IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LAGOS DIVISION

HOLDEN AT LAGOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE S. A. YELWA……JUDGE

 

THIS MONDAY, 29^TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025

SUIT NO: NICN/LA/155/2023

 

BETWEEN 

DR. AYODEJI OLADIPO SASEGBON- --------------------------CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT

AND 

1. TOTAL ENERGIES E & P NIGERIA LTD- -----------DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT 
2. TOTAL ENERGIES SE- ----------------------------------DEFENDANT/APPLICANT 

 

RULING

By a motion on notice dated 21^st January, 2025 and filed 22^nd January, 2024, brought pursuant to orders 17 Rules 1 & 3, 18 Rule 2 (2) and 55 Rule 12(1)(a) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017; Sections 6 & 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigerian 1999 (as amended) and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable court wherein counsel on behalf of the Defendant/Applicant sought for the following orders;

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO RELIEF (1) ABOVE

 

 AND FOR SUCH FURTHER ORDER OR ORDERS as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.

GROUNDS FOR THIS APPLICATION

1. The facts presented by the Respondent in his Complaint, Statement of Material Facts and Statement of Facts do not show any employment relationship between the Respondent and the Applicant and therefore do not disclose any cause of action against the Applicant.
2. There is an unbroken line of authorities to the effect that cause of action is an issue of jurisdiction and therefore the absence of cause of action robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain the claim against the Applicant.
3.  By virtue of Section 254C (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), and Sections 7 (1), 21 and 54 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, the National Industrial Court is vested with jurisdiction over employer-employee relationship throughout the Federation. The Applicant, a foreign company and at all material times resident or doing business Outside the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, has no employment relationship with the Respondent and did not employ or terminate the Respondent’s employment as to confer jurisdiction over the Applicant.
4.  In the alternative to an order striking out the suit against the Applicant, the circumstances of the suit filed by the Respondent necessitate the grant of an order by this Honourable Court to direct the Respondent to make a deposit as security for costs in this suit.

In support of the motion is a 9 paragraphs affidavit deposed to by one Daniel Eyiridua, a Litigation Assistant in the law firm of Templars, counsel to the Defendant/Applicant, at the Registry of this Honourable Court before the Commissioner for Oath on 22^nd January, 2025, two (2) exhibits attached, accompanied by a written address.

On 2^nd July, 2025, when this motion came up for hearing, counsel for the applicant, Mr. Lawal Kazeem Esq, while arguing his motion, adopted his written submission as his argument in this matter, also supported by a further and better affidavit deposed to on 30^th June, 2025. 

Thus, in response, the Claimant’s counsel E. S. Abiniwo Esq submitted at the hearing that he filed an 8 paragraphs Counter Affidavit deposed to by one David Attah, a Litigation Officer in the law firm of Candide Johnson Law, (Counsel for the Claimant/Respondent). Accompanying the Counter Affidavit, is a written address which are in the case file. Counsel while reacting to the application, adopted same as his argument. He adumbrated by submitting that the issues cannot be resolved except by trial, and urged the court to invoke its powers under Order 18 and take this application along with the substantive suit. 

Consequent upon the submissions of the Claimant’s counsel, the applicant counsel went further to submit that they have filed reply on points of law on 30^th June, 2025, and argued that the court should discountenance all the arguments of the Respondent and grant the reliefs sought by the Applicant in this application. 

ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION RAISED BY THE APPLICANT’S COUNSEL. 

The applicant counsel formulated a sole issue for determination of his application in his written address to wit:

“Whether having regard to the Respondent’s complaint, statement of material facts, and statement of facts, the reliefs sought in this application ought to be granted.” 

Counsel submitted a preliminary point where he raised the question as to whether the applicant is entitled to file a Motion on Notice at this stage of the proceedings and more importantly, whether the court is bound to consider the application at this stage.

It is the submission of counsel that there is no gainsaying the fact that jurisdiction is very important in the administration of justice. It is the authority of a court to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its determination, and the validity or otherwise of any judicial proceeding turns on the existence or otherwise of jurisdiction.

