proceedings beyond merely declaring that it lacks jurisdiction. See Madukolu Vs Nkemdilim [1962] 1 All NLR 587; Rossek Vs ACB Limited [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt 312) 382.

10. It is equally trite that in civil jurisprudence, where the issue arises as to whether

or not a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit; it is the Claimant’s claims that must 

be examined in order to find an answer. See Tukur Vs Government of Gongola State [1989] 4 NWLR (Pt 117) 517; Adeyemi Vs Opeyori [1976] 9-10 SC 31; Anigboro Vs Sea Trucks (Nig) Ltd [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt 399) 35. See also the cases of Godwin Vs Okwey [2010] 16 NWLR (Pt1219) 309; CBN Vs Okojie [2015] All FWLR (Pt 807) 478; United Cement Co Nig Ltd Vs Akamkpa Local Govt Council [2016] LPELR 11370; Ahmed Vs Ahmed [2013] All FWLR (Pt 699)1025, cited by the Claimants’ counsel. So, in the instant case, the Court must restrict itself to the facts deposed by the Claimants in the Statement of Facts and the reliefs sought in determining the issue of jurisdiction.

11. At this juncture, permit me to resolve the preliminary issues raised by respective counsel in their written addresses.  In his written address, counsel for the Claimants argued that by Order 3 Rule 10 (iv) of the Rules of this Court, it is required for the Defendants to file a defence and incorporate a special defence (if any). In other words, the argument of counsel seem that the 3rd Defendant ought to have specifically pleaded the special defence and that failure of the 3rd Defendant to file the special defence will be deemed waived. As correctly submitted by counsel for the 3rd Defendant in the Reply on Points of Law, the Rule of this Court in reference does not make such provision.

12. Furthermore, it is on record that as required by Order 18 Rule 2 (4) of the Rules, the 3rd Defendant filed a Memorandum of Conditional appearance on 24/04/2025. Order 9 Rule 2 of the Rules of this Court also provides that where any Defendant fails or omits to file a Memorandum of Appearance, the delivery of any document or subsequent processes in relation to the matter shall be deemed good and proper service.  See also the cases of Elabanjo & Anor Vs Dawodu [2006] LPELR 1106; Nasir Vs CSC, Kano State [2007] 5 NWLR (Pt 1190) 253. Therefore, the argument of Claimants’ counsel on waiver by the 3rd Defendant is hereby discountenanced. 

13. On his part, counsel for the 3rd Defendant in his Reply on Points of Law to the 

Claimants’ written address argued that paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the Counter-Affidavit offends Section 115 of the Evidence Act, 2011, being legal arguments, conclusions, statements which are not facts that are recognizable to the Deponent and urged the Court to strike out the said paragraphs. The cases of Military Governor of Lagos State Vs Ojukwu [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 621; NEC Vs Izuogu [1993] 2 NWLR (Pt 275) 270; Osian Vs Flour Mills of Nigeria Ltd [1968] All NLR 432, were cited inter-alia to buttress his submissions.

14. It is trite law that an affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter. See Section 115 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011, which states thus:

(1)        "Every affidavit used in the Court shall contain only a statement of facts and circumstances to which the witness deposes, either of his own personal knowledge or from information which he believes to be true.

(2)        An affidavit shall not contain extraneous matter, by way of objection, prayer or legal argument or conclusion."

On when a matter is extraneous in an affidavit, the Supreme Court in General Aviation Services Limited Vs Thahal [2004] All FWLR (Pt 211) 1368 SC per Uwaifo JSC, said

"If therefore, affidavit evidence is in the form of conclusion, inference, legal argument, prayer, or objection, it raises no fact which needs to be controverted but is simply regarded as extraneous to the determination of factual disputers.”

15. The test therefore for determining whether a matter is extraneous is to ascertain whether that particular deposition is fit only as an argument which counsel ought to urge upon the Court. Once it falls within that category, then the deposition is offensive to Section115 of the Evidence Act. I have looked at each of the paragraphs in the Counter-Affidavit that are said to be offensive. Firstly, the Deponent is not a legal practitioner to have made the legal arguments contained therein, then, the following paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 contain statements, legal arguments and conclusions that are proper for written address. Therefore, I agree with the submission of counsel that the said paragraphs of the Counter-Affidavit are offensive to provisions of Section 115 of the Evidence Act. The said paragraphs are hereby accordingly struck out.

