IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD

 

DATED: 8^TH DAY OF MAY, 2026                   SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/30/2025

 

BETWEEN:

 

DR. MICHAEL IBE UKAEGBU -------------------------- CLAIMANT

 

AND

1. ABIA STATE UNIVERSITY, UTURU
2. VANGUARD MEDIA LIMITED
3. LEADERS AND COMPANY LIMITED
4. PUNCH NIGERIA LIMITED --------------------- DEFENDANTS

 

 

REPRESENTATIONS:

D. O. David Ezaga, SAN with E. A. Ukaegbu and E. O. David Ezaga for the Claimant.

Chris Ekweozor for the 1^st Defendant.

Vitalis F. Ajoku with S. W. Okah and Chinyem Egbua for the 2^nd Defendant.

 

RULING

This ruling is in respect of an application brought before this Court by the 2nd Defendant seeking an order striking out this suit against it for want of competence and jurisdiction, or in the alternative, striking out its name together with the reliefs touching and concerning the 2nd Defendant.

 

This suit was commenced by way of a General Form of Complaint filed on the 9th day of May, 2025 together with a verifying affidavit, statement of facts, list of witnesses, witness statement on oath, list of documents and copies of the documents intended to be relied upon at trial.

 

By the Complaint and Statement of Facts, the Claimant claims against the Defendants the following reliefs:

 

a.    A Declaration that Claimant is still in the employment of the 1^st Defendant and entitled to all the benefits, rights and privileges of his employment until he attains the retirement age, or until he voluntarily retires or until his employment is otherwise lawfully terminated.

 

b.    ?A Declaration of this Honourable Court that the purported termination of Claimant's employment with the Abia State University Uturu alluded to in the Print Media on the 27^th day and the 28^th day of December, 2021 is ineffectual, unconstitutional, null, void and of no legal effect.

 

c.    A Declaration that the Claimant is entitled to remain and continue in the employment of the 1^stDefendant until he retires therefrom.

 

d.    ?An Order of this Honourable Court setting aside the purported termination of Claimant's employment for being ineffectual, null and void.

 

e.    An Order directing the 1^st Defendant to pay the Claimant all his arrears of salaries, outstanding entitlements including his salaries and other benefits up to the date of judgment in this suit.

 

f.    An Order of this Honourable Court reinstating Claimant as a full academic staff of the 1^stDefendant.

 

g.    An Order reinstating the Claimant as the Head of Department of the Mass Communication Department, Faculty of Humanities of the 1^st Defendant to serve out his one-year academic tenure.

 

h.    An Order promoting Claimant to the rank of his contemporaries in the 1^st Defendant with his full entitlements and benefits from December, 2021 till judgment is delivered.

 

i.     The sum of N200,000,000.00 (Two Hundred Million Naira) only being general damages for loss of job, defamation of character, psychological trauma, embarrassment, etc caused Claimant by Defendants' publications in the print media on the 27^th and 28^th December, 2021 respectively and the unlawful termination of Claimant's employment with the 1^st Defendant.

 

j.     Perpetual Injunction restraining the Defendants, their privies, assigns, servants, workers and legal representatives howsoever named from the further harassing, embarrassing Claimant through any publication outlet.

 

k.    An Order Mandating the Defendants to make a reversal publication in the 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^thDefendants' newspapers stating that Claimant bas been reinstated as a full academic staff of the 1^stDefendant, and that Claimant was never involved in nor found guilty of sexual harassment.

 

l.      30% Post Judgment Interest

 

In response to the suit, the 1st Defendant entered conditional appearance on the 10th day of July, 2025 and subsequently filed its Statement of Defence on the 14th day of October, 2025 together with accompanying frontloaded processes.

 

Similarly, the 2nd Defendant entered conditional appearance on the 24th day of October, 2025 and filed its Statement of Defence together with the requisite accompanying processes.

 

The Claimant thereafter filed replies to the respective Statements of Defence of the 1st and 2nd Defendants on the 4th day of December, 2025.

