NICN - JUDGMENT
IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN
THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN
AT LAGOS
BEFORE
HIS LORDSHIP, HON. JUSTICE IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA
Date: Tuesday, 10th March
2026 SUIT NO. NICN/LA/275/2020
BETWEEN
MR. EZIOKE ATHAN CHUKWUEMEKA … CLAIMANT
AND
1. THE HONOURABLE MINISTER OF
STATE FOR PETROLEUM RESOURCES
2. THE MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM
RESOURCES … DEFENDANTS
3. THE NIGERIAN UPSTREAM PETROLEUM
REGULATORY COMMISSION
JUDGMENT
1. The Claimant initiated this lawsuit on 17th
August 2020, and in his amended statement of facts dated 9th November 2022, but
filed on 11th November 2022, he sought:
a.
A
declaration that the procedure
followed by the Defendants in compulsorily retiring the Claimant from the
employment of the Defendants is inconsistent with the Public Service Rules,
Section 35 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as
amended, and other relevant labour laws relating to retirement in an employment
with statutory flavour and therefore illegal, wrongful, unlawful, null and
void.
b.
A
declaration that the retirement of the Claimant vide a letter dated 7th August
2018, which was to take effect from the 12th of February 2018, is inconsistent
with the provisions of the Public Service Rules and other relevant labour laws
in respect of the retirement of a public servant whose employment has a statutory
flavour and therefore wrongful, unlawful, null, and void.
c.
A
declaration that the employment of the Claimant with the Defendants is still
subsisting.
d.
A
declaration that the Claimant is entitled to all his emoluments before and
after the employment of the Claimant was purportedly retired till the date of his
reinstatement and due retirement in accordance with the Public Service Rules
and relevant labour laws.
e.
An
order of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendants to reinstate the
Claimant to his employment with the 3rd Defendant without any loss in promotion
and entitlements whatsoever.
f.
An
order of this Honourable Court
compelling the Defendants to pay the Claimant all his entitlements and
emoluments from the month of August 2016 when he was unlawfully suspended and
compulsorily retired to the date of his reinstatement and conclusion of this
suit.
g.
The
sum of ?500,000,000.00 (five hundred million naira) as general damages against
the Defendants jointly and severally.
History of the case
2. Upon receiving the originating process, the Defendants
entered an appearance and filed a joint statement of defence on 22nd September
2020. The Claimant filed a reply to the statement of defence on 27th January
2021, out of time, which was regularised on 17th March 2021. On 9th July 2021,
the 3rd Defendant filed a separate memorandum of appearance and statement of
defence, which were regularised on 4th August 2021. The Claimant replied to
this on 2nd August 2021. On 2nd November 2022, the Claimant was granted leave
to amend his statement of facts, as well as his replies to the joint statement
of defence from the 1st and 2nd Defendants and the 3rd Defendant’s statement of
defence. These amendments were filed on 11th November 2022, but the Claimant did
not amend the reply to the joint statement of defence of the 1st and 2nd
Defendants. Subsequently, the 1st and 2nd Defendants submitted their consequential
amended statement of defence on 5th July 2023. The trial commenced on 24th June
2021 and concluded on 5th July 2023. The Claimant testified on his own behalf
and tendered nine exhibits. At this point, K.H. Yussuf Esq., representing S.S.
Usman Esq. for the 3rd Defendant, requested an adjournment, stating he was
unprepared to cross-examine the Claimant due to the absence of the lead
counsel. The 1st and 2nd Defendants were also absent and unrepresented. The
trial was then adjourned until 14th July 2021 for continuation. After several
adjournments and applications, the trial resumed on 5th July 2023. The Claimant
adopted two additional statements on oath dated 11th November 2022, submitted
five exhibits, and was cross-examined by the Defendants’ counsel. The 1st and
2nd Defendants indicated they would not call any witnesses, while the 3rd
Defendant requested an adjournment to allow for the substitution of a witness
who had left its employment. Consequently, the suit was adjourned to 8th
November 2023, for the 3rd Defendant to present and conclude its case. On 8th
November 2023, when the hearing resumed, the 3rd Defendant was absent. I.C.
Ituma Esq., representing the 3rd Defendant’s counsel, informed the Court that
the witness had left the 3rd Defendant's employment and that they were in the
process of filing a substitution application. Upon the application of the
Claimant’s counsel, the defence of the 3rd Defendant was closed under Order 38,
Rule 10 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules,
2017. The suit was then adjourned to adopt final written addresses. Parties
exchanged their final written addresses, which their counsel adopted on 10th
December 2025, and the matter was set down for judgment.
Brief
facts of the case
3. The
Claimant's case is that he was employed by the Defendants following an offer
dated 1st September 1987, and his appointment was confirmed on 11th November
1988. He was promoted on 21st December 1998, due to his additional qualifications,
and eventually became Deputy Chief Accountant, SS2, in 2015. Throughout his
employment, he had a clean record until he received a query in April 2016
regarding a personal loan with First Bank of Nigeria Ltd. He responded to this
query on 1st May 2016. Despite the disciplinary committee concluding he had
done no wrong with the loan, he was suspended on 22nd August 2016, and only
received half of his salary without justification. His letters requesting the
withdrawal of his suspension went unanswered. Unexpectedly, on 7th August 2018,
he was notified of his compulsory retirement effective 12th February 2018. He
stated that, according to the Public Service Rules, as a Grade Level 13 officer
who started on 12th October 1987, he could not be retired until 12th October
2022, and that the retirement process was procedurally incorrect. His solicitor
sent a pre-action notice to the 1st Defendant on 2nd November 2018, demanding
the retraction of the retirement letter, but there was no response. He believes
he was denied a fair hearing and asserts he is not subject to any disciplinary
action. The Defendants disclaimed liability and prayed the Court to dismiss the
suit.
Summary
of final written addresses
4. The learned counsel for the Claimant raised
six issues for determination in the final written address dated 6th December
2024:
a.
What
is the effect of the 1st and 2nd Defendants’ refusal to file their statement of
defence to this suit/or their refusal to lead evidence in this suit?
b.
What is
the effect of the refusal of the 3rd Defendant to lead evidence in its defence?
c.
Whether,
going by the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant was lawfully
retired?
d.
Whether,
going by the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant was afforded
the right of fair hearing?
e.
Whether,
going by the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant is not entitled
to be reinstated with his arrears of salaries and allowances paid to him?
f.
Whether,
going by the facts and circumstances of this case, the Claimant is not entitled
to damages?
5. In
addressing the first issue, the learned counsel argued that the failure of the
1st and 2nd Defendants to file a defence against the Claimant’s claim
constitutes an admission of the allegations made. The counsel maintained that,
in this case, the 1st and 2nd Defendants lack any viable defence to the
Claimant's claims, citing the cases of Okoebor v. Police Council & Ors
[2003] 12 NWLR (Pt 834) 444 and Olaiya v. Kwara Investment Property
Development Co. Ltd [2017] LPELR 45653(CA). The Court was urged to rule
against the 1st and 2nd Defendants. Turning to the second issue, counsel cited
the authority of Newbreed Organization Ltd v. Erhomosele [2006] 5 NWLR (Pt
974) 499 at 527, arguing that the 3rd Defendant's failure to defend the
suit also constitutes an admission. He urged the Court to resolve this issue in
favour of the Claimant.
