IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ENUGU JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ENUGU

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE O.O. AROWOSEGBE

DATE:MONDAY OCTOBER 13, 2025   SUIT NO:NICN/EN/14/2022

 

 BETWEEN:

MR. UDEANI IKECHUKWU OBED.....................CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

NIGERIAN BREWERIES PLC..........................DEFENDANT

 

APPEARANCES:

1. D.O. NWEZE - FOR THE CLAIMANT.

2. CHINONSO NWOBODO - FOR THE DEFENDANT.

 

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

            COMPLAINT commenced this suit Apr 4, 2022 along with Statement of Facts [SF] which has the following reliefs at its end:

1. A declaration that the continual refusal of the Defendant to pay the Claimant compensation for injuries sustained during working hours in the premises of the Defendant at Champions Breweries Uyo, Akwa- ibom [sic] State is unlawful.
2. An Order [sic] compelling the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) for injuries sustained during working hours in the premises of the Defendant at Champions Breweries Uyo, Akwa-ibom [sic] State.
3. An Order for the payment of 20% interest of N50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) per month from April 2022, till judgment is delivered and 5% interest from the judgment date until the whole money is paid.
4. An Order that the Defendant should pay the Claimant his any other outstanding entitlement as contained in the letter of 24th April, 2017.

 

            The defendant filed Statement of Defence [SD] Aug 10, 2022 and the claimant did not file Reply. Thus, issues were deemed joined on the SD. I move to summary of the pleadings.

 

SUMMARY OF THE PLEADINGS

A: Statement of Facts

            The claimant pleaded that on 25th Mar 2016, as the defendant's employee, he sustained injuries in the course of his work, when a forklift driven by another staff, knocked him down in the defendant's factory. He pleaded that he was subsequently laid off after the accident and not paid compensation for the injuries, despite repeated demands. He pleaded that, as a result of the injuries, he could no longer provide for his family. That ends summary of the SF. I move to summary of the SD.

 

B: Summary of the Statement of Defence

            The defendant counterpleaded that the claimant was given good treatment and resumed work when he was certified okay but he and others were laid off subsequently on ground of redundancy arising from economic downturn and paid adequate compensations. The defendant further counterpleaded that, though, the claimant sustained injuries, but got well enough and resumed work before he was laid off and therefore, not incapacitated, and can still work and earn a decent living. The defendant counterpleaded the claimant's reliefs that he was not entitled to anything. Thus, ended summary of the pleadings, as the claimant did not file Reply. I move to summary of proceedings.

 

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

            The case first came up before me Jul 20, 2022 and subsequently came up few other times without any serious business. It was opened Jan 17, 2024 with the claimant testifying as CW1. CW1 adopted his Written Statement on Oath [WSO] made 22/04/2022 and tendered Exhibits C1 to C9 and was handed over for cross-examination [XX]. 

 Under XX, CW1 admitted he resumed work after the accident and that the defendant's sponsored his treatment but said he had to, because of threat that he would be sacked if he did not, but admitted no letter was written to threaten him. He admitted that his salaries were paid during the period of his absence. He said when he resumed work, he could not perform optimally because, he was still using crutches and could not put on safety gadgets. He admitted that, as a Manager, his work was to supervise his subordinates but that; it was still part of his job to repair machines and he also had to supervise technicians from the mechanic depart whenever they were carrying out repairs. He admitted he was paid redundancy benefits. The XX was brought to an end without re-examination [RXX] while the case was adjourned for defence.

            It came up for defence Jul 24, 2024 and Simeon Opaluwa testified as DW1 for the defence. He adopted his WSO made Aug 10, 2022 without tendering any exhibit and was thereafter submitted for XX. Under XX, DW1 said he had worked with the defendant for 18 years and that; he was the Human Resources Business Partner [HRBP]. He said where performance gap is discovered, his work is to identify the cause and apply the necessary corrective measures and that; the line manager primarily escalates the gaps in a worker under him and his duty comes in thereafter. He said redundancy has a procedure which begins with agreeing on modalities with the unions, which report back to the workers and that; the defendant had such agreement with the union on the instant redundancy. He said the mandate that the union must discuss redundancy with their members is the practice.

