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NICN - JUDGMENT

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HER LADYSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. A. OBASEKI-OSAGHAE

 

DATE: MAY 8, 2026                                             SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/222/2025

BETWEEN:

MRS OROGUN CAROLINE OMUBOBA                                    CLAIMANT            

AND

  1. NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM

COMPANY LIMITED

  1. GROUP CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,                         DEFENDANTS

 NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM 

COMPANY LIMITED

REPRESENTATION

Ibrahim Idris SAN for the Claimant, with O. P Ilori, Nnaemeka Madubuchi.

 

Inam Wilson SAN for the Defendant, with Obafemi Agaba, Chimeze Ndubuisi, Ifunanya Nna- ude, O.J. Chukkol, Abdulmalik Zaruq, Iyanoluwa Fakunde, Umar, Sharon Abraham, Emmanuel Nwike, Benjamin Enebeli. 

  

RULING

Introduction and claims 

[1] The Claimant commenced this action by originating summons on July 24, 2025 praying for the determination of the following questions:

  1. Whether the purported termination of the employment of the Claimant with 1st  Defendant, vide a letter with Reference No. HR/C 16570, dated the 26th day of September 2022, issued by one Aminu-Zaria, A.M, for and on behalf of the 2nd Defendant, the  Group Chief Executive Officer of the 1st Defendant, does not amount to a nullity and ineffectual in law, same having not been authorized by the 1st Defendant’s Top  Management   Committee  (TMC) the body or Committee vested with the requisite powers to terminate the employment of the Claimant in consonance with the mandatory provision of   Rule 18.10.11  of the NNPC Disciplinary Policies and Procedures, 2019,   Guideline?  
  2. Whether by the combined reading of the provisions of Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Act, Cap 320, Laws of the Federation, 1990, Petroleum Industry Act, 2021, and or the NNPC Disciplinary Policies and Procedures, 2019, Guideline, it is not ultra-vires the powers of the 1st Defendant’s Group Chief Executive Officer. i.e.  2nd Defendant, or any person acting in his stead, including one Aminu-Zaria, A.M, to issue or caused to be issued a purported letter of termination of the Claimant’s employment with the 1st   Defendant, vide a letter with Reference No. HR/C 16570, dated the 26th day of September 2022? 

In the unlikely event that Questions 1 & 2 are resolved in the negative: 

3. Whether assuming without conceding that the 1st Defendant’s Group Chief Executive Officer,  i.e. 2nd Defendant or anybody in his stead  can terminate the Claimant’s employment with the 1st  Defendant, given the clear provisions of Rules 18.10.1-18.10.11 of the 1st Defendant’s extant NNPC Disciplinary Policies and Procedures, 2019, Guideline, the 2nd Defendant can elect to terminate the employment of the Claimant, vide letter of termination with Reference No. HR/C 16570, dated the 26th day of September 2022, when the Claimant had not contravened or adjudged to have breached or committed any of the infractions contained in Rules 18.10.1-18.10.11 of NNPC Disciplinary Policies and Procedures, 2019, Guideline, that would warrant or give rise to the termination of the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant? 

[2] The Claimant is seeking the following reliefs:

  1. A declaration that the purported termination of the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant, vide a letter of Termination of Employment with Reference No. HR/C 16570, dated 26th day of September 2022, issued by one Aminu-Zaria, A.M, for and on behalf of the 1st Defendant’s Group Chief Executive Officer, i.e. 2nd Defendant, is null, void and ineffectual, same having not been issued by the 1st Defendant’s Top Management Committee (TMC), being the appropriate authority or entity contemplated under RULE 18.10.11 of NNPC Policies and Procedures, 2019, Guideline, that is vested with the requisite powers to terminate the Claimant’s employment. 
  2. A declaration that it is ultra vires the powers of the 1st Defendant’s   Group Chief Executive Officer. i.e. 2nd Defendant, or any person acting on his stead or under his instructions, including one Aminu-Zaria, A.M, to terminate the Claimant’s employment vide a letter with Reference No. HR/C 16570, dated the 26th day of September 2022, as the only and sole body or Committee vested with such requisite power, under the mandatory and clear provision of    Rule 18.10.11 of the NNPC Disciplinary Policies and Procedures, 2019, Guideline, is the 1st Defendant’s Top Management Committee (TMC).  
  3. A declaration that assuming without conceding that the 1st Defendant’s Group Chief Executive Officer. i.e. 2nd Defendant, or anyone acting in his stead or under his instructions, including one Aminu-Zaria, A.M, can terminate the Claimant's employment, that power of termination of the employment of the Claimant can only be exercised where the Claimant is adjudged to have contravened or found guilty of any of the infractions spelled out in Rule 18.10.11 of NNPC Disciplinary Policies and Procedures, 2019. 
  4. A declaration that the purported termination of the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant vide a letter with Reference No. HR/C 16570, dated the 26th day of September 2022, issued by one Aminu-Zaria, A.M, for and on behalf of the 2nd Defendant,  being null, void, and ineffectual in law, the Claimant’s employment with the 1st Defendant, in the eye of the law,   remains intact or is considered subsisting and valid and therefore, the Claimant is entitled to all her withheld salaries, emoluments, benefits, allowances and other perks of office that accrue to her office from the 26th  September 2022, by the 1st Defendant, when the 2nd Defendant purportedly terminated the employment of the  Claimant,  till date. 
  5. An order directing the Defendants to, forthwith, place or put the Claimant, in a concurrent position, enjoyed by her other colleagues who were in the 1st Defendant’s SS1 Employment Cadre with the Claimant when her employment was abruptly and purportedly terminated by the 2nd Defendant vide a letter of termination, with reference No. HR/C 16570, dated 26/9/2022. 
  6. An order of mandatory Injunction directing the Defendants to pay the Claimant, forthwith or within 31 days upon delivery of judgment in this suit, all her withheld outstanding or accrued salaries, allowances, emoluments, and all other perks of office concomitant or attached to her position or attached to the current positions enjoyed by her colleagues before the purported termination of the Claimant’s employment by the 2nd Defendant, starting from the 27th September 2022, till date.  
  7. An order directing the Defendants to forthwith, reinstate the Claimant to the 1st Defendant’s employment. 
  8. Any other consequential relief(s) as this Honourable court may deem fit to make in this circumstance. 

[1] The Defendants/Applicants entered a conditional appearance on 19th November 2025, and filed a Motion on Notice on December 1, 2025 pursuant to Order 17 Rule 1(1) & (9), and Order 18 Rule 2(2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, and under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The Defendants/Applicants are praying for the following:

1. An Order dismissing this suit for being an abuse of court process in view of the fact that the suit seeks to relitigate Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 - Mrs Orogun Caroline Omuboba v Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited which was earlier dismissed by this Honourable Court on 10 July 2025.

Or alternatively 

An order striking out the name of the 2nd Defendant from this Suit.

2. And for such Further or other Order(s) as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in in the circumstances.

[2] The grounds upon which this application is brought are as follows:

1. The Respondent commenced Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 - Mrs Orogun Caroline Omuboba v Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited & Anor on 20 August 2024 and the suit was dismissed on 10 July 2025.

2. The Respondent is relitigating Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 in the present Suit No: NICN/ABJ/222/2025 as both suits involve the same parties, the same subject matter, the same issues and the present suit is accordingly an abuse of court process.

3. The Respondent’s suit is incompetent against the 2nd Defendant as it is not a juristic person

[3] The Motion is supported by an affidavit sworn to by Iyunoluwa Fakunle, a legal practitioner in the employment of the Defendants’ counsel’s firm, to which is annexed Exhibit NN1 and a written address. In opposition, the Claimant/Respondent filed a counter affidavit  sworn to by Well Blessing Danladi, litigation clerk in the law firm of Ibrahim Idris (SAN) & Co, counsel to the Claimant on 14th January 2026 and a written address. The Defendants/Applicants filed a reply on points of law on 2nd February 2026. The parties adopted their respective addresses and made oral submissions. 

Defendants/Applicant’s submissions

[4] The Defendants/Applicants submitted two issues for determination:

1. Whether the Honourable Court ought to dismiss the instant suit for being an abuse of court process.

2. Whether this Honourable Court ought to strike out the 2nd Defendant for being a non- juristic person.

[5] Learned Senior Counsel in arguing the first issue submitted that this court has the inherent powers and duty to ensure that its process is not abused as these powers are derived from the inherent powers and sanctions conferred on a court of law by virtue of Section 6(6) (a) of the Constitution. He further argued that the court in Amefule v State (1988)2 NWLR (Pt. 75) 156 the Court defined abuse of court process as proceedings which are wanting in bona fide and are frivolous, vexatious or oppressive and also as abuse of legal procedure or improper use of legal process. He further argued that the Supreme Court in Adegbanke v Ojelabi & Ors (2021) LPELR-54992 (SC) held that an order of dismissal entered by a court in a suit operates as an estoppel per rem judicatam and bars a party from re-litigating the subject matter.