16. In his oral submission, counsel for the Claimants further argued that Public Officer’s Protection Act (POPA) and the Limitation Law of Kogi State, 1991 are unknown and/or inapplicable in Kogi State, and submitted that the said statutes are inapplicable in the instant case. Counsel placed reliance on the cases of CIL Risk & Asset Management Ltd Vs Ekiti State Govt [2020] 12 NWLR (Pt1738) 203 at 243; Suleiman Darda’u Vs Kogi State Polytechnic & Anor in Suit No: NICN/LKJ/33/2020, judgement of this Court delivered on 28/07/2022 and Maha Bameyi Vs Polaris Bank Ltd & Anor in Suit No: HCL/52/2025, Ruling of High Court of Kogi State, delivered on 03/02/2026, and urged the Court to hold that the Limitation Law, Kogi State is non-existent and that the POPA is inapplicable in Kogi State.

17. In response to the oral submission of the Claimants’ counsel, counsel for the 3rd Defendant submitted that the instant Objection is hinged on Section 2 (a) of the POPL (supra) which remains applicable in Kogi State by virtue of Section 4 of Decree No. 41 of 1991, States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) (No.2) Decree 1991. Counsel further submitted that pursuant to the said Decree, all existing laws in the States (in the instant case Kwara State and Benue State) out of which the new States, (including Kogi State) thus created by the Decree shall continue to have effect in the new States thus created, subject to such limits and modifications as may be necessary. The further submission of counsel is that by Section 315 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the POPL (supra) is an existing law and such law shall continue to exist until it is expressly repealed.

18. I must be clear in stating that a case is only an authority for the facts before it and similar facts arising from subsequent cases as precedent. The implication of this is that once the material facts are not the same, a Court is not under obligation to follow the decision earlier decided by a Court either as persuasive or binding precedent. See Okeke Vs Uwaechina [2022] LPELR 57291 (SC); Skye Bank Vs Akinpelu [2010] LPELR 3072. Bearing this in mind, it is important to focus on the salient interesting point the counsel for the 3rd Defendant is making that the Objection in the instant case is hinged on the provision of the POPL which is an existing law in Kogi State pursuant to Decree No 41 of 1991and that by virtue of Section 315 of the Constitution applicable in Kogi State. It must also be noted that the said Decree came into force on 27/08/1991.

19. I have painstakingly examined the authorities cited by Claimants’ counsel with regards to his arguments. As correctly submitted by counsel for the 3rd Defendant, the instant Objection is hinged on POPL (supra) and not POPA as assumed. The authorities cited by Claimants’ counsel were in respect of POPA and more importantly, reference was not made by the Supreme Court in the CIL Risk and Asset Management case to Decree No 41 or the applicability of the said Decree to the newly created States.

20. Now Section 315 (1) (b) of the 1999 Constitution provides:

“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, an existing law shall have effect with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution and shall be deemed to be 

(b) a Law made by a House of Assembly to the extent that it is alaw with respect to any matter on which a house of Assembly is empowered by this Constitution to make laws.”

In the instant case, I am of the firm view that without referring to Decree No.41 in CIL Risk and Asset Management case, or having not considered or applied Decree No.41 in the case, the facts in the CIL case are distinguishable from the facts of the present case and as such, this Court is not bound to follow same. And I so hold. In the same vein, the said Decree was not considered and/or applied by this Court in the Dard’au case or by the High Court in the Bameyi case. It is equally trite that decisions of Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction are persuasive and this Court is also not bound by them. And I so further hold. 