            He said he knew the claimant could still work because, after full treatment, the doctors certified that he could work and that he was not aware that he must be paid for the injuries for which he was treated and certified fit. He said disable people work with the defendant till date and the XX was brought to an end without RXX. The defendant closed its case and the matter was adjourned for adoption of final written addresses [FWAs]. 

            It came up for FWAs Jul 16, 2025. CHINONSO NWOBODO adopted the defendant's FWA while D.O. NWEZE's application to regularise the claimant's FWA was granted and the learned Nweze subsequently adopted the claimant's FWA. There being no Reply on Points of Law [RPL], the case was adjourned to Oct 2, 2025 for judgment and because, it was not ready on this date, it was further adjourned sine die. When it was ready, date was communicated to the learned counsel to the parties. Having done with summary of the proceedings, I move to summary of the FWAs.

 

SUMMARY OF THE FWAs

A: Summary of the Defendant's FWA

             OGOCHUKWU ONYEKWULUJE franked the defendant's FWA and submitted a lone issue to wit: "Did the Claimant prove his case to be entitled to his claims. " [sic] Arguing the lone issue, the learned counsel said the claimant's case was that he was sent on redundancy because of his injury without paying him compensation for the injury. The learned counsel argued that the pertinent evidence under XX that the claimant was pressured to resume work was not pleaded and was therefore, off mark - Amobi v. Amobi (1996) NWLR [sic] (Pt. 469) 638 (SC) and submitted that the claimant’s case must be limited to his pleadings in para 14 with which the defendant joined issue in paras 4-7 and which counterpleading was strengthened under XX of DW1 that the claimant, along with others, was downsized by reason of economic downturn and not out of bias. The learned counsel submitted that this was unchallenged.

            The learned counsel submitted that, to be entitled to compensation for injury, the claimant must prove the nature and degree of injury whereas, the claimant pleaded in paras 13 & 15 of the SF that he now uses walking stick to aid him to walk. The learned counsel argued that, it must be noted that the claimant was admitted in the hospital for just 3 days, meaning that the injury was not serious and this was corroborated by the fact that no medical report was tendered to show the nature and the degree of the injury sustained. The learned counsel argued that Exhibit C2 did not show the degree of injury sustained, as it was a mere excuse duty letter and merely indicated fractured left foot with soft tissue injury and that this could not sustain the fact that the injury left him unable to provide for his family. The learned counsel is of the view that Exhibit C4 also did not satisfy the need for proof of the degree of injury and that, having accepted that he was treated by the defendant and paid redundancy fee, the claimant had no case. 

            The learned counsel submitted that the fact that the claimant limped is not enough; that only complete incapacitation is enough hence, the claimant could still provide for his family; and the fact that the claimant was discharged just after three days supports this view. The learned counsel argued further that the claimant did not plead and prove negligence and as such, the court could not infer negligence - Adeniji v. Adeniji (1972) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) 298. The learned counsel submitted further that the claimant did not prove he was laid off because of injury. The learned counsel submitted that the photograph tendered did not prove injury and that only evidence from medical doctor could and cited ACC Nig. Ltd v. Namgboye (2005) 17 NWLR (Pt. 954) 275 at 284. The learned counsel submitted that the claimant failed to discharge the burden on him. The learned counsel also argued that, apart from not being entitled to the damages claimed, the claimant is also not entitled to the interest claimed, as he did not submit any parameter to estimate it.

            The learned counsel finally submitted that there was no basis for relief (d) as the claimant did not plead that he approached his pension custodian to claim his gratuity and pension and it declined. Arising from the above, the learned counsel urged the Court to dismiss the case. That ends summary of the defendant's FWA. I move to summary of the claimant's FWA.

