NICN - JUDGMENT
IN THE NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE PORT HARCOURT
JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT PORT
HARCOURT
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD
DATED: 8TH DAY OF MAY, 2026 SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/53/2025
BETWEEN:
MISS BLESSING OGECHI NNAJI--------------------------CLAIMANT
AND
- FIDELITY BANK PLC
- CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA-----------------------DEFENDANTS
Representations
A.I. Salami for the Claimant
O.C. Obasi for the 1st Defendant
S.B. Ojo for the 2nd Defendant
JUDGEMENT
The Claimant commenced this suit by way of an Originating
Summons filed on the 18th day of July, 2025. The Originating Summons was
supported by a 15-paragraphed affidavit deposed to by the Claimant, Miss
Blessing Ogechi Nnaji, and accompanied by a written address.
Arising from the said Originating Summons, the Claimant
submitted for determination the following question, as follows:
Whether
there exists on the record of the 1st Defendant any incident of
fraud, financial malfeasance or any impropriety whatsoever attributable to the
Claimant, which accords with the offences contemplated under the Revised
Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in
Nigeria, March 2024 (issued by the Central Bank
of Nigeria pursuant to Section 47
of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act 2020), so as to justify the
continued retention of the Claimant’s name on the blacklist maintained by the
2nd Defendant, which blacklist precludes employment in the Nigerian financial
sector.
Upon the determination of the said question, the Claimant
seeks the following reliefs:
1.
A
Declaration that the 1st Defendant does not have any record or proof of any
offence directly inculpatory of the Claimant in respect of fraud, financial
crime, abuse of office, breach of trust or any offence as defined under the
said Revised Guidelines, which would warrant her inclusion or retention on the
blacklist.
2.
An
Order directing the 2nd Defendant to forthwith remove or cause to be removed
the name of the Claimant from its blacklist, thereby restoring to her the right
to be considered for and retain employment within the Nigerian financial
industry.
In response to the said originating summons, the 1st Defendant
on the 16th of February, 2026 filed a 9 paragraphed
counter-affidavit deposed to by one Hope Effiong along with a written
address in opposition. The 2nd Defendant on their part,
filed on the 28th of August 2025, a 13 paragraphed
Counter-Affidavit deposed to by one Rosiji, Oluwatobi Oladunni and
a written address.
The Claimant subsequently filed on the 21st of
January, 2026, a Further affidavit of 8 paragraphs deposed to
by herself and also accompanied the affidavit with a reply on point of law
to the 2ndDefendant’s written address.
The Defendants in addition to their response to the
Originating summons filed separate notice of preliminary objection. That
of the 1st Defendant was filed on the 9th of
October, 2025 while that of the 2nd Defendant was filed on the
1st of August 2025.
The notice of preliminary objection filed by
the 1st Defendant was brought pursuant to Order 17 Rules 1
and 2 of the National Industrial Court (Civil) Procedure Rules
2017 and under the Inherent Jurisdiction of
this Honourable Court. The notice is seeking for:
i.
An order of
this Honourable Court striking out this suit for want of jurisdiction
and competence.
ii.
And for such further other
order as this Honourable Court may make in the circumstances.
The grounds upon which the objection is placed is that
the originating summons filed by the Claimant is not for the interpretation of
any document, hence, same is filed in disregard for the rules of this
court and accordingly requires pleading of facts and proof through credible
evidence. Counsel to the 1st Defendant in the written
address in support of the notice, formulated a lone issue for determination to
wit:
Whether the Claimant’s Suit seeking for a declaration
that the 1st Defendant do not have any record or proof of any
offence that is directly inculpatory of commission of any financial crime can
be commenced via originating Summons?
In arguing the lone issue, counsel cited the
cases of INAKOJU & ORS v. ADELEKE & ORS (2007)
LPELR-1510(SC) and HON. A.G & COMMISIONER FOR JUSTICE, AKWA IBOM STATE
& ORS v. ESSIEN (2020) LPELR-49576(CA) on the use of originating summons
before positing that having annexed only correspondences and/or letter between
the Claimant and the 1stDefendant, the documents do not come within
the purview of the documents that are expected to be construed
or interpreted by this Honourable Court as they are documents
which forms part of a Court proceedings and not what should accompany an
Originating summons.
Counsel also cited the cases of NEMI & 2 ORS.
V. THE STATE (1987) 4 SC 374 and ALHAJI MUHAMMADU MAGARI DINGYADI &ANOR. V.
INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS. (2011) 4SC (Pt.1) to contend
that the Claimant has failed to bring before this Court the Statute, Will,
Deed or the Constitution allegedly infringed by the 1stDefendant
that requires the interpretation of this Honourable Court and in the
absence of such strict provisions of the law, counsel urged the Court to strike
out this suit and decline Jurisdiction
In response to the foregoing, Claimant on the 21st of
January, 2026 filed a written address in opposition to the 1st Defendant’s
notice of preliminary objection and arising therefrom, counsel to the Claimant
contended that the instrument to be interpreted is the CBN REVISED
GUIDELINES FOR BLACKLISTING FOR BANKS AND 0THER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN
NIGERIA OF MARCH 2024, while adding that by virtue of Order 3 Rule 3 of the
Rules of this Court, such document comes within the documents mentioned in the
said Rules.
