IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT LAGOS

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HON. JUSTICE IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA

 

Date: Tuesday, 17th February 2026                        

SUIT NO. NICN/LA/60/2022

 

BETWEEN

 

MR. KEHINDE ADENIYI JOHNSON                           … CLAIMANT

 

AND                                                       

 

LAFARGE AFRICA PLC            …                     DEFENDANT

 

JUDGMENT

 

1.         The Claimant initiated this lawsuit on 10th February 2022, seeking the following reliefs: 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2.         Upon receiving the originating process, the Defendant entered a conditional appearance and filed a statement of defence along with a notice of preliminary objection on 1st March 2022. The Claimant responded on 23rd March 2022. The trial commenced and concluded on 17th May 2023. The Claimant adopted sworn statements dated 10th February 2022 and 23rd March 2022, and presented 19 exhibits. The Claimant was then cross-examined. Following this, Mfonobong Akpan, a KSD & CAPEX Category Manager employed by the Defendant, testified in defence of the suit and presented 10 exhibits. He was also cross-examined and re-examined. The matter was then adjourned to adopt the final written addresses. The parties exchanged their final written addresses, which counsel adopted on 4th December 2025, and the case was set down for judgment. 

 

Brief facts of the case

 

3.         The Claimant asserts that he was an employee of the Defendant. After his employment ended, the Defendant continued to use his personal data and listed him as a contact person in their purchase orders. Two years after his employment ceased, the Claimant discovered this issue and raised concerns through his solicitors. The Defendant acknowledged the allegation, requested time to investigate, and ultimately attributed it to a system glitch, assuring the Claimant that it would cease. Based on this assurance, the Claimant informed his solicitors to refrain from pursuing legal action against the Defendant. However, to his surprise, the Defendant continued to use his personal data, which caused him emotional distress. The Defendant disputed the Claimant's claims and denied causing him any emotional distress.

 

            Summary of final written addresses

 

4.         Learned counsel for the Defendant raised two issues for determination in the final written address dated and filed on 12th September 2023:  

 

 

 

5.         Before arguing the issues for determination, the learned counsel for the Defendant raised objections regarding the admissibility of Exhibits 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19. The basis for these objections was that the exhibits were not tendered by the makers of the documents, as required under Section 83(1)(b) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended) [“the Evidence Act”]. Counsel cited several cases in support of this argument, including Omega Bank Nigeria Ltd v. O.B.C. Ltd [2005] 8 NWLR (Pt 928) 547, Samari Abdulmalik & Anor v. Yusuf Ahmed Tijani & Ors [2012] 12 NWLR 461 at 474, and Sterling Bank Plc v. Samak Associates Ltd & Ors [2021] LPELR-56409[CA].

 

6.         In the second part of the objection, counsel explained the meaning and purpose of a certificate of authentication as outlined in Section 84 of the Evidence Act. He asserted that per Section 84(4)(b) of the Evidence Act, only the maker of the document, who can attest to the operation of the device used to produce the document, is permitted to tender a certificate of authentication. However, in this case, Exhibits 15 and 19 were prepared and executed by Messrs. Onisile Dayo and Femi Adisa-Kalu, respectively, but were tendered through a witness. Upon reviewing Exhibits 15 and 19, counsel argued that it is unclear whether the documents were indeed produced by the deponents and whether they were the owners of the devices used to create them. As a result, counsel contended that the statements in the certificates are ambiguous due to noncompliance with the procedure for producing a certificate of authentication. The failure to call the makers as witnesses renders Exhibits 15 and 19 documentary hearsay. Counsel referenced the case of Oyekunle Stephen Gbenga v. All Progressives Congress & Ors [2020] 14 NWLR (Pt 1744) 248 at 273 as support and urged the Court to disregard Exhibits 15 and 19. Furthermore, counsel submitted that if the Court decides to admit these documents, they should not be given any probative value, citing Edward Nkwegu Okereke v. Nweze David Umahi & Ors [2016] LPELR-400035[SC] and Omega Bank Nigeria Ltd v. O.B.C. Ltd (supra) in support. Counsel also argued that if the Court concludes that the referenced exhibits are inadmissible, the documents associated with Exhibits 15 and 19 should be marked as rejected due to noncompliance with Section 84 of the Evidence Act. Counsel reiterated the principle that one cannot build a case on a shaky foundation, referencing Macfoy v. UAC [1962] 1 AC 100 and OUT v. ACB International Bank Plc & Anor [2008] LPELR–2827[SC]. Consequently, the Court was urged to find Exhibits 6, 7, 14, 16, 17, and 18 inadmissible.

 

7. In regard to issue one, counsel reiterates his argument supporting the Defendant’s preliminary objection, asserting that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the claims of assault and emotional distress. Counsel contends that even if we assume, without conceding, that the Court does have the jurisdiction to address the claim, the Claimant has not met the burden of proof for both assault and infliction of emotional distress. To support this argument, counsel cited the cases of Nnaemeka Okoye & Ors v. Ogugua Nwankwo [2014] 15 NWLR (Pt 1429) 93 at 128-129 and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines & Anor v. Mustapha Jawad Taher [2014] 3 NWLR (Pt 1393) 137 at 198. Counsel outlined four essential elements required to prove the tort of infliction of emotional distress and argued that the Claimant failed to establish these elements. Additionally, counsel noted that pleadings not supported by evidence are deemed abandoned, referencing N.I.P.C. Ltd v. Thompson Organization [1969] NMLR. He urged the Court to disregard paragraphs 8 and 9 of the statement of facts, concluding that the claims of assault and emotional distress remain unproven.

 

8.         In addressing the second issue, specifically regarding the testimonies of both the Claimant and the Defendant’s witness concerning the Claimant’s personal email and telephone number, as well as the Defendant’s exit policy, counsel argued that the Claimant returned a telephone number pack upon completing his exit clearance. Consequently, the Defendant was unaware that the Claimant had not returned his official telephone number. Counsel summarised the steps taken by the Defendant to ensure that the Defendant’s suppliers ceased communication with the Claimant. It was argued that since the Claimant continued to be contacted via the official line after his termination and the Defendant never used or disclosed the Claimant’s personal information to its suppliers, the Claimant’s right to privacy was not breached. In conclusion, counsel contended that the ongoing use of the Claimant’s data resulted from the Claimant’s choice to continue using the official line and his intention to maintain business relations with the Defendant's suppliers. Therefore, counsel asserted that the Claimant's claims remain unproven and urged the Court to dismiss the suit with costs.

 

9.         The learned counsel for the Claimant raised three issues for determination in the final written address dated 22nd May 2024, but filed on 24th May 2024:  

 

 

 

 

10.       In addressing the first issue, contrary to the Defendant’s argument that the Claimant’s data privacy rights were not breached and that there is no proven infliction of emotional distress, counsel asserts that the Defendant should have sought the Claimant’s consent before using his personal data after the Claimant's exit, as the employment relationship no longer existed between them. Counsel referenced Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution, Article 12 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; the African Union Convention on Cybersecurity and Data Protection 2014; and the Economic Community of West African States Data Protection Act 2010, and argued that data protection and privacy rights are fundamental under these laws. Counsel provided background on the events that led to the enactment of the National Data Protection Act of 2023 and explained its purpose. He outlined the principles of data protection as defined in Section 24 and the obligations of a data controller as per Section 29 of the National Data Protection Act, 2023. Counsel referenced Sections 24(1)(f), (2), and (3), as well as Section 29(1)(c) of the NDPA 2023, and argued that the Defendant’s breach of these sections resulted in the Claimant’s harassment. Counsel further contended, based on Section 26(1) and (3) of the NDPA, that the Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the Claimant consented to the use of his personal data. The Court was urged to rule against the Defendant on this issue. 

 

11.       Additionally, it is argued that the Defendant’s defence is inconsistent, especially given his claims of a system glitch and the fact that the Claimant withheld his official phone number. The Court was urged not to selectively accept the Defendant’s evidence, citing the case of Godwin Nwafor Maduka & Ors v. Victor Echezona Anyadiegwu [2014] LPELR-23751(CA). Counsel further submitted that the Defendant breached Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution. The learned counsel, citing “McGregor on Damages” [16th ed.], distinguished between special and general damages and argued that damages are available for fundamental human rights violations, as in the present case, once a breach is established. The case of Jim Jaja v. C.O.P Rivers State [2013] 6 NWLR (Pt 1350) 225 at 243 is cited in support of this claim. Thus, counsel concluded that the Claimant is entitled to both general and exemplary damages, recommending the case of First Bank & Ors v. A-G Federation & Ors [2018] LPELR-46084[SC] as further support. The Court was urged to grant the Claimant’s claims. Referring to Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution and Ibenwelu v. Lawal [1971] 1 ALL NLR 23 at 26, counsel contended that a party whose rights have been infringed upon can seek redress.

 

12.       In the second issue of the case, counsel defined intentional infliction of emotional distress according to Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, as well as the case Hyatt v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 292 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). Counsel outlined the four necessary preconditions for establishing a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress: the Defendant must act intentionally or recklessly; the Defendant's conduct must be extreme and outrageous; the Defendant's conduct must cause the emotional distress; and the emotional distress must be severe. Counsel analysed these elements in conjunction with the evidence presented before the Court and argued that the Defendant’s conduct caused the Claimant severe emotional distress. Counsel urged the Court to rule in favour of the Claimant on this issue against the Defendant.

 

13.       Regarding issue three, in response to the objection raised about the admissibility of Exhibits 6, 14, and 16-19, counsel argued that, upon review of the referenced exhibits, the WhatsApp messages and emails are correspondence between the Claimant and officials of the Defendant, including some of the dispatchers from the Defendant's suppliers. Therefore, these documents do not constitute documentary hearsay, and the Court was urged to accept this position. Additionally, counsel argued that even if the Court finds the exhibits inadmissible, they should still be considered admissible under Sections 39(d) and 41 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended). This is because the contents of the exhibits consist of statements made in the ordinary course of the Defendant's business. Furthermore, obtaining the attendance of all the document creators would cause undue delays and incur expenses. In further response to the Defendant's submissions, counsel referred to Sections 83(2)(a) and (b) of the Evidence Act and emphasised that relevance and probative value determine admissibility. The case of Ogbe v. Asade [2009] LPELR-2275, pages 36-37, was cited in support of this position.

