1 IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT JOS DATE: Thursday, 23rd October 2025. SUIT NO: NICN/JOS/26/2021 BETWEEN: MR. CHRISTOPHER UTOWARE CLAIMANT/DEFENDANT AND: 1. CHAN MEDI-PHARM LTD/GTE (CMP) 2. INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF CHRISTIAN HEALTH ASSOCIATION OF DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS NIGERIA (CHAN) REPRESENTATION: • YETUNDE NZE, ESQ., J.W. DUNG, ESQ. FOR THE CLAIMANT/DEFENDANT. • W.O. OTUAGOMA, ESQ., S.A. ABBAH, ESQ., O.E. AKLO; E.D MOYI, ESQ., FOR THE DEFENDANTS/COUNTERCLAIMANTS. JUDGMENT: 1. The case originally commenced before Honorable Justice P.A. Bassi in 2021, prior to his elevation to the Court of Appeal. When it was reassigned to me, the parties were prepared to adopt their final written addresses by mutual consent and upon application of counsel for both parties, proceedings resumed from the point at which they had been halted under the previous judge’s tenure. Consequently, certified true copies of the record of proceedings from 7 October 2021 to 24 March 2023 were adopted, and the case continued before me from 16 July 2024 until the delivery of this judgment. 2 2. A summary of the complaint lodged is that the claimant joined Chan Medi-Pharm Ltd in 2008 and over the next thirteen years rose to the position of Senior Manager. In October 2020—shortly after his team won significant logistics contracts—he was suspended without pay and, six months later, summarily dismissed. He alleges that neither Chan MediPharm’s Employee Handbook or Human Capital Policy nor his constitutional right to a fair hearing were honored. Accordingly, he asks the court to declare both the suspension and dismissal null and void, and to award him back pay for the unpaid months, leave pay, a gratuity for more than thirteen years’ service, two months’ notice pay, release of the company vehicle, general damages, interest, and legal costs. 3. The first and second defendants—Chan Medi-Pharm Ltd and its parent, the Christian Health Association of Nigeria—maintain that his suspension and dismissal for misconduct were entirely lawful under contractual provisions permitting summary discipline. They say he was deemed culpable by an internal audit and by his refusal to comply with the terms of suspension, even though no formal written charges were served. They also dispute every element of his benefit calculations and have counterclaimed for over one million naira, which they allege he improperly received from Global Fund disbursements. 4. The claimant herein took out a writ of summons dated 23rd August 2021 claiming the following reliefs in the complaint as follows; a. A DECLARATION that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of the claimant by the 1st defendant is unlawful, null, void and of no effect whatsoever. b. A DECLARATION that the failure of the 1st defendant to avail the claimant the opportunity to defend himself before his purported suspension as required by the 1st defendant’s Employee’s Handbook and 3 the Human Capital Management and Administration Policy and Procedure strikes at the root of denial of his fundamental right to fair hearing and therefore the said suspension is thus, wrongful, null, void and of no effect whatsoever. c. A DECLARATION that the ratification of the suspension of the claimant by the National Executive Council (NEC) and Board of Trustees (BOT) of the 2nd defendant and the approval of the eventual dismissal of the claimant by the National Executive Council (NEC) of the 2nd defendant without according him an opportunity to be heard is wrongful, null, void and constitutes a brazen violation of his right to fair hearing. d. A DECLARATION that the claimant is entitled to the payment of salary arrears of four (4) months from June 2020 to 16th October, 2020 in the sum of N868,182.67 (Eight Hundred and Sixty-Eight Thousand, One Hundred and Eighty-Two Naira, Sixty-Seven Kobo) only being salaries and allowances owed to the claimant before his suspension as well as the sum of N733,058.97 (Seven Hundred and Thirty-Three Thousand, Fifty-Eight Naira, Ninety-Seven Kobo) only, being payment in lieu of unutilized leave. e. A DECLARATION that the claimant is entitled to the payment of salary arrears of seven (7) months from 16th October 2020 to June 2021 in the sum of N2,366,498.75 (Two Million, Three Hundred and Sixty-Six Thousand, Four Hundred and Ninety-Eight Naira, Seventy-Five Kobo) only being salary for the period he was on the suspension, same having been done in violation of his right to fair hearing. f. A DECLARATION that the claimant is entitled to the payment of his gratuity in the sum of N1,546,723.06 (One Million, Five Hundred and Forty-Six Thousand, Seven Hundred and Twenty-Three Naira, Six Kobo) only, as well as the sum of N593,094.74 (Five Hundred and Ninety-Three Thousand, Ninety-Four Naira, Seventy-Four Kobo) only, being unremitted deductions and approved expenses. 4 g. A DECLARATION that the claimant is entitled to payment in lieu of notice (2 moths basic) in the sum of N 235,340.00 (Two Hundred and ThirtyFive Thousand, Three Hundred and Forty Naira) only. h. AN ORDER DIRECTING the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the Claimant his entire entitlements in the sum of N6,342,898.19 broken down as follows: i. Payment in lieu of unutilized leave =N733,058.97 ii. Gratuity for 13 years, 3 months =N1,546,723.06 iii. Arrears of salaries and allowances for four months (June 2020 – October 2020) before suspension =868,182.67 iv. Salaries and allowances for seven months (October 2020 – June 2021) during suspension =N2,366,498.75 v. Unremitted deductions & approved Expenses =N593,094.74 vi. Payment in lieu of notices (2 months basic) =235,340.00 vii. TOTAL =N6,342,898.19 i. A DECLARATION that the forceful collection of the claimant’s official carKIA Optima with Reg. APP 819 AV/12A 216 FG is wrong and contrary to the car ownership scheme of the 1st defendant as the claimant is willing to pay the 5% of the cost of the car in accordance with the 1st defendant’s car ownership scheme as approved by its Sixth Board Meeting held on 16th November 2007. j. AN ORDER directing the defendants jointly and severally, to release the claimant’s official car- KIA Optima with Reg. APP 819 AV/12A 216 FG to the claimant in line with the 1st defendant’s car ownership scheme as approved by its Sixth Board Meeting held on 16th November 2007. k. The sum of N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as general damages against the defendants, jointly and severally. 5 l. 10% post-judgment interest on the judgment sum until the judgment is liquidated. m. Cost of this action. 5. After the pleadings were exchanged, the case proceeded to hearing. The claimant then called three witnesses—Mr. Edward Egede, Mr. Emmanuel Atortor, and Mr. Christopher Utoware (the claimant himself)—and tendered thirty-five exhibits, which were admitted as Exhibits C1 through C35 in the following sequence – see pages 5 to 9 of the CTC of record of proceedings: C1- Letter dated 15th February, 2008. C2- Letter dated 22nd May, 2009. C3- Letter dated 30th September, 2010. C4- Letter dated 5th January, 2015. C5- Letter dated 23rd June, 2010. C6- Letter dated 26th May, 2011. C7- Letter dated 14th August, 2012. C8- Letter dated 20th December, 2018. C9- Letter dated 12th October, 2018. C10- Certificate of Identification. C11- Email of 20th October, 2020. C12- Letter dated 9th November, 2020. C13- Letter dated 25th January, 2021. C14- Letter dated 9th June, 2021. C15- Email of 16th November, 2020. C16- Spreadsheet of claimant’s Updated Terminal Benefits. C17- Letter dated 16th October, 2020. C18- Letter dated 23rd July, 2018. C19- Minutes of 42nd Meeting of Medicare & General-Purpose Committee of the Board held on 30th August, 2018. C20- Letter dated 17th June, 2019. C21- Salary Structure of the 1st Defendant. C22- Letter dated 28th July, 2020. C23- Memo of 21st August, 2015. 6 C24- Loan agreement with guarantees of Dr. Gobgab and Prof. Madaki. C25- Minutes of 7th Board of Directors Meeting held on 8th February, 2008. C26- Minutes of 7th Board of Directors Meeting (produced by the defendants but deferring in date and content to that produced by the claimant). C27- Letter dated 5thDecember 2019. C28- Employee Handbook of the 1st defendant. C29- Human Capital Management & Administration Policy and Procedure. C30- Minutes of 6th Board of Trustees meeting held on 16thNovember 2007. C31- Salary Structure of the 1st defendant (produced by the defendants but deferring in content to that produced by the claimant). C32- Memorandum and Articles of Association of the 1st defendant. C33- Finance & Accounts Policy and Procedures. C34- Minutes of the 35th Board of Trustees Meeting held on 21stAugust 2015. C35- Series of Payroll of the 1st defendant. 6. On 31/1/2023, the defendants called 2 witnesses, i.e., Dr. Nanshep Daniel Gobgab (Dw1) and Kutus Martins Oluruntoba (Dw2) and tendered 1 Exhibit marked Exhibit “D1” which is a Report of CHAN Medi-Pharm Ltd/Gte Value for Money Audit dated July 2020. 7. At the close of the trial, the court – per Bassi, J (as he was then), directed both parties’ counsel to file their final written addresses and submissions, to be adopted as of March 3, 2023. That did not prove possible until they were finally adopted on the same day this judgment was delivered on 23/10/2025. CLAIMANT’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS: 8. In his pleadings filed on 23/8/2021, the claimant maintains that, for all times relevant to this suit, he was employed by the first defendant—a company limited by guarantee, duly incorporated under the Companies and Allied Matters Act, with its registered office at Little Rayfield, BukuruRayfield Road, Jos, Plateau State—and by the second defendant, an association coordinating church-sponsored health-care work in Nigeria, 7 whose head office is at Jos-Bukuru Road, Little Rayfield, Jos, Plateau State. 9. By letter dated 15 February 2007 (Exhibit C1), the first defendant offered the claimant a probationary appointment as Administration Manager, reporting to the Head of Human Capital and Administration, after he passed the final interview stage. That offer was confirmed in a letter dated 22 May 2009 (Exhibit C2) and took effect on 5 September 2009. On the strength of his satisfactory performance, the claimant received several commendations and was successively promoted to: • Deputy Manager, Step 1 (2010 – Exhibits C3 & C5) • Manager, Step 1 (2011 – Exhibit C6) • Manager, Step 4 (2012 – Exhibit C7) • Senior Manager, Step 3 (2018 – Exhibit C8). 10. For thirteen years the claimant served the defendants with distinction, earning commendations (Exhibits C3 & C4) and, on the strength of his performance appraisals, successive promotions (Exhibits C6, C7 and C8). 11. The claimant further alleges that the 1st defendant’s funding became critical when Diamond Bank (now Access Bank) withdrew the facility granted to it in compliance with a Central Bank of Nigeria directive. 12. The claimant contends that, as a member of the Executive Management Team, he worked diligently to keep the first defendant afloat. In that effort, the team implemented drastic cost-cutting measures— reducing allowances and staff numbers to curb overheads—and engaged external consultants to develop funding proposals for both local and international agencies within the company’s field of expertise. 8 13. While the 1st defendant’s management worked tirelessly to keep the company afloat, the 2nd defendant’s Board of Trustees—having failed to provide the promised funding—pursued its own agenda by placing further demands on the meager resources the 1st defendant was barely sustaining. 14. The claimant alleges that once the 1st defendant secured logistics service contracts in September 2020 from two funding agencies—the Society for Family Health and the Global Fund for Tuberculosis—he reported for duty on October 12, 2020, and was served with a letter (Exhibit C9) suspending him without pay for three months. The letter stated that the suspension followed the findings of a Value-for-Money audit of CHAN Medi-Pharm and had been ratified by the NEC and Board of Trustees of the 2nd defendant. 15. The suspension was further extended by three months without pay by letter dated 25 January 2021 (Exhibit C13). After approximately seven months of unpaid suspension, the claimant was served on 9 June 2021 with a dismissal letter (Exhibit C14), approved by the NEC of the second defendant in accordance with the Board of Directors’ recommendation from the first defendant. 16. The claimant, aggrieved by his treatment after 13 years of meritorious service, tendered his resignation (Exhibit C17) immediately upon receiving the suspension letter. The defendant refused to accept it, asserting that the resignation was a ruse to avoid summary dismissal— and thereby preserve terminal benefits—despite the claimant’s alleged gross misconduct, which would have justified dismissal without entitlements. 