IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD

 

DATED: 4^TH DAY OF MAY, 2026              SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/138/2022

 

BETWEEN:

MR. DIKE NNAMDI COSMOS----------------------------CLAIMANT

AND

1. WORLDWIDE TECHNICAL SERVICES LTD
2. YINSON OPERATIONS AND PRODUCTION 

WEST AFRICA LTD                                                    -------DEFENDANTS

AND SAFETY AGENCY (NIMASA)  

 

REPRESENTATIONS:

F. C. Onekwa for the Claimant.

C. N. Nwibe for the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

 

JUDGEMENT

This suit was commenced by way of a General Form of Complaint filed on the 11^th day of October, 2022 against the 1st and 2nd Defendants. Subsequently, with the leave of this Court, the Claimant joined the 3rd Defendant and filed an Amended Complaint on the 25^th day of May, 2023. Thereafter, on the 20th day of March, 2025, the Claimant filed a Further Amended Complaint.

The said Further Amended Complaint was accompanied by a verifying affidavit, statement of facts, list of witnesses, witness statements on oath, list of documents, and copies of the documents to be relied upon at trial.

 

Arising from the Further Amended Complaint and the Statement of Facts, the Claimant’s claims against the Defendants are as follows:

 

1. A Declaration that the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant by the 1st Defendant via an email dated 10th December, 2021 is unlawful, wrongful and of no effect for lack of legal competence, authority, and fair hearing.
2. A Declaration that the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the 1st Defendant via an email dated 27th June, 2022 is unlawful, wrongful, void and of no effect for lack of legal competence, authority, capacity, and fair hearing.
3. A Declaration that the Claimant’s promotion from the rank of Able Seafarer to the rank of Junior Cargo Operator by the 2nd Defendant, pursuant to the satisfactory performance of the Claimant in a promotion interview conducted by the onboard management of the 2nd Defendant, is lawful, valid, and subsisting.
4. A Declaration that the Claimant’s employer is the 2nd Defendant by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (as amended), other applicable international maritime labour instruments, and the relevant laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and not the 1st Defendant.
5. An Order directing the immediate payment of all monies due to the Claimant by way of arrears of monetary entitlements, unlawful deductions, and non-remittances made on the Claimant’s entitlements before, during, and after the periods of the purported suspension and termination of his employment by the 1st Defendant.
6. An Order directing the reinstatement of the Claimant to the rank of Junior Cargo Operator in the employment of the 2nd Defendant and the payment of all salaries and other monetary benefits that have accrued and continue to accrue from that position.
7. A Declaration that the indifference and inaction of the 3rd Defendant amounts to a breach of its statutory duty to the Claimant, which has occasioned hardship to him.
8. The sum of ?100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira Only) jointly and severally against the Defendants as special and general damages for the unlawful interference with the Claimant’s employment and employment rights, including the issuance of the suspension and termination letters and other alleged unfair labour practices, as well as the alleged inaction of the 3rd Defendant.
9. An Order directing the Defendants to produce and provide to the Claimant his pension administration information/PIN to enable him access his pension fund, and to issue to him all tax receipts/certificates from July 2021 to date.
10. An Order directing the 2nd Defendant to issue to the Claimant a certificate of sea service testimonial from the date of his promotion to date.
11. An Order directing the 3rd Defendant to revalidate the Claimant’s expired Certificate of Competence as an Officer-in-Charge of Navigational Watch.
12. The sum of ?5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira Only) as cost of litigation.
13. 10% interest on the judgment sum until liquidation.

 

In response to the foregoing claims, the 1st Defendant filed its Statement of Defence on the 22nd day of December, 2022. Following the amendment of the Claimant’s processes, the 1st and 2nd Defendants filed an Amended Statement of Defence on the 8th day of June, 2023. Thereafter, upon the filing of the Claimant’s Further Amended Complaint, the 1st and 2nd Defendants filed a Further Amended Statement of Defence on the 25th day of April, 2025. The said defence was accompanied by a list of witnesses, witness statements on oath, list of documents, and copies of the documents to be relied upon at trial.

 

Upon being served with the Defendants’ processes, the Claimant filed a Reply to the Amended Statement of Defence on the 14th day of July, 2023.

 

Trial commenced before this Court on the 15^th day of January, 2024, with the Claimant opening his case. The Claimant, Mr. Dike Nnamdi Cosmos, testified for himself as CW1. He adopted his witness statements on oath made on the 25^th day of May, 2023, marked as C1.

 

During his testimony, CW1 tendered a total of ninety (90) documents, which were admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits C2 to C91. It is pertinent to note that Exhibit C91, though tendered through the Claimant during cross-examination by learned counsel to the Defendants, was admitted under protest.

 

The said documents are as follows:

 

• Exhibit C2: Basic Mandatory Certificate (STCW)
• Exhibit C3 (A & B): Seafarer’s Medical Certificates
• Exhibit C4: Certificate of Competence issued by NIMASA
• Exhibit C5: Certificate of Proficiency issued by NIMASA
• Exhibit C6: Certificate of Training in GMDSS Radio Operations
• Exhibit C7: Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) General Operator Certificate
• Exhibit C8: Certificate of Training in Radar/ARPA (Operational Level)
• Exhibit C9: Payslip for July 2020
• Exhibit C10: Payslip for July 2021
• Exhibit C11: Payslip showing payments for extra days worked
• Exhibit C12 (A & B): Payslip for July 2021 and document showing expected remuneration as Junior Cargo Operator
• Exhibit C13: Evidence of unutilized time-off for November 2020
• Exhibit C14: Evidence of unutilized time-off for February 2021
• Exhibit C15: Claimant’s email request for financial information
• Exhibit C16: Claimant’s complaint letter to NIMASA dated 4th February 2022
• Exhibit C17: Claimant’s email correspondence
• Exhibit C18: Certificate of Competence result slip
• Exhibit C19: Medical Care Certificate
• Exhibit C20: Certificate in International Safety Management (ISM) Code
• Exhibit C21: Ship Security Officer Certificate
• Exhibit C22: Request for promotion/Certificate of Competence as Junior Cargo Operator
• Exhibit C23: General Out-Patient Card (Military Hospital, Port Harcourt)
• Exhibit C24: Email dated 8th October 2021
• Exhibit C25: Hospital Patient ID Card (New Mile One)
• Exhibit C26: Email dated 14th October 2021
• Exhibit C27: Hygeia HMO pre-authorization email
• Exhibits C28 & C29: Emails to Green Care Medical Consultants
• Exhibit C30: Letter from Green Care Medical Consultants
• Exhibit C31: Email to 1st Defendant dated 3rd November 2021
• Exhibits C32, C37, C39 & C41: Claimant’s request letters to the 1st Defendant
• Exhibits C33–C35: Emails from the 1st Defendant to the Claimant
• Exhibits C36, C38, C39 & C40: Claimant’s various emails to the 1st Defendant
• Exhibit C42: Suspension email dated 10th December 2021
• Exhibit C43 (A–F): Complaint letter to NIMASA dated 18th April 2022
• Exhibit C44: 1st Defendant’s response dated 19th April 2022
• Exhibit C45: Termination email dated 27th June 2022
• Exhibit C46 (A & B): Claimant’s letter to NIMASA dated 5th July 2022
• Exhibit C47: Proof of delivery (Red Star Express)
• Exhibit C48: Pre-action notice
• Exhibits C49–C53: Payslips
• Exhibit C54: Payslip reflecting housing allowance, child education, and tandem mooring
• Exhibit C55: Payslip for NUPENG CBA arrears
• Exhibit C56: Claimant’s letter to the Defendant
• Exhibit C57: 1st Defendant’s response
• Exhibit C58: Offer of Crewing Employment Contract
• Exhibit C59: Seafarer’s Identity Document
• Exhibit C60: Marshall Islands Seafarer’s Certificate
• Exhibit C61: Data Privacy Consent Form (Marshall Islands Maritime Administrator)
• Exhibit C62: Application for Seafarer’s Identification and Record Book
• Exhibit C63: Minimum Safe Manning Certificate
• Exhibit C64: Email dated 20th July 2022
• Exhibit C65: First Bank Statement of Account
• Exhibit C66: Email dated 25th June 2020
• Exhibits C67 & C68: WhatsApp chats with WTS Energy (Mr. Michael)
• Exhibit C69: WhatsApp chat with Shehu
• Exhibits C70–C72: Emails to Michael
• Exhibit C73: Seaman Record Book and Certificate of Discharge
• Exhibit C74: First Bank Statement of Account
• Exhibit C75: Email regarding offshore safety bonus
• Exhibit C76: Email on crew change/quarantine dated 24th December 2020
• Exhibit C77: Email from Lawal Yusuf
• Exhibit C78: Payslip for January 2021
• Exhibit C79: Email on crew change/quarantine dated 15th February 2021
• Exhibits C80 & C81: Mobilisation emails
• Exhibit C82: Signa Pension Form
• Exhibit C83: Email on Collective Bargaining Agreement meeting dated 24th September 2021
• Exhibit C84: Letter from National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers dated 23rd September 2021
• Exhibit C85: Email titled “Re: Collective Bargaining Agreement” dated 30th September 2021
• Exhibit C86: NUPENG letter to the 1st Defendant dated 27th February 2022
• Exhibit C87: Email from the 1st Defendant dated 15th March 2022
• Exhibit C88: Claimant’s letter to NUPENG dated 25th March 2022
• Exhibit C89: NUPENG letter to the Claimant dated 16th March 2022
• Exhibit C90: Certificate of Compliance pursuant to Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011
• Exhibit C91: NUPENG letter to the Claimant dated 16th March 2022 (admitted under protest).

