Page 1 of 23 IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT IBADAN BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE Y. M. HASSAN DATE: 20TH OCTOBER, 2025. SUIT NO.: NICN/IB/61/2020 BETWEEN MRS. TEMILOLA MUJIDAT OLODAN ---------- CLAIMANT/APPLICANT AND THE INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL AGRICULTURE (IITA) --------------------------- DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT REPRESENTATION M.B. GANIYU FOR THE CLAIMANT/APPLICANT S.O. AKINYOMI FOR THE DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT RULING INTRODUCTION. 1. By a motion on notice dated and filed on the 6th day of May, 2025. The motion was brought pursuant to Order 13 Rule 5, Order 17 Rule 1 and Order 26 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedures Rules) 2017 and under of inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The Claimant/Applicant herein prayed this Honourable Court for the following reliefs: Page 2 of 23 1) AN ORDER granting leave to the Claimant/Applicant to state the correct name of the Defendant by deleting the phrase “THE INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE” from the name of the Defendant and retaining the phrase “INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL AGRICULTURE (IITA)” as the name of the Defendant in the Claimant’s complaints and in the Claimant’s Statement of Facts in the manner shown in the documents entitled Claimant’s “Proposed Amended Complaint” and Claimant’s “Proposed Amended Statement of Facts” both of which documents are attached to the Affidavit in support of this motion and marked Exhibits TM1 and TM2 respectively. 2) AN ORDER that the phrase “INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL AGRICULTURE (IITA)” be substituted for the phrase “THE INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL AGRICULTURE (IITA)” wherever the phrase “THE INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL AGRICULTURE (IITA)” appears in this case or on any process filed by the Claimant in this case. 3) AN ORDER granting leave to the Claimant/Applicant to amend her Complaints and Statement of Claim in the manner shown in the documents entitled Claimant’s “Proposed Amended Complaint” and Claimant’s “Proposed Amended Statement of Facts” both of which documents are attached to the affidavit in support of this motion and marked Exhibits TM1 and TM2 respectively. AND FOR such further or other Orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances. Page 3 of 23 2. The application is predicated upon the following grounds as follows: 1) It is necessary to remove the phrase “THE INCORPORATE TRUSTEES OF THE” occurring in the name of the Defendant and to state the name of the Defendant simply as “INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL AGRICULTURE (IITA).” 2) It is also necessary to correct or remove some words or phrases which the Claimant regards as redundant from her Complaint and Statement of Facts and to amend the Claimant’s Complaint and Statement of Facts in the manner which has been highlighted in the Claimant’s Complaint and Statement of Facts both of which documents are attached to the Affidavit in support of this motion and marked Exhibits TM1 and T'M2 respectively. 3. In support of this application, is 15 paragraphs Affidavit deposed to by the Claimant/Applicant herself. Attached to the Affidavit are annexures marked as Exhibits TM1 and TM2 respectively. Equally filed in support is a Written Address dated 6th day of May, 2025, wherein Counsel to the Claimant/Applicant, M.B. Ganiyu, formulated a lone issue for determination to wit: whether this Honourable Court can grant the application of the Claimant as presented. SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT/APPLICANT’S COUNSEL 4. In arguing the lone issue, Counsel submitted referring the Court to Order 13 Rule 5 of the Rules of this Honourable Court that the power which is exercisable under this Rule is considered by the Courts as powers of the Court to grant an Order for the amendment of any power before the Court. Reference was made to the cases of Page 4 of 23 MAERSK INVESTMENTS LTD v. ADDIDE INVESTMENT LIMITED (2002) 11 NWLR (pt. 778) page 317; WARRI v. CHIEF SAM WARRI ESI & ANOR. 3 FSC 94 at 96 (1958) SCNLR 384; NJEMANZE v. SHALL BP, PORT HARCOURT (1966) 1 ANLR 8; EMECHETA v. OGUERRI (1996) 5 NWLR (pt. 447) 277, among others. 5. Arguing further, the Learned Counsel stated that the Claimant has brought this application in line with the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Maersk Investment Ltd v. Addide Investment Limited (Supra). 