9 17. Crucially, at no point—before or during his suspension, nor at the time of his dismissal—was the claimant ever served with a formal query or given an opportunity to defend himself. Indeed, throughout these proceedings the defendants were unable to establish any allegation of misconduct against him. DEFENDANTS’ DEFENCE/COUNTER CLAIM: 18. In their joint statement of defence dated 14 January 2022, the defendants denied all of the claimant’s substantive allegations and asserted that, rather than owing him ?868,182.67 for four months’ unpaid salary, they were liable for only ?575,383.20. 19. They explained that, in light of the 1st defendant’s declining fortunes, the 2nd defendant commissioned an investigation into its management team, of which the claimant was then a member. 20. Hence, the first defendant suspended the claimant for repeatedly obstructing the auditors it had engaged. 21. They also contend that it was discovered that one of their employees, Cajetan Igwe, had been using his personal account to handle the first defendant’s funds. 22. Had the claimant, who was head of human resources at the time, not permitted it, this would never have occurred. 23. The claimant declined to provide the auditors with the requested accounting records. 10 24. It was alleged that the claimant had wrongfully obtained ?1,184,159.00 from the Global Fund by falsely representing himself as project staff of the first defendant. 25. The defendants argue that under the employee handbook they may suspend an employee—on pay or off pay—while an investigation is pending, without first issuing any query letter. 26. They contend that it was revealed the claimant had colluded in a plot to destroy the defendants’ business prospects. 27. They contended that the claimant’s resignation was a deliberate ploy to avoid being dismissed for misconduct and thereby secure terminal benefits from the defendants. 28. They argue that the employee handbook makes no provision for staff vehicles. 29. During the audit, it emerged that the claimant had pledged the defendants’ vehicle in his possession as collateral for a loan, which the defendants are now repaying from their own revenue. 30. Because he failed to adhere to the suspension requirements, the defendants ultimately chose to dismiss the claimant’s employment. 31. They invoke the claimant’s terms of employment to assert their right to dismiss him for dishonesty, misconduct, gross insubordination, or any act likely to jeopardize the defendants’ business interests. 32. In their counterclaim, the defendants – now counter claimants – sought the following reliefs: 11 a. A declaration that the counter claimants are entitled to all the monies received by the claimant under the global fund project. b. An order to set off the sum of N1,184,159.00 from the four months’ salaries owed the defendant, which is the sum of N575,383.20 only. c. An order for the payment of the sum of N608,775.80 to the counter claimants. CLAIMANT’S REPLY TO THE DEFENCE AND COUNTER CLAIM: 33. In response to the defendants’ joint statement of defence, the claimant, on 25 March 2022, lodged both a reply to that defence and a defence to the counter-claim. 34. He testified that the defendants kept the salary structure they established in 2008 unchanged all the way through to his suspension in 2020. 35. He denied each of the defendants’ substantive allegations and explained that, as the head of human resources at the time, he drafted all correspondence with the defendants’ authorization. 36. Contrary to the defendants’ claim, the claimant maintains he is owed ?868,182.67 for four months’ salary. 37. The claimant also asserts that throughout the 2015–2017 Global Fund project, his involvement—with the defendants’ management approval—went entirely unchallenged. Accordingly, agreed percentages were deducted from his salary to offset the level-of-effort allowances paid by the Global Fund. 12 38. The claimant submits that he was never served with any query nor afforded an opportunity to be heard before the first defendant unjustly suspended him. 39. He asserted that the intolerable, non-conducive work environment— compounded by the failure to pay his salary for seven months—left him with no choice but to resign. 40. The claimant contends that the defendants’ decision to dismiss him was unlawful, as they unjustly withheld his terminal benefits. 41. The claimant states that, upon leaving the defendants’ company, he returned all company property, as evidenced by the handover note he submitted to the court. 42. He closed by stating that, after thirteen years of service, the defendants treated him unfairly in the manner of his dismissal. 43. In his response to the counter-claim and set-off, the claimant (as defendant) denies that he wrongfully received N1,184,159. He explains that the Global Fund budget expressly provided a Level of Effort (LoE) allowance for staff who played key roles in the project’s implementation. That allocation was formally approved by the first defendant’s Board at its 35th meeting on 21 August 2015. The defendant to the counter-claims relies on the minutes of that meeting, which have been filed in this court. 44. He stated that, notwithstanding this, the counter-claimants compelled the defendant to refund the Global Fund disbursements he had received by deducting a total of N734,980.25 from his monthly salaries between July 2015 and June 2017. 13 45. The defendant finally requests that this court dismiss the counterclaims and set-offs advanced by the counter claimants. DEFENDANTS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS 46. In the defendants’ counsel’s final written address and submissions filed on 27/1/2025, two issues for determination were isolated, which are i. whether the claimant has proved his case to be entitled to the reliefs sought. ii. whether the claimant has proved his entitlement to the claimed N868,182.67 as four months’ outstanding salary and if so or not, whether the defendants have proved their setoff/counter-claim in the sum of N1,184,159 and how much is now due to the defendants/counterclaimants. 47. On issue one—which is, whether the claimant has established entitlement to the reliefs sought—the defendants’ counsel submits that it is a well-settled principle that a claimant must succeed on the strength of his own case, not on any weakness in the defence. He relied on Babalola v. Rufus (2010) ALL FWLR Pt. 515 at pp. 339–340, paras. H–A. 48. Accordingly, the claimant’s three witnesses (CW1, CW2 and CW3) each gave evidence in chief about the claimant’s purported unlawful dismissal and his attendant entitlements. The crucial issue is whether their testimony remained credible after cross-examination, and thus whether the claimant has made out his case before any examination of the defendants’ defence. 14 49. Counsel contends that CW1 initially denied ever serving as a director of Eileeno Pharm Ltd while employed by the defendants and further claimed he had brought no action against the defendants similar to the claimant’s. Yet, paradoxically, CW1 later admitted that he is suing the defendants in this court and that, in his sworn statement, he described himself as a director of Eileeno Pharm Ltd during his tenure with the defendants. Learned counsel invites the court to take judicial notice of CW1’s suit (Mr. Edward Egede v. Chan Medi-Pharm Ltd, Suit No. NICN/JOS/24/2021) pursuant to section 122(2)(m) of the Evidence Act 2011 (as amended 2023). This clear contradiction fatally undermines CW1’s credibility, argues learned counsel. See Yusuf v. Obasanjo (2006) All FWLR (Pt. 294) 387 at 483E. 50. Regarding CW1, he accordingly conceded in cross-examination that he did not pay the claimant during his employment with the defendants and had no direct knowledge of the claimant’s salary or benefits. He also admitted that the claimant’s case relied on a company policy document which he did not possess. Consequently, anything he said about the claimant’s pay and entitlements is hearsay—devoid of personal knowledge—and is therefore inadmissible as proof. See Section 38, Evidence Act 2011 (as amended 2023); Idahosa v Idahosa (2020) 6 NWLR Pt. 1720, p. 254 at 269 C–D. 51. CW2 fared no better. On cross-examination he admitted that he, too, was dismissed by the defendants. He candidly acknowledged that despite being the company’s financial controller, he never calculated the claimant’s entitlements—those figures were prepared by the claimant himself—and he offered no documents to support his oral testimony. 52. CW3 (the claimant) conceded that the Global Fund project benefits belonged to the 1st defendant. He maintained that he fully cooperated with 15 the auditors and that, under company policy, an employee could use a personal bank account for the employer’s transactions—despite this practice conflicting with general work ethics and industry standards, of which the court may take judicial notice. He further asserted that the sums he received from the Global Fund were later deducted from his salary, relying on Exhibit C35 as proof. However, when asked to point out the Global Fund deduction in Exhibit C35, he could only identify entries for PAYE, pension contributions, and a staff loan. It is settled law that oral evidence cannot vary or override documentary evidence; rather, documents serve as the benchmark against which oral testimony is measured. See Cameroon Airlines v. Otituizu (2011) 2 SCNJ 96 at 110. 53. Counsel for the defendants also points out that the claimant’s assertion of an approved car-ownership scheme collapsed under crossexamination. He claimed to have the scheme in court but could not produce it and instead said it was merely “referred to” in board-meeting minutes allegedly prepared by the chairman—who, he admitted, is not responsible for minute-taking. Without the actual approved scheme in evidence, any inference as to its contents would be speculative, which the court must guard against (AGIP v AGIP (2010) 1 SCNJ 1 at 49:16–25). 54. The claimant further admitted that he emailed the defendants offering to return all company property in his custody, including the car he now claims as his own. He also conceded that Exhibit C16—his purported calculation of entitlements—was drafted by him on the day of his dismissal, despite having been suspended months earlier. Equally damaging was his acceptance that his employment letter (Exhibit C1) forms part of the contractual relationship with the defendants and expressly empowers the company to terminate employment without notice if he is “considered” guilty of misconduct or to have placed the company in jeopardy (Dudusola v Nigeria Gas (2013) 3 SCNJ 24 at 35:9–11). 16 55. Finally, the defendants’ employee handbook (Exhibit 28) reinforces this power, in paragraph 42.8.2 authorizing suspension without pay or compensation in lieu thereof, and in paragraph 42.8.4 permitting dismissal with or without notice and disallowing any gratuity for summary dismissals. 56. The claimant has filed over thirty documents without directing the court to the passages that support his case, says the defense counsel. It is settled law that a party tendering documentary evidence must link each exhibit to the relevant facts by adducing evidence of its contents, rather than simply overwhelming the court and inviting speculation about its meaning. (OKEREKE v. UMAHI (2016) 11 NWLR Pt. 1524 438, 494–495 paras. H–C.) 57. Likewise, the burden of proof in a civil suit always lies with the claimant, who must succeed on the strength of his own case. Only once he has made out a prima facie case does the burden shift to the defendant to rebut. A defendant is under no obligation to disprove unproved assertions by the claimant. (NNPC v. SAMFADEK & SONS LTD. (2018) 7 NWLR Pt. 1617 1, 9 para. D.) 58. Even if the court were to assume—without conceding—that the claimant has discharged his initial burden, the defendants say his suspension and dismissal perfectly conformed to the clear terms of his letter of employment and the employee handbook. 59. The defendants’ witnesses testified, unchallenged in crossexamination, that: Misconduct was discovered; The claimant refused to comply with suspension terms (see Exhibit C11); He was lawfully summarily dismissed; No car-ownership scheme existed; and dismissal forfeited any post-service benefits. Where cross-examination does not 17 dispute a material fact, the court must accept it as established. (ESENE v. STATE (2017) 8 NWLR Pt. 1568 337, 370 paras. E–H.) Counsel submits that Issue 1 be resolved for the defendants. 60. On issue 2, the defendants concede owing four months’ salary but calculate it at N575,383.20, not the N868,182.67 claimed by the claimant. The claimant’s only support is his own unauthenticated computation; CW2 (the first defendant’s financial controller) admitted under crossexamination that he did not prepare those figures and that no documents back them up. Accordingly, the claimant can recover only the N575,383.20 the defendants expressly admit. 61. On the set-off/counter-claim point, the claimant (as defendant to the counter-claim) did not dispute the correctness of the N1,184,159.00 sum claimed by the counter-claimants. Instead, he maintained that those funds were lawfully paid to him and thereafter reclaimed by salary deductions— an “injustice” he accepted for the sake of peace (see paras. 