Arising from the Further Amended Statement of Facts and the evidence of the Claimant, the case of the Claimant is that he is a seafarer who served as a crew member aboard the Abigail-Joseph FPSO, a vessel owned and operated by the 2nd Defendant.

 

The Claimant contended that the 1st Defendant is a crewing, recruitment, and placement service provider engaged in the recruitment of personnel on behalf of the 2nd Defendant, while the 2nd Defendant is the Shipowner responsible for the operation of the Floating Production, Storage and Offloading vessel (FPSO) Abigail-Joseph.

 

The Claimant further stated that the 3rd Defendant is a statutory agency established to regulate maritime operations in Nigeria, including the enforcement of grievance procedures and protection of the rights of seafarers.

 

The Claimant averred that he was employed as a seafarer on the 2nd day of July, 2020 through a letter of employment issued by the 1st Defendant. However, he contended that the said employment arrangement was contrary to the applicable laws and regulations governing maritime labour, particularly as it failed to reflect the 2nd Defendant—the actual Shipowner—as his employer.

 

The Claimant maintained that he protested the said arrangement and insisted that his employment documentation ought properly to have identified the 2nd Defendant as his employer in line with the applicable maritime legal framework.

The Claimant further alleged that the Defendants subjected him to a series of unfair labour practices. He contended that his salary for the month of July 2020 was not paid in full and that he was underpaid for an additional fourteen (14) days worked beyond his normal twenty-eight (28) day work rotation. He also asserted that his annual leave allowance for the year 2021 was not paid, his thirteenth month allowance was not fully paid, his safety bonus entitlement was withheld, and his annual terminal benefit due in December 2021 was not paid.

 

In addition, the Claimant alleged that he was not paid for fourteen (14) days of time-off not utilized in November 2020 and February 2021.

 

The Claimant further stated that he was promoted by the 2nd Defendant from the rank of Able Seafarer to the rank of Junior Cargo Operator on the 9th of July, 2021. He, however, contended that notwithstanding the said promotion, the 1st Defendant continued to remunerate him based on his former rank without any corresponding adjustment in salary and failed to issue him with a formal letter confirming the said promotion.

 

The Claimant also alleged that the Defendants failed to provide him with his pension administration details, thereby depriving him of access to his pension entitlements. He maintained that the cumulative effect of these acts and omissions caused him mental distress and emotional trauma, and that all efforts made by him to resolve the issues amicably proved abortive.

 

Under cross-examination, CW1 admitted that his contract of employment was executed between himself and the 1st Defendant and that it was the 1st Defendant that deployed him to work with the 2nd Defendant. He also confirmed that his salaries and other emoluments were paid by the 1st Defendant.

 

CW1 further stated that employment within the maritime sector is regulated by applicable rules and international conventions, and asserted that liability for the payment of wages rests on the shipowner. However, he conceded that he did not place any evidence before the Court establishing that such liability rested on the 2nd Defendant in the instant case.

 

CW1 also confirmed that he was initially engaged as an Able Seaman and alleged that he was subsequently promoted to the position of Junior Cargo Operator. He admitted, however, that he was not issued any formal letter of promotion. He nevertheless maintained that he performed duties consistent with that role, including signing the vessel’s meteorology logbook in the capacity of a Junior Cargo Operator.

He further testified that his claims span the period during which he served both as an Able Seaman and as a purported Junior Cargo Operator. He denied disembarking from the FPSO Abigail-Joseph on the 1st of October, 2021 to attend any association meeting. He maintained that he was issued a letter of indefinite suspension in December 2021 and not on the 16th of March, 2022 as suggested.

 

Finally, CW1 confirmed that throughout the duration of his employment, it was the 1st Defendant that paid his salaries.

 

Upon the discharge of CW1, the Claimant closed his case.

 

The 1st and 2nd Defendants, on the 13th day of October, 2025, opened their defence by calling one witness, Mr. Michael Falagbe, a Senior Operations Officer of the 1st Defendant, who testified as DW1. He adopted his witness statement on oath made on the 6th day of May, 2025, marked as D1.

 

Through DW1, a total of forty-four (44) documents were tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibits D2–D45, all of which were admitted under protest. The said exhibits are as follows:

 

• Exhibit D2: Offer of Crewing Employment Contract dated 25th June, 2020
• Exhibit D3: Email to the Claimant dated 8th May, 2022 titled “Closure to your contract termination”
• Exhibit D4: Email to NUPENG dated 11th December, 2021
• Exhibit D5: Claimant’s Crew Member Personal Information
• Exhibit D6: Email dated 20th October, 2021
• Exhibit D7: Medical Report of the Claimant dated 21st October, 2021
• Exhibit D8: NUPENG letter to the Claimant dated 16th March, 2022
• Exhibit D9: Claimant’s termination letter dated 27th June, 2022
• Exhibit D10: Email to the Claimant dated 11th March, 2022
• Exhibits D11–D13: Payslips for June–August 2020
• Exhibit D14: Overtime payment for August and September 2020
• Exhibits D15–D22: Payslips for August–December 2020
• Exhibit D23: Payment slip for 13th month (2020)
• Exhibit D24: Payment for terminal benefit (2020)
• Exhibits D25–D43: Payslips for January–November 2021
• Exhibit D44: Payment slip for 13th month (2021)
• Exhibit D45: Payment for terminal benefit (2021)

 

Having carefully examined the exhibits tendered by the Defendants, I observe that Exhibit D16 was not tendered. Consequently, the said Exhibit D16 is hereby expunged from the record of this Court.

 

Arising from the Amended Statement of Defence and the evidence of DW1, the case of the Defendants is that the 1st Defendant is a labour service provider engaged in the recruitment and placement of personnel for the 2nd Defendant and other companies.

 

The Defendants contended that the Claimant applied for and was employed as an Able Seaman, and not as an Able Seafarer as alleged. They further maintained that the 2nd Defendant had no dealings whatsoever with the Claimant in respect of any promotion and was not, at any material time, the Claimant’s employer.

 

The Defendants stated that the only contract executed by the Claimant is the Offer of Crewing Employment Contract dated 25th June, 2020, which was between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant. They added that the 1st Defendant never requested any document from the Claimant for the purpose of promoting him.

 

The Defendants further averred that the Claimant resumed duty on the 6th of July, 2020 after completing his training, and that his salaries and allowances were duly paid as and when due, including his leave allowance.

 

They contended that the Claimant’s monthly salary was ?328,052.58, contrary to the sum of ?675,710.83 alleged by the Claimant, and that his leave allowance stood at ?276,849.23, and not ?305,159.72 as claimed. The Defendants also denied that the Claimant was ever promoted to the position of Junior Cargo Operator.

The Defendants further stated that the Claimant operated on a rotational schedule, disembarked on the 6th of October, 2020, completed his twenty-eight (28) days’ time-off, and resumed on the 6th of November, 2020. On this basis, they contended that he was not entitled to payment for fourteen (14) days’ time-off not spent.

 

They also maintained that all statutory deductions, including taxes, were duly remitted.

 

The Defendants further alleged that the Claimant disembarked from duty on the 1st of October, 2021 without notifying them of any medical condition, and that despite being granted two weeks’ leave upon medical recommendation, he failed to return to work, notwithstanding the intervention of the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG).