 

B: Summary of the Claimant's FWA

            D.O. NWEZE franked the claimant's FWA and submitted a lone issue to wit: "whether from the preponderance of evidence adduced at the trial, the Claimant is entitled to compensation for the injuries sustained at his workplace and" [sic]. The learned counsel argued that by virtue of para 16 of the SF and 17 of the WSO, the claimant sustained a permanent injury and was laid off in a purported downsizing. The learned counsel argued that SS. 1(a) & 7 of the Employees' Compensation Act [ECA] mandate that compensations must be paid for all injuries. The learned counsel submitted that the claimant's evidence that he had relocated to his village and doing nothing, because nobody would employ him was not controverted and thus, deemed admitted and cited S. 123 of the Evidence Act [EA].

            The learned counsel argued that the claimant's case was that he was laid off because of the injury sustained. The learned counsel argued that DW1 admitted the claimant's case but said that he did not know that he had to be paid for his injuries. The learned counsel argued that DW1, not being a medical doctor, was not in a position to know if the claimant was okay and cited S. 131(1) of the EA and submitted that the claimant's evidence of how he used to drive to the office in crutches and wore sandals to office and could not use safety gadgets because of his condition was not controverted and likewise his pleadings in paras 7-9. On this, the learned counsel cited Adejugbe v. Ologunga (2004) 6 NWLR (Pt. 868) 46 to the effect that, general traverse is no traverse.

            On the basis of the foregoing, the learned counsel invited the Court to hold that the claimant is entitled to be compensated for the injury suffered and rounded up the FWA. As there was no RPL filed, that ends summary of the FWAs. I move to give my decision. 

            But before then, I hereby state that I have given the case a most dispassionate consideration, as is evident in my summaries above. I still recalled the demeanours of the two witnesses. I have also taken note of the authorities cited and did additional research to enable me give a good decision. I am aware that I did not summarise the WSOs. This is because they are carbon copies of the pleadings, which I have earlier carefully summarised above. But I have carefully read them and would make references to them whenever necessary. Off to my decision I go.

 

COURT'S DECISION AND THE RATIONALE

            I adopt the defendant's lone issue, as more direct to the cause of action herein than the claimant's convoluted prolix lone issue. It is however slightly reframed. The reframed issue is now: Did the claimant prove his case and entitled to the reliefs claimed? And as a preface, I wish to state that the claimant's learned counsel's reference to the Employees Compensation Act [ECA] is irrelevant because, the claimant came under common law and not under the Act. So, it is common law that guides this case – S. 12(1) of the ECA. Let us now get down to the real business. 

            The claimant pleaded in para 13 of the SF that: "The accident caused the Claimant to be partially unable to make use of his limbs until recently when he begun to do so with the aid of a walking stick." The defendant did not join issue on this when it pleaded in paras 2 & 3 of the SD thus: "2. The Defendant admits the averments in paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 and 13 of the Statement of Facts.' '3. In addition to the above, the Defendant states that the Claimant was given the best treatments with all the expenses paid by the Defendant. The Claimant resumed work when he felt he was medically fit enough to resume work and as approved by his medical experts who attended to him." The underlined portions showed, first, that the defendant positively admitted para 13 of the SF and admitted too, that the claimant resumed work, not when he was totally healed, but when he felt fit enough to resume work. Though, DW1's WSO omitted para 2 of the SD relating to admission of para 13 of the SF, but admitted he knew the claimant sustained injuries and was treated and discharged and resumed work - para 8 of the DW1's WSO. The omission was clearly in line with the trite principle that what is admitted in pleadings, needs no further proof - NRMA & FC v. Johnson (2019) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1655) 247 (SC) 261, C. Note carefully in this instance that DW1 omitted the issue of medical doctor certifying the claimant fit to resume work pleaded in para 3 of the SD. This implies abandonment of that aspect of the defence – UNILORIN v. Adesina (2010) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1199) 331 (CA) 339, E-G. 