6. In
issue three, the learned counsel referenced the case of Yemisi v. F.I.R.S
[2013] ALL FWLR (Pt 693) 1992 at 1995-1996, and explained the three types
of employment relationships. Counsel argued that, based on Exhibits 1, 2, 3,
and 4, the Claimant’s employment has statutory protection. Upon reviewing
Exhibits 3 and 4, the counsel contended that the employment, provision, and
discipline of officers, particularly those in the Claimant's cadre, is the
exclusive responsibility of the Federal Civil Service Commission, as
established in Yemisi v. F.I.R.S. (supra). On this basis, counsel
asserted that the disciplinary procedure outlined in the Civil Service Rules
was not properly followed, and that the Defendants acted as judges in their own
case, citing FUT Yola v. Maiwuya [2013] ALL FWLR (Pt 677) 534 at 755-756.
Counsel further argued that the reason for the Claimant’s compulsory retirement
is not related to any improvement or lack thereof concerning the 3rd Defendant,
emphasising that the Claimant had worked without any issues. In response to the
3rd Defendant’s assertion that it had the authority, in accordance with the
civil service rules, to retire the Claimant as a punitive measure, counsel
maintained that the Defendants lacked the power to terminate the Claimant’s
employment, referring to the case of Alhassan v. ABU Zaria [2010] ALL FWLR
(Pt 538) 962 at 976. The Court was urged to resolve the issue against the
Defendants.
7. In
addressing the fourth issue, counsel referenced several cases, including Power Holding
Company of Nigeria v. Alabi [2011] ALL FWLR (Pt 557) 698 at 702, Garba
v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 550 at 558, and Alhassan
v. ABU Zaria (supra), and argued that the Claimant was denied a fair
hearing because the letter of complaint from First Bank was not presented to
the Claimant. Furthermore, the Claimant was not informed of the panel members'
ranks, and although the panel included representatives from five of the six
geopolitical zones in the country, the Claimant's zone was excluded.
Additionally, there was no evidence of authority from the Civil Service
Commission appointing the panel members, as they were all selected from the 3rd
Defendant. The Court was urged to resolve the issue in favour of the Claimant.
8. In
discussing issue five, counsel argued that, contrary to the 3rd Defendant's
claims that the Claimant's employment fell under a master-servant relationship
and that the NNPC corporate guide was applicable instead of the civil service
rules, the Claimant's conditions of service are not governed by the NNPC
corporate guide, as evidenced by Exhibits 3, 4, 5, and 8. Counsel raised
concerns about how a fact-finding committee had transformed into a disciplinary
committee. Counsel reviewed paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, and 17 of the 3rd
Defendant's statement of defence, along with Exhibits 10 and 11, asserting that
the 3rd Defendant's defence is an afterthought. Citing PHCN Plc v. Offoelo
[2013] All FWLR (Pt 664) 1, PHMB v. Ejitagha [2000] FWLR (Pt 9) 1510,
Shitta-Bey v. F.P.S.C [1989] 1 SC 40, and UNTHMB v. Nnoli [1992] 6
NWLR (Pt 250) 752, counsel contended that if the termination of employment
with statutory flavour, as in this case, does not adhere to the required
procedure, it is considered null and void, and therefore, the Claimant is
entitled to reinstatement. Counsel urged the Court to uphold this position.
9. In
addressing the sixth issue, the learned counsel referred to the case of UBN
v. Uke-Fayanju [2019] ALL FWLR (Pt 1017) 602 at 619, arguing that general
damages are those damages that the law presumes to arise from the wrongdoing
alleged by the Claimant. Counsel further asserted that the Claimant has
demonstrated his entitlement to the sum of N500,000,000.00
in damages. In conclusion, counsel argued that the Claimant is entitled to
either reinstatement or the payment of his salaries and allowances from 2016,
when he was placed on half salary, up to 2022, when he should have retired,
relying on the case of Omidiora v. Federal Civil Service Commission [2008]
ALL FWLR (Pt 415) 1807 at 1810. The Court was urged to grant the reliefs
sought by the Claimant and to rule against the Defendants.
10. The
learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants nominated four issues for
determination in the final written address dated 7th December 2025:
a.
Whether
the Claimant’s employment is governed by the Defendant’s Conditions of Service
and not the Public Service Rules (PSR).
b.
Whether
the Defendants complied with the principles of fair hearing in the disciplinary
process leading to the Claimant’s compulsory retirement.
c.
Whether
the Claimant is automatically entitled to declaratory relief in default of the
1st and 2nd Defendants to file a statement of defence and lead evidence in this
suit
d.
Whether
the 2nd Defendant is a juristic person that can be sued before this Honourable
Court.
11. In
addressing the first issue, the learned counsel referred to Exhibits 1 and 4,
as well as the Claimant’s testimony during cross-examination, and argued that
the Claimant’s appointment is governed by the conditions of service of the 3rd
Defendant, rather than the Public Service Rules. Consequently, this implies
that the Federal Civil Service Commission lacks disciplinary authority over the
Claimant. Counsel explained that, due to the Claimant’s alignment with NNPC
salary and grade levels prior to his compulsory retirement, his employment is
subject to the conditions of service of the 3rd Defendant, which has its own
distinct disciplinary procedures. To support this argument, cases such as Oforishe
v. Nigerian Gas Co. Ltd [2018] 2 NWLR (Pt 1602) 35 at 49-50, Bamgboye v.
University of Ilorin [1999] 10 NWLR (Pt 622) 290, and Organ v. Nigeria
LNG Ltd [2013] 16 NWLR (Pt 1381) 506 were cited. The Court was urged to hold
that the Claimant’s employment is governed by the 3rd Defendant’s conditions of
service and not by the Public Service Rules.
12. In
addressing issue two, the learned counsel referenced the cases of Ariori v.
Elemo [1983] 1 SCNLR 1, Judicial Service Commission v. Ajolore [2006] 12
NWLR (Pt 993) 1, and Organ v. Nigeria LNG Ltd (supra), and argued
that a fair hearing entails giving each party the opportunity to understand the
case against them and to respond without any inhibition or restrictions.
Counsel asserted that in employment law, a fair hearing does not necessarily
require a courtroom-style proceeding. Counsel submitted that the requirement
for a fair hearing is satisfied if an employee is notified of the allegations
against him and is allowed the opportunity to respond. Counsel stated that the
infractions leading to disciplinary action against the Claimant amounted to
misconduct as per the 3rd Defendant’s conditions of service. He noted that the
Claimant was afforded a fair hearing throughout the proceedings. The Court’s
responsibility, according to counsel, is to assess compliance with the
principles of fair hearing rather than to evaluate the adequacy of the evidence
presented before the disciplinary committee, citing Arinze v. First Bank
[2004] 12 NWLR (Pt 888) 663. Furthermore, counsel highlighted that since
the Claimant was issued a query, responded to it, and appeared before the
disciplinary committee to explain his position, he cannot legitimately complain
about a lack of a fair hearing. The cases of Nitel v. Akwa [2006] 2 NWLR (Pt
964) 391 and Alhassan v. ABU Zaria [2010] ALL FWLR (Pt 538) 963 were
cited in support of this argument. Counsel contended that the case of Garba
v. University of Maiduguri [1986] 1 NWLR (Pt 18) 550, which the Claimant
relied upon, was misapplied. The Court was urged to rule accordingly.