 

Under cross-examination, DW1 testified that he has worked in the maritime industry for seven (7) years. He, however, stated that he was unaware whether the 2nd Defendant is a maritime company and also stated that he did not know whether the employment of seafarers is regulated by the Merchant Shipping Act 2007 and the Maritime Labour Convention 2006.

DW1 confirmed that Grant Atumah is a manager of the 1st Defendant and maintained that the Claimant is solely an employee of the 1st Defendant. He further asserted that the Merchant Shipping Act 2007 does not apply to the Claimant’s employment.

 

He testified that employment of a seafarer is not necessarily limited to a relationship between the shipowner and the seafarer, and denied that any employment arrangement outside such structure is unlawful.

 

DW1 also stated that an Officer of the Watch (OOW) Certificate does not qualify a person to work on any vessel indiscriminately, and maintained that the STCW Certificate is the standard requirement for an Able Seaman, while the OOW Certificate is not relevant to that role. He further stated that the OOW Certificate was not a requirement for any promotion applicable to the Claimant.

He maintained that all complaints made by the Claimant were addressed in accordance with applicable procedures and denied that Exhibit C90 establishes that the Claimant was an employee of the 2nd Defendant.

 

Upon the discharge of DW1, the matter was adjourned for adoption of Final Written Addresses.

 

Arising from the Defendants’ Final Written Address filed on the 23rd day of December, 2025, learned counsel to the Defendants, Chinwe Omodu, Esq., formulated three (3) issues for determination as follows:

 

1. Whether the Claimant is a staff of the second defendant to be entitled to promotion by the second defendant?
2. Whether the first defendant has the right to terminate the employment

of the claimant?

 

In arguing issue one counsel submitted that by Exhibit C58 and D2, there is no doubt that the offer of crew employment contract, dated 25^th of June, 2020, executed by the claimant and first defendant, proves that the claimant was a staff of the first defendant and not the 2^nd Defendant. Counsel argued that the claimant cannot claim to be a staff of the 2^nd defendant, simply because he was deployed to the 2^nddefendant’s ship to work as an Able Seaman. Counsel added that the claimant admitted under cross examination on June 30, 2025, to be an employee of the 1^st Defendant. Counsel stated that facts admitted need no further proof. He relied on NIGERIAN SHIPBUILDERS LIMITED V. GOLDEN O. TAMUNO, ESQ. (2024) 12 N.W.L.R. (PT. 1951) 157, on page 186 paragraphs E to F and BGL PLC & ORS V. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC. (2024)9 N.W. L.R. (PT. 1942)181, on page F to G.

 

Counsel submitted that the claimant had admitted that he was in the employment of the 1^st defendant, his unfounded claim of promotion by the 2^nd defendant is a fact in issue and it is a fact which necessitated this suit, also that the claimant with the intention to mislead this court, calculated his salaries and emoluments based on his purported and unfounded promotion from an able seaman, which he was employed by the 1^st defendant to a junior cargo operator.Counsel stated that the claimant never pleaded any promotion letter to prove his alleged promotion. Counsel relied on Order 12 Rule 13 of the Rules of the National Industrial Court, 2017 to state that where the claimant is challenging the termination of appointment, his complaint shall be accompanied by the claimant's letter of appointment, if any, together with a letter of confirmation of appointment, letter (s) of Promotion. Counsel noted that the word used in Order 12 Rule 13 of the Rules of this court is “shall” meaning mandatory. He cited CYRIACUS OGIDI & 3 ORS. V. THESTATE (2005) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 918) 286. Counsel contended that, the claimant who alleged he was promoted never pleaded his letter of promotion.

 

Counsel submitted that the Claimant, having admitted that he was in the employment of the 1st Defendant, and having failed to plead or produce the alleged letter of promotion, which forms the foundation of this suit, has rendered his case untenable. Counsel therefore urged this Honourable Court to resolve issue one in favour of the 1^st and 2^ndDefendants.

 

In arguing issue two on whether the 1^st defendant has the right to terminate the employment of the claimant. Counsel stated that employer-employee relationship is contractual in nature, and whenever an employee seeks to enforce any employment rights, the terms of the employment agreement shall form the basis of the terms that must be placed before the court for consideration. Counsel stated that the claimant did not make reference to any clause in the terms of employment entered between the claimant and the 1^st defendant, neither did the claimant seek any relief which relates to any employment right or benefit.

 

Counsel stated that the contract of employment empowers either party to terminate the contract prematurely with a notice period of(30) calendar days or one - month salary in lieu. Counsel cited Scc Nigeria Limited & Anor. V. David George & Anor. (2024) 18 NWLR (PART. 1971) on page 421, at pages 464 to 465, paragraphs G to F.He added that parties are under obligation to respect and obey the contract entered into. He relied on Eniwomake Richard Ovivie & Ors. V. Delta Steel Company Ltd (2023) 14 NWLR (pt. 1904) page 203 and page 226, paragraph F to H. He stated that the claimant has not proved before this court how the first defendant breached the terms of the contract of employment entered by the parties.

 

Counsel argued that an employer such as the 1^st defendant is not bound to give any reason for termination of a contract of employment. He relied on Maijah Elisha Gyubok V. The Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi & Anor. (2024) 16 N.W.LR. (PART. 1965) page 515, at page 550, paragraphs E to G. However, he stated that the claimant’s employment was terminated as a result of insubordination and absconding from duty since 22^nd of November, 2021. Counsel referred the court to exhibit C58 to stated that the claimant is in total violation of the Offer of Crew Employment Contract, dated 25^th June, 2020. The claimant neglected his duty, since 22^nd of November, 2021in breach of clause 25 and 35 pages 4 and 6 of the contract of employment and that every request, by the 1^st defendant for the claimant to report to work proved abortive.

 

On issue three counsel stated that it is not in dispute that the claimant is an employee of the 1^st defendant, hence in view that the claimant could not prove his purported promotion to Junior Cargo Operator by the 2^nd defendant, the claimant is not entitled to any monetary claim. He added that the salary, entitlement and benefits of the claimant is as stated in his contract of employment. In conclusion, Counsel urged the court to dismiss the claims of the claimant.

 

In response to the foregoing submissions of the defendants, the Claimant filed his final written address on the 9^th of February, 2026and arising therefrom, counsel to the Claimant F. C. Onuekwa Esq. formulated Five issues for determination as follows:

 

1. Whether by the facts and evidence before this court as well as the applicable laws and international instruments in the maritime industries, the claimant was an employee of the 2^nd defendant and not the 1^st defendant.
2. Whether by the facts and evidence before this court and the applicable laws in the Maritime Industries, the promotion of theClaimant by the 2^nd defendant from the position of Able Seafarer to Junior Cargo Operator is valid, lawful and subsisting.
3. Whether by the facts, circumstances and evidence before this court as well as the applicable laws in the Maritime industries, the 1^st defendant lawfully and validly suspended and terminated the employment of the Claimant without the consent and approval of the 2^nd defendant.
4. Whether by the facts and evidence before this court and the circumstance of this case, as well maritime as the applicable laws in the Maritime industries, the Claimant is entitled to special and general damages against the defendants as well as the entire Claim of the Claimant as appearing on the face of the statement of claim.
5. Whether Documents 2-44 tendered by the 1^st and 2^ndDefendants are in compliance with the requirement of the law as to justify its admissibility before this court.

 

In addressing issue one, counsel submitted that the Claimant’s status as a seafarer was not in dispute, having been established by Exhibits C2, C3(a-c), C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C17, C18, C20 and C21. He referred the Court to Article II paragraph 1(f) of the Maritime LabourConvention 2006 (as amended), which defines a seafarer as any person employed, engaged or working in any capacity on board a ship to which the Convention applies.

 

Counsel argued that the Claimant was in fact an employee of the 2^ndDefendant, being the shipowner of Abigail-Joseph FPSO, while the 1^st Defendant was merely a manning agent or seafarer recruitment and placement service provider, lacking the legal competence to employ a seafarer since it did not own a ship. He relied on Section 92(3) of the Merchant Shipping Act 2007.

 

He further submitted that under Regulation 1.4 and Standard A1.4 paragraph 5(a)(b) of the Maritime Labour Convention, recruitment and placement services are prohibited from using mechanisms that hinder seafarers from obtaining employment for which they are qualified, and cannot charge fees for such placement.

 

Counsel contended that seafarers’ employment is highly regulated under the Maritime Labour Convention and the Merchant Shipping Act, requiring a clear, written and legally enforceable agreement consistent with prescribed standards. He referred to Regulation 2.1 of the Convention, which requires that a seafarer’s employment agreement be signed by both the seafarer and the shipowner or the shipowner’s representative.