6. In another argument, Counsel referred the Court to the supporting Affidavit to the motion and stated that the Claimant’s Counsel had a genuine believe that the Defendant should be sued in the manner in which it was sued by adding the phrase “The Incorporated Trustees of the” to the name of the Defendant. Reliance was placed on Section 4(1) of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) Act. 7. Again, Counsel argued that the Defendant was not misled in anyway as a result of the fact that it was sued in the manner in which it was originally sued as it had filed its papers and participated at the trial of this case by filing documents in the name of the Defendant. 8. Consequently, Counsel submitted that by the provision of Order 26 Rule 1 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure Rules) 2017, this Honourable Court has a discretion to grant the Claimant/Applicant’s application for leave to amend her Statement of Claim, which discretion ought to be exercised judicially and judiciously in the interest of justice and based on materials placed before the Court. Reference was made to the case of CHEVRON Page 5 of 23 NIG. LTD v. ENIOYE (2005) ALL FWLR pt. 265, page 1168 at 1174. 9. To this end, Counsel stated that the amendments being sought here are to correct certain word proceeding errors and to align the pleading with the evidence which has been laid already. He added that the Court is generally inclined to grant the amendment. Reliance was placed on the case of IMONIKE v. A.G. BENDEL STATE (1992) 6 NWLR (pt. 248) 396 at 408-409. 10. Finally, Counsel urged this Honourable Court to grant the amendments sought by granting this application. 11. In opposition to the motion on notice, the Defendant/Respondent filed 4 paragraphs Counter Affidavit deposed to by one Ayomide Joseph Abe, a Paralegal with the firm of Prime Solicitors, retained by the Defendant in this matter. Attached to the counter Affidavit is an annexure marked as Exhibit A. Equally filed in support of the Counter Affidavit is a Written Address dated 9th day of July, 2025 wherein Counsel to the Defendant/Respondent, Sinmisola Akinyomi, distilled two issues for determination, to wit: 1) Whether the Claimant has sued a Juristic person in the circumstance of this case? 2) Whether it is appropriate in the circumstance of this case to grant the Claimant’s application? SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT/ RESPONDENT 12 On issue one, Counsel submitted that no action can be brought against any party other than a natural person or a juristic person and that parties to any matter must be juristic or natural persons in existence at the time of instituting an action. Reference was made to Page 6 of 23 the cases of FAWEHINMI v. NIGERIAN BAR ASSOCIATION NO. 2 (1989) 2 NWLR (pt. 105) 494; MANAGEMENT ENTERPRISES LTD v. OTUSANYA (1987) 2 NWLR (pt. 55) 179; ODEDO v. P.D.P & ORS (2015) 8 SCM 121 at 143, paras G-I. 13. In another argument, Counsel stated that the Defendant in the heading of this suit is definitely not a Juristic person known to Nigerian law and hence no action can be maintained against such a person under Nigerian law or in the Court of law. He cited the cases of THE REG. TRUSTEES OF THE AIRLINE OPERATORS OF NIG. v. NAMA (2014) 4 SCM 194 at 209-210, paras 1, A-C; ANYEAGBUNAM v. OSAKA (2000) 5 NWLR (pt. 657); ABUBAKAR v. YAR’ADUA (2008) 19 NWLR (pt. 1120) 1 at 150-152, paras G-H; ABUBAKAR & ORS v. YAR’ADUA & ORS (2008) LPELR-51(SC) pg. 137-138, paras G-B. 14. Submitting further, Counsel stated that the person of the Defendant in this suit, neither being a natural nor a Juristic person known to Nigeria law, disrobes this Court of the jurisdiction to entertain this suit and same is liable to be struck out or dismiss. Reliance was place on the case of BAKARE & ORS v. ADEOGUN & ORS (2014) 2 SCM 62 at 91, paras C-E; JUSTICE F.O AYOOLA (nee AKANBI) v. ALHAJI B.A. BARUWA & ORS (1999) 11 NWLR (pt. 628) 595; OKONTA v. PHILIPS (2010) 18 NWLR (pt. 1225) 320, (2010) 12 SCM 127; GENEVA v. AFRIBANK (2013) 9 SCM, 85 at 110-111, paras I, A-D; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERAL v. ALL NIGERIA PEOPLE PARTY & ORS (2003) 12 SCM 1 at 12, (2003) 18 NWLR (pt. 851) 182; KNIGHT AND SEARLE v. DOVE (1964) 2 ALL ER 307; ADMIN ESTATE OF GEN. SANI ABACHA v. EKE-SPIFF & ORS (2009) 3 SCM 1. Page 7 of 23 15 Again, Counsel stated that the Claimant in this matter filed this action against the Incorporated Trustees of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture to this, Counsel submitted that such a party is unknown to law. That the law recognizes only natural persons and Juristic persons such as bodies corporate, have the capacity to sue and be sued. That it is on this premise that Counsel objected to the grant of the Claimant’s Application to amend the name of the Defendant in this suit. He cited the cases of ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION v. ALL NIGERIA PEOPLE’S PARTY & ORS (2003) 12 SCM 1 at 12, (2003) 18 NWLR (pt. 851) 182; ALHAJI AFIA TRADING AND TRANSPORT COMPANY LTD v. VESITAS INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. (1986) 4 NWLR (pt. 38) 802 AND ABUBAKAR & ORS v. YAR’ADUA & ORS (2008) LPELR – 51(SC) (Pp. 139, para B). 16. Arguing the issue further, Counsel stated that the concept of misnomer pertains to situations where a legal entity exists and is merely misnamed. That it does not extend to cases where the entity sued does not exist or is not a juristic person. Reliance was placed on the case of MAERSK LINE v. ADDIDE INVESTMENT LTD (2002) 11 NWLR (pt. 778) 317. 17. In another submission, Counsel stated that the competence of parties, whether Claimant or Defendant, is vital and important as it goes to the foundation of a suit and consequently touches on the jurisdiction of the Court and that an action can only be sustained if parties to it are shown to be proper parties to whom rights, interests, benefits, and obligations arising from the controversy or cause of actions are attached, so that the Court can render a final decree thereon. In support, Counsel cited the cases of MAKERI v. KAFINTA (1990) 7 NWLR (pt. 163) 411 at 420-421, paras D-A, Page 8 of 23 paras A-B; AKINDELE v. ABIODUN (2009) 11 NWLR (pt. 1152) 356 at 381, paras B-E; THE ADMINISTRAORS/EXECUTORS OF THE ESTATE OF GENERAL SANI ABACHA v. SAMUEL DAVID EKE-SPIFF & 3 ORS (2009) 7 NWLR (pt. 1139) 97 at 126. 18. To this end, Counsel submitted that naming a non-juristic person as a Defendant is not a misnomer and cannot be amended to substitute a juristic person. Reference was made to the case of AGBONYAGBE BANK LTD v. GENERAL MANAGER G.B. OLLIVANT LTD & ORS (1961) 1 ALL NLR 125. 19. Finally on issue one, Counsel submitted that it is rooted in law that where a party is improperly sued, the course open to and proper Order the Court ought to make is to strikeout the suit. On this, Counsel cited the cases of AKINDELE v. ABIODUN (SUPRA) at 392, paras A-B; NKPORNINI v. EJIRE (2009) 9 NWLR (pt. 1145) 131 at 179, para D. 20. On issue two, Counsel submitted that the Court’s primary objective in the exercise of judicial discretion on any application before it, must be to attain substantial justice, and for substantial justice to be done judicially and judiciously; it is trite that the Court weighs the interest of both parties without any sentiments in order to arrive at a just and equitable decision. Reliance was placed on the case of DADA v. I.T.L (2005) 11 NWLR (pt. 936) 293 at 306, para F; HART v. T.S.K.J (1998) 12 NWLR (pt. 578) pg. 377. 21. Submitting further, Counsel stated that although the prayers sought by the Claimant are within the discretion of this Honorable Court, it is however, the Plaintiff’s duty to ensure that the necessary elements and law is in place in order to obtain said Orders from the Court. Page 9 of 23 Reliance was placed on the case of ENEH v. N.D.I.C (2018) 16 NWLR pt. 1645, pg. 355 at 369, paras A-B. 22. In another submission, Counsel stated that applications are not granted by the Court as a matter of course, much more this type as sought by the Claimant in this suit. And on the principles governing amendment, Counsel cited the cases of UBN PLC v. LAWAL (2011) LPELR-8879(CA) page 9-10, paras D-E; ALSTHOM S.A. & ANOR v. SARAKI (2000) LPELR-436(SC) p. 23-24, paras E-B. 23. The Learned Counsel contended that where the amendment is being sought mala fide or where the amendment being sought would change the very character of the suit, the Court would refuse such an application. Furthermore, that the Court will refuse such an application where if granted, it would unduly delay the suit or unfairly prejudice either party to the suit. He relied on the case of CCG (NIG) LTD & ANOR v. IDORENYIN (2015) LPELR24685(SC) (pp. 32-33, paras C-E). 