IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD

 

DATED: 8^TH DAY OF MAY, 2026        SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/53/2025

 

BETWEEN:

MISS BLESSING OGECHI NNAJI--------------------------CLAIMANT

AND

1. FIDELITY BANK PLC
2. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA-----------------------DEFENDANTS

 

Representations

A.I. Salami for the Claimant

O.C. Obasi for the 1st Defendant

S.B. Ojo for the 2nd Defendant

 

JUDGEMENT

The Claimant commenced this suit by way of an Originating Summons filed on the 18th day of July, 2025. The Originating Summons was supported by a 15-paragraphed affidavit deposed to by the Claimant, Miss Blessing Ogechi Nnaji, and accompanied by a written address.

 

Arising from the said Originating Summons, the Claimant submitted for determination the following question, as follows:

 

Whether there exists on the record of the 1^st Defendant any incident of fraud, financial malfeasance or any impropriety whatsoever attributable to the Claimant, which accords with the offences contemplated under the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria, March 2024 (issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria pursuant to Section 47 of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 2020), so as to justify the continued retention of the Claimant’s name on the blacklist maintained by the 2nd Defendant, which blacklist precludes employment in the Nigerian financial sector.

 

Upon the determination of the said question, the Claimant seeks the following reliefs:

 

1. A Declaration that the 1st Defendant does not have any record or proof of any offence directly inculpatory of the Claimant in respect of fraud, financial crime, abuse of office, breach of trust or any offence as defined under the said Revised Guidelines, which would warrant her inclusion or retention on the blacklist.
2. An Order directing the 2nd Defendant to forthwith remove or cause to be removed the name of the Claimant from its blacklist, thereby restoring to her the right to be considered for and retain employment within the Nigerian financial industry.

 

In response to the said originating summons, the 1^st Defendant on the 16^th of February, 2026 filed a 9 paragraphed counter-affidavit deposed to by one Hope Effiong along with a written address in opposition.  The 2^nd Defendant on their part, filed on the 28^th of August 2025, a 13 paragraphed Counter-Affidavit deposed to by one Rosiji, Oluwatobi Oladunni and a written address. 

 

The Claimant subsequently filed on the 21^st of January, 2026, a Further affidavit of 8 paragraphs deposed to by herself and also accompanied the affidavit with a reply on point of law to the 2^ndDefendant’s written address. 

The Defendants in addition to their response to the Originating summons filed separate notice of preliminary objection. That of the 1^st Defendant was filed on the 9^th of October, 2025 while that of the 2^nd Defendant was filed on the 1^st of August 2025.

 

The notice of preliminary objection filed by the 1^st Defendant was brought pursuant to Order 17 Rules 1 and 2 of the National Industrial Court (Civil) Procedure Rules 2017 and under the Inherent Jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The notice is seeking for:

 

1. An order of this Honourable Court striking out this suit for want of jurisdiction and competence.
2. And for such further other order as this Honourable Court may make in the circumstances.  

 

The grounds upon which the objection is placed is that the originating summons filed by the Claimant is not for the interpretation of any document, hence, same is filed in disregard for the rules of this court and accordingly requires pleading of facts and proof through credible evidence. Counsel to the 1^st Defendant in the written address in support of the notice, formulated a lone issue for determination to wit:

 

Whether the Claimant’s Suit seeking for a declaration that the 1^st Defendant do not have any record or proof of any offence that is directly inculpatory of commission of any financial crime can be commenced via originating Summons?

 

In arguing the lone issue, counsel cited the cases of INAKOJU & ORS v. ADELEKE & ORS (2007) LPELR-1510(SC) and HON. A.G & COMMISIONER FOR JUSTICE, AKWA IBOM STATE & ORS v. ESSIEN (2020) LPELR-49576(CA) on the use of originating summons before positing that having annexed only correspondences and/or letter between the Claimant and the 1^stDefendant, the documents do not come within the purview of the documents that are expected to be construed or interpreted by this Honourable Court as they are documents which forms part of a Court proceedings and not what should accompany an Originating summons.

Counsel also cited the cases of NEMI & 2 ORS. V. THE STATE (1987) 4 SC 374 and ALHAJI MUHAMMADU MAGARI DINGYADI &ANOR. V. INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS. (2011) 4SC (Pt.1) to contend that the Claimant has failed to bring before this Court the Statute, Will, Deed or the Constitution allegedly infringed by the 1^stDefendant that requires the interpretation of this Honourable Court and in the absence of such strict provisions of the law, counsel urged the Court to strike out this suit and decline Jurisdiction 

 

In response to the foregoing, Claimant on the 21^st of January, 2026 filed a written address in opposition to the 1^st Defendant’s notice of preliminary objection and arising therefrom, counsel to the Claimant contended that the instrument to be interpreted is the CBN REVISED GUIDELINES FOR BLACKLISTING FOR BANKS AND 0THER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA OF MARCH 2024, while adding that by virtue of Order 3 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court, such document comes within the documents mentioned in the said Rules. 

