
IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT ABUJA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HONOURABLE JUSTICE O. Y. ANUWE
Dated: 27th January 2026 SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/307/2025
Between:
10, Foloki Francis Maaebi
11, Chinedu Isiuku
12. Philip Idongesit Nyong
13. Aminu Umar Abdulrahman
14. Abdulaziz Umar Dembo
15. Abubakar Abdullahi Isa
(Suing for themselves and as concerned members of the Petroleum & Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN) NMDPRA Branch)
And
Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN)
(The General Secretary, PENGASSAN)
(Caretaker Committee, NMDPRA Branch)
Representation:
Zakariya Hussaini (SAN), with him, Ezra Enwere and Munirat Yahaya for the Claimants
Amb. Sola Iji, with him, Femi Abimbola for the Defendants
JUDGMENT
In an Originating Summons filed by the Claimants, as members of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA) branch of Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGANSAN), on 13th October 2025, this Court was requested to determine the following questions:
Upon the determination of the questions, the Claimants sought the following reliefs:
1. A declaration that by the provisions of the PENGASSAN Constitution 2022, it is only the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) of a branch that has the Constitutional powers to constitute the Ethics, Grievance and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC) for the discipline off its branch members.
2. A declaration that any Ethics, Grievances and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC) not constituted by the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) is illegal, null and void.
3. A declaration that by the provision of the PENGASSAN Constitution 2022; the affairs of a Branch of the Association cannot be administered with a Caretaker Committee for more than three (3) months within which a branch election shall be conducted.
4. A declaration that the act of running any branch of the PENGASSAN with a Caretaker Committee for over a period of three (3) months is unconstitutional, illegal and unknown to the PENGASSAN Constitution.
5. A declaration that the suspension of the Claimants by the Central Working Committee (CWC) of the 1t defendant on 18th August, 2025, pursuant to the recommendation of an Ethical, Grievance and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC)not constituted by the branch executive committee (BECOM) is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void.
6. A declaration that the constitution of a Caretaker Committee (CTC) by the Central Working Committee (CWC) after the expiration of the Branch Executive Committee's tenure, in the absence of either a merger or disciplinary dissolution of BECOM, instead of conducting elections, as mandated by the constitution, is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void.
7. A declaration that the Ethics, Grievance and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC) constituted by the Caretaker Committee (CTC), rather than by duly elected Branch Executive Committee (BECOM), cannot validly exercise disciplinary powers over the Claimants.
8. A declaration that the suspension of the Claimants without affording them fair hearing, contrary to Rule 34.5 of the PENGASSAN Constitution and Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), is unconstitutional, illegal, null and void.
9. A declaration that the actions of the Central Working Committee (CWC), including the refusal to process the Applicants' petitions and grievances as required by Rules 34.4 and 34.9.4.6 of the PENGASSAN Constitution, amount to an infringement of the Applicants' guaranteed rights under the Association's Constitution and the general principles of fair hearing.
10. A declaration that it is mandatory for the CWC of PENGASSAN and the NEC to ensure proper accounting records, audits and disbursement of the funds of the Association to the Chapters and Branch and failure to give financial accounts and disburse accordingly amounts to a violation of the Constitution.
11. An order setting aside the constitution and composition of the Ethics, Grievance and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC) formed by the CTC on the 11th July, 2025 for being unconstitutional and unknown to the PENGASSAN Constitution
12. An order setting aside the suspension of the Claimants dated 18h August, 2025 arising from the illegal EGDC constituted by the CTC, for being unconstitutional and unknown to the PENGASSAN Constitution
13. An order dissolving the Caretaker Committee (CTC) set up by the Central Working Committee (CWC) after the expiration of the tenure of the Branch Executive Committee's (BECOM) on the 27th of May, 2025.
14. An order directing the Central Working Committee to conduct general hybrid elections in accordance with the extant rules of the Constitution of PENGASSAN.
15. An order directing the CWC to give financial accounts of PENGASSAN to the NEC and members and appoint an independent auditor to conduct audits on the NMDPRA Branch and chapters account.
16. An order directing the immediate and continued disbursement of funds to the Branch and Chapters of the Association as provided by the PENGASSAN Constitution, 2022.
17. An order directing the Defendants to pay the sum of N500,000,000 as general and aggravated damages to each of the Claimants.
18. An order directing the defendants to pay the sum of N100,000,000 as cost of litigation.
CASE OF THE CLAIMANTS
The affidavit in support of the Originating Summons was deposed to by Muhammed Mujib Rahman, the 2nd Claimant in this suit. He said the Claimants are Senior Staff members of NMDPRA and they are members of the NMDPRA Branch of PENGASSAN, a trade union founded to protect the interest of senior staff members in the Petroleum and Natural Gas industries in Nigeria. The activities of members of PENGASSAN, the 1st defendant, are guided and governed by the PENGASSAN Constitution 2022 which came in to effect on the 15th December 2022. In the said PENGASSAN Constitution, there are established organs for the administration of the affairs of PENGASSAN and these organs include the National Executive Committee (NEC), the Central Working Committee (CWC), the Zonal Executive Council (ZECOM) and the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM). The PENGASSAN Constitution also made provisions for the appointment of a caretaker committee (CTC) where there is a merger of branches or disciplinary dissolution of BECOM. The PENGASSAN Constitution also made provisions on elections and discipline of its members.
By the Constitution, upon the merger of branches or upon a disciplinary dissolution of BECOM, a Caretaker Committee (CTC) shall be formed with tenure of 3 months within which election will be conducted to elect the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM). The tenure of a CTC is temporary for only 3 months. The Constitution also established the machinery for the discipline of the members of the Association and such power is donated to the Ethical, Grievance and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC). The EGDC is the only committee responsible for the discipline of members. The constitution also set up the composition of EGDC at the National, Zonal and Branch levels. The composition of members of the EGDC at the branch level is 2 elected BECOM members and 3 other members who shall be nominated by the BECOM and chaired by branch Industrial Relations Officer IRO.
The discipline of members of the association commences from the EGDC at all levels. At the Branch level, the procedure for discipline of members of PENGASSAN is that the BECOM submits the disciplinary matter to the EGDC for investigation. Any member that is to be disciplined must be given at least 14 days written notice of the charges against him or her, including the time and place for the hearing. The person charged will have the opportunity to appear to make presentation and give evidence on the charges against him or her. After investigation by the EGDC, it reports back its findings and recommendations to the BECOM which shall review the report of the EGDC. The 2nd to 8th defendants are not members of the BECOM of the Claimants.
The enactment of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) 2021 led to the merger of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) and Petroleum Equalization Fund (Management) Board (PEF) to establish the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (NMDPRA). All the staff of the defunct agencies moved to NMDPRA and the NMDPRA became a Branch of PENGASSAN. Upon the establishment of the NMDPRA in 2021, the Central Working Committee of PENGASSAN, in accordance with Rule 4.4(b) of the Constitution, constituted a Caretaker Committee on 10th January 2022 to run the affairs of the NMDPRA Branch for 3 Months while election is conducted. At the expiration of the 3 months tenure of the Caretaker Committee in March 2022, the branch election was not conducted by the Central Working Committee. Instead, the Central Working Committee unilaterally extended the tenure of the Caretaker Committee by another 3 months. There is no provision in the PENGASSAN constitution which donated any power to the CWC to extend the tenure of the CTC for another 3 months.
At the expiration of the 6 months CTC transition period in May 2022, the NMDPRA Branch Congress could not hold and a result, the claimants and other Branch members had an informal engagement amongst themselves and resolved to allow the elected members continue with the administration, particularly considering that those elected BECOM would soon cease to be members of the 1st Defendant by virtue of promotion in line with Rule 4.3 (a) of the Constitution. But in November 2022, at the expiration of the CTC’s extended tenure and when election was supposed to be conducted, the conduct of the Chapter election was cancelled by the Branch and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on the ground that some of the defunct agencies would not be adequately represented. The Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) and 2nd and 3rd Defendants suggested that the positions be shared amongst the 3 defunct agencies. This suggestion was agreed to by the Claimants and other Branch members. However, on the proposed date of election, election did not hold because the 2nd and 3rd Defendants insisted that the Election must be by Consensus against the method of voting provided by Rules 11.7.3 and 11.8.6 of the Constitution. Some of the members of the 1st Defendant NMDPRA BECOM elected in May 2022 were promoted to Executive position by the management and by the provisions of Rules 4.1 and 4.3 (a) of the PENGASSAN Constitution, they cease to be members and representatives of the 1st Defendant. In view of the exit of these members, there ought to be Bye-Elections in line with Rules 11.4.1 and 11.4.3 of the Constitution to fill the vacant positions. However, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants maintained that the promoted members of BECOM are still members, even though these BECOM members were not paying dues as required by Rules 11.2.7 of the Constitution due to their promotion by the management.