13. In arguing issue three, contrary to the
Claimant’s assertion that he is entitled to the requested reliefs due to a lack
of defence and evidence from the 1st and 2nd Defendants, counsel clarified that
the 1st and 2nd Defendants submitted a joint statement of defence dated 9th
September 2020. Following the amendment of the statement of facts, they filed a
consequential amended statement of defence on 30th June 2023. Counsel argued
that even if we assume, without conceding, that the 1st and 2nd Defendants had
not filed a statement of defence, the burden remains on the Claimant to prove
his entitlement to the declaratory reliefs he claims. Such reliefs cannot be
granted merely because of the absence of a defence or as a matter of course;
they require credible evidence. To support this assertion, counsel referenced
the cases of Nwokidu v. Okanu [2010] 3 NWLR (Pt 1181) 362 and Dumez
Nig. Ltd v. Nwakhoba [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt 1119) 361, among others.
Consequently, counsel submitted that although the Claimant bears the burden of
proof regarding his entitlement to the declarations, he has failed to meet this
burden. The Court was urged to conclude that the Claimant is not entitled to
the sought declaratory relief for insufficient proof, rendering the relief
subject to dismissal.
14. In
canvassing issue four, counsel defined a juristic person according to Black's
Law Dictionary and argued that only natural persons, artificial persons, or
statutory bodies that are expressly granted legal personality may sue or be
sued in their own names. Counsel maintained that a party lacking legal
personality cannot sue or be sued, and any suit brought against such a party is
void. To support this position, cases such as Ekwenibe & Sons Trading
Co. Ltd v. N.S.I.T.F.M.B. [2006] 10 NWLR (Pt 987) 347, Fawehinmi v. NBA
(No. 2) [1989] 2 NWLR (Pt 105) 558, and A.G. Federation v. Great Eastern
Insurance Co. Ltd [2016] 9 NWLR (Pt 1518) 10 were cited. Counsel argued
that the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, which is named as the 2nd Defendant,
does not possess legal personality because it is not established by statute but
rather functions as an administrative arm of the Federal Government. This
renders the 2nd Defendant an improper party to the suit, resting on the cases
of F.G.N. v. Shobu [1994] 7 NWLR (Pt 358) 735 and Ibrahim v. JSC
Kaduna State [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt 584) 1. Counsel contended that suing the
2nd Defendant constitutes not only a procedural defect but a fundamental flaw
that undermines the validity of the suit, making it subject to dismissal,
citing the cases of Corporate Ideal Insurance Ltd v. Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd
[2014] 7 NWLR (Pt 1405) 165 and A.G. Federation v. Great Eastern
Insurance Co. Ltd [2016] 9 NWLR (Pt 1518) 10 in support. Counsel urged the
Court to determine that the 2nd Defendant is not a juristic person and should
be struck from the case, and to dismiss the Claimant’s claim due to lack of
merit and evidence.
15. The
learned counsel for the 3rd Defendant formulated one issue for determination in
the final written address dated and filed on 8th December 2025:
Whether, in the circumstances of
the facts of this case, considering the evidence led at the trial and in view
of the settled principles of law, the Claimant has established his case to be
entitled to the reliefs sought?
16. Arguing
the sole issue for determination, counsel submitted that the Claimant’s case is
presumptuous, fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and lacks
sufficient evidence. Counsel further argued that the declaratory reliefs sought
by the Claimant must be proven, even in the absence of a defence, citing the
cases of Ifediora v. Okafor [2019] 16 NWLR (Pt 1698) 322 at 341, and Mohammed
v. Dantata [1996] 8 NWLR (Pt 496) 745 in support of this position. Additionally,
it is submitted that the grant or refusal of the declaratory relief is
discretionary. To be entitled to the discretionary powers of the Court, it is
the Claimant's responsibility to prove his case, even without a defence. The
cases of Akinyemi v. Odua Investment Co. Ltd [2012] LPELR-8270(SC) 32-33,
and Alao v. Akano & Ors [2005] LPELR-409(SC) were cited to support
this argument. Counsel argued that the Claimant has a duty to produce the
contract of employment between him and the 3rd Defendant to resolve the
controversy. However, he failed to do so but admitted under cross-examination
that the 3rd Defendant’s conditions of service regulate his employment, as
indicated in Exhibit 1. This position is further supported by the cases of Udoh
v. Civil Service Commission, Akwa Ibom State & Ors [2013] LPELR-21849(CA)
and Ziideeh v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2007] LPELR-3544(SC).
It was also submitted that the Claimant failed to plead and produce the Public
Service Rules, did not cite the specific provisions that were breached, or
provide references to any relevant labour law in support of his claim of
wrongful termination of employment. This lack of specificity renders his claim
speculative and unproven, as evidenced by the cases of Nigerian Army Council
& Anor v. Erhabor [2018] LPELR-44958(CA) and Okeme v. Civil Service
Commission Edo State [2000] 14 NWLR (Pt 688) 480 at 490-491. The Court was
urged to dismiss this suit.
17.
In response to the Claimant’s
allegation that his right to a fair hearing was breached, counsel refers to the
Claimant’s documentary evidence, specifically Exhibits 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8, as
well as his testimony under cross-examination regarding this issue. Counsel
contends that the Claimant was afforded a fair hearing prior to the termination
of his employment. It was further argued that since the Claimant was queried
and provided a response, he cannot claim to have been denied a fair hearing,
resting on INEC v. Musa [2003] LPELR-275(SC) and Imonikhe v. Unity
Bank Plc [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt 1262) 624 at 640. Additionally, counsel contended
that the Claimant has misapplied the case of Yemisi v. F.I.R.S [2012]
LPELR-7964(CA). Therefore, counsel concluded that the termination of the
Claimant’s employment by the 3rd Defendant is lawful, as it complied with the
constitutional provisions of fair hearing, notwithstanding the Claimant’s
claims of a statutory flavour, citing the case of Ziideeh v. Rivers State
Civil Service Commission in support.
18. The
learned counsel urged the Court to disregard paragraphs 1.8.5, 1.8.6, and 1.8.7
of the Claimant’s final written address, given that the 3rd Defendant’s
statement of defence is deemed abandoned. It rests upon the Claimant to prove
his case, regardless of the weaknesses of the opposing side's case. Counsel
returned a negative answer to the Claimant’s issue five, on reinstatement,
arguing that since the Claimant is due for retirement in 2023, any
reinstatement would be futile, relying on Saraki v. Kotoye [1992] 9 NWLR (Pt
264) 156. Counsel also submitted that the Claimant’s monetary claims remain
unproven due to a lack of particulars, citing the cases of Daniel Holdings
Ltd v. UBA Plc [2005] LPELR-922(SC) and NBA Plc v. Ubani [2013]
LPELR-21902(SC) in support. Furthermore, counsel argued that the Claimant
is not entitled to damages because he has failed to establish his claims and
has not pleaded the particulars of suffering that would entitle him to an award
of damages; these particulars were only introduced in the written address. Counsel
emphasised that a written address does not equate to evidence, and a relief
cannot be granted based solely on sentiments. The cases of Kubor & Anor
v. Dickson & Ors [2012] LPELR-9817(SC) and Okpe v. Fan Milk Plc
& Anor [2016] LPELR-42562(SC) were cited in support. Finally, the Court
was urged to resolve the single issue in favour of the 3rd Defendant and
dismiss the suit for lack of proof.