 

14.       In response to the Defendant’s argument regarding the certificate of authentication, counsel asserts that there is no law preventing a third party from presenting it in accordance with Section 84 of the Evidence Act. The case of Stanbic IBTC Bank v. Longterm Global Capital Ltd & Ors [2021] LPELR-55610[CA] was cited to support this position. Counsel further argued that the cases cited by the Defendant to support his stance were misapplied. The Court was urged to compare the cases referenced by the Defendant with the current suit to resolve the issue of the admissibility of documents against the Defendant. Regarding the issue of assault, counsel clarified the definition of assault and referred the Court to FBN Plc & Anor v. Onukwugha [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt 950) 120 at 152 and Ndibe & Ors v. Ndibe [2008] LPELR-4178(CA). Counsel summarised the Claimant’s evidence concerning assault and the breach of personal data, arguing that there is unchallenged evidence indicating that if the Defendant had protected the Claimant’s personal data, the assault would not have occurred. Additionally, counsel pointed out that none of the documents presented by the Defendant’s witness originated from the Defendant. Despite this irregularity, the Defendant chose to overlook it, citing Sections 39(d) and 41 of the Evidence Act. Upon assessing the Claimant’s evidence and referencing Exhibits 5, 6, and 7-19, counsel contended that the Claimant has sufficiently proved his case and urged the Court to hold so in the interest of justice. Counsel further urged the Court to take this opportunity to expand the jurisprudence of the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) in Nigeria, thereby teaching the Defendant that there are consequences for its actions. The Court was urged to grant the Claimant’s claims.

 

15.     In arguing the reply on points of law filed on 11th June 2024, the Defendant's counsel reiterated objections to Exhibits 6, 14, and 16-19. The counsel noted that Sections 39(d) and 41 of the Evidence Act do not apply because the makers of the documents are known to the Claimant and their attendance can be secured without delay or unreasonable expense. Consequently, it was argued that the exhibits constitute documentary hearsay, referencing Odogwu v. The State [2013] 14 NWLR (Pt 1373) 74. Additionally, the learned counsel contended that the application of Section 83(2)(a) and (b) of the Evidence Act is not automatic. It is ultimately for the Court to determine whether calling the makers of the documents as witnesses would cause great delay and expense, which is not applicable in this case, making the exhibits inadmissible. The counsel further argued that if the Court were to admit the documents, no weight should be assigned to them, citing Okereke v. Umahi & Ors [2016] LPELR-400035. Moreover, the learned counsel asserted that the case of Ogbe v. Asade (supra) was misapplied by the Claimant, emphasising that the focus should have been on how the exhibits were tendered, rather than how they were obtained. Referring to Section 1 of the Evidence Act, the counsel stated that relevance is distinct from admissibility, noting that while a piece of evidence may be relevant, it can still be deemed inadmissible.

 

16. In response to paragraph 4.39 of the Claimant’s final written address, counsel argued that the Claimant's interpretation of assault is not aligned with legal standards, and the allegation of assault remains unproven due to the Claimant's failure to establish any of the required elements of assault. The case of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines v. Taher [2014] 3 NWLR (Pt 1393) 137 was cited in support. Furthermore, it was argued that the burden of proof lies with the Claimant. While the general burden of proof in civil cases is discharged on a balance of probabilities, the burden of proof for the tort of assault necessitates proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The cases of Muhammed v. The State [2023] 1 NWLR (Pt 1866) 507 and Omorhirhi v. Enatevwere [1988] 1 NWLR (Pt 73) 746 were also referenced in support. Therefore, counsel contended that the Claimant has failed to prove his case from both legal angles and urged the Court to disregard the Claimant’s allegation of assault against the Defendant. In response to paragraphs 4.31 (a)-(d) of the Claimant’s final written address, counsel submitted that the Claimant's allegation of emotional distress stems from his own actions, and the Defendant cannot be held liable in this regard. Additionally, the claim remains unproven by the Claimant, relying on the case of Mainstreet Bank Ltd v. Chahine [2015] 11 NWLR (Pt 1471) 479. Therefore, the learned counsel urged the Court to dismiss this suit with costs.

 

Preliminary issues

 

17.       The Defendant’s counsel objected to Exhibits 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 because they were not tendered by the makers of the document, citing Section 83(1)(b) of the Evidence Act. Additionally, the learned counsel objected to Exhibits 15 and 19 because the certificates of compliance were tendered through the Claimant, who did not produce the documents listed in the certificates, did not execute the certificates of authentication, and the makers of the certificates were not called as witnesses, rendering the exhibits documentary hearsay. The Court was urged to hold that Exhibits 6, 7, 14, 16, 17, and 18, authenticated by Exhibits 15 and 19, are inadmissible. Responding, the Claimant’s counsel submitted that the referenced exhibits, being correspondence between the Claimant and officials of the Defendant and some dispatchers of the suppliers, are not hearsay. 

 

     Are Exhibits 6, 7, 14, 16, 17, and 18 admissible?  

 

18.       The Defendant’s grouse is that the referenced exhibits were not tendered by their makers. In contrast, the Claimant insists that since these documents are correspondence between the Claimant and the Defendant's officials, as well as some dispatchers from the suppliers, they are not hearsay. Hearsay evidence is evidence that does not solely derive its value from the credit given to the witness that is testifying, but which rests in part or in all, on the veracity and competence of some other person or persons. However, evidence or a statement made to a witness may be hearsay, depending on the circumstances. If the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in a statement, it amounts to hearsay and is inadmissible. Conversely, if the evidence is merely to establish that a fact exists, but not the truth of the statement therein, it is not hearsay and admissible. Furthermore, express or implied assertions by anyone other than the witness testifying, and assertions in documents produced to the Court when no witness is testifying, are hearsay and therefore inadmissible as evidence of what is asserted. Please refer to Momodu v. State [2025] 11 NWLR (Pt 1999) 357 at 382-383. 

 

19.    By Section 37 of the Evidence Act, hearsay evidence means an oral or written statement made otherwise than by a witness in the proceedings or recorded in a book, document, or any record whatsoever, proof of which is not admissible under any provision of the Act, which is tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated in it. Section 38 of the Evidence Act renders hearsay evidence inadmissible. Therefore, documentary evidence is hearsay when it seeks to establish the truth of what is contained in the document and not to establish the fact that it was indeed made, as stated in Metuh v. FRN & Anor [2020] 7 NWLR (Pt 1723) 325 at 359-361. See also Maku v. The State [2021] LPELR-56324[CA] 40-41, where the Court of Appeal, per Oho, JCA, held that “Generally speaking, a document is said to amount to a documentary hearsay when the person who purports to have made and/or signed the document is not the one tendering it in Court and consequently cannot vouch for the authenticity of the contents of the document as it did not come from his personal knowledge.” In Momodu v. The State (supra), the Supreme Court, per Tukur, JSC, posited that “in an attempt to establish guilt of a Defendant through evidence of a particular witness who was not called in evidence, as in this case, where such evidence has been reduced to writing by the victim, the maker of such a document must be called to testify. Any other attempt to use the written document to establish the truth of its content, in the absence of the maker, constitutes documentary hearsay, except it falls under the exceptions stated in Section 39 of the Evidence Act.” Thus, by Sections 37, 38, and 126 of the Evidence Act, hearsay evidence can only be used to inform the Court about what a witness heard from another and not to establish the truth of what was said or written, unless it falls within the exceptions in Section 39 of the Evidence Act. The Section provides that “Statements, whether written or oral of facts in issue or relevant facts made by a person – (a) who is dead; (b) who cannot be found; (c) who has become incapable of giving evidence; or (d) whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are admissible under Sections 40 to 50.” 

 

20.     Section 83(1) of the Evidence Act deals with the admissibility of documentary evidence, and provides, “In any proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement made by a person in a document which seems to establish that fact shall, on production of the original document, be admissible as evidence of that fact if the following conditions are satisfied –

 

(a)       if the maker of the statement either–

            

1. had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement, or 
2. where the document in question is or forms part of a record purporting to be a continuous record, made the statement (in so far as the matters dealt with by it are not within his personal knowledge) in the performance of a duty to record information supplied to him by a person who had, or might reasonably be supposed to have, personal knowledge of those matters; and

 

(b) if the maker of the statement is called as a witness in the proceedings:
 

Provided that the condition that the maker of the statement shall be called as a witness need not be satisfied if he is dead, or unfit by reason of his bodily or mental condition to attend as a witness, or if he is outside Nigeria and it is not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance, or if all reasonable efforts to find him have been made without success.”