Due to the continued infraction of the Constitution by the 2nd and 3rd defendants and BECOM, the Claimants and other branch members resolved and passed a vote of no confidence in the BECOM and further challenged the BECOM’s continued assumption of office through a letter to the Central Working Committee dated 6th October 2023 and signed by 540 members of the branch. The letter was duly received by the Central Working Committee but did not respond to the letter. The tenure of the BECOM was to come to an end on 27th May 2025 by Rule 20.1 of the Constitution. However, up till 15th May 2025, there was no communication of any sort from the 3rd Defendant to the Claimants and the Branch. This led to the Branch members and the Claimants to petition against the Central Working Committee to the NEC on 21st May 2025.
The Claimants and Branch members, based on their rights in Rules 34.4 (i), (ii), and (iv) of the Constitution, wrote to the 1st and 2nd defendants notifying them of the expiration of the tenure of the current branch executives and to request for the conduct of election. Because of the continued refusal and neglect of the concerns of the Branch members, infraction of the provisions of the Constitution and abdication of responsibilities by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, all the Branch Members called a Congress wherein it was unanimously resolved by over 523 Members to protest the continued defiance and infractions of the CWC. When the issues were still not resolved, the Branch Members issued a correspondence on 16th June 2025, to the National Executive Council (NEC) of the 1st Defendant. The communiqué was sent to the Defendants through the 3rd Defendant via a mail. Instead of the Defendants to resolve the issue by complying with Constitution, they wrote a letter dated 27th June 2025 to the Claimants' Management that another Caretaker Committee had been constituted to run the affairs of the Branch. This new Caretaker Committee is made up of the 4th to 8th defendants.
The caretaker committee constituted on the 27th June 2025 made it the third time that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants are appointing Caretaker Committee to manage the affairs of the branch, which act is not provided in the Constitution. This is wrong and unacceptable as Rules 11.4.3 of the Constitution clearly provides that Election should succeed the expiration of BECOM's tenure. The claimants and other branch members of the NMDPRA Branch challenged the illegal constitution of the 4th to 8th defendants as Caretaker committee and notified the Defendants of their rejection of the constitution of the Caretaker Committee in the letter dated 4th July 2025 stating their position, as allowed by Rule 34.4(iv) of the Constitution, that they do not recognize the Caretaker Committee and that Rule 31.4 of the Constitution would only apply if there was dissolution of the BECOM subject to disciplinary actions under Rule 31 and not when there was a conclusive expiration of tenure under Rules 20.1 and 11.4.0 of the Constitution.
What was needed was a Branch Election and not the constitution of a Caretaker Committee. The Branch Members escalated the matters to the Registrar of Trade Unions for his intervention in a letter dated the 1st August 2025. When the Branch did not receive any positive response to all its requests for intervention, it issued a correspondence on 14th August 2025, digitally signed by over 523 members, notifying the Hon. Minister of Labour and Employment of its resolve to conduct an election as passed by the Branch Congress. It further requested the Hon. Minister to facilitate the deployment of Returning Officers to conduct the Elections in line with Rules 11.5.3 of the Constitution. The Honorable Minister responded to the request through a letter dated 15th August 2025, imploring the Branch Members to maintain calm and pause the conduct of the proposed election while it engages all parties concerned to see to the amicable settlement of the issues raised.
Immediately the 4th to 8th defendants were inaugurated as Caretaker Committee by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, they issued queries to the Claimants on the basis of the Claimants’ complaints about the non-compliance with the Constitution by the Defendants. The Defendants further constituted a Branch Ethics, Grievance, and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC) on 9th July 2025. An EGDC can only comprise of elected BECOM members and other members appointed by BECOM and must be chaired by an elected Industrial Relations Officer (IRO) as stipulated in Rule 12.7 of the 1st Defendant's Constitution. The composition of the EGDC was however without an elected Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) at the time. Also, members of the EGDC constituted by the Defendants are not members of BECOM and do not comprise of nominated members by BECOM as required by the Constitution. Again, the 4th to 8th defendants are not members of the NMDPRA BECOM and as such do not have the power to appoint the EGDC.
By a letter dated 11th July 2025, the Caretaker Committee invited the Claimants to appear before the EGDC and in response to the invitation, the claimants jointly challenged the illegality of the EGDC. Instead of responding to the claimant’s challenge to the illegality of the EDGC, the Defendants issued a notice of suspension to the Claimants, stating that it reviewed the report of the EGDC and resolved to suspend the Claimants for terms ranging from 5 to 10 years. The 2nd and 3rd Defendants unilaterally deliberated on the recommendation of the EGDC and suspended the Claimants without the ratification of NEC as mandatorily required by Rule 10.7 of the Constitution. Upon receipt of the notices of suspensions, the claimants appealed individually against the suspension vide letters dated 25th August 2025 and challenged the legality of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants to issue such notice of suspension without the ratification of the NEC as required by Rule 10.7 of the Constitution. The Defendants can only review and make recommendations to the NEC who has the ultimate say on suspension and termination of the membership status of any member, including the Claimants. The Defendants received the claimants appeals through the 3rd Defendant but, contrary to Schedule 2.3 of the constitution, refused to respond or invite the Claimants to hear the appeal. As a result of the refusal of the Defendants to respond or hear the Claimants' appeals, the Claimants engaged the services of solicitors at Savannah Law Chambers to further appeal against their suspensions. There was also no response to their solicitor’s letter dated 19th September 2025. Without an opportunity given to the claimants to be heard on appeal, by a notice of refund dated 8th October 2025, the 4th to 8th Defendants informed the claimants of the refund of the deducted check-off dues back to the Claimants.
It was also averred by the deponent that the Defendants failed to govern the 1st defendant in accordance with the Constitution, as mandated by Rule 2.4 and 5.1 of the Constitution. The Defendants' actions in dismissing the rights of members of the association, including the claimants, to vote in an honest and credible election; to call for the conduct of elections; and to express their views and displeasure is a violation of Rules 34.4 (i), (ii) and (iv) of the Constitution. The Defendants’ failure to provide the annual financial report of the Association or to submit the Association's account for audit and remittance of dues to the Chapters and Branch of the Association contravenes Rule 26.5, 23.1, 23.2 and 30.6.1 of the Constitution. The Defendants passivity in initiating the election process by appointing a returning officer, after the completion of tenure of the BECOM is contrary to Rules 11.4.3 and 11.5.3 of the Constitution. The constitution of the CTC by the defendants, instead of appointing a returning officer is contrary to Rules 4.4(b) and 31.4 of the Constitution. The composition of EGDC by the CTC violates Rule 32.7 of the Constitution which mandates that only validly elected BECOM members and other members nominated by the BECOM can validly make up the composition of the EGDC. The CTC was constituted on 27th June 2025 and the 3 months tenure ended on 27th September 2025. The notice of refund issued by the 4thDefendant on 8th October 2025 shows the extension of the tenure of the CTC over the period of 3 months. The continued holding of office by the 4th to 8th Defendants beyond 3 months is a continued violation of the Constitution by the Defendants. The issuance of queries on the Claimants derogates from the Claimants' rights to express their views on the conduct of the affairs of the association and therefore contrary to Rules 34.4 (iv) and 34.5 of the Constitution. The unilateral suspension of the claimants without the ratification of the NEC is Contrary to Rules 10.7 of the Constitution.
The documents marked Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, H1, I, J, K, L, L1-L15, M, N, N1-N14, O, O1-O15, P and Q were referred to the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons and attached thereto.
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS
In the written address in support of the Originating Summons, learned counsel for the claimants, Munirat Yahaya Esq., formulated 8 issues for determination to wit:
1. Whether by the mandatory Provisions of Rules 32.1, 322, 323, 326 and 32.7 of the PENGASSAN Constitution of 2022, is not only the Branch Executive Committee (BECOM) that has the Constitutional power to establish the Ethical, Grievance and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC) for the branch?
2. Whether a branch EGDC not Constituted by the BECOM in accordance with the Constitution is not illegal, null and void
3. Whether by the mandatory provisions of Rules 4.4(b) and 11.5.3 of the PENGASSAN Constitution of 2022, the appointment of a Caretaker Committee (CTC) for a mandatory three (3) months period can be extended without the appointment of a Returning Officer to conduct a branch election?
4. Whether by the construction and interpretation of rules 32.7, 34.4, 34.5, 34.9, 4.6, 10.3, 10.7 and Schedule 2.2.8, on the valid mode for suspending a member of the association is not through the composition of a valid branch EDGC and final ratification of the CWC's recommendation by NEC? If yes, whether the suspension of the Claimants by the Defendants is valid and not liable to be set aside?
5. Whether by the construction and interpretation of rules 11.4.3, 11.5.3 of the PENGASSAN Constitution 2022, it is mandatory on the CWC through the General Secretary, to appoint a returning officer to immediately proceed with election processes upon the expiration of tenure of BECOM? If yes, whether the constitution and composition of a Caretaker Committee (CTC) by the Central Working Committee (CWC) after the expiration of the Branch Executive Committee's tenure, instead of conducting elections as mandated by the constitution, is valid, lawful and constitutional?
6. Whether the suspension of the Claimants without affording them fair hearing contrary to Rule 34.5 of the PENGASSAN Constitution and Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, is null and void?
