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NICN - JUDGMENT

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
                         IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION
                                     HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT
 
                                     BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP:

 HONOURABLE JUSTICE BUHARI SANI…..JUDGE
 
                        ON THURSDAY, THE 14TH DAY OF MAY, 2026
 
 
                                                                         SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/10/2024
 
 BETWEEN:


SILAS DAISI UKAWA ………………………………….. CLAIMANT.
AND
AWARITSE NIGERIA LIMITED …………………….. DEFENDANT.

 
 

 

JUDGMENT


 
 The Claimant commenced this suit by a Complaint dated and filed on the 22nd day of February, 2024. The Claimant seeks against the Defendant the following reliefs:
 
1. A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to his unpaid salary in lieu of   termination of his appointment and all other entitlements as enshrined in            the letter of employment.


 2. An order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the pension tax      deductions made from the Claimant's salary for four (4) years.


 3. An order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of   N4,080,000.00 being the Claimant's annual bonuses for eight (8) years.


 4. An order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of   N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only as general damages.


5. And for further order(s) as the Court may deem fit to make in the  circumstances.

 The Claimant filed alongside the Complaint a Statement of Material Facts, List of Witnesses and Documents to be relied upon, and a Verification Affidavit.
 
 The Defendant filed a Preliminary Objection challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine the suit on the grounds that the suit did not comply with Sections 97 and 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, among other grounds. The Court delivered its considered ruling on the 2nd day of October, 2024, overruling the preliminary objection.
 
 Thereafter, the Defendant filed its Statement of Defence on the 21st day of October, 2024, along with a List of Witnesses, List of Documents, and Written Deposition on Oath of Dorothy Sedi.
 
 The Claimant filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence and a Further Statement on Oath on the 13th day of November, 2024.
 
 

                         FACTS OF THE CASE

 

The Claimant’s Case.

The Claimant, Silas Daisi Ukawa, testified on his own behalf as CW1 on 16th December, 2024. He adopted his two Witness Statements on Oath dated 22nd February, 2024 and 13th November, 2024 as his evidence-in-chief. He tendered several documents which were admitted in evidence as Exhibits C1 to C5.
 
 The Claimant's case as presented in his Statement of Material Facts and oral evidence is as follows:
 
 The Claimant is a Nigerian citizen. The Defendant is a limited liability company incorporated in Nigeria, an indigenous marine transportation company servicing multinational oil companies. The Claimant was employed by the Defendant as Chief Engineer by a letter of employment dated 15th February, 2016 (Exhibit C1). The Claimant distinguished himself in the discharge of his duties, and in 2020, he had his contract of employment reviewed by the Defendant, receiving another letter of employment captioned "Seafarer Employment Agreement" dated 4th April, 2020 (Exhibit C2), which serves as the Defendant's staff handbook containing Human Resources and administrative policies.
 
 The Claimant worked with the Defendant for eight years, during which he performed his duties creditably without any warning, query, or downtime. While on board the Defendant's vessel "Prince Jopherson 1" in September 2022, he fell sick and was taken to Morning Star Hospital in D/Line, Port Harcourt, one of the hospitals retained by the Defendant for its staff. The Claimant was discharged and certified fit by the hospital to resume work, but was refused posting by the Human Resources Manager, who refused to give any reason for the non-posting.
 
 In May 2023, the Claimant received via his WhatsApp messenger a letter titled "Notice of Termination of Appointment" dated 25th May, 2023 (Exhibit C3), purportedly terminating his appointment with the Defendant.
 
 The Claimant discovered that the Defendant did not remit tax deductions made from his salary for four (4) years to his pension manager. A copy of the Claimant's pension statement of account from Access Pension was tendered as Exhibit C4.
 
 The Claimant's solicitors wrote a letter of demand to the Defendant dated 25th August, 2023 (Exhibit C5), but the Defendant refused, failed, and neglected to pay his entitlements.
 