 

21. I have looked at the referenced exhibits. Exhibit 6 is an email correspondence between the Claimant and a customer of the Defendant, with the purchase orders attached. Exhibit 7 is a package addressed to the Claimant with the Defendant’s address. Exhibit 14 is a WhatsApp chat between the Claimant and one Mr. Lawrence with the purchase order attached. Exhibit 16 is an email correspondence between the Claimant’s counsel and the Defendant’s counsel, which is invariably the Claimant’s document. Exhibit 17 is an email correspondence between a customer of the Defendant and the Claimant, and Exhibit 18 is a WhatsApp chat between one Mr. Emmanuel and the Claimant. The Defendant’s counsel, relying on Omega Bank Nigeria Ltd v. O.B.C. Ltd (supra), among others, had argued that the rationale for calling the maker of a document to testify is that he can answer questions on it. The Court of Appeal, in Metropolitan Shuttle Express Ltd & Anor v. The Minister of the Federal Capital Territory & Ors [2022] LPELR-57440(CA), rejected some exhibits because they were not tendered by the makers or persons who had knowledge of their contents. Therefore, the test for admissibility of the referenced exhibits should be whether the Claimant has personal knowledge of the contents and can answer questions on them. I think so. The exhibits are mainly correspondence and chats that arose after the Claimant’s exit relating to the Defendant's business, which he coordinated during his employment, and some in which he answered customers’ enquiries. Given these circumstances, the Claimant has personal knowledge of the documents and can answer questions about the facts they contain. Therefore, I hold that the documents were rightly admitted in evidence. Additionally, an objection to electronically-generated documents cannot be sustained on the ground that the maker has not been called as a witness. Section 84 of the Evidence Act deals with the manner in which the documents are produced rather than their maker. The objection requiring the presence of the makers of the electronically-generated documents to tender them is, with due respect, a misapplication of the provision of Section 83(1)(b) of the Evidence Act. In Brila Energy Ltd v. FRN [2018] LPELR-43926(CA), the Court of Appeal held that Section 83 of the Evidence Act does not apply to electronically-generated documents. This objection is, thus, overruled.

 

Are the certificates of authentication, Exhibits 15 and 19, admissible?

 

22.     The Defendant’s counsel urged the Court to reject Exhibits 15 and 19 because the makers of the documents were not called as witnesses, and the Claimant, through whom they were tendered, is not the maker and cannot speak to the contents. The Claimant’s counsel argued otherwise, relying on Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc v. Longterm Global Capital Ltd & Ors [2021] LPELR-55610(CA) to the effect that a non-maker of a certificate of authentication can tender it in evidence. I agree with the submission by the learned Claimant’s counsel. It is not mandatory that the certificate of compliance under Section 84(4) of the Evidence Act be tendered by the maker; a document can be admitted in evidence even if the maker is available but not called as a witness. The Court has discretion under Section 83(2) of the Evidence Act to admit or refuse to admit a document when the maker has not been called. In exercising this discretion, the only requirement is whether the document is relevant to the fact in issue, and if it is, it should be admitted, as held in Elias v. FRN [2021] 16 NWLR (Pt 1800) 495 at 551. In Atabo v. FRN [2023] LPELR-61080(CA), the Court of Appeal laid the issue to rest. The Court held that "There is nothing in S.84 requiring that the computer-generated documents and the certificate of compliance must be tendered in evidence through their maker or that their maker must be called as witness to testify concerning their compliance with S.84 (2) (a) to (d) and S.84 (4)(a) to (c) of the Evidence Act. The compliance certificate must prima facie show compliance with S.84 (4) (a) to (c) and does not require evidence outside itself to show so. Once the compliance certificate is in keeping with S.84(4)(a) to (c), it is prima facie proof that the computer-generated documents satisfied the conditions in S.84 (2)(a) to (d)…The argument that the computer generated documents admitted as exhibits E, F, G, and H and the certificate of their compliance with S.84 (2), exhibit I are legally inadmissible evidence because PW3 through whom they were tendered is not their maker and that their maker was not called as a witness to enable him or her to be cross examined is wrong." Based on the above, I hold that Exhibits 15 and 19 were correctly admitted in evidence. Therefore, this objection is also overruled.

 

          Preliminary objection

 

23.      By a notice of preliminary objection dated 1st March 2022 and brought under Orders 17 Rule 1(1), 18 Rule 2(2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 (“the Rules”), Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, Section 6(6) of the 1999 Constitution and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the Defendant prayed the Court for an order striking out the suit for lack of jurisdiction and for such further order as the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances, on the following grounds:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

24.      The preliminary objection is supported with a 13-paragraph affidavit sworn by Mfonobong Akpan, a KSD & CAPEX Category Manager of the Defendant. Attached to the affidavit are six exhibits marked as Exhibits LAP 1, LAP 2, LAP 3, LAP 4, LAP 5, LAP 6A, and LAP 6B referred to in paragraphs 8(b) to 8(f). These are the Claimant’s solicitors’ letter dated 25th September 2020, the Defendant’s response dated 12th October 2020, the Claimant’s solicitors’ letter dated 1st September 2021 with the attachments, the Defendant’s letters dated 8th September 2021 and 4th October 2021, and the Defendant’s email to Olayinka Morenikeji of 15th September 2021 notifying her of the Claimant’s disengagement. 

 

25.      The learned counsel for the Defendant nominated one issue for determination in the written address filed in support of the preliminary objection: “Whether in the circumstances of this suit, this Honourable Court can strike out this suit entirely for lack of jurisdiction”. Referencing Utih & Ors v. Onoyivwe & Ors [1991] LPELR-3436(SC) and Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] LPELR-24023(SC), counsel argued that the Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear the suit. Citing Section 254C (1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, Section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, and Adepoju v. INEC [2012] 21 WRN 38, counsel contended that the Claimant's claim is the primary determinant of the Court's jurisdiction. Since the matters of data privacy breach and the alleged tortious acts are unrelated to the Claimant's employment and arose after the Claimant's disengagement, the Court does not have jurisdiction over these issues.

 

26.      Counsel referred to Section 272(1) of the 1999 Constitution, Dr. Emmanuel Akpan v. University of Calabar [2016] LPELR-41242(CA), Ayo Akinyemi v. Crawford University [2011] NLLR (Pt 61) 90 at 110, and Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution to support the argument that only the State High Court, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, and the Federal High Court can exercise jurisdiction over tortious claims and breaches of data privacy, particularly where there is a gap in the Nigeria Data Protection Regulation 2019, which governs data privacy in Nigeria. Counsel noted that while Article 4.2(1) of the NDPR mentions a Court of competent jurisdiction, it does not specify which Court is referred to. Counsel then urged the Court to grant the reliefs sought, emphasising that the Defendant has complied with Order 18 Rule 2(2) of the Rules. It was also pointed out that, despite the Claimant initiating this suit under Order 3 Rule 1(1)(a) of the Rules, which should have been filed under Order 3 Rule 2(1), any claims of incompetence related to jurisdiction must lead to the suit being struck out. Referring to Section 11(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, counsel reiterated that since a breach of data privacy is not within the provisions of Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution or Section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act, the only Courts with jurisdiction are the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State or the FCT. This renders the complaint incompetent and deprives the Court of jurisdiction. Counsel argued further that attempting to file the suit under Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution is ineffective because the Claimant's claims are unrelated to employment, and the Claimant’s claim for emotional distress cannot be initiated under Chapter IV, relying on the cases of Governor of Akwa Ibom State & Ors v. Bassey [2021] LPELR-53325(CA) and Ransome-Kuti & Ors v. A. G., Federation & Ors [1985] LPELR-2940(SC). Counsel urged the Court to strike out the suit due to a lack of jurisdiction. 

 

27.    The Claimant filed a counter affidavit of 19 paragraphs dated 23rd March 2022, sworn by Adikea Confidence, a litigation clerk at the Claimant’s solicitors’ law firm. In response, the Defendant filed a further affidavit of 19 paragraphs, sworn by Mfonobong Akpan, and a reply on points of law on 1st April 2022. The Claimant filed an 11-paragraph reply affidavit on 8th February 2023. Attached to the reply affidavit is Exhibit KJ1, which is referenced in paragraph 8 of the affidavit. This exhibit includes proof of ownership of the MTN number 08087189285. 

 

28.      Learned counsel for the Claimant raised one issue for determination: “Whether or not this Honourable Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate on the claims of the Claimant/Respondent. Arguing the issue, the counsel submitted that the only determinant of the Court’s jurisdiction is the Claimant’s claim, relying on Kato v. CBN [1991] 9 NWLR (Pt 214) 126, among others. Relying on the Oxford Dictionary and Merriam Webster Dictionary definition of “related” and the Black’s Law dictionary definition of “incidental”, the learned counsel argued that the Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the main and the ancillary claims under Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution and Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, citing the case of MHWUN v. Ehigiegba [2018] LPELR-44972(CA) in support. The learned counsel also contended that the cases of Dr. Emmanuel Akpan v. University of Calabar (supra) and EG Ayo Akinyemi v. Crawford University (supra) relied on by the Defendant were overruled by the Court of Appeal in MHWUN v. Ehigiegba [2018] LPELR-44972(CA), and in line with the principle of stare decisis, the latter case is a binding authority as illustrated in Cardoso v. Daniels [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt 20) 1 at 47 and Olawoye v. Bello [2015] LPELR-24475(CA). The Court was urged to hold so. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant’s claim arose out of the employment relationship between the parties despite its termination. It was also argued that the Claimant’s fundamental rights can be enforced under Order 3 Rule 2(2)(b) of the Rules, and based on Section 254C (1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution, this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the fundamental human rights enforcement claims which are employment-related. The Court was urged to do substantial justice and discountenance the Defendant’s submission, relying on the case of Joseph Afolabi & Ors v. John Adekunle & Anor [1983] 2 SCNLR 141 at 150. The Court was urged to dismiss the preliminary objection with costs. 

 

29.      In the reply on points of law dated 31st March 2022, the learned counsel for the Defendant argued that the Claimant’s assertions in paragraphs 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 of his written address support the Defendant’s position that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the claim due to the absence of an employment relationship. Citing the cases of Savage v. Uwechia [1972] 3 SC 214 at 221 and Uwazuruonye v. Governor, Imo State [2013] 8 NWLR (Pt 1355) 28 at 56-57, counsel contended that since the Claimant's claim of breach of data privacy arose after the termination of his employment with the Defendant, it is not related to employment, and thus the Court lacks jurisdiction over it. Counsel further argued that the Claimant misapplied the case of MHWUN v. Ehigiegba (supra), noting that cases serve as authority only for their specific decisions, citing Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Adesanya [1989] 3 NWLR (Pt 109) 250 at 266, among others. The Court was urged to disregard the decision in MHWUN v. Ehigiegba (supra). Counsel maintained that there is no conflict between the cases of Dr. Emmanuel Akpan v. University of Calabar (supra) and MHWUN v. Ehigiegba (supra). Additionally, the learned counsel summarised the facts of Pharmabase Nigeria Limited v. Olatokunbo [2020] 10 NWLR (Pt 1732) 379 and posited that, even if there were any inconsistencies between this decision and that of MHWUN v. Ehigiegba (supra), according to the principle of stare decisis, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Pharmabase Nigeria Limited v. Olatokunbo (supra) should be preferred. The cases of Cardoso v. Daniels (supra) and Olawoye v. Bello (supra) were cited in support of this argument. The Court was urged to adopt the latter decision, resolve the issue in favour of the Defendant, and grant the application.