 

He argued that the Claimant was employed as an Able Seafarer on 2^ndJuly 2020 following a successful interview conducted by the 2^ndDefendant, and that having already obtained the certificate of competence relevant to the rank of Junior Cargo Operator, the 2^ndDefendant agreed to promote him after one year of service. According to counsel, upon resumption, the 1^st Defendant presented Exhibit C58, the purported seafarer agreement, and induced the Claimant to sign it. Counsel maintained that Exhibit C58 was inconsistent with the law because the 1^st Defendant was not qualified to be the Claimant’s employer, that role belonging to the 2^ndDefendant under Regulation 2.1 of the Convention.

 

Counsel also submitted that Exhibits C90(a) and (b) established that the Claimant was an employee of the 2^nd Defendant before his suspension and termination of his employment by the 1^st Defendant, actions allegedly taken without the authority of the 2^nd Defendant.

 

Finally, counsel submitted that from the inception of the employment relationship, the 1st Defendant employed various means to deny the Claimant his full employment entitlements, conduct which amounts to unfair labour practice contrary to Standard A2.1(b) of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (as amended). Counsel further argued that by virtue of Section 254C(1)(f), (h) and (k) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010, this Court is vested with jurisdiction to compel the Defendants to comply with and give effect to the provisions of the Maritime Labour Convention, as well as other relevant laws and regulations governing the employment of seafarers, insofar as they relate to the Claimant’s case.

 

Counsel agreed with the position of the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants that admitted facts require no further proof, particularly as the Claimant admitted that he was employed by the 1^st Defendant and deployed to the 2^nd Defendant’s vessel, Abigail-Joseph FPSO. However, counsel contended that there are exceptions to the rule on admissions, especially where the admission is against interest. Counsel argued that for such an admission to avail the adverse party, it must not only accord with the material evidence before the Court, but must also be consistent with the applicable law and the proper weight to be attached to it. He relied on OFFODILE V. OFFODILE (2019) 16 NWLR Part 16 98 page 189 at 211 Para E-G.

 

In arguing issue two counsel stated that following the discussion with the 2^nd defendant sometime in 2019 in the course of the claimant interview, he accepted to fill the vacant position of Able Seafarer in the 2^nd defendant vessel Abigail-Joseph FPSO, owing to the promise made to the Claimant that he would be promoted within one year from the date of his employment being 2^nd July, 2020, in view that the Claimant already obtained the certificate of competence relevant to the officer cadre “Junior Cargo Operator” as at the time of the said interview. In support of his position is exhibit C68 which indicates further request of the claimant certificate of competence (00W) at about one year after the claimant employment and upon his eventual promotion. He alleged that the claimant was assured of obtained promotion letter from the 1^st defendant on or before the 23^rd July, 2021. However, that the 1^st defendant vehemently opposed the claimant's promotion and refused to prepare and release the claimant promotion letter till date. Counsel contended that such opposition amounts to unfair labour practice for being inconsistent with international best labour practice. Counsel submitted that the court can draw inference or conclusions from facts proved in evidence before it. Counsel relied on MUHAMMED V. STATE (2007) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1045) Pg 303 at 331.

 

In addressing issue three counsel stated that the claimant’s suspension was incurably defective and unlawful. The ground being that the 1^stdefendant, not being a shipowner as to qualify it to employ a seafarer as required by law cannot terminate the employment of the claimant without authorization of the 2^nd Defendant. Counsel referred the court to standard A2.1 paragraph (a) of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (as amended). Hence that the act of the 1^st defendant issuing the indefinite suspension as well as the termination of the claimant employment without the authorization of the 2^nd defendant is defective and unlawful and offence standard A1.4, paragraph 5(a).

 

Counsel stated that contrary to the position that the clamant disembarked the ship on 2^nd October, 2021 to attend Collective Bargaining Agreement meeting, the real position was that the claimant disembarked the ship on health grounds. Counsel contended that there are material contradictions in the evidence of the defendants and urged the court not pick and choose which of the conflicting versions to believe or follow. He relied on ANYANWU V.PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2020) 3 NWLR, Part 1710 page134 at 167 Para A-B. 

 

In addressing issue four counsel stated that the claimant is entitled to special and general damages against the defendants as well as the entire claim. Counsel contended that in view that the letter of indefinite suspension and the termination of the claimant’s Contract by the 1^st defendant is improper for want of locus and authority as there is no evidence indication that 2^nd defendant authorized same. Counsel contended that the said letters and every other action of the 1^st defendant constituting the claimant's complaints before this court is unlawful, thereby making the 1^st defendant liable to all the attendant consequences for her action against the claimant.

 

Also, that the 1^st defendant manipulated and influenced the 2^nddefendant and the claimant from having a valid Seafarer agreement from the beginning of the claimant’s appointment contrary to standard A2.1 Paragraph 1(a)(c) of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (as amended) which constitutes unfair labour practice or contrary to international best practice in labour. He added that the intendment of the 1^st defendant was to deny the claimant his due entitlement in the course of his employment, an act which is clearly prohibited under Standard A1.4 paragraph 5(a) of the MaritimeLabour Convention 2006 (as amended). Counsel added that the 2^nddefendant on the other hand did not take any step to stop the 1^stdefendant from the unfair labour practice meted on the Claimant in the course of his work with the 2^nd defendant.

 

Counsel stated that the claimant made complaint pursuant in line with Regulation B5.1.5 Paragraph 2(e) of the Maritime LabourConvention 2006 (as amended), however, the defendants failed to address all the claimant’s complaint which constitutes acts and inaction contrary to the provisions of the maritime labour convention. Counsel referred the court to paragraph 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60 of the claimant's amended statement of claim, and exhibits C16 a-c, C31, C37 a & b, C39 a & b, C40, C43 a-g, C46 a & b, C56.

 

On the part of special damages counsel submitted that to succeed in a claim for damages, a party must plead, particularize or itemize it. It must be claimed specially and proved strictly. He relied onCAMEROON AIRLINES V. OTUTUIZU (2011) 4 NWLR Part 1238 page 512 at 544, Para A. He submitted further that the claimant have established his entitlement to special damages.

 

The counsel stated that the claimant is also entitled to general damages. As regards the liability of the 3^rd defendant, counsel stated that the 3^rd defendant is in breach of Section 22(1) of Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency Act, 2007. In view that the 3^rd defendant on record is vested with the competence to regulate the employment, welfare of Seafarers by investigating every dispute between the shipowner and the Seafarer submitted to it. However, the 3^rd defendant refused to act on the various complaints bothering on unfair labour practice meted on the claimant, which lead to non-payments of Claimant's monetary entitlements as well as non-remittance of the claimant's pension deductions, as well as the issue of promotion and the case of suspension and eventual termination of employment of the claimant. In addition, counsel stated that the wrongs suffered by the Claimants by the actions of the 1^st defendant were largely based on the inactions of the 2^nd and 3^rd defendants who neglected their duties under the laws.

 

Counsel submitted that Section 164(1)(2) of the Marchant Shipping Act, 2007 confers the jurisdictions on this Court to rescind inconsistent contract between shipowner and the seafarer.

 

On the admissibility of document counsel submitted that Section 89 (a) - (b) of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended 2023) outline conditions for admissibility. While Section 84(1) (2) (a-d) provides for condition in which statement contained in a document produced by a computer shall be admissible as evidence of any fact. Counsel contended that documents 1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 sought to be tendered by the 1^st and 2^nd defendants were all photocopies. No foundation was laid before tendering same, being secondary evidence, thus offends section 89 (a-h) of the Evidence Act. While document 2, 3, 5 and 9 are documents produced by computer which by section 84 (1)(2)(a-d) of the Evidence Act provides the conditions in which such documents would be admitted, counsel contended that they were tendered without compliance with the provision of 84 (1)(2)(a-d) of the Evidence Act. Counsel cited Omo-Agage V Oghojafor(2011) 3 NWLR part 1234 Page 341 at 353, Para G-H.

 

In conclusion counsel urged the court to grant the claimant's prayers in this suit.

 

By way of reply on point of law filed on the 11^th of February, 2026, counsel to the Defendants in reply to issue one formulated by the claimant maintained that the 1^st defendant is not a mining agent, and that the Claimant signed a contract with 1^st defendant and that the contract is binding on the 1^st defendant and the Claimant. Counsel added that it is not the duty of this court to rewrite an agreement for parties or input what is not in the agreement voluntarily entered by the parties. He relied on MRS Josephine Dongest Mbat V, The Honourable Minster, Federal Capital Territory & Ors (2024) 16 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 1965) 451, on page 491, paragraph E-G.

