IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT CALABAR

BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MR. SANUSI KADO

23^RD OCTOBER, 2025                                                              

SUIT NO. NICN/CA/57/2024

BETWEEN:

Agrinya Julius Agrinya ……………………………………………. Claimant/respondent

AND

1. Government of Cross River State
2. Governor of C ross River State
3. The Attorney General of Cross River State                              defendants/applicants
4. Dr. Justin Bashel (Cross River State Commissioner

Science, Technology and Innovation).

RULING.

1. This deal with motion on notice brought pursuant to order 17 rule 1(1), (4) (b) & (c), order 3 rule 7(1) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 and under the inherent jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. The motion is praying for:-
   1. An order of this Honourable court dismissing this suit in its entirety for being an abuse of the court process, the claimant on record having filed a similar suit, in suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024, pending before the Federal High Court, Abuja.
   2. An order of this court dismissing this suit for being frivolous, vexatious and improper.
   3. And for such further or other order(s) as this court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.
2. The grounds for this application are:-
3. The instant suit is a duplication of a subsisting suit between the same parties and over the same subject matter, that is, Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024 earlier lodged at the Federal High Court, Abuja.
4. In the said earlier suit, the 4^th, to 8^th Respondents are the same as the 1^st to 4th, Defendants in the instant suit in.
5. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the instant suit are exactly the same as those in the earlier Suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024 lodged at the Federal High Court, Abuja.
6. The issues raised in the instant suit are the same as those previously instituted   before  the  Federal   High  Court  in   Suit  No: FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024 filed on the 13^th day of September, 2024 between the same parties.
7. The exhibits in suit no. FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024 earlier lodged at the Federal High Court Abuja are the same as all the exhibits in the instant suit.
8. All the facts in the verifying affidavit filed in FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/024 earlier lodged at the Federal High Court, Abuja, are the same as the pleadings in the statement of claim filed in the instant suit,
9. The initiation of a separate parallel action in respect of the same issues amounts to a grievous impropriety and an abuse of the courts process, warranting the dismissal of the instant suit.
10. The Claimant is engaging in forum shopping and multiplicity of actions to harass and overreach the Defendants/Applicants,
11. The Motion on Notice is supported by an affidavit of 5 paragraphs sworn to one Uke Eze Lawrence, litigation officer in the chambers of the Honourable Attorney General of Cross River State, Ministry of justice, Calabar. 
12. Udenyi Omaji, Esq, State counsel 1, Ministry of justice, appearing for the defendants/applicants in oral adumbration informed the court that he is relying on the averments contained in the affidavit in support and the exhibits attached therein. Counsel also adopted the written address filed along with the motion on notice and reply on points of law filed on 4/7/2025 as his argument of the motion on notice.
13. The crux of the facts leading to the filing of this suit are that sequel to a petition from the 4^th defendant to the Police, the claimant was arrested as part of the police investigation. In the middle of all these, the claimant put up an application for voluntary retirement. Upon the claimant’s release,0000000000000000000000000000 the claimant instituted suit no. FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024 filed on the 3^rd day of September, 2024 at the Federal High Court, Abuja, see exhibit MOJ  1. Despite the pendency of the suit at the Federal High Court, Abuja, the claimant/respondent initiated the instant suit before this court on the 19^th September, 2024 over these same set of facts against all the defendants in this suit, relying on the same documents and claiming same or similar reliefs in both suits. The claims in both suits revolve around the same transaction and the effect of both suits is substantially the same. Exhibits A-I In the earlier suit are exactly the same as the exhibits in the instant suit, the entire statement of facts in the instant suit are the same as the facts in the verifying affidavit filed in the earlier suit.  It is therefore contended that the present suit is an abuse of courts process and ought to be dismissed.
14. In the written address a single issue was formulated for determination, to wit-

Whether the present suit does not constitute an abuse of the process of this Honourable Court and ought not to be dismissed.