 

30.      The crux of the preliminary objection is that the Claimant's employment with the Defendant had ended when the cause of action arose. Additionally, because the cause of action is unrelated to the employment relationship, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. The eight grounds of the preliminary objection can be subsumed into two main grounds: first, the Court does not have jurisdiction because the employment relationship between the parties ended on 8th November 2019, and the cause of action is not employment-related; second, the suit is an abuse of the Court's process intended to damage the Defendant's reputation. Both parties presented strong arguments to support their positions. It is undisputed that an employment relationship existed between them, and that the relationship ended on 8th November 2019, after which the cause of action arose. However, does this mean the cause of action is unrelated to employment? I do not think so. The jurisdiction of this Court encompasses matters related to pre-employment, employment, and post-employment issues. Moreover, the use of the Claimant's data arises from the parties' employment relationship. Therefore, the fact that the employment ended when the cause of action arose is irrelevant.

 

31.     Jurisdiction is fundamental to any adjudication, and any proceeding conducted without jurisdiction is a nullity. Jurisdiction is the authority given to a Court by the Constitution or statute to decide matters which come before it. It is the limits imposed on the power of a validly constituted Court to hear and determine issues between persons seeking to avail themselves of its process by reference to the subject matter of the issues or to the persons between whom the issues are joined or to the reliefs sought. A Court cannot entertain a case that it lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate. Please refer to Attorney General of Kwara State & Anor v. Adeyemo & Ors [2017] 1 NWLR (Pt 1546) 210 at 239 and Okwuosa v. Gomwalk & Ors [2017] 9 NWLR (Pt 1570) 259 at 276-277. 

 

32.      The jurisdiction of this Court is donated by Section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, and Section 254C (1), (2), (4), and (5) of the 1999 Constitution. Section 254C (1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution provides that “Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other Court in civil causes and matters – (a)        relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.” This provision has received judicial interpretation. In Kano State Government & Ors v. Muhammed [2016] LPELR-41334(CA) 30, the Court of Appeal, per Abiru, JCA [as he then was], observed that “The consensus of the Court is that by the provisions, the National Industrial Court possesses exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating or incidental to an employee/employer relationship….” In Nwagbo & Ors v. National Intelligence Agency [2018] LPELR-46201(CA), the same Court, per Mustapha, JCA, held that the words “relating to or connected with” used to state the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court in Section 254(C)(k) of the 1999 Constitution are clear in both intent and meaning, and as such ought to be interpreted to be inclusive rather than exclusive. The Court noted that the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court extends beyond disputes between employers and employees to include any labour and industrial relations matter. 

 

33.      Similarly, in Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria v. Ehigiegba [2018] LPELR-44972(CA), Oho, JCA, noted that: “It is now settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the law maker does not use any words in vain. The argument here is that the repetitive use of the words; “connected with”, “related to”, “pertaining to”, “arising from”, “incidental thereto”, or “connected therewith” used in Section 254(1)(a) of the Nigerian Constitution, 1999 as amended were not used in vain as the law makers must have meant their use to emphasize and reiterate the wide jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court over all issues arising from employment and labour disputes regardless of the nature of the claims or reliefs in the suit. Generally, the nature of the dispute between parties and the set of facts giving rise to the dispute should naturally determine whether the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction in a particular matter or not.” However, the same Court, in the unreported decision in Ecobank Nigeria Limited v. Mrs. Winifred Effiok Osu, Appeal no. CA/L/963/2016, delivered on 24th February 2020, per Tijjani Abubakar, JCA (now JSC), at page 22 cited with approval its decision in Emmanuel Sebastian Akpan v. University of Calabar [2016] LPELR-41242(CA) and held that “The National Industrial Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction in terms of subject matter, as clearly spelt out in Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution, as amended. Its jurisdiction is limited to matters closely related to labour and employment matters (sic). The National Industrial Court cannot entertain any matter outside its constitutionally prescribed subject matter area.” The Court of Appeal, per Nimpar, JCA, further held in Central Bank of Nigeria v. Gabriel Oodo & Anor [2021] 18 NWLR (Pt 1809) 461 at 512-513, that this Court is a specialised Court, not a Court of general jurisdiction, and that the subject matter is the most important factor in determining whether this Court will have jurisdiction in a matter and regardless of the parties.

 

34.   Undoubtedly, the subject matter of a case is crucial in determining whether this Court has jurisdiction. The Defendant contends that the Claimant cannot pursue a tort action or claim for breach of data privacy since the employment relationship has ended. Conversely, the Claimant asserts that, despite the termination of his employment, the Defendant continued to represent him to its partners and clients as an employee by using his personal information, thereby breaching his right to privacy. The Claimant’s claim is summarised in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the statement of facts, which is reproduced in similar paragraphs of the Claimant’s sworn statement, which, for clarity, are reproduced here.

 

                          25.     The Claimant avers that the usage and continuous usage of my name and personal data by the Defendant, two years after my disengagement with the Defendant without my approval or consent whether express or tacitly amounts unlawful usage, appropriation and commodification of my name and personal data to transact business for pecuniary benefits of the Defendant and also amount to tortious interference with my sole right to usage of my name.

 

                          26.     The Defendant has also violated my right to privacy and human dignity by committing tortious interference with my sole right and privilege of the use of his name and personal data.

 

 35.     Based on the foregoing, the Claimant sought four declarations, which are reproduced here.

 

 

 

 

 

36.      In assessing jurisdiction, the Court considers the claims outlined in the General Form of Complaints and the statement of facts. Relevant cases such as Society BIC S.A. & Ors v. Charzin Industries Ltd [2014] 2 SC (Pt II) 57 at 87, Salami v. National Judicial Council [2014] LPELR-22774(CA) 27, and Central Bank of Nigeria v. Okefe [2015] LPELR-24825(CA) 43-44 support this. Manifestly, the first claim situates the Claimant’s cause of action and shows that it stems from the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant, even though it has been terminated, as both parties have acknowledged. The Claimant’s counsel rightly pointed out that the Defendant continued to use the Claimant's personal information and represented him as an employee to partners and clients, despite the termination of the employment relationship. The Defendant's assertion that there is no connection to the Claimant's employment is unfounded. The Defendant acquired the Claimant's personal information during his employment and continued to use it after termination, linking the claims to the employment relationship even after it ended. A review of Exhibit 3, attached to the affidavit supporting the preliminary objection, and its accompanying documents reveals that, as late as 2021, the Claimant was still receiving purchase orders from the Defendant’s clients as part of the Defendant's staff. To those clients and partners, the Claimant remained the Defendant's employee. It was only on 15th September 2021, as shown in Exhibit 6, that the Defendant formally notified one of its clients that the Claimant was no longer employed. Despite this, the Claimant continued to receive enquiries on behalf of the Defendant as stated in paragraph 21 of the statement of facts, and reiterated in paragraph 21 of the Claimant’s sworn statement. 

 

37. The facts of this case, when viewed alongside Section 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, indicate that the issues at hand stem from the workplace. The continued unauthorised use of the Claimant’s details, which were obtained during the employment relationship, is directly related to that relationship. Furthermore, Section 254C(1)(d) of the 1999 Constitution grants this Court exclusive jurisdiction over fundamental rights matters that arise from or are connected to employment and industrial relations. A breach of the right to personal data or privacy, protected by Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution and the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023, by a former employer constitutes a violation of a fundamental right tied to the Claimant’s employment. The obligation of confidentiality and data protection typically extends beyond the end of the employment relationship and falls within the purview of this Court’s jurisdiction. It is clear that this Court's jurisdiction encompasses disputes that occur before, during, and after employment. As noted in Ondo State House of Assembly & Ors v. Ogundeji [2025] 16 NWLR (Pt 2011) 391 at 398, the subject matter jurisdiction of a Court is determined by the principal relief being sought, not by any consequential or ancillary reliefs. Therefore, references to tortious interference and the Tort of Infliction of Emotional Distress do not exclude this case from the Court’s jurisdiction. In the unreported case of Miss Franca Onu Daniel v. Primetech Security Equipment Co. Ltd & Anor, Suit No. NICN/ABJ/368/2024, which judgment was delivered on 17th October 2025, by Hon. Justice Sublim, the Court assumed jurisdiction and determined that the Defendants' continued use of the Claimant's personal data and image on the 1st Defendant's social media platforms constituted an infringement of the Claimant's right to privacy, as protected under Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution. Additionally, the term “Court” in Section 65 of the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023 refers to “any court of competent jurisdiction,” implying a Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the breach of personal data. I have reviewed the decision in Pharmabase Nigeria Limited v. Olatokunbo (supra) and respectfully note that the case turned on its unique facts. Mahmoud, JCA, stated on page 402 of the report that, “by virtue of Order 1(2) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, the National Industrial Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain an enforcement procedure matter brought under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules. It is only the Federal High Court and State High Court, including the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, that have the jurisdiction to entertain such applications.” It is important to note that this case was not initiated under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules, and nothing in the processes before me deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear it. Given these considerations, I conclude that this Court has the jurisdiction to hear this claim, irrespective of the termination of the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant.