 

However, prior to the filing of the said reply, the 2nd Defendant filed a Motion on Notice on the 24th day of October, 2025 seeking the following reliefs:

 

1.     An Order of this Honourable Court striking out this suit against the 2nd Defendant for want of competence and jurisdiction; or in the alternative,

2.    An Order striking out the name of the 2nd Defendant from this suit together with Reliefs 33(i), (j), (k) and (l) of the Statement of Facts insofar as they relate to the 2nd Defendant for want of competence.

3.    And for such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.

 

The grounds upon which the application is predicated are as follows:

 

1. That the subject matter of defamation/libel does not fall within the jurisdiction of this Court.
2. That the 2nd Defendant is not the employer of the Claimant and there exists no employer-employee or master-servant relationship between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant.
3. That the proper remedy available to the Claimant, if any, lies in instituting a separate action before the High Court.

 

In support of the application, the 2nd Defendant filed a 6-paragraphed affidavit deposed to by one Anayo Okoli together with a written address.

 

Arising from the written address in support of the application, learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant/Applicant, Vitalis F. Ajoku, Esq., formulated a sole issue for determination as follows:

 

“Whether the 2nd Defendant/Applicant is entitled to the reliefs sought in this application.”

In arguing the sole issue counsel cited Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Section 7 (1) (a) - (v) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Act, 2006, to submit that this honourable court does not have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain matters bothering on defamation/libel for which the 2^nd Defendant is being sued in this court. Counsel added that jurisdiction is a threshold issue, and if a Court lacks it, every step taken in the matter will be an exercise in futility. Counsel relied on AREWA V. N.I.D.C (2006) 27 NSCQR 543.

 

Counsel contended that the option open to a party aggrieved where a set of facts give rise to multiple cause of action is that the party would have to bring two different actions at the same time and adopt the appropriate procedure for each class of action. Counsel relied on ABALAKA V. MINISTER OF HEALTH (2025) 15 NWLR (PT.2009) 413 SC Ratio 8.

 

Counsel also contended that the Claimant pleaded evidence and not summary of facts, hence the pleadings offend Order 30 rule 3 of the rules of this court. Counsel stated that paragraphs 2 -32 of his pleadings is same with paragraphs 2 - 32 of his Written Statement on Oath, counsel contended that is either the Claimant pleaded evidence or he has no witness statement on oath at all.

 

Counsel contended further that most of the documents the claimant relied on were not front-loaded incompliance with the practice direction of this Court, 2022. Counsel added that the effect of such non-compliance is that his processes should be treated as incompetent and the end result will be a striking out of the entire suit. Counsel cited paragraphs 3(2) & (3) and paragraph 4 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Filing of Applications/Motions in Trade Union matters and marking of Exhibits) Practice Directions (No. 1) 2022.

 

In conclusion counsel urged the court to grant the reliefs of the 2^nd Defendant and strike out the suit against the 2^nd defendant or strike out the name of the 2^nd defendant from the suit.

 

The Claimant in response to the said motion on notice filed a Seven paragraphed Counter-affidavit accompanied by a written address filed on the 4^th day of December, 2025 which was deposed to by Dr. Michael Ibe Ukaegbu (the Claimant).

Arising from the written address in support of the counter affidavit, counsel to the Claimant N. D. Ukaogo Esq. formulated a lone issue for determination to wit;

Whether this Honourable Court can determine the issue of defamation/libel connected or related to the Claimant's workplace.

 

In arguing the said issue counsel submitted that this Honorable Court Can determine the claim of defamation/Libel related to the Claimant's workplace. He added that this Court has jurisdiction over matters relating to employment and labour relations, including Cases of libel that are connected with the workplace. He emphasized that the word "connected with," "related to," "pertaining to," "arising from," incidental thereto," or "connected therewith" used in Section 254(1) (a) of the Nigeria Constitution, 1999, as amended, ensures the wide jurisdiction of this court. Counsel relied on MHWUN V. EHIGIEGBA (2018) LPELR - 44972 (CA) to submit that the issue that brought about the defamation of the Claimant, and the publication thereof, emanated or was related to the Claimant's employment.

 

Counsel submitted that Claimant pleaded facts and not evidence. Also in claimant’s Written Deposition, he gave evidence relying on the Facts he pleaded in his Statement of Facts. Counsel added that the Claimant did not offend any rule or law in his pleadings and in his written deposition.