Issue for determination
19. I have reviewed the submissions of the parties,
and, in my opinion, the eleven issues for determination can be summarised into
one central question: Is the Claimant entitled to a judgment on any of his
claims?
20. It
is a fundamental rule of evidence that whoever
desires the Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent
on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. By
the combined force of Sections 131, 132, 133, 134, and 136[1] of the Evidence
Act, the Claimant bears the initial burden of proving the pleaded facts on the
balance of probabilities. If the
Claimant fails to discharge this burden satisfactorily, his claims will be
dismissed without considering the Defendants’ case, as the Defendants are not
required to prove their defence under these circumstances. In such a situation,
there would be no evidence to rebut, leading to a judgment against the Claimant
for lack of evidence. Please refer to Igwenagu v. Hon. Minister, Federal
Capital Territory & Ors [2025] 7 NWLR (Pt 1988) 145 at 173–174, Nsude
& Ors v. Nichodemus & Ors [2025] 4 NWLR (Pt 1982) 253 at 280, and Nduul
v. Wayo & Ors [2018] LPELR-45151(SC) 51–53.
21. Additionally, the Claimant who seeks
declaratory relief must establish his entitlement to the declaration by
credible evidence and will succeed on the strength of his case, not on the
weakness of the defence or admission by the Defendant. Since a declaratory
relief involves the exercise of the Court’s discretion, the Claimant must place
sufficient materials before the Court to justify the grant of the declaration,
as illustrated in the cases of Nduul v.
Wayo & Ors [2018] 7 SC (Pt III) 164 at 213, U.T.C. Nigeria Plc v.
Peters [2022] 18 NWLR (Pt 1862) 297 at 312, 313, and Osho v. Adeleye & Ors [2024] 8
NWLR (Pt 1941) 431 at 452.
22. In resolving employment disputes, the Court
will refer to the employment contract and any other stipulations that are
incorporated, or deemed to have been incorporated, into the contract, as stated
in the cases of Adekunle
v. United Bank for Africa Plc [2019] 17 ACELR 87 at 108 and Gbedu
& Ors v. Itie & Ors [2020] 3 NWLR (Pt 1710] 104 at 126. The employment contract serves as the foundation
for any action taken in the event of a breach. The success of the case hinges
entirely on the terms agreed upon, or deemed to have been agreed upon, by the
parties involved, as outlined in Umera
v. Nigerian Railway Corporation [2022] 10 NWLR (Pt 1838) 349 at 386 and Gyubok
v. The Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi & Anor [2024] 16 NWLR (Pt 1965) 515 at
549.
23. Generally, an employer has the inherent right to
terminate an employee's services, whether the employment is protected by law or
governed by contract. However, when an employer chooses to disengage an
employee, it is crucial that it complies with the terms and conditions outlined
in the employee's contract of employment. Failing to adhere to these terms may
result in wrongful termination, for which the employer could be held liable for
damages, or compelled to reinstate the employee in appropriate cases. Please
refer to Oforishe v. Nigerian Gas Company Ltd [2018] 2 NWLR (Pt 1602) 35 at
53-54, 61; Ovivie & Ors v. Delta Steel Company Limited [2023]
14 NWLR (Pt 1904) 203 at 229, 236; and Dangote Cement Plc v. Ager
& Anor [2024] 10 NWLR (Pt 1945) 1 at 36. Similarly, an employee who
claims his employment was wrongfully terminated, or as in this case, that he
was wrongfully retired, bears the responsibility of pleading the terms and
conditions of his employment contract and demonstrating how the employer
breached them, as noted in Sections 131[1] and 136[1] of the Evidence Act, and
the cases of Onwusukwu v. Civil Service Commission [2020] 10 NWLR (Pt 1731)
179 at 200, 201, U.T.C Nigeria Plc v. Peters [2022] 18 NWLR (Pt 1862)
297 at 320, Ovivie & Ors v. Delta Steel Company Limited [2023]
LPELR-60460(SC) 9-10, and Benue Brewery Limited v. Okonta [2024]
LPELR-61878(CA) 8.
Summary of evidence
24. The
Claimant sought seven reliefs, testified to support his case, and tendered 14
documents, which were marked as Exhibits 1 to 14. These are: appointment letter
dated 1st September 1987, confirmation letter dated 11th November 1988, conversion,
upgrading, and re-deployment letter dated 21st December 1998, four promotion
letters, query dated 26th April 2016, reply to query dated 1st May 2016, suspension letter dated
19th August 2016, retirement letter dated 7th August 2018, pre-action notice
dated 2nd November 2018, the Claimant’s letter dated 30th July 2014 protesting his
exclusion from the 2013 and 2014 promotion exercise, response to the Claimant’s
letter dated 8th September 2014, the Claimant's letter dated 30th November 2015,
the Claimant’s response to query dated 4th December 2015, First Bank of Nigeria
Ltd offer of credit facility dated 7th April 2015.
25. The Claimant asserts that he was employed
by the Defendants based on an offer of employment dated 1st September 1987. His
appointment with the 3rd Defendant was confirmed by a letter dated 11th
November 1988. On 21st December 1998, the Claimant received an upgrade and a
change in his deployment due to his additional qualifications and
certification. He advanced through the ranks to the position of Deputy Chief
Accountant, SS2, in 2015, a role he maintained until his compulsory retirement.
Throughout his employment, he had a clean record until he received a query from
the 3rd Defendant in April 2016 concerning a personal loan with First Bank of
Nigeria, as detailed in a letter dated 26th April 2016. He responded to this
query in a letter dated 1st May 2016. To his surprise, he was subsequently
summoned to the 3rd Defendant’s disciplinary committee, which was investigating
him for alleged default on the personal loan. He found these allegations strange
and unfounded, as all his transactions with First Bank were conducted in good
faith and he had not defaulted on the loan. Upon conclusion of the
investigation, the disciplinary committee did not find him culpable of any
wrongdoing regarding the loan. Nevertheless, on 22nd August 22, 2016, he was
placed on suspension and received half of his salary without any lawful
justification. Despite his numerous letters pleading with the 3rd Defendant to
withdraw his suspension and restore his full salary, he received no response,
despite not having defaulted on the loan. Unexpectedly, while pursuing justice
relating to his half salary and suspension, he received a letter dated 7th
August 2018, notifying him of his compulsory retirement, effective 12th
February 2018, from the 3rd Defendant. He testified that, under the Public
Service Rules, as amended by the Federal Government Official Gazette dated 25th
August 2009, as a Grade Level 13 Officer who began service with the Defendants
on 12th October 1987, he cannot be compulsorily retired until 12th October
2022. He further contended that the procedure followed by the Defendants to
retire him was inconsistent with his employment status, which is governed by
statutory regulations. Following this, his solicitor, Yinka Muyiwa, Esq., sent
a pre-action notice dated 2nd November 2018, to the 1st Defendant, demanding
that the Defendants retract the compulsory retirement letter; however, the
Defendants failed to respond. The Claimant stated that, according to the Public
Service Rules, only the Civil Service Commission can discipline an employee on
Grade Level 13. The Claimant believes that he was deprived of a fair hearing before
his compulsory retirement and maintains that he is not subject to any
disciplinary action. He requests the reliefs outlined in the amended statement
of facts.
