
IN
THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL
DIVISION
HOLDEN
AT PORT HARCOURT
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE
JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD.
Dated: 23rd day of September, 2025 SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/180/2022
BETWEEN:
GIFT ENYA-------------------------------------------CLAIMANT
AND
GENESIS
FOODS NIG. LTD.
(Also known as Genesis Group Nig.
Ltd.)-------------------- DEFENDANT
REPRESENTATION:
O.
L. T. Agorandu for the Claimant.
Jerry
Elumeze with M. J. Micah for the Defendant.
This suit was commenced by way of
a General Form of Complaint dated and filed on the 22nd day of December, 2022,
accompanied by all requisite frontloaded processes, including the Claimant‘s
Statement of Facts, List of Witnesses, Witness Depositions on Oath, List of
Documents, and copies of documents to be relied upon at trial.
The matter was initially assigned to Hon. Justice
P. I. Hamman and subsequently re-assigned to this Court on the 8th day of
February, 2024.
Arising from the Complaint and
Statement of Facts, the Claimant‘s claims against the Defendant are as follows:
1. A
declaration that the Defendant was negligent and failed in its duty to provide
the Claimant with the requisite Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), which
resulted in an industrial incident and injuries suffered and sustained by the
Claimant at her workplace within the Defendant‘s premises, leading to: o Loss
of flexion in her 2nd, 3rd, and 4th left fingers; o Disfigurement;
o Brain damage; o Occasional
loss of memory; and o Resentment from subsequent
employers.
The Claimant, therefore, claims
general and special damages as follows:
2.
The sum of ?150,000,000.00
(One Hundred and Fifty Million Naira) as compensation and/or cost of treatment
for the loss of flexion in her 2nd, 3rd, and 4th left fingers and the brain
injury sustained, as well as sponsorship and payment for treatment in any
recognized hospital in Nigeria or overseas for brain surgery.
3.
Payment of the Claimant‘s
accumulating salaries of ?30,000.00 monthly from the
20th of April, 2020, until the determination of this suit, amounting to ?870,000.00
as at September 2022.
a.
Payment of medical allowance of ?30,000.00
monthly from January 2010 until the determination of this suit, amounting to ?4,320,000.00
as at September 2022.
4. The
sum of ?1,500,000.00 (One Million,
Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as legal fees.
In response, the Defendant filed
its Statement of Defence on the 31st day of January, 2023, accompanied by its
List of Witnesses, Witness Statement on Oath, List of Documents, and copies of
the documents to be relied upon at trial.
The Claimant, in turn, filed a
Reply to the Defendant‘s Statement of Defence on the 15th day of May, 2023.
Trial commenced before this Court
on the 31st day of October, 2024, with the Claimant opening her case and
testifying as the sole witness (CW1). She adopted her Witness Statements on
Oath filed on the 22nd of December, 2022, and the 3rd of July, 2023,
which were adopted and marked as C1a and C1b respectively.
Through CW1, the Claimant
tendered a total of fourteen (14) documents, which were admitted in evidence
and marked as follows:
·
Exhibit C2 - Genesis Staff ID
Card.
·
Exhibit C3 - Genesis Group Staff
Handbook.
·
Exhibit C4 - Claimant‘s Pictures.
·
Exhibit C5 - Letter of Employment
dated 14th December, 2009.
·
Exhibit C6 - Salary Upgrade
Letter dated 18th May, 2012.
·
Exhibit C7 - Redeployment Letter
dated 14th December, 2009.
·
Exhibit C8 - Prime Medical
Consultant’s Request for X-Ray Services for the Claimant.
·
Exhibit C9 - Prime Medical
Consultant’s Medical Report dated 30th April, 2012.
·
Exhibit C10 - Rivers State
University Teaching Hospital (BMH), Port Harcourt – Request for Radiological
Examination dated 25th July, 2022.
·
Exhibit C11 (a-j) - Brain CT Scan
CD from BMH Hospital, pictures of the Claimant, and Certificate of Compliance.
·
Exhibit C12 - Brain CT Scan image
and envelope from BMH
Hospital.
·
Exhibit C13 - BMH Hospital
Patient Personal Card.
·
Exhibit C14 - BMH Hospital
Medical Report dated 26th July, 2022.