 

Counsel added that this court also has the power to order that parties should file pleadings in the event that there exist disputed facts while citing Order 3 Rule 17. Counsel posited that dispute cannot be inferred at this stage since it is only the document of the Claimant that can be considered.

 

Counsel maintained that determining whether the Claimant deserves to remain on the blacklist of the CBN, can be attained by the interrogation of documents to that effect and conversely, if no document exist, then the same overriding issue for determination can easily be answered or determined in the negative i.e.  that no facts exist that justifies Claimant retention on the CBN blacklist.

 

Counsel cited the case of SANI V KOGI STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY (2019) 4 NWLR (PT 1661) SC 72 to posit that assuming there is dispute of fact, such dispute has to be substantial and there cannot be dispute of fact where there are no contradictory or adverse facts. 

 

I have taken into account the grounds upon which the notice of preliminary objection of the 1^stDefendant is predicated and also considered the argument of both counsel in their respective written addresses. To my mind, the lone issue for the determination of the notice of preliminary objection filed by the 1^st Defendant is to wit:

 

Whether or not the instant suit is one that can be determined through the originating summons proceedings.

 

The limit of the foregoing issue is owing to the fact that where the court finds that the instant suit cannot be determined by originating summons, all that would be required would be for the court to order parties to exchange pleadings by way of a Complaint. In other words, the commencement of an action under the wrong proceedings before this court does not rob the court of jurisdiction and would not warrant an order striking out the suit as prayed by the 1^stDefendant. 

 

For avoidance of doubt, the court in the case of P.D.P. V. Abubakar (2007) 3 NWLR (pt. 1022) 515 referred to.] (p. 353, paras. C, D, F, 361, paras. B-C) held that;

 

“The form of commencement of an action does not necessarily make it incompetent. It does not matter whether the action was begun by writ of summons or by Originating summons. What is most important is the question of justice of the case. Thus, where a suit is improperly commenced by originating summons, the defect relates to procedure and does not affect the competence of the suit. The legal effect is to order pleadings and not strike out the suit”.

 

To consider whether or not the instant suit can be maintained using the originating summons as the mode of commencement, I have taken into account the issue to be determined. The said question is to determine whether the 1^st Defendant has any record which accords with the CBN REVISED GUIDELINES FOR BLACKLISTING FOR BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA OF MARCH 2024 which could justify the retention of the name of the Claimant in the Backlist of CBN which prevents the Claimant from working in any financial institution in Nigeria. 

 

While counsel to the 1^st Defendant had contended that there is no instrument to be interpreted before this court, counsel to the Claimant posited that the said CBN REVISED GUIDELINES FOR BLACKLISTING FOR BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA OF MARCH 2024 is what is to be interpreted and the Claimant via his further affidavit exhibited the said CBN REVISED GUIDELINES FOR BLACKLISTING FOR BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA OF MARCH 2024. There is no gainsaying that the said regulation being a subsidiary legislation comes within the framework of an enactment.

 

In addition to the foregoing, I have taken into consideration the reliefs sought by the Claimant, and I am of the considered view that the said reliefs are amenable to determination by way of Originating Summons. This position is informed by the provisions of Order 3 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court which provides as follows:

 

Civil proceedings that may be commenced by way of Originating Summons include matters relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreement or any other instrument relating to employment, labour and industrial relations in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or law in force in Nigeria.

 

In the same vein, Order 3 Rule 16 of the Rules of this Court provides thus:

 

1. Any person claiming to be interested under an enactment, constitution, agreement or any other written instrument may by Originating Summons apply to the Court for the determination of any question of construction arising from the instrument and for a declaration of the rights of the person(s) interested, in so far as such question of construction arises from a subject matter over which the Court has jurisdiction.
2. A party activating the interpretative jurisdiction of the Court shall indicate with sufficient particularity the provisions or part of the document sought to be interpreted.

 

Bearing the foregoing provisions in mind, I am of the firm view that this Court is properly called upon to determine, through the Originating Summons procedure, whether or not the 1st Defendant has in its custody any record which aligns with the relevant provisions of the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria, March 2024 issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria, as it affects the Claimant’s eligibility for employment within the Nigerian financial sector.