Counsel submitted that the law has always been clear, that a party can raise jurisdictional issue in any manner even viva voce, and at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal to the Supreme Court for the first time. Counsel referred the court to the cases of Alao v. V.C. UNILORIN (2008) 1 NWLR (PI. 1069) 421; Madu v. Mbakwe (2008) 10 NWLR (pt. 1095) 293 at 325- 326. Counsel further relied on the case of Buremoh v. Akande (2017) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1563) 74 at 107 paras B -C.

Counsel maintained that it cannot be said that the applicant raised the issue of jurisdiction too early or too late. Counsel urged the court to dismiss or strike out the suit against the Applicant as a party in this suit.

Learned counsel submitted on the substantive issue that it is settled law that jurisdiction is the corner stone of all judicial proceedings, and foes to the root and foundation of adjudication. Counsel referred the court to the case of Uti v. Onoyiwe (1991) 1 SCNJ 25 pg 49.

Counsel submitted further that the applicant stated for the avoidance of doubt, that it does not seek to contend that a foreign party cannot be sued before Nigerian Courts at all or that this Honourable Court does not have jurisdiction over the Applicant simply because it is not resident or carrying on business in Nigeria. However, Applicant will show that having regard to the Respondent’s Complaint, Statement of Material Facts, and Statements of Facts, this Honourable Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit as presently constituted against the Applicant.

Learned counsel contended that a proper reading of the provisions of Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) and Sections 7(1), 21 and 54 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 which prescribe the subject matter and territorial jurisdiction of the Honourable Court show that the Honourable Court’s jurisdiction may only be validly exercised in relation to labour or employment matters in Nigeria.

Counsel submitted that the Claimant/Respondent commenced this action against the 1^st Defendant/Respondent and the Applicant via a general form of complaint. The Applicant referred the Honourable Court to the Respondent’s letter of employment dated 13^th October 2017, which has been incorporated in and forms part of the Respondent’s claim before the Honourable Court. A calm review of the said letter of employment shows clearly that the Respondent was employed by the 1^st Defendant until his employment was duly terminated by the same 1^st Defendant on 19^th July 2018. The Claimant/Respondent was neither employed by the Applicant nor was his employment terminated by the Applicant.

It is the submission of counsel that instructively, paragraphs 8 to 116 of the Claimant/Respondent’s Statement of Material Facts and Statement of Facts, which contains the facts in support of the Respondent’s substantive claim of alleged wrongful termination of his employment, all refer to the 1^st Defendant only as the Claimant/Respondent’s erstwhile employer, without any mention of the Applicant, neither does it disclose any cause of action against the Applicant. 

Counsel maintained that by virtue of Section 254C (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), and Sections 7 (1), 21 and 54 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006, it is established that the Honourable Court is vested with jurisdiction over employer-employee relationship throughout the Federation, and therefore lacks jurisdiction over the Applicant which is a foreign company with no employer-employee relationship with the Respondent and which is at all material times resident and doing business outside the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court.

Learned counsel submitted that the law is clear that a court is competent when the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction, and there is no feature in the case that prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction. Counsel referred the court to the case of MADUKOLU & ORS V NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNJ 341. 

Learned counsel submitted that the suit discloses no cause of action against the Applicant. It is a trite principle of Nigerian law that the existence of a cause of action is an indispensable prerequisite to the institution of an action against a party. Thus, the absence of a cause of action would necessarily result in the want of the sufficient legal interest in a plaintiff to institute an action or maintain a claim against a defendant. Put differently, counsel stated cause of action is a sine qua non for the sustenance of an action. Counsel relied on the case of  A.G. Federation vs. A.G., Abia State (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 725) 689 at 773 paras A-E and   also P.V.C. Ltd. vs. Lawal (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 911) 121 at 143-144.

Counsel further submitted that it is thus, pertinent in every case, to question whether a claimant has prima facie established any case against a defendant and/or demonstrated its entitlement to the reliefs sought against the defendant. In the instant case, counsel submitted that the action as constituted by the Claimant/Respondent discloses no cause of action against the Applicant and that its joinder as a party to the suit is erroneous or a calculated attempt to embarrass the Applicant. Counsel urged the court to dismiss or strike out the suit against the Applicant for want of action.