7. Whether the actions of the Central Working Committee (CWC), including the refusal to process the Claimants' petitions and grievances as required by Rules 34.4 and 34.9.4.6 of the PENGASSAN Constitution, amount to an infringement of the claimants’ rights under the PENGASSAN Constitution and the general principles of fair hearing?
8. Whether by the construction and interpretation of Rules 9.5, 9.9, 13.6.1, 13.6.2, 13.6.4, 23.5, 23.5.1, 26.1., 26.2. 26.3, 34.10.1, 34.10.2 of the PENGASSAN Constitution, it is mandatory for the CWC and the NEC to ensure proper accounting records, audits and disbursement of the funds of the Association?
Counsel’s arguments on each issue are as follows:
ISSUES ONE AND TWO
In arguing issues 1 and 2 together, learned counsel for the claimants set out the provisions of Rules 32.1, 32.2, 32.3, 32.6 and 32.7 of the PENGASSAN Constitution to submit that, with respect to the branch, the EGDC shall be constituted by the BECOM and no any other organ of the Association can do so. It was further submitted that in the constitution of the EGDC by the BECOM, the BECOM does not have any discretion to alter, amend or add to the method of constitution and composition except as provided by the PENGASSAN Constitution. Also, by Rule 32.7, the EGDC must be comprised of 2 elected BECOM members and 3 other members who shall be nominated by the BECOM and chaired by Branch IRO. Any branch EGDC not constituted by the BECOM in accordance with Rules 32.7 of the Constitution is null, void and of no effect.
ISSUE THREE
In arguing issue 3, learned counsel for the claimants set out the provisions of Rules 4.4(b) and 11.5.3 of the PENGASSAN Constitution to submit that where there is a merger which results to a new branch, the CWC has power to appoint a CTC to steer the affairs of the new branch for a maximum period of 3 months within which election shall be conducted to elect the BECOM who will take over the affairs of the branch. By the provisions of Rules 4.4(b) of the PENGASSAN Constitution, it is mandatory on the CWC to conduct a branch election before the expiration of the tenure of the CTC. Also, the power of the CWC to appoint CTC cannot be extended.
ISSUE FOUR
It was submitted that the suspension of the Claimants by the Defendants was not done in accordance with the due process laid in Rule 32.7 of the PENGASSAN Constitution. Their suspension is therefore invalid, illegal and liable to be set aside. The PENGASSAN Constitution laid down the valid procedure to be followed in a disciplinary matter in Rules 32.0, 32.1, 32.7, 32.8 and 10.7 and Schedules 2.2.8 of the PENGASSAN Constitution. Counsel set out the provisions of Rules 32.0, 32.1, 32.7, 32.8 and 10.7 of the PENGASSAN Constitution and argued that the Committee responsible for the discipline of members at the branch level, is the EGDC and the valid mode of suspension of a member at the Branch level is as follows:
i. Constitution of the Branch EGDC by the BECOM to act on the disciplinary cases against any erring member of the Association;
ii. The EGDC is composed of BECOM members and other nominated members by BECOM;
iii. The BECOM members are those duly elected executive members in line with the Constitution;
iv. BECOM will submit a complaint against the members of the branch to the EGDC;
v. The EGDC shall invite the members, Conduct their investigation by calling evidence;
vi. Upon the conclusion of investigation by the EGDC, the EGDC shall submits its report to the BECOM for further deliberations and recommendation to the CWC;
vii. The CWC shall forward its recommendation to the NEC for ratification and approval, if there no any appeal filed;
viii. The NEC shall pass the final resolution on such disciplinary recommendation upon ratification.
ix. The only valid decision on any disciplinary actions involving the members of the 1st Defendant is the duly ratified decision of the NEC.
It was argued that the EGDC of the branch was constituted by an illegal CTC and not by BECOM and the members of the EGDC are not members of BECOM. For this reason, the EGDC was not validly constituted or composed. The EGDC therefore does not have the powers to disciplinary action or recommend the suspension the claimants. The composition of the EGDC, its report and recommendation ought to be nullified. By Rule 10.7 of the PENGASSAN Constitution, the CWC may only review and recommend disciplinary measures, while the NEC retains the ultimate authority to ratify any suspension or termination of membership. In his case however, as shown in the claimants’ suspension letters, the CWC issued suspension letters directly to the Claimants without seeking the ratification of the NEC. This action of the CWC amounts to usurpation of the powers of NEC and a violation of the Constitution. The failure of the CWC to seek ratification of the suspension renders the suspension of the Claimants null and void.
ISSUE FIVE
Counsel referred to Rule 11.4.3 and 11.5.3 of the PENGASAN Constitution and submitted that the expiration of tenure of BECOM mandates the conduct of election and the appointment of a Returning Officer by the 3rd Defendant for Branch elections. Upon the expiration of tenure of BECOM, there has to be a dissolution of the committee after which election process is commenced by the Returning Officer appointed by the 3rd Defendant. By the Constitution, it is mandatory on the Defendants, through the 3rd Defendant, to appoint a Returning Officer to immediately proceed with election processes upon the expiration of tenure of BECOM. The 3rd Defendant's failure to appoint a returning officer for the conduct of the NMDPRA BECOM election is unconstitutional, null and void.
The tenure of the BECOM came to an end on the 27th May 2025 but the Defendants constituted a CTC to direct the affairs of the Branch. In the PENGASSAN Constitution, there are only 2 instances where a CTC can be constituted. The first instance is under Rule 4.4(b) where the Defendants can only constitute a CTC if there is a 'merger of Branches' and within the transition period wherein election would be conducted, a CTC is to be constituted to manage the affairs of the new Branch. This was done by the Defendants in October of 2021 upon the merger of agencies by the Petroleum Industry Act. The Claimants had no dispute with this first CTC as it was a valid constitution, save the extension of tenure. The second instance is under Rule 31.4 where if the BECOM is dissolved from as a result of a disciplinary action against it arising from Rules 31.1, 31.2, and 31.3 of the Constitution. If there was a disciplinary dissolution of the BECOM, a CTC would be constituted to manage the affairs of the Branch for 3 months while election is conducted. The constitution of the CTC in June 2025 was not as a result of merger nor was it a result of a disciplinary dissolution of BECOM. The situation was that the BECOM's tenure, although marred with illegality, had expired. The proper procedure following the expiration of the tenure is to conduct as election as provided in Rule 11.4.3 of the Constitution. Except as provided in Rule 4.4(b) and Rule 31.4, the Defendants have no power under the Constitution to constitute a CTC and any constitution outside the provision of the Constitution is invalid, illegal and ultra vires. The action of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants in constituting CTC to perpetually run the affairs of the Branch and failing to conduct of valid election after the expiration of the BECOM's tenure is a violation of the constitution.
ISSUES SIX AND SEVEN
Issues 6 and 7 were argued together. It is the submission of counsel for the claimants that by RULE 34.5 of the PENGASSAN Constitution and Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the claimants were entitled to fair hearing but they were never granted an opportunity to defend themselves before the CWC issued the suspension letters. Also, Rules 34.4 (iv) and 34.9.4.6 of the PENGASSAN Constitution guarantee members the right to ventilate grievances and have same processed but instead of addressing the Claimants' petitions in Exhibits B, C, D, F, H, O1-O17and P, the Defendants ignored them and instead proceeded to punish the Claimants. The actions of the Defendants violated the 1st Defendant's Constitution.
Prior to the resolution of the CWC to suspend the Claimants, the Defendants never gave the Claimants a right of fair hearing to appeal the reports of the EGDC, as required by schedule 2.2.8 to the Constitution, before the decision was passed. Upon the suspension of the Claimants, the claimants individually appealed against the decision of the CWC in line with schedule 2.3 but none of the Appeals was processed or considered by the Defendants only for the 4th Defendant to implement the suspension vide Exhibit Q.
ISSUE EIGHT
It was submitted that the PENGASSAN Constitution provided for the need for financial management and accountability of the funds of the association in Rule 34.10.1 of the PENGASSAN Constitution. Rule 34.10.2 and provide that since the funds of the 1st Defendant are held for the benefit of the members, there should be regular audits and appropriate distribution of summaries of such audits to ensure that members and the general public have adequate information of the finance of the 1st defendant. The NEC and the Defendants, being the superior governing organs of the 1st defendant, utmost degree of compliance with the provision of the Constitution is expected of them. But the NEC and the CWC have failed in the management of the funds of the association; failed to ensure proper financial management and accountability of the 1st Defendant's funds and failed to present financial reports of the association for the past four years. There was also the absence of audit reports as well as submission of budget proposal.
By the combined reading of Rules 13.6.1, 13.6.2, and 13.6.4, the National Financial Secretary of the CWC is mandated to record all monies of the association and maintain such records; prepare financial statements of the Association for each meeting of the NEC and NDC; prepare annual account for auditing which is to be submitted to the Registrar of Trade Union. The Financial Secretary and Trustees of the association shall also draft the annual budget for the consideration of the CWC and the final approval of the NEC, pursuant to Rule 26.1. To further protect the funds of the association, the Constitution created the offices of National Auditors, with the responsibility of auditing the accounts of the association at all tiers under Rules 13.10.3. The Constitution made the NEC duty bound to protect the funds of the Association against extravagance, misappropriation and mismanagement in Rule 9.5, which can be attained through maintaining up-to-date financial books and reports, and ensuring adequate disbursement of funds. By Rule 9.9, the NEC makes the final approval of the association's annual budget and annual financial reports of the association.