·
Exhibit C15 - Claimant‘s
Solicitors‘ Letter dated 2nd February, 2021.
Arising from the Statement of
Facts and the evidence adduced through her Witness Statements on Oath, the case
of the Claimant is that she was in good health and without any physical
deformity at the time she was employed by the Defendant as an Assistant Pizza
Cook on the 14th of December, 2009. She contends that, by the provisions of the
Defendant‘s Staff Handbook, the Defendant was obligated to provide her with a
complete set of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) in compliance with
applicable international industrial safety standards. It is her case that,
notwithstanding repeated requests, the Defendant deliberately failed to supply
the requisite PPE safety kits.
The Claimant alleged that on the
7th of January, 2010, while performing her duties without the said PPE, she
slipped and sustained injuries to her fingers and head, resulting in occasional
memory loss and permanent deformity of her left fingers. She stated that she
received initial treatment at Prime Medical Centre before being referred to
Prime Medical Consultant, who recommended a brain MRI and CT scan, and advised
that she should only engage in stress-free work. She further averred that the
Defendant failed to provide the urgent medical attention recommended, and that
upon resuming work she collapsed on duty and was again taken to Prime Medical
Centre. Following this incident, the Defendant instructed her not to return to
work, assuring her that her salary would continue and that they would seek a
permanent cure for her condition.
The Claimant asserted that the
Defendant paid her salary and medical allowance until March 2020, when such
payments abruptly ceased. She further stated that she later sought treatment at
the Rivers State University Teaching Hospital, where a brain CT scan confirmed
that she had sustained a brain injury.
Under cross-examination, CW1
testified that the incident occurred some 14 years ago. She maintained that she
was instructed to remain at home because of her disability, and that she was not
aware of any obligation to report her recovery progress to the Defendant. She
admitted that one of the photographs tendered showed her wearing an apron but
not safety boots. She further stated that the Defendant‘s manager discontinued
her medical treatment, and that she did not receive any medical care provided
by the company thereafter. CW1 confirmed that she had previously instituted an
action in the High Court in which a medical report was required, and she
alleged that the said report established that she had suffered brain damage.
She also confirmed her claim for medical allowance, though she could not recall
whether such an allowance was expressly provided for in the Defendant‘s
Handbook.
Upon the close of the Claimant‘s
case, the Defendant opened its defence and presented one witness, Chizurum
Iroezindu, a Human Resources Advisor, who testified as DW1. She adopted her
Witness Statement on Oath filed on the 30th of October, 2024, which was marked
as Exhibit D1. Through DW1, four (4) documents were tendered and admitted in
evidence as Exhibits D2 to D5, namely:
·
Exhibit D2 – Request for X-Ray
Services;
·
Exhibit D3 – Sick Certificate;
·
Exhibit D4 – Request for Medical
Report; ? Exhibit D5 – Medical Report.
From the Statement of Defence and
the testimony of DW1, the Defendant‘s case is that the Claimant was employed by
Genesis Foods Nig. Ltd., which it says is distinct from Genesis Group Nigeria
Limited. The Defendant contends that the Claimant was provided with all
necessary PPE for an Assistant Cook, including a uniform, apron, hand gloves,
kitchen cap, and canvas shoes — the latter being considered equivalent to
safety boots in a kitchen setting, in line with the Staff Handbook.
The Defendant asserts that on the
7th of January, 2010, the Claimant tripped on her own accord while at work and
fell, sustaining some injuries, but denies that she suffered any brain injury.
It claims to have borne all medical expenses, including the cost of an MRI scan
which revealed no head injury, and relies on a certificate from Prime Medical
Consultant clearing the Claimant to resume work on the 21st of January, 2010.
The Defendant argues that if the Claimant had suffered any relapse, she was
under a duty to return for further treatment, which she failed to do, and that
she never returned to work.
Nevertheless, the Defendant
maintained payment of her salary until March 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic
forced the suspension of all staff duties and payments. Upon resumption of
operations in July 2020, only employees who returned to work were reinstated
for payment, and the Claimant did not resume duty. The Defendant further
contends that the medical report dated 26th July, 2022, was prepared 12 years
after the incident, based solely on the Claimant‘s narration, and was procured
for the purpose of this litigation. It also raised the defence that the action
is statute-barred.