 

Counsel contended that the Claimant has front-loaded all the documents he intends to rely on during trial and has properly marked them both in his Statement of Facts and in his Reply to the Defence. Counsel concluded by stating that this honourable has the jurisdiction to entertain and hear this suit.

 

In response to the submission of the claimant’s counsel, counsel to the 2^nd defendant on the 9^th day of February, 2026 filed a reply on points of law and argued that MHWUN V. EHIGIEGBA [2018] LPELR -44972 [CA] cited by the claimant’s counsel has been upturned by many recent authorities affirming that this Honorable Court lacks the substantive jurisdiction over "work place" defamation/libel. Counsel relied on ECOBANK NIG. LTD AND ORS V. OSU (2020): unreported CA, delivered February 24 2020and ECOBANK NIG. LTD AND ORS V. IDRIS [2021] LPELR 52806 (CA] to contend that the National industrial court does not have the jurisdiction over defamation cases.

 

He also cited CONGO ADEZOR V. INTELS NIGERIA LTD judgement delivered on the 16/01/2025 at the National Industrial Court, Yenagoa Division, and emphasized that the Court dismissed an ancillary claim for defamation for want of jurisdiction.

Counsel added that jurisdiction of court is the life wire or blood of any litigation before a Court, it is so fundamental that when a court lacks jurisdiction any action taken by that court in a suit will be a nullity notwithstanding the fact that proceedings of the court was well conducted. Counsel relied on MADUKOLU VS. NKEMDILIM (1962) SCNLR 341. 

 

Counsel submitted that suit No. NICN/PHC/30/2025 was not initiated by due process of law which clothes this Honourable Court with the jurisdiction to hear, entertain and determine relief (i), hence this Honourable Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the 2^nd defendant. He further maintained that this Honourable Court has jurisdiction over the main claim which borders on labour related matter but does not have jurisdict1on on the ancillary relief which borders on defamation and this ancillary relief can stand on its own and is not tied on the main claim.

 

I have painstakingly considered all the processes filed in respect of the instant Motion on Notice, particularly the grounds upon which the application is predicated, together with the submissions canvassed by learned counsel both in support of and in opposition to the application. Consequently, I find that the sole issue arising for determination is as follows:

 

Whether this Court possesses the jurisdiction to entertain the claims against the 2nd Defendant relating to alleged defamation/libel.

There is no gainsaying that the gravamen of the objection raised by the 2nd Defendant/Applicant is that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the claims of the Claimant against the 2nd Defendant as it relates to alleged defamation/libel.

I must emphasize at the outset that the law is firmly settled that jurisdiction constitutes the foundation upon which every adjudication rests. Jurisdiction is therefore a threshold issue which must be accorded utmost priority and may be raised at any stage of proceedings. In FEDERAL AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF NIGERIA v. MAEVIS LIMITED (2018) LPELR-51108(CA), the Court held thus:

 

“The question of jurisdiction has become a recurring issue in adjudication. Jurisdiction is undoubtedly a threshold issue. The apex Court described the necessity of a Court to have requisite jurisdiction as follows:

 

‘Jurisdiction is a threshold matter. It is very fundamental as it goes to the competence of the Court to hear and determine a suit. Where a Court does not have jurisdiction to hear a matter, the entire proceedings no matter how well conducted and decided would amount to a nullity. It is thus mandatory that Courts decide the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding to consider any other matter.’”

 

See also OBIUWEUBI v. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2011) LPELR-2185(SC); BRONIK MOTORS LTD v. WEMA BANK LTD (1983) 1 SCNLR 296 and MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341.

 

The locus classicus on jurisdiction remains MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (supra), wherein the Supreme Court held that a Court is competent when:

1.     It is properly constituted as regards numbers and qualifications of its members;

2.    The subject matter of the action is within its jurisdiction; and

3.    The action is initiated by due process and upon fulfillment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction.

 

Thus, the subject matter of an action remains central and determinative in the resolution of jurisdictional questions.

The jurisdiction of this Court is principally derived from Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and Section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006.

 

For ease of reference, Section 254C(1)(a) of the Constitution provides thus:

 

“Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters—

 

(a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.”