The Defendants violation of the Constitution in the management of the Association's finance is also apparent in lack of remittance to the Branch and Chapter. One of the sources of funds for the association is the check-off dues paid by members of the association and 40 percent of the check-off dues go to the Branches for distribution as stated in Rules 23.5 (IV) and 23.5.1 of the Constitution. However, no remittance had been made to either the Chapter or the Branch by the Defendants which is tantamount to depriving the members of the association funds belonging to them. The failure of the CWC and the NEC to ensure proper accounting records, audits and disbursement of the funds of the Association is a violation of the PENGASSAN Constitution. Counsel urged the Court, in conclusion, to grant the reliefs sought by the claimants in this suit.
CASE OF THE DEFENDANTS
The defendants filed a counter affidavit and written address in opposition to the Originating Summons on 11th November 2025. The counter affidavit was deposed to by Femi Abimbola, a Legal Practitioner in the law firm of Sola lji & Co.
It was averred that the claimants lack the locus to institute this action in a representative capacity because the Claimants are not recognized representatives of the NMDPRA Branch of PENGASSAN and they do not have the authorization of the National Secretariat or Central Working Committee [CWC] of PENGASSAN as well as that of the majority of members of the NMDPRA Branch of PENGASSAN. The membership of the claimants in PENGASSAN had since been suspended because of their involvement in acts of misconduct, constitutional violations, and actions prejudicial to the interest of the 1st Defendant. The act of the Claimants and some of their associates which constituted unconstitutional conduct include the constitution of a parallel Executive Committee, electoral body and creation of a letterhead which bears the 1st Defendant's logo, in total defiance of the authority of the Caretaker Committee constituted by the CWC of the 1st Defendant. The Constitution empowers the CWC to extend or reconstitute a CTC where the exigencies of administration or unresolved Branch disputes require, in the interest of the members. In line with the provisions of the 1st Defendant's Constitution, the CWC and NEC exercise supervisory powers over all disciplinary organs. Where a Branch EGDC cannot be constituted due to the absence of a validly elected BECOM, the CWC may act to ensure discipline and order, in accordance with Rules 4.4(b) and 10.7. A CTC constituted by the CWC to administer the operation of a Branch, pending election into the positions of BECOM, have the full constitutional powers of the BECOM, including the power to constitute a disciplinary committee to investigate the conduct of its erring Branch member(s). The 4th to 8th Defendants, who were constituted as the Chairman, Secretary and members of the CTC, act as substantive BECOM, and have the full authority of the BECOM, pending the time the election is conducted to fill the vacant positions of BECOM.
When the BECOM of NMDPRA Branch completed its tenure, it ought to have notified the National Body two months before the expiration of its tenure but it failed to do so and it continued to remain in office for another 3 months after the expiration of the initial term. This caused the CWC to constitute the 2021 Caretaker Committee to stabilize the new NMDPRA Branch. The constitution of the Caretaker Committee (CTC) and subsequent extensions of its tenure was lawful and in compliance with Rules 10.2, 10.10 and 31.4 of the PENGASSAN Constitution. The CTC was duly constituted by the CWC after the expiration of the BECOM pending a new election in accordance with Rule 31.4 of the Constitution.
The queries and EGDC proceedings were lawfully issued, following acts of insubordination, disruption, and disobedience to lawful directives of the National Secretariat. The composition of the EGDC was equally proper, given the absence of a functioning BECOM other than the CTC. The Claimants' suspension followed due process and was recommended by the EGDC, reviewed by the CWC, and ratified in accordance with internal disciplinary procedures. The Claimants were given fair hearing, and having been duly notified in writing. The CWC acted transparently, in accordance with the Constitution and in the best interest of the 1st Defendant and its members. The CWC's intervention in the NMDPRA Branch was lawful, constitutional, and justified under the doctrine of necessity, aimed at preventing leadership vacuum and industrial disruption.
The present dispute arose from the demand by some aggrieved members of the NMDPRA Branch of PENGASSAN, insisting on conducting a hybrid election instead of the constitutionally recognized delegates' election applicable to Branches with multiple Chapters across the country. Although the PENGASSAN Constitution provide room for a non-delegates' election, such arrangement applies only to Branches without multiple Chapters. The insistence of the Claimants on conducting a hybrid election led to internal tension within the Branch from May 2025. The Claimants also embarked on several unconstitutional actions found to be inimical to the interest of the Association. The Claimants have consistently acted contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and their actions amount to gross misconduct and insubordination. The PENGASSAN Constitution provides for the procedure for internal dispute resolution which all members are bound to follow in Sections 3.0 to 3.8. The Claimants failed to explore or exhaust these internal mechanisms before escalating their grievances to external bodies, including the Honourable Minister of Labour and security agencies.
By Section 32.7 of the PENGASSAN Constitution, the Caretaker Committee is the duly recognized leadership of the Branch and is responsible for the running of the Branch, including constitution of the EGDC. Pursuant to Section 31.5, the Central Working Committee (CWC) met on 18th August 2025, deliberated on the disciplinary report submitted by the EGDC and effected the suspension of the Claimants. The CTC remains the lawfully constituted leadership of the NMDPRA Branch and all its actions are valid, constitutional and endorsed by the National Executive of PENGASSAN. By virtue of the PENGASSAN Constitution, the CWC is the executive and administrative organ of the Association whose functions include implementing decisions of the NEC and the National Delegates' Conference (NDC). Acting under its constitutional and supervisory powers, the CWC established a CTC pending the conduct of Branch elections. All subsequent extension of the tenure of the CTC was constitutional and in tandem with the oversight functions of the CWC. The CWC also acted under the doctrine of necessity to avert a leadership vacuum. The CWC remains accountable to the National Executive Council (NEC) and the National Delegates Conference (NDC) and both organs were notified of the steps taken. Thus, the acts being complained of by the Claimants are presumed to have been regularly and properly carried out in accordance with the provisions of the 1st Defendant's Constitution.
Documents marked Exhibits A1-15, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 were attached to in the counter affidavit.
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS IN OPPOSITION
In the written address in support of the counter affidavit, the defendants adopted the 8 issues submitted for determination by the claimants. The arguments of the learned counsel for the defendants on each of the issues are as follows:
ISSUE ONE
Learned counsel for the defendants referred to Rule 31.4 of the PENGASSAN Constitution to submit that the CTC is a constitutional organ with delegated powers of the BECOM. As such, the CTC can exercise all powers exercisable by the BECOM, including constituting an EGDC. Once a BECOM ceases to exist by expiration or dissolution, the CWC has authority to constitute a CTC to run the affairs of that Branch, which implies the power to perform all routine and necessary executive functions of the BECOM pending the election of new executive officers.
When the BECOM of NMDPRA Branch failed to call for elections at the expiration of its tenure, it necessitated the intervention of the CWC who invoked Rule 31.4 to constitute a CTC by a letter dated 27th June 2025.
This action is within the constitutional powers of the CWC who has a supervisory and general oversight on the Branches and their BECOMs. A Caretaker Committee validly constituted assumes all administrative powers of the dissolved BECOM, including institution of disciplinary and ethical processes against erring members. The CTC lawfully stands in the shoes of the BECOM for all interim administrative purposes pending the time the BECOM is constituted and has power to constitute the EGDC to investigate misconduct within the Branch. Learned Counsel for the defendants submitted that the acts of the CWC and CTC enjoy the presumption of regularity under Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act 2011.
ISSUE TWO
It was submitted that the CTC of the NMDPRA Branch constituted a five-member EGDC on 8th July 2025, pursuant to Rule 32.7, to investigate several reported infractions committed by the Claimants. The EGDC invited the claimants but they refused to attend. The committee proceeded with its report, which was submitted to the CWC on 18th August 2025. The CWC subsequently suspended the Claimants in accordance with its disciplinary powers under Rule 31.5. Even if there was any procedural irregularity, the constitution of the EGDC was justified under the doctrine of necessity to fill an administrative vacuum and prevent breakdown of discipline and its report was properly ratified by the CWC in accordance with Rule 31.5 of the Constitution of the 1* Defendant. Mere dissatisfaction with disciplinary outcome does not render the process void. The EGDC and the CWC acted under clear constitutional authority and their acts are therefore valid and enforceable.
ISSUE THREE
It was submitted that the tenure of a Caretaker Committee (CTC) can be validly extended without the appointment of a Returning Officer to conduct a Branch election. The CWC possesses constitutional discretion to extend the tenure of or reconstitute a Caretaker Committee in the interest of effective administration. Rule 10.2 of the PENGASSAN Constitution vests in the CWC the power to ensure an effective and efficient administration of the Association. This provision connotes that the CWC must ensure the smooth and effective running of the administration of the Association and thus, may perform any other role(s) as may be deemed necessary for the smooth and effective running of the administration of the association, inclusive of the NMDPRA Branch. The NMDPRA Branch had no functional BECOM, was engulfed in factional disputes, and had members from newly merged Agencies under the Petroleum Industry Act 2021 still in the process of integration. These circumstances made immediate elections impracticable. The CWC was therefore duty-bound to extend the tenure of or reconstitute the CTC to prevent a leadership vacuum in order to maintain industrial peace.