 

38.      The second aspect of the objection pertains to the abuse of the Court's process. This has been defined as the improper and wrongful use of a legitimately issued Court process to achieve a result that is either unlawful or beyond the intended scope of that process. For reference, see Olowe & Anor v. Aluko [2025] 13 NWLR (Pt 2003) 517 at 560-563. In that case, the Supreme Court determined that there was no evidence indicating that the Respondent had improperly used judicial proceedings to harass the Appellants or to undermine the administration of justice. In the instant case, I have concluded that the Claimant's claim arose from the employment relationship that existed between the parties and falls within the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the essential elements that constitute an abuse of the Court's process are not present. Furthermore, although the Defendant raised this issue as one of the grounds for objection, it did not provide any supporting arguments, which renders this objection abandoned. Please refer to Okpoko Community Bank Ltd & Anor v. Igwe [2013] 15 NWLR (Pt 1376) 167 at 180. Consequently, this ground also fails. In conclusion, the preliminary objection is dismissed.

 

Issue for determination

 

39.      I have considered the issues for determination nominated by the parties. In my opinion, these five issues can be consolidated into a single overarching question: is the Claimant entitled to a judgment on his claims, either in full or in part?

 

40.      It is a fundamental principle of law that whoever desires the Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove those facts. By the combined force of Sections 131, 132, 133, 134, and 136[1] of the Evidence Act, the Claimant bears the initial burden of proving the pleaded facts on a balance of probabilities.  If the Claimant fails to discharge this burden satisfactorily, his claims will be dismissed without considering the Defendant's case, as the Defendant is not required to prove its defence under these circumstances. In that case, there would be no evidence to rebut, resulting in a judgment against the Claimant for insufficient evidence. Please refer to the cases of Igwenagu v. Hon. Minister, Federal Capital Territory & Ors [2025] 7 NWLR (Pt 1988) 145 at 173 – 174, Nsude & Ors v. Nichodemus & Ors [2025] 4 NWLR (Pt 1982) 253 at 280, and Nduul v. Wayo & Ors [2018] LPELR-45151(SC) 51 – 53.

 

41.      The Claimant who seeks declaratory relief must demonstrate his entitlement to the declaration by credible evidence and will succeed on the strength of his case, not on the weakness of the defence or admission by the Defendant. As granting declaratory relief involves the Court’s discretion, the Claimant must place sufficient materials before the Court to justify the declaration, as illustrated in the cases of Nduul v. Wayo & Ors [2018] 7 SC (Pt III) 164 at 213, U.T.C. Nigeria Plc v. Peters [2022] 18 NWLR (Pt 1862) 297 at 312, 313, and Osho v. Adeleye & Ors [2024] 8 NWLR (Pt 1941) 431 at 452.

 

Summary of evidence

 

42.      The Claimant is seeking ten reliefs. He testified and submitted 19 exhibits, which are marked as Exhibits 1 to 19. These are: affidavit of loss of appointment letter dated 19th February 2020, letter of cessation of employment dated 1st November 2019, certificate of service, payslips for August and September 2019, the Defendant’s email dated 16th August 2021, along with the Claimant’s response dated 24th August 2021, and five attachments; another email from the Defendant dated 16th August 2021 with the Claimant’s response dated 24th August 2021 and attachments, four pictures of the consignment from IFF PVT Ltd, DHL delivery notes dated 27th and 28th August 2020, letter from the Claimant's solicitors dated 25th September 2020 addressed to the Defendant, the Defendant’s response dated 12th October 2020, letter from the Claimant's solicitors dated 1st September 2021 addressed to the Defendant, the Defendant’s responses dated 8th September 2021 and 4th October 2021, WhatsApp communication between the Claimant and the delivery person from Rotation and Precision Machines Limited, a certificate of authentication dated 29th November 2022, email correspondence between the Defendant’s representative and the Claimant’s solicitor dated 8th September 2021,  email from one Oladiran Abel to the Claimant dated 7th January 2022, WhatsApp chat of 7th January 2022 with the attachment, and certificate of authentication dated 23rd March 2022.

 

43.      The Claimant’s evidence is that he was employed by the Defendant as a plant buyer by a letter of employment dated 23rd January 1994. During his tenure, he worked diligently, conducting his responsibilities with professionalism and integrity until his departure on 8th November 2019. One year after leaving the Defendant, he began receiving telephone calls, text messages, and emails from unknown individuals at odd hours, requesting that he receive shipments intended for the Defendant. He consistently redirected these requests to the appropriate Defendant plants and deleted the communications from his phone. This situation persisted for nearly two years, and he typically refused the requests to accept shipments on behalf of the Defendant’s customers. However, one evening, he felt compelled to accept a shipment from IFF Pvt Limited, Indore, India, as the dispatcher was unable to deliver it directly to the Defendant. Upon receiving the shipment, he attempted to deliver it to the Defendant’s office in Sagamu, Ogun State, acting in good faith as a former employee. Unfortunately, he was denied access by the Defendant's security personnel, which made the delivery impossible. During this process, he was assaulted by the Defendant's staff and subsequently attacked by armed robbers who attempted to steal the shipment. He reported the incident to the Sagamu police station, where the police involved the Defendant and facilitated the handover of the shipment to the Defendant’s representative that same night. It was at this point that he realised the implications of the Defendant's continued use of his name and personal information without his consent, which led to this lawsuit. He is concerned about how the Defendant would have responded if the robbers had succeeded in stealing the shipment, as they might have shifted the liability onto him, demanded payment for the shipment, and pursued criminal charges against him, which has been their customary practice with employees. On his instructions, his lawyers, Messrs. A.O. Omotayo & Co., sent a letter dated 25th September 2020 to the Defendant, requesting that they cease the unlawful use of his name for the procurement of consignments. However, the Defendant did not comply. In response, the Defendant sent a letter dated 12th October 2020, but continued to engage in the unauthorised use of his name and personal data in its procurement transactions.

 

44.      Approximately a year after his last encounter with the Defendant, he received two emails on 16th and 24th August 2021, respectively, with attached purchase orders dated 31st May 2021, identifying him as the buyer’s contact person for a purchase of a percussion drill. In response to this, and on his instructions, the law firm of Messrs. Goldrush Partners sent a letter of demand to the Defendant's Managing Director on 1st September 2021. The letter demanded an end to the illegal use of his name and personal data for procurement purposes without his consent or approval, two years after he had left the Defendant. However, in a letter dated 8th September 2021, the Defendant denied liability and requested two weeks to conduct an internal review of the lawyer's letter. In its subsequent letter dated 4th October 2021, the Defendant again denied liability but suggested it was due to a computer glitch, which he did not believe. This skepticism was reinforced by emails sent to his personal email address and a phone call from the delivery agent, which revealed the Defendant's unlawful actions. Following assurances from the Defendant in its 4th October 2021 letter, he decided to drop the matter and instructed his lawyers to discontinue legal action against the Defendant, choosing instead to focus on his business. However, on 7th January 2022, he received yet another email and purchase order from one Oladiran Abel, listed as the Defendant’s contact person, requesting details for a shipment with a delivery date of 30th November 2021. Additionally, he received a WhatsApp message from an unknown individual named Emmanuel, inquiring about the Defendant’s plant for a shipment delivery. After his protest, Emmanuel deleted the purchase order immediately, but he had already taken a screenshot. Despite the Defendant's assurances, it continued to use his personal email and phone number for its transactions. 

 

45.      The Claimant stated that the Defendant's illegal and continuous use of his name, phone number, and email without his consent constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation to its partners and customers, suggesting that he is still employed by the Defendant. This situation has placed him at risk of being held accountable for all purchase orders issued by the Defendant using his personal data, particularly if shipments go missing in transit. As a result, his identity and integrity have been compromised, potentially affecting his employment with his current employer, as it could appear that he is working for two organisations simultaneously. The Claimant emphasised that the Defendant's continued use of his name and personal data, two years after his departure, without his approval, constitutes unlawful use, appropriation, and commodification of his identity for the Defendant's financial gain. He further asserted that this interference violates his exclusive rights to control the use of his name. Additionally, the Claimant testified that his right to privacy and human dignity had been violated by this tortious interference. The Claimant mentioned that he was attacked while attempting to deliver a shipment from India to the Defendant. Coupled with the unauthorised use of his personal data and the anxiety over the potential consequences of lost shipments or other unforeseen complications, he has suffered emotional and psychological trauma, which he claims constitutes the Tort of Infliction of Emotional Distress. The Claimant stated that the emotional, physical, and monetary losses he experienced, along with his legal expenses, are difficult to quantify. However, he seeks indemnification for N50,000,000.00 as general and aggravated damages, as outlined in his complaint.

 

46.       In the Claimant’s further sworn statement, he acknowledged that the Defendant disabled his access to its server, describing this action as a tactic to obscure the real issue. He noted that a similar distraction was presented in an email from the Defendant to his lawyer dated 8th September 2021, which his lawyer effectively addressed in a response on the same day. The Claimant explained that the matter at hand concerned a pre-programmed software application called SAP (System Application Program), used to generate Purchase Orders. He indicated that it was impossible to adjust this software to remove his personal data without deactivating the entire program. Consequently, the Defendant intentionally refused to remove him from its business operations, thereby commodifying his name and personal data in violation of his fundamental human right to privacy, resulting in ongoing disturbances from the Defendant's suppliers and customers. He clarified that his lawyer’s letter dated 25th September 2020, specifically addressed the breach of his right to privacy, the violation of his personal data, and the Nigeria Data Protection Regulation of 2019. The Claimant emphasised that he could not provide the alleged shipment notes because he was neither the recipient nor the issuer of those notes. He stated that his only concern was the persistent disturbances caused by the Defendant's customers and suppliers, and that he intended to gather evidence to support his claims. Additionally, he stated that he had provided evidence of these disturbances; however, the Defendant responded in a letter dated 4th October 2021, attributing the issue to a “Computer Server Glitch.” He described this claim as a fabrication intended to cover up the Defendant’s mismanagement, especially given the Defendant's difficult position. The Claimant asserted that the defence of a computer server glitch is unsustainable because, even if such a glitch existed, the Defendant mishandled the situation by having its representatives communicate with customers and suppliers. This issue should have been addressed by the Defendant's Information Technology department to prevent further occurrences. The Claimant further explained that the disturbances could not have been caused by a computer glitch, as the procurement process begins with emails that include his name, personal data, and phone number directly in their content. He asserted that this situation resulted from human error, encapsulated in the principle of "GIGO—Garbage In, Garbage Out." 