 The Claimant asserted that throughout his eight years of employment, he was not allowed to proceed on annual leave, and the annual leave bonuses were not paid to him. Furthermore, the Defendant has refused to pay the one month salary in lieu of notice of termination.
 
 Under cross-examination, the Claimant admitted that there was no provision for leave bonuses in Exhibit C1, and that he did not take any leave while in the employ of the Defendant. He also admitted that the Human Resources Department of the Defendant is in Sapele, Delta State, and that only that department can grant approval for leave.
 
 The Defendant's Case
 
 The Defendant opened its case on 6th February, 2025, calling one witness, Dorothy Sedi (the Human Resources Manager), who testified as DW1. She adopted her Witness Statement on Oath filed on 21st October, 2024 as her evidence-in-chief and tendered two documents: a pay slip (Exhibit D1) and a United Bank for Africa deposit slip showing remittance to the Claimant's pension account (Exhibit D2).
 
 The Defendant's case as presented in its Statement of Defence and evidence is as follows:
 
 The Defendant avers that the Claimant's total salary and entitlements are as specified in his employment letters. The Defendant paid for the Claimant's treatment at the hospital at various times, and the Claimant was paid his salaries as and when due in line with his contract of employment, even while he was sick.
 
 The Notice of Termination of Appointment dated 25th May, 2023 was sent in compliance with the Claimant's contract of employment and validly terminated the Claimant's employment. At the time of termination, the Claimant was on time off for several months and as such was entitled to only 40% of his salary.
 
 The Defendant has paid the Claimant his entitlements, and all pension deductions have been remitted to the Claimant's pension account. The Claimant's June 2023 salary was paid in December 2023.
 
 The Claimant is not entitled to payment for any leave bonuses as alleged because the Claimant worked on a "one month on and one month off" basis. The Claimant never applied for leave at any time, and no leave was taken by him in the course of his employment.
 
 The Defendant contended that the Claimant's solicitor's letter is of no consequence as the Defendant is not indebted to the Claimant as alleged or at all.
 
 DW1 testified under cross-examination that the Claimant was paid his June salary in December 2023, and that the Defendant had remitted pension contributions to Sigma Pensions, not Access Pension as claimed by the Claimant.
 
 ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
 
 In the Claimant's Final Written Address filed on 27th March, 2025, the Claimant formulated a lone issue for determination:
 
 "Whether the Claimant in the circumstances of this case is not entitled to the judgment of this Court."
 
 In the Defendant's Final Written Address filed on 14th March, 2025, the Defendant formulated two issues for determination:
 
 Issue One:

 "Whether the Written Deposition on Oath of the Claimant filed on 22/2/2024 is not in violation of the Evidence Act, 2011 and therefore incompetent."
 
 Issue Two:

 "Whether on the state of the pleadings and the evidence before this Honourable Court, the Claimant has established his entitlement to the reliefs sought."
 
 This Court therefore adopts the two issues formulated by the Defendant as they adequately capture the crux of the dispute between the parties.
 
 SUMMARY OF PARTIES' FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESSES
 
 
Defendant's Final Written Address:
 
 The Defendant's Final Written Address was filed on 14th March, 2025. Learned counsel for the Defendant, Felix O. Asotie of Global Law Firm, argued as follows:
 
 On Issue One: Whether the Written Deposition on Oath of the Claimant filed on 22/2/2024 is in violation of the Evidence Act, 2011 and therefore incompetent.
 
 Counsel submitted that Section 117(1)(a) and (b) of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides:
 
 "(1) Every affidavit taken in a cause or matter shall - (a) be headed in the court and in the cause or matter; (b) state the full name, trade or profession, residence and nationality of the deponent."
 
 Counsel argued that the Written Deposition on Oath of the Claimant filed on 22/2/2024 did not state the full name, trade or profession, residence and nationality of the deponent, which is a flagrant violation of Section 117(1)(b) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
 
 Counsel submitted that the word "shall" in the provision makes it mandatory and must be complied with, relying on Onochie v. Odogwu (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 89, where the Supreme Court held that the word "shall" expresses a command or exhortation, or what is legally mandatory.
 