Counsel added that this court also has the power to
order that parties should file pleadings in the event that there exist disputed
facts while citing Order 3 Rule 17. Counsel posited that dispute cannot be
inferred at this stage since it is only the document of the
Claimant that can be considered.
Counsel maintained that determining whether the
Claimant deserves to remain on the blacklist of the CBN, can be attained by the
interrogation of documents to that effect and conversely, if no document exist,
then the same overriding issue for determination can easily be answered or
determined in the negative i.e. that no facts exist that justifies
Claimant retention on the CBN blacklist.
Counsel cited the case of SANI V KOGI STATE
HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY (2019) 4 NWLR (PT 1661) SC 72 to posit that assuming there is
dispute of fact, such dispute has to be substantial and there cannot be dispute
of fact where there are no contradictory or adverse facts.
I have taken into account the grounds upon which the
notice of preliminary objection of the 1stDefendant is predicated
and also considered the argument of both counsel in their respective written
addresses. To my mind, the lone issue for the determination of the notice
of preliminary objection filed by the 1st Defendant is to wit:
Whether or not the instant
suit is one that can be determined through the originating summons proceedings.
The limit of the foregoing issue is owing to the fact
that where the court finds that the instant suit cannot be determined by
originating summons, all that would be required would be for the court to order
parties to exchange pleadings by way of a Complaint. In other words, the
commencement of an action under the wrong proceedings before this court does
not rob the court of jurisdiction and would not warrant an order striking out
the suit as prayed by the 1stDefendant.
For avoidance of doubt, the court in the case of P.D.P.
V. Abubakar (2007) 3 NWLR (pt. 1022) 515 referred to.] (p. 353, paras. C, D, F,
361, paras. B-C) held that;
“The form of commencement of an action does not necessarily
make it incompetent. It does not matter whether the action was begun by writ of
summons or by Originating summons. What is most important is the question of
justice of the case. Thus, where a suit is improperly commenced by originating
summons, the defect relates to procedure and does not affect the competence of
the suit. The legal effect is to order pleadings and not strike out the suit”.
To consider whether or not the instant suit can be
maintained using the originating summons as the mode of commencement,
I have taken into account the issue to be determined. The said
question is to determine whether the 1st Defendant has any
record which accords with the CBN REVISED GUIDELINES FOR BLACKLISTING FOR BANKS
AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA OF MARCH 2024 which could justify
the retention of the name of the Claimant in the Backlist of CBN which prevents
the Claimant from working in any financial institution in Nigeria.
While counsel to the 1st Defendant had
contended that there is no instrument to be interpreted before this court,
counsel to the Claimant posited that the said CBN REVISED GUIDELINES FOR
BLACKLISTING FOR BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA OF MARCH
2024 is what is to be interpreted and the Claimant via his further
affidavit exhibited the said CBN REVISED GUIDELINES FOR BLACKLISTING FOR BANKS
AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN NIGERIA OF MARCH 2024. There is no
gainsaying that the said regulation being a subsidiary legislation comes
within the framework of an enactment.
In addition to the foregoing, I have taken into
consideration the reliefs sought by the Claimant, and I am of the considered
view that the said reliefs are amenable to determination by way of Originating
Summons. This position is informed by the provisions of Order 3 Rule 3 of the
Rules of this Court which provides as follows:
Civil
proceedings that may be commenced by way of Originating Summons include matters
relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment,
agreement or any other instrument relating to employment, labour and industrial
relations in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the
provisions of Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or law in force in Nigeria.
In the same vein, Order 3 Rule 16 of the Rules of this
Court provides thus:
(1)
Any person claiming to
be interested under an enactment, constitution, agreement or any other written
instrument may by Originating Summons apply to the Court for the determination
of any question of construction arising from the instrument and for a
declaration of the rights of the person(s) interested, in so far as such
question of construction arises from a subject matter over which the Court has
jurisdiction.
(2)
A party activating the
interpretative jurisdiction of the Court shall indicate with sufficient
particularity the provisions or part of the document sought to be interpreted.
Bearing the foregoing provisions in mind, I am of the firm
view that this Court is properly called upon to determine, through the
Originating Summons procedure, whether or not the 1st Defendant has in its
custody any record which aligns with the relevant provisions of the Revised
Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in
Nigeria, March 2024 issued by the Central Bank
of Nigeria, as it affects the Claimant’s eligibility for
employment within the Nigerian financial sector.
I must add that the mere existence of a dispute of fact
does not, without more, render the Originating Summons procedure inappropriate.