 

I must add that the mere existence of a dispute of fact does not, without more, render the Originating Summons procedure inappropriate. The law is settled that such dispute must be substantial, material, and fundamental to the determination of the live issues before the Court. Where the dispute is peripheral or merely incidental, the action may still be competently sustained by way of Originating Summons.

 

In this regard, the Court in PAM v. MOHAMMED (2008) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1112) 1 at 481, paragraphs D–E, held that:

 

“It is not always that when there is dispute on facts that the matter should be commenced by writ of summons. The dispute on facts must be substantial to affect the live issues in the matter. Where the dispute is peripheral and not material to the live issues, an action can be sustained by originating summons. Facts make a case and it is the dispute in the facts that gives rise to litigation.”

 

Applying the foregoing principle to the instant case, I find that any perceived dispute of fact does not rise to the level of substantiality required to displace the Originating Summons procedure. The central issue remains the interpretation and application of the said Guidelines to the status of the Claimant, which is a matter properly within the interpretative jurisdiction of this Court.

The notice of preliminary objection filed by the 2nd Defendant was brought pursuant to Section 251(1) (a), (p), (q) and (r) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The reliefs sought therein are:

 

a. An order of this Honourable Court striking out the suit on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same against the 2nd Defendant; and

b. Such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.

 

The grounds upon which the objection is predicated are that by virtue of Section 251 of the Constitution, the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the 2nd Defendant as an agency of the Federal Government, and that the subject matter of this suit pertains to the regulatory powers of the said 2nd Defendant.

 

Counsel to the 2nd Defendant accordingly formulated a lone issue for determination, namely:

 

Whether, having regard to the status of the 2nd Defendant as an agency of the Federal Government and the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution, this Court possesses the jurisdiction to entertain the subject matter of this suit.

 

In arguing the said issue, counsel submitted that jurisdiction is fundamental and must be established before the Court can proceed. Reliance was placed on authorities including MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 ALL NLR 581, as well as INAKOJU v. ADELEKE (2007), amongst others, to contend that the proper forum for this action is the Federal High Court.

 

Counsel further urged the Court to examine the processes filed by the Claimant, particularly the reliance placed on the regulatory framework issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria, and to hold that the subject matter falls squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.

In response, learned counsel to the Claimant contended that while the authorities cited by the 2nd Defendant correctly state the law, they are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Counsel submitted that the subject matter of this suit is fundamentally rooted in employment and labour relations, thereby bringing it within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

 

Counsel further argued that the reliefs sought by the Claimant, particularly the restoration of her eligibility for employment within the financial sector, are intrinsically linked to her right to work and to be employed, which are matters squarely within the jurisdiction of this Court.

 

I have carefully considered the grounds of the Preliminary Objection of the 2nd Defendant alongside the submissions of learned counsel on both sides.

 

To my mind, the issue for determination is as follows:

 

Whether this Court possesses the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit in view of the status of the 2nd Defendant as an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria.

 

There is no gainsaying that jurisdiction is indeed the lifeblood of adjudication as contended by counsel to the 2^nd Defendant. in the case of ARDO & ANOR v. NYAKO & ORS  (2013) LPELR-20887(CA) the court held that:

 

“it is trite that jurisdiction is a fundamental and threshold matter, the life blood of adjudication which when raised, the Court ought to determine same before proceeding with the consideration and determination of the substance of the case. Where a court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit the entire proceeding is in nullity no matter how well conducted. It has also been held that it is the claim of the Plaintiff, in this case, it is the Statement of Claim and the Reliefs Sought by the Appellant that determine the jurisdiction of the Court. See Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (pt. 1025) 423 at 588; Ugwu v. Ararume (2008) CCLR at 270 also reported (2007) 12 NWLR (pt. 1048) 367 at 445 paras. B - C and Elabanjo v. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (pt. 1001) 76”.

 

It is equally not in doubt that for a Court to validly adjudicate over a matter, the subject matter of the suit must fall within the jurisdiction conferred on the Court. See MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 ALL NLR 581 at 589.

 

Having stated the foregoing, the contention raised by the 2nd Defendant, as can be gleaned from the grounds of its objection, is essentially that the subject matter of this suit falls outside the jurisdiction of this Court. Put differently, the 2nd Defendant challenges the substantive jurisdiction of this Court on the premise that, being an agency of the Federal Government, any matter involving it must, by virtue of Section 251 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), be entertained exclusively by the Federal High Court.