ALLANAH V. KPOLOKWU (2016) 6 NWLR (PT.1507) 1 AT 27, SARAKI v KOTOYE (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt.264) 156; Okafor v  A.G. Anambra State (19991) 6 NWLR (Pt.2-00) 659

8. Counsel continued his submission that abuse of court process is also the inconvenience and inequities involved in the aims and purposes of the action, The abuse lies in the multiplicity of actions between the same parties and over the same transaction and the court will not lend its machinery to sustain such actions. To support this contention counsel relied on the cases of OKORODUDU V. OKOMADU (1977) 3.S.C. 21; BUKOYE V. ADEYEMO (2017) 1 NWLR (PT,1546)173 AT192.
9. Counsel submitted that what the law seeks to prevent is the multiplicity of actions between the same parties in a most disturbing manner. Thus, even where there exists a right to institute the action, the multiplicity of actions, is an abuse. On this contention reliance was placed on the case of SHELL TRUSTEES (NIG.) LTD V IMANISONS LTD (2000) 6 NWLR (PT. 662).
10. It is submission of counsel that to determine whether there is abuse, the court will look at the substance of the claim and not only the form. In support of this sub,mission reliance was placed on the cases of UMEH v, I.N.E.C. (2014) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1400) 529 at 584.; AGWASIM V,OJICHIE (2004) 10 NWLR (PT 882) 613 at pp 624-625 paras H-A.
11. Counsel submitted that in  the earlier suit it was couched as strictly fundamental Rights enforcement or prevention of arrest and detention of the claimant. In relief d in the present suit are on arrest and detention. The substance of the claims are same. The effect of suit no, FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024 filed on the 3^rd  day of September, 2024 at the Federal High Court; Abuja and the instant suit is the same. It was held in OKAFOR v, A,G, ANAMBRA STATE (1991.) 6 NWLR (PL 200) 659, A party cannot change the configuration of parties in order to re-litigate issues that have already been submitted to a competent court.  What matters is the substance. Not the form.”
12. Counsel also placed reliance on PDP v, EZEONWUKA (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 1 at 49, where the apex court stated that ‘Abuse of court process may occur even where the parties are not identical,  if the subject matter and reliefs are essentially the same. “
13. It is submitted a slight or strategic alteration in party names or titles does not cleanse the duplicity or abuse. In the instant suit, though there is a slight variation in the composition and arrangement of the parties in both suits in that, the 4^th 6^th, 7^th and 8^th Respondents in the suit before the Federal High Court, Abuja are the 1^st to 4^th defendants in this suit, as demonstrated in the legal principles above, abuse of Court process is not defeated by cosmetic differences in party arrangement or nomenclature. The only difference between the earlier suit and the instant one is the relief for retirement benefits which the claimant is already receiving from the defendants as shown in exhibit MOJ 2 A-2 D annexed herein. Regardless, there was nothing preventing the claimant from pursuing all his claims in one suit before one court and against all the related defendants. To support this submission counsel relied on the decision of this court in unreported case of GEORGE OCHIE & ORS V,  CROSS RIVER STATE COUNCIL ON PRIVATIZATION & ORS (unreported suit no NICN/CA/ 48/2023, delivered on 4^th March, 2025).
14. Even where the reliefs were different as some of the reliefs in the instant suit, the courts have decided that seeking conflicting reliefs on the same issue and subject from different courts at the same time is an abuse of courts process. On this submission counsel found support in the case of EZENWO V. FESTUS (NO,1) (2020) 15 NWLR (PT.1750) 324 @ 349 paras E-H.
15. In the circumstances, counsel urged the court to look critically at the particulars in suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024 pending before the Federal High Court, Abuja as demonstrated in exhibit MOJ 1, and compare same with the instant suit and my lord will definitely come to a conclusion that the instant suit is an abuse of courts process and dismiss same as my lord did in the GEORGE OCHIE OJIE’s case above.
16. It is also submitted that the instant suit amounts to vexing a defendant twice and goes against the principle of law that  “No man should be vexed twice for the same cause of action by the improper use of the judicial process:  This  interferes with the effective and efficient administration of justice’’. See GOVERNOR OF KWARA STATE V. LAWAL (2007) 13 NWLR (PT 1051) 347.
17. Counsel submitted that the practice of pursuing similar processes in two different courts has been described by the courts as forum shopping and severely frowned at. In EZENWO V, FESTUS (NO.1) (2020) NWLR (PT. 1750) 324 @ 349 paras E-H, the Supreme Court said:

‘It is a gross abuse of judicial process for a party to embark on a frolic of Forum shopping: that is, looking for a favourable court to entertain its suit. The tribunal rightly held that it was an abuse of process for the 1^st Respondent to seek conflicting reliefs on the same issue and subject from different courts at the same time.