During cross-examination, DW1
confirmed that the Claimant sustained an injury on the Defendant‘s premises,
but professed ignorance as to whether the Staff Handbook obligates the
Defendant to bear the medical bills of an employee injured at work. She
admitted that she was unaware of the contents of the Handbook but confirmed
that the Claimant was given a written letter of employment. DW1 testified that
the Claimant effectively terminated her employment by absconding from duty in
February 2011, though salary payments continued until 2020. She claimed that
the Defendant had instructed Prime Medical Consultant to continue the
Claimant‘s treatment, albeit without producing evidence to that effect. She
added that the Claimant physically worked for just over one year after her
employment but remained on the payroll for approximately 11 years.
DW1 maintained that the Claimant
was provided with safety boots, and stated she did not know whether the
Claimant ever wrote to the Defendant about her health condition, but agreed
that the Claimant wrote to the Defendant after her salary was stopped. She
finally noted that the Claimant, like all other staff, received palliatives
from the Defendant.
Upon the discharge of DW1, the
Defendant closed its case. The matter was thereafter adjourned for adoption of
Final Written Addresses. On the 30th day of June, 2025, parties adopted their
respective addresses. The Defendant had filed its Final Written Address on the
27th day of May, 2025, wherein learned counsel, Jerry Elumeze, Esq., formulated
the following three issues for determination namely:-
1.
Whether the claim for negligence
is statute barred and liable to be dismissed on that ground.
2.
Whether the Claimant has
established her claim of negligence against the Defendant
3.
Whether the Claimant is entitled
to the special and general damages claimed in this suit.
In addressing issue one counsel
stated that the purpose of limitation law is to remove and extinguish a right
of action when an action is not filed within the statutory period of time. He
cited Egbe v Adefaras in (No. 2) (1987) 1 NWLR (Part 47) 1. Counsel added that
where a matter is statute barred there can no longer be a right of action and a
court of law is robbed of the jurisdiction to hear or entertain the claim. Counsel
submitted that by Section 16 of the of the Limitation Law of Rivers State every
action on tort or contract shall be within 5 years when the action arose. In
determining when the cause of action arose the claimant‘s pleading shall be the
determining factor.
Counsel pointed out that by
paragraph 6 and 7 of the claimant‘s statement of claim, the claimant mentioned
that the accident happened on 7/1/2010 and that the claim of negligence arose
from the accident that happened on 7/1/2010 hence the cause of action arose on
7/1/2010. Counsel stated that the Claimant's cause of action which accrued on
7/1/2010 expired on 6/1/2015. He contended that the Claimant's suit filed on
the 9/1/2023, 13 years after the accrual of the alleged cause of action, is
caught up by Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Rivers State and therefore
statute barred. He cited SPDC v. West (2018) LPELR-44290 (CA) at 12-20.
On issue two counsel submitted
that assuming that the claim for negligence is not statute barred, the Claimant
has woefully failed to prove her claim of negligence. Counsel stated that in a
claim based on negligence the claimant must establish both negligence and
damages. He cited Iyere v BFFM Ltd (2008) 18 NWLR (Part 119) 360.
Counsel further stated that the
fact that the Claimant was in a work place when the accident occurred on
7/1/2010 did not create an actionable cause of action. The Claimant has a legal
burden to establish that the workplace accident was caused by the negligence of
the Defendant, and secondly that the Claimant suffered damage as a result of
the workplace accident.
Counsel submitted that negligence
is the breach of duty of care which results in an injury. He added that negligence
is a matter of fact and a party alleging negligence must not only plead the act
or acts of negligence but must also give specific particulars of the
negligence. He cited Aku Nmecha Transport Services (Nig.) Ltd. & Anor. v.
Atoloye (1993) 6 NWLR (Part 298) 233 at 248. Counsel stated that the defendant
had denied the fact that it never provided the claimant with Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) like safety boots, uniform, protective gear on her
head, hand or foot. Counsel argued that the parties have joined issues on the
particulars of negligence, that the claimant has the burden of proving
negligence which the claimant failed to discharge.