 

Bearing in mind that what is being challenged is the substantive jurisdiction of this Court, it must be stated unequivocally that the resolution of such a question is not one that admits of conjecture, as jurisdiction is strictly circumscribed by statute. Interestingly, the same Constitution relied upon by learned counsel to the 2nd Defendant in challenging the jurisdiction of this Court is also the very instrument upon which the Claimant predicates her assertion that this Court is vested with the requisite jurisdiction. 

 

In determining the issue of jurisdiction, it is settled law that the Court must examine the originating processes filed by the Claimant. In this regard, the Supreme Court in A.G. ANAMBRA STATE v. A.G. FEDERATION (2007) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) held that:

 

“It is settled law that for the purpose of determining whether a court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it, it is the duty of the court to look at the statement of claim where one is required and had been filed and take the documents therein contained as true ex facie… In a case commenced by originating summons, the relevant processes to be examined are the originating summons and the affidavit in support thereof.” Per Onnoghen, JSC P. 91-92, Para E-A.

 

See also GOLDMARK NIGERIA LTD v. IBAFON CO. LTD (2012) LPELR-9349(SC).

 

In the light of the foregoing authorities, I have examined the Originating Summons and the affidavit in support thereof. The narrative presented by the Claimant is that she was previously employed by various financial institutions, including the 1st Defendant, and at the time of instituting this action, was employed by Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers. The Claimant avers that her current employer brought to her attention that her name had been placed on the blacklist maintained by the Central Bank of Nigeria, and that the report allegedly emanated from the 1st Defendant. Consequent upon this development, she was requested to resign her employment.

 

The Claimant, by this action, seeks essentially the removal of her name from the said blacklist, with a view to restoring her eligibility for employment within the financial sector.

 

The foregoing narrative clearly demonstrates that the gravamen of the Claimant’s complaint is the impact of the alleged blacklisting on her employment status and prospects. The reliefs sought are therefore intrinsically tied to her right to work and to be considered for employment.

 

It is not in dispute that the 2nd Defendant is mentioned in this suit in its capacity as the regulator responsible for issuing the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria pursuant to Section 47 of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act, 2020. It is also not in dispute that the 2nd Defendant is an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria.

 

Indeed, by virtue of Section 251(1)(p), (q) and (r) of the Constitution, the Federal High Court is vested with jurisdiction in matters relating to the administration or management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies, as well as in matters seeking declaratory or injunctive reliefs affecting same.

 

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is apparent that learned counsel to the 2nd Defendant has accorded little or no consideration to other provisions of the same Constitution which define and expand the jurisdiction of this Court. While it is correct that, prior to the Third Alteration, the jurisdiction of this Court was not constitutionally entrenched as that of a superior court of record, the enactment of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 fundamentally altered the jurisdictional landscape.

 

For the avoidance of doubt, Section 254C(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides thus:

 

“Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257 and 272 of this Constitution and anything contained in this Constitution, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters—

 

The foregoing provision clearly vests the National Industrial Court with constitutional authority to adjudicate on matters incidental to or connected with labour and employment. Bearing in mind that the reliefs sought by the Claimant are directed at restoring her eligibility for employment within the financial sector, there is no gainsaying that the subject matter of this suit falls squarely within the ambit of Section 254C(1)(a) of the Constitution and is therefore within the jurisdiction of this Court.

 

With respect to the contention that the 2nd Defendant is an agency of the Federal Government, it is pertinent to observe that the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Section 254C is expressly made “notwithstanding” the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution. The legal implication of the word “notwithstanding” is to accord supremacy to the provision in which it appears, thereby excluding the operation of any other provision that might otherwise limit its effect.

 

In this regard, the Supreme Court in ADEDAYO & ORS v. PDP & ORS (2013) LPELR-20342(SC), relying on PETER OBI v. INEC (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt. 378) 1116, held that:

 

“The word ‘notwithstanding’ is used to exclude any impeding effect of any other provision of the statute… so that the said section may fulfil itself.”

 

It must also be borne in mind that in the interpretation of the Constitution, its provisions must be read holistically and not in isolation. The Supreme Court, in BRONIK MOTORS LTD v. WEMA BANK LTD (1983) LPELR-808(SC), emphasized that:

 

“The provisions of a Constitution ought to be interpreted as a whole; related sections ought to be construed together.”

 

Consequently, Section 251 of the Constitution, which vests jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters involving Federal Government agencies, cannot be read in isolation. It must be construed alongside Section 254C, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on this Court in respect of labour and employment matters.

 

The inevitable consequence of this constitutional arrangement is that where a dispute involves a Federal Government agency and simultaneously arises from or is connected with employment or labour relations, jurisdiction resides exclusively in the National Industrial Court and I so hold.

 

In other words, a Federal Government agency, when engaged in matters relating to employment, labour or industrial relations, is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court as the constitutionally designated forum for the adjudication of such disputes.