            From the above, it is very clear beyond disputation that the defendant admitted that the claimant was still partially incapacitated till the time of hearing this suit and in line with the law that what is admitted needs no further proof, DW1 did not waste time on this in his WSO - NRMA & FC v. Johnson (2019) 2 NWLR [supra]. Hence, the issue of partial disability as result of the accident is settled in the claimant's favour. The defendant argued that the claimant's case was that he was downsized because of his disability and nothing more. That is incorrect, from the SF, the claimant's main cause of action was that he was not paid compensation for the injuries he sustained as a result of the accident he had in the course of his work and employment in the defendant's factory - para 17 of the SF. The issue of being retrenched as a result of the accident is ancillary to the cause of action and in support of the main cause of action - paras 14 & 17 of the CW1's WSO. This inference is grounded in the fact that the claimant did not frame any relief for compensation for redundancy but only for the injuries sustained as a result of the accident.

            The defendant also made heavy weather about the claimant not pleading and proving negligence. There is always an exception to any rule of law and the exception to the need to plead and prove negligence is found in the doctrine of res ipse loquitur which says, where, in the normal course of things, an accident which would not have occurred without carelessness in handling a thing under the control of the defendant, occurs, the need to prove negligence is obviated and the courts can infer negligence from the circumstances - SPDCN Ltd. v. Anaro (2015) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1472) 122 (SC) 179, F-C and; 183, A-E. This rule is based on the self-evident nature of the occurrence. The claimant pleaded in paras 9 & 10 that he was hit by a forklift while at his duty post and that, were it not for the shouts of others, he would have been mauled to death, because the forklift’s driver was oblivious of the havoc he had caused. Is this not a case warranting the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur? If this does not invite the application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur, I do not know what would. In any case, in my considered view, the claimant had pleaded enough particulars of negligence that was required of him in the circumstance. By pleading that people had to shout to draw the driver's attention to the havoc he had caused is enough pleading of negligence in the conduct of the defendant's forklift-driver. Anyway, the defendant admitted responsibility for the accident, making the need for any further proof of negligence unnecessary. Hence, the issue of not proving negligence is misplaced and accordingly hereby dismissed.

            One last ancillary issue raised is that, without medical doctor's report or testimony, the claimant cannot prove his case. This is not the law. Cases of injuries resulting from torts could be proved without medical certificates - A.O. Obasuyi Sons Ltd v. Erumiawho (1999) 12 NWLR (Pt. 630) 227 (CA) 239, C. The relevancy of the authority is only on the issue of the non-need for medical report in some instances on injuries resulting from torts and not on the ECA. See also the Supreme Court in CC Const. Co. Ltd. v. Okhai (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 851) 79 (SC) 104-105, G-E. The law had been ensconced long ago that admission needs no further proof. The defendant had admitted the fact of claimant's partial deformity, as has been depicted herein earlier: what therefore is the need for medical report or evidence from a medical expert? It is otiose. Anyway, there is even proof from a medical doctor, which the defendant did not challenge as false but only argued, it was not conclusive proof - Exhibit C2, which says unambiguously that: 

            "The above named was admitted in our hospital on the 25th of March, 2016 on account of blunt trauma to the right and left feet following an industrial accident. He is currently being managed for fracture of the left foot with soft tissue injury."   

            

            And the defendant admitted too, the claimant resumed in the office with crutches. The argument that this was not pleaded is totally irrelevant because, it has sufficient nexus to what was pleaded, as to form a natural and logical nexus to the pleading and therefore, regarded as sufficiently anchored by the pleadings more so, that the answer was elicited as elaboration of the state of the injury under XX, a fact of partial disability, which the defendant had earlier admitted. You do not plead evidence but facts that anchor it – Ita v. Expenyong (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt. 695) 587 (CA) 616, D-F – "The English language', as Lord Denning said: 'is not an instrument of mathematical precision" - Seaford Court Estates v. Asher (1949) 2 KB 481. So, people could not be expected to plead in exactitude or with mathematical precision. As you plead facts and not evidence, the facts pleaded sufficiently anchored this evidence elicited under XX. 