 

Counsel contended that the claimant never pleaded fraud, misrepresentation and undue influence in his statement of claim, as regard the claimant contract agreement (exhibit C58) signed with the 1^st defendant. Counsel cited All Progressive Congress V. Bashir Sheriff & Ors (2024) 2 NWLR (PT 1921) AT PAGE 49, PARTICULARLY AT pages 151 -152, paragraphs G to H.

 

In reply to the claimant’s issue two counsel maintained that the claimant’s none compliance with Order 3 Rule 13 of the Rules of this Honourable Court, has rendered the claimant's action incompetent and ought to be dismissed in its entirety.

 

Regarding claimant’s issue 3, 4 and 5, particularly regarding admissibility of document counsel stated that the document sought to be tendered is pleaded and relevant to this case. Counsel stated that the claimant’s contention that the document is not the original and not relevant to this suit is not sustainable. Counsel argued that a piece of evidence is first admitted by a trial court before the question of the weight of the admitted evidence is inquired into by court. Counsel relied on OMEGA BANK NIGERIA PLC V. 0.B.C LTD (2005) 7 N.W.L.R (PT. 928 547 AT 582. Counsel added that a secondary document can be tendered when the primary document is not available. All the party needs to do is to lay foundation to the admissibility of such secondary document. Counsel contended that the 1^st and 2^nd defendants counsel laid proper foundation before tendering the said document. He relied on Fawehinmi V. L.G.P (2000) 7 NWLR (PT665) 481 at 531, Aderemi J.C.A. Counsel further contended that the 1^st and 2^nd defendants complied with section 84 of the Evidence Act and accordingly file their certificate of compliance.

 

In the light of the foregoing, I have carefully evaluated all the processes filed by the parties in this suit. I have also considered the testimonies of the witnesses called by both sides, observed their demeanour, and painstakingly examined all the exhibits tendered and admitted in evidence.

 

I have further taken into account the reliefs sought by the Claimant vis-à-vis the submissions of learned counsel in their respective Final Written Addresses. Arising from the totality of the issues raised, the issues for determination are as follows:

 

1. Whether the Claimant has established that the 2nd Defendant is his employer.
2. Whether, having regard to the facts and evidence before this Court, the termination of the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant was wrongful.
3. Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought.

 

Before proceeding to resolve the issues formulated above, it is imperative to determine the status of the exhibits admitted under protest.

 

In that regard, I note that learned counsel to the Claimant, during trial, objected to the admissibility of Exhibits D2–D45, upon which the Court directed parties to address the issue in their respective Final Written Addresses. However, from a review of the Claimant’s address, it is evident that the objection was canvassed only in respect of Exhibits D2–D15, with no argument advanced regarding Exhibits D16–D45.

Consequently, the objection in respect of Exhibits D16–D45 is deemed abandoned, and the said exhibits are accordingly admitted as marked.

 

With respect to Exhibits D2–D15, the Claimant challenged their admissibility on two principal grounds.

 

First, Exhibits D2, D5, D7, and D11–D15 were objected to on the basis that they are photocopies, being secondary evidence, for which no proper foundation was laid in accordance with Section 89 of the Evidence Act.

 

Secondly, Exhibits D3, D4, D6, and D10 were challenged as computer-generated documents for which the requirements of Section 84 of the Evidence Act were allegedly not complied with.

 

In response, learned counsel to the Defendants contended that the documents were duly pleaded, relevant to the issues before the Court, and that proper foundation was laid for the admissibility of the secondary documents. Counsel further submitted that a certificate of compliance pursuant to Section 84 of the Evidence Act was duly filed in respect of the computer-generated documents.

 

It is trite that the admissibility of a document is determined by three cardinal considerations, namely:

1. whether the document is pleaded;
2. whether it is relevant to the facts in issue; and
3. whether it is admissible under the law.

 

With respect to Exhibits D3, D4, D6, and D10, which are computer-generated documents, Section 84 of the Evidence Act requires that a certificate be produced identifying the document, the manner of its production, the device used, and confirming that the device was in regular use.

 

From the record of this Court, it is evident that the Defendants filed a Certificate of Compliance pursuant to Section 84 of the Evidence Act along with their Amended Statement of Defence filed on the 8th day of June, 2023. Although the said certificate was not re-frontloaded upon the subsequent amendment filed on the 25th of April, 2025, the earlier certificate remains part of the record of this Court.

 

Once a certificate satisfying the requirements of Section 84 accompanies the document, the condition precedent for admissibility is fulfilled. I am therefore satisfied that the requirement of Section 84 has been duly complied with, and the objection in that regard is accordingly overruled.

 

With respect to Exhibits D2, D5, D7, and D11–D15, I note that Section 89 of the Evidence Act permits the admissibility of secondary evidence where proper foundation is laid for the non-production of the original.

 

More importantly, I observe that a number of the documents now being objected to were earlier tendered by the Claimant himself in the course of his case. Specifically:

 

• Exhibit D2 corresponds with Exhibit C58
• Exhibit D6 corresponds with Exhibit C27
• Exhibit D7 corresponds with Exhibit C30
• Exhibit D8 corresponds with Exhibit C89
• Exhibit D9 corresponds with Exhibit C45
• Exhibit D12 corresponds with Exhibit C9

 

The law is settled that a party cannot approbate and reprobate. Having tendered and relied on the same or similar documents, the Claimant cannot subsequently object to their admissibility when tendered by the opposing party.

 

In addition, the said documents were duly pleaded by the Defendants and are clearly relevant to the issues in controversy, particularly as they relate to the Claimant’s employment and remuneration.

 

In the light of the foregoing, the objections raised by the Claimant in respect of Exhibits D2–D15 lack merit and are hereby overruled. Consequently, all the said exhibits are admitted in evidence and shall be accorded their due probative value.

 

I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the respective parties. The law is settled that the admissibility of a document is primarily determined by its relevance to the facts in issue and its admissibility under the Evidence Act. Relevance remains the foundational test of admissibility. In Royork Nigeria Limited v. Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice, Sokoto State & Anor (2017) LPELR-42506(CA), the Court of Appeal held thus:

 

“The position of the law is that evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issues and when it is also competent… admissibility of evidence is governed by relevance…”

 

Although learned counsel to the Claimant contended that the documents in question are irrelevant, I must state that relevance is best determined in the course of evaluation of the evidence. Having admitted the documents, it is more appropriate to reserve the issue of weight and probative value for determination at the stage of substantive evaluation.

 

Accordingly, while this Court shall be guided by the probative value to be attached to the said documents, the objections raised in respect of Exhibits D2–D15 are hereby overruled.

 

It is also pertinent to state that this Court is empowered, pursuant to Section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, to depart from the strict application of the rules of evidence in the interest of justice. In view of the relevance of the documents placed before this Court, and in furtherance of substantial justice, I find it appropriate to invoke the said provision and admit all the documents tendered in evidence, subject to the weight to be ascribed to them.

 

Having resolved the preliminary issue relating to admissibility, I now turn to the substantive issues for determination.

 

In addressing Issue One, which is whether the Claimant has established that the 2nd Defendant is his employer, the case of the Claimant is that he is a trained seafarer deployed to work aboard the vessel Abigail-Joseph FPSO, owned by the 2nd Defendant. He contended that although his letter of employment, Exhibit C58, was issued by the 1st Defendant, the said Defendant merely acted as a recruitment and placement agent, while the actual employer, under maritime law, is the shipowner, being the 2nd Defendant. The Claimant further argued that under the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 and the Merchant Shipping Act 2007, only a shipowner can employ a seafarer.

 

Conversely, the 1st and 2nd Defendants contended that the Claimant was employed solely by the 1st Defendant pursuant to the Offer of Crewing Employment Contract dated 25th June, 2020, admitted as Exhibit D2 (also Exhibit C58), and that no contractual relationship exists between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant.

 

This Court must emphasize that employment relationships are fundamentally governed by the terms of the contract entered into by the parties. In David Kolawole Are v. Oluwafemi Yemisi Owoeye (2014) LPELR-41096(CA), the Court of Appeal held that:

 

“Where parties have reduced their agreement into writing, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to vary, add to, or contradict the terms of the written agreement.”