The law is settled that such dispute must be substantial, material, and
fundamental to the determination of the live issues before the Court. Where the
dispute is peripheral or merely incidental, the action may still be competently
sustained by way of Originating Summons.
In this regard, the Court in PAM v. MOHAMMED (2008) 16 NWLR
(Pt. 1112) 1 at 481, paragraphs D–E, held that:
“It is
not always that when there is dispute on facts that the matter should be
commenced by writ of summons. The dispute on facts must be substantial to
affect the live issues in the matter. Where the dispute is peripheral and not
material to the live issues, an action can be sustained by originating summons.
Facts make a case and it is the dispute in the facts that gives rise to
litigation.”
Applying the foregoing principle to the instant case, I
find that any perceived dispute of fact does not rise to the level of
substantiality required to displace the Originating Summons procedure. The
central issue remains the interpretation and application of the said Guidelines
to the status of the Claimant, which is a matter properly within the
interpretative jurisdiction of this Court.
The notice of preliminary objection filed by the 2nd
Defendant was brought pursuant to Section 251(1) (a), (p), (q) and (r) of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), and under
the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The reliefs sought therein
are:
a. An order of this Honourable Court striking out the suit
on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain same against the
2nd Defendant; and
b. Such further order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem
fit to make in the circumstances.
The grounds upon which the objection is predicated are that
by virtue of Section 251 of the Constitution, the Federal High Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to the 2nd Defendant as an agency
of the Federal Government, and that the subject matter of this suit pertains to
the regulatory powers of the said 2nd Defendant.
Counsel to the 2nd Defendant accordingly formulated a lone
issue for determination, namely:
Whether, having regard to the status of the 2nd Defendant
as an agency of the Federal Government and the provisions of Section 251 of the
Constitution, this Court possesses the jurisdiction to entertain the subject
matter of this suit.
In arguing the said issue, counsel submitted that
jurisdiction is fundamental and must be established before the Court can
proceed. Reliance was placed on authorities including MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM
(1962) 2 ALL NLR 581, as well as INAKOJU v. ADELEKE (2007), amongst others, to
contend that the proper forum for this action is the Federal High Court.
Counsel further urged the Court to examine the processes
filed by the Claimant, particularly the reliance placed on the regulatory
framework issued by the Central Bank
of Nigeria, and to hold that the subject matter falls
squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
In response, learned counsel to the Claimant contended that
while the authorities cited by the 2nd Defendant correctly state the law, they
are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Counsel submitted that the
subject matter of this suit is fundamentally rooted in employment and labour
relations, thereby bringing it within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court
pursuant to Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).
Counsel further argued that the reliefs sought by the
Claimant, particularly the restoration of her eligibility for employment within
the financial sector, are intrinsically linked to her right to work and to be
employed, which are matters squarely within the jurisdiction of this Court.
I have carefully considered the grounds of the Preliminary
Objection of the 2nd Defendant alongside the submissions of learned counsel on
both sides.
To my mind, the issue for determination is as follows:
Whether
this Court possesses the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit in view
of the status of the 2nd Defendant as an agency of the Federal Government of
Nigeria.
There is no gainsaying that jurisdiction is indeed the
lifeblood of adjudication as contended by counsel to the 2nd Defendant.
in the case of ARDO & ANOR v. NYAKO
& ORS (2013) LPELR-20887(CA) the court held that:
“it is trite that jurisdiction is a fundamental
and threshold matter, the life blood of adjudication which when raised, the
Court ought to determine same before proceeding with the consideration and
determination of the substance of the case. Where a court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain a suit the entire proceeding is in nullity no matter how well
conducted. It has also been held that it is the claim of the Plaintiff, in this
case, it is the Statement of Claim and the Reliefs Sought by the Appellant that
determine the jurisdiction of the Court. See Inakoju v. Adeleke
(2007) 4 NWLR (pt. 1025) 423 at 588; Ugwu v. Ararume (2008) CCLR at
270 also reported (2007) 12 NWLR (pt. 1048) 367 at 445 paras. B - C
and Elabanjo v. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (pt. 1001) 76”.
It is equally not in doubt that for a Court to validly
adjudicate over a matter, the subject matter of the suit must fall within the
jurisdiction conferred on the Court. See MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 ALL NLR
581 at 589.
Having stated the foregoing, the contention raised by the
2nd Defendant, as can be gleaned from the grounds of its objection, is
essentially that the subject matter of this suit falls outside the jurisdiction
of this Court. Put differently, the 2nd Defendant challenges the substantive
jurisdiction of this Court on the premise that, being an agency of the Federal
Government, any matter involving it must, by virtue of Section 251 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), be
entertained exclusively by the Federal High Court.
Bearing in mind that what is being challenged is the
substantive jurisdiction of this Court, it must be stated unequivocally that
the resolution of such a question is not one that admits of conjecture, as
jurisdiction is strictly circumscribed by statute. Interestingly, the same
Constitution relied upon by learned counsel to the 2nd Defendant in challenging
the jurisdiction of this Court is also the very instrument upon which the
Claimant predicates her assertion that this Court is vested with the requisite
jurisdiction.