26. The Claimant's additional sworn statement
reiterates his earlier evidence. He emphasised that the 3rd Defendant is not a
subsidiary of the NNPC, stating that before the enactment of the Petroleum
Industry Act, 2021, the 3rd Defendant was not an autonomous body. It did not
have a Board of Directors approved by the National Assembly and was instead led
by a Director who reported to the Permanent Secretary. Consequently, all
promotions and disciplinary matters were managed by the Permanent Secretary,
who derives his authority from the Civil Service Commission and is also a
member of that Commission, and who operates under the Public Service Rules
rather than the Corporation's conditions of service, as mentioned in his
letter. The Claimant denied that his denial of promotion for two consecutive
years was due to poor appraisal scores. He stated that, in a letter dated 30th
July 2014, he protested his lack of promotion to the Defendant, who responded
on 8th September 2014, indicating that he was due for promotion but was not
recommended due to limited slots. After receiving this promotion letter, he
raised objections to paragraph 3 in a letter dated 30th November 2015.
27. The
Claimant refuted allegations of truancy, stating that he took annual leave with
the full knowledge and permission of the Manager of FAD, Warri Zone. He claimed
to have responded to a query concerning this issue through a letter dated 4th
December 2015. He also denied receiving notice of a complaint from First Bank
of Nigeria Ltd regarding a loan facility granted to him until he found it in
the 3rd Defendant’s statement of defence after receiving the document. The
Claimant asserted that the complaint from First Bank is not genuine, as it is
dated 8th April 2016, while the query against him was served on 26th April
2016, and his repayment due date is 28th April each year. This timing suggests the
complaint was lodged before the repayment due date. He indicated that, as of
the date of the complaint, Mrs. Carol Coker, to whom the letter dated 8th April
2016, was addressed, had already retired as a Deputy Director of Corporate
Services within the 3rd Defendant. The Claimant's request to the 3rd
Defendant’s Cooperative in Warri to consolidate his loans into a single
treasury bond was not granted. He stated that had this request been approved,
his loans would have been repaid by the 3rd Defendant's Cooperative in Warri,
converting his annual principal repayment into N8,000,000.00 (eight million naira) with monthly interest payments.
He claimed that repayments to the Bank and the NNPC Cooperative were deducted
directly from his salary without his knowledge. While he was in the process of
resolving this issue in Warri, he unexpectedly received a query from Lagos. He
challenged the 3rd Defendant to provide evidence regarding whether a
banker-customer relationship constitutes an offence that warrants suspension
and subsequent compulsory retirement under the Public Service Rules. He further
testified that he was denied a fair hearing during the disciplinary panel
sessions, and he asserted that the composition of the committee was illegal. He
explained that the Disciplinary Committee's duty was to conduct investigations
and submit their report to the Permanent Secretary for necessary action. Since
the Permanent Secretary, who derives his authority from the Civil Service
Commission, is in charge of promotions and disciplinary matters, and these are
regulated by the Public Service Rules rather than the 3rd Defendant's
conditions of service, this raised significant concerns. The claimant asserted
that the panel’s actions to suspend him and subsequently impose compulsory
retirement rendered the panel a judge in its own case. Although he was
compulsorily retired on 18th February 2018, his official retirement date is
12th October 2022. Given that he was employed on 12th October 1987, the
required 35 years of service or reaching 60 years of age, whichever comes
first, have not yet been fulfilled. Therefore, he stated that his compulsory
retirement is illegal and unlawful, as the Civil Service Commission did not
authorise the retirement of any public servant.
28. Under
cross-examination by the learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Defendants, the
Claimant admitted that he was employed based on Exhibit 1. He confirmed that
Exhibit 1 is from the Petroleum Inspectorate, which is not a party to this
case. He acknowledged that the Petroleum Inspectorate was referred to as a
corporation in five instances. Referring to paragraph 2, he agreed that his
employment aligns with the Corporation’s conditions of service as indicated in
Exhibit 1. He confirmed that the Petroleum Inspectorate was merged with the
Ministry of Petroleum and that he has maintained his salary. He affirmed that
he has received numerous promotions within the Department of Petroleum
Resources (DPR). According to Exhibit 4, he was promoted from SS 4 to SS 3 and
then to SS 2, and this grading is consistent with public service rules. He
denied that any of these documents indicates level 13. When asked whether there
is any document in Exhibit 4 showing grade level 13, he stated that it is not
explicitly stated, but he claimed that SS 3 is equivalent to grade level 13. The
Claimant confirmed that Exhibit 5 is the query issued to him. He was uncertain
whether he received the query on 31st December 2009, and he could not recall
receiving a warning letter dated 13th May 2010. He denied receiving another
query on 3rd December 2015, regarding his absconding from work, and he could
not recall a warning letter dated 7th December 2015. He admitted to responding
to Exhibit 5, the query. He was invited to a disciplinary panel comprising two
members from each zone, but none were from his zone, making a total of ten
members. When asked if any of them were his juniors, he replied that he did not
know their grade levels. He admitted that the panel posed questions to him, to
which he responded. Although he was discharged and told he would hear their
decision, he received no communication from them until he initiated this suit. He
was not aware that Exhibit 5 was a result of a petition by First Bank. He
confirmed that he obtained a five-year loan from First Bank. He had also
secured a loan from a co-operative before the First Bank loan, as he is a
member and entitled to it. The co-operative loan is deducted at source. He
denied that he was unable to service the First Bank loan because of these
deductions. He will turn 60 in August 2023 and was scheduled to leave service
after 35 years in 2022, given his appointment in 1987.
29. During cross-examination by the 3rd Defendant,
he confirmed that he was compulsorily retired by the 1st Defendant. The 3rd
Defendant is an agency of the 2nd Defendant. He denied that NNPC and the 3rd
Defendant are regulated by the same rules. He stated that he was employed in
1987 and denied receiving a series of queries and warnings. He admitted that he
was suspended and placed on half salary, but denied responding to all the
queries issued to him. When asked whether he had received a warning letter as
per Exhibit 4, he claimed it was a promotion letter, not a warning, and stated
that he had written a letter to the permanent secretary. He asserted that he
has access to the NNPC conditions of service. He denied that all promotions and
disciplinary actions for staff are governed by the NNPC conditions of service,
insisting instead that they are guided by public service rules. He maintained
that civil service rules govern the 3rd Defendant’s operations. When asked if
he had any evidence that civil service rules governed his employment, he
replied that he did. He acknowledged awareness of the harmonisation between the
DPR and NNPC but stated that it had not been implemented. Before his
retirement, he held the position of Deputy Chief Accountant on grade level 13.
He denied that his grade rose to SS2 due to the harmonisation. He also stated
that he was not recalled after his suspension, and expressed uncertainty about
the circumstances, which is why he is in Court. The Claimant denied that the 3rd
Defendant retired him on compassionate grounds to qualify him for benefits and
stated that his letter of compulsory retirement did not instruct the finance
and accounts department to compute his benefits. He mentioned that he has not
received any benefits from anyone, asserting that the letter he received was
solely a compulsory retirement notice and nothing more. He firmly denied that
the 3rd Defendant was magnanimous in retiring him.
30. The 1st and 2nd Defendants did not call any
witnesses and chose to rest their case on the Claimant's case. The Claimant
contended that the 1st and 2nd Defendants' failure to file a statement of
defence constitutes an admission, citing the case of Okoebor v. Police
Council & Ors (supra). In contrast, the 1st and 2nd Defendants argued
that they had indeed filed their defence and maintained that, even in the
absence of a defence, the Claimant has the obligation to prove his entitlement
to the reliefs sought. Similarly, the Claimant asserted that the 3rd
Defendant's failure to provide evidence supporting its defence also constitutes
an admission. The 3rd Defendant did not address this point in its final written
address. However, it is established law that pleadings are not evidence.