 

In the instant case, Exhibit C58 (also Exhibit D2) constitutes the operative contract of employment. The evidence before this Court clearly establishes that the said contract was executed between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant, and not the 2nd Defendant.

 

In further reinforcement, the Court in Huawei Technologies Limited & Anor v. Auta Nyada & Anor (2023) LPELR-61009(CA) reiterated that:

 

“The Court will not look outside the terms stipulated in the contract of employment in determining the rights and obligations of the parties.”

 

More compelling is the admission made by the Claimant under cross-examination that:

• his contract of employment was with the 1st Defendant;
• he was deployed by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd Defendant; and
• his salaries were paid by the 1st Defendant.

 

The law is trite that facts admitted require no further proof. See Mbula Traditional Council & Ors v. Estate of the Late Benjamin Nwazue & Anor (2022) LPELR-58220(CA)

 

With respect to the Claimant’s reliance on the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 and the Merchant Shipping Act 2007, I acknowledge that these instruments impose certain regulatory and statutory obligations on shipowners. However, such obligations do not ipso facto displace a valid contractual employment relationship duly entered into between parties.

 

In other words, the existence of regulatory obligations on the part of a shipowner does not automatically confer the status of employer on the shipowner where the evidence clearly establishes a binding contract of employment with another entity.

 

In the final analysis, this Court finds that the 1st Defendant is the contractual employer of the Claimant, and the Claimant has failed to establish that the 2nd Defendant is his employer and I so hold.

 

The next issue for determination is whether, having regard to the facts and evidence before this Court, the termination of the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant was wrongful.

 

The law is settled that in claims for wrongful or unlawful termination of employment, the burden rests on the Claimant to establish the following:

1. that he was an employee of the Defendant;
2. the terms and conditions governing the employment; and
3. the manner in which those terms were breached by the employer in bringing the employment to an end.

 

In Oak Pensions Limited & Ors v. Mr. Michael Oladipo Olayinka (2017) LPELR-43207(CA) the Court of Appeal reiterated this position.

 

In the instant case, with respect to the first requirement, the Claimant tendered Exhibit C58, being the Offer of Crewing Employment Contract dated 25th June 2020, which clearly establishes that his employment relationship was with the 1st Defendant, as earlier found by this Court.

 

On the second requirement, the said Exhibit C58 also constitutes the primary document governing the terms and conditions of the Claimant’s employment.

The crucial question, therefore, is whether the Claimant has demonstrated that the 1st Defendant breached the said terms in suspending and subsequently terminating his employment.

 

The Claimant challenged both the indefinite suspension communicated via email dated 10th December 2021 (Exhibit C42) and the termination dated 27th June 2022 (Exhibit C45). However, beyond merely challenging these actions, the Claimant failed to specifically demonstrate how the 1st Defendant acted in breach of the contractual terms governing his employment.

 

The position of the Defendants is that the Claimant absented himself from duty and failed to resume work despite several efforts made to secure his return, which ultimately led to his suspension and eventual termination.

 

While the Claimant contended that his absence was on medical grounds, a careful review of the documentary evidence, particularly Exhibits C30 to C40, reveals otherwise.

 

Exhibit C30, being the medical report from Green Care Medical Consultants dated 21st October 2021, indicates that the Claimant required only two (2) weeks to recuperate. Upon the expiration of this period, the 1st Defendant, through Exhibit C33 dated 8th November 2021, sought clarification on the Claimant’s medical status and readiness to resume duty.

 

Rather than provide such clarification, the Claimant, by Exhibit C37 dated 13th November 2021, raised grievances relating to his alleged promotion to the rank of Junior Cargo Operator.

 

From the totality of the evidence, it is evident that the Claimant’s continued absence from duty was not solely attributable to medical reasons, but was substantially influenced by an unresolved dispute concerning his alleged promotion.

I have also considered the relevant contractual provision, particularly Article 25 of Exhibit C58, which provides thus:

 

“Crew members who fail to return to work after time-off or annual leave shall be regarded as having left the company unless he notifies the company within forty-eight (48) hours of acceptable reason(s) for absence.”

 

This provision places a clear obligation on the employee to notify the employer within the stipulated period and provide acceptable reasons for any absence from duty, failing which the absence may be treated as abandonment of employment.

 

In the present case, there is no credible evidence that the Claimant complied with this requirement within the stipulated timeframe.

 

In the circumstance, the suspension of the Claimant, as communicated via Exhibit C42, cannot be said to be wrongful. The evidence shows that the Claimant remained absent from duty beyond the period justified by medical evidence and failed to provide satisfactory explanation within the contractual framework.

 

It is settled law that an employer has the right to suspend an employee as part of its disciplinary powers, particularly to facilitate investigation or address infractions. In City Central Group of Companies Ltd v. Mr. Dominic Eze (2021) LPELR-55725 (CA), the Court affirmed this position.

 

Similarly, in Mrs. Omoseebi-Oladipo Elizabeth v. Ondo State Judicial Service Commission & Anor (2021) LPELR-55177(CA), the Court held that suspension is a recognized disciplinary measure and a preliminary step in the employer’s control over its workforce.

 

Suspension, therefore, does not amount to termination, but rather serves as a mechanism to regulate the employment relationship pending further action.

 

In the light of the foregoing, this Court finds that the Claimant has failed to establish that his suspension was in breach of the terms of his employment.

 

I now proceed to consider the contention of the Claimant that the subsequent termination of his employment was wrongful.

 

The Claimant has not demonstrated how the 1st Defendant contravened any specific provision of the contract of employment in terminating his appointment. His principal argument is that the 1st Defendant, not being a shipowner, lacked the competence to terminate his employment without the authorization of the 2nd Defendant, by virtue of Standard A2.1(a) of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (as amended).

 

I have earlier addressed this contention and I reiterate that while maritime regulations impose obligations on shipowners, they do not, without more, extinguish or invalidate a valid contractual relationship between a seafarer and a crewing agency. Where a contract of employment exists, the rights and obligations of the parties must be determined strictly within the framework of that contract.

 

It is trite law that in a master–servant relationship, an employer possesses the unfettered right to terminate the employment of an employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all, provided the termination is effected in accordance with the terms of the contract.

 

In Lightening Networks Ltd v. Auta Nyada & Ors (2023) LPELR-61010(CA), the Court of Appeal affirmed this principle. Similarly, in Mr. Eniwomake Richard Ovivi & Ors v. Delta Steel Company Ltd. (2023) LPELR-60460(SC), the Supreme Court emphasized that the Court must confine itself to the terms of the contract of service and give effect thereto.

 

In the instant case, the Claimant has failed to establish that the termination of his employment was in breach of any contractual provision. There is no evidence before this Court that the termination did not comply with the procedure stipulated in the contract, particularly with respect to notice or payment in lieu thereof.

Consequently, this Court finds that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was not wrongful.

 

Having so held, I now proceed to consider the third issue, which is whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought. In doing so, the Court shall consider each of the reliefs in turn based on the facts and evidence before it.

 

Reliefs one and two shall be considered conjunctively.

 

Relief one seeks for “A declaration that the purported indefinite suspension of the Claimant by the 1^st Defendant via email dated 10^th December 2021 is unlawful, wrongful and of no effect for lack of legal competence, authority and fair-hearing”.

Relief two seeks “A declaration that the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the 1^st Defendant via email dated 27^th June 2022 is unlawful, wrongful, void and of no effect for lack of legal competence, authority, capacity and fair-hearing”.

 

Both reliefs are anchored on the contention that the 1st Defendant lacked the competence to suspend the Claimant and that the actions taken violated the principles of fair hearing.

 

With respect to suspension, this Court has already found that the Claimant was absent from duty beyond the period justified by medical evidence and that such absence was not solely predicated on health grounds but was intertwined with a dispute regarding his alleged promotion.

 

The Court has also examined the relevant contractual provision regulating absence from duty and finds that the 1st Defendant, being the employer, possessed the authority to discipline the Claimant for failure to resume duty. Such disciplinary measures include suspension.

 

It is settled that suspension is essentially an administrative or interim measure pending further action and does not, in itself, require a full-scale hearing before it is imposed. In the circumstances of this case, the suspension was a direct consequence of the Claimant’s failure to resume duty and cannot be said to be arbitrary or wrongful.

 

On the issue of termination, the Court has examined Exhibit C58, being the Offer of Crewing Employment Contract, which governs the relationship between the parties. The said contract provides for termination by either party upon notice or payment in lieu of notice.