In determining the issue of jurisdiction, it is settled law
that the Court must examine the originating processes filed by the Claimant. In
this regard, the Supreme Court in A.G. ANAMBRA STATE v. A.G. FEDERATION (2007)
12 NWLR (Pt. 1047) held that:
“It is
settled law that for the purpose of determining whether a court has the
requisite jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it, it is the duty of the
court to look at the statement of claim where one is required and had been
filed and take the documents therein contained as true ex facie… In a case
commenced by originating summons, the relevant processes to be examined are the
originating summons and the affidavit in support thereof.” Per Onnoghen, JSC P. 91-92, Para E-A.
See also GOLDMARK NIGERIA LTD v. IBAFON CO. LTD (2012)
LPELR-9349(SC).
In the light of the foregoing authorities, I have examined
the Originating Summons and the affidavit in support thereof. The narrative
presented by the Claimant is that she was previously employed by various
financial institutions, including the 1st Defendant, and at the time of
instituting this action, was employed by Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers. The
Claimant avers that her current employer brought to her attention that her name
had been placed on the blacklist maintained by the Central Bank
of Nigeria, and that the report allegedly emanated from
the 1st Defendant. Consequent upon this development, she was requested to
resign her employment.
The Claimant, by this action, seeks essentially the removal
of her name from the said blacklist, with a view to restoring her eligibility
for employment within the financial sector.
The foregoing narrative clearly demonstrates that the
gravamen of the Claimant’s complaint is the impact of the alleged blacklisting
on her employment status and prospects. The reliefs sought are therefore
intrinsically tied to her right to work and to be considered for employment.
It is not in dispute that the 2nd Defendant is mentioned in
this suit in its capacity as the regulator responsible for issuing the Revised
Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in
Nigeria pursuant to Section 47 of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions
Act, 2020. It is also not in dispute that the 2nd Defendant is an agency of the
Federal Government of Nigeria.
Indeed, by virtue of Section 251(1)(p), (q) and (r) of the
Constitution, the Federal High Court is vested with jurisdiction in matters
relating to the administration or management and control of the Federal
Government or any of its agencies, as well as in matters seeking declaratory or
injunctive reliefs affecting same.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is apparent that learned
counsel to the 2nd Defendant has accorded little or no consideration to other
provisions of the same Constitution which define and expand the jurisdiction of
this Court. While it is correct that, prior to the Third Alteration, the
jurisdiction of this Court was not constitutionally entrenched as that of a
superior court of record, the enactment of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010 fundamentally altered the
jurisdictional landscape.
For the avoidance of doubt, Section 254C(1)(a) of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides
thus:
“Notwithstanding
the provisions of Sections 251, 257 and 272 of this Constitution and anything
contained in this Constitution, the National Industrial Court shall have and
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and
matters—
(a)
relating to or connected
with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters
arising from the workplace, including conditions of service, health, safety,
welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected
therewith.”
The foregoing provision clearly vests the National
Industrial Court with constitutional authority to adjudicate on matters
incidental to or connected with labour and employment. Bearing in mind that the
reliefs sought by the Claimant are directed at restoring her eligibility for
employment within the financial sector, there is no gainsaying that the subject
matter of this suit falls squarely within the ambit of Section 254C(1)(a) of
the Constitution and is therefore within the jurisdiction of this Court.
With respect to the contention that the 2nd Defendant is an
agency of the Federal Government, it is pertinent to observe that the
jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Section 254C is expressly made
“notwithstanding” the provisions of Section 251 of the Constitution. The legal
implication of the word “notwithstanding” is to accord supremacy to the
provision in which it appears, thereby excluding the operation of any other
provision that might otherwise limit its effect.
In this regard, the Supreme Court in ADEDAYO & ORS v.
PDP & ORS (2013) LPELR-20342(SC), relying on PETER OBI v. INEC (2007) ALL
FWLR (Pt. 378) 1116, held that:
“The
word ‘notwithstanding’ is used to exclude any impeding effect of any other
provision of the statute… so that the said section may fulfil itself.”
It must also be borne in mind that in the interpretation of
the Constitution, its provisions must be read holistically and not in
isolation. The Supreme Court, in BRONIK MOTORS LTD v. WEMA BANK LTD (1983)
LPELR-808(SC), emphasized that:
“The
provisions of a Constitution ought to be interpreted as a whole; related
sections ought to be construed together.”
Consequently, Section 251 of the Constitution, which vests
jurisdiction in the Federal High Court in matters involving Federal Government
agencies, cannot be read in isolation. It must be construed alongside Section
254C, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on this Court in respect of labour
and employment matters.
The inevitable consequence of this constitutional
arrangement is that where a dispute involves a Federal Government agency and
simultaneously arises from or is connected with employment or labour relations,
jurisdiction resides exclusively in the National Industrial Court and I so hold.