 

Similarly, Section 7(1) (a) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 provides thus:

“The Court shall have and exercise exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters—

(a) relating to — (ii) environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour and matters incidental thereto.”

 

Flowing from the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, it is beyond contention that the National Industrial Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to or connected with labour, employment, industrial relations and workplace issues, including matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.

Based on the foregoing provisions, I must state that the jurisdiction conferred on this Court is specifically in respect of matters relating to labour, employment, industrial relations, trade unions and workplace-related disputes.

 

The law is settled beyond peradventure that in determining whether a Court possesses jurisdiction to entertain a matter, the principal process to be examined is the originating process, particularly the Statement of Facts together with the reliefs sought by the Claimant. In MR. ALALADE OF HYDRA AGENCY NIGERIA LIMITED & ORS v. THE PRESIDING PRESIDENT OF THE OTA GRADE 1 CUSTOMARY COURT & ORS. (2021) LPELR-55656(CA), the Court held thus:

 

“I consider it well settled that jurisdiction is determined by the claim of the plaintiff. It is what the plaintiff submits to the Court for adjudication, that is to say, the subject matter and claim, that determines whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim or not. Therefore, the process to be examined in determining if the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter submitted to it for adjudication is the plaintiff’s claim.”

 

Consequently, upon a careful examination of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts together with the reliefs sought therein, it is evident that the foundation of the Claimant’s case is that he was employed by the 1st Defendant vide a letter of appointment dated the 26th day of April as a Lecturer II within the senior staff cadre of the 1st Defendant and was subsequently promoted to the rank of Lecturer I in the Department of Mass Communication.

 

The Claimant further averred that he was later appointed as the Head of the Department of Mass Communication and diligently discharged his duties until allegations of sexual harassment were allegedly made against him by one Miss Okoye Sandra. The Claimant stated that following the said allegation, he was removed from his position as Head of Department on the 24th day of February, 2021.

 

The Claimant further maintained that on the 27th and 28th days of December, 2021, his attention was drawn to certain publications allegedly made by the 1st Defendant through the print media platforms of the 2nd to 4th Defendants, wherein it was reported that the Governing Council of the 1st Defendant had purportedly terminated his employment on grounds of sexual harassment of a student.

 

Thus, this Court, having carefully examined the Statement of Facts and the reliefs sought against the 2nd Defendant, particularly paragraph 31(d) of the Statement of Facts wherein the Claimant alleged, inter alia, that:

“The act of the 2^nd – 4^th Defendants in publishing that Claimant was dismissed from the employment of the 1st Defendant for sexual harassment without first inquiring from the Claimant to hear his own side, is malicious, reckless, uncultured, unethical and calculated to bring Claimant to disrepute and in fact pronounce him guilty even before being heard, ”together with Relief 33(k), finds that the claims and reliefs directed against the 2nd Defendant principally concern newspaper publications, alleged defamatory statements, injury to reputation, and the publication of a retraction.

 

I hold that the foregoing claims constitute distinct and independent causes of action founded on defamation, which are capable of subsisting independently of the employment claims against the 1st Defendant.

 

This position accords with the decision of the Court of Appeal in ECOBANK NIGERIA LTD & ORS v. JAMILU IDRIS (2021) LPELR-52806(CA), relied upon by learned counsel for the 2nd Defendant/Applicant.

 

Also instructive is the decision of the Court of Appeal in DR. MAURICE TABANG BISONG v. UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR (2016) LPELR-41246(CA), wherein the Court held thus:

 

“The National Industrial Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction in terms of subject matter, as clearly spelt out in Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. Its jurisdiction is limited to matters closely related to labour and employment matters. The National Industrial Court cannot entertain any matter outside its constitutionally prescribed subject matter area. A claim cannot be considered as ancillary to the main claim when it is completely removed from the subject matter of the main claim. A careful examination of the provisions of Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, will not reveal that its powers extend to entertaining a claim in tort at all. A claim in tort cannot be considered as being ancillary to a claim for wrongful dismissal when brought before a Court whose jurisdiction is limited by statute.

 

Learned Counsel for the Respondent has rightly submitted that claims for defamation are not merely ancillary claims. A claim for defamation stands on its own. The learned trial Judge therefore rightly declined jurisdiction over the Appellant’s claim for defamation. ”Per OTISI, J.C.A. (Pp. 37–38, paras. E–E).