In the light of the foregoing, it is irrestible conclusion of this court that the issue formulated for the determination of the Preliminary Objection of the 2nd Defendant is resolved in favour of the Claimant, to the effect that this Court possesses the requisite substantive jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit notwithstanding the status of the 2nd Defendant as an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria. Consequent upon the foregoing, the preliminary objection raised and argued by the 2^nd Defendant lacks merit and same is accordingly dismissed in its entirety.

 

Having dismissed the preliminary objection of the Defendants and resolved the issue of jurisdiction, the Court now turns to the substantive matter.

 

Arising from the written address in support of the Originating Summons, learned counsel to the Claimant formulated a lone issue for determination, as follows:

 

Whether there exists on the record of the 1st Defendant any incident of fraud, financial malfeasance or impropriety attributable to the Claimant, which accords with the offences contemplated under the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria, March 2024 issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria, so as to justify the continued retention of the Claimant’s name on the said blacklist.

 

In arguing the lone issue, learned counsel submitted that the Claimant is not aware of the specific facts or circumstances that led to the inclusion of her name on the blacklist maintained by the 2nd Defendant. Counsel stated that the only information available to the Claimant was communicated through her employer, from whom she has now resigned.

 

Counsel further contended that the Claimant, through her solicitors, made formal inquiries to both Defendants requesting clarification on the basis of her blacklisting, but was not furnished with any substantive response, save for an indication from the 1st Defendant that an internal investigation was ongoing.

 

It was further argued that even assuming the existence of any prior disciplinary issue, such would not, without more, constitute an offence of sufficient gravity to warrant blacklisting under the applicable Guidelines.

Counsel submitted that the Revised Guidelines, being a regulatory instrument issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria, were designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and adherence to fair hearing standards in determining the circumstances under which an individual may be blacklisted.

 

Particular reference was made to Clause 7.0 of the Guidelines, wherein the concept of “offence level” is introduced. Counsel argued that a proper reading of the said provision, in conjunction with the qualifying criteria therein, indicates that only conduct of a grave and egregious nature, supported by verifiable records in the custody of the reporting institution, can justify blacklisting.

 

It was further submitted that the intention of the said provision is to exclude minor or innocuous infractions which, although disciplinary in nature, do not rise to the level of offences warranting the severe consequence of blacklisting.

 

Counsel also relied on the principle of statutory interpretation that provisions of an enactment must be read together in order to give effect to the true intention of the lawmaker. In this regard, reliance was placed on MUDIAGA-ODJE v. YPS (NIG) LTD (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1400) 413.

 

Counsel concluded by asserting that the Claimant has maintained an unblemished professional record and urged the Court to grant the reliefs sought.

 

In response to the foregoing, learned counsel to the 1st Defendant, in the written address in support of the Counter-Affidavit, contended that the Claimant cannot lay claim to integrity. Counsel argued that prior to the termination of the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant, she was confronted with acts of misconduct which, according to counsel, were manifest throughout the course of her employment and constituted gross financial impropriety. It was further contended that such conduct justified the 1st Defendant in reporting same to the industry regulator in order to safeguard the integrity of the financial system.

 

Counsel relied on UBN PLC v. SOARES (2012) LPELR-8018(CA) and concluded that the Claimant lacks the requisite integrity to be employed within the financial sector or any sector that demands public trust and confidence.

 

On the part of the 2nd Defendant, learned counsel formulated three issues for determination, as follows:

1. Whether, having regard to the status of the 2nd Defendant as the apex bank and an agency of the Federal Government, and in view of Section 251 of the Constitution, this Court possesses jurisdiction to entertain this suit against the 2nd Defendant;
2. Whether, given the contentious nature of the suit, same can properly be commenced by way of Originating Summons; and
3. Whether, in the circumstances of this case, the Claimant has proved her case to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

 

Having regard to the earlier determinations of this Court on the respective Preliminary Objections of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, there is no gainsaying that issues one and two have been conclusively addressed and resolved. The rulings thereon remain binding, and I shall refrain from re-engaging with the arguments canvassed in that regard.

 

In arguing the third issue, learned counsel to the 2nd Defendant submitted that it is trite that he who asserts must prove. Counsel referred to Sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended), as well as the case of OWIE v. IGHIWI (2005) LPELR-2846(SC), to contend that the burden of proof rests on the Claimant to establish the facts upon which her claims are predicated.