2–6 of his Defence to the Defendants’ Set-off/Counter-Claim). By failing to challenge the amount, he assumed the burden of proving that the defendants indeed recovered it. (See N.N.P.C. v. Samfadek & Sons Ltd.) Under crossexamination, he pointed to Exhibit C35 as documentary proof of those deductions, but when its contents were examined he conceded that it contains no entries for LoE deductions as alleged; it records only PAYE, pension and staff-loan deductions. Although a trained accountant, he then speculated that the Global Fund deductions were included under “staff loans,” a point that finds no support in Exhibit C35. Oral evidence cannot be used to alter a clear document. (See Yonwuren v. Modern Signs Ltd (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1795) 122 at 156–158; Nammagi v. Akote (2021) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1762) 170 at 193.) The court is urged to find that the burden of disprove has not been discharged by the defendant to the counter-claim. 18 62. Counsel submitted that the defendant in the counter-claim has utterly failed to disprove that the ?1,184,159.00 he received for the Global Fund project—which was intended for the benefit of the counterclaimant—was in fact repaid to him by the counter-claimant. 63. Turning to the arithmetic, and without conceding that the claimant is entitled to ?868,182.67, if that sum were set off against the counter-claim of ?1,184,159.00, the counter-claimant would still be owed ?315,976.33. Alternatively, if this court finds that the claimant’s recovery is limited to the ?575,383.20 admitted by the defendant, then setting off that amount against the ?1,184,159.00 counter-claim leaves a balance of ?608,775.80 in the counter-claimant’s favour. 64. Counsel ultimately urges the court to dismiss the claimant’s case and enter judgment for the counter-claimants in accordance with the reliefs sought in their set-off/counter-claim. CLAIMANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS: 65. The claimant’s counsel’s final address and submissions was filed on 10/6/2025. Within, the following issues were isolated for determination: a. Whether the failure of the defendants to accord the claimant a hearing before his suspension and eventual dismissal does not amount to violation of the provisions of the defendants’ employee handbook and an infringement on his fundamental right to fair hearing thereby rendering his dismissal wrongful. b. Whether the claimant has proved his case to be entitled to the reliefs sought. c. Whether the defendants proved their set-off/ Counterclaim to be entitled to the reliefs sought therein. 19 66. On the first issue—whether the defendants’ failure to afford the claimant a hearing before suspending and ultimately dismissing him breached their own Employee Handbook and violated his right to a fair hearing, thus making the dismissal wrongful—counsel for the claimant contends that terminating him for alleged misconduct without any opportunity to present his side was inherently punitive, leaving him disgraced and dishonored. After all, a fundamental principle of natural justice is that no one may be condemned unheard—hence the maxim audi alteram partem. 67. This constitutionally guaranteed principle equally governs employment contracts. Yet in this case the claimant was suspended and later dismissed for alleged misconduct without ever being allowed to defend himself. It is settled that observance of natural-justice rules is essential to the fair administration of justice. See Sifax (Nig.) Ltd v. Phoenix Capital Ltd (2025) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1984) 199; Umar v. Onwudine (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt. 774) 129. 68. The first defendant, in accordance with the principles of natural justice and fair hearing, included explicit safeguards in its Employee Handbook (paragraph 42.7.3.1.14, Exhibit 28) and in the Human Capital Management & Administration Policy and Procedure (paragraph 23.8.3.1.15, Exhibit 29) to ensure every employee’s right to be heard, particularly in cases of alleged workplace offences. That provision provides: “In all cases of major offences and minor offences, the staff member shall be given a written query and an opportunity to state his case in writing. The outcome may be exoneration, a warning, termination or dismissal from the company.” 20 69. Counsel submits that the cited handbook provision embodies the principles of natural justice by requiring an employee to be given the chance to present his case before any disciplinary measure—be it a warning, termination or dismissal—is imposed. Here, however, the defendants flagrantly disregarded their own rules by punishing the claimant, first suspending and then dismissing him on the strength of the Value-for-Money audit, without issuing any formal query or allowing him to defend himself. As the court made clear in Ezeagwu v. Nigerian Army (2006) 11 NWLR (Pt. 991) 382, the dismissal of an employee is by its nature punitive. 70. It is hardly surprising that in paragraph 22 of his sworn statement, the defendants’ witness, Dr. Daniel Gobgab (DW1), openly admitted the company’s real aim was to punish the claimant by suspending him without pay and then dismissing him without any hearing. He explained that the claimant’s resignation was merely a tactic to avoid formal dismissal and still secure terminal benefits, despite misconduct warranting dismissal without pay. 71. The claimant’s counsel further argues that paragraph 22 of the defendants’ witness DW1’s statement plainly shows the suspension and dismissal were contrived to punish, embarrass and deprive him of his terminal benefits. After more than thirteen years of service, the claimant felt aggrieved by this unfair treatment and, viewing the unpaid suspension as punitive—especially since he was never allowed to state his case as the employee handbook requires—opted to tender his resignation (see Exhibits C11, C15 and C17). 72. It is important to note that the defendants’ Employee Handbook (Exhibit 28) and Human Capital Management & Administration Policy and 21 Procedure (Exhibit 29)—both of which reflect the constitutional right to a fair hearing—clearly require that, in every case of major or minor misconduct, an employee must receive a written query and a chance to respond. Only after the employee has had this opportunity to defend himself can the defendant properly decide whether he should be exonerated, or subject to a warning, suspension, or dismissal. 73. Oddly, the first defendant did not follow its own established procedures when it suspended the claimant without pay for three months (Exhibit C9) and then extended that unpaid suspension for another three months (Exhibit C13), ostensibly to continue investigating the allegations. One would have expected that, at the end of the inquiry, the defendants would have confronted the claimant with its findings. Instead, without ever sharing the outcome of any investigation, the Defendant dismissed him by letter dated 9 June 2021 (Exhibit C11). 74. Counsel argues that by suspending the claimant for seven months without pay, the defendants effectively imposed a penalty before he was ever heard or given an opportunity to defend himself. Such conduct strikes at the heart of the right to fair hearing and breaches the fundamental principles of natural justice. It is well-settled that an employee cannot be placed on half pay—or deprived of pay altogether—without first being issued a formal query and allowed to respond. In U.B.A. Plc v. Oranuba (2014) 2 NWLR (Part 1390), the court stated: “It is against fair hearing and the rule of natural justice for an employee to be suspended on half salary when the employee has not been queried and accorded a fair hearing on the query. In the instant case, the punitive measure of on half salary pending investigation meted to the respondent was wrong…” The Court in this case went further to state thus: “An employee cannot be removed or dismissed for a specific misconduct in the absence of adequate opportunity afforded him to justify or explain same. Before 22 an employer can dispense with the services of his employee all he needs to do is to afford the employee an opportunity of being heard before exercising his power of summary dismissal, even where the allegation for which the employee is being dismissed involves accusation of crime.” 75. Counsel further contends that, to justify the claimant’s suspension and dismissal, the defendants relied on paragraphs 4.14 and 4.1.6 of their final address, arguing that they were entitled to suspend him under the terms of his employment letter and paragraph 42.8.2 of the defendant’s Employee Handbook (Exhibit C28). However, that a close reading of the Handbook—especially paragraph 42.7.3.1.14—reveals that: “In all cases of major offences and minor offences, the staff member shall be given written query and an opportunity of stating his case in writing. Therefore the result may be exoneration, a warning, termination or dismissal from the company” . 76. A review of the claimant’s terms of employment makes clear that the defendants lack authority to suspend or dismiss him at will without first issuing a written query and affording him an opportunity to respond. The defendants’ reliance on Paragraph 42.8.2 of the Employee Handbook (Exhibit C28) is misplaced and appears only in their written address as an afterthought. In reality, it is Paragraph 42.7.3.1.14 of the first defendant’s Employee Handbook that operationalizes any disciplinary step under Paragraph 42.8.2. In other words, the handbook requires that an employee first be served with a query and given an opportunity to answer before the employer may decide to exonerate, warn, suspend or dismiss. Absent that mandatory query and chance to present his defence, the defendant has no authority to summarily dismiss the claimant. 77. Counsel submits that it is wholly unfair for the defendants to claim that clause 42.8.2 entitles them to dismiss the claimant without notice. A proper reading of clauses 42.7.3.1.14 together with 42.8.2 makes it clear, beyond any doubt, that clause 42.8.2 cannot be invoked until the 23 employee has been issued a query, given a chance to answer it, and formally found guilty. 78. Similarly, the defendants cannot invoke the termination clause in the claimant’s employment letter to dismiss him for alleged misconduct without first finding him guilty—especially when the allegation turns on the result of a Value-for-Money audit. A proper finding of guilt presupposes that the employee has been given an opportunity to defend himself. The wording of the termination clause in the claimant’s most recent letter of employment, dated 20 December 2018 (Exhibit C8), confirms that the defendants may only terminate his employment if he is “considered to be guilty.” For ease of reference, that clause is reproduced below: ”TERMINATION The company reserves the right to terminate your employment immediately and without notice, if you are considered to be guilty of dishonesty, misconduct, gross insubordination, or in any way place the company’s business in jeopardy…” 79. Counsel submits that the trigger phrase “if you are considered guilty” in the claimant’s employment letter plainly presupposes more than an immediate dismissal. Read alongside paragraph 42.7.3.1.14 of the defendants’ Employee Handbook, it requires first that the alleged misconduct be established, and the individual formally held responsible before any finding of guilt. As Oxford Languages defines it, “guilty” means “culpable of or responsible for a specified wrongdoing.” 80. Counsel further argues that a determination of “guilt” cannot be made at the sole discretion of the Defendant or in the absence of the person accused. As the adage goes, “you cannot shave a man’s head behind his back.” This requirement is rooted in the long-established 24 principles of natural justice and the right to a fair hearing and has been consistently upheld by the courts. For instance, in Olatunbosun v. NISER Council (supra) at page 31, paragraph D, the court held that an investigating body must not receive evidence or representations without the knowledge of the person under investigation. The court stated: “One of the essential elements of fair hearing is that the body investigating the charge (in this case of misconduct) must not receive evidence or representation behind the back of the person being investigated. The court would not inquire whether such evidence or representation did work to the prejudice of the person being investigated. It is sufficient that it might. The risk of it is enough. 81. In the authority just cited, the court stressed that anyone subject to an investigation must be given the chance to put forward their case, since denying a hearing causes prejudicial harm. It is now firmly established that in misconduct-related dismissals a fair-hearing requirement is a condition precedent; if that condition is not met, the termination is void. See N.E.P.A. v. Ango (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 737) 627, where the court held: “Where an employer fails to comply with the condition precedent for termination of employment, such as fair hearing, he forfeits his right to dismiss, and any alleged dismissal is a nullity. In the instant case, the trial court found that the disciplinary Ad-Hoc Committee did not offer the Respondent opportunity to be fairly heard before he was dismissed. This is because the guilt was arrived at proceedings where the trial was conducted in the respondent’s absence and where he had no opportunity to contradict what was being urged against him”. 