Learned counsel submitted that the Claimant/Respondent failed to show the infraction of his legal right by the Applicant. The facts supporting the alleged infraction of the Claimant/Respondent’s legal rights are contained in paragraphs 8 to 116 of the Claimant’s statement of material facts and statement of facts. Counsel referred the court to the case of  Okonkwo v. A. G. of the Federation and Minister of Justice   & Anor (2017) LPELR-51365 (CA).

Counsel also submitted that in the alternative, the Claimant/Respondent ought to give security for cost in favour of the Applicant. Counsel relied on the case of Dick v. Our and Oil Co. Ltd (2018) 14 NWLR (pt. 1638). Also, counsel referred the court to Order 55 Rule 12(1) (a) of the  Rules of this Honourable court, 2017 which calls for the exercise of the court’s discretion judicially and judiciously to meet the end of justice, and submitted further that only the burden imposed on the applicant is to demonstrate that the circumstances are present for this Honourable Court to think it just to order the Claimant/Respondent to give security for cost. 

Counsel maintained that the NICN Rules permits the issuance of, and service of originating process on Defendants that are residents or carrying on business outside Nigeria in extraordinary cases, and where the circumstances permit. This often comes with intensive financial implications for such foreign Defendants. Counsel referred the court to the case of Houtmangratcht v. Oduba (1995) 1 NWLR (pt. 371) 295 at pg 308 para H. 

It is the submission of counsel that the proposed amount by the Applicant as security for costs is not capricious and is 1% of the Claimant/Respondent’s claim in this suit, which should be paid to an interest yielding account maintained by the Deputy Chief Registrar of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Lagos Division as security for costs, pending the hearing and determination of the suit.

ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION RAISED BY THE CLAIMANT/ RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL

The Claimant/Respondent counsel formulated a sole issue for determination of this application in his written address to wit;

“Whether, having regard to the Respondent’s Complaint, Statement of Material Facts, and Statement of Facts, the reliefs sought in this application ought to be granted.” 

Learned counsel submitted that the proper questions are as follows;

1. Whether the French parent company of a Nigerian employer which exercised overwhelming ownership, direction and control of its subsidiary in all matters including management of the employee’s labour can escape legal responsibility for acts which breach the employees’ rights under national and international law?
2. Whether a French company indirectly employing Nigerian labour on international contracts can deny a Nigerian employee rights enjoyed by all its international employees under the law binding on that French company.
3.  Whether the factual and legal liability of the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant can be determined without inquiry at trial into the substantial facts which prove its liability?
4.  Whether a Nigerian labour Court should impede the right of action of a wrongfully dismissed employee by ordering him to provide security for costs to a foreign company doing business in Nigeria in respect of an action properly commenced in Nigeria and if so to what degree?

Counsel submitted that on sub issue one, the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant in exercising a significant ownership and management over the 1^st Defendant and its employees are co-employers of the Claimant/Respondent. This implies that the 2^nd Defendant is jointly and severally liable with the 1^st Defendant for the wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment. Counsel referred the court to Section 91(1) of the Labour Act which presents the visage of an employment relationship whereby a person who is recruited by one person   provides his services for another. Counsel referred the court to the case of Oyewumi Oyetayo v. Zenith Bank (2012) 29 NLLR (pt. 84) 370 (NIC).

Counsel further submitted that the Claimant in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 21, 95 and other relevant paragraphs in his statement of material facts and statement of facts, as well as paragraphs 3, 4, 7, 8 and other relevant paragraphs of his Reply to the statement of defence and through documentary evidence established that the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant exercises a significant level of control over the 1^st Defendant and its employees. 

Counsel contended that the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant operates a “One Total Organisation” policy which means that it’s staff strength within subsidiaries in countries across the world are run under a single organisational structure as one global company. The 2^nd Defendant/Applicant control over the 1^stDefendant includes its management of its day by day operations and its staff who are routinely transferred across the world within the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant Group. 

Counsel maintained that the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant is as jointly and severally liable with the 1^st Defendant for the wrongful termination of the employment of the Claimant/Respondent. Counsel further submitted that even the 1^st Defendant is an agent of the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant.