THE SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT/RESPONDENT.

Whether the application of the defendants/applicants lacks merit.

‘’where a set of facts or cause of action gives rise to multiple causes of action including a breach or threatened contravention of a fundamental right under the constitution, a party so affected will have to bring two different actions’’.

21. Counsel further submitted that the suit before the Federal High Court is to enforce Fundamental right of the claimant and the one before this Honourable court is purely a labour matter. According to counsel the assertion that a party must bring two different actions when a set of facts gives rise to multiple causes of action, including a breach or threatened contravention of a fundamental right, is a nuanced area of law. This principle is rooted in the need to address distinct legal issues separately, especially when one involves fundamental rights under the Constitution.
22. Counsel continued his submission that the Nigerian Constitution, particularly Chapter IV, provides for the enforcement of fundamental rights. When a cause of action involves a breach of these rights, it is typically addressed through a fundamental rights enforcement procedure, which is distinct from other civil or criminal proceedings. This is because the enforcement of fundamental rights is governed by specific procedural rules, such as the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009. To support his contention counsel relied on the case of Egbuonu V Borno Radio Television Corporation (1997) LPELR-1040(SC), the Supreme Court stated thus,

“It would appear that where a set of facts or cause of action gives rise to multiple causes of action including a breach or threatened contravention of a fundamental right under the Constitution, the party so affected, as plaintiff, would have to bring two different actions at the same time.” – Per MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS, JSC (Pp 14 – 15 Paras D – A).

“An action for wrongful dismissal from employment cannot be brought under the Rules since it belongs to a different class of action from actions on contravention or threatened contravention of a fundamental right.” Per MUHAMMADU LAWAL UWAIS,JSC (Pp 13 -14 Paras F – A).

24. Similarly, in Nwanze v. NRC (2022) LPELR-59631(SC), the court reiterated the importance of distinguishing between actions for the enforcement of fundamental rights and other civil claims. This distinction is crucial because the remedies and procedural requirements differ significantly.
25. Counsel also refers to the following cases:
26. UKEH v. OKORIE & ORS (2018) LPELR-45486(CA),
27. OKECHUKWU & ANOR v. EFCC & ORS (2014) LPELR-24079(CA) Pp. 24-25, Paras. F-A,
28. OBINWA v. COP & ORS (2006) LPELR-5333(CA) Pp. 19-22,Paras. C-B,
29. AKINOLA v. VC UNILORIN & ORS (2004) LPELR-10898(CA)P. 26, Paras. B-E,
30. SIFAX (NIG) LTD v, PHOENIX CAPITAL LTD & ANOR (2017)LPELR-50825(CA) P. 35, Paras. C-D, USMAN v. IBRAHIM & ORS (2022) LPELR-59345(CA),
31. HEARES KONSORTS LTD & ANOR v. LOWER BENUE RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS (2020) LPELR-50357(CA) Pp. 28-29, Paras. B-A 
32. In concluding his submission, counsel urged the court to resolve the sole issue in favour of the Claimant and refuse the reliefs prayed by the Defendants in their Motion for want of merit. As this court has the jurisdiction to entertain the Claimant’s suit. This application is an utter waste of time and should be dismissed with substantial cost.
33. The defendants/applicants in reply to the claimant’s argument in  opposition to the objection on ground of abuse of court process, submitted that the defendants/applicants’ application is meritorious and as a matter of fact, very pertinent in this case. it is submitted that the claimant/respondent’s assertion that a party cannot bring a labour matter and fundamental human rights matter in the same suit is not supported by the prevailing and recent position of the law applicable in the National Industrial Court. To buttress the point being made counsel refers to the provisions of section 254 C (1) (d) (Third Alteration) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and submitted that this section empowers this Court to hear and determine complaints:

“relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of chapter 1V of this constitution as. It relates to employment, Labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employers association or any other matter which the court has jurisdiction to hear and determine”.