In other words, a Federal Government agency, when engaged
in matters relating to employment, labour or industrial relations, is amenable
to the jurisdiction of this Court as the constitutionally designated forum for
the adjudication of such disputes.
In the light of the foregoing, it is irrestible conclusion
of this court that the issue formulated for the determination of the
Preliminary Objection of the 2nd Defendant is resolved in favour of the
Claimant, to the effect that this Court possesses the requisite substantive
jurisdiction to entertain the instant suit notwithstanding the status of the
2nd Defendant as an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria. Consequent
upon the foregoing, the preliminary objection raised and argued by the 2nd
Defendant lacks merit and same is accordingly dismissed in its entirety.
Having dismissed the preliminary objection of the Defendants
and resolved the issue of jurisdiction, the Court now turns to the substantive
matter.
Arising from the written address in support of the
Originating Summons, learned counsel to the Claimant formulated a lone issue
for determination, as follows:
Whether
there exists on the record of the 1st Defendant any incident of fraud,
financial malfeasance or impropriety attributable to the Claimant, which
accords with the offences contemplated under the Revised Guidelines for
Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria, March 2024
issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria, so as to justify the continued retention of the
Claimant’s name on the said blacklist.
In arguing the lone issue, learned counsel submitted that
the Claimant is not aware of the specific facts or circumstances that led to
the inclusion of her name on the blacklist maintained by the 2nd Defendant.
Counsel stated that the only information available to the Claimant was communicated
through her employer, from whom she has now resigned.
Counsel further contended that the Claimant, through her
solicitors, made formal inquiries to both Defendants requesting clarification
on the basis of her blacklisting, but was not furnished with any substantive
response, save for an indication from the 1st Defendant that an internal
investigation was ongoing.
It was further argued that even assuming the existence of
any prior disciplinary issue, such would not, without more, constitute an offence
of sufficient gravity to warrant blacklisting under the applicable Guidelines.
Counsel submitted that the Revised Guidelines, being a
regulatory instrument issued by the Central Bank
of Nigeria, were designed to ensure transparency,
accountability, and adherence to fair hearing standards in determining the
circumstances under which an individual may be blacklisted.
Particular reference was made to Clause 7.0 of the
Guidelines, wherein the concept of “offence level” is introduced. Counsel
argued that a proper reading of the said provision, in conjunction with the
qualifying criteria therein, indicates that only conduct of a grave and
egregious nature, supported by verifiable records in the custody of the
reporting institution, can justify blacklisting.
It was further submitted that the intention of the said
provision is to exclude minor or innocuous infractions which, although
disciplinary in nature, do not rise to the level of offences warranting the severe
consequence of blacklisting.
Counsel also relied on the principle of statutory
interpretation that provisions of an enactment must be read together in order
to give effect to the true intention of the lawmaker. In this regard, reliance
was placed on MUDIAGA-ODJE v. YPS (NIG) LTD (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1400) 413.
Counsel concluded by asserting that the Claimant has
maintained an unblemished professional record and urged the Court to grant the
reliefs sought.
In response to the foregoing, learned counsel to the 1st
Defendant, in the written address in support of the Counter-Affidavit,
contended that the Claimant cannot lay claim to integrity. Counsel argued that
prior to the termination of the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant,
she was confronted with acts of misconduct which, according to counsel, were
manifest throughout the course of her employment and constituted gross
financial impropriety. It was further contended that such conduct justified the
1st Defendant in reporting same to the industry regulator in order to safeguard
the integrity of the financial system.
Counsel relied on UBN PLC v. SOARES (2012) LPELR-8018(CA)
and concluded that the Claimant lacks the requisite integrity to be employed
within the financial sector or any sector that demands public trust and
confidence.
On the part of the 2nd Defendant, learned counsel
formulated three issues for determination, as follows:
1.
Whether,
having regard to the status of the 2nd Defendant as the apex bank and an agency
of the Federal Government, and in view of Section 251 of the Constitution, this
Court possesses jurisdiction to entertain this suit against the 2nd Defendant;
2.
Whether,
given the contentious nature of the suit, same can properly be commenced by way
of Originating Summons; and
3.
Whether,
in the circumstances of this case, the Claimant has proved her case to be
entitled to the reliefs sought.
Having regard to the earlier determinations of this Court
on the respective Preliminary Objections of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, there
is no gainsaying that issues one and two have been conclusively addressed and
resolved. The rulings thereon remain binding, and I shall refrain from
re-engaging with the arguments canvassed in that regard.
In arguing the third issue, learned counsel to the 2nd Defendant
submitted that it is trite that he who asserts must prove. Counsel referred to
Sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended), as well as
the case of OWIE v. IGHIWI (2005) LPELR-2846(SC), to contend that the burden of
proof rests on the Claimant to establish the facts upon which her claims are
predicated.