[6] Learned Senior Counsel in arguing the second issue submitted that the Respondents commenced this action against the 2nd Applicant, the Group Chief Executive Officer, Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited who is not a person nor registered as a company under the laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or any other laws, hence a non-juristic person. He argued that any action brought against a non-juristic person, such as the 2nd Applicant as in this case is liable to be struck out against such party for incompetence. He relied on the case of Iyke Med. Merch v Pfizer (2001) 10 NWLR (Part 722) 540 at 555. He further argued that it is trite law that such matters instituted wrongly against a non- juristic person is incompetent and liable to be struck out. He relied on the case of Calabar Municipal Govt v Honesty (2022) 2 NWLR (Part 1815) 403 at 432, paras A-C. He therefore urged the Court to dismiss the instant suit for being an abuse of court process. 

Claimant/ Respondent submissions

[8] Learned Senior Counsel submitted one issue for determination to wit:

Whether having regard to the fact that the earlier suit between the parties was dismissed solely on procedural grounds without a determination on the procedural grounds without a determination on the merits, this honourable Court can hold that the present suit constitutes an abuse of court process or that the 2nd Defendant is not a competent party before the court.

[9] Learned Senior Counsel argued that the authorities cited by the Defendant/ Applicant does not advance their case as this particular suit is distinguishable as the earlier suit was terminated purely on technical grounds without any consideration of the merits.  He submitted that a dismissal based on a procedural defect does not constitute a judgment on the merits and therefore cannot ground abuse of court process. He relied on the case of P.W.T. (Nig) Ltd v J.B.O Int’l (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1226). He submitted that a decision is said to be on the merit only when the court has undertaken a full consideration of the issues and evaluated the evidence before arriving at a conclusion. He relied on the case of AG Anambra State v Okeke (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 782) 575. He further argued that where a matter is terminated without any evaluation of the substantive issues and without a determination of rights of the parties, such a dismissal is in law and in effect tantamount to a striking out. He relied on the case of Milan Industries Limited v Polaris Bank Limited & Ors (2022) LPELR- 59135 (CA).

[10] Learned Senior Counsel argued that where a Public Office is expressly created by statute endowed with defined powers, duties and responsibilities such an office acquires a juristic status to the extent necessary for the performance of its statutory functions. The law recognizes as juristic persons all artificial entities, whether offices, commissions, agencies or authorities created by the statute and clothed with legal capacity. He relied on the case G.O.C v Fakayode (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt. 329) 744 (Pg. 758, paras E-F). He argued that the Petroleum Industry Act (Section 59) does not only create the NNPCL as a statutory company; it also creates its governance architecture including the office of the CEO. He therefore submitted that the earlier dismissal was purely technical and cannot operate as estoppel or constitute abuse of court process.

Reply

[11] Learned Senior Counsel submitted that in an originating summons, the affidavit is in and of itself the evidence in support of the case, citing Eze v UniJos (2017) 17 NWLR (P 1, Uwazuruonye v Gov, Imo State (2013) 8 NWLR (Pt 1355) 28, A-G Anambra State v A-G Federation (2005) 9 NWLR (Pt 931)572.  He further submitted that the implication of the decisions is that Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 was heard on its merit having been fought on affidavit evidence. It was his submission that the case relied on by the Claimant Milan Industries Limited v Polaris Bank Limited (2022) LPELR-59135 (CA) is not applicable. He  referred to Section 59 of the PIA and submitted that it only lists those who make up the Board of NNPC Limited and did not create the offices listed, and that the Claimant has not shown that this Chief Executive is the same person as the 2nd Applicant- the Group Chief Executive Officer.