21. Now, the simple and narrow question to be determined in the present Objection is whether the provision of Section 2 of POPL (supra) and Limitation Law (supra) are applicable to the facts of the instant case, to oust the jurisdiction of this Court for being statute-barred and liable to be dismissed. The intendment of the doctrine governing the calculation of the limitation period, as encapsulated in Section 2(a) of POPA or POPL (as in the instant case), to preserve the orderly administration of justice and the law on the limitation period for bringing an action against a public officer is settled beyond doubt by a plethora of judicial authorities. The general position of the law is that time begins to run for the purposes of the limitation law from the date the cause of action accrues. See Ajayi Vs Adebiyi [2012] 11 NWLR (Pt 1310) 137; Sulgrave Holdings Inc, Vs FGN [2012] 17 NWLR (Pt 1329) 309. In the famous decision of Thomas Vs Olufosoye [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt 13) 523, a cause of action is said to arise and accrue to the person entitled to it when the fact or all the facts are complete which entitle a person to a remedy against another if proved.

22. The case of the Claimants as disclosed in the Statement of Facts is that they were employed as officers by the 5th Defendant on different cadres at various times from 29th January, 1979 and 2000. However, they alleged that the 3rd and 5th Defendants under the guide of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Defendants arbitrarily stopped their salaries and allowances in the month of September 2009 and still continuing without a just cause till date. The Claimants contend that without ever been indicted for any wrong doing or invited for investigation on any subject matter their names were arbitrarily removed from the payroll and without first determining the subsisting employment relationship. The Claimants also alleged that their employment still subsists with the Defendants.

23. As I earlier stated, the argument of the Claimants’ counsel in reaction to the Objection is that limitation laws do not apply to actions founded on rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution or acts founded from malice, abuse of powers, illegal actions of officials or wrongful actions such as arbitrary withholding of salary or cases founded on contract. The Claimants’ counsel also argued that the act of withholding the Claimants’ salary without the determination of their employment is a continuing injury and the action falls within the exception of continuing damage, rendering Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Law inapplicable to the instant case. 

24. On the issue that Limitation Law do not apply to actions founded on rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution, I agree with the submission of counsel for the 3rd Defendant that the Claimants’ action is not a fundamental right action. By Order II Rule 1 of Fundamental Right Enforcement Procedure Rules 2009, the actions competent pursuant to the FREP Rules are those that the main and principal claims centers on the fundamental rights. The cases of WAEC Vs Akinkunmi [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt 1091) 152; University of Ilorin Vs Oluwadare [2006] 14 NWLR (Pt 1000) 751, cited by counsel are apposite.

25. In response to the argument that the Claimants’ case falls within the exception of continuing damage/injury, counsel for the 3rd Defendant in his Reply of Points of Law distinguished between a cause of action and a continued damage or injury; that a cause of action is a factual situation, the existence of which entitles a person to obtain a remedy from a Court against another person, whilst a continual damage or injury is the continued act (of omission or commission) or injury and not the continuation of the effect of the act, injury or damage. Counsel cited the case of INEC Vs Ogbadibo Local Government & Ors [2015] LPELR 24839. This same position was held in the cases of Alhassan Vs Aliyu [2009] LPELR 834; Oludele Vs Wema Bank Plc [2014] LPELR 23389; Ukanna & Ors Vs Nigeria Security Printing & Minting Plc [2016] LPELR 51206. 

26. Proceeding on this legal footing therefore, it is clear from the averments in the

Amended Statement of Facts particularly paragraphs 2, 10, 11, 14, 17 and 18

thereof, that the alleged act (cause of action) is that their names were arbitrarily removed from the payroll which resulted in the stoppage of their salaries. The act of removal of the names of the Claimants from the payroll crystalized and was completed in September 2009. Put differently, the cause of action in the instant case is not continuous and the exception in Section 2 (a) of the POPL with respect to continuous damage or injury does not apply in this case. And I so hold

27. Perhaps, I should remark that in paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the Amended Statement of Facts, the Claimants stated that a Notice of Intention to Sue was served on the Defendants on 31/08/2010; that the Claimants filed two suits; Suit No: OHC/05/2011 and Suit No: OHC/07/2011, at the Kogi State High Court, Okpo; that the judgements on issue of jurisdiction were set aside on 10/12/2019; that same was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 03/01/2024 and other efforts they made to resolve the dispute with the Defendants proved abortive. From facts presented by the Claimants in the foregoing, it is unassailable that the cause of action had accrued since September 2009 by the filing the earlier suits at the Okpo High Court.    