 Counsel submitted that the failure to comply with Section 117(1)(b) renders the Witness Deposition on Oath incompetent and liable to be struck out.
 
 In response to the Claimant's reliance on Order 41 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court, counsel argued that Rules of Court cannot override provisions of substantive law, relying on First Bank of Nigeria v. Maiwada (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1348) 444 at 485, where the Supreme Court held that provisions of rules of court which are subject to the law must take the side line. See also Touton S.A. v. G.C.D.N.Z. S.P.A. (2011) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1236) 1 at 23.
 
 Counsel further argued that mere acquiescence by a party cannot cure a breach of mandatory provisions of law, relying on First Bank of Nigeria v. Maiwada (supra) and Raji v. Unilorin (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 259 at 275. In Odu v. Jarigbe (2017) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1556) 445 at 468, the Court of Appeal observed that there cannot be waiver by consent where there is glaring non-compliance with clear fundamental statutory provisions.
 
 On Issue Two: Whether on the state of the pleadings and the evidence, the Claimant has established his entitlement to the reliefs sought.
 
 Counsel submitted that in civil proceedings, the burden of proof is on the Claimant, and the degree of proof is on the preponderance of evidence, relying on Egwa v. Egwa (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1014) 71 at 89 and Orji v. D.T.M. (Nig.) Ltd (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 467 at 505.
 
 Regarding the first relief (declaratory relief), counsel submitted that declaratory reliefs are rights being asserted by a party which it wants the court to declare, relying on Akande v. Adisa (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1324) 538 at 571. The Supreme Court in A.G. Cross River v. A.G. Fed. (2012) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1327) 425 at 479 held that a Claimant must show the existence of a legal right. In Fabunmi v. Agbe (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 2) 799, the Court held that a Claimant must satisfy the Court by credible evidence that he is entitled to the right he claims.
 
 Counsel argued that for the Claimant to succeed on his first relief, he must show that he is entitled to salary in lieu of notice and other entitlements and that same have not been paid. Relying on Ovivie v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd (2023) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1904) 203 at 226 and G.S. & L. Ltd v. AMCON (2023) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1907) 345 at 381, counsel submitted that parties are bound by the terms of their contract.
 
 The provision on termination in Exhibit C2 provides: "The length of notice which you are entitled to receive from the ship owner to terminate your employment is 1 Month." Exhibit C3 shows the Claimant was given one month notice. Salary in lieu of notice is paid only when employment is abruptly terminated without the required notice, relying on Mobil Producing Nig. Unlimited v. Asuah (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 740) 723 at 750 and Odiase v. Auchi Polytechnic (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 546) 477 at 490.
 
 Regarding the second relief (pension deductions), counsel submitted that the Defendant has already remitted the pension deductions vide Exhibit D2, and the Claimant did not deny this in his Reply, so the facts are deemed admitted under Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011 and Agbanelo v. UBN Ltd (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt. 666) 534 at 549.
 
 Regarding the third relief (annual leave bonuses), counsel submitted that Exhibit C2 provides: "There is no provision for the transfer of paid annual leave from one year to the next. All paid annual leave must be taken in the year in which it accrues. There is also no provision for payment to be made in lieu of untaken leave except where paid annual leave has accrued but has not been taken at the date of termination of employment." The Claimant admitted under cross-examination that he did not take any leave. Therefore, he is not entitled to leave bonuses.
 
 Counsel argued that the Claimant's evidence in his Further Statement on Oath about "practice in the maritime industry" was not pleaded and therefore goes to no issue, relying on Vinz Int'l (Nig.) Ltd v. Morohundiya (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1153) 562 at 580 and Aminu v. Hassan (2014) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1400) 287 at 321-322.
 
 Regarding the fourth relief (general damages of N10,000,000), counsel submitted that the Claimant has not made any averment with respect to any loss or damage suffered. In Umera v. NRC (2022) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1838) 349 at 395, the Supreme Court stated that general damages are not usually awarded in cases for wrongful termination of employment.
 
 Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant's reliefs.
 
 Claimant's Final Written Address:
 
 The Claimant's Final Written Address was filed on 27th March, 2025. Learned counsel for the Claimant, B. Tedeye (Mrs.) of The Intermediaries Law Firm, argued as follows:
 
 Counsel submitted that the Claimant's evidence shows that: as at the time of his termination, his salary was not paid to him; throughout the eight years of employment, he did not proceed on annual leave and his leave bonuses were not paid; and the Defendant did not remit tax deductions from his salary to his pension administrators.
 
 Counsel argued that where evidence of a witness has not been challenged, contradicted, or shaken under cross-examination, and such evidence is in line with pleaded facts, the court must accept it, relying on Mrs. Iquo Mbong Nyong v. Terna Peter Igbaya (2023) Vol. 36 WRN 114 at 135.
 
 Counsel referred to paragraphs 7 and 8 of DW1's evidence and Exhibits D1 and D2. Exhibit D1 (pay slip) was made in December 2023, about 7 months after termination, and after the Claimant's solicitor's letter was received. Facts admitted need no further proof, relying on Bala Waziri v. Bank of Agriculture Ltd (2023) Vol. 29 WRN 63 at 106.
 
 Counsel noted that the Defendant admitted that "no leave was taken by the Claimant in the course of his employment." The Claimant's job description as a Marine Engineer is for "one month on and one month off," yet Exhibits C1 and C2 state "you are entitled to 30 working days as paid leave in each year of your employment and leave entitlement of ten (10%) of your annual basic." Oral evidence cannot contradict documentary evidence, relying on Bala Waziri v. Bank of Agriculture Ltd (supra) at 110.
 
 On the Defendant's Issue One (alleged defect in the Written Deposition), counsel relied on Order 41 Rule 3 of the Rules of this Court, which provides that the court may receive any affidavit notwithstanding any defect or irregularity in its form. Counsel submitted that the Defendant having become aware of the defect and participated fully in the suit has acquiesced and cannot turn around afterwards to complain, relying on Enterprise Bank v. Aroso (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1394) 256 at 292. The issue is mere technicality, and the court should apply substantial justice without undue regard to technicalities, relying on Bala Waziri v. Bank of Agriculture Ltd (2023) Vol. 29 WRN 63 at 91-92.
 
 Counsel urged the Court to grant all the reliefs sought by the Claimant.
 
 Defendant's Reply on Points of Law.
 
 The Defendant filed a Reply on Points of Law on 10th April, 2025, responding to the Claimant's submissions on the affidavit defect. Counsel reiterated that Order 41 Rule 3 refers to defects in the title or jurat, not the mandatory contents required by Section 117(1)(b) of the Evidence Act. Counsel urged the Court to discountenance the Claimant's submissions.
 
                                     

 COURT'S DECISION
 
 This suit emanates from the termination of the Claimant's employment as Chief Engineer with the Defendant, a marine transportation company. The Claimant was initially employed on 15th February, 2016, and his contract was reviewed upward on 4th April, 2020. He fell ill in September 2022, was treated at a hospital retained by the Defendant, and was certified fit to resume work. However, he was not posted back to work. In May 2023, his employment was terminated via a letter sent to his WhatsApp. The Claimant seeks payment of salary in lieu of notice, pension tax deductions for four years, annual leave bonuses for eight years, and general damages.
 
 The Defendant contends that the termination was valid, that the Claimant was given one month notice as required by his contract, that his June 2023 salary was paid in December 2023, that pension deductions have been remitted, and that the Claimant is not entitled to leave bonuses because he never took any leave and worked on a "one month on, one month off" basis.

I shall therefore examine the laws that generally relates to various issues in this case. The law recognizes three categories of contracts of employment. In Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2010) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1189) 1, the Supreme Court per Oguntade, JSC identified them as: (a) purely master and servant relationship; (b) servants who hold their office at the pleasure of the employer; and (c) employments with statutory flavour. See also CBN v. Igwillo (2007) LPELR-835(SC) and Adedeji v. CBN (2023) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1878) 531.
 