Counsel argued that the Claimant failed to establish that
her name was indeed placed on the blacklist maintained by the Central Bank of Nigeria, and that the
claim is therefore unsubstantiated. It was further contended that the
Claimant’s case is founded on hearsay, and that this Court is enjoined to act
only on credible and admissible evidence, not conjecture or emotion.
In support of this contention, counsel relied on JOSHUA v.
MAITSAMIYA (2024) LPELR-62417(CA); UNION HOMES SAVINGS & LOANS PLC v. UBN
(2022) LPELR-58242(CA); and DUMEZ (NIG) LTD v. NWAKHOBA (2008) LPELR-965(SC).
Counsel accordingly urged the Court to dismiss the
Claimant’s suit for lacking merit.
By way of Reply on Points of Law, learned counsel to the
Claimant contended that the 2nd Defendant cannot rely on evasive denials to
join issues with the Claimant, and that the facts deposed to by the Claimant
remain substantially unchallenged. Counsel relied on DANLADI v. DANGIRI (2015)
2 NWLR (Pt. 1442) 124 (SC).
I have carefully considered the depositions in the
affidavit and further affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, as well
as the Counter-Affidavits of both the 1st and 2nd Defendants. I have also taken
into account the submissions of learned counsel on both sides as contained in
their respective written addresses and reply on points of law.
Bearing the foregoing in mind, I shall proceed to determine
the lone question formulated by the Claimant. In doing so, it is apposite to
first set out, in clear terms, the factual foundation upon which the said
question is predicated.
For avoidance of doubt, the narrative presented by the
Claimant is that she commenced her career with the 1st Defendant through a
labour contractor, initially as a cleaner, and was subsequently elevated to a
front-desk role. She thereafter pursued further academic qualifications and
went on to work with other financial institutions, including Ecobank, Oak
Pensions, ARM Pensions, and Crusader Pensions, before securing employment with
Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers.
The Claimant averred that while in the employment of
Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers, her attention was drawn to the fact that her
name had been placed on a blacklist maintained by the Central Bank of Nigeria, and that the
report was allegedly traceable to the 1st Defendant. Being uncertain as to the
basis for such blacklisting, she instructed her solicitors to write to both
Defendants seeking clarification. The 1st Defendant responded by indicating
that it was conducting an internal review of its records.
The Claimant further averred that, during the pendency of
this suit, she was advised by her employer to resign pending the resolution of
the issue, and she accordingly tendered her resignation on the 24th of July,
2025.
In support of her case, the Claimant exhibited, among other
documents, the letters written to the Defendants, the response of the 1st
Defendant, her letter of resignation, and the relevant Guidelines issued by the
Central Bank of Nigeria.
The position of the 1st Defendant, as gleaned from its
Counter-Affidavit, is that the Claimant is fully aware of her alleged acts of
financial misconduct, including abuse of her position during her employment.
The 1st Defendant averred that the Claimant was subjected to queries, integrity
tests, and suspension, and that her failure in the said integrity assessment
led to the termination of her employment and the possibility of blacklisting.
The 1st Defendant further contended that the Claimant has
not approached this Court with clean hands, having allegedly suppressed
material facts relating to her misconduct.
In support of its position, the 1st Defendant exhibited
documents including an internal memorandum dated 13th October 2017, an email
trail, a letter relating to staff redeployment, and a letter of termination
issued by FSL Securities Limited.
The 2nd Defendant, on its part, merely averred that it
received the correspondence from the Claimant’s solicitors but that the
Claimant commenced this action before the complaint could be investigated.
Bearing the foregoing in mind, the central issue that
emerges is that while the 1st Defendant asserts that it possesses records of
the Claimant’s alleged financial misconduct, the determinative question is
whether such records, as presented before this Court, meet the threshold contemplated
under the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial
Institutions in Nigeria.
The resolution of this issue necessarily requires a careful
correlation of the records placed before this Court by the 1st Defendant
vis-à-vis the provisions of the said Guidelines issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria.
For the purpose of interpretation, learned counsel to the
Claimant referred to Clause 7.0 of the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for
Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria, which
provides for the conditions under which a financial institution may blacklist
an individual. The said provision stipulates that a financial institution shall
blacklist any individual who has been indicted by an administrative or investigative
panel, sanctioned by a competent authority, or convicted by a court of
competent jurisdiction in respect of specified offences including fraud,
forgery, insider abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation of facts,
and other related misconducts affecting the financial system.
The provision further emphasizes that blacklisting
decisions must be based on objective criteria and not on personal bias,
prejudice, or miscellaneous infractions. In addition, the Guidelines require
that, in determining whether to blacklist an individual, the financial
institution must take into cognizance:
·
the
intent and level of involvement of the individual;
·
the
level of harm caused to the institution or its customers; and
·
the
availability of concrete and established evidence.