 

Counsel argued that the Claimant failed to establish that her name was indeed placed on the blacklist maintained by the Central Bank of Nigeria, and that the claim is therefore unsubstantiated. It was further contended that the Claimant’s case is founded on hearsay, and that this Court is enjoined to act only on credible and admissible evidence, not conjecture or emotion.

 

In support of this contention, counsel relied on JOSHUA v. MAITSAMIYA (2024) LPELR-62417(CA); UNION HOMES SAVINGS & LOANS PLC v. UBN (2022) LPELR-58242(CA); and DUMEZ (NIG) LTD v. NWAKHOBA (2008) LPELR-965(SC).

 

Counsel accordingly urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant’s suit for lacking merit.

 

By way of Reply on Points of Law, learned counsel to the Claimant contended that the 2nd Defendant cannot rely on evasive denials to join issues with the Claimant, and that the facts deposed to by the Claimant remain substantially unchallenged. Counsel relied on DANLADI v. DANGIRI (2015) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1442) 124 (SC).

 

I have carefully considered the depositions in the affidavit and further affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, as well as the Counter-Affidavits of both the 1st and 2nd Defendants. I have also taken into account the submissions of learned counsel on both sides as contained in their respective written addresses and reply on points of law.

 

Bearing the foregoing in mind, I shall proceed to determine the lone question formulated by the Claimant. In doing so, it is apposite to first set out, in clear terms, the factual foundation upon which the said question is predicated.

 

For avoidance of doubt, the narrative presented by the Claimant is that she commenced her career with the 1st Defendant through a labour contractor, initially as a cleaner, and was subsequently elevated to a front-desk role. She thereafter pursued further academic qualifications and went on to work with other financial institutions, including Ecobank, Oak Pensions, ARM Pensions, and Crusader Pensions, before securing employment with Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers.

 

The Claimant averred that while in the employment of Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers, her attention was drawn to the fact that her name had been placed on a blacklist maintained by the Central Bank of Nigeria, and that the report was allegedly traceable to the 1st Defendant. Being uncertain as to the basis for such blacklisting, she instructed her solicitors to write to both Defendants seeking clarification. The 1st Defendant responded by indicating that it was conducting an internal review of its records.

 

The Claimant further averred that, during the pendency of this suit, she was advised by her employer to resign pending the resolution of the issue, and she accordingly tendered her resignation on the 24th of July, 2025.

In support of her case, the Claimant exhibited, among other documents, the letters written to the Defendants, the response of the 1st Defendant, her letter of resignation, and the relevant Guidelines issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria.

 

The position of the 1st Defendant, as gleaned from its Counter-Affidavit, is that the Claimant is fully aware of her alleged acts of financial misconduct, including abuse of her position during her employment. The 1st Defendant averred that the Claimant was subjected to queries, integrity tests, and suspension, and that her failure in the said integrity assessment led to the termination of her employment and the possibility of blacklisting.

 

The 1st Defendant further contended that the Claimant has not approached this Court with clean hands, having allegedly suppressed material facts relating to her misconduct.

 

In support of its position, the 1st Defendant exhibited documents including an internal memorandum dated 13th October 2017, an email trail, a letter relating to staff redeployment, and a letter of termination issued by FSL Securities Limited.

 

The 2nd Defendant, on its part, merely averred that it received the correspondence from the Claimant’s solicitors but that the Claimant commenced this action before the complaint could be investigated.

 

Bearing the foregoing in mind, the central issue that emerges is that while the 1st Defendant asserts that it possesses records of the Claimant’s alleged financial misconduct, the determinative question is whether such records, as presented before this Court, meet the threshold contemplated under the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria.

 

The resolution of this issue necessarily requires a careful correlation of the records placed before this Court by the 1st Defendant vis-à-vis the provisions of the said Guidelines issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria.

 

For the purpose of interpretation, learned counsel to the Claimant referred to Clause 7.0 of the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria, which provides for the conditions under which a financial institution may blacklist an individual. The said provision stipulates that a financial institution shall blacklist any individual who has been indicted by an administrative or investigative panel, sanctioned by a competent authority, or convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction in respect of specified offences including fraud, forgery, insider abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation of facts, and other related misconducts affecting the financial system.

 

The provision further emphasizes that blacklisting decisions must be based on objective criteria and not on personal bias, prejudice, or miscellaneous infractions. In addition, the Guidelines require that, in determining whether to blacklist an individual, the financial institution must take into cognizance:

• the intent and level of involvement of the individual;
• the level of harm caused to the institution or its customers; and
• the availability of concrete and established evidence.

 

A holistic reading of Clause 7.0 reveals that the mere existence of misconduct is not sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant blacklisting. Rather, the misconduct must attain a certain threshold of gravity, measured against the level of harm occasioned and supported by verifiable and credible evidence.