 In a pure master and servant relationship, the master has the unfettered right to terminate the employment, provided he complies with the procedure stipulated in the contract. In Damisa v. UBA (2025) 19 NWLR 409, the Supreme Court held that a mere contract of employment is guided by the agreement of the parties, and the only remedy available for wrongful dismissal is a claim for damages, not reinstatement or a declaration that the termination is null and void.
 
 In Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun (2024) 15 NWLR 1, the Supreme Court per Agim, JSC held that where a contract of employment is terminated by the employer contrary to the agreed terms, the quantum of damages cannot be based solely on the remuneration during the notice period.
 
 Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides: "Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts shall prove that those facts exist."
 
 Section 133(1) of the Evidence Act provides: "In civil cases, the burden of first proving the existence or non-existence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the Court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side."
 
 In Folarin v. Agusto (2023) LPELR-59945(SC) , the Supreme Court per Okoro, JSC held: "In all civil cases, the burden of proof lies on whoever desires the Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts to have existed. Indeed the burden of proof lies on the party who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side."
 
 In Omos ebi v. Bakare (2023) LPELR-59623(CA) , the Court of Appeal per Lokulo-Sodipe, JCA reiterated that the onus of proof in a civil matter lies on the plaintiff to establish his case upon a preponderance of evidence.
 
 The standard of proof in civil cases is on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence. See Emeka v. Chuba-Ikpeazu (2017) LPELR-41920(SC) per Ogunbiyi, JSC.
 
 In Damisa v. UBA (supra) , the Supreme Court held: "In contracts of employment governed only by agreement of parties and not by statute, removal of employee by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed to. Any other form connotes wrongful termination or dismissal but not to declare such dismissal null and void."
 
 In Ovivie v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd (2023) LPELR-60460(SC) , the Supreme Court per Aji, JSC held: "The Court must confine itself to the terms of contract of service between the parties which provides for their rights and obligations. Generally speaking, a master can terminate the contract of employment with his servant at any time and for any reason or for no reason at all, provided the terms of contract of service between them are complied with."
 
  Issue One: Whether the Written Deposition on Oath of the Claimant filed on 22/2/2024 is incompetent for violating Section 117(1)(b) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
 
 The Court has carefully examined the Claimant's Witness Statement on Oath filed on 22nd February, 2024. The document is titled "STATEMENT ON OATH" and contains the following at its commencement:
 
 "I, SILAS DAISI UKAWA, male, adult, Christian, Nigerian Citizen, staff of Awaritise Nigeria Limited, now residing at No. 5 Emmanuel Street, Off Aker Road, Rumuolumeni, Obio/Akpor Local Government Area of Rivers State, do hereby make Oath and state as follows:"
 
 The Court finds that the deposition states the deponent's name (Silas Daisi Ukawa), nationality (Nigerian Citizen), and residence (No. 5 Emmanuel Street, Off Aker Road, Rumuolumeni, Obio/Akpor Local Government Area of Rivers State). However, the deposition does not explicitly state the deponent's "trade or profession" as required by Section 117(1)(b) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
 
 The Defendant argues that this omission renders the entire deposition incompetent. The Court must first address a fundamental distinction in law.
 The law draws a clear distinction between an "affidavit" and a "witness statement on oath" filed in the course of proceedings. This distinction was authoritatively settled by the Court of Appeal in Aliyu v. Bulaki (2019) LPELR-46513(CA) , where the Court held:
 
· An affidavit is a sworn statement of facts made by a deponent who swears to its truth based on his personal knowledge or information derived from others. It is used primarily in interlocutory applications and originating processes. The formal requirements for affidavits, including those under Section 117 of the Evidence Act, are strictly applied because the deponent does not subsequently appear in court for cross-examination on the contents.
 · A witness statement on oath (or written deposition on oath) is a document prepared for the purpose of giving evidence-in-chief at trial. It is a formal out-of-court statement that is adopted by the witness in court under oath. The witness then becomes available for cross-examination. Any initial defect in the form of a witness statement on oath is considered curable when the witness appears in court, confirms the truth of the statement, and adopts it as his testimony, subjecting himself to cross-examination.
 