Counsel further stated that the
claimant had admitted to have been given uniform, apron, cap which contradicts
her pleading that she was not given safety kits. And that the claimant‘s
exhibit particularly the picture which showed the claimant on uniform without
her cap shows that the claimant was careless with her PPE. Counsel added that
the claimant failed to show how negligence is a matter of fact, there is a
burden on the Claimant to show how the accident was caused by lack of safety
boots, or how the accident happened.
On issue three counsel stated
that the claims of the claimant is not sustainable in law for the simple reason
that special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. He cited
Eneh v. Ozor & Anor (2016) LPELR-40830(SC). He added that the claimant did
not proffer any iota of proof in support of the claim for N150,000,000. Counsel
submitted that the claimant‘s exhibits proves nothing to substantial his claim
of N150,000,000.
In analyzing the whole exhibits
counsel stated that the patient's personal card merely proves that the Claimant
went to a hospital on 25/7/2022, a period of over 12 years after the accident.
The photographs are mere evidence that the Claimant underwent a scan, but are
not evidence of the result of the scan. A request for scan is mere evidence
that the Claimant went to a hospital in 2022 and a request was made to carry
out a scan on the Claimant and that the compact disc, x rays, the photographs,
are mere evidence that that the Claimant underwent brain scan and head x-rays,
but they are not evidence of brain injury. And that a neurologist is required
to interpret and explain the x rays and compact disc to the court and give
evidence whether they show brain injury, but no neurologist was called to give
evidence. And that the medical report by Rivers State Teaching Hospital made in
2022by a casualty officer in a hospital is an attempt to deceive the court, in
view that a casualty officer is a first line officer who deals with
emergencies, and not an accident that happened in the past 13 years and that
the report makes no reference to the claimant‘s x-ray/brain scan/MRI and was
based on what the claimant told the casualty officer.
For the claims of accumulating
salaries counsel stated that Salary is reward for work done. He cited Atulomah
v. Nigerian College of Aviation Technology (2015) LPELR-25733(CA). Counsel
submitted that the Claimant is seeking accumulated salary award for a period in
which the Claimant did not work for the Defendant. He contends that Claimant is
not entitled to salary for 20/4/2020 till date of judgment as it would be
inequitable for the Claimant to receive salary when she did not work. Counsel
added that effect of the Claimant's failure to report back to work after the
expiration of her sick leave on 3/2/2011 is that she abandoned and absconded
from work, and the fact that the Defendant continued paying the Claimant salary
for 9 years does not justify the abandonment of her job.
Counsel further added that the
claimant was not entitled to the claim for medical allowance of N30,000 per
month, that her employment letter stipulated that her salary was gross salary
which included medical allowance. With regards to the claim for legal fee,
counsel stated that there is no judicial support for a claim of legal fees as
special damages. He cited Ihekwoaba v ACB Ltd (1998) 10 NWLR (Part 571) 590 at
610 – 611. In conclusion counsel urged the court to dismiss the case of the
claimant.
In response, learned counsel for
the Claimant, O. L. T. Agorondu, Esq., filed the Claimant‘s Final Written
Address on the 30th day of June, 2025, wherein two issues were formulated for
determination, namely:
1.
Whether the claim for negligence
is statute-barred and liable to be dismissed on that ground.
2.
Whether the Claimant has
successfully proved her case to be entitled to the reliefs claimed in this
suit, hinged on continuing personal injuries, pain, fraud, and concealment
arising from the negligence of the Defendant.
In arguing issue one, counsel
stated that, the claimant‘s suit is not caught by the provisions of Section 16
of the Limitation Law Cap. 80 Laws of Rivers State of Nigeria, 1999 by virtue
of Sections 17, 18, 23 and 24 of the said law, as the Claimant still suffers
memory loss due to the brain damage which is continuing from the personal
injury sustained from the Defendant's negligence.
Counsel added that there are
exceptions to limitation laws which is provided under Section 31 of the
imitation law, and such exceptions includes where there is fraud, concealment
or mistake. Counsel contended that the claimant discovered that she was being
deceived and defrauded by the Defendant in 2020.
Counsel contended that the
injuries sustained by the claimant from the negligence of the Defendant is
still continuing and constitutes exception and that the cause of action will
not abate or become statute barred until the personal injury or damage which is
of a continuing nature completely stops or abates. Counsel cited MULIMA VS.
ÜSMAN (2014)1l6 NWLR (PT. 1432) 160 and INEC VS. ONOWAKPOKO (2018)2 NWLR (PT.