I am in agreement with learned counsel to the Claimant that the magnitude of the alleged misconduct is qualified by the requirement that the conduct must be of such seriousness as to cause significant harm to the institution or its customers. This requirement operates as a safeguard against the arbitrary or disproportionate application of blacklisting sanctions.

 

In addition to the substantive conditions stipulated under Clause 7.0, the Guidelines also prescribe a mandatory procedural framework for blacklisting under Clause 8.0.

 

For the purpose of clarity, Clause 8.0 provides that before a financial institution can validly blacklist an individual, the following steps must be complied with:

• an investigation must be conducted to ascertain the veracity of the allegation;
• the affected individual must be notified in writing of the allegations and afforded the opportunity to respond within a stipulated period;
• a Disciplinary Committee must be constituted to review the matter;
• the individual must be invited to appear and present a defence;
• a decision must be reached based on the evidence presented;
• where the individual is indicted, the matter must be escalated to an Independent Review Panel (IRP) for validation; and
• the final decision must be communicated to the individual.

 

The procedure further contemplates situations where the individual fails to appear and provides safeguards to ensure fairness, including the possibility of extending time where justified. It also makes provision for conflict resolution between the decisions of the Disciplinary Committee and the IRP.

 

The foregoing provisions are clear, detailed, and mandatory. They establish both substantive and procedural thresholds which must be satisfied before an individual can be validly blacklisted.

 

The law is settled that where the words of a statute or subsidiary legislation are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary and natural meaning without resort to extraneous interpretation. In this regard, the Supreme Court in 7-UP BOTTLING CO. LTD v. ABIOLA & SONS (NIG) LTD (1995) LPELR-2(SC) held that:

“Where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.”

 

Accordingly, the provisions of Clauses 7.0 and 8.0 of the said Guidelines must be applied as they are, and any departure therefrom would render the blacklisting process defective.

For the purpose of applying the law to the facts before this Court, the provision relied upon by learned counsel to the Claimant is Clause 7.0 of the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria.

 

As earlier reproduced, the said provision sets out the substantive conditions under which a financial institution may blacklist an individual, while Clause 8.0 prescribes the mandatory procedure to be followed in arriving at such a decision.

 

There is no contention as to the meaning or import of these provisions. The crux of the dispute is whether the 1st Defendant has placed before this Court any record of misconduct attributable to the Claimant which accords with the substantive and procedural requirements stipulated in the said Guidelines.

 

It is in that light that I have carefully examined the exhibits annexed by the 1st Defendant in support of its assertions.

 

Exhibit A, being an internal memorandum dated 13th October 2017, emanated from the Human Resources Department of the 1st Defendant and sought approval to return the Claimant to her primary employer, FSL Securities Limited, on the ground of doubtful integrity. The background to the memo was an integrity test conducted on the Claimant, during which a discrepancy arose between the amount recorded on a deposit slip and the cash handed over. The Claimant was alleged to have retained a portion of the excess sum after partially refunding same.

 

Prior to the issuance of the said memo, the Claimant had been queried via Exhibit B, an email trail dated 10th October 2017. In her response, the Claimant expressed remorse, attributing her conduct to negligence and stating that it was not her intention to retain the money.

 

Subsequently, Exhibit C, a letter dated 17th October 2017, was issued by the 1st Defendant to FSL Securities Limited indicating that the services of the Claimant were no longer required. This was followed by Exhibit D, a letter of termination issued to the Claimant by her direct employer.

 

The foregoing constitutes the entirety of the record presented by the 1st Defendant in support of its assertion of financial misconduct.

 

The pertinent question that arises is whether these materials satisfy the substantive and procedural thresholds prescribed under Clauses 7.0 and 8.0 of the said Guidelines.

 

The answer, without hesitation, is in the negative.

 

While the conduct attributed to the Claimant in the course of the integrity test is certainly unbecoming and deserving of disciplinary sanction, it does not, without more, meet the threshold contemplated under Clause 7.0 of the Guidelines. There is no evidence before this Court to establish that the alleged conduct resulted in any significant harm to the institution or its customers, nor is there any indication that it falls within the category of grave offences contemplated under the said provision.

 

More fundamentally, there is a complete absence of compliance with the procedural safeguards stipulated under Clause 8.0. Beyond the issuance of a query, there is no evidence that:

• a Disciplinary Committee was constituted;
• the Claimant was invited to defend herself before such a committee;
• any findings were formally made;
• the matter was referred to an Independent Review Panel; or
• any final decision was communicated to the Claimant in accordance with the Guidelines.