 The Court in Aliyu v. Bulaki (supra) further held that where a witness appears in court, is sworn, adopts his written statement as his evidence-in-chief, and is cross-examined on it, the witness statement on oath becomes his oral testimony reduced to writing. The court can then act on it even if it had initial technical defects, provided the witness has confirmed its truth under oath in court.
 
 In this case, the Claimant (CW1) was sworn in court on 16th December, 2024. He formally adopted his Witness Statement on Oath dated 22nd February, 2024 as his evidence-in-chief. He was thereafter thoroughly cross-examined by learned counsel for the Defendant. The Defendant did not raise any objection to the competency of the witness statement at the time it was tendered or before the Claimant adopted it. The objection was raised for the first time in the Defendant's Final Written Address after the conclusion of trial.
 
 Applying the principle in Aliyu v. Bulaki (supra) , the Court finds that the Claimant's appearance in court, his adoption of the written statement under oath, and his submission to cross-examination cured any initial defect in the form of the witness statement. The omission of the "trade or profession" is, in any event, a technical irregularity that does not go to the substance of the deposition. The Claimant's profession as a Chief Engineer is readily discernible from the contents of the deposition.
 
 Furthermore, the Defendant, having become aware of the alleged defect at the time of filing its Statement of Defence on 21st October, 2024, proceeded to participate fully in the trial without raising a preliminary objection on this ground. In Enterprise Bank v. Aroso (2014) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1394) 256 at 292, the Supreme Court held that where a party becomes aware of a defect and participates fully in the suit, it has acquiesced and cannot turn around afterwards to complain.
 
 The Court also notes that the Claimant filed a Further Statement on Oath dated 13th November, 2024, which was not challenged by the Defendant on this ground. That statement substantially repeated the same identifying information.
 
 Accordingly, this Court resolves Issue One in favour of the Claimant. The technical omission of "trade or profession" does not render the Witness Deposition on Oath incompetent. The deposition is properly before the Court and is admissible in evidence.
 
 On Issue Two: Whether the Claimant has established his entitlement to the reliefs sought.
 
 In resolving this Issue I shall examine each of the Claimant's reliefs in the light of  pleadings and evidence as follows:
 
 On relief One: Declaration that the Claimant is entitled to his unpaid salary in lieu of termination of his appointment and all other entitlements as enshrined in the letter of employment.
 
 This is a declaratory relief. In Ogboru v. Okowa (2016) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1522) 84 at 123, the Supreme Court held that a party who seeks declaratory reliefs succeeds only on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of his adversary's case. In the instant case the contract of employment between the parties is contained in Exhibits C1 and C2. The termination clause in Exhibit C2 provides:
 
"The length of notice which you are entitled to receive from the ship owner to terminate your employment is 1 Month."
 

 The Claimant was issued Exhibit C3, "Notice of Termination of Appointment" dated 25th May, 2023, which states that his employment will no longer be required with effect from 26th June, 2023. This constitutes one month notice of termination.
 
 The law is settled that payment in lieu of notice is only an alternative where the required notice has not been given. In Mobil Producing Nig. Unlimited v. Asuah (2001) 16 NWLR (Pt. 740) 723 at 750 and Odiase v. Auchi Polytechnic (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 546) 477 at 490, the Courts held that once the agreed period of notice or payment of salary in lieu thereof has been given, it prevents the termination from being wrongful.
 
 The Claimant admitted under cross-examination that he received the termination letter in May 2023. The notice period expired on 26th June, 2023. The Claimant claimed that his salary was not paid, but Exhibit D1 shows that the Claimant's June 2023 salary was paid in December 2023. The Claimant did not challenge the authenticity of Exhibit D1.
 