 

Defamation is the tort consisting in the publication of a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society or which tends to expose such person to hatred, contempt or ridicule. It may take the form of libel or slander. See MRS. FLORENCE OKECHUKWU v. UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC & ANOR (2017) LPELR-43100(CA).

 

I must state that defamation remains a tort actionable under the general law and does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court.

 

In determining the proper forum for the commencement of an action founded on defamation/libel, the Court in SOUTHWESTERN LAW SCHOOL & ORS v. MR. AIGBOKHAN PRESIDENT (2022) LPELR-58985(CA) held thus:

 

“Regarding the second issue which queried the venue of the commencement of the libel action in question, I only wish to support my learned brother’s expatiation of the law with the views expressed by I. T. Muhammed, JSC. (as he then was) in Dairo v. Union Bank of Nig. Plc (2007) LPELR-913(SC), where the issue of venue for commencement of the libel suit arose. His Lordship opined that in a defamatory action, publication of the defamatory statement is an essential element of the cause of action. So, it is the publication and not the composition of a libel that constitutes the actionable wrong, as the injury arises from the effect produced upon its readers.

 

His Lordship further made it clear that it is not the wishes or consent of parties that confer jurisdiction on a Court. It is the nature of the claim before the Court and the Constitution or statute that confer jurisdiction on a Court. A cause of action in libel therefore arises where the libel is published, and jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court of the State where the libel is published.”

 

I must reiterate that the claims and reliefs directed against the 2nd Defendant principally concern newspaper publications, alleged defamatory statements, damages for injury to reputation, and retraction of the said publications, all arising from allegations connected with the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant.

 

I find that these claims constitute distinct and independent causes of action founded on defamation which are capable of standing independently of the employment claims against the 1st Defendant.

 

I am not oblivious of the settled principle that it is the principal or main claim that determines the jurisdiction of the Court. In the instant case, the principal claims of the Claimant, particularly Reliefs (a)–(h), relate essentially to the alleged unlawful termination of the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant.

 

I have considered the decisions in ADENIYI OLUSHOLA & ANOR v. ESHIESHI ANDREW (2021) LPELR-56017(CA) and PDP & ANOR v. SYLVA & ORS. (2012) LPELR-7814(SC), wherein Rhodes-Vivour, J.S.C. held thus:

 

“A Court cannot hear and determine ancillary claims if it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claim and where the ancillary claims would clearly involve substantial consideration of the main claims.”

 

However, matters must always be determined on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

 

In the instant suit, Reliefs (a)–(h), which constitute the substantive employment-related claims of the Claimant, are directed principally against the 1st Defendant and concern the employer-employee relationship between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant. The 2nd Defendant is not the employer of the Claimant and no employment relationship whatsoever exists between the Claimant and the 2nd Defendant.

 

The claims against the 2nd Defendant arise solely from the alleged publication complained of by the Claimant.

 

Since this Court lacks jurisdiction over claims founded on defamation/libel, the 2nd Defendant cannot properly remain a party before this Court, and I so hold.

 

The 2^nd Defendant/Applicant also raised issues relating to pleading evidence instead of material facts as well as alleged non-frontloading of documents. However, having determined that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims relating to the 2nd Defendant, it becomes unnecessary to consider the said objections.

 

It is therefore the considered view of this Court that the claims against the 2nd Defendant relate substantially to alleged defamation/libel, a subject matter outside the jurisdiction of this Court. However, the substantive employment claims against the 1st Defendant fall squarely within the jurisdiction conferred on this Court by the Constitution and the National Industrial Court Act.

 

Consequently, the Court hereby makes the following orders:

1.     The application succeeds in part.

2.    The name of the 2^nd Defendant is hereby struck out from this suit.

3.    The reliefs relating to defamation and publication, including the reliefs touching and concerning the 2^nd Defendant, are hereby struck out for want of jurisdiction.

4.    The substantive employment claims against the 1st Defendant shall proceed to trial.

Ruling is accordingly entered.

I make no order as to costs.

 

………………………………………………………………………..

HON. JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, Ph.D

JUDGE