28. Now, I am not unmindful of the fact that the Apex Court has oscillated over the years as to the question whether the Limitation law (of which POPA/POPL is one) applies to employment contracts. Permit me to bring to the fore the Supreme Court cases of the recent past. In National Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission & 2 Ors Vs Ajibola Johnson & 10 Ors [2019] 2 NWLR (Pt 1656) 247 SC, after reviewing the older authorities, held that the Limitation Law does not apply to employment contracts. However, the conflicting decisions emanating from the superior courts of records of this country on the issue has been rapid.  Counsel for respective parties have elaborately furnished some of these decisions.

29. The most recent decision of the Supreme Court on the vexed issue of the applicability of POPA and Limitation Law is the case of Okoronkwo Vs INEC [2025] 8 NWLR (Pt 1991) 131. In that case, it was held that Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act (supra) or Limitation Law (POPL) applies to contract of service, as in the instant case, thereby entitling the Defendants to exercise their statutory right and duty. The doctrine of judicial precedent otherwise known as Stare Decisis is not alien to our jurisprudence. It is a well settled principle of judicial policy which must be strictly adhered to by all lower Courts. While such lower Courts may depart from their own decisions reached per in curiam, they cannot refuse to be bound by decisions of higher Courts even if those decisions were reached per in curiam. The implication is that a lower Court is bound by the decision of a higher Court even where that decision was given erroneously. See CBN Vs Okojie [2015] 14 NWLR (Pt 1479) 263.

30. In Atolagbe Vs Awuni [1997] 9 NWLR (Pt 522) 536 at 564, Uwais CJN (as he 

then was) stated thus:

“It is now well settled that under the common law doctrine of precedent or stare

 decisis the decision of a higher Court may be criticized by the Judge of the lower Court but notwithstanding the criticism the Judge of the lower Court is bound to follow and apply such decision in the case before him. He has no right to disregard the decision or side-track it.”

This principle was recently restated by the Apex Court in Wema Bank Plc Vs Awotunde [2025] 18 NWLR (Pt 2017) 273.

31. Limitation of action principle is both statutory and equitable rule of law applicable in international and national laws. One of the principles of the statutes of limitation is that a person who sleeps on his right should not be assisted by the Courts in an action for his claims. A person who is aware of his rights but allows them to go stale should not be allowed to revive the said stale action to the detriment of an adversary. It applies to make claim(s) inadmissible if a party waits for an unreasonable period to bring the claim, thereby prejudicing the Defendant’s ability to defend. It is similar to the equitable principle that equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent and it prevents a party from acting unconscionably. See Nwadiaro Vs Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd [1990] NWLR (Pt 150) 322.

32. In Skye Bank Plc Vs Perone (Nig) Ltd [2016] LPELR, 41443, Tsammani JCA, opined thus:

“Statutes of Limitation are enacted so as to prevent or avoid a situation where a Plaintiff who has slept over his right may wake up from his slumber at any time to commence an action in respect of a right which has accrued to him. Such Limitation Statutes are founded on principles of equity and fairness and therefore in keeping with the equitable principles of equity aids the vigilant and not an indolent person. A person who has decided to hibernate while his right is being violated cannot wake up at his leisure to commence action to realize such right. The rationale behind such statutes is that, a Plaintiff should not be allowed to perpetrate injustice by keeping a Defendant in suspense ad infinitum”

33. On the basis of the foregoing analysis and based on the principle of stare decisis by which this Court is bound, the decision I have arrived at is that the filing of the Complaint seventeen (17) years after the act complained of, clearly offends Section 2 (a) of the Public Officers Law (supra). I find in the result that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this suit. The same shall be and is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their respective costs.

Ruling is hereby entered accordingly.

 

SINMISOLA O. ADENIYI

(Hon. Judge)

27/07/2026