82. In trying to gloss over their failure to afford the claimant a hearing before suspending and dismissing him, the defendants actually undermined their own case. They argued that their witness testified the claimant was suspended for misconduct because he failed to comply with suspension terms that would have granted him a hearing. That line of argument implies the misconduct only arose after suspension, directly 25 contradicting the stated grounds in the suspension notice and dismissal letter—that it was based on the outcome of the value-for-money audit. Under cross-examination, DW1 confirmed this inconsistency as follows: “The claimant was suspended for investigation purposes but dismissed based on value for money report”. 83. Counsel argues that the defendants have not identified any clear basis for the claimant’s suspension and dismissal, creating the impression that they are scrambling to justify their failure to afford him the mandatory hearing before taking disciplinary action. Although DW1 referred to email correspondence between himself and the claimant—allegedly showing the claimant’s non-compliance with the suspension terms—he omitted and refused to tender those emails in court, thereby giving rise to the presumption of withholding evidence under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act. 84. A review of Exhibits C11, C15 and C17—letters and emails exchanged between the claimant and the defendants—shows that when he was placed on a three-month unpaid suspension (per Exhibit C9’s instruction to hand over all office tools upon receipt), the claimant fully complied with those terms and consistently maintained this position under cross-examination. “Yes I sent a mail to the 1stdefendant informing him (sic) that I intended to hand over properties to them including the vehicle and I complied…” 85. A few days after the suspension, in his 19 October 2020 email, DW1 expressly confirmed that he visited the office to assess the claimant’s hand-over but found it incomplete. Although the defendants pleaded this email, it was never tendered—no doubt because its contents were unfavourable to them. Counsel invites the court’s attention to the 19 26 October 2020 email, which is annexed to the defendants’ Statement of Defence. 86. It is a well-settled principle that a court may examine documents in its own docket in order to achieve a just determination. In Mohammed v. N.D.I.C. (2024) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1957) 67, the court held as follows: “The court is imbued with the powers to consider and utilize a document in its record for the determination of a contentious issue even though the document was not tendered and admitted as an exhibit at the trial. Nothing forbids a court from looking into its records to resolve an issue as the court is required to dispassionately consider and determine every fact available. Thus, a court is entitled to look into any document in its records and make use of it in order to arrive at a just decision.” See also Amobi v. Ogidi Union Nigeria (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt 1864) 153; Adebowale v. Ademola (2021) 4 NWLR (Pt 1767) 399. 87. A review of the email exchanges—including the message dated 19 October 2020—shows that the claimant did everything required under the suspension. When he realized he could not meet the original deadline, he asked for an extension, but Dr. Gobgab (DW1) and the defendants, flatly refused. From start to finish, Dr. Gobgab’s handling of the suspension reeks of vindictiveness—a clear attempt to punish the claimant even while the investigation was still in progress. After all, why else would the suspension letter insist that the claimant turn over company cars and all his work tools? One is left to ask: were the vehicles and ID cards somehow needed to “investigate” further? 88. Moreover, a cursory review of the exchanges between the claimant and the first defendant—especially those involving DW1—shows that DW1, then installed as chairman, was determined to punish the claimant for his own reasons, even if it meant flouting the defendant’s established rules and procedures. His conduct was plainly driven by malice. 27 89. The defendant’s suggestion, put forward by DW1, that the claimant was dismissed for failing to comply with his suspension plainly serves as an afterthought to excuse their denial of a hearing and is therefore a complete non-starter. In fact, this argument fell apart like a house of cards when DW1 conceded under cross-examination that the claimant was suspended merely for investigation but dismissed on the basis of the value-for-money report. 90. Cross-examination exists solely to probe a witness’s credibility and the reliability of his testimony. In Yonwuren v. Modern Signs Ltd (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1795) 122, the court accordingly held: “…the object of cross-examination is to test the credibility of an opponent’s case. It is meant to discredit the evidence- in- chief of a witness. It has the potential to perforate an opponent’s case and enhance that of the cross examiner. It is used to test the veracity of a witness. It is the yardstick with which to measure the truth in evidence- in – chief of a witness. It affords the judge sufficient opportunity to watch and assess the credibility and reliability of a witness by watching his demeanour in the witness box.” 91. Counsel submits that DW1’s testimony was thoroughly challenged and ultimately discredited, showing him to be an unreliable witness. Consequently, the defendants’ claim that the claimant committed misconduct by breaching his suspension terms was merely a façade that collapsed under cross-examination. He respectfully urges the court to so hold. 92. Furthermore, DW2—the auditor responsible for the Value-for-Money report that formed the basis for the claimant’s suspension and dismissal— was unable to establish that he held the necessary qualifications to 28 conduct the audit or to testify as an expert in this matter. When pressed under cross-examination to produce evidence of his credentials, he stated: “I am chattered after working with Ekoja B. Ekoja to investigate the accounts of the 1st defendant. I do not have anything before the court to prove that I am a Chartered Accountant. I have my lapel pin, my necktie and my firms ID card. 93. It is well-settled that an expert called to give evidence must first establish the qualifications that confer special competence in the relevant field. In this case, DW2 did not do so, leaving his expertise open to question. Not surprisingly, he admitted under cross-examination that he had been part of the team auditing the first defendant’s accounts under Ekoja B. Ekoja from 2017 to 2019—the very period covered by the Valuefor-Money audit. This situation creates what auditors call a “self-review threat,” which arises whenever an auditor is asked to evaluate work they or their firm performed earlier. Such a threat inherently compromises the auditor’s objectivity and independence, since it is difficult to impartially assess or challenge one’s own prior work. 94. Despite claiming under oath that the claimant obstructed the Valuefor-Money audit, DW2 was unable to point to any specific allegation against him in Exhibit D1 or any other document. In fact, the audit’s cover page (Exhibit 22) thanks management for their cooperation. Under crossexamination, when asked to produce any audit query issued to the Claimant, DW2 could not identify a single letter. He first referred to “page 30” of Exhibit D1, then back-tracked, saying that page merely recorded what happened after the supposed query. He ultimately admitted he could not locate the query letters at all. Neither DW1 nor DW2 ever introduced any formal audit query against the claimant, and the court cannot assume such a document exists. 29 95. Moreover, in paragraph 25 of his sworn statement DW1 alleged that the claimant had used the first defendant’s vehicles as collateral for a loan. Yet, when cross-examined and confronted with the actual loan agreement (Exhibit C24), DW1 withdrew his claim, since the document clearly shows that he himself, not the claimant, guaranteed the loan. 96. Counsel further pointed out that the defendants never proved their claim that the claimant helped a staff member use his personal bank account for the company’s business. This allegation collapsed when DW1, Dr. Daniel Gobgab, conceded under cross-examination that he too receives company advances into his personal account. Counsel refers the Court to the 31 January 2023 proceedings, where Dr. Gobgab testified as follows: “Yes I receive advances in my personal account to carry out task.” 97. DW1’s acknowledgment is entirely consistent with the first defendant’s Finance & Account Policy, specifically paragraph 18.1.2 of the Account Procedure Recording and Guidelines (Exhibit 33), which authorizes staff conducting field work to receive cash advances in their personal accounts to perform company tasks. That is why DW1 also admitted he received advances into his own account for such purposes. Accordingly, his statements at paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of his sworn witness statement—none of which have been supported by any evidence—are without foundation and should be struck out. It is settled law that if a party advances a fact in its pleadings but fails to produce any evidence for it, the party is deemed to have abandoned that fact (see W.C.C. Ltd. v. Batalha (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 986) 595 at 616–617 H–B). see also the case of Awojugbagbe Light Ind. Ltd. v. Chinukwe (1995) 4NWLR (PT. 390) 379; Olanrewaju v. Bamigboye (1987) 3 NWLR (PT.60) 353. 30 98. In line with the authority cited above, the defendants produced no evidence to support their allegations, while the claimant demolished each charge with documentary proof that matched his sworn testimony. By establishing his case with this documentary evidence—the highest form of proof—the burden then shifted to the defendants to demonstrate that an employee may not use a personal account for company business and that the claimant helped conceal that account from the auditor. The defendants plainly failed to discharge that burden. Indeed, throughout this litigation they never substantiated any misconduct allegations set out in their pleadings. 99. According to learned counsel, the facts and circumstances suggest that the Value-For-Money audit was merely a façade, contrived to dismiss the claimant and deny him his rightful benefits after thirteen years of spotless, meritorious service—service the defendants themself acknowledged and praised in Exhibits C3 and C4, as well as through annual performance appraisals that led to his promotions (Exhibits C6, C7, C8). 100. Even if—without admitting it—the defendants could show, even by the slightest measure, that the claimant was guilty of the alleged misconduct, that would not relieve them of the obligation to give him a chance to defend himself. The real question is: was the claimant ever formally queried about any wrongdoing or afforded an opportunity to answer before his suspension and eventual dismissal? Under rigorous cross-examination, the defendants’ witness DW1, Dr. Daniel Gobgab, was ultimately forced to concede the following: “The claimant was suspended for investigation purposes but dismissed based on value- for money report. The claimant was not confronted with the value for money report. 31 “Yes he was not given a written query, so he never responded” . 101. DW1’s testimony under cross-examination demonstrates that the claimant was never formally queried nor given the chance to address the unfounded allegations the defendants have failed to substantiate before this Honourable Court. 102. Section 36(2)(a) of the 1999 Constitution clearly requires that anyone whose rights or obligations are at stake must be given a chance to present their case before the relevant authority makes a decision affecting them. Therefore, before the defendants—or anyone acting on their behalf—could conclude that the claimant was guilty of the misconduct alleged in the suspension and dismissal letters and invoke the termination clause in his employment contract, they were first obliged to afford him an opportunity to defend himself and state his case. 103. Moreover, the defendants’ claim at paragraph 4.1.6—that key parts of their evidence emerged unscathed from cross-examination—fails on two counts. First, counsel did not identify which evidence allegedly survived scrutiny. Second, the record shows that, under crossexamination, the defendants repeatedly relied on unfounded assertions. They produced no document—neither the Value-for-Money audit report nor any other exhibit—that supports a single allegation of wrongdoing against the claimant. Both DW1’s and DW2’s testimony collapsed under probing questions and cannot be credited. As a matter of settled law, a witness whose evidence is internally inconsistent is not entitled to selective acceptance by the court. Such a witness forfeits all presumption of truthfulness. See Ezemba v. Ibeneme (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 894) 617, where the Supreme Court held accordingly. 