28. Counsel continued his submission that this position of the law was explicitly stated and reinforced in DAPAAH & ANOR V. ODEY (2018) LPELR-46151(CA). See also UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC V. EZEKIEL (201s) LPELR-43779(CA).
29. In considering the more expansive provisions of Section 254C (1) (d) on this Court’s jurisdiction on the subject matter, it was held in DIAMOND BANK PLC V. CHIJIOKE UNAKA & ORS (2019) LPELR-50350 (CA), per Abiru JCA (as he then was) thus:

“The present position of the law therefore is that the High Court and the Federal High Court have concurrent jurisdiction in cases of fundamental human rights irrespective of the causative subject matter or the status of the parties concerned, except where the breach of fundamental rights is in cases, the subject matter of which falls within the area of exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. By the provision  of Section 254C(l)(d) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), only the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction in respect of breach of fundamental rights in cases relating to or connected with any labour. Employment. Trade union industrial relations. And matters arising from the workplace. Or relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or non-payment of salaries,  wages, etc (SCC Nigeria Limited vs. George (2019) LPELR 46963(CA).”

30. Therefore, within the context of industrial relations, an application for enforcement of fundamental rights is cognizable in this Court. Section 254C(1)(a) has sufficiently clothed this Court with the general jurisdiction to interpret, apply and enforce the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, including enforcement of fundamental rights, that are pertinent or ancillary to the determination of all causes of action over which it has jurisdiction.
31. It is our submission that the Claimant would have been well within his rights and within the ambience of the law had he instituted a single suit in this Court to enforce his present claims and his fundamental rights as claimed, arose out of a purely labour matter.  The argument that the suit before the Federal High Court is to enforce the fundamental human right of the claimant and the suit before the court is purely a labour natter is thus, untenable.
32. It is submission of counsel that nothing prevented the Claimant from going against all the Defendants and pursuing all the reliefs in one suit. The effect of the suits is the same and the evidence required to establish both is the same, therefore, this court where the subsequent suit was filed, is enjoined to dismiss the abusive suit.
33. Furthermore, it is submitted that all the authorities relied on in the claimant/respondent’s written address are inapplicable in the instant case and this honourable court is urged to discountenance them all.
34. The Claimant in his said written address, relied on the case of EGBUONU V. BORNO RADIO TELEVISION CORPORATION (1997) 12 NWLR (PT. 531) 29, and similar authorities to buttress his argument that “the supreme court made it clear that a party cannot bring a labour matter and fundamental human rights matter in the same suit”.
35. Counsel submitted that, that is not what the supreme court decided in that case. The issue in that case was whether an action for wrongful dismissal could be instituted under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules (FREP RULES). The Claimant instituted an action for wrongful dismissal, a strictly labour concern, under the FREP Rules, 1979 and the Respondent challenged same for being improperly commenced, that being an action for wrongful dismissal, the action did not fall within the provisions of Cap IV of the Constitution as there was no fundamental right of anyone to retain his employment, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court agreed with the objection and dismissed the Appeal.  
36. Besides the fact that the principle in that case has been mis-represented by the Claimant/Respondent in the instant suit, there are many other distinguishable issues with the said case relied on by the Claimant to advance his file-two-suits-defence,
37. Firstly, the decision does not represent the leading judgement of the court delivered by KUTIGI JSC, which did not say anything about filing of two suits even remotely or at all. The law is settled that it is the leading judgement of a court that represents the decision of that court and where there is an inconsistency between a concurrent judgement and a leading judgement, the leading judgement will prevail. See AKPOKU V, ILLOMBU (1998) 8 NWLR (PT,561) 283; IYEKE V. PTI (2019) 2 NWLR (PT.1656) 217.
38. Secondly, the decision was merely the obiter dictum of Uwais JSC, which was stated in passing while agreeing with the lead judgement of the court.
39. Thirdly, the claimant merely extracted a portion of the said obiter dictum without representing the entire thoughts of the court. This was what the court said extensively:

‘’ it would appear that where a set of facts or cause of action gives rise to multiple causes of action including breach or threatened contravention of a fundamental right under the constitution, the party so affected,  as plaintiff would have to bring two different actions at the same time. One of such actions by a writ of summons according to the provisions of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules and the other by a Motion exparte in accordance with the provisions of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules. If this is done in the same high court it would perhaps be possible to have the cases consolidated “ However, it seems that this may not he possible if the case based on fundamental rights is instituted in the Federal High Court since that court lacks jurisdiction to hear some categories of the cases that could be initiated by writ of summons…. It is for the foregoing reasons and the fuller reasons contained in the leading judgment; that I too hereby dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs’’. Per Muhammadu Lawal Uwais,   JSC (Pp 41 -42 Paras B-D & H),