 

The evidence before the Court shows that the Claimant remained absent from duty despite several communications requesting him to resume work. The Claimant did not establish that he resumed duty after November 2021, nor did he show that he was prevented from resuming duty by the Defendants.

 

It is settled that even where termination is alleged to be wrongful, the Claimant must demonstrate that the termination was in breach of the contract of employment. In the instant case, the Claimant has failed to identify any provision of the contract that was violated.

 

Furthermore, the allegation of denial of fair hearing cannot avail the Claimant in this circumstance. In a master–servant relationship, termination of employment does not necessarily require prior hearing unless expressly provided for in the contract.

 

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that both the suspension and the termination of the Claimant’s employment were carried out within the bounds of the contract of employment.

 

Accordingly, reliefs one and two fail and are hereby dismissed.

 

Relief three seeks for “A declaration that the Claimant promotion from the rank of Able Seafarer to the rank of Junior Cargo Operator by the 2^nd Defendant pursuant to the satisfactory performance of the claimant in a promotion interview conducted by the onboard management of the 2^nd Defendant is lawful, of full effect and subsisting.

The law is settled that he who asserts must prove. See Mrs. Joan Ijieme v. Chief Gabriel Aigbe (2022) LPELR-58211(CA). More particularly, a claim for declaratory relief is not granted as a matter of course; the Claimant must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence. In Oba Jubril Bolaji Matanro v. Prince Rabiu Oyegoke (2022) LPELR-61108(SC), the Supreme Court reiterated that the burden on a claimant seeking a declaration is a heavy one and must be discharged by credible evidence.

 

In the context of a claim for declaration of promotion, the Claimant bears the burden of placing before the Court cogent and credible evidence establishing that:

 

• the promotion was duly approved by the employer;
• the promotion took effect; and
• the terms and conditions of the promotion were communicated to him.

 

The Claimant contended that he was promoted on 9th July 2021 following a successful promotion interview conducted onboard the 2nd Defendant’s vessel, and that the onboard management of the 2nd Defendant approved the said promotion, albeit without a formal letter issued by the 1st Defendant.

 

I have carefully reviewed the totality of the evidence placed before the Court, including the various certificates, correspondences, and requests for recognition of the alleged promotion.

 

However, the following deficiencies are manifest:

 

1. There is no formal letter of promotion issued by either the 1st or 2nd Defendant confirming the Claimant’s elevation to the rank of Junior Cargo Operator.
2. There is no official communication or document from the 2nd Defendant evidencing approval of the said promotion.
3. There is no credible evidence that the Claimant was remunerated in accordance with the rank of Junior Cargo Operator.
4. The Defendants have unequivocally denied that any such promotion was ever granted.

 

It is settled that promotion constitutes a fundamental alteration of an employee’s status and must be clearly and unequivocally established. The Court cannot speculate or infer promotion in the absence of clear and credible evidence.

 

Furthermore, where an employment relationship is governed by written terms, any variation of such terms—particularly one as significant as promotion—must be evidenced in writing. The Court cannot elevate expectation, internal discussions, or informal processes into a legally binding change of status.

 

While the Court acknowledges that the Claimant may possess the requisite qualifications for a higher role and may have participated in internal processes suggestive of advancement, such circumstances, without more, do not constitute proof of a valid promotion in law.

 

In the final analysis, the Claimant has failed to discharge the burden of proof required to establish that he was duly promoted to the rank of Junior Cargo Operator.

 

Accordingly, this relief fails and is hereby refused.

 

Relief four seeks for “A declaration that the Claimant employer is the 2^nd Defendant by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (as amended) and other relevant local and international maritime labour instruments as well as the relevant laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and not the 1^st Defendant. 

 

This issue has already been considered and determined by this Court under the earlier issue relating to the identity of the Claimant’s employer. For the avoidance of doubt, I reiterate that while maritime regulations impose certain obligations on shipowners, they do not, without more, displace or invalidate a valid contract of employment entered into between a seafarer and a crewing agency.

 

Having found that the Claimant entered into a binding contract of employment with the 1st Defendant, and that the 1st Defendant exercised control over his engagement, remuneration, and deployment, this Court holds that the 1st Defendant is indeed the Claimant’s employer and I so hold.

 

Accordingly, this relief fails and is hereby dismissed.

 

Relief five seeks for “An order directing the immediate payment of all monies due the Claimant by way of monetary entitlements and unlawful deductions, non-remittances etc, made on claimant’s entitlements, before during and after the periods of the purported suspension and termination of the Claimant’s employment by the 1^st defendant.

 

This relief is in the realm of special damages. The law is settled that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. See Luke Nwanewu Onyiorah v. Benedict C. Onyiorah & Anor (2019) LPELR-49096(SC), where the Supreme Court held that a claimant must not only plead but also strictly prove the exact sum claimed with credible evidence.

The Claimant alleged non-payment and underpayment of various entitlements, including:

• salary shortfalls,
• unpaid overtime,
• leave allowances,
• safety bonuses,
• thirteenth month allowances,
• terminal benefits, and
• payments for time-off not spent.

 

In support, the Claimant tendered several documents, including payslips, emails, and bank statements.

I have carefully examined the totality of the documentary evidence before the Court, particularly Exhibits C9, C10, C11, C12, C49–C54, as well as the corresponding documents tendered by the Defendants.

 

From the evidence, the Court observes as follows:

1. There are material inconsistencies between the sums claimed by the Claimant and the amounts reflected in the documentary evidence.
2. A significant portion of the Claimant’s computation is predicated on remuneration allegedly due to him as a Junior Cargo Operator—a position which this Court has already found he did not validly attain.
3. The Defendants tendered countervailing payslips and payment records disputing the Claimant’s assertions and indicating that payments were made in accordance with the contractual terms.
4. The Claimant failed to present a clear, coherent, and verifiable computation demonstrating precisely how the alleged sums were arrived at.

It is settled that special damages must be proved with certainty and exactitude. The Court cannot speculate, approximate, or embark on conjecture where the figures are uncertain or not clearly established. See Kewalram Nigeria Ltd v. Olugbenga Rosiji (2019) LPELR-49696(CA).

 

In the instant case, even the contractual benchmark is unclear from the Claimant’s own case. While Exhibit C58 reflects a basic salary structure, the actual payments received by the Claimant—as evidenced in the payslips—vary across periods without a consistent evidential basis linking them to the sums claimed.

 

For instance, the Claimant’s earnings fluctuate across different months, and the Court is unable to reconcile the figures claimed with the documentary evidence in a manner that satisfies the strict standard required for special damages.

 

In the final analysis, the Claimant has failed to strictly prove the specific sums claimed or establish his entitlement to the monetary reliefs sought with the degree of precision required by law.

 

Accordingly, this relief fails and is hereby refused.

 

Relief six seeks for “An Order directing the instant reinstatement of the Claimant to the rank of Junior Cargo Operator in the company of the 2^nd Defendant and pay all the claimant salary and other monetary benefits that had accrue and accruing from the position”.

 

This relief is clearly predicated on the success of earlier reliefs, particularly:

 

• Relief three, which sought to establish that the Claimant was validly promoted to the rank of Junior Cargo Operator; and
• Relief five, which sought monetary entitlements arising from that alleged status.

 

This Court has already found that the Claimant failed to establish that he was validly promoted to the said position. The foundation upon which this relief rests has therefore collapsed.

 

Furthermore, the Court has also held that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was not wrongful. It is settled that reinstatement is not ordinarily available in a master–servant relationship, except where the employment is clothed with statutory flavour—which is not the case here.

 

Accordingly, there exists no legal basis upon which this Court can grant the relief of reinstatement or payment of salaries attached to a position not proven to have been attained.

 

This relief therefore fails and is hereby refused.

 

Relief seven seeks for “A declaration that the indifference and inaction of the 3^rd Defendant amounts to culpable negligence of its statutory duty to the Claimant which has occasioned hardship to the claimant”.

 

It is noted that the 3rd Defendant did not enter appearance or defend this action. However, that fact alone does not relieve the Claimant of the burden of proof, particularly in a claim for declaratory relief.

 

The law is settled that for a claim in negligence to succeed, the Claimant must establish:

1. that the Defendant owed him a duty of care;
2. that the duty was breached; and
3. that the breach caused damage to him.

 

See Guaranty Trust Bank Plc v. Prof. Kobina Keme-Ebi Imananagha (2022) LPELR-56906(CA).

 

In addition, where negligence is alleged against a statutory body, it must be shown that:

• the statutory duty relied upon is owed specifically to the Claimant as an individual, and not merely to the public at large; and
• the breach of such duty gives rise to a private cause of action.