24. Consequently, Counsel argued and submitted that not only had pleadings closed, but also that trial had concluded. As it is, the Claimant/Applicant’s application is tantamount to restarting the case afresh, parties refiling all their attendant processes in the suit, and having trial re-opened an event that would equate a gross and inexcusable waste of judicial resources, funds, time and efforts in this suit. 25. In addition, Counsel submitted that for the Claimant to now bring the extant application at this stage, after extended efforts, funds and judicial resources and time have been expended on this suit by both the Defendant and this Honourable Court, under the guise of a misnomer, is simply unconscionable and is sufficient proof that the Page 10 of 23 Claimant was never in doubt as to the identities, nature of the Defendant and as such a frivolous and vexatious application now sought by the Claimant is deserving of no more than an unconditional dismissal by the Honorable Court. He cited the cases of IMALE & ORS v. AGIRI & ORS (1997) LPELR-5781(CA) (pp. 12-16, paras D-C); BIYA & ORS v. BONET & ORS (2020) LPELR-52144(CA) (pp. 12-14, paras B-F). 26. Arguing issue two further, Counsel submitted that it is trite that he who comes to equity must come with clean hands, and he that seeks equity must do equity. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant’s application amounts to an abuse of Court processes as it was not only brought mala fide, but is a selfish attempt to undermine the course of justice. And moreso that the Claimant’s application is an abuse of Court process as the Claimant has now come when they are long overdue to amend their Complaints and Statement of Claim and change the very character of their suit thereby acting in bad faith to the jeopardy of not only the Defendant but also the Court. Reliance was placed on the cases of ORJI v. AMARA (2016) 14 NWLR (pt. 1531) page 57-58, paras E-A; OYEYEMI v. OWOEYE (2017) 12 NWLR pt. 1580, pg. 364 at 392, among others. 27. To this extend, Counsel urged the Court to exercise its duty to prevent the abuse of Court process and the targeted perversion of justice in this suit by dismissing the Applicant’s application. 28. Finally, Counsel contended that this application is an abuse of Court process and also a bid by the Claimant to frustrate this case and subvert the course of proceedings. In that regard, Counsel submitted that the justice of this case demands that the Claimant’s application be refused and urged the Court to so hold and equally dismiss the Page 11 of 23 Claimant’s application with substantial cost in favour of the Defendant. REPLY ON POINT OF LAW 29. The Claimant/Applicant filed a reply on points of law to the Defendant’s Written Address dated the 9th day of July, 2025. The said reply on point of law is dated and filed on 17th July, 2025. COURT’S DECISION 30. I have carefully perused the motion on notice, the relief sought, the supporting Affidavit, the annexures attached therewith and the Written Address filed in support. I have equally gone through the counter Affidavit in opposition and the annexures attached therewith as well as the Written Address in support of the counter Affidavit. Similarly, I have studied the Claimant/Applicant’s reply on points of law. Having done all these, it is therefore my humble view that the issue for determination distilled by the Counsel in their respective Written Addresses can be summed up into one to wit: whether the Claimant/Applicant has made out a case for the grant of this application. 31. It is important to point out at the onset that the basis of this application is that the Claimant/Applicant is seeking for leave of this Honourable Court to state the correct name of the Defendant and to also amend her complaints and Statement of Facts. Having pointed out these, let me refer to the case of FBN PLC v. TOSKWA (2000) 13 NWLR (pt. 685) 521 where the Court of Appeal per CHUKWUMA ENEK J.C.A (as he then was) held relying in OPUTA J.S.C in AWOTE v. OWUDUNNI (1986) 5 NWLR (pt. 46) 941 that: Page 12 of 23 “…amendment connotes an alteration, addition or subtraction without being exhaustive, it has been held to embrace substitution.” 32. To this extend, the law is trite that the grant and or refusal of an application of this nature involves an exercise of discretionary power and such discretion must be exercised judicially and judiciously. In support of this, I refer to the case of AZUH v. UNION BANK (2014) LPELR-22913(SC) where the Supreme Court per KEKERE EKUN J.S.C held that: “The grant of an Order of interim injunction or interlocutory injunction is an equitable remedy within the discretionary powers of the Court. As with all exercise of discretion, the power must be exercised judicially and judiciously, taken all relevant circumstances into account.” See also the case of OJEBODE & ORS v. AKANO & ORS (2012) LPELR-9090. 