 

47.      The Claimant testified that the errors made by the Defendant, whether caused by humans or computer systems, render the Defendant liable for negligence due to a breach of the duty of care owed to him. This breach has resulted in emotional distress for him, leading to this lawsuit. The Claimant emphasised that the core of his claim is that the Defendant, through its pre-programmed SAP system, continued to use his personal data to issue Purchase Orders. The Defendant also presented him to its customers and partners as the contact person for these orders, a situation that persisted for over two years after his departure from the company, culminating in a contact from a customer on 16th February 2022. He referenced a letter dated 4th October 2021, which was sent to hundreds of suppliers and customers, causing him significant distress. The Defendant's acknowledgment in paragraph 12 of the statement of defence has vindicated his claims. Upon receiving the letter dated 4th October 2021, he instructed his lawyer to halt legal proceedings against the Defendant, hoping it would address the issue, based on assurances that the situation would improve. Unfortunately, it did not. The Claimant gathered evidence from an email he received regarding another delivery by Oladiran Abel on 7th January 2022. It was at this point that he realised that the harassment would continue unless the Court intervened. He asserted that the Defendant has admitted to breaching his data privacy and violating his right to privacy, thus being liable for the emotional distress he has endured due to their actions. The Defendant's failure to remove his personal data from its SAP system, which caused ongoing harassment and disturbance two years after his departure, resulted in significant emotional distress. He prayed the Court to grant his claim, finding it meritorious.

 

48.      During cross-examination, the Claimant stated that he had worked with the Defendant for over 25 years and had risen through the ranks. He held multiple job descriptions, including roles in engineering, inventory, and procurement, but he did not interface with the Defendant's suppliers in these positions. However, he acknowledged that his work in procurement involved interacting with suppliers. When asked if these interactions were conducted through his official lines and emails, he clarified that it was more than that, as suppliers would also visit him in his office. He mentioned using the phone number 08034753030 before joining the Defendant, and that he had this number before 1994. He stated that the phone number he used to communicate with the Defendant's suppliers is listed on the purchase order and is the same number he had before 1994. The Claimant explained that there were no telephone lines available in 1994 and that he purchased the number he referred to in Ikeja in 2001. He has two phone lines: one personal and one provided by the Defendant; both lines are registered in his name. He received the calls on the line provided by the Defendant, although his personal number is not included in the purchase order. He returned the Defendant's properties, except for the CUG SIM. He signed the employee exit clearance form and received a certificate confirming his exit. He covered the Sagamu branch and stated that after leaving the Defendant's employment, he did not enter the factory. He reported an incident where he was assaulted by security personnel while attempting to deliver a consignment at the Estate gate, which he reported to the Sagamu Police Station. He indicated that he did not have evidence of injury because he was not physically harmed. His official email address was Kehinde.Johnson@Lafarge.com, which is on the purchase order along with his phone number. He mentioned that he does not possess any documents containing his personal email address.

 

49.        Mfonobong Akpan, a Category Manager for KSD & CAPEX at the Defendant, acknowledged the Claimant’s employment history and termination. He testified that following the Claimant's exit and the payment of all his severance packages and entitlements, the Defendant promptly disabled the Claimant's email account and restricted his access to the Defendant’s servers, in accordance with the company's exit policies and the Nigeria Data Protection Regulation of 2019. Mr. Akpan further testified that the Defendant received a complaint from the Claimant’s counsel on 25th September 2020. The letter stated that the Claimant’s name was being used by “faceless and unknown” members of the Defendant’s staff. The complaint specifically noted that the DHL Customer Care number [08039077000] was used to contact the Claimant. In response, the Defendant issued a letter on 12th October 2020, clarifying that all consignments were typically ordered in the company's name. Therefore, it was impossible for an order to have been placed in the Claimant’s name, and he could not have been contacted after his departure to receive any shipments. The Defendant also requested that the Claimant provide the shipment notes mentioned in the 25th September 2020 letter, but he failed to do so. A year later, on 1st September 2021, the Defendant received another letter from the Claimant's new counsel. This letter stated that despite the Claimant's exit from the Defendant’s employment, he was still receiving calls and messages asking him to pick up packages on the company’s behalf. The Claimant cited an incident where he was contacted by IFF Pvt Limited to receive a consignment from India. He alleged that he received the package and took it to the Defendant’s Sagamu office, but was denied access to the Defendant’s premises. 

 

50.      The Claimant alleged that he was not only denied access but also assaulted, which led him to take the consignment to the Sagamu Police Station, where the issue was resolved. In response, the Defendant sent a letter dated 8th September 2021, reiterating that they had disabled the Claimant’s email account and his access to their servers. The Defendant requested two weeks to conduct internal reviews and investigations, promising to update the Claimant’s Counsel afterward. Subsequently, on 4th October 2021, the Defendant sent a follow-up letter emphasising that the Claimant’s email account and access to the Defendant’s servers had indeed been disabled and that the Claimant had been removed from the Defendant’s Group Purchasing Platform. The Defendant asserted that any ongoing communications from the Claimant were due to a system glitch and assured that this would be resolved. To further address the situation, the Defendant communicated with its suppliers and customers, notifying them of the Claimant’s exit and instructing them to cease all communications with him. Despite the Defendant's efforts, which the Claimant was aware of, the Claimant initiated this lawsuit, alleging misrepresentation and infliction of emotional distress. The Defendant denied any breach of the Claimant’s data privacy or any harassment, stating that this lawsuit constitutes an abuse of the Court process and is intended to scandalise, humiliate, blackmail, and damage the Defendant's reputation. The Defendant also asserted that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. Additionally, the Defendant submitted ten documents marked as Exhibits D1 to D10. These are: the Claimant's solicitors' letter dated 1st September 2021, the Defendant’s response dated 8th September 2021, a letter from the Defendant dated 4th October 2021, email dated 15th September 2021, emails of 15th and 16th September 2021, a certificate of authentication, the Claimant's solicitors' letter dated 25th September 2020, the Defendant’s response dated 12th October 2020, an employee exit clearance form, and a letter of cessation of employment dated 1st November 2019.

 

51.      During cross-examination, Mr. Akpan stated that the Defendant has 1,034 vendors. He denied that the Defendant admitted to the allegation in a letter sent to the Claimant’s solicitors. When shown Exhibit D3 and asked to read paragraph 3, he indicated that the only issue found was an error in the Claimant’s phone number. Mr. Akpan was then referred to paragraph 12 of his sworn statement, which he read. He confirmed that an email was sent to all 1,034 vendors. When asked why he only submitted two of the emails, he replied, “I have no idea.” Mr. Akpan acknowledged that, as a KSD and CAPEX Category Manager, he was provided with a SIM card upon employment. This SIM card was registered in Lafarge’s name and was supposed to be returned upon his exit. When questioned about how the Defendant obtained his name, fingerprints, and other requirements, Mr. Akpan stated that those details were handled by the IT department and that he only knew he received a SIM card from the Defendant. However, he admitted that the issue of SIM ownership was never raised in the three years following the Claimant’s exit. Upon re-examination, Mr. Akpan added that the SIM ownership issue was not raised because there were no issues at the time.

 

          Evaluation of Evidence

 

52.       I have reviewed the evidence presented by both parties, which includes both oral and documentary evidence. The Claimant seeks damages for breach of data privacy, emotional distress resulting from this breach, and a mandatory injunction requiring the Defendant to remove his personal information from its server, along with other related claims. It is agreed that the Claimant served as the Defendant’s plant buyer and that his employment was terminated on 8th November 2019. It is not disputed that the Defendant had access to the Claimant's personal data due to his employment. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that a few years after the employment relationship ended, the Claimant continued to receive calls, emails, and other messages regarding the delivery of consignments to the Defendant. The Claimant raised this issue with the Defendant, requesting that action be taken to resolve it. Initially, the Defendant's response was vague. Subsequently, the Defendant denied any wrongful use of the Claimant’s data, attributing the issue to a computer glitch, but assured the Claimant that they would address it. However, the Defendant's efforts appear to have had little effect, as the problem persisted and led to this lawsuit. The central question, therefore, is whether the Defendant’s continued use of the Claimant’s personal data in its purchase orders, long after the Claimant’s disengagement, constitutes a breach of the Claimant’s data privacy and right to privacy, thereby entitling him to damages and a mandatory injunction.

 

 Breach of the right to personal data and privacy

 

53.       The supporting evidence is contained in paragraphs 6 to 26 of the Claimant’s sworn statement, and paragraphs 4 to 9 of his additional sworn statement, which have been summarised in this judgment. Suffice to state that the Claimant’s case is that one year after cessation of the employment relationship with the Defendant, he continued to receive calls, texts, and emails from unknown individuals requesting that he accept shipments intended for the Defendant. He redirected these requests to the appropriate plants and deleted the communications. This continued for nearly two years, during which he generally refused to accept shipments. One evening, he accepted a shipment from IFF Pvt Limited in Indore, India, as the dispatcher could not deliver it directly. He attempted to deliver it to the Defendant's office in Sagamu, Ogun State, but was denied access by security and subsequently assaulted by the Defendant's staff. He was then attacked by armed robbers attempting to steal the shipment. After reporting the incident to the Sagamu police, the shipment was handed over to the Defendant's representative that night. Realising the Defendant was using his name and personal information without consent, he instructed his lawyers, Messrs. A.O. Omotayo & Co., to send a letter on 25th September 2020, requesting an end to this unlawful use. The Defendant did not comply and instead sent a letter dated 12th October 2020 while continuing these practices. On 16th and 24th August 2021, he received emails containing purchase orders that listed him as the buyer's contact. His lawyers, Messrs. Goldrush Partners, sent a letter on 1st September 2021 demanding an end to this illegal use. The Defendant responded on 4th October 2021, denying liability and claiming a computer glitch, which he found hard to believe. On 7th January 2022, he received another email and a purchase order from Oladiran Abel, as well as a WhatsApp message from an unknown individual named Emmanuel. After his protest, Emmanuel deleted the purchase order, but he had taken a screenshot. Despite previous assurances, the Defendant continued to use his personal email and phone number for transactions.