            Having established that the claimant sustained a partial permanent deformity as a result of the said accident, the claimant is automatically entitled to compensation for the injury. The defendant, via DW1, who claimed it did not know that the claimant ought to have been compensated for the injuries under XX, now knows. Accordingly, relief (a) is granted in full. The only issue is the amount of compensation the claimant is entitled to. I agree that the permanent partial disability does not totally incapacitate the claimant from working. The claimant did not give the exact type of trade he peddled before the accident to enable the Court know how exactly the injuries impacted his continued function in the trade. But man does not live alone for work. He lives for the enjoyment of good health and optimal functioning of all the parts of his body. It needs no scientific proof that deformity of any part of the body affects, to some degree, the quality of life a person lives and his performance at most jobs. It is of universal knowledge, which the court takes judicial notice of. Hence, the claimant might still be able to work but at greater inconvenience than when all his limbs were functioning optimally.

            To make matters worse, the claimant was thrown out as disused squeezed-out orange because of the injury sustained in the course of the defendant's work and paid off thereto but without a thought about his injuries. The defendant claimed it did not retrench the claimant because of the injury but because of economic downturn that necessitated downsizing and made the claimant's work redundant. How and why: the court was not told. Is it that the defendant no longer had need for supervisors, which was the claimant's schedule before the retrenchment or what exactly made the claimant redundant, the defendant did not say. In economic parlance, redundancy is invited purely by economic downturn or by reason of technological innovation that made particular human functions otiose, as machines have taken over so that, it would not be economical to continue to retain those doing such works. 

            In either event, downsizing is purely economic phenomenon and for that reason, it is governed purely by scientific verifiable reason, which is the reason labour law insists the criteria must be clearly stated and discussed with the staff to be affected, either personally or through their unions, before it is carried out - S. 20(1) of the Labour Act [LA] and Art 4 of the ILO C158 - Termination of Employment Convention, the convention which guarantees security of tenure in employment relations. It says employment shall not be terminated unless for a valid "operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment or service" amongst others. This covers the issue of termination arising from redundancy because, redundancy, as I have shown earlier, is purely a product of operational requirement of a company.

            The essence of insisting on specified verifiable criteria for picking redundant employees is to rule out its being abused for other ulterior motives and in fulfillment of fair labour practices as guaranteed by S. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution. In the long run, downsizing and redundancy are based on the assessment of the continued usefulness of the victim-worker to the firm. Meaning, only those considered to be no longer useful or less useful are affected by redundancy. Hence, the defendant, who alone, has the reason for the retrenchment of the claimant proximate to his partial disability resulting from the accident had at the defendant's workplace, has the legal duty to prove that the claimant was not retrenched because of his partial disability. He who asserts what is peculiarly within his closet proves - Savannah Bank v. Pan Atlantic (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 49) 212 (SC) and Odunze v. Onwosu (2007) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1050) 1 (SC) 44-45, E-A. And the defendant can only do this by tendering the alleged agreement it said it had with the claimant's union, which detailed the factors used to select workers considered redundant, and the particular factors affecting each clearly stated against the names of each of the alleged multiple workers it claimed the downsizing affected. 

            That is the only way by which the Court can form objective opinion about the real factor that was responsible for the claimant's retrenchment proximate to his injuries. It is only after satisfactorily doing this that the burden shifts back to the claimant to disprove it. In the absence of this, the defendant is guilty of withholding evidence and attached with the implication that, were the evidence tendered, it would have been unfavourable to the defendant’s case, which was the reason it was withheld - Ononuju v. State (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1409) 345 (SC) 392-393, H-B. Hence, in the absence of any proof of the alleged reason for retrenching the claimant, the claimant reason, which is circumstantially supported, is therefore, unassail. Note that the defendant never gave a specific reason for retrenching the claimant but only that the downsizing of the claimant was caused by economic downturn, which downsizing also affected many other workers. But as I have shown above, we know that factors are considered to arrive at which particular worker is to be downsized when the whole business is not being shut down. Which exactly amongst these factors was responsible for retrenching the claimant was not specified. 