33. Furthermore, the law is equally settled that the main purpose of amendment of pleadings is to enable the Court to determine the real questions or issues in controversy between the parties. In this respect, see the case of MOBIL OIL v. NABSONS (1995) 7 NWLR (pt. 407) at page 256 where it was held thus: “In the exercise of its discretion as to whether or not to grant an amendment of pleadings, what should guide the Court is that an amendment of pleadings for the purpose of Page 13 of 23 determining the real questions in controversy between the parties ought to be allowed unless such amendment will entail injustice or surprise or cause embarrassment to the other party or where the applicant is acting mala fide or where it will cause injury to the Respondent which cannot be compensated by costs. The Court is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes which they make in the conduct of their cases...” 34. In addition, it is settled principle of law that the primary aim of amending a process already filed is to enable the Court resolve issues in controversy effectively and effectually. Therefore, the weight of judicial authorities lean in favour of allowing a party to amend its legal processes wherever there is the need to do so provided injustice is not caused to the other side and not overreached in such a way that he cannot be compensated with cost. See the case of ALSTHOM S.A. v. SARAKI (2000) 14 NWLR (pt. 687) page 415 at 424. 35. At this juncture, it is worthy of note that the Claimant/Applicant deposed in the supporting Affidavit particularly at paragraphs 6, 7, 11 and 12, which for clarity and ease of reference, I shall reproduce same hereunder. Paragraph (6) reads thus: “On the 28th day of April, 2025 around 3 p.m., my leading Counsel, M.B. Ganiyu had informed me during a telephone conversation Page 14 of 23 between us and I verily believe him that one of the highlights of the Written Address of the Defendant is that it has stated therein that its name was wrongly stated on the process that were issued by the Claimant in this case in that its name is INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL AGRICULTURE (IITA) and not THE INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL AGRICULTURE (IITA) as stated in the process which was issued by me.” Paragraph (7) reads thus: “On hearing this, I instructed the said M.B. Ganiyu during the said telephone conversation to take any necessary steps under the law to rectify any lapse or error in stating the name of the Defendant. Mr. M.B. Ganiyu then informed me that he considers it necessary to bring this application to state the name of the Defendant as indicated on the face of the application and in the manner shown in the documents entitled Claimant’s “Proposed Amended Complaint” and Claimant’s “Proposed Amended Statement of Facts” both of which documents are attached to the Affidavit in support of this motion and marked Exhibits TM1 and TM2 respectively already shown to me.” Page 15 of 23 Paragraph (11) reads thus: “The Defendant as sued had filed its process and participated at the trial of this case by filing documents in the name of the Defendant.” Paragraph (12) reads thus: “I was also informed further during the telephone conversation with the said M.B. Ganiyu that it is also necessary to amend some paragraphs of both the Claimant’s Complaint and Statement of Claim as already shown in the said Exhibits TM1 and TM2 respectively to bring the Claimant/Applicants’ pleading in line with the evidence already led.” 36. From the foregoing, it is clear that the main aim of this application is to change the name of the Defendant/Respondent wrongly stated from the Incorporated Trustees of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) to International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), by deleting the phrase “The Incorporated Trustees of the”. In that regard, I refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of UNITY BANK PLC v. TAMBUWAL CONSTRUCTION & TRADING CO. LTD & ANOR (2025) LPELR – 80562 per HARUNA SIMON TSAMANI, JSC at page 48-49, paras A-D where it was held thus: “A careful consideration will show that the whole issue rests on “misnomer”. The Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed.) p.1197 Page 16 of 23 defines “misnomer” as a mistake in naming a person, place or thing, especially a legal instrument. A misnomer is therefore a mistake in name or giving an incorrect name to a person in a