Therefore, if a Defendant fails to call a witness to substantiate its defence,
the pleading is deemed abandoned, as referenced in Durosaro v. Ayorinde
[2005] LPELR-967(SC) and Central Bank of Nigeria & Ors v. Okojie
[2015] LPELR-24740(SC). As a result, the statements of defence filed by the
Defendants, along with accompanying sworn statements, do not constitute
evidence before the Court, as they were not adopted. Nevertheless, the failure
to call a witness does not automatically imply a lack of evidence to support
the pleadings. Evidence elicited from witnesses called by the opposing parties
during cross-examination regarding pleaded facts is considered part of that
party's case, as established in Uchiv & Anor v. Sabo & Ors [2015]
LPELR-40360(CA).
31. I
have carefully reviewed the pleadings of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, along with
the evidence elicited during the cross-examination of the Claimant. I find that
the evidence elicited from the Claimant by the 1st and 2nd Defendants, which
supports their case, is that he was employed by Exhibit 1, which outlines the
conditions of service set by NNPC. It is also noted that the Petroleum
Inspectorate was merged with the Ministry of Petroleum and that the Claimant’s
promotions were handled by the Department of Petroleum Resources. Furthermore,
the Claimant acknowledged receipt of a query, as shown in Exhibit 5, and provided
a response. Following this, he was invited to a disciplinary panel, which
afforded him a fair hearing. Additional points include that the Claimant
secured loans from First Bank and the Cooperative. However, the allegations that
the Claimant's grading from SS3 to SS2 are not found in the public service
rules; the Claimant was queried on 31st December 2009, 13th May 2010, and 3rd
December 2015, and received a warning on 7th December 2015; members of the
disciplinary committee were selected based on the Claimant's status; the
Claimant was unable to service the loan from First Bank and was expected to
retire upon reaching the age of 65 in 2022; issues surrounding the Claimant’s retirement
and the authority of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to retire the Claimant under
the Conditions of Service remain unproven.
32. I
have carefully reviewed the pleadings of the 3rd Defendant dated 1st February
2021, though filed on 9th July 2021, as well as the evidence elicited during
the cross-examination of the Claimant. I find that the only evidence supporting
the 3rd Defendant’s pleadings is the Claimant’s statement that he was
compulsorily retired by the 3rd Defendant, which is an agency under the 2nd Defendant.
Additionally, the Claimant confirmed that he was employed in 1987, was
suspended, and retired at grade level 13 as Deputy Chief Accountant. However,
other claims, such as the assertion that the same rules govern both NNPC and
the 3rd Defendant, the issuance of queries and warnings, the responses to those
queries, the assertion that the conditions of service for NNPC regulate the
employment relationship between the Claimant and the 3rd Defendant, and the
letter of compulsory retirement requesting the finance and accounts department
to calculate his benefits, remain unproven.
Evaluation of evidence
33. I
have thoroughly reviewed and assessed the evidence presented by the parties,
including both oral and documentary evidence. The Claimant sought several
declarations, an order for his reinstatement, and damages. It is undisputed
that the Claimant was employed by the Petroleum Inspectorate, as indicated in
Exhibit 1. He was queried, responded, and appeared before a disciplinary
committee. Furthermore, it is also undisputed that the Claimant was suspended
and subsequently compulsorily retired. Parties agree that the Petroleum
Inspectorate merged with the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and that the
Claimant’s promotions were from the Department of Petroleum Resources.
Additionally, it is not in dispute that the Claimant secured a loan from First
Bank and a cooperative society. The key issues to be resolved are whether the
Claimant's employment was statutorily protected and governed by the Public
Service Rules; whether he was granted a fair hearing before he was compulsorily
retired; whether his compulsory retirement is unlawful; and whether the 2nd
Defendant is a juristic personality.
Was the Claimant’s employment statutorily protected?
34. The supporting evidence is found in paragraph
17 of the Claimant’s sworn statement, which asserts that his employment enjoys
statutory protection. This assertion was reiterated in his final written
address. The 1st and 2nd Defendants contended that the Claimant’s employment
was governed by the Corporate Policy and Procedure Guide (CPPG), which outlines
the Conditions of Service of the 3rd Defendant. By Section 131(1) of the
Evidence Act, the burden of proof lies with the party who makes an assertion.
Therefore, the Claimant, who claims that his employment is statutorily
protected, bears the responsibility to prove it, regardless of any evidence
from the Defendants. The Claimant submitted 14 exhibits. Exhibit 1, the
appointment letter, mentions “the Corporation’s Conditions of Service.” During
cross-examination by the 1st and 2nd Defendants, the Claimant admitted that he
was employed under Exhibit 1, which is on the letterheaded paper of the
Petroleum Inspectorate, even though it is not a party to the suit. He confirmed
that the Petroleum Inspectorate is referred to as the Corporation and
acknowledged that his employment was consistent with the Corporation’s
conditions of service as stated in Exhibit 1. Additionally, the Claimant
admitted during cross-examination by the 3rd Defendant that he possesses the
NNPC conditions of service. However, when asked to provide evidence that his
employment is regulated by the Civil Service Rules, the Claimant could only
assert that it is so, without referencing any specific document. Upon reviewing
the Claimant’s evidence regarding this issue, I found nothing in Exhibits 2, 3,
and 4, or any other exhibit that substantiates his claim. Therefore, apart from
the Claimant’s oral testimony, there is no evidence corroborating the assertion
that his employment has statutory protection.
35. The
law is settled that the fact that an employer is an institution established by
statute does not, ipso facto, clothe all the institution's appointments with a statutory
flavour. An employment enjoys a statutory flavour when the contract of service
is governed by statute or when the conditions of service are contained in
regulations derived from statutory provisions. Usually, an
employee's status is determined by reference to the appointment letter. Please
refer to Okoh v. The Federal Polytechnic, Bauchi & Anor [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt
1961) 261 at 293, Comptroller-General of Customs & Ors v. Gusau [2017] 18
NWLR (Pt 1598) 353 at 390, Umera v.
Nigerian Railway Corporation (supra) at page 393, and Central Bank of
Nigeria v. Ohiku [2020] LPELR-51274(CA) 62. After carefully evaluating all the evidence presented, I
conclude that the Claimant's employment did not have statutory protection and
was governed by the Corporation's conditions of service.
Was the Claimant’s
right to a fair hearing breached?
36. The Claimant’s evidence in paragraph 19 of his
sworn statement is that he was denied a fair hearing prior to his compulsory retirement.
This fact was reiterated in his final written address. The Claimant argued that
he was denied a fair hearing because the complaint letter from First Bank was
not shown to him, and he was not informed of the ranks of the panel members, nor
was his geopolitical zone represented on the panel. The Claimant also argued
that there was no evidence that the Civil Service Commission empanelled the
members of the panel since they were all drawn from the 3rd Defendant. Conversely,
the 1st and 2nd Defendants contended that the requirement of a fair hearing is
satisfied if a party knows the allegation against him and responds to it. This
argument was reiterated by the 3rd Defendant.