32 “No witness who has given on oath two material inconsistent evidence is entitled to the honour of credibility. Such a witness does not deserve to be treated as a truthful witness.” 104. Counsel further submits that the defendants’ reliance, in paragraphs 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 of their final address, on the testimony of the claimant’s witnesses neither advances their case nor excuses their refusal to grant the claimant a hearing before suspending him without pay for seven months and eventually dismissing him. They have not shown how the Elieno decision—relevant only to CW1—prevented them from affording the claimant a hearing, nor how CW2’s admission that he did not calculate the claimant’s salary justifies that failure. 105. It is well established that when an employer alleges that an employee was removed or dismissed for a particular misconduct, that dismissal cannot stand unless the employee was given a proper opportunity to explain, justify and defend the allegations. In N.O.M. Ltd. v. Daura (1996) 8 NWLR Pt. 468 at 601, the Court held: “…However, in an action for wrongful dismissal as in the present case, where an employer pleads that an employee had been removed or dismissed for a specific misconduct, the dismissal cannot be justified in the absence of adequate opportunity offered to the employee to explain, justify or defend the alleged misconduct.” 106. Relying on the authorities cited, counsel contends that dismissing the claimant for alleged misconduct without giving him any chance to answer the allegations violates the basic requirements of fair hearing and natural justice. The defendants cannot fall back on the old common-law idea that an employer may hire or fire at will—an approach once justified by courts’ reluctance to force a worker on an unwilling employer. Today, however, the National Industrial Court—empowered by Section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act and Section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution— 33 has exclusive jurisdiction over labour disputes and must apply international best practices. In particular, Article 4 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158), to which Nigeria is a signatory, provides that an employee’s contract may only be terminated for a valid reason connected to the worker’s capacity or conduct, or to the operational requirements of the undertaking. 107. Counsel further contends that the way the claimant was suspended and dismissed—and the defendants’ failure to afford him a fair hearing— constitutes an unfair labour practice in breach of the defendants’ own operational requirements. Moreover, Section 254C(2) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended by the Third Alteration) expressly empowers the National Industrial Court, notwithstanding any other provision of the Constitution, to apply and enforce international conventions, best practices and labour standards and to eliminate all forms of unfair labour practices. 108. This provision has opened the door to a broader use of ILO Conventions and other international treaties, protocols or conventions in resolving employment disputes in Nigeria. In particular, under Article 4 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention, the National Industrial Court may invoke and give effect to such international instruments— specifically the ILO Convention to which Nigeria is a signatory—when determining employment matters. See SAHARA ENERGY RESOURCES LTD v. OYEBOLA (2020) LPELR-51806 (CA). 109. Ultimately, counsel argues that dismissing the claimant’s employment without giving him an opportunity to respond amounts to an unfair labour practice, contravenes the principles of fair hearing and natural justice, and calls for reference to international best practices. 34 110. Accordingly, counsel submits that because the claimant was never given a hearing, his dismissal is wrongful, unlawful, and violates his right to a fair hearing, and invites the court to decide this issue in the claimant’s favor. 111. With respect to learned counsel’s submissions on Issue Two— whether the claimant has proved entitlement to the reliefs sought—the claimant’s counsel adopts and relies on all arguments advanced under Issue One. He submits that once this honourable court finds the claimant’s dismissal wrongful for failure to afford him an opportunity to defend himself in accordance with the rules of fair hearing and natural justice, the reliefs claimed must necessarily follow. It is settled that a party’s claim will succeed if supported by cogent, credible and plausible evidence, particularly when that evidence is not effectively challenged. See Oyede & Ors v. Akinbo & Ors (2017) LPELR-42863(CA) and Polaris Bank Ltd v. OHMS Sources & Systems Ltd (2021) LPELR-54782(CA), where the court stated: “Once a party sufficiently proves an assertion, especially when it is not controverted, the only course of action left for the court is to grant the relief sought…” 112. The claimant sought thirteen specific remedies, labeled “a–m,” from this honourable court. His counsel submits that, on the strength of the totality of evidence before the court, he has conclusively established his entitlement to all the reliefs claimed against the defendants. Although the defendants contend that the claimant simply filed a mass of documents without directing the court to the relevant portions, that argument does not undermine his well-supported case. 113. Counsel responds that the defendants’ argument ignores the wellsettled rule that documents are only “dumped” on the court when they 35 have no link to the pleadings and are introduced from the bar. A review of the claimant’s pleadings and the court’s 4 July 2022 proceedings (CTC pages 7–8) shows that every document tendered was directly tied to the claimant’s evidence—none were sprung on the court at trial. The defendants had ample opportunity to object to these documents’ admissibility or to dispute their contents, since they were all properly pleaded and filed in advance. Indeed, some of the documents were produced by the defendants’ own witness under subpoena. 114. Counsel submits that because the defendants never challenged the admissibility of the documents the claimant properly pleaded and introduced through his own evidence, their belated complaint of “dumping” in the final address is futile and should be dismissed. He asks the court to so hold. 115. The claimant’s reliefs “a,” “b,” “c,” “d,” “e,” “f,” “g” and “i” are all declaratory in nature. Under established law, declaratory relief is granted once credible evidence has been adduced in support. Counsel therefore submits that, on the strength of the oral testimony and documentary exhibits before this court, the claimant has fully discharged the evidential burden and is entitled to each of the declaratory remedies claimed. 116. Reliefs (a), (b) and (c), which arise from the denial of a fair hearing and thus render the claimant’s suspension and dismissal wrongful, have already been fully addressed under Issue One. Counsel again adopts those submissions, especially since the defendants did not challenge them—and, notably, DW1 conceded under cross-examination that no query was ever issued to the claimant. It is settled law that admitted facts require no further proof. Counsel therefore urges the court to find that the suspension and dismissal, carried out without affording the claimant a 36 hearing and in violation of his right to fair hearing, are wrongful and void, entitling him to reliefs (a), (b) and (c). 117. Counsel pointed out that reliefs (d), (e) and (f) are declaratory in nature, relating respectively to the sum owed to the claimant up to his suspension and the salary and allowances he would have received as compensation for wrongful dismissal. It is settled law that an employee’s damages are measured by the remuneration he would have earned had he remained in the defendants’ employment. See SPDC Ltd v. Olarewaju (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118), in which the Supreme Court held: “In cases of wrongful dismissal of an employee, the measure of damages is, prima facie, the amount the employee would have earned had the employment continued according to the contract of employment ….” 118. Under relief (d), the claimant seeks four months’ salary arrears for June–October 2020 totaling ?868,182.67, plus ?733,058.97 in lieu of unutilized leave—amounts he says were due before his suspension. The defendants do not deny his entitlement but contend that only ?575,383.20 is owing. To prove his case, the claimant tendered the defendants’ payroll records (Exhibit C35 series) and a spreadsheet (Exhibit C16) showing his terminal benefits, including gratuity, as detailed in paragraph 59 of his statement. The defendants have never explained how they arrived at their lower figure and, despite being ordered to produce the original spreadsheet, they omitted and refused to do so, resorting instead to a bare denial of the four months’ arrears. 119. Counsel submits that, although the defendants admit owing the claimant four months’ salary, they have neither explained nor documented how they arrived at their own figures. In those circumstances, the spreadsheet prepared by the claimant is the most reliable evidence of his true entitlement. It is well established that civil claims are decided on the 37 balance of probabilities, and where one party offers no competing evidence, the scale of justice must inevitably preponderate in favour of the other (see FBN Plc v. Yerima (2020) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1725) 63; Afrilec v. Lee (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1349) 24). The defendants cannot deny the amount recorded in the spreadsheet by mere assertion of a lower figure without any supporting documentation. 120. Counsel for the claimant argues that by admitting they owe ?575,383.20 without explaining how they arrived at that figure, the defendants are asking this honourable court to speculate—something the courts have ruled is not an acceptable method of decision-making. Moreover, because the defendants did not challenge the spreadsheet submitted by the claimant, the court is entitled to rely on it in determining the amount due. 121. Furthermore, if this court concludes that the claimant was not afforded a fair hearing before his suspension, then the reliefs sought in paragraphs “e” and “f” – namely salary and related benefits for the sevenmonth suspension period – will automatically follow. In that event, he will be entitled to all the salaries and allowances he would have received but for the unlawful suspension and subsequent dismissal. See Afribank (Nig.) Plc v. Osisanya (2000) 1 NWLR (Pt. 642) 598; A.C.B. Ltd v. Ufondu (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 523) 169. 122. Moreover, the claimant’s relief “I” seeks a declaration that he is entitled to the company vehicle under the 1st Defendant’s car-ownership scheme, which was proposed at the sixth Board meeting and approved at the seventh Board meeting of the 1st Defendant. To support this claim, the claimant relied on Exhibits C30 and C25 (see paragraph 7.3.1(iii) of Exhibit C25 and paragraph 8.4 of Exhibit C30), which record the recommendation 38 and subsequent approval of the car-ownership scheme at those two meetings. 123. To establish interest, the claimant subpoenaed the defendants for two items: the minutes of the sixth board meeting (which recommended the car-ownership scheme) and the minutes of the seventh board meeting (which approved it). In response, the defendants produced only the minutes of the seventh meeting—Exhibit C26—but those are dated 2006, long before the sixth meeting ever occurred. Counsel submits that Exhibit C26 plainly fails to satisfy the subpoena. A side-by-side comparison of Exhibits C25 and C30 with C26 demonstrates that C26 bears no relation to the requested meetings. Counsel therefore invites the court to so hold. 124. Counsel further argues that the defendants’ objections to the claimant’s entitlement—despite the clear documentary proof in Exhibits C25 and C30 and in the absence of any contrary evidence—are entirely baseless and should be struck out. It is well established that, when the existence of facts is in issue, the most reliable proof is documentary evidence. See Gbenga v. A.P.C. (2020) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1744) 248 and MAUTECH v. Yarai (2020) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1748) 395. 125. The defendants have not produced any documents to prove that the Car Ownership Scheme has been discontinued. They cannot rely on oral testimony to contradict the clear terms of the Board meeting minutes that approved the scheme. 