legal instrument. If reasonable doubt arises as to the identity of a person intending to sue or to be sued, it can vitiate the proceeding. In most cases it occurs when the correct person is sued under a wrong name. See EMESPO J. CONTINENTAL LIMITED v. CORONA SR MBH & COMPANY (Ike Oners of “M.V. Concordia”) (2006) LPELR-1129(SC); MAERSK LINE & ANOR v. ADDIDE INVESTMENTS LTD & ANOR (2002) LPELR – 1811(SC) and APGA v. UBAH & ORS (2019) LPELR-48132(SC). See also ISHAQ v. BELLO (2008) LPELR-4337(CA), where Okoro, JCA (as he then was) held that: “A misnomer is said to be a mistake in name and it occurs when there is a mistake as to the name of a person who sued or was sued, or when an action is instituted by or against the wrong name of a person. In other words, the correct person is taken to Court under a wrong name or incorrect name is given to a person in a Court.” In any given case, what should concern the Court is that it is the right or correct person Page 17 of 23 who has sued or has been sued. Thus, a misnomer that will vitiate the proceedings should be such that will create a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person who has sued or has been sued. Also, where none of the parties to the action has been misled by the mistake, the error as to the name of any of the parties will not vitiate the proceedings. Such a mistake may be corrected by amendment. See REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE AIRLINE OPERATORS OF NIGERIA v. NAMA (2014) LPELR-22372(SC) and NJOKU v. UAC Foods (1999) 12 NWLR (pt.632) 557.” 37. Consequently, the Claimant/Applicant’s Counsel submitted in their Written Address in support of the motion inter alia that the Defendant was not misled in anyway as a result of the fact that it was sued in the manner in which it was originally sued as it had filed its papers and participated at the trial of this case by filing documents in the name of the Defendant. 38. However, the Defendant/Respondent deposed in the counter Affidavit in opposition to the motion particularly at paragraph 3(g), 3(h), 3(n), 3(o), and 3(s) which for clarity and ease of reference, I shall reproduce same hereunder. Paragraph 3(g) reads thus: That the said Claimant’s application is seeking to amend their Complaints and Statement of Facts Page 18 of 23 by changing the originally stated name of the Defendant from INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL AGRICULTURE to INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF TROPICAL AGRICULTURE. Paragraph 3(h) reads thus: That the Claimant is also seeking to amend some paragraphs of her Statement of Claim. Paragraph 3(n) reads thus: That the name as sued is not just a mistake as to name or a misnomer, but is rather a mistake as to identity which goes to very foundation of the suit as instituted by the Claimant.” Paragraph 3(o) reads thus: “That the suit was not properly constituted from inception because it amounts to suing a non-existent legal person.” Paragraph 3(s) reads thus: “That the Claimant’s application is seeking to mislead the Court and the grant of same would occasion a great injustice not on the Defendant, but also against established tenets and principles of the law.” Page 19 of 23 39. Moreso, the Defendant/Respondent’s Counsel submitted in their Written Address particularly at paragraph 3.25 inter alia that the Claimant’s application amount to an abuse of Court processes as it was not only brought mala fide but is a selfish attempt to undermine the Course of justice. Also, Counsel submitted that the Claimant bring the extend application at this stage after extended efforts, funds, and judicial resources and time have been expended on this by both Defendant and this Honourable Court, under the guise of a misnomer is simply unconscionable. 40. To this end, I refer to the case of ANAKWE & ANOR v. OLADEJI (2007) LPELR-3837 where Court of Appeal per AWALA, JCA held in page 12-12, paras B-B that: “It is pertinent however to examine some factors outlined in the ABIMBOLA GEORGE’S case (Supra) that are suspicious for the grant or refusal of leave to amend and the exercise of the discretion in allowing or refusing leave to amend. They include: 1. The altitude of the parties. 2. Nature of the amendment sought in relation to the suit. 3. The question in controversy. 