 

54.     The Claimant presented several exhibits to support his case, specifically Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, and 18. Exhibit 5 is an email dated 16th August 2021, from Gibadi Finance (Gibadi.Com Limited) to the Claimant regarding the Defendant’s purchase order for a percussion drill. One attachment to this email is the Defendant’s purchase order, dated 31st May 2021, from Total African Distribution Ltd, which identifies the Claimant as the buyer and includes his telephone number and email address. Exhibit 6 contains part of the documentation from Exhibit 5, showing that the Defendant’s staff processed the purchase order on 31st May 2021, which included the Claimant’s details. Exhibit 7 provides photographic evidence of the consignment from IFF PVT Limited, with the Claimant listed as the buyer. Exhibit 8 includes DHL delivery notes for 27th and 28th August 2021. Exhibits 9 to 13 comprise letters from the Claimant’s solicitors along with the Defendant’s responses. Exhibit 14 is a WhatsApp conversation between the Claimant and the delivery person, which includes the attached purchase orders. Exhibit 16 consists of email correspondence between the Claimant’s solicitors and the Defendant. Exhibit 17 is another request from a delivery person named Oladiran Abel to the Claimant, dated 7th January 2022. Exhibit 18 is a WhatsApp chat with Emmanuel, a delivery person from Rotation and Precision Machines Limited. This documentary evidence supports the Claimant’s oral testimony and demonstrates that, despite the Claimant’s objections and the Defendant’s assurances, he continued to receive inquiries and requests for the Defendant’s consignments long after his employment relationship with the Defendant had ended.     

 

55.     The rebuttal evidence is presented in paragraphs 6 to 12 of the Defendant’s witness sworn statement. The Defendant states that after the Claimant's departure, it promptly disabled his email account and restricted access to its servers in accordance with company exit policies and the Nigerian Data Protection Regulations of 2019. On 25th September 2020, the Defendant received a complaint from the Claimant’s counsel alleging that unknown members of the Defendant's staff were misusing the Claimant’s name. In a letter dated 12th October 2020, it was clarified that all consignments were ordered in the company’s name, making it impossible for the Claimant to have received any shipments. The Defendant requested the shipment notes mentioned in the complaint, but the Claimant did not provide them. On 1st September 2021, the Claimant's new counsel sent another letter indicating that the Claimant continued to receive calls regarding picking up packages for the company. The Claimant described an incident in which he was contacted by IFF Pvt Limited regarding a consignment from India. He took this consignment to the Defendant’s Sagamu office but was denied access and allegedly assaulted. He subsequently reported the incident to the Sagamu Police Station. In response, on 8th September 2021, the Defendant reiterated that the Claimant’s email account and server access had been disabled and requested two weeks for internal reviews. On 4th October 2021, the Defendant confirmed that the Claimant’s access had been revoked and stated that any communications he received were due to a system glitch. The Defendant also informed suppliers and customers about the Claimant’s exit and instructed them to cease all communications with him. The Defendant submitted 10 exhibits. Exhibit D1 is the same as Exhibit 11, Exhibit D2 corresponds to Exhibit 12, Exhibit D3 matches Exhibit 13, Exhibit D7 is the same as Exhibit 9, Exhibit D8 is identical to Exhibit 10, and Exhibit D10 corresponds to Exhibit 2. Exhibits D4 and D5 comprise an email from the Defendant dated 15th September 2021 and acknowledgments by two of the recipients. Exhibit D9 is the Claimant’s exit clearance certificate. Exhibits D1, D2, D3, D7, and D8 are letters exchanged between the Defendant and the Claimant’s solicitors. Exhibits D9 and D10 include the Claimant’s exit clearance certificate and notice of cessation of employment. The only evidence relevant to the defence is Exhibits D4 and D5, which consist of the Defendant’s email titled “Exited Buyers/Procurement Employees//4501626238” addressed to Morenikeji Olayinka and copied to three of the Defendant’s employees. This email notified them that the Claimant was no longer with the company, along with acknowledgments from Morenikeji Olayinka and Silverbond Exclusive Services Limited. In Exhibit D3, the Defendant’s letter dated 4th October 2021, to the Claimant’s solicitors, the Defendant wrote: “Lafarge vendors were immediately notified, and we hereby confirm that your client will not be contacted going forward, as the computer server glitch has been fixed.” The Defendant’s witness reiterated this evidence during cross-examination, stating that the email was sent to 1,034 of the Defendant’s suppliers. However, when asked why he only provided two acknowledgments, he responded, “I have no idea.” It is also noteworthy that after this letter, the Claimant still received an inquiry from Oladiran Abel on 7th January 2022.

 

56.     While the Defendant appeared to deny the claims made by the Claimant, it did not dispute the specific incidents of data privacy breaches reported by the Claimant. The Defendant also did not deny the receipt and delivery of the consignment from IFF Pvt Limited by the Claimant. Furthermore, there was no contradiction regarding the emails and WhatsApp chats that included purchase orders with the Claimant’s name and telephone number. During the Claimant's cross-examination, the Defendant sought to prove that the Claimant's retention of the CUG SIM card was responsible for the calls the Claimant received from suppliers. However, Exhibit D9, the Claimant’s exit clearance certificate, and Exhibit 3, the certificate of service, demonstrate that there were no concerns regarding the Claimant's retention of the CUG line at the time of his departure from the Defendant. The Defendant's witness admitted during cross-examination that the issue of SIM ownership was not raised for three years after the Claimant’s exit. However, during re-examination, the witness claimed it was not raised because there was no issue at the time. The Claimant testified that he had two telephone numbers, one personal and one provided by the Defendant, and that both numbers are registered in his name. Given this context, it is my considered opinion that, since the Defendant did not raise the issue of the Claimant’s retention of the CUG line before this lawsuit, the matter was not an issue at that time. Subsequent events cannot change this fact, and the Defendant is estopped from bringing up the issue under Section 169 of the Evidence Act.

 

57. Additionally, Exhibits 4, 5, and 18 show that the Claimant’s name appears on the purchase orders as the buyer. The Defendant appears to have admitted this breach in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Defendant’s witness’s sworn statement. Moreover, Exhibits 5, 6, and 17 reveal that some communications occurred through the Claimant’s personal email address. After considering all the evidence, I find that the Claimant's retention of the CUG SIM is immaterial and does not constitute a defence to the Claimant’s claims. Weighing all the evidence, it is clear that the scale tilts in favour of the Claimant. The Claimant’s evidence is unchallenged, relevant, and conclusive, and I am compelled to accept and act on it. Please, refer to Oforlete v. State [2000] 12 NWLR (Pt 681) 415 at 436 and Boye Industries Limited & Anor v. Sowemimo & Anor [2022] 3 NWLR (Pt 1817) 195 at 225-226. Section 24(1)(d), (e), and (f) of the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023, impose duties on the Defendant as a data controller. These duties include ensuring that the Claimant's personal data is retained only for as long as necessary to fulfil the lawful purposes for which the data was collected or further processed. Additionally, Section 24(3) of the Act establishes a duty of care for the Defendant regarding data processing and requires the Defendant to demonstrate accountability in relation to the principles set forth in the Act. These obligations were clearly violated by the Defendant. Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the Claimant has discharged the burden of proof based on the preponderance of evidence. Therefore, I find as a fact that the Defendant’s continued use of the Claimant’s name and telephone number, long after the employment relationship had ended, violated the Claimant's rights to personal data and privacy as protected by the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023, and Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution.

 

 Has the Claimant proved the Tort of Infliction of Emotional Distress?

 

58.     The Claimant has alleged that he experienced the Tort of Infliction of Emotional Distress due to the continued use of his name and personal information. The supporting evidence is outlined in paragraphs 7 to 24 and 27 of the Claimant’s sworn statement. In paragraph 27, the Claimant testified that he suffered emotional distress when he was attacked while attempting to deliver a shipment from India to the Defendant. Furthermore, the continued use of his name and personal data created fear of potential consequences from the loss of any shipment or other complications. This situation led to emotional and psychological trauma, which constitutes the Tort of Infliction of Emotional Distress. The Defendant generally denied the claims made in paragraph 25 of the statement of facts in paragraph 2 of the statement of defence. The Defendant's counsel argued under issue one that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear claims of assault and emotional distress since they are categorised as tortious claims. In paragraphs 5.28 to 5.29 of the Defendant’s final written address, counsel identified three elements necessary to establish the tort of infliction of emotional distress and argued that the Claimant failed to prove these elements. In response, the Claimant’s counsel, in paragraphs 4.29 and 4.31 of the final written address, has listed four elements required for the tort of infliction of emotional distress. Counsel asserted that the Claimant has indeed established these elements and is therefore entitled to damages. The Defendant reiterated its earlier arguments in the reply on points of law.

 

59.     I have determined in this judgment that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the Claimant's claims. It is important to clarify that the claim before this Court pertains to the tort of infliction of emotional distress, rather than tortious assault. The principles governing these two types of tort differ significantly. I have reviewed the case of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines & Anor v. Taher [2014] 3 NWLR (Pt 1393) 137, as cited by the Defendant; however, the facts and issues in that case are distinct from those in the current matter. Therefore, I respectfully conclude that the case is not applicable here.