1602) 134. He added that, in view that the injury sustained by the claimant has
not ceased, claimant‘s action is not statute barred. He cited Oko-Jaja V. NNPC
(2019) LPELR 48447 (CA). He added that the law is that in a Case of continuance
of damage or personal injury, the cause of action is determined when the injury
resulting from the act ceases.
In arguing issue two counsel
submitted that negligence is a question of fact, not law, therefore each case
must be treated and decided in the light of it‘s own facts and circumstances.
Counsel cited UTB (NIG) VS. 0ZOEMENA (2007)3 NWLR (PT. 1022) 488 SC.
Counsel contended that in common
law employers have the duties of care to their employees. Counsel contended
that there is no closed list of duty, as a result, categories of negligence are
never closed. He added that the incident occurred because the Defendant failed
or omitted to give the Claimant as provided in its Staff handbook safety shoes.
Counsel contended that the defendant handbook paragraph 11, 12 at Page 17
stipulates that the defendant bears the cost of medical treatment for injuries
sustained by an employee.
Counsel stated that in an action
for negligence, the Claimant needs to prove the following; duty of care owed by
the Defendant, there is a failure to attain a standard of care prescribed by
law; and Damages or injury suffered by the Claimant as a result of the breach
of the duty of care owed her by the Defendant. Counsel stated that the claimant
in paragraph 5 and 6 of the statement of claim pleaded the particulars of the
Negligence and has stated the defendant failed to provide safety boots as
provided under Article 16.2of the Defendant's handbook (Exhibit C3), he
contends that the safety shoes would have prevented the accident.
In the claims for N150,000,000
special and general damages, counsel contended that based on the exhibits
tendered before the court which is the medical report it clearly showed that
the claimant is suffering from the injuries and needs medical treatment, and
need no medical expert to prove pain and suffering. Counsel cited C & C
CONSTRUCTION C0. LTD VS OKHAI (2003) 18 NWLR (PT. 85l)79 at 104 - 105.
The claimant urged the court to
grant payment for accumulated salaries from 2020, in view that there is no
document stating or suggesting that the Claimant employment was either
suspended, terminated or summarily dismissed or any kind of cessation of her
employment or that she absconded or resigned. Counsel contended that the
claimant is still a staff and an employee of the defendant. The claimant
contended that her situation is a special circumstance of who sustained work place
injuries and was asked to stay at home and was being paid by the Defendant,
cannot be termed abscondment. Counsel stated that the defendant paid the
claimant from when the accident happened to 2020 before they stopped. Counsel stated
that the claimant‘s salary was upgraded in 2012, hence the defendant cannot
rely on the grounds that the claimant absconded from work in 2011. Counsel
added that the claimant is entitled to her salary until she her employment is
officially and in writing terminated. Counsel stated that withholding of the
claimant‘s salary is unlawful.
In addition, counsel stated that
the Defendant bears the cost of medical treatment for any employee injuries as
provided in Article 11.11 and 11.12 of the defendant‘s handbook. With regards
to the solicitor‘s fees, counsel contended that, Claimant's Solicitors fee as a
special claim is part of and borne out of the Claimant's cause of action.
Counsel cited VANGUARD MEDIA LIMITED VS. BRIGHTWATERS ENERGY LIMITED & ANOR
(2022) LPELR-58569 (CA). Counsel urged the court to resolve the whole issues in
favour of the claimant.
By way of reply on point of law
filed on the 4th of July, 2025, counsel to the Defendant posited
thatsection 31 of the Limitation Law of Rivers State cited by the claimant
alleging the case of the claimant to be under exception of fraud, concealment,
or mistake, on grounds that the claimant was deceived is disconnected to the
claimant‘s case. Counsel contended that the Claimant's claim is rooted in
negligence arising from an industrial accident. He stated that the Claimant is
suing for alleged breach of care. Therefore, the issue of fraud or concealment
simply does not arise. Counsel submitted that issue of fraud must be pleaded.
He cited Belgore v. Ahmed (2013) 8 NWLR (Part 1355) 60.
Counsel added that Section 16 of
the limitation Law specifically provides that limitation period for actions
founded in tort is 5 year, and that the law does not make a distinction between