Rather than comply with the prescribed procedure, the 1st Defendant merely facilitated the termination of the Claimant’s employment through her direct employer and thereafter proceeded, without demonstrated due process, to subject her to the far more severe consequence of blacklisting.

 

Such conduct is not only inconsistent with the letter of the Guidelines but also offends the principles of fairness, transparency, and accountability which the Guidelines were designed to uphold.

 

It is also instructive that while the 1st Defendant alleged multiple instances of misconduct, only a single incident was placed before this Court. Even in respect of that incident, the evidence falls short of establishing a basis for blacklisting within the contemplation of the applicable regulatory framework.

 

On the issue of burden of proof, I am mindful that where a party seeks to justify an action taken under a regulatory framework, such party bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with the conditions prescribed by that framework. In the instant case, the Defendants have failed to discharge that burden.

 

Furthermore, the Guidelines in question, by their very nature, impose serious consequences on an individual’s right to employment within a critical sector of the economy. They therefore partake of the character of expropriatory provisions and must be construed strictly.

 

In this regard, the Supreme Court in N.U.P. v. I.N.E.C. (2021) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1805) 305 held that:

 

“expropriatory statutes need to be construed fortissime contra preferentes; that is, strictly in favour of the citizen and against the government. However, the golden rule in the Interpretation of statues is to determine and reflect the intention of the law maker particularly when intention is clear. In such an event, resort cannot be had to a liberal Interpretation. [Provost, Lagos State College of Education v. Edun (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt.870) 476; I.N.E.C v. Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 806) 72 referred to.] (P.354, paras. C- D).

 

With respect to the contention of the 2nd Defendant that the Claimant failed to establish that she was indeed blacklisted, I find that argument unpersuasive.

 

The affidavit evidence of the Claimant to the effect that she was informed of her blacklisting remains substantially unchallenged. The 2nd Defendant did not expressly deny the assertion but rather adopted a position of non-committal.

 

It is settled law that affidavit evidence which is not controverted is deemed admitted. See TUKUR v. UBA (2012) LPELR-9337(SC), the court held that:

 

“It is already a settled law that an affidavit evidence constitutes evidence and must be so construed, hence any deposition therein which is not challenged or controverted is deemed admitted. See: Ajomale Vs. Yaduat & Anor (No.2) 5 NWLR (Pt.191) 226 at 282-283, (191) 5 SCNJ 178, Magnusson Vs. Koiki (1993) 12 SCNJ 114; Henry Stephens Engineering Ltd Vs. Yakubu (Nig) Ltd (2009) 6 SCM 90 at 99. “Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (pp 46-47, paras G-B)

 

Relying on the foregoing authorities, I am mindful of the fact that the 2nd Defendant did not, in any part of its Counter-Affidavit, expressly deny that the Claimant was blacklisted. Rather, the 2nd Defendant merely averred that it was not in a position to admit or deny the assertions made by the Claimant. In my considered view, such a deposition does not amount to a categorical contradiction or rebuttal of the facts deposed to by the Claimant. The Court is therefore entitled to place reliance on the assertions of the Claimant, same having been deposed to as facts within her knowledge and belief.

 

More importantly, the Claimant placed before the Court other circumstantial evidence in support of her assertion, including the fact that she resigned from her subsequent employment upon the advice of the Human Resource Department of her former employer, who informed her of the said blacklisting.

 

In the final analysis, and upon a careful evaluation of the totality of the evidence before this Court, the lone question formulated by the claimant for determination of the instant suit is answered to the effect that it is the finding of this court that there exists nothing on the record of the 1st Defendant incidents of offences such as fraud, financial malfeasance or improprieties of any kind whatsoever, to which the CLAIMANT is culpable of which satisfies the substantive and procedural requirements of the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria so as to justify the continued retention of the Claimant’s name on the blacklist maintained by the Central Bank of Nigeria.

 

Accordingly, the question submitted for determination is resolved in favour of the Claimant.

 

The reliefs sought are meritorious and are hereby granted as follows:

 

1. It is hereby declared that the 1^st Defendant does not have any record or proof of any offence directly inculpatory of the Claimant, within the meaning of the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria, March 2024, which would warrant her inclusion on the blacklist maintained by the 2^nd Defendant.
2. It is hereby ordered that the 2^nd Defendant shall forthwith remove or cause to be removed the name of the Claimant, Miss Blessing Ogechi Nnaji, from its blacklist, thereby restoring her eligibility for employment within the Nigerian financial sector.

 

Judgment is accordingly entered.

I make no order as to cost.

 

………………………………………………………………………..

HON. JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, Ph.D

JUDGE