 The Court finds that the Claimant was given one month notice of termination as required by his contract. He is therefore not entitled to salary in lieu of notice. Regarding other entitlements, the Claimant has not specifically pleaded or proved what other entitlements remain unpaid. This relief fails.
 
 On relief Two: An order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the pension tax deductions made from the Claimant's salary for four (4) years.
 
 The Claimant pleaded that the Defendant did not remit tax deductions from his salary for four years to his pension manager (Access Pension). The Defendant tendered Exhibit D2, a schedule of pension contributions showing remittances to Sigma Pensions Ltd. The Defendant's witness testified that remittances were made to Sigma Pensions, not Access Pension.
 
 The Claimant in his Reply filed on 13th November, 2024 did not specifically deny the Defendant's averment that pension deductions were remitted. Under Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011, facts admitted need no further proof. In Bongo v. Gov. Adamawa State (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1339) 403 at 441, the Court held that facts not specifically denied are deemed admitted.
 
 However, there is a discrepancy between the Claimant's claimed pension manager (Access Pension) and the Defendant's remittance destination (Sigma Pensions). The Claimant's Exhibit C4 is a pension statement from Access Pension. The Defendant's Exhibit D2 shows remittances to Sigma Pensions.
 
 The Court finds that the Defendant has made pension remittances, but not  to the Claimant's designated Pension Fund Administrator. The Claimant is entitled to have his pension contributions remitted to his chosen PFA. The Court shall therefore order the Defendant to provide evidence of remittance to the Claimant's Access Pension account or to pay over the unremitted deductions to Access Pension.
 
 On relief Three: An order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N4,080,000.00 being the Claimant's annual bonuses for eight (8) years.
 
 The Court notes a discrepancy in the Claimant's pleadings. In the Statement of Material Facts, the Claimant claimed annual bonuses of N4,080,000. However, in the Further Statement on Oath, the Claimant claimed N44,080,000. The Court will proceed on the relief as stated in the Complaint: N4,080,000.00.
 
 Exhibit C2 (Seafarer Employment Agreement) provides:


"You are entitled to take 30 working days as paid leave in each year of employment and leave entitlement of Ten Percent (10%) of your annual basic. ... There is no provision for the transfer of paid annual leave from one year to the next. All paid annual leave must be taken in the year in which it accrues. There is also no provision for payment to be made in lieu of untaken leave except where paid annual leave has accrued but has not been taken at the date of termination of employment."
 

 The Claimant admitted under cross-examination that he never took any leave during his eight years of employment. He also admitted that he never made a formal application for leave. The Claimant's assertion in his Further Statement on Oath that:

 "the practice in the maritime industry is that employee proceeds on annual leave at the eve of their employment and not to formally apply for same." 

It was not pleaded in the Statement of Material Facts. In the case of Vinz Int'l (Nig.) Ltd v. Morohundiya (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1153) 562 at 580, the Court held that evidence on facts not pleaded goes to no issue.
 
The Defendant's witness testified that the Claimant worked on a "one month on, one month off" basis. This   piece of evidence was not contradicted. In essence, the Claimant worked approximately six months in a year. The entitlement to 30 working days of paid leave per year must be read in context of this work schedule. More fundamentally, the contract expressly provides that leave bonuses are only payable for leave actually taken, with a narrow exception for accrued but untaken leave at the date of termination. 

The pleadings and evidence shows that the Claimant never took leave, and he has not shown what leave had accrued in 2023 before his termination on 26th June, 2023. Also under the contract, leave cannot be transferred from year to year, and there is no provision for payment in lieu of untaken leave except at termination.
 
 The Claimant's employment commenced under Exhibit C1 in 2016, but the leave provision only appeared in Exhibit C2 of 2020. Even assuming the Claimant was entitled to leave from 2020, he did not take any leave. The only potential entitlement would be for leave accrued between 4th April, 2020 (date of Exhibit C2) and 25th May, 2023 (date of termination notice) that is a period of about three years.
 