It was submitted that the purpose of the three-month provision is to prevent indefinite or arbitrary occupation of office not to bar the CWC from extending the tenure of the CTC where the exigencies of administration require it. Counsel for the defendants cited A-G, Federation v. Atiku Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1 to support his argument that constitutional or statutory time limits are directory, not mandatory, where strict enforcement would defeat the purpose of the instrument. Counsel also relied on National Union of Electricity Employees V. BPE (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 538. According to counsel, the extension of the CTC's tenure is a lawful exercise of the CWC's administrative discretion under Rule 10.2.
It was argued further, with regards to the appointment of a Returning Officer under Rule 11.5.3, that the Constitution did not provide any where that the CTC's tenure automatically lapses if a Returning Officer has not been appointed. Rules 4.4(b), 11.5.3, and 31.4 shows that the CWC may constitute or reconstitute a CTC "to administer the affairs of the Branch pending the conduct of elections and the conduct of elections depends on the readiness of the Branch, for which a Returning Officer is appointed as and when due. To insist that elections must be held within three-month period regardless of readiness would undermine the constitution's goal of orderly administration. The CWC's decision to extend the CTC's tenure was reasonable, constitutional and in the best interest of all the members.
ISSUE FOUR
It was submitted that a careful interpretation of the Rules 32.7, 34.4, 34.5, 34.9, 4.6, 10.3, 10.7 and Schedule 2.2.8 of the PENGASSAN Constitution will show that the disciplinary structure of PENGASSAN is multi-tiered and constitutionally regulated. The disciplinary framework begins at the Branch level through the EGDC and culminating in CWC and, where necessary, ratification by the NEC. Under Rule 32.7, the responsibility to constitute the EGDC resides in the BECOM but where a BECOM is dissolved or absent, the CTC assumes the authority and powers of BECOM to run the Branch, including the institution of the EGDC where necessary.
The CWC acts as the executive and administrative organ of the Association and in the exercise of this constitutional mandate under Rule 10.2 of the Constitution, the CWC constituted the CTC. The CTC constituted under Rule 31.4, created a Branch EGDC which investigated and reported the Claimants' misconduct in accordance with Rule 32.7 and Schedule 2.2.8. The CWC, at its meeting of 18th August 2025, deliberated on and adopted the EGDC report, as required by Rule 34.5. The decision suspending the claimants was communicated to them. These steps satisfy the procedural prerequisites for a valid disciplinary action. The validity of the suspension does not depend on prior NEC approval because ratification by the NEC is confirmatory and not jurisdictional nor a condition precedent. There is no constitutional requirement that the NEC must first ratify the CWC's decision before a suspension takes effect. The suspension remains valid until overturned.
It was further argued that the Claimants were accorded fair hearing as they were notified of the allegations, invited to appear before the EGDC but they refused or failed to attend. Counsel submitted that a person who refuses an opportunity to defend himself cannot later complain of denial of fair hearing relying on UBA V. Oranuba (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt.
1337) 1.
ISSUE FIVE
Learned Counsel for the defendants submitted that Rule 11.4.3 flows from Rule 11.4.0 on House Dissolution which is concerned with the agenda of the National, Zonal, Branch and Chapter Delegates' Conference as applicable. With respect to Branch Delegates' Conference, the thrust of Rule 11.4.1 of the Constitution is that at appropriate time during the agenda of the Conference, the Branch Chairman shall call for a motion to dissolve the BECOM. It is in this context of dissolution of the BECOM at the Branch Delegates that the General Secretary is mandated, in Rule 11.5.3 of the Constitution to appoint a Returning Officer for the conduct of elections into the BECOM. Thus, one major agenda item of the Branch Delegates' Conference is the election of new officers into the BECOM and it is mandatory to conduct the election of BECOM after dissolution of BECOM at the Branch Delegates' Conference.
When the tenure of a BECOM expires but Branch Delegates' Conference couldn’t be held to conduct elections, the CWC has an obligation to appoint a CTC to administer the Branch for a period of 3-months during which the CTC will make arrangements for the Branch Delegates' Conference for the election of BECOM. The tenure of a CTC can also be validly extended without the appointment of a Returning Officer to conduct a Branch election. Thus, it is not mandatory on the CWC through the General Secretary, to appoint a returning officer to immediately proceed with election processes upon the expiration of tenure of BECOM.
ISSUE SIX
It was admitted that both Rule 34.5 of the PENGASSAN Constitution and Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution entitle the claimants to the right to fair hearing. However, the requirement of fair hearing is met once an opportunity to be heard is offered, whether or not the person avails himself of it. Counsel referred to Okeke V. Uwaechina (2022) LPELR-57291 (SC); Carnation Registrars Ltd V. President of the NICN (2023) LPELR-60102(SC); UBA v. Oranuba (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1337) 1 and Olatunbosun V. NISER Council (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 80) 25. In this case, the EGDC invited the Claimants to appear before it and answer the allegations against them but only two of the 24 invited members attended. 22 members, including the claimants, refused to appear despite having knowledge of the proceedings. The EGDC proceeded in their absence and submitted its report to the CWC in line with Rule 34.5. The CWC considered the report, adopted it and recommended the suspension of the Claimants. The Claimants' refusal to attend the hearing after they were invited constitutes a waiver of their right to be heard. A person who deliberately declines to utilise the opportunity for defence cannot later allege denial of fair hearing. The cases of Ogundoyin V. Adeyemi (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 403 and lbrahim V. F.R.N. (2019) 17 NWLR (Pt.1702) 311 were relied on.
It was submitted that the procedure adopted by the Defendants complied with Rule 34.5 and in line with the disciplinary procedure of the 1" Defendant. Thus, the suspension of the Claimants is valid and constitutional and they were afforded opportunity for fair hearing in accordance with the provision of Rule 34.5 of the PENGASSAN Constitution and Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution.
ISSUE SEVEN
It was submitted that the Claimants' allegation that the CWC violated Rules 34.4, 34.9, and 4.6 of the PENGASSAN Constitution by refusing to process their petitions or grievances are unfounded as it is within the constitutional mandate of the CWC to properly attend to its members concerns and the period within which to attend to such concern has no time limit. The Claimants never properly submitted their petitions through the established internal mechanisms. They bypassed the recognised Branch CTC to address the petitions to external authorities, which is a misconduct under Rule 28.1 and 28.2 of the PENGASSAN Constitution. Counsel set out the provisions of Schedule 3 of the PENGASSAN to submit that members are enjoined to exhaust all internal avenues for redress of grievances before resorting to external bodies. But the claimants violated these rules and they cannot now accuse the CWC of refusing to process grievances that were not properly submitted.
The CWC's discretion to defer or decline petitions during ongoing disciplinary proceedings is constitutionally protected having been empowered to take all such steps as are necessary in the best interest of the Association and for the smooth and effective running of the Association. The CWC, having received the EGDC report indicting the Claimants, it was justified in deferring consideration of their petitions until after the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The Constitution does not require the CWC to process every grievance immediately, particularly where there is an ongoing disciplinary measure against the complainants. In any case, the CWC's temporary deferment of the Claimants grievances was lawful and reasonable exercise of administrative discretion but not a refusal or violation of their rights.
The Claimants have produced no credible evidence that the CWC deliberately or maliciously refused to process any properly filed grievance. Counsel cited APC V. Garba (2022) LPELR-57513(CA) where it was held that courts should not interfere with the internal administrative discretion of an Association unless there is proven illegality or manifest bad faith. The CWC's conduct neither deprived the Claimants of their right to petition nor foreclosed access to internal remedies. The Claimants refused to submit to the same procedures they now claim were denied them. Thus, the alleged delay or refusal by the CWC to process the Claimants' petitions and grievances, as required by Rules 34.4, 34.9, and 4.6 of the PENGASSAN Constitution, does not amount to infringement of the Claimants' rights to fair hearing
ISSUE EIGHT
It was submitted that Rules 9.5, 9.9, 13.6.1, 13.6.2, and 13.6.4 of the PENGASSAN Constitution assign the responsibility for financial management, accountability and oversight of the Association to the CWC and NEC collectively. While the CWC functions as the administrator of funds, the NEC ensures compliance, integrity, and transparency in financial dealings. It is therefore mandatory for the CWC and the NEC to ensure proper accounting records, audits, and disbursement of the funds of the Association. These are fundamental obligations imposed also by Sections 37 and 38 of the Trade Unions Act.
The CWC and NEC have fully complied with their constitutional financial duties and have consistently ensured transparency, periodic audit, and due process in the management of PENGASSAN's funds. Counsel referred to the case of Onuekwusi V. R.T. C.N. (1998) 9 NWLR (Pt. 566) 596 where it was held that where a constitution of a trade union provides mechanisms for accountability and the union follows those mechanisms, the court will not interfere in the absence of proof of fraud or gross irregularity. Counsel also relied on National Union of Electricity Employees V. Bureau of Public Enterprises (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1194) 538 to the effect that courts should be slow to interfere in the internal administration of trade unions where the acts complained of are done bonafide and within constitutional powers. Thus, as long as the CWC and NEC have acted within the framework of Rules 9.5-34.10.2, the court should presume regularity under Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
In addition, the Claimants who alleged financial infractions failed to prove the allegation by their failure to produce the audit reports showing discrepancies or evidence of misapplication of funds or the minutes of NEC meetings showing the failure to account. The Claimants have not adduced evidence to prove that the CWC and NEC have failed, at any point, in discharging their mandatory obligation. Counsel submitted in conclusion that the Claimants have not put forth any tangible case to merit the reliefs sought. He urged this court to dismiss this suit.
CLAIMANTS FURTHER AFFIDAVIT AND REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW
The claimants filed a further affidavit and reply on points of law on 17th November 2025. The further affidavit was deposed to by Muhammed Mujib Rahman, the 2nd Claimant in this suit. I observed, upon reading the contents of the further affidavit and the submissions made in the reply, that the processes are basically repeating of the facts already deposed in the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons and the submissions already made in the written address in support of the Originating Summons. It is therefore safe to simply deem the further affidavit and reply on points of law as having been duly considered in this judgment.
DECISION
The Claimants are members of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority [NMDPRA] Branch of the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASAN), the 1st defendant in this suit, who were suspended from the Association by the Central Working Committee [CWC] of the 1st defendant sometimes in August 2025. In the Originating Summons, the claimants submitted 16 questions for determination by the Court. Upon examining the questions, I observe that they can be determined under 5 issues, which are:
1. Whether the Caretaker Committee [CTC] constituted by the Central Working Committee [CWC] of the 1st defendant [PENGASSAN] for the NMDPRA Branch of the 1st defendant on 27th June 2025 was validly constituted.
2. Whether the CTC can exist for more than 3 months without the branch election being conducted.
3. Whether the Ethical, Grievance and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC) established by the Caretaker Committee [CTC] for NMDPRA Branch of the 1st defendant was properly constituted and can validly exercise disciplinary powers over the Claimants.
4. Whether the suspension of the claimants from membership of the 1st defendant by the Central Working Committee on 18th August 2025 is proper and valid.
5. Whether the Central Working Committee (CWC) and the National Executive Committee (NEC) has been shown to have failed in their mandatory function to ensure proper accounting records, audits and disbursement of the funds of the Association to the Branches and Chapters.
I will determine the issues seriatim as set out above.
ISSUE 1:
This issue arose from questions 5 and 12 of the Originating Summons. In these questions, the claimants challenged the constitution of the branch CTC by the CWC and the failure to conduct election after expiration of the tenure of the Branch Executive Committee [BECOM]. In questions 3, 5, 6, 10 and 12 of the Originating Summons, the claimants want this Court to construe the provisions of Rules 4.4(b), 11.4.3, 11.5.3, 31.2, 31.3, 3.14, 31.4, 11.4.1, 11.7.3 and 20.1 of the 1st defendant’s constitution to determine the questions. The 2022 Constitution of the 1st defendant is Exhibit A of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons.
The case of the claimants is that upon the establishment of the NMDPRA in 2021, the CWC of the 1st defendant, in accordance with Rule 4.4(b) of the Constitution, constituted a CTC on 10th January 2022 to run the affairs of the NMDPRA Branch for 3 Months while election is conducted. At the expiration of the 3 months tenure of the CTC in March 2022, the branch election was not conducted by the CWC but it extended the tenure of the CTC by another 3 months even though no provision in the 1st defendant’s constitution gave power to the CWC to extend the tenure of the CTC for another 3 months. At the expiration of the 6 months CTC transition period in May 2022, election held where new BECOM was elected in May 2022 and the tenure of the BECOM was to come to an end on 27th May 2025 by Rule 20.1 of the Constitution. However, instead of conducting elections to elect new BECOM, the Defendants constituted a CTC to direct the affairs of the Branch in June 2025. This new CTC comprised of the 4th to 8th defendants as its chairman and members.
The quarrel of the claimants is with this new CTC. According to them, there are two instances in the 1st defendant’s constitution where a CTC can be constituted. The first instance is under Rule 4.4(b) where there is a merger of Branches and within the transition period when election would be conducted, a CTC is to be constituted to manage the affairs of the new Branch. The second instance is under Rule 31.4 where there is a disciplinary dissolution of the BECOM arising from Rules 31.1, 31.2, and 31.3 of the Constitution, then a CTC would be constituted to manage the affairs of the Branch for 3 months while election is conducted. It was contended by the claimants that the CTC constituted in June 2025 was not as a result of merger nor was it a result of a disciplinary dissolution of BECOM. Since the BECOM's tenure expired, the proper thing to have been done was to conduct as election as provided in Rule 11.4.3 of the Constitution and not to constitute a CTC. It is for this reason the claimants assert that the CTC constituted in June 2025 by the defendants is invalid, unlawful and unconstitutional.
On their part, the response of the defendants is that the 1st defendant’s Constitution empowers the CWC to constitute, extend or reconstitute a CTC where the exigencies of administration or unresolved Branch disputes requires or in the interest of the members. When the BECOM of NMDPRA Branch completed its tenure, it ought to have notified the National Body two months before the expiration of its tenure but it failed to do so and it continued to remain in office for another 3 months after the expiration of the initial term. When the BECOM of NMDPRA Branch failed to call for elections at the expiration of its tenure, it necessitated the intervention of the CWC who invoked Rule 31.4 to constitute a CTC by a letter dated 27th June 2025. This action is within the constitutional powers of the CWC who has a supervisory and general oversight on the Branches and their BECOMs. The CTC was duly constituted by the CWC after the expiration of the BECOM pending a new election in accordance with Rule 31.4 of the Constitution. It was also contended that the CWC acted under the doctrine of necessity to avert a leadership vacuum.
From the facts, it is not in dispute that upon the expiration of the tenure of the BECOM of NMDPRA Branch of the 1st defendant in May 2025, the CWC of the 1st defendant constituted a CTC for the Branch in June 2025. The letter of notification of the constitution of the CTC is Exhibit G. The 4th to 8th defendants are the members of the CTC. The claimants’ contention is that the CTC was not validly constituted because none of the 2 situations under Rules 4.4(b) and 31.4 of the 1st defendant’s constitution for constitution of a branch CTC existed at the time to warrant the constitution of the CTC.
I have examined the provisions of the 1st defendant’s constitution. It contains 3 circumstances in which a CTC may be constituted to run a Branch of the 1st defendant.
Rule 4.4(b) provides as follows:
“Merger: Where a merger results in a new branch, fresh elections shall be conducted within three (3) months. During the three-month transition period, a Caretaker Committee with equal representation from both branches shall be constituted to run the affairs of the new branch. Where the legal status of the companies remains after the merger, the branches will continue to exist.”
Rule 16.2 provides that:
“The power to establish a new branch shall be at the discretion of the association, where necessary a caretaker committee shall be constituted or proper election shall be conducted.”
Rules 31.2 and 31.4 provide thus:
31.2- “The CWC may suspend or dissolve, subject to the approval of NEC, the Executive Committee of any Branch in accordance with the Rules of the Constitution and the procedure in Schedule 2.”
31.4- “In the event of the dissolution of a Branch Executive Committee, a Caretaker Committee of not more than five persons shall be constituted to run the affairs of the Branch for a period of three months during which time an election shall be conducted to elect officers. However, the three months tenure as Caretaker shall not count for persons who serve in Caretaker Committees.”
From the above provisions, a Care Taker Committee (CTC) may be constituted for a branch of the 1st defendant where there is a merger resulting to a new branch or where a new branch is established or where a BECOM is dissolved as a result of a disciplinary action. Were any of these situations present when the 4th to 8th defendants were constituted as CTC in June 2025?
The facts contained in the affidavit of the parties show that none of the situations for setting up a CTC for a branch in Rules 4.4(b), 16.2 31.2 and 31.4 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution existed as at June 2025 when the 4th to 8th defendants were constituted as CTC for the Branch. There was no merger resulting to a new branch nor was the branch a newly established branch. Also, the BECOM was not dissolved as a result of a disciplinary action. It is a fact that the tenure of the last BECOM expired and it was thereafter that the CTC was constituted. There is however evidence from the parties showing that elections could not be conducted after the expiration of the tenure of the BECOM to elect new BECOM as a result of internal wrangling between the members. See paragraphs 45 to 60 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons and paragraphs 35 to 37 of the defendant’s counter affidavit. It is therefore clear that upon the expiration of the tenure of the last BECOM, a vacuum in the leadership of the branch was created and elections could not be immediately conducted to elect new BECOM. The constitution of the 1st defendant did not make provision for how the branch should be run before election is conducted in such a situation where the tenure of BECOM expired but election could not be held. The defendants have said in their counter affidavit that they invoked Rule 31.4 of the 1st defendant’s constitution to constitute the CTC.
A careful examination of the provisions of Rules 4.4[b], 16.2 and 31.4 of the 1st defendant’s constitution reveals that the spirit or purpose behind the provision for constituting CTC for a branch is to appoint leadership for a branch which is yet to conduct election to elect BECOM. The function of the CTC is to administer the affairs of the branch for a limited period pending when election will be conducted to elect the BECOM. Now, Rules 10.2 and 10.10 of the 1st defendant’s constitution empowers the CWC to ensure the effective administration of the association, including performing any act deemed necessary for the smooth and effective running of the association. When the tenure of the last BECOM of the branch expired and elections were not immediately conducted, the branch was left without leadership. That situation is relatively similar to the circumstance in Rule 31.4 of the 1st defendant’s constitution when a BECOM is dissolved before election is conducted. The proper thing for the CWC to do to avoid leadership vacuum in the branch and to ensure the branch continues to run was to constitute a CTC. I therefore agree with the defendants that the constitution of the CTC by the CWC was occasioned by the doctrine of necessity to avert a leadership vacuum in the branch arising from the inability to conduct the branch election.
The fact that the CTC was not constituted under any of the circumstances provided in Rules 4.4(b) and 31.4 of the 1st defendant’s constitution cannot be used to fault the constitution of the CTC. In my view, the constitution of the CTC is valid, lawful or constitutional. Questions 5 and 12 of the Originating Summons are answered in the negative
ISSUE 2
This issue arose from questions 3, 6 and 10 of the Originating Summons. In question 3, the claimants questioned whether by the provisions of Rules 4.4(b), 11.4.3 and 11.5.3 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution, the 3 months tenure of the CTC can be extended without the appointment of a returning officer to conduct the branch election? I have earlier examined the provisions of Rule 4.4[b] of the 1st defendant’s Constitution which require that, in the case of merger of branches, fresh elections must be conducted within 3 months and during the 3-month transition period, a Caretaker Committee be constituted to run the affairs of the new branch.
Rule 11.5.3 designated the Principal/Senior/Assistant General Secretary or the Organizing Secretary or any person appointed by the General Secretary or his designate as the Returning Officer for Branch election. While Rule 11.4.3 provides that following the dissolution of BECOM, the returning officer shall immediately proceed with the election process. Rule 11.4.3, when read with Rules 11.4.1 and 11.4.2 relates to conduct of election upon dissolution of the BECOM at the Branch Delegate Conference. That is to say the requirement of the 1st defendant’s constitution for a returning officer to immediately proceed with the election process in Rule 11.4.3 relate to conduct of election upon the dissolution of the BECOM at the Branch Delegate Conference. The last BECOM of the NMDPRA Branch was not dissolved at the Branch Delegate Conference. The tenure expired without a Branch Delegate Conference held to formally dissolve the BECOM. Accordingly, the requirement in Rule 11.4.3 was not applicable in that circumstance.
I have said in this judgment that the CWC was right to have constituted the branch CTC in view of the exigency of the situation with the branch. Now, the purpose for which the 1st defendant’s constitution provided the constitution of CTC in Rules 4.4[b] and 31.4 is to run the branch for 3 months within which period election must be conducted to elect the BECOM. The CTC was constituted in June 2025 and its duration, as stated in Exhibit G, is 3 months from 27th June 2025, which lapsed on 27th September 2025. The branch election ought to be conducted within that period. However, as at the time the claimants filed this suit in October 2025, the CTC was still in place and no election had been conducted to elect the branch BECOM. There is no evidence placed before this court by the defendants to show that the continued existence of the CTC was a result of a valid or authorized extension of its tenure. Besides, there is no provision in the 1st defendant’s constitution which allow for extension of the tenure of the CTC without conducting elections.
It is therefore a fact that neither the CWC nor the CTC appointed a returning officer to conduct the branch election within the 3 months tenure of the CTC, instead, the CTC was left to continue to exist. By the provisions of the 1st defendant’s Constitution permitting the constitution of a CTC, the CTC can only exist for 3 months within which period the Constitution mandates that election must be conducted. The refusal of the defendants to conduct the branch election within the 3 months tenure of the CTC is unlawful and unconstitutional. I also hold that the continued existence of the CTC beyond 3 months, without elections being conducted, is unlawful and unconstitutional. On this ground, the CTC, having exceeded its life span is hereby dissolved. Consequently, questions 3, 6 and 10 of the Originating Summons are answered in the affirmative.
ISSUE 3:
This issue encompasses questions 1, 2, 7, 11 and 13 of the Originating Summons. In these questions, the claimants challenge the appointment, composition and actions of the Ethical, Grievance and Disciplinary Committee (EGDC) set up by the CTC of the NMDPRA branch to investigate allegations of misconducts leveled against the claimants. It is the case of the claimants that the 1st defendant’s Constitution established the EGDC at the National, Zonal and Branch levels with the responsibility for the discipline of members. By Rule 12.7 of the 1st Defendant's Constitution, the composition of members of the EGDC at the branch level is 2 elected BECOM members and 3 other members who shall be nominated by the BECOM and chaired by the branch Industrial Relations Officer [IRO]. At the Branch level also, it is the BECOM that submits the disciplinary matter to the EGDC for investigation. When the 4th to 8th defendants were inaugurated as Branch CTC, they constituted the EGDC on 9th July 2025. There was no elected BECOM as at the time the EGDC was constituted by the CTC. According to the claimants, since the 4th to 8th defendants were not members of the elected branch BECOM, they lacked the power to appoint the EGDC. It was further contended that members of the EGDC were not members of BECOM and do not comprise of nominated members by BECOM as required by the Constitution. Thus, the composition of EGDC by the CTC violates Rule 32.7 of the Constitution which mandates that only validly elected BECOM members and other members nominated by the BECOM can make up the composition of the EGDC. The position of the learned counsel for the claimants is that the branch EGDC not constituted by the BECOM in accordance with Rules 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution is null, void and of no effect.
In response, it was averred in the counter affidavit of the defendants that the CTC of the NMDPRA Branch constituted a five-member EGDC on 8th July 2025, pursuant to Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution. By the 1st defendant’s constitution, the CTC is the duly recognized leadership of the Branch and it is responsible for the running of the Branch, including constitution of the EGDC. Thus, a CTC constituted by the CWC to administer the operation of a Branch, pending election of BECOM, has the full powers of the BECOM, including the power to constitute a disciplinary committee to investigate the conduct of its erring Branch member(s). In the absence of elected BECOM, the CTC act as substantive BECOM and has the full authority of the BECOM. It was contended that the composition of the EGDC by the CTC was proper. In his submissions, the counsel for the defendants added that the CTC can exercise all powers exercisable by the BECOM, including constituting an EGDC to investigate misconduct within the Branch.
Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution provides thus:
“At the Branch level, the EGDC shall be comprised of two elected BECOM members and three other members who shall be nominated by the BECOM and chaired by Branch IRO.”
This provision is clear and unambiguous. It mandates that the EGDC at the branch level shall be comprised of 2 elected BECOM members and 3 other members nominated by BECOM. Now, upon being constituted in June 2025, the CTC in turn set up the branch EGDC in July 2025 to investigate allegations of misconduct against the claimants.
One of the contentions of the claimants is that the CTC cannot set up EGDC but only elected BECOM can do so. I do not agree with this contention. Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution did not stipulate who can establish the EGDC. It is the constitution itself that has, in Rule 32.1, established the EGDC for each level. What Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution contained is how the EGDC is composed in terms of its membership and not who has the powers to establish the EGDC for the branch. Thus, it is the 1st defendant’s Constitution that established the branch EGDC and not the CTC.
The area where the claimants further challenged the propriety of the EGDC is the composition. According to the claimants, the EGDC at the branch level can only comprise of elected BECOM and other members nominated by the BECOM. It is for these reasons the claimants contended that the EGDC cannot validly exercise disciplinary powers over them and that the actions of the EGDC in the disciplinary case against them were illegal and a violation the Constitution.
By Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution, the EGDC is composed of only elected BECOM members and other members whom the BECOM nominated. The elected Branch IRO is the constitutional Chairman of the EGDC. The provisions of Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution are mandatory by the use of the word “shall”. There was no elected BECOM at the time the EGDC was constituted in July 2025. It is clear that the EGDC constituted by the CTC was not composed as provided in Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution. The defendants, in their attempt to justify the composition of EGDC, contended that the CTC constituted by the CWC to administer the operation of a Branch pending election of BECOM, has the full powers of the BECOM, including the power to constitute a disciplinary committee to investigate the conduct of its erring Branch member(s). This fact is not in doubt. The CTC has the powers to administer or run the affairs of the Branch for the period of its duration before the BECOM is elected. The issue in contention is however whether the members of the CTC can be considered as elected BECOM to whom Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution specifically permitted to compose the EGDC and to nominate other members of the EGDC? Although the CTC, in running the branch exercises the powers of the BECOM, it cannot however transform itself to elected BECOM so as to compose the EGDC or nominate members of the EGDC under Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution. In other words, the CTC, not being elected BECOM, cannot compose the EGDC nor can it nominate other members of the EGDC. The implication is that the EGDC was constituted in violation of the provisions of the 1st defendant’s Constitution.
I have held earlier in this judgment that the CTC was rightly constituted in June 2025 to administer the branch in the absence of election to elect the BECOM. The CTC’s priority was to ensure that the branch election was organized and conducted to elect the BECOM. It seems however that the primary focus of the CTC was to discipline the claimants because of the urgency at which it set up the EGDC. In view of the clear provisions of Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution, the CTC has no role in the composition of the EGDC. The CTC ought to have left the issue of the discipline of the claimants to the incoming BECOM who could competently compose or set up the EGDC. I hold, in the result, that the CTC wrongly assumed the position of BECOM in constituting the EGDC.
Now, upon being composed, the EGDC issued queries to the Claimants; invited the Claimants to appear before the EGDC, which invitation the claimants declined anyways; submitted its report to the CWC who, after reviewing the report, suspended the Claimants from membership of the 1st defendant for a number of years. An EGDC not constituted in accordance with the provisions of the 1st defendant’s constitution cannot validly and lawfully exercise disciplinary action against members of the 1st defendant. All the actions of the EGDC taken in the disciplinary case against the claimants are therefore unlawful, null and void.
In view of the foregoing, I find grave faults in the appointment, composition and actions of the EGDC. Consequently, questions 1, 2, 7, 11 and 13 of the Originating Summons are answered in the affirmative.
ISSUE 4.
This issue combines questions 4, 8, 9 and 15 of the Originating Summons where the claimants sought the court to determine the propriety of their suspension from membership of the 1st defendant. Exhibits N, N1 to N14 are the suspension letters of the claimants, all dated 18th August 2025. The claimants were informed that the CWC deliberated on the report of the EGDC and decided to suspend the claimants from the membership of the 1st defendant.
As seen in the content of Exhibits N, N1 to N14, the suspension of the claimants resulted from the investigation and recommendation of the EGDC to the CWC. The fact that the EGDC has been found in this judgment to be unlawful and void implies that there was no competent EGDC composed as provided in Rule 32.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution which heard the case against the claimants or made any recommendation against the claimants before they were suspended. The claimants were therefore not given fair hearing by a competent EGDC before they were suspended. The further implication is that the disciplinary procedure in the 1st defendant’s Constitution was not followed before the claimants were suspended by the CWC. Therefore, the suspension of the claimants is unlawful, null and void.
The claimants also said they were suspended by the CWC without the ratification of NEC as mandatorily required by Rule 10.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution. I have examined Rule 10.7 of the 1st defendant’s Constitution. It gave power of discipline of members of the 1st defendant at all levels to the CWC but made the exercise of the power “subject to ratification by the NEC.” In other words, CWC cannot discipline any member of the 1st defendant, including suspension, without the ratification of that disciplinary action by the NEC. Any exercise of the disciplinary powers of the CWC without ratification by NEC will render the disciplinary decision of the CWC null and void.
There is no indication in Exhibits N, N1 to N14 that the NEC ratified the suspension before it was communicated to the claimants vide the letters. The defendants have however averred in the counter affidavit that the Claimants' suspension followed due process and was ratified in accordance with internal disciplinary procedures. It was also stated that the CWC is accountable to the National Executive Council (NEC) and the National Delegates Conference (NDC) and it notified both organs of the steps taken. Learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the validity of the suspension does not depend on prior NEC approval. It was also submitted that there is no constitutional requirement that the NEC must first ratify the CWC's decision before a suspension takes effect. From the facts contained in the counter affidavit of the defendants, the defendants did not adduce any evidence to show that the suspension of the claimants by the CWC, as a disciplinary action, was ratified by NEC before or after the suspension was effected. The argument of the learned Counsel for the defendants is a further confirmation that the suspension of the claimants was not with NEC ratification.
It is not in doubt that the suspension of the claimants from membership of the 1st defendant by the CWC on 18th August 2025 was not ratified by NEC of the 1st defendant. Therefore, the failure of the CWC to obtain NEC’s ratification of the suspension of the claimants renders the suspension null and void. Consequently, questions 8, 9 and 15 of the Originating Summons are answered in the affirmative. I find that the suspension of the Claimants was not done in accordance with the provisions of the 1st defendant’s Constitution. The claimants’ suspension is hereby declared invalid, illegal, null and void.
ISSUE 5.
In question 14 of the Originating Summons, the claimants asked whether it is not mandatory for the CWC and the NEC to ensure proper accounting records, audits and disbursement of the funds of the Association to the Branches and Chapters pursuant to Rules 9.5, 9.9, 13.6.1, 13.6.2, 13.6.4, 23.5, 23.5.1, 26.1, 26.2, 26.3, 34.10.1 and 34.10.2 of the Constitution of the 1st defendant? On the basis of this question, the claimants sought a declaration, in relief 10, that it is mandatory for the CWC and the NEC to ensure proper accounting records, audits and disbursement of the funds of the Association to the Chapters and Branch and failure to give financial accounts and disburse accordingly amounts to a violation of the Constitution.
I have read the provisions of Rules 9.5, 9.9, 13.6.1, 13.6.2, 13.6.4, 23.5, 23.5.1, 26.1, 26.2, 26.3, 34.10.1 and 34.10.2 of the Constitution of the 1st defendant. They made various provisions on the duties and functions of the CWC and NEC regarding the finances of the 1st defendant, including keeping proper accounting records, auditing of accounts and disbursement of the funds of the Association. These are the basic duties of the CWC and the NEC which the defendants are not disputing. In issue 8 of the written address in support of the defendant’s counter affidavit, learned counsel for the defendants confirmed that the said Rules of the 1st defendant’s Constitution assign the responsibility for financial management, accountability and oversight of the Association to the CWC and NEC collectively. Counsel also conceded that it is the duty of the CWC and the NEC to ensure proper accounting records, audits, and disbursement of the funds of the Association. It is therefore not in dispute that the constitution of the 1st defendant has vested the duty of proper accounting records, audits and disbursement of the funds of the Association on the CWC and the NEC. Question 14 is accordingly determined in the affirmative.
The issue however is whether the claimants have shown in this suit that the CWC and the NEC have failed in the performance of these constitutional responsibilities? The need to prove this claim arose from the declaration sought by the claimants in relief 10. It is the law that declaratory reliefs are granted only upon proof of the reliefs. In any suit or application where a party seeks a declaratory claim, such a party is required to prove the claim with cogent, credible and satisfactory evidence to be entitled to the grant of the claim. See ADDAH vs. UBANDAWAKI [2015] 7 NWLR [Pt. 1458] 325; ZACCALA vs. EDOSA [2018] 6 NWLR [Pt. 1616] 528. Thus, the claimants are required by law to prove that the CWC and NEC failed to give financial accounts and also failed to disburse the funds of the Association.
The evidence adduced by the claimants, which relate to the issue at hand, are those in paragraph 87 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons. It was averred that the Defendants failure to provide the annual financial report of the Association or to submit the Association's account for audit and remittance of dues to the Chapters and Branch of the Association contravenes Rules 26.5, 23.1, 23.2 and 30.6.1 of the Constitution. In these averments, the claimants made these allegations: failure to provide the annual financial report of the Association; failure to submit the Association's account for audit and failure to remit dues to the Chapters and Branches. However, the terse nature of the averment in paragraph 87 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons is not sufficient to establish the allegations. It is not enough for the claimants to merely allege that the defendants failed to discharge their financial constitutional responsibilities. The claimants must go further to satisfy the court of the basis for their assertion. The claimants failed to do so. No evidence is presented to the court from which to believe that the defendants failed to provide the annual financial report of the Association or to submit the account for audit or to remit dues to the Chapters and Branches.
In my view, what the claimants alleged in paragraph 87 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons is no more than speculation. This Court cannot grant the claim in relief 10 of the Originating Summons based on speculation. The result is that the Claimants failed to prove that the CWC and NEC failed in discharging their obligation of ensuring proper accounting records, audits, and disbursement of the funds of the Association.
CONCLUSION
Having determined the 5 issues identified by this Court for determination in this suit, all the 16 questions presented by the claimants for determination in the Originating Summons have similarly been determined. The claimants sought a total of 18 claims in the Originating Summons. Upon the resolution of the issues, reliefs 6, 10, 15, 16, 17 and 18 failed and they are accordingly dismissed. Reliefs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13 and 14 succeed and they are hereby granted in the terms as sought by the claimants, save relief 14 which is granted in these terms:
The CWC of the 1st defendant is ordered to, within 7 days of this judgment, commence the electoral process for the election of the BECOM of the NMDPRA Branch in accordance with the electoral guidelines and requirements of the constitution of the 1st defendant.
Parties shall bear their respective costs.
Judgment is entered accordingly.
Hon. Justice O. Y. Anuwe
Judge