126. According to learned counsel, reliefs “h,” “j,” “k,” “l” and “m” are all ancillary to the primary reliefs. Therefore, if the court grants the principal reliefs, these ancillary claims will follow as a matter of course. In awarding them, counsel requests the court to review the full body of evidence and fix the quantum of damages in line with international best practices— 39 particularly for general damages under relief “k.” Relief “l” is a statutory entitlement and will be granted as of right, whether expressly claimed or not. Relief “m” lies within the court’s discretion, and so he invites the court to exercise that discretion in the claimant’s favour. 127. Finally, counsel urges that in light of the claimant’s uncontroverted oral and documentary evidence, this court should grant all the reliefs claimed. It is well established that where an employee is wrongfully dismissed, they are entitled to the salary and benefits they would have earned if their employment had been lawfully terminated. In TOYINBA v. UNION BANK PLC (2023) 1 NWLR (1865) 403 at 422, the court held that: “in a master/servant relationship, which is purely contractual and devoid of statutory flavour, where the employee’s employment is wrongfully terminated, he is entitled to what he would have earned has his employment been properly terminated. In other words, what the employee would be entitled to would be the salary for the period of notice to terminate his employment as stipulated in the terms of his contract.” 128. On the whole, counsel calls on the court to resolve this issue in favour of the claimant. 129. With respect to Issue Three—whether the defendants have established their entitlement to the reliefs claimed in their setoff/counterclaim—counsel argues that they have not. Throughout these proceedings, the defendants have failed to discharge the burden of proof necessary to support the reliefs they seek by way of set-off/counterclaim. 130. In their counter-claim pleadings, the defendants allege that the claimant failed to disclose personal payments received under the Global Fund project yet nonetheless claimed ?1,184,159 without any supporting computation or documentary evidence. They concede only 40 ?575,383.20—representing four months’ salary arrears—and seek to set off that amount against his claims. 131. It is a well-established legal principle, embodied in Sections 131– 134 of the Evidence Act 2023 (as amended), that a party who asserts a fact must prove it. This rule has both statutory authority and Supreme Court endorsement in A.-G., Rivers State v. A.-G., Bayelsa State (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1340) 123 at 161, paras. B–C, where the Court held: “A party who asserts must prove same. This is in accordance with section 135 of the Evidence Act.” 132. See also the case of NIGERIAN ARMY V. YAKUBU (2013) 8 NWLR (PT. 1355) 1 AT 15, PARAS. D-G where the apex court held that: “It is basic that any party which asserts must prove same.” 133. Guided by the statutes and case law just cited, counsel submits that bare allegations in a pleading are not evidence. Such pleadings must be supported by independent proof, for they cannot themselves constitute— or serve in lieu of—evidence. 134. To refute the allegation, the claimant tendered Exhibits C34 and C23, which are the minutes of the meetings at which the Global Fund project was discussed. Exhibit C23 is a memorandum explaining how the project would be implemented and expressly providing—at paragraph 1.3.4—that participating staff would be paid on a Level–of–Effort (LOE) basis. DW1 formally ratified the committee’s report in Exhibit C23, raised no objections to its findings and never questioned the LOE-based payments to the first defendant’s staff, yet he later accused the claimant of secretly receiving Global Fund salaries. 41 135. During the Global Fund project, the defendants nonetheless deducted the claimant’s salary for the entire duration of that project—even though no such deduction was proposed or approved by the 1st defendant’s Board. It is therefore both unfair and misleading for the defendants to claim that the claimant failed to disclose his Global Fund payments when, in fact, DW1 himself ratified the committee’s report at the Board meeting (Exhibit C34). Instead of acknowledging that payment, the defendants secretly labeled each deduction as a “staff loan” in the payroll records (Exhibit C35). A close look at those records shows that all the “staff loan” deductions occurred precisely during the 2015–2017 period when the Global Fund project was in effect. 136. Thus, the claimant’s testimony—that deductions were taken from their pay because they received Level-of-Effort salaries under the Global Fund—is supported by the evidence. It is well established that oral testimony is bolstered when corroborated by documentary proof. In Odunlami v. Nigerian Navy (2013) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1367) 20, the Supreme Court held: “Where documentary evidence supports oral testimony, the latter becomes more credible. This is premised on the position of the law that documentary evidence serves as a hanger from which to assess oral evidence”. 137. In paragraph 4.2.2, the defendants try to absolve themselves by pointing to Exhibit C35 series and saying it only shows PAYE, pension and staff?loan deductions, with no indication of any Global Fund charge. But the obvious follow?up is this: why did those so?called “loan” deductions occur exclusively during the Global Fund project period? The natural inference is that the defendants deliberately relabeled Global Fund salary deductions as loans to hide their misconduct from the Fund and avoid the repercussions of improperly docking project staff pay. Notably, DW1 even conceded under cross?examination that he is now barred from bidding on 42 any Global Fund contract because earlier financial irregularities led to his blacklisting. 138. At paragraph 14 of his sworn statement, DW1 relied on the contract and payment vouchers to support the defendants’ claim of ?1,184,159.00. However, just as with their other baseless allegations, they never produced those documents to substantiate this figure. Counsel then contends at paragraph 4.2.2 that because the claimant did not expressly deny receiving that sum from the Global Fund, it must be treated as an admission—thereby improperly shifting the burden of proof onto him. 139. Counsel submits that the defendants’ argument is not merely speculative but fundamentally flawed. Had they properly considered the claimant’s defence, particularly Exhibits C35, C34 and C23, they would have seen that his evidence completely undermines their set-off and counterclaim, which rest on falsehood. It is settled law that a claim founded on falsehood must be dismissed. See Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 254, where the Supreme Court held: “Where the whole case of the Plaintiff is founded on falsehood and fabrications, it should be dismissed by the trial court…” 140. Counsel submits that Exhibit C23—a memorandum from the committee appointed by the defendant recommending that staff who worked on the Global Fund Project be paid—was expressly ratified by DW1 in Exhibit C34. That ratification completely undermines the defendant’s counterclaim that the claimant received funds without their knowledge. Once that counterclaim fails, the proposed set-off must also fail, since you cannot base a set-off on an unfounded claim. 43 141. Counsel ultimately submits that the court should find the defendants have not established their set-off/counterclaim and that it must therefore be dismissed. DEFENDANTS’ REPLY: 142. On July 8, 2025, in reply to the claimant’s final written address and submissions, defence counsel filed a points-of-law reply, reiterating that the defendants, as the claimant’s employers, had the authority to dismiss him—a right they exercised in the dismissal letter tendered as Exhibit C14. 143. He contended that because the claimant’s employment is not protected by statute, the court should reject the claimant’s counsel’s insistence that a reason must be given before terminating his employment. 144. He emphasized that the claimant still bears the burden of proof and has failed to meet it, and that neither he nor his witnesses presented sufficiently credible evidence on which this court could base a favourable decision. 145. On Issue 2, defendants’ counsel submits that the claimant’s protest—namely, that his exhibits were not simply “dumped” before the court—is unsustainable. He argues that, even when documents are pleaded and tendered, the court must disregard any that are not properly linked to the case at trial. To support this, he relies on the decision in OJIEKERE v. OJIEKERE (2018) LPELR 44271 (CA) and urges the court to discount the claimant’s submissions on the point. 146. Counsel for the defendants also challenged paragraph 7.2 of the claimant’s submissions, in which it was asserted that the claimant had discharged his burden of proof by way of oral testimony and documentary exhibits. The defence argues that the declaratory reliefs sought under items a, b and c depend on a prior determination that the dismissal was wrongful. Thus, even if—without conceding—wrongful dismissal is 44 established, the claimant must still demonstrate his entitlement to the specific remedies claimed under a, b and c; they are not automatically conferred by a finding of wrongful dismissal. See NIGERIAN AIRWAYS Ltd. v. ABE (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 786) 350. 147. Counsel further submits that the claimant misunderstood the legal position when, in paragraphs 7.4 to 7.6 of his final address, he complained that the defendants failed to explain how they arrived at the sum they acknowledge owing. The mere fact that the claimant produced a spreadsheet does not relieve him of his burden to prove entitlement to the declaratory reliefs he seeks. Relying on Oboh v. Obaika (2024) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1922) 421 at 427 para. E, counsel points out that the spreadsheet was prepared by the claimant during his suspension and did not originate from the defendants. In the absence of any other reliable and credible evidence, the court’s award cannot exceed the amount the defendants themselves have admitted. 148. The defendants’ counsel submits that relief (i), which the claimant supports with exhibits C30 and C25 to establish his entitlement to the company vehicle, must fail. Neither exhibit demonstrates a formal car? grant policy, and in the absence of any such policy the claimant cannot show he was entitled to possess or own the vehicle during his employment. Counsel further argues that the same deficiency dooms reliefs (h), (j), (k), (l) and (m), as there is no credible or reliable evidence to substantiate those claims. 149. Regarding the third issue identified by the claimant’s counsel, the defendants’ counsel submits that the counter-claimants have clearly established the defendant’s admission of receipt of funds from the Global Fund project. Consequently, the same amount was properly deducted from his salary by the defendants. He concludes that, in light of the 45 compelling evidence presented by the counter-claimants, their counterclaim must succeed. 150. Finally, counsel for the defendants submits that the issues raised by the claimant’s counsel in paragraph 9 of his address amount to an unwarranted fishing expedition for evidence—a “voyage of discovery” this court cannot undertake. He points out that the claimant’s pleadings contain no specific factual foundation for the allegation that the defendants currently hold the funds they now seek to recover in their counterclaim, and that the court should not be required to speculate on that point. On that basis, he urges the court to dismiss the claimant’s claims and to allow the defendants’ counterclaims and set-off. COURT’S DECISION: 151. I have carefully reviewed all the parties’ processes, witness testimony and exhibits, and the counsel’s final submissions, which I earlier summarized in this judgment. The three issues identified by the claimant’s counsel sufficiently frame the questions to be decided, and I now adopt and restate them as follows: a. Whether the defendants’ failure to afford the claimant a hearing before suspending and ultimately dismissing him constitutes a breach of their Employee Handbook and an infringement of his fundamental right to a fair hearing, thereby rendering his dismissal wrongful. b. Whether the claimant has demonstrated entitlement to the reliefs claimed. c. Whether the defendants have established their set-off/counterclaim and are entitled to the reliefs they seek. 152. Respecting Issue 1: Whether the claimant's dismissal was wrongful due to the failure to provide a fair hearing, section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution guarantees that “in the determination of his civil rights and 46 obligations…a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal.” A labour tribunal or industrial court is a “tribunal” for this purpose: see NEPA v. Ango (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 764) 204. 153. Under both the defendants’ Employee Handbook (article 42.7.3.1.14) and CHAN Human Capital Policy (article 23.8.3.1.15), any suspension or dismissal for misconduct must be preceded by(1) a written query, (2) service on the employee, and (3) a hearing at which the employee may respond. These mirror the common-law audi alteram partem principle. 