A holistic reading of Clause 7.0 reveals that the mere
existence of misconduct is not sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant
blacklisting. Rather, the misconduct must attain a certain threshold of
gravity, measured against the level of harm occasioned and supported by
verifiable and credible evidence.
I am in agreement with learned counsel to the Claimant that
the magnitude of the alleged misconduct is qualified by the requirement that
the conduct must be of such seriousness as to cause significant harm to the
institution or its customers. This requirement operates as a safeguard against
the arbitrary or disproportionate application of blacklisting sanctions.
In addition to the substantive conditions stipulated under
Clause 7.0, the Guidelines also prescribe a mandatory procedural framework for
blacklisting under Clause 8.0.
For the purpose of clarity, Clause 8.0 provides that before
a financial institution can validly blacklist an individual, the following
steps must be complied with:
·
an
investigation must be conducted to ascertain the veracity of the allegation;
·
the
affected individual must be notified in writing of the allegations and afforded
the opportunity to respond within a stipulated period;
·
a
Disciplinary Committee must be constituted to review the matter;
·
the
individual must be invited to appear and present a defence;
·
a
decision must be reached based on the evidence presented;
·
where
the individual is indicted, the matter must be escalated to an Independent
Review Panel (IRP) for validation; and
·
the
final decision must be communicated to the individual.
The procedure further contemplates situations where the
individual fails to appear and provides safeguards to ensure fairness,
including the possibility of extending time where justified. It also makes
provision for conflict resolution between the decisions of the Disciplinary
Committee and the IRP.
The foregoing provisions are clear, detailed, and
mandatory. They establish both substantive and procedural thresholds which must
be satisfied before an individual can be validly blacklisted.
The law is settled that where the words of a statute or
subsidiary legislation are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their
ordinary and natural meaning without resort to extraneous interpretation. In
this regard, the Supreme Court in 7-UP BOTTLING CO. LTD v. ABIOLA & SONS
(NIG) LTD (1995) LPELR-2(SC) held that:
“Where
the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their
plain and ordinary meaning.”
Accordingly, the provisions of Clauses 7.0 and 8.0 of the
said Guidelines must be applied as they are, and any departure therefrom would
render the blacklisting process defective.
For the purpose of applying the law to the facts before
this Court, the provision relied upon by learned counsel to the Claimant is
Clause 7.0 of the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other
Financial Institutions in Nigeria issued by the Central Bank
of Nigeria.
As earlier reproduced, the said provision sets out the
substantive conditions under which a financial institution may blacklist an
individual, while Clause 8.0 prescribes the mandatory procedure to be followed
in arriving at such a decision.
There is no contention as to the meaning or import of these
provisions. The crux of the dispute is whether the 1st Defendant has placed
before this Court any record of misconduct attributable to the Claimant which
accords with the substantive and procedural requirements stipulated in the said
Guidelines.
It is in that light that I have carefully examined the
exhibits annexed by the 1st Defendant in support of its assertions.
Exhibit A, being an internal memorandum dated 13th October
2017, emanated from the Human Resources Department of the 1st Defendant and
sought approval to return the Claimant to her primary employer, FSL Securities
Limited, on the ground of doubtful integrity. The background to the memo was an
integrity test conducted on the Claimant, during which a discrepancy arose between
the amount recorded on a deposit slip and the cash handed over. The Claimant
was alleged to have retained a portion of the excess sum after partially
refunding same.
Prior to the issuance of the said memo, the Claimant had
been queried via Exhibit B, an email trail dated 10th October 2017. In her
response, the Claimant expressed remorse, attributing her conduct to negligence
and stating that it was not her intention to retain the money.
Subsequently, Exhibit C, a letter dated 17th October 2017,
was issued by the 1st Defendant to FSL Securities Limited indicating that the
services of the Claimant were no longer required. This was followed by Exhibit
D, a letter of termination issued to the Claimant by her direct employer.
The foregoing constitutes the entirety of the record
presented by the 1st Defendant in support of its assertion of financial
misconduct.
The pertinent question that arises is whether these
materials satisfy the substantive and procedural thresholds prescribed under
Clauses 7.0 and 8.0 of the said Guidelines.
The answer, without hesitation, is in the negative.
While the conduct attributed to the Claimant in the course
of the integrity test is certainly unbecoming and deserving of disciplinary
sanction, it does not, without more, meet the threshold contemplated under
Clause 7.0 of the Guidelines. There is no evidence before this Court to
establish that the alleged conduct resulted in any significant harm to the
institution or its customers, nor is there any indication that it falls within
the category of grave offences contemplated under the said provision.
More fundamentally, there is a complete absence of
compliance with the procedural safeguards stipulated under Clause 8.0. Beyond
the issuance of a query, there is no evidence that:
·
a
Disciplinary Committee was constituted;
·
the
Claimant was invited to defend herself before such a committee;
·
any
findings were formally made;
·
the
matter was referred to an Independent Review Panel; or
·
any
final decision was communicated to the Claimant in accordance with the
Guidelines.