37. Fair
hearing is a fundamental right that encompasses both the fairness of the
hearing itself and the fairness of the resulting decision. It is an essential
requirement in all proceedings before judicial or quasi-judicial bodies. It has
been stated that "deciding without hearing" constitutes a denial of
fair hearing. For reference, see Muyideen v. Nigerian Bar Association &
Anor [2021] 13 NWLR (Pt 1794) 393 at 411-412 and Olatunbosun v. Nigerian
Institute of Social and Economic Research Council [1988] 3 NWLR (Pt 80) 25 at
52. In the latter case, the late Justice Oputa clearly stated that “The right to a fair
hearing will only arise where there is an allegation of misconduct which may
result and in fact did result in some form of punishment, deprivation of some
right or loss of means of livelihood to the Appellant. In every case of
dismissal or termination of appointment which may vitally affect a man's career
or his pension, in such a case, it is equally vitally important that the
Appellant be given ample opportunity to defend his conduct.” In Imonikhe v. Unity Bank Plc [2011] 12 NWLR (Pt
1262) 624 at 648, Rhodes-Vivour,
JSC, held that “Accusing
an employee of misconduct, etc., by way of a query and allowing the employee to
answer the query, and the employee answering it before a decision is taken,
satisfies the requirements of a fair hearing or natural justice. The appellant
was given a fair hearing since he answered the queries before he was dismissed.”
38. I
have reviewed the Claimant’s evidence on the matter. In paragraphs 9 to 12 of
his sworn statement, he testified that he received a query, responded to it,
and appeared before a disciplinary committee. Exhibits 5 and 6 contain the
query and the Claimant’s reply, respectively. During cross-examination by the
1st and 2nd Defendants, the Claimant admitted that he was queried as shown in
Exhibit 5, and he provided a response. Subsequently, he was invited to a
disciplinary panel to address the query and his response. He was questioned by
the panel and answered accordingly. It is evident that the Claimant was aware
of the allegations against him and presented his defence. The fact that the 3rd
Defendant did not accept his defence does not imply that he was denied a fair
hearing. Additionally, the Claimant’s claims that he was not informed of the
ranks of the panel members, that his geopolitical zone was excluded, and that
there is no evidence that the panel was constituted by the Civil Service
Commission seem to be afterthoughts. There is no evidence that the Claimant
challenged the composition of the panel at any time before this suit. Furthermore,
the Claimant did not plead or prove any breach of the provisions of his
employment contract by the 3rd Defendant in establishing the disciplinary
panel. Since it has been established that the Claimant’s employment was
governed by the Corporation’s conditions of service, it is the Claimant's
responsibility to plead and prove the specific provisions of these conditions
that he alleges were breached. However, the pleading and evidence provided are
insufficient. In conclusion, I find that the Claimant’s right to a fair hearing
was not breached.
Was the Claimant’s retirement
wrongful?
39. The
basis of the Claimant's challenge to his retirement is that his employment was
protected by statute, and he could only be disciplined by the Federal Civil
Service Commission under the Public Service Rules. In response, the 3rd
Defendant argued that the responsibility to plead the terms and conditions of
his employment, as well as how they were breached, rests with the Claimant, and
he has failed to do so. It is well established that an employee claiming
wrongful termination must present the terms of his employment to the Court and
demonstrate how the employer violated these terms. See Skye Bank Plc v.
Adegun [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt 1960) 1 at 35–36. The supported evidence is
provided in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Claimant’s further sworn statement,
indicating that under the Public Service Rules, as amended by the Federal
Government Official Gazette dated 25th August 2009, a Grade Level 13 officer
such as himself, who joined the Defendants' service on 12th October 1987,
cannot be compulsorily retired until 12th October 2022. Thus, he asserts that
his compulsory retirement is unlawful. Although the Claimant did not submit the
Public Service Rules to the Court, something the Court is required to take
judicial notice of under Section 122(1) and (2)(a) of the Evidence Act, he also
did not specify which particular provisions were breached. Despite this
omission, I found in this judgment that the Claimant's employment was governed
by the 3rd Defendant's conditions of service. Based on the evidence presented,
I conclude that the Claimant has not demonstrated that his compulsory
retirement is unlawful. However, I note that the effective date of the
Claimant’s retirement was inexplicably backdated to 12th February 2018. It is
important to note that the law prohibits the retroactive termination of an
employee’s employment. A termination of employment takes effect from the date
the notice of termination is served on the employee, not otherwise. This
principle is illustrated in the cases of Underwater Engineering Co. Ltd
& Anor v. Dubefon [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt 400) 156 at 164 and Eka v. Kuju
[2013] LPELR-22124(CA) 16. Consequently, backdating the effective date of
the Claimant's retirement renders the retirement wrongful rather than null and
void.
Is the 2nd Defendant a juristic person?
40. The 1st and 2nd Defendants argued that the 2nd
Defendant is not a juristic person and therefore should not be a party to this
suit. They requested the Court to strike the 2nd Defendant from the case. The
Claimant did not respond to this submission. It is a well-established legal
principle that only natural persons and juristic persons are capable of
instituting or defending legal proceedings. A natural person refers to a human
being, whereas a juristic person, often called an artificial person, is an
entity recognised by law as having the rights and responsibilities of a human
being. This category includes corporations, partnerships, and other
associations, regardless of whether they are incorporated. In Nigeria, juristic
corporate bodies fall into two main categories: those companies registered
under Part A of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, and statutory
corporations and trustees of associations registered under Part C of the same
Act. The legal personality of a statutory corporation is granted explicitly or
implicitly by the statute that creates it. This statute typically states that
the corporation is a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common
seal, and that it may sue or be sued in its corporate name. However, it is
essential to note that not every statutory body possesses the characteristics
of a juristic person, even if it has certain specific duties or functions.
Generally, bodies established under the Constitution and endowed with specific
statutory powers and responsibilities are considered juristic persons, even if
they are not explicitly classified as such. Importantly, the Government of the
Federation or the Government of a State is constitutionally recognised as a
corporate entity, allowing them to sue or be sued under Sections 6(6)(b), 36(1)
and (2), and 232(1) of the 1999 Constitution. In contrast, various
unincorporated ministries and functionaries of the Government do not have this
status and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued. Please refer to Anozia v. A.G,
Lagos State & Ors [2010] 15 NWLR (Pt 1216) 207 at 238-240 and Ataguba
and Company v. Gura Nigeria Limited [2005] 2 SC (Pt I) 101 at 105.
41. A
non-juristic person generally cannot sue or be sued. In the case of Federal
Government of Nigeria & Ors v. Shobu Nig Ltd & Anor [2014] 4 NWLR (Pt
1396) 45 at 59-60, the Court of Appeal addressed whether the Federal
Ministry of Works qualifies as a juristic personality. The Court concluded that
the Federal Government established the Federal Ministry of Works for
administrative convenience; therefore, it cannot sue or be sued in its own
name. When an objection is raised regarding a party's competence in an action,
the responsibility lies with the party seeking to include that party in the
case to justify its participation. In this instance, there is no evidence
indicating that the 2nd Defendant possesses the necessary statutory authorisation
to sue or be sued, either explicitly or implicitly. Consequently, I conclude
that the 2nd Defendant is not a juristic person and, therefore, cannot sue or
be sued. As a result, the 2nd Defendant has been improperly joined in this
suit, and it is hereby struck off.
In the premises,
the sole issue for determination is resolved against the Claimant.