40. Counsel submitted that, it is clear that even from the said obiter, there is no intention that a party should be vexed twice over the same set of transaction, hence the   suggestion in obiter that the suits be consolidated so that they can be heard at once.
41. It is further submitted that the case in question is a 1997 decision that was decided under the 1979 Constitution and the 1979 FREP RULES which did not take the provisions of Section 254 C (1) (d) of the Third alteration to the 1999 Constitution (which allows the National Industrial Court to hear Fundamental Right disputes arising from workplace, into consideration and which would have made the obiter dictum absolutely unnecessary.
42. Finally, counsel submitted that the circumstances of the present case were not in issue in the earlier case, the issue before that court was not one of an abuse of courts process, as is the instant case, but of bringing a non-chapter IV claim under the FREP RULES. The decision therein therefore does not represent the arguments in the instant case. Counsel urged the court to find and so hold and dismiss this abusive suit.
43. Counsel also sub mitted that what the law seeks to prevent is the multiplicity of actions between the same parties in a most disturbing manner. Even where there exists a right to institute the action, the multiplicity of actions is an abuse. The law is settled that where two matters involving the same subject matter and parties are pending before different courts, the later suit should be dismissed. The later suit constituting an abusive process. Since suit no. FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024, pending before the Federal High Court, Abuja was commenced before the instant Suit, the Suit before this Honourable Court is liable to be dismissed. The judicial system frowns upon duplication and parallel litigation. As the continued existence of this suit before this Honourable court undermines judicial discipline and wastes precious judicial time. Counsel urged the court to discountenance the arguments in the Claimant/Respondent’s written address, and find that the instant suit constitutes an abuse of court process, and dismiss same accordingly.

COURT’S DECISION:

44. I have considered the motion on notice, affidavit in support and counter affidavit filed in opposition to the motion on notice. I have as well considered all the processes filed by the parties in this suit and the written and oral submission of counsel for the parties.
45. The grouse of the defendants/applicants is that this suit as it is presently constituted is afflicted by the vice of abuse of court process and should not be countenanced by the court, but, dismissed to end the abuse. The defendants/applicants insisted that filing of this suit on 19/9/2024, subsequent to the filing of suit No. FCH/ABJ/CS/1305/2024, on 3/9/2024, which is still pending before the federal High Court, Abuja Division has rendered this suit frivolous, vexatious and improper.
46. For the claimant/respondent filing of this suit does not amount to abuse of process of court, because there is difference in the two suits. As the instant suit is entirely a labour matter. While the suit before the Federal high Court is entirely a fundamental human rights matter. He also stated that he has the right to file the two cases as this suit is not an abuse of process of court.
47. Let me say here that the phrase “abuse of process” has been judicially held to mean the improper and tortious use of a legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or beyond the process’ scope. See Ogboru v. Uduaghan (2013) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1370) 33; Ogar v. Igbe (2019) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1678) 534; FUTO v. AMCON  (2024) LPELR – 63036; Olowe v. Aluko (2025) 13 NWLR (Pt. 2003) 517 SC; G.T.B. Plc v. Innoson (Nig.) Ltd. (2025) 15 NWLR (Pt. 2008) 349.
48. From the above judicial definition of abuse of court process, it means that the process of the court has not been used bona fide and it may occur when a party improperly uses a judicial process to the harassment, irritation and annoyance of his opponent and to interfere with the administration of justice. The concept of abuse of judicial process is inherently broad and imprecise, encompassing a wide range of circumstances and situations. However, a common thread running through all instances of abuse is the improper or unreasonable use of judicial procedures by a party, in a manner that is designed to harass, delay, or otherwise obstruct the fair administration of justice. See G.T.B. Plc v. Innoson (Nig.) Ltd. (2025) 15 NWLR (Pt. 2008) 349.
49. Now, what is to be determined by this court is the question of whether the claimant in this case has vide filing of this suit during the pendency of suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024, at the Federal High Court has rendered this suit to be afflicted by the vice of abuse of the process of court liable to be dismissed.
50. Looking at the processes filed by the parties and the suit before the federal High Court there is no doubt that there are now two suits pending before two different courts at the same. The claimant/respondent has even admitted having filed two suits pending pari passu, but, claimed that it is his right to file the suits. However, despite the existence of the two suits at different court, counsel for the claimant/respondent has insisted that the argument that there is an abuse of court process is misleading. Counsel continued his submission that where a set fact give rise to multiple causes of action including a breach or threatened contravention of a fundamental right under the constitution, a party so affected will have to bring two adequately different actions. To support this position counsel heavily relied on the cases of Egbuonu v Borno Television Corporation (supra), Adinuso v Omeire (supra) and host of other cases. 
51. The counsel for the defendants/applicants has in his reply on points of law adequately and rightly in my view responded to the argument canvassed by the counsel for the claimant/respondent. I share the views expressed by counsel for the defendants/applicants to the effect that the cases relied by counsel for the claimant/respondent are not applicable in this case, they are distinguishable with the facts of this case, more particularly, considering the facts that the provisions of section 254C of the constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, were not considered in the cases relied on by the counsel for the claimant/respondent.
52. It is trite law that the party alleging or making the allegation of an action being in abuse or an abuse of court process owes the burden of proving the assertion or allegation by dint of the provisions in sections 131, 132 and 133(1) of the Evidence Act. See also Ibrahim v. A.P.C. (No.1) (2019) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1699) 444; N.I.W.A. v. S.P.D.C.N. Ltd. (2020) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1749) 160; Lokpobiri v. Ogola (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1499) 328; A.-G., Kwara State v. Lawal (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1606) 266; Okafor v. Nweke (2025) 16 NWLR (Pt. 2010) 47.
53. To find out, if, the defendants/applicants have discharged the burden of proof placed on them by the law, the entirety of the processes filed before the court would be scrutinized. In furtherance of  exercise of this duty, I have thoroughly examined the originating process commencing this suit, the defence filed by the defendants/applicants and the reply filed by the claimant /respondent as well as the motion on notice, affidavit in support, the  exhibits attached therein and the counter affidavit filed in opposition to the application seeking for dismissal of this suit on ground of abuse of court process.
54. What emerges from the exercise carried out is that the defendants/applicants were served with exhibit MOJ 1, being suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/1305/2024 filed on 3^rd of September, 2024, at the federal High Court Registry Abuja.
55. A comparism of the suit pending before the federal High Court filed on 3/9/2024 and the instant suit filed at the Registry of this court in Calabar on 19/9/2024, will show that the two suits are pending pari passu. They were also based on same facts, as well as issues to be resolved. The parties in this suit are also parties in the suit before the Federal High Court, Abuja. 