Rather than comply with the prescribed procedure, the 1st
Defendant merely facilitated the termination of the Claimant’s employment
through her direct employer and thereafter proceeded, without demonstrated due
process, to subject her to the far more severe consequence of blacklisting.
Such conduct is not only inconsistent with the letter of
the Guidelines but also offends the principles of fairness, transparency, and
accountability which the Guidelines were designed to uphold.
It is also instructive that while the 1st Defendant alleged
multiple instances of misconduct, only a single incident was placed before this
Court. Even in respect of that incident, the evidence falls short of
establishing a basis for blacklisting within the contemplation of the
applicable regulatory framework.
On the issue of burden of proof, I am mindful that where a
party seeks to justify an action taken under a regulatory framework, such party
bears the burden of demonstrating compliance with the conditions prescribed by
that framework. In the instant case, the Defendants have failed to discharge
that burden.
Furthermore, the Guidelines in question, by their very
nature, impose serious consequences on an individual’s right to employment
within a critical sector of the economy. They therefore partake of the
character of expropriatory provisions and must be construed strictly.
In this regard, the Supreme Court in N.U.P. v. I.N.E.C.
(2021) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1805) 305 held that:
“expropriatory statutes need to be construed fortissime
contra preferentes; that is, strictly in favour of the citizen and against the
government. However, the golden rule in the Interpretation of statues is to
determine and reflect the intention of the law maker particularly when
intention is clear. In such an event, resort cannot be had to a liberal
Interpretation. [Provost, Lagos State College of Education v. Edun (2004) 6
NWLR (Pt.870) 476; I.N.E.C v. Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 806) 72 referred to.]
(P.354, paras. C- D).
With respect to the contention of the 2nd Defendant that
the Claimant failed to establish that she was indeed blacklisted, I find that
argument unpersuasive.
The affidavit evidence of the Claimant to the effect that
she was informed of her blacklisting remains substantially unchallenged. The
2nd Defendant did not expressly deny the assertion but rather adopted a
position of non-committal.
It is settled law that affidavit evidence which is not
controverted is deemed admitted. See TUKUR v. UBA (2012) LPELR-9337(SC), the
court held that:
“It is already a settled law that an affidavit evidence
constitutes evidence and must be so construed, hence any deposition therein
which is not challenged or controverted is deemed admitted. See: Ajomale Vs.
Yaduat & Anor (No.2) 5 NWLR (Pt.191) 226 at 282-283, (191) 5 SCNJ 178,
Magnusson Vs. Koiki (1993) 12 SCNJ 114; Henry Stephens Engineering Ltd Vs.
Yakubu (Nig) Ltd (2009) 6 SCM 90 at 99. “Per ARIWOOLA, J.S.C. (pp 46-47, paras
G-B)
Relying on the foregoing authorities, I am mindful of the fact
that the 2nd Defendant did not, in any part of its Counter-Affidavit, expressly
deny that the Claimant was blacklisted. Rather, the 2nd Defendant merely
averred that it was not in a position to admit or deny the assertions made by
the Claimant. In my considered view, such a deposition does not amount to a
categorical contradiction or rebuttal of the facts deposed to by the Claimant.
The Court is therefore entitled to place reliance on the assertions of the
Claimant, same having been deposed to as facts within her knowledge and belief.
More importantly, the Claimant placed before the Court other
circumstantial evidence in support of her assertion, including the fact that
she resigned from her subsequent employment upon the advice of the Human
Resource Department of her former employer, who informed her of the said
blacklisting.
In the final analysis, and upon a careful evaluation of the
totality of the evidence before this Court, the lone question formulated by the
claimant for determination of the instant suit is answered to the effect that
it is the finding of this court that there exists nothing on the record of the
1st Defendant incidents of offences such as fraud, financial malfeasance or
improprieties of any kind whatsoever, to which the CLAIMANT is culpable of which
satisfies the substantive and procedural requirements of the Revised Guidelines
for Blacklisting for Banks and Other Financial Institutions in Nigeria so as to
justify the continued retention of the Claimant’s name on the blacklist
maintained by the Central Bank
of Nigeria.
Accordingly, the question submitted for determination is
resolved in favour of the Claimant.
The reliefs sought are meritorious and are hereby granted
as follows:
- It is hereby
declared that the 1st Defendant does not have any record or
proof of any offence directly inculpatory of the Claimant, within the
meaning of the Revised Guidelines for Blacklisting for Banks and Other
Financial Institutions in Nigeria, March 2024, which would warrant her
inclusion on the blacklist maintained by the 2nd Defendant.
- It is hereby
ordered that the 2nd Defendant shall forthwith remove or cause
to be removed the name of the Claimant, Miss Blessing Ogechi Nnaji, from
its blacklist, thereby restoring her eligibility for employment within the
Nigerian financial sector.
Judgment is
accordingly entered.
I make no order as
to cost.
………………………………………………………………………..
HON. JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, Ph.D
JUDGE