 

60.     According to Cornell Law School, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) occurs when one acts in a manner that intentionally or recklessly causes another person to suffer severe emotional distress. As correctly noted by the Claimant's counsel, for the Claimant to succeed, four critical cumulative elements must be established: the Defendant's conduct is extreme or outrageous, something a reasonable person would find intolerable; the Defendant acted either intentionally or recklessly; the Defendant's conduct is the direct cause of the Claimant's emotional distress; and the emotional distress suffered by the Claimant is severe and not transient. Emotional distress refers to a negative mental reaction resulting from another person's conduct, and it encompasses feelings such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, and worry, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 10th Edition, pages 575-576. The question now is whether the Claimant has proved these elements.

 

61.     I have determined in this judgment that the Defendant breached the Claimant's data privacy. The consequence of the Defendant’s continued unauthorised use of the Claimant’s data is detailed in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, and 22 of his sworn statement. In paragraph 11, the Claimant expressed that he was distraught and worried that if he were dispossessed of the shipment, the Defendant would not hesitate to hold him liable for the loss and might even pursue criminal prosecution, as it had done in the past with an employee. Despite being informed of the breach, the Defendant took no action until after receiving the Claimant's solicitors' second letter dated 1st September 2021 (Exhibit 11). The Defendant then sent an email dated 15th September 2021 (Exhibits D4 and D5). The evidence clearly shows that the Defendant's conduct was intolerable, particularly after the Claimant's solicitors' letter dated 25th September 2020 (Exhibit 9) was received. The Defendant's response, as shown in Exhibit 10 dated 12th October 2020, exhibited reprehensible indifference and extreme recklessness. There is unchallenged evidence that the Claimant suffered from severe emotional distress resulting from the Defendant’s conduct. Based on these facts, I conclude that the Claimant has successfully established the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

 

           In the premises, the lone issue for determination is resolved in the affirmative.

 

          Consideration of the reliefs

 

62.     The first claim seeks a declaration that usage and continuous usage of the name and personal data of the Claimant by the Defendant without his consent after the termination of the contract of employment by the Defendant amounts to unlawful usage, fraudulent misrepresentation, appropriation and commodification of the Claimant's name and personal data which has been yielding pecuniary benefits to the Defendant, but none to the Claimant either as an employee or an independent contractor either expressly or by implication. I found in this judgment that the Defendant’s continued use of the Claimant’s name and telephone number, long after the employment relationship had ended, violated the Claimant's rights to personal data and privacy as protected by the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023 and Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution. However, the allegation of pecuniary benefits is not pleaded or proved, and it is hereby discountenanced. Thus, this claim succeeds partially. 

 

63.       The second claim is for a declaration that the Defendant has also violated the Claimant's constitutional right to privacy and human dignity by committing tortious interference with the Claimant's sole right and privilege of the usage of his name, identity, personal and private data, and violation of the Nigerian Data Protection Regulation. This claim is vague, as the Claimant has combined several unrelated issues. It is the law that a relief should typically flow from the pleadings. The Claimant's case is primarily based on a breach of his rights to personal data and privacy under the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023, and Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution. The right to human dignity is a separate claim that has neither been pleaded nor proven. There is no evidence to suggest that the Claimant was tortured or experienced degrading treatment. Although the Claimant alleged that he was assaulted while attempting to deliver a consignment to the Defendant, he later clarified under cross-examination that he was not beaten. Aside from his claim of assault and attempted robbery, there is insufficient evidence to substantiate these allegations. Furthermore, the allegation of tortious interference stands as a distinct claim. Tortious interference is a common law tort that occurs when a third party intentionally and improperly disrupts an existing contract or legitimate business relationship between two parties, resulting in financial harm. While I have determined that the Defendant violated the Claimant's rights to personal data and privacy, there is no evidence of a violation of the Claimant's right to human dignity or of tortious interference. Therefore, I conclude that this claim has not been established and it is accordingly denied.

 

64.       The third claim seeks a declaration that the Defendant has inflicted on the Claimant emotional distress, when he was attacked while trying to deliver the shipment from India to the Defendant, and also the fear he goes through every time he receives calls to come and get the shipments of the Defendant, with the fear that, when such consignments get missing or what if some people or defendant are using his name and data to perpetrate illegality behind his back at the behest of the Defendant, and given the recent indictment of the Defendant in Syria for crimes against humanity and its alleged involvement with ISIL (ISIS). The Claimant has combined several unrelated issues. In paragraphs 11 and 24 of his sworn statement, the Claimant asserts that the Defendant’s continued use of his personal data puts him at risk of being held liable for purchase orders under his name, especially if those orders go missing, which could affect his current employment. There is, however, no pleading or evidence that his personal data was used to facilitate any illegal activities. Furthermore, the claim that the Defendant has been recently indicted in Syria for crimes against humanity and is allegedly involved with ISIL (ISIS) is neither pleaded nor proved. Consequently, I hold that this claim has not been proved, and, accordingly, deny it.

 

65.     The fourth claim seeks a declaration that the totality of the conduct of the Defendant, whether expressly or implicitly, with the continuous usage of the Claimant's name and personal data, amounts to the commission of the Tort of Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) on the Claimant. I determined in this judgment that the Claimant has successfully established the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. I adopt my reasoning and conclusion in paragraphs 58 to 61 above, and hold that this claim has been established, and it is granted.

 

 

66.     The fifth claim is for an order directing the Defendant to permanently remove the Claimant's name, phone number, and his personal data from its company servers, applications, company's purchase orders, and email templates as the buyer/contact person of the Defendant, which the Defendant has sent to its sellers/customers all over the world. I found in this judgment that the Defendant’s continued use of the Claimant’s name and telephone number, long after the employment relationship had ended, violated the Claimant's rights to personal data and privacy as protected by Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023, and Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution. This claim is also granted because it is related to the first claim, which was partially granted.

 

67.       The sixth claim is for an order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to immediately deactivate its pre-generated code in the name of the Claimant as the contact person on purchase orders/computer generating/initiating line for purchase orders sent to all its customers/sellers worldwide. This claim is related to the fifth claim, which has been granted; therefore, it is granted as well. 

 

68.       The seventh claim is for an order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant through its Executive Directors to undertake in writing that the Claimant is excluded from any liability, whether civil or otherwise, real or ostensible, and in perpetuity with respect to any consequence that may arise from all the havoc it may (sic, that may be) wrecked with the usage of the personal data, name and identity of the Claimant. Having granted reliefs five and six, this claim is unwarranted. Furthermore, the Claimant has not demonstrated the need for such an undertaking. Therefore, this claim is denied.

 

69.       Relief eight is for an order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to issue a letter of indemnification to the Claimant, indemnifying him from any loss or liability that may arise from all the transactions of the purchase orders that have been issued with the Claimant's name as buyer and contact person, after his disengagement from the Defendant's company. I adopt my reasoning and conclusion in relief seven above, and I hold that this claim has not been established; therefore, I hereby deny it.

 

70.       Relief nine is for an order that written evidence be produced, which proves that 'g' and 'h' supra have been complied with, and evidence that all the sellers/customers of the Defendant have been notified that the Claimant is no longer the contact person for the Defendant's company and no longer works with the Defendant. Since this claim relies on the success of reliefs 7 and 8, and those reliefs have been refused, this claim must therefore fail and is hereby denied. 

 

71.       The tenth claim seeks an order of this Honourable Court to the Defendant to pay the sum of N50,000,000.00 [fifty million naira] to the Claimant as general and aggravated damages, to remediate all the harms done to him, his person, name, and the emotional distress foisted on the Claimant by reasons of the unlawful conduct of the Defendant. The Claimant combined two unrelated claims. General damages are awarded at the Court's discretion and are meant to compensate for losses caused by an adversary's actions, as demonstrated in the cases of Nigerian Railway Corporation v. Ojo [2021] LPELR-55971(CA) and Ecobank Nigeria Limited v. Saleh [2020] LPELR-52024(CA). This Court has broad powers under Section 19[d] of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, to award damages in any circumstance contemplated by the Act or any Act of the National Assembly pertaining to matters within the Court's jurisdiction. However, the granting of damages is neither automatic nor routine. It is a discretionary exercise that must be substantiated by the facts and circumstances of each case. Conversely, aggravated damages are awarded when the Defendant's conduct is sufficiently outrageous to warrant punishment, such as in cases involving malice, fraud, cruelty, insolence, or a flagrant disregard for the law. To justify this type of award, it is insufficient to merely demonstrate that the Defendant committed the wrongful act in question. The Defendant's behaviour must also be shown to be deliberately high-handed, insolent, vindictive, and in complete disregard for the Claimant’s rights, which is not the case here. The Court takes into account the Defendant’s motives, conduct, manner, and overall attitude. This is supported by Aice Investment Company Limited & Anor v. Fidelity Bank Plc [2025] 3 NWLR (Pt 1979) 279 at 297-298. However, despite the inelegant couching of this claim, it is a settled principle of law that where there is a wrong, there must be a remedy. Having found that the Defendant violated the Claimant’s rights to personal data and privacy, I hold that the Claimant is entitled to damages in the circumstances of this case. Referencing Section 48(4) and (5) of the Nigeria Data Protection Act, 2023, which establishes a higher maximum penalty of N10,000,000 and a standard maximum penalty of N2,000,000 for a confirmed violation of the Act's provisions, I award the Claimant N2,000,000 in damages.

 

72.       Overall, this case is partially successful. Reliefs 1, 5, and 10 are granted in part. Reliefs 4 and 6 are fully granted. Reliefs 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9 are dismissed.

 

Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

 

…………………………………..

IKECHI GERALD NWENEKA

JUDGE

            30/1/2026

 

            Attendance: The Claimant is present, while the Defendant is absent.

 

            Appearances

 

Femi Adisa-Isikalu Esq. for the Claimant

 

            Ugochukwu Eze Esq. with Chidiebere Ironuru Esq., and Azeez Adebayo Esq. for the Defendant