Decision

[12] I have heard the parties on this application, and have considered the submissions and authorities cited by counsel. It is not in dispute that the Claimant herein filed an earlier complaint against the Defendants in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 - Mrs Orogun Caroline Omuboba v Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited and Group Chief Executive Officer Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited which was dismissed by this Court on 10 July 2025. This fact is admitted in paragraph 4a of the counter affidavit. However, the Claimant added that: “the said suit was never taken, heard, or determined on its merit.”  Now, the judgment delivered by this Court in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 - Mrs Orogun Caroline Omuboba v Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited and Group Chief Executive Officer Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited on July 10, 2025 dismissed the Claimant’s complaint and claims. The Claimant frontloaded the Judgment (Exhibit A6), and the Defendants have annexed the Judgment to the supporting affidavit (Exhibit NN1). 

[13] A careful perusal of Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 shows that this instant suit involves the same parties, the same subject matter, the same issues, and the same reliefs with respect to the termination of the Claimant/Respondents employment. The issue to be resolved is whether the Judgment in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 is one on the merits, or the dismissal was on procedural grounds. The Claimant instituted Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 by originating summons just as she has done in this instant suit. In an action commenced by way of originating summons, pleadings are not filed, nor are witnesses called. It is heard on affidavit evidence deposed to in support, and in opposition, with documents exhibited. The affidavit takes the place of pleadings, see the decisions of the Supreme Court in Uzoho v National Council on Privatization (2022) 15 NWLR (Pt 1852) 1 at 30 Para D-E ; Owuru v Adigwu (2018) 1 NWLR (Pt 1599) 1 at 27 Para E-G per Kekere-Ekun JSC now CJN:

The suit at the trial court was instituted by way of originating summons with affidavits in support and in opposition thereto. Documents were attached to the affidavits and marked as exhibits. In actions commenced by originating summons, the affidavit evidence takes the place of pleadings. The averments are on oath and are of the same evidential value as a witness statement on oath frontloaded in a suit commenced by writ of summons in which pleadings are filed. The counter affidavit serves as a statement of defence. Thus every material averment in an affidavit filed in respect of an originating summons must be specifically denied by the adverse party, otherwise the averments will stand unchallenged and will be deemed admitted.

[14] The Judgement in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 speaks for itself. Both parties were heard as can be seen in paragraphs 7 to 19 of the Judgement; and in paragraph 28 the Court stated as follows:

It is the law that whoever desires the Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove those facts exist, see sections 131, 132, 133, and 136 of the Evidence Act 2011. The evidential and legal burden of proof is on the Claimant. Having found that the entire facts in the affidavit in support of the originating summons and the further affidavit amount to inadmissible hearsay evidence, the Claimant has not placed any evidence before the Court in support of her case. The originating summons is left bare with nothing to consider.

[15] An action commenced by originating summons is fought and determined on affidavit evidence see, N.F.V.C.B v Adegboyega (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt 1662) 283 SC, Owuru v Adigwu supra. The Court heard both parties, reviewed and evaluated the affidavit evidence placed before it, held the Claimant’s evidence to be hearsay evidence, and dismissed the case for lack of proof.  On the authorities of the Supreme Court, Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 was heard and determined on its merit. How then can Learned Senior Counsel to the Claimant submit that Suit No: NICN/ABJ/235/2024 was not heard and determined on its merits? It is settled law that where a case has been considered on its merits to finality, and found to be unproven, it is subject to a dismissal order, see In Re Apeh v PDP (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt 1576) 252. 

[16] An order of dismissal operates as estoppel per rem judicatem and bars a party from re-litigating the subject matter, see Adegbanke v Ojelabi & Ors (2021) LPELR-54992 (SC); (2023) 4 NWLR (Pt 1875) 481, Nwaoha v C.O. P (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt 1628) 568. A matter dismissed comes to a final bus - stop until the judgment is set aside on appeal. The case of Milan Industries Limited v Polaris Bank Limited 7Ors (2022) LPELR-59135 CA cited by the Claimant’s counsel is not on all fours with this case and therefore not applicable.

[17] I find that this instant suit constitutes an abuse of the process of court, as it seeks to relitigate Suit No: NICN/ ABJ/235/2024. It is liable to an order of dismissal, and it is therefore unecessary to consider the issue of the legal personality of the 2nd Defendant, see Re Apeh v PDP supra, Osaji v Nigerian Army (2022) LPELR-58816 SC.

[18] This suit is dismissed. Costs in the sum of N200,000.00 awarded the Defendants. 

 Ruling is entered accordingly.

 

                                                    ______________________________

                                                       Hon Justice O. A. Obaseki-Osaghae