Learned counsel submitted that the second sub issue for determination, the Claimant being an employee of the of the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant is entitled to all rights and protection under International law and labour law of France and that the court has the jurisdiction to enforce these rights. Counsel referred the court to Sections 254 (C) (1) (b) (f) (h) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), and Section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. Counsel also relied on the case of Skye Bank Plc v. Adedokun Olusegun Adegun (2024) LPELR- 622 19 (SC).

Counsel submitted on sub issue three that the Claimant has established a reasonable cause of action against the Applicant. The Applicant is a necessary party whose presence is vital for the just determination of the suit, and the court is empowered by Order 18 Rule 2 (2) and (3) of the NIC (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 to take applications challenging its jurisdiction alongside the Claimant’s substantive suit. Counsel cited the case of  Iyeke v. P.T.I (2019) 2 NWLR  (pt. 1656) p. 217 at p. 239 para D-F.

It is the submission of counsel on sub-issue four that the demand for security for costs is a mechanism to deter the Claimant/Respondent who is already victimised by the wrongful action of the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant. Counsel maintained that the provision on security for costs does not apply in the instant case as stipulated by the NIC Rules of Civil procedure, 2017. The second and third prayers sought by the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant in its motion on notice is an attempt to restrict the Claimant/Respondent’s right to access the Honourable Court. Counsel referred the court to Order 55 Rule 12(1) (a) of the Rules of this Court 2017 and the case of Houtmangratcht v. Oduba (1995) 1 NWLR (pt. 371) p. 295 at p. 307 paras A-C. Counsel urged the court to strike out the application of the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant. 

FURTHER AND BETTER AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE 2^ND DEFENDANT/APPLICANT’S MOTION ON NOTICE DATED 21^ST  JANUARY, 2025.

The 2^nd Defendant/Applicant filed a 6 paragraphs further and better affidavit deposed to by  Daniel Eyiridua, as well,  a Litigation Assistant in the Law Firm of Templars, counsel to the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant. Accompanying the further affidavit in support of the motion on notice dated 21^st  January, 2025, is  a reply on point law, wherein counsel  submitted that there is no co- employment relationship among the Applicant, claimant/respondent and the 1^st Defendant/Respondent. The Claimant/Respondent arguments in paragraph 4.15 to 4.17 and 4.20 to 4.28 is beyond the scope of the Applicant’s application. 

Counsel contended that the applicant is not a necessary party whose presence is vital for the just determination of this suit. Counsel submitted further that the NIC Rules 2017 does not fetter the discretion of the Honourable Court to hear and determine the Applicant’s application before the determination of the substantive suit, and that the demand for security for cost is not targeted at restricting or intimidating the Claimant/Respondent. Counsel urged the court to discountenance all the arguments of the Claimant/Respondent, and grant all the reliefs sought by the Applicant in the application. 

 

DECISION OF THE COURT 

In determining this application and of course the issues and submissions raised by the parties which I have carefully read through, let me raise a single issue to the effect that;

 “Whether, considering the averments in the statement of facts and the reliefs Claimant seeks against Applicant, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claims against the Applicant?”

The issue raised in this application and the canvassed arguments are very  simple and straight forward. In a nutshell, the Applicant challenges the jurisdiction of the Court on the basis that there is no employment relationship between it and Claimant, the Claimant/Respondent argued that the 1^st Defendant and the Applicant are co-employers of the Claimant, and as such, are jointly and severally liable. Also, that pleadings have shown that there is a reasonable cause against the 2^nd Defendant/Applicant. Claimant argued further that being resident within the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court does not mean that he is liable to provide security for cost in this suit. 

It is certain that the jurisdiction of a Court to adjudicate on a matter is a fundamental issue. Where a Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain and determine a matter before it, the juridical basis for exercise of any power in respect of that matter is absent. See Okwuosa v. Gomwalk & Ors. [2017] 9 NWLR [Pt. 1570] 259 at 276-277. A Court is said to have jurisdiction in respect of a case when it has the authority to take cognizance of and decide the case. See Amakeze v. Nze Pet Company Nig. Ltd & Anor. [2021] 1 NWLR [Pt. 1756] 107 at 128. Where a Court’s jurisdiction is challenged, the Court is empowered by Section 6[6] of the 1999 Constitution to consider the claims before it in order to decide whether it has the jurisdiction to entertain it. See Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency v. Brawal Shipping Nigeria Limited [2015] LPELR-25864[CA] 13 and Alhaji Jibrin Isah v. INEC & Ors. [2016] 18 NWLR [Pt. 1544] 175 at 223.