154. The International Standard under ILO Convention No. 158 (on termination of employment) requires that an employee be informed of the reasons for dismissal and given an opportunity to defend himself. It underlines the standard of “fair procedure.” 155. Based on the parties’ contentions the claimant testified (CW3) that at no time did the defendants serve him with any written query, nor invite him to any meeting or hearing, before suspending him (Oct. 2020) or dismissing him (Apr. 2021). He relies on: Exhibit C3 – suspension letter, which is silent on any query served; and Exhibit C5 – dismissal letter, which is similarly silent. 156. The evidence before the court shows that at no relevant time did the defendants issue or serve the claimant with any formal query concerning the allegations that led to his dismissal. In short, he was never given an opportunity to respond to those charges before being dismissed. 47 157. This brings the court to the core of the fair-hearing principle. A fair hearing is a fundamental tenet of justice and, together with the rule against bias—captured by the Latin maxim “nemo judex in causa sua”—forms one of the two main pillars of natural justice in common law. The right to a fair hearing is universally held to be both inalienable and inviolable. Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) enshrines this right, stipulating that when any authority or government body determines a person’s rights or obligations, that person must be granted a fair hearing within a reasonable time. 158. In MBANEFO v. MOLOKWU & ORS. (2014) LPELR-22257 (SC), the Supreme Court explained the real meaning of a fair hearing, holding, among other things, as follows: “it cannot be over flogged; the cardinal principle of fair hearing and a hearing is taken to be fair when all parties to the dispute are given a hearing or an opportunity of a hearing. If one of the parties is refuse a hearing or not given an opportunity to be heard, the hearing cannot qualify as fair hearing….” 159. A fair hearing is one that fully respects the rules of natural justice. In DEDUWA & ORS v OKORO DUDU & ORS (1976) LPELR-936(SC), the Supreme Court made clear that any process breaching those rules is invalid. Likewise, in URHATA v MENTA LTD (1968) NMLR 55 at 58, it was held that the audi alteram partem principle is a basic tenet of justice that only legislation can override. 160. It is well established that any decision by a judicial body—or by an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial powers—that determines an individual’s rights or obligations in breach of the fair-hearing rule is null and void (see Ndukauba v. Kolomo (2005) 1 SC (1) 80; Ene & Ors v. Ene & 48 Ors (2012) LPELR-1970 (CA)). Whether an individual has in fact been granted a fair hearing depends, however, on the particular facts and circumstances of each case (see Ayoade v. State (2020) LPELR-49379 (SC)). 161. In cross-examination, DW1 admitted that “the claimant was suspended for investigation purposes but dismissed based on [the] valuefor-money report.” That admission plainly implies the claimant was never given an opportunity to be heard either before his suspension or before his dismissal. This amounts to a denial of fair hearing, and I so hold. 162. Paragraph 42.7.3.1.14 of Exhibit 28 (the 1st defendant’s Employee Handbook) and paragraph 23.8.3.1.15 of Exhibit 29 (its Human Capital Management & Administration Policy and Procedure), both quoted above, make it clear that whether the offence is major (as alleged against the claimant) or minor, the employee must be served with a written query and given the opportunity to submit a written response. 163. The evidence before this court is unequivocal: the defendants failed to honour the claimant’s employment contract by denying him a fair hearing before dismissing him, thereby breaching a fundamental principle of justice. That omission not only violated the parties’ contractual terms but also flagrantly contravened section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), which guarantees the right to a fair hearing. Accordingly, the dismissal was wrongful, and issue one is resolved in the claimant’s favour and against the defendants. I will return to the consequence of this court’s finding shortly. 49 164. The second issue asks whether the claimant has established his entitlement to the reliefs claimed. Apart from the declarations sought, he asks the court to grant him the following: i. Payment in lieu of unutilized leave =N733,058.97 ii. Gratuity for 13 years, 3 months =N1,546,723.06 iii. Arrears of salaries and allowances for four months (June 2020 – October 2020) before suspension =868,182.67 iv. Salaries and allowances for seven months (October 2020 – June 2021) during suspension =N2,366,498.75 v. Unremitted deductions & approved Expenses =N593,094.74 vi. Payment in lieu of notices (2 months basic) =235,340.00 vii. TOTAL =N6,342,898.19 165. It should be emphasized that the claimant’s monetary claims are for special damages, and it is well-settled that special damages must be readily quantifiable, precisely assessable, and supported by evidence (see Okulaja v. Haddad (1973) 11 S.C. 357). This principle places the burden on the claimant to show, by credible evidence, how the claimed figures were calculated. 166. With respect to the claimant’s demands for ?733,058.97 in lieu of unutilized leave, ?1,546,723.06 as gratuity for 13 years and 3 months, and ?593,094.74 for unremitted deductions and approved expenses, the claimant shoulders the burden of showing precisely how each figure was calculated. He must explain the basis or formula—whether a percentage or other method—used to arrive at the gratuity sum; identify the exact leave period covered and demonstrate how that produced the 50 ?733,058.97 figure; and itemize each unremitted deduction and approved expense, stating the amount attributable to each. 167. Interestingly, the claimant submitted a spreadsheet that the defendant company had prepared. A close look reveals it bears only the claimant’s signature in his capacity as Head of Human Capital and Administration. Although it is unstamped and appears not to have been formally approved by the defendants, they have neither challenged its authenticity nor alleged that the claimant fabricated it to mislead the court (see Exhibit C16). 168. I have carefully reviewed Exhibit C16, which the claimant tendered. The claimant’s counsel rightly noted that, if the defendants possessed any document contradicting it, they would have been expected to produce it. It is therefore surprising that no challenge was made to this evidence. Having been admitted, the court must now assess its probative value. 169. Once again, the only signature on the document is the claimant’s, signed as “HC and Admin.” Dated 9/6/2021, it bears the title “Terminal Benefits HCM & Admin” for Utoware Christopher and itemizes amounts that sum to ?6,342,868.19. The document is a spreadsheet filled with detailed calculations that only an accountant could fully explain. 170. On the same 9/6/2021, the defendants wrote a letter of dismissal to the claimant – see exhibit C14. 171. Prior then, on 12/10/2020, the claimant was placed on suspension without pay. In response, he submitted his resignation to the defendants on 16/10/2020, thereby ending his employment, and the defendants acknowledged receipt of his resignation letter on that same day. 51 172. Having regard to these facts, the claimant’s employment ended on the date he tendered his resignation, not on the date the defendants purported to dismiss him. Because exhibit C16 was prepared and signed after that resignation, he lacked any authority to execute it. Accordingly, the document is inauthentic, carries no evidentiary weight, and is rejected by this court. I so hold. 173. It is striking—and I would fail in my duty if I did not point it out—that counsel on both sides lost sight of the dispute’s real issue. Despite pages of arguments, numerous documents and extensive filings, none has confronted the true significance of the claimant’s 16/10/2020 resignation letter or its potential impact on the case. Had counsel given this crucial piece of evidence the attention it deserves, I am convinced the entire course of the dispute would have been different. 174. Under a master–servant relationship, either party may lawfully terminate the employment contract. Here, the claimant validly resigned in 2020 in accordance with his letter of employment and the defendants’ own policies. Consequently, the defendants’ later suspension (Exhibit C9) and dismissal (Exhibit C14) were nugatory, since by 9/6/2021 he was no longer their employee. 175. Under the law, an employee’s resignation is the formal, voluntary act of ending their employment contract. It reflects the employee’s intention to vacate his position. Such a resignation becomes effective either on the day the written notice is received by the person or authority addressed (or by a duly authorized agent), or on any later date expressly stated in the notice, as permitted by law. 176. When an employee resigns before facing dismissal, the actual effects will turn on the terms of the employment contract, the employer’s 52 policies, and the facts surrounding the departure. Key potential consequences include: i. Loss of right to challenge the dismissal – By resigning first, the employee may forfeit any opportunity to dispute an unfair or unlawful termination, since there is no longer an active dismissal to contest. ii. Impact on severance pay – Voluntary resignation typically disqualifies an employee from statutory or contractual severance, unless the contract or company policy explicitly provides for severance in resignation scenarios. iii. Entitlement to accrued benefits – An employee who resigns is ordinarily entitled to any earned but unpaid compensation—such as wages, unused vacation, and bonuses—up to the resignation date, payable according to the contract and applicable labor law. iv. Reputational considerations – Resigning can help avoid the label of “fired,” but it may also prompt questions about reliability or commitment. Conducting the resignation professionally and transparently can help reduce negative perceptions. v. Constructive dismissal claims – If an employee leaves because the employer’s conduct (for example, harassment, discrimination, or breach of contract) made continued employment intolerable, they may still pursue a claim for constructive dismissal despite having resigned. vi. Notice?period obligations – Most contracts require a specified notice period. Failing to honour this notice may 53 expose the employee to deductions from final pay or claims for damages for breach of contract. vii. Compliance with company procedures – Employers often set out resignation steps—such as submitting a formal notice, attending an exit interview, and returning company property. Employees should follow these rules closely to avoid disputes. Refer to the cases of ZUBAIRU & ANOR v. MOHAMMED & ORS (2009) LPELR5124(CA), MAJA v. STOCCO (1968) LPELR-25497(SC), OLANIYAN & ORS v. UNILAG & ANOR (1985) LPELR-2565(SC), BENUE BREWERY LTD v. OKONTA (2024) LPELR-61878(CA), AGOMUO v. FIDELITY BANK LTD (2023) LPELR60663(CA). 177. According to the terms of the claimant’s employment as seen in exhibit C1, under the heading TERMINATION, it is stated that “upon confirmation, your engagement becomes terminable by two months’ notice in writing on either side without any reasons given or payment in lieu thereof”. 178. This is consistent with article 49.4.4 of the defendants’ Employee Handbook (exhibit C28), which requires all senior management staff— such as the claimant at the time—to give three months’ notice when resigning. 179. Being that the words used in that document are clear and unambiguous, it means that where the claimant decides to terminate the employment agreement voluntarily by resignation, he must give the defendants three months’ notice or forfeit his salaries for those three months. 54 180. It is evident the claimant understood this, as shown in his resignation letter (Exhibit C17), where he stated the following words, reproduced verbatim below: 16th October 2020 The Board Chairman, CHAN Medi-Pharm Ltd. Gte., CHAN Secretariat Little Rayfield Jos, Plateau State. Dear Sir, LETTER OF RESIGNATION. The above subject matter refers. Upon receipt of the letter of suspension dated 12th October 2020 addressed to me by the company and after careful consideration of the content and circumstances of the issuance of the said letter of suspension, I have considered the situation including the notice period as contained on my terms of engagement. I however, have resolved in light of the three months’ suspension without pay, to put in my resignation which ordinarily ought to take effect from the end of December 2020 and humbly request that it takes effect immediately. Kindly accept my sincere gratitude and appreciation to CHAN Medi-Pharm Ltd./Gte and Christian Health Association of Nigeria (CHAN) for the opportunity to serve and contribute my quota to the growth and enhancement of the company. I will be willing to assist whenever my services are required and particularly assist in making the handing over process seamless. Thank you, Yours faithfully, Mr. Christopher O. Utoware. 