 However, the Claimant has not provided evidence of his annual basic salary for the purpose of calculating the 10% entitlement. Although Exhibit C2 shows a monthly gross salary of N1,700,000. The annual basic salary (N425,000 x 12 = N5,100,000). Ten percent of that is N510,000 per year. For the three years, the amount would be N1,530,000. But this calculation is on the basis of leave that was not taken. Under the contract, leave bonuses are payable for leave taken, not for leave not taken.
 
 The Court finds that the Claimant has failed to establish his entitlement to N4,080,000 or any sum as annual leave bonuses. The clear terms of Exhibit C2 do not permit payment for untaken leave except at termination for accrued leave. The Claimant did not take leave, and the termination occurred in June, so only a portion of 2023 leave would have accrued. This relief accordingly failed.
 
 On relief Four: An order directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N10,000,000.00 as general damages.

The law is that general damages are damages that the law presumes and flow from the type of wrong complained about by the victim. They are compensatory damages for harm that results from the wrong for which a party has sued; that the harm is reasonably expected and need not be alleged or proved. Award of such damage is within the discretionary powers of the Court. How ever, the exercise of such discretion must be based on evidence before the court. The award is not a matter of course or on speculations or sentiment but on sound and solid and solid legal principles. In other words, it is not made out of sympathy borne out of extraneous considerations but rather on legal evidence of probative value adduced in proof of an actionable wrong or injury or injury. See Mekwunye v. Emirates Airlines (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1677) 191 SC., British Airways V. Atoyebi (2014) 13 NWLR (pt. 566) 370, R.C.C. (Nig.) Ltd V. Rokomoh Property Co. Ltd. (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 934) 615, Elf pet.(Nig.) Ltd. V. Umah (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1628) 428 SC., A.S.E.S.A. V. Ekwenem (2009) 13 NWLR (pt. 1158) 410 SC.
 
 In the instant case the Claimant has not pleaded any circumstance that would justify an award of general damages for wrongful termination. His employment was properly terminated with notice. The claim for N10,000,000 general damages is without foundation and hereby refused.
 
 On relief Five: The Claimant in his Reply sought "an order of declaration as unlawful the termination of the claimant." This was not one of the original reliefs in the Complaint. The Court has already found that the termination was in accordance with the notice provision in the contract. The termination was therefore lawful.
 
 In the final analysis, the Court finds as follows:
 
 1. The Claimant's employment was validly terminated with one month notice as required by Exhibit C2. The Claimant is not entitled to salary in lieu of notice.
 2. The Defendant has made pension remittances, but the Court is not satisfied that these remittances were made to the Claimant's designated Pension Fund Administrator (Access Pension). The Claimant is entitled to have his pension contributions remitted to his chosen PFA.
 3. The Claimant is not entitled to annual leave bonuses for eight years, having never taken annual leave and the contract expressly prohibiting payment in lieu of untaken leave except at termination for accrued leave.
 4. The Claimant is not entitled to general damages of N10,000,000.
 
 The Court makes the following orders:
 
 1. The Claimant's reliefs numbered 1, 3, and 4 are hereby DISMISSED.
 
 2. The Claimant's relief numbered 2 is granted in part. The Defendant is hereby ordered to provide to the Claimant within thirty (30) days of this judgment, proof of remittance of all pension deductions from the Claimant's salary to his designated Pension Fund Administrator, Access Pension. In default of providing such proof, the Defendant shall pay directly to the Claimant's Access Pension account  of all unremitted pension deductions within the same period of 30 days from today.
 
 3. Each party shall bear its own costs.
 
 This judgment is the decision of this Honourable Court and it is hereby entered accordingly.
 
 

 


 
                                     HON. JUSTICE BUHARI SANI
                                                              JUDGE.

 

LEGAL REPRESENTATIONS:

  1. O. Tedeye, Esq, (Mrs) for the Claimant.

Felix O. Asotie, Esq, for the Defendant.