4. The time the application is made. 5. The stage at which it is made, and 6. All other relevant circumstances.” Page 20 of 23 41. As pointed out earlier in this ruling that the gamut of this application centres on changing the name of the Defendant as presently sued from the Incorporated Trustees of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) to the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA). Therefore, Order 13 Rule 5 of the Rules of this Honourable Court provides thus: “Where the name of a party has been incorrectly stated, a Judge of the Court may upon application order a correction of such name on any terms as may be just.” 42. In that light and from the Affidavit evidence before the Court, it appears none of the parties in this suit was misled by the error as to the name of the Defendant. The Defendant participated completely at the trial without raising any eye brow. This, in my opinion, is a clear case of misnomer. In this respect, I refer to another Supreme Court decision in the case of APGA v. UBA & ORS (2019) LPELR – 48132 per UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, JSC at pages 18-19, paras A-F, where it was held thus: “What is new herein is that the 2nd Respondent was sued and christened as “All Progressive Party” instead of “All Progressive Grand Alliance.” The Appellant therefore averred that the wrong use or the suit against a wrong party impinges on the jurisdiction of the Court. I must say that the Appellant has taken this principle beyond measure. Thank God that he acknowledged the fact that it was a wrong name used and clearly means and demonstrates that he Page 21 of 23 was in no wise deceived and misled. Per ADEKEYE, JSC in BELLO v. INEC & ORS (2010) LPELR-767(SC), in a similar scenario addressed such a mistake of joinder of party or misnomer thus: “The failure to join as a party a person who ought to have been so joined gives rise to the mistake of non-joinder of party. The fact that a necessary party to the action has not been joined will not render the action a nullity. The proceedings of a Court of law will not be a nullity on the ground of lack of competence of the Court of lack or jurisdiction merely because a Plaintiff fails to join a party who ought to have been joined. The Court cannot dismiss a suit because a party who ought to have been joined was left out.” Misnomer in this sense means, simply, a wrong use of a name. If the entity intended to be sued exists but a wrong name is used to describe it that, in my judgment, is a misnomer. See per AYOOLA, JSC in MAERSK LINE & ANOR v. ADDIDE INVESTMENTS LTD & ANOR (2002) LPELR-1811(SC). It is a mistake in name, i.e. giving incorrect name to a person in the writ of summons. It occurs when a mistake is made as to the name of a person who sued or was sued or when an action is brought by or against the wrong Page 22 of 23 name of a person. When both parties are quite familiar with the entity envisaged in a Writ of Summons and could not have been misled or have any real doubt or misgiving as to the identity of the person suing or being sued, then there can be no problem of mistaken identity to justify a striking out of the action. A misnomer that will vitiate the proceedings would be such that will cause reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person intending to sue or be sued. See per OKORO, JSC in REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE AIRLINE OPERATORS OF NIG v. NAMA (2014) LPELR-22372(SC).” 43. Consequently, the contention of the Defendant/Respondent’s Counsel that this is not a misnomer, is discountenance. I so hold. 44. In view of the foregoing, I have taken a close look and examine in toto the Claimant’s proposed amended Statement of Facts attached to the supporting Affidavit, in my humble view, if granted, it will bring out the real issue in controversy in this suit. Moreso, from the totality of the Affidavit evidence of the Defendant/Respondent before the Court, there is nothing sufficiently place to show that this Application if granted will overreach the Defendant/Respondent nor that the Claimant/Applicant brought this Application in bad faith or an abuse of Court process. I so hold. 45. In the final analysis, it is my considered opinion that the Claimant/Applicant has made out a case for the grant of this Page 23 of 23 Application as granting same will not overreach the Defendant/Respondent. Consequently, I hereby resolve the issue for determination in favour of the Claimant/Applicant against the Defendant/Respondent and hold very strongly that this Application has merit and is accordingly granted as prayed in the interest of justice. 46. Ruling is entered accordingly. No Order as to cost. --------------------------------------------------- Hon. Justice Y. M. Hassan Presiding Judge.