181. Even though the defendants’ representative responded by email (Exhibit C11) that the claimant’s resignation was “unacceptable,” it in no 55 way diminishes his right to resign at will—a right expressly recognized in his employment letter. 182. In Professor T.M. Yesufu v Governor of Edo State & Ors (SC.70/1996), the Supreme Court held that a resignation becomes effective without the need for formal acceptance by the respondents. The Court reached a similar conclusion in T.O.S. Benson v Onitiri (1960) 5 FSC 69, where the facts closely resembled those in the present case. There, the Court reaffirmed that an individual’s right to resign is absolute and that there is no discretion to refuse a notice of resignation—whether it is addressed to the appointing minister or to the board on which Benson served. 183. Now, article 49.5 of the Employee Handbook (Exhibit C28) provides that once the employee has submitted all final records, their terminal benefits shall be paid after deducting any outstanding obligations owed to the defendants. 184. Proof of special damages in a matter of this kind cannot rest on mere speculation or conjecture. Although the claimant’s demands for thirteen years and three months’ gratuity, unremitted deductions and approved expenses seem genuine, they have not been supported by sufficient evidence before this Court. His claim for payment in lieu of unutilized leave specifically, is likewise unsubstantiated and is accordingly denied. 185. However, this court acknowledges that every wrong requires a remedy. Accordingly, the claimant’s right to gratuity cannot be denied, since he served uninterrupted for thirteen years and three months before resigning in 2020. His entitlement is akin to a crystallized liquidated sum which is determinable from the terms of his employment even without providing the exact figures in court. Therefore, the defendants are ordered, 56 within 30 days of this judgment, to calculate and pay his gratuity. Should they fail to do so, the outstanding amount will accrue interest at 20% per annum. I so hold. 186. Because the claimant’s resignation deprived him of any standing to challenge his subsequent suspension and dismissal, the court’s conclusions on issue one, as set out in the foregoing paragraphs, are purely academic and without practical effect. I so hold. 187. Accordingly, in light of this court’s findings, reliefs a, b, c, d, e, g, and h—all of which depend on the fatal balance—cannot succeed and are hereby refused. 188. Relief f – the payment of the claimant’s gratuity – is hereby granted, subject to (a) a determination of the exact amount due and (b) the procedure set out in paragraph 185 of this judgment. 189. In respect of salary arrears, the claimant seeks N868,182.67 for four months’ unpaid salary (June–October 2020) prior to his resignation/suspension, and N2,366,498.75 for seven months’ salary (October 2020–June 2021) during his suspension. 190. The court has already held that the claimant lacks standing to pursue any claims against the defendants arising after his voluntary resignation. Consequently, his claim for ?2,366,498.75 representing seven months’ salary from October 2020 to June 2021 fails and is dismissed. 191. Although the defendants acknowledge owing the claimant four months’ salary before his suspension, but they calculate the total due as ?575,383.20 rather than the ?868,182.67 claimed. In such circumstances, it is generally assumed that an employee’s last drawn salary represents his true pay. 57 192. In light of the foregoing findings, the claimant’s back pay is capped at one month’s salary, as he forfeited the remaining amount when he resigned from the defendants’ company effectively on 16/10/2020. So, even though he was owed four months’ salaries as admitted by the defendants, he is only entitled to the payment of a month’s salary in view of his decision to resign voluntarily. 193. It is remarkable that nowhere in the parties’ filings is there any specification of the salary the claimant continued to receive before this dispute. After scrutinizing every document in detail, I find it astonishing that the claimant was so preoccupied with largely peripheral matters that he entirely overlooked the very figures that should have been given priority. 194. Exhibit C35 consists of a set of documents outlining the defendants’ staff payment schedule. Although the printouts are extremely small and almost unreadable, the court, in the interests of justice, examined them closely to identify the claimant’s exact monthly salary. Unfortunately, they still do not show what his precise salary was in 2020 when he resigned. 195. It is a settled principle that a court may act on valid admissions and undisputed facts (see section 123, Evidence Act). Here, the defendants have admitted owing the claimant four months’ salary for June–October 2020. However, exhibit C8, the promotion letter of 20/12/2018, records his annual salary as ?3,688,050.00, which ordinarily serves to calculate what his monthly entitlement was. 196. It is clear that the court is confused about the claimant’s true monthly salary at the time he resigned. Exhibit C8 lists his annual pay as ?3,688,050, which works out to ?307,337.50 per month. Yet the claimant’s own calculation—?868,182.67 for four months—implies a 58 monthly rate of only ?217,045.66, and the defendants’ admitted figure of ?575,383.20 for the same period implies just ?143,845.80 per month. To make matters worse, none of the claimant’s documents conclusively establishes his actual take-home pay. In the end, only the parties know the precise salary, and since this court cannot embark on an open-ended fact-finding mission, it will award whatever sums it finds due when delivering its final orders. 197. Having exercised his right to resign, the claimant is only entitled to one month’s salary since he ordinarily forfeits three month’s salary as a result of his resignation. The court therefore orders the defendants to pay one month’s salary to the claimant within 30 days of this judgment. Failure to comply will attract interest at 10% per month until full payment is made. 198. The claimant’s request for ?235,340.00 in lieu of notice—equivalent to two months’ basic salary—cannot be upheld and is accordingly refused. 199. In respect of Reliefs I and J, the claimant seeks for an order to declare the forceful collection of the vehicle in his possession as wrongful and further asks this court to order the defendants, jointly and severally, to release his official vehicle—a KIA Optima bearing registration APP 819 AV/12A 216 FG—to him under the first defendant’s car-ownership scheme as approved at its Sixth Board Meeting on 16/11/2007. 200. The defendants contend that their Employee Handbook contains no provision for staff vehicles, so the claimant has no entitlement to one. The claimant, however, relies on the minutes of the first defendant’s Sixth Board Meeting of 16 November 2007, which he says establish the car? ownership scheme. Those minutes are not before the court, as the 59 defendants failed to produce them despite the claimant’s notice to produce. 201. Claimant’s counsel urges the Court to invoke section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, presuming that the defendants omitted the minutes because, if produced, they would harm their case. I accept that the first defendant is in possession of the minutes of the Sixth Board Meeting held on 16 November 2007 and so ought to have produced them or explained their absence. I therefore draw the presumption that, if produced, those minutes would be detrimental to the defendants’ case. 202. Nevertheless, a legal presumption cannot replace actual evidence. It is well settled that in any suit or proceeding the burden of proof lies on the party who would lose if no evidence were led by either side (Section 132, Evidence Act). Moreover, that burden must be discharged on a balance of probabilities in all civil proceedings (Section 134, Evidence Act) – see Onobruchere v. Esegine (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 19) 799 and Ojomo v. Den (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 64) 216. 203. It should be noted at this stage that the court will act only on credible evidence. The claimant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to the official vehicle by showing that he fulfilled the scheme’s conditions. I also take into account his cross-examination testimony regarding the return of the first defendant’s property, where he said: “Yes, I sent an email to the first defendant informing him that I intended to hand over their property, including the vehicle, and I complied.” 204. The claimant’s relief (i) asserts that he is prepared to pay the 5% contribution required by the scheme in order to take ownership of the official vehicle. However, the court finds no legal basis or evidence 60 permitting him to continue participating in that scheme once his employment with the first defendant ended, and I so hold. 205. Accordingly, Issue 2 is resolved partly in the claimant’s favour. 206. Issue 3 asks whether the defendants have proven their setoff/counterclaim and are therefore entitled to the reliefs they seek. They allege that the claimant diverted ?1,184,159.00—funds earmarked for the Global Fund project—into his personal bank account instead of applying them for the defendants’ benefit. 207. The defendants/counterclaimants further contend that the claimant wrongfully obtained ?1,184,159.00 from the Global Fund by portraying himself as project staff of the first defendant. While the claimant (as counter-defendant) admits receipt of this sum but denies any impropriety. He maintains that the allocation was formally approved by the first defendant’s Board at its 35th meeting on 21 August 2015, relying on the minutes of that meeting. 208. In his additional defence, the claimant (the defendant in the counterclaim) argues that, between July 2015 and June 2017, the counterclaimants deducted a total of N734,980.25 from his monthly salaries to recoup the Global Fund disbursements he received. He relies on Exhibit C35 to support this. 209. A quick review of Exhibit C35 reveals no reference to Global Fund or level-of-effort deductions, a point the defendants’ counsel also noted. By contrast, the claimant’s counsel maintained that the entries labeled “staff loan” on Exhibit C35 correspond to the 2015–2017 period when the Global Fund project was active, implying that the defendants deliberately disguised those deductions as loans. 61 210. It is well settled that once a document is admitted in evidence, it stands on its own and cannot be varied or contradicted by oral testimony. As held in FAM-LAP NIG. LTD & ANOR v. JAHMARCO NIG. LTD & ANOR (2018) LPELR-44730, documentary evidence “speaks for itself.” The court has no duty to bridge gaps in proof by assuming facts that the documents do not disclose. 211. Thus said, it should be also emphasized that it is the duty of the claimant, having admitted the receipt of the Global Fund, to prove his assertion that the same fund was deducted from his salary by the defendants. From the evidence before this court, it is clear that the claimant has failed to discharge that burden of proof, and I so hold. 212. I wish to stress, as I conclude—and particularly in relation to the claimant’s request that this court set aside the defendants’ decisions to suspend and dismiss him—that under the common-law master-servant relationship an employer’s right to terminate employment is sacrosanct. Accordingly, the law does not permit a court to force an unwilling employer to retain an unwanted employee. See Olaniyan v. University of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 and Shitta-Bey v. Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC 40. 213. Nevertheless, an employer’s exercise of that right must fully comply with applicable laws and the terms of the parties’ employment contract. If the employer breaches those legal requirements or contractual provisions in terminating the employee, the dismissal is typically deemed wrongful, giving rise to an award of damages rather than rendering the termination void. See BAKO V. BRITISH COUNCIL (NIG) & ANOR (2022) LCN/16040(CA). 62 214. Finally and for the avoidance of any doubt whatsoever, the claimant’s suit succeeds only in terms of the orders granted, which are: i. Claimant’s gratuity to be determined and paid to him within 30 days of this judgment which shall in default attract an annual interest of 20% per annum until finally liquidated. ii. 1 month’s salary owed before his resignation. 215. The defendants’ counter-claim is upheld. The claimant in the main suit is therefore ordered to repay to the defendants the sum of ?1,184,159.00 that he received from the Global Fund Project without authorization. 216. The judgment is recorded as set out above. Any claim for relief not expressly granted is hereby denied. No order is made as to costs. DELIVERED IN JOS THIS 23rd DAY OF OCTOBER 2025. Hon. Justice I.S. Galadima, Judge. Public access to NICN decisions: Judgments and reasons for the judgments are published, in full, online at https://nicnadr.gov.ng. NICN decisions are available to the general public shortly after a copy each has been sent to the applicant(s) and respondent(s) in a case.