Consideration of the reliefs
42. Relief one is for a declaration that the procedure followed by the
Defendants in compulsorily retiring the Claimant from the employment of the
Defendants is inconsistent with the Public Service Rules, Section 35 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended and other
relevant labour laws relating to retirement in an employment with statutory
flavour and therefore illegal, wrongful, unlawful, null and void. I found that
the Claimant's employment did
not have statutory protection and was governed by the Corporation's conditions
of service. Additionally, the
Claimant did not prove that his compulsory retirement was unlawful. I reiterate
my reasoning and conclusions from paragraphs 34, 35, and 39 above, and conclude
that this claim has not been substantiated; therefore, it is denied.
43. Relief
two is for a declaration that the retirement of the Claimant vide a letter
dated 7th August 2018 which was to take effect from the 12th of February 2018
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Rules and other
relevant Labour Laws in respect of retirement of a public servant whose
employment has statutory flavour and therefore wrongful, unlawful, null and
void. In this judgment, I determined that the Claimant's employment did not have statutory protection and
was governed by the Corporation's conditions of service. Additionally, I found that the Claimant did
not prove that his compulsory retirement was unlawful. It is important to note
that the law prohibits the retroactive termination of an employee’s employment.
A termination of employment takes effect from the date the notice of
termination is served on the employee, not otherwise. This principle is
illustrated in the cases of Underwater Engineering Co. Ltd & Anor v.
Dubefon [1995] 6 NWLR (Pt 400) 156 at 164 and Eka v. Kuju [2013]
LPELR-22124(CA) 16. Consequently, backdating the effective date of the Claimant's
retirement to 12th February 2018 is inconsistent with established labour law
and therefore wrongful, but it is not null and void. Therefore, this claim
succeeds partially.
44. Relief
three is for a declaration that the employment of the Claimant with the
Defendants is still subsisting. I determined in this judgment that the
Claimant's employment lacks statutory flavour. It is established law that when
an appointment is terminated, it effectively ends the employment relationship,
particularly in cases without statutory protections. The question of whether
the person whose employment has been terminated accepts this decision is
irrelevant. Even if the individual challenges the termination in Court, this
does not indicate that the employer had any intention other than to terminate
the employment relationship. When an employer decides to terminate an
employment contract, the employee ceases to be employed, and his right, if any,
is to claim the terminal benefits specified in the employment contract. An
employee cannot unilaterally maintain a contract of employment that has been
terminated by the employer. Consequently, in cases of termination of an
employment contract, Courts will rarely rule that the employment remains valid,
as they generally do not grant specific performance of a service contract
lacking statutory backing. Please refer to the cases of Ilodibia v. Nigeria
Cement Company Limited [1997] LPELR-1494(SC), Jombo v. Petroleum
Equalisation Fund (Management Board) [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt 945) 443 at 457,465 and
Wilbros Nig Limited & Anor v. Macaulay [2009] LPELR-8507(CA). The 3rd
Defendant has clearly expressed its intention to terminate the Claimant’s
services, and this Court must honour that decision given the circumstances of
this case. Therefore, this claim is denied.
45. Relief
four is for a declaration that the Claimant is entitled to all his emoluments
before and after the employment of the Claimant was purportedly retired till
the date of his reinstatement and due retirement in accordance with the Public
Service Rules and relevant labour laws. It is a well-established principle that
relief should typically arise from the pleadings. Similarly, claims for
monetary damages fall under the category of special damages, which must be
specifically pleaded and proven. After reviewing the amended statement of
facts, I found that the claimed emoluments are not clearly stated and that no
evidence supports them. Additionally, the claim lacks clarity as it does not
specify the period for which the emoluments are being sought. This claim is
based on the assumption that the Claimant's employment is protected by law and
that his compulsory retirement is invalid. Since this assumption is incorrect,
there is no need to make such a declaration. Therefore, this claim fails for
lack of sufficient evidence and is hereby denied.
46. Relief
five is for an order of this Honourable Court compelling the Defendants to
reinstate the Claimant to his employment with the 3rd Defendant without any
loss in promotion and entitlements whatsoever. In this judgment, I found that the
Claimant's employment did not have statutory protection, making it one of
master and servant. Consequently, the Claimant's retirement cannot be deemed
null and void, nor can he be reinstated, since the Court will not impose a
willing employee on an unwilling employer. The remedy of reinstatement is only
available to a statutory employee whose employment has been wrongfully
terminated. In a master and servant relationship, the Court can only declare
the termination, here, the retirement, as wrongful, and the appropriate remedy
for the aggrieved employee would be an award of damages for wrongful
termination, as illustrated in the cases of Ilodibia v. Nigeria Cement
Company Limited (supra) and Damisa v. United Bank for Africa [2025] 19
NWLR (Pt 2021) 409 at 431. Therefore, I hold that this claim has not been
substantiated, and it is hereby denied.
47. Relief
six is for an order of this
Honourable Court compelling the Defendants to pay the Claimant all his
entitlements and emoluments from the month of August 2016, when he was
unlawfully suspended and compulsorily retired, to the date of his reinstatement
and conclusion of this suit. This claim is similar to the fourth claim and is
related to the fifth. Since no reinstatement has been ordered, the requirement
to pay the Claimant's entitlements and emoluments from August 2016 to the
present does not arise. Therefore, I conclude that this claim has not been
established, and it is hereby denied.
48. Relief seven is the sum of ?500,000,000.00 (five
hundred million naira) as general damages against the Defendants jointly and
severally. General damages are those that the law presumes to be the direct,
natural, or probable consequence of the act in question. They are a type of
monetary compensation awarded at the Court’s discretion to alleviate losses
caused by the actions of the opposing party, as established in Nigerian
Railway Corporation v. Ojo [2021] LPELR-55971(CA) 40-41 and Anibaba v.
Dana Airlines Limited & Anor [2025] 9 NWLR (Pt 1994) 377 at 415-416.
General damages are intended to compensate for actual injuries. To qualify for
an award of general damages, the Claimant must demonstrate that he has suffered
a legally recognisable loss due to the actions or omissions of the Defendants,
as illustrated in Ecobank Nigeria Limited v. Saleh [2020] LPELR-52024(CA)
83-85. In this case, I have determined that the Claimant did not prove that
his compulsory retirement was unlawful. Thus, the Claimant has not suffered any
injury, and consequently, damages are not awardable. This claim is therefore
denied.
49. However,
having found that backdating the effective date of the Claimant's retirement to
12th February 2018 is inconsistent with established labour law and therefore wrongful,
but it is not null and void, I hold that the Claimant is entitled to his salary
up to August 2018, and declare that the Claimant’s retirement takes effect from
August 2018.
50. In
the final analysis, relief 2 succeeds partially. Reliefs 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
are dismissed. It is declared that backdating the effective date of the
Claimant's retirement to 12th February 2018 is inconsistent with established
labour law and therefore wrongful. It is also declared that the Claimant’s
retirement takes effect from August 2018, and that the Claimant is entitled to
his salary up to August 2018. The 1st and 3rd Defendants are hereby ordered to
update the Claimant’s records accordingly.
Judgment is entered accordingly.
…………………………………..
IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA
JUDGE
10/3/2026
Attendance:
Parties absent.
Appearances
Yinka Muyiwa Esq., with A.
E. Oladepo Esq. and O. N. Nwizu Esq. for
the Claimant
Idris B. Imam Esq for the 1st and 2nd Defendants
Dr. Salihu Shehu Usman for the 3rd Defendant