The court in FEDERAL AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF NIGERIA v. MAEVIS LIMITED (2018) LPELR-51108(CA) held that, “The question of jurisdiction has become a recurring issue in adjudication. Jurisdiction is undoubtedly a threshold issue. The apex Court described the necessity of a Court to have requisite jurisdiction as follows: “Jurisdiction is a threshold matter. It is very fundamental as it goes to the competence of the Court to hear and determine a suit. Where a Court does not have jurisdiction to hear a matter, the entire proceedings no matter how well conducted and decided would amount to a nullity. It is thus mandatory that Courts decide the issue of jurisdiction before proceeding to consider any other matter, see BRONIK MOTORS LTD & ANOR v. WEMA BANK LTD (1983) 1 SCNLR 296.” See OBIUWEUBI V CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA (2011) LPELR -2185 (SC)”. See also MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 2 SCNLR 341.

It is trite that a Court is competent when it is properly constituted as regards members of the bench none of whom is for any reason disqualified; the subject matter of the case is within the Court’s jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the Court from exercising its jurisdiction; the case before the Court is initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. See Amakeze v. Nze Pet Company Nig. Ltd & Anor. [supra].

I have painstakingly gone through the statement of facts. Claimant sought to establish a co-employment relationship between him, Applicant and 1^st Defendant in paragraphs 4 to 7 of the statement of facts. The concept of co-employer is now firmly entrenched in our labour jurisprudence, and is to the effect that a party could be held to be an employee of two companies and the employment rights and obligations become enforceable against either or both companies. The Court of Appeal gave life to this principle in Onumalobi v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation & Anor. [2004] 1 NLLR [Pt. 2] 304 at 323-324, which decision was followed by this Court in Oyewumi Oyetayo v. Zenith Bank Plc [2012] 29 NLLR [Pt. 84] 370 at 420. However, it is evident that the purpose of establishing the co-employer relationship is to justify the claims which he seeks against Applicant. These are reliefs 1, 2, 5, 6 and 8.

In the light of the forgoing contentions, the law is certain that in determining whether a Court has jurisdiction on a matter, the only document to be considered is the statement of claim containing the reliefs the claimant seeks from the Court. In MR. ALALADE OF HYDRA AGENCY NIGERIA LIMITED & ORS v. THE PRESIDING PRESIDENT OF THE OTA GRADE 1 CUSTOMARY COURT & ORS (2021) LPELR-55656(CA) the court held that:

 “….it well settled that jurisdiction is determined by the claim of the plaintiff. It is what the plaintiff submits to the Court for adjudication, that is to say, the subject matter and claim, that determines whether the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim or not….”

 Therefore, the process to be examined in determining if the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter submitted to it for adjudication is the claimant’s claim. I have read through  the paragraphs of the statement of material facts, particularly paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7, 19, 20, 21 as preliminary amongst others and Reliefs a, b, c, e, f, g and h, by which, I am of the humble view that this court is competent to hear and determine the claimant’s case and that there is a cause triable. I so hold and therefore, relief 1 fails and same is refused.

Reliefs 2 and 3 of the application are ancillary reliefs. Their success is predicated on the success of the main relief. It portends therefore that where the main or principal relief fails, the ancillary reliefs must certainly fail. Having dismissed relief one, there is no support base of these two ancillary reliefs. After all, it is trite that you cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there.

Flowing from the above, the lone issue for determination is resolved in the positive. I hold that considering the averments in the statement of facts and the reliefs Claimant seeks against Applicant, this Court has the jurisdiction in the overall interest of justice to adjudicate on the claims. Consequently, the Applicant's application having failed, it be, and it is hereby dismissed.  This suit can now proceed to trial. I make no order as to costs.

 

 

Ruling is entered accordingly. 

 

HON. JUSTICE S. A. YELWA 

(JUDGE)