56. As pointed out earlier in this ruling the law is well settled that the concept of abuse of judicial process is imprecise. It involves circumstances and situations of infinite variety and conditions. However, its one common feature is the improper use of the judicial process by a party in litigation to interfere with the due administration of justice. It is recognized that the abuse of the process may lie in both a proper and improper use of the judicial process by a party in litigation. But the employment of judicial process is only regarded generally as an abuse when a party improperly uses the issue of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of his opponent; and the efficient and effective administration of justice. This will arise in instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the same opponent on the same issues. See I.T.B. Plc v. Okoye (2021) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1786) 163. The institution of two actions by the claimant/respondent, at Federal High Court and this court constitutes an abuse of the court process. It is to be noted that the rationale for the doctrine of abuse of process is that there must be an end to litigation. Although, every person as citizen has a right of access to the court for redress, that right should be exercised bona fide in good faith and not capricious. See Okafor v. Attorney-General of Anambra State (1991) 6 NWLR (Pt.200) 659; Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt.264) 156; Owonikoko v. Arowosaiye (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt.523) 61; Adeyemo v. Ida (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 546) 504. The claimant in this case by choosing to file one case at the Federal High Court, Abuja and this instant suit at the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Calabar Division has engaged in abuse of court process to the irritation and harassment of the defendants/respondents.
57. The conduct of the claimant/respondent in filing two suits at different court also offend the well-entrenched principle of law on prohibition of forum shopping. Forum shopping occurs when a party attempts to litigate same grievance in multiple courts, like in the case at hand, it amounts to abuse of court process. In our clime the courts have consistently held that parties must carefully chose their forum in order to avoid abuse of process of court. In the case at hand the claimant/applicant’s decision to file two separate suits based on the same  facts indicates an attempt to circumvent the proper and appropriate judicial processes and shop for a favourable forum to the advantage of the claimant/respondent. 
58. The claimant/respondent has argued correctly in my view that courts have now moved away from technicalities, but, let me make it loud and clear that forum shopping is not a mere technicality, but, a fundamental abuse of process of court that undermines the integrity of the judicial system and courts cannot fold their arms and sanction such a fundamental vice to damage the well-entrenched system of justice delivery. The importance of determining proper forum for settlement of disputes cannot be over emphasized. The parties cannot simply be allowed to forum shop that may yield to a more favourable result to the party forum shopping. In the case at hand the claimant’s claims appears to be intertwined, but, the proper forum should be determined based on the nature of the reliefs sought. If the primary claim is for enforcement of fundamental rights, the Federal high Court would be the appropriate forum. If the primary claim is employment and related fundamental rights matters, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria would be the appropriate forum. See …………. Therefore, filing two suits to be pending simultaneously constitute forum shopping which our jurisprudence has prohibited as it constitutes abuse of process and undermines integrity of the judicial system. 
59. It is to be remembered that the claimant/respondent in this case initiated two suits based on same factual situation, one at Federal High Court alleging breach of fundamental rights and seeking for declarations that the defendants/applicants have no right in law to use police, and or their agents and operatives to invite, chase around, harass, seek to arrest, arrest, detain humiliate, dehumanize and oppress the claimant/respondent with respect to facts of this case which are purely civil and borders on internal affairs of a private company limited by shares.
60. The other case was instituted at the National Industrial court of Nigeria, wherein the claimant is praying for declarations that he ceased to be an employee of government of Cross river State, he is MD of Cross River State Smart city Networks ltd, he is not answerable to Cross River State Government, but, the company and that the defendants/applicants have no right in law to use police or any other security agency to invite, chase around, harass, seek to arrest, arrest, detain, dehumanize, and oppress the claimant. He is also praying for an order compelling the defendants to process his pending retirement benefits forthwith. And an order of perpetual injunction against the defendants/applicants.
61. I have perused the reliefs in the two cases, it is clear to me reliefs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, pending before the Federal High Court and relief d in the complaint before this court are same. And the evidence for proof of the reliefs is same. From this analysis,  it is clear to me that the two suits are based on identical factual circumstances. This dual approach by the claimant/applicant represents a clear abuse of judicial process aimed at vexatious litigation. There is no doubt this court has a binding duty to halt and terminate, a process filed by a party, if it is found to amount to abuse of process as herein. This Court has inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process by frivolous and/or vexatious proceedings before it, whenever it is brought before it as done herein. See the case of Agwasim v. Ojichie (2004) 10 NWLR (Pt. 882) 613 at 625; Maigari Dingyadi v INEC & Ors (2011) LPELR-950(SC).
62. In Maigari Dingyadi v INEC & Ors (2011) LPELR-950(SC), Adekeye, JSC (as he then was now RTD), (P. 24, paras. B-F), has this to say:-

"This Court in Dingyadi v. INEC (No.2) stated categorically that abuse of court is not merely an irregularity that can be pardoned but constitutes a fundamental defect, the effect of which will lead to dismissal of the process which is abusive. In the case of Arubo v. Aiyeleru (1993) 3 NWLR (pt. 280) pg.125, the Supreme Court took the stand that: "Once a court is satisfied that the proceeding before it amounts to an abuse of process, it has the right, in fact the duty to invoke its coercive powers to punish the party which is in abuse of its process. Quite often, that power is exercised by a dismissal of the action which constitutes the abuse" Adesanoye v. Adewole (2000) 9 NWLR (pt.127) pg. 671."

63. In view of the foregoing, the instant suit having been found by this court to be an abuse of court process must be dismissed in order to end the abuse. Therefore, I have no choice than to dismiss this suit for being an abuse of court process. This suit is hereby accordingly dismissed.
64. I make no order as to costs.
65. Ruling is hereby entered accordingly.

Sanusi Kado,

Judge.

REPRESNTATION:
 A. O. Adebayo, Esq; for the claimant/respondent.

No representation for the defendants/applicants.