 

The Claimant relied on several exhibits, including letters of complaint addressed to the 3rd Defendant and follow-up correspondences, to demonstrate alleged inaction.

While this Court acknowledges that the 3rd Defendant is vested with regulatory and supervisory responsibilities over maritime labour matters, including the welfare of seafarers, such responsibilities are primarily regulatory and administrative in nature. They are directed at general industry oversight rather than the enforcement of individual contractual employment rights.

 

The Claimant has not demonstrated that the statutory obligations of the 3rd Defendant extend to a mandatory duty to intervene in, or resolve, individual employment disputes in a manner that gives rise to civil liability.

 

More importantly, the Claimant has failed to establish a causal nexus between the alleged inaction of the 3rd Defendant and the hardship complained of. The gravamen of the Claimant’s complaint arises from his contractual relationship with the 1st Defendant, which has already been adjudicated upon by this Court.

 

In the absence of credible evidence showing:

• a specific duty owed to the Claimant,
• a breach of that duty, and
• resultant damage directly attributable to such breach,

 

this Court cannot impose liability on the 3rd Defendant.

 

Accordingly, this relief fails and is hereby refused.

 

Relief eight seeks for “The sum of ?100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) only, jointly and severally, being special and general damages against the defendants for the unlawful interference to the Claimant’s employment/employment rights which include the issuance of unlawful employment letter, the purported letter of indefinite suspension and letter of termination of contract as well as other unfair labour practice meted on the claimant, and the indifference and inaction of the 3^rd defendant to the claimant complaints to it (sic) which have occasioned hardship, mental agony and general health crises on the claimant and his family.

 

General damages are those damages which the law presumes to flow naturally from the wrongful act of a Defendant. They need not be specifically pleaded or strictly proved, but must be justified on sound legal principles and supported by the facts of the case. See Ndinwa v. Igbinedion (2001) 5 NWLR (Pt. 705) 140 At 150.

 

However, it is equally settled that the award of general damages is not made as a matter of course. It must not be based on speculation, sentiment, or conjecture, but on credible evidence demonstrating that a legal right has been violated and that loss has flowed therefrom.

 

In the instant case, this Court has already found that:

• the termination of the Claimant’s employment was not wrongful;
• the suspension was not unlawful; and
• the claims against the 3rd Defendant are unsubstantiated.

 

In the absence of any established wrongful act on the part of the Defendants, there exists no legal basis upon which an award of damages can be anchored.

 

Accordingly, this relief fails and is hereby refused.

 

Relief nine seeks for “An Order directing the Defendants to produce and give to the Claimant his pension administration information/pin to enable the claimant have access to his pension fund and to also issue to the claimant all his tax receipts/certificates from July 2021 till date.

 

It is trite that pension contributions and tax deductions are statutory entitlements and do not belong to the employer. By virtue of the Pension Reform Act, an employer is under a legal obligation to remit pension contributions to the employee’s Retirement Savings Account (RSA) and ensure proper documentation of such remittances.

 

From the evidence before the Court, particularly the payslips tendered, it is evident that deductions were made from the Claimant’s earnings in respect of pension and tax.

 

Having established that the Claimant was an employee of the 1st Defendant, this Court finds that the Claimant is entitled to access information relating to his pension contributions and tax remittances.

Accordingly, an order is hereby made directing the Defendants to:

 

• produce and furnish the Claimant with his pension administration details/PIN; and
• issue to the Claimant all relevant tax receipts and certificates covering the period from July 2021 up to the time he ceased earning salary.

 

Relief ten seeks for “An Order of the Court directing the 2^nd Defendant to issue to the claimant a Certificate of Sea Service testimonial from the date of Claimant promotion till date which the claimant is ordinarily entitled save for unlawful suspension and termination of the claimant employment”.

 

A Certificate of Sea Service is a specialized document within the maritime industry, typically issued to certify:

 

• the actual period spent onboard vessels;
• the rank or capacity in which the seafarer served;
• the nature of duties performed; and
• the type of vessel and voyages undertaken.

 

Given its technical and regulatory significance, entitlement to such a document must be strictly proved.

 

While the Claimant has established that he was employed as a seafarer, mere proof of employment does not suffice to ground entitlement to a Sea Service Certificate. What is required is credible evidence of actual sea service.

 

The Court observes that the Claimant failed to provide sufficient evidence demonstrating:

 

1. the precise period of his sea service, including dates of embarkation and disembarkation;
2. the duration and continuity of such service;
3. the specific rank or capacity in which he served onboard; and
4. that his role qualified for sea time certification under applicable maritime standards.

 

Furthermore, the Claimant did not place before the Court any contractual provision, statutory obligation, or regulatory framework mandating the Defendants to issue such a certificate.

It is also instructive that the Claimant failed to establish that a formal request for the issuance of the certificate was made and refused. The law is settled that where a party alleges wrongful withholding of a document, there must be evidence of prior demand and refusal, unless the obligation arises automatically—which has not been shown in this case.

 

In the absence of the requisite evidential foundation, this Court cannot speculate or infer entitlement.

 

Accordingly, this relief fails and is hereby refused.

 

Relief eleven seeks for “An Order directing the 3^rd Defendant to revalidate the Claimant’s expired Certificate of Competence as an Officer-in-Charge of Navigational Watch whose willful refusal and failure to attend to the Claimant complaints in respect of this matter in line with his statutory responsibility and pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (as amended) substantially led to the unlawful suspension and eventual termination of the claimant employment.

 

A Certificate of Competence within the maritime sector is a regulated professional certification. Its issuance and revalidation are governed by strict statutory and regulatory requirements, including:

 

• proof of requisite sea-time;
• medical fitness certification;
• completion of mandatory refresher courses; and
• compliance with prescribed professional and regulatory standards.

 

Revalidation is therefore not automatic but conditional upon strict compliance with these requirements.

 

In the instant case, the Claimant has failed to place before this Court credible evidence establishing that:

• he satisfied the mandatory conditions for revalidation;
• he made a formal application to the 3rd Defendant in accordance with laid-down procedures;
• there exists a specific statutory or regulatory duty imposed on the 3rd Defendant to revalidate his certificate in the circumstances; or
• the 3rd Defendant refused or neglected to act on any such application.

 

In the absence of these foundational facts, this Court is unable to determine whether the Claimant is even qualified for revalidation.

 

The Claimant further contended that the failure to revalidate his certificate led to his suspension and eventual termination. This argument is untenable.

 

There is no evidence before this Court establishing that the Claimant’s employment was strictly contingent upon a valid Certificate of Competence, nor has the Claimant demonstrated any causal nexus between the alleged inaction of the 3rd Defendant and the decision of the employer to suspend or terminate his employment.

 

The acts of the employer cannot, without credible proof, be attributed to the 3rd Defendant. This Court cannot engage in speculation to bridge this evidential gap.

 

In the final analysis, the Claimant has failed to establish:

• a clear legal right to the relief sought;
• a statutory duty owed to him by the 3rd Defendant; and
• a breach of such duty.

 

Accordingly, this relief is speculative, unsubstantiated, and unsupported by credible evidence. It is therefore refused.

 

Relief twelve seeks for “The sum of ?5,000,000.00 as cost of litigation”.

 

It is settled that costs are ordinarily awarded in favour of a successful party to compensate for expenses incurred in the course of litigation and not as a punitive measure. See National Agency For Food and Drugs Administration and Control v. Fijabi Adebo Holdings Ltd & Ors (2019) LPELR-50923(CA).

 

In the instant case, the Claimant has largely failed in his claims. Accordingly, he is not entitled to the award of costs.

 

This relief therefore fails and is refused.

 

Relief thirteen seeks for “10% interest on the Judgement sum until liquidated”. 

 

While this Court is empowered pursuant to Order 47 Rule 7 of the Rules of this Court to award post-judgment interest, such an order can only be made where there is a monetary award in favour of the party seeking same.

 

In the instant case, no monetary award has been made in favour of the Claimant.

 

Accordingly, this relief is bound to fail and is hereby refused.

 

Having considered all the reliefs sought by the Claimant, it is clear that the issues for determination are resolved substantially in favour of the Defendants.

 

In the final analysis, the Claimant’s case succeeds only to the limited extent of relief nine, which has been granted. All other reliefs fail and have been accordingly dismissed.

 

Judgment is accordingly entered.

 

I make no order as to cost.

 

 

……………………………………………………………………….

HON. JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD

JUDGE