            Hence, it is right to conclude that the claimant was retrenched because he became less useful to the defendant as a result of the accident and the resultant partial disability. That is, the claimant was punished for the defendant's fault. It is an instance of unfair labour practices frowned upon by S. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution. I therefore find that the claimant was retrenched because of the injury he had in the course of his work with the defendant without being paid compensation for the injury: just like that! That settled, the next thing is to assess the compensation the claimant is entitled to.    

            In assessing the compensation to which the claimant is entitled, I take into consideration the fact that the claimant ought to have been paid in 2016 when the cause of action arose and had not been paid till now: more than nine years ago. I also considered as a relevant factor in this wise the dwindling fortunes of the Naira in the last nine years ago. I noted that the claimant claimed post-judgment interest. It is my view that the compensation to be granted, having already taken into consideration the fact that the compensation is being ordered paid belatedly after nine years, it is no longer necessary to grant pre-judgment interest. I also took into consideration the fact that the defendant's conduct herein amounts to unfair labour practice contrary to S. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution, and must therefore be adequately redressed pursuant to S. 19(d)-(e) of the National Industrial Court Act [NICA]. I also considered the self-evident fact that the claimant had been made to suffer psychological and emotional traumas by the defendant's conduct in this wise. Pursuant to the powers conferred on me by S. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution and SS. 14 & 19(d) of the NICA, I assessed the compensation payable at N20M [Twenty Million Naira] only and accordingly award same against the defendant to be paid to the claimant with immediate effect. Relief (b) is accordingly granted to that extent. 

            The claimant is entitled to cost as a matter of course, having won the case. I also assessed the cost at N500T [Five Hundred Thousand Naira] only and accordingly grant same. By virtue of Or. 47, R. 7 of the NIC Rules, the claimant is also automatically entitled to post-judgment interest rate and the law, according to the cited rule, is that, it must not be less than 10% per annum. I noted that the claimant claimed 5%. Normally, a court is not supposed to grant than what the party pleads to be sufficient for him because, the party alone knows where the shoe pinches him. But this is a case of damages in which the law fixed the minimum, which the claimant claimed less than, in ignorance. That cannot diminish the sanctity of the law and as such, the claimant cannot be granted less than what the law gives him as a corollary right. In the end, pursuant to the powers conferred on me in SS. 14 & 19(d)-(e) of the NICA and Adegboyu [Adegboye] v. UBA [Unreported Court of Appeal Suit No. CA/IL/20/2021 - delivered Apr 14, 2022], I accordingly grant the claimant 10% post-judgment simple interest per annum on the judgment sums until fully liquidated. Relief (c) is accordingly granted to the extent of 10% post-judgment simple interest per annum alone while the prejudgment interest is refused. 

            Relief (d) is speculative and indefinite. Courts lack jurisdiction to deal with speculation - Mohammed v. Wammako (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 573 (SC) 590, F-G. The appropriate order to make on a speculative case or claim, according to the foregoing authority, is dismissal. I accordingly dismiss relief (d) as lacking in merits. The judgment takes immediate effect. That ends the treatment of all reliefs grantable. I must now conclude this case.

 

CONCLUSION

            In the end, I reiterate the reliefs granted as follows:

1.  A declaration that the continual refusal of the defendant to pay the claimant compensation for the injuries sustained during working hours in the premises of the defendant at Champions Breweries Uyo, Akwa-Ibom State is unlawful.
2. An order compelling the defendant to pay the claimant the sum of N20M (Twenty Million Naira) for the injuries sustained during working hours in the premises of the defendant at Champions Breweries Uyo, Akwa-Ibom State.
3. Cost of N500T [Five Hundred Thousand Naira] only awarded. 
4. An order for the payment of 10% post-judgment simple interest per annum from the judgment date until the whole of the monies awarded are paid.
5. The judgment takes immediate effect.

 

            Judgment is entered accordingly this day Monday Oct 13, 2025, under my very hand, as the presiding judge.

 

.............................................

Hon. Justice Oluwakayode Ojo Arowosegbe

Presiding Judge

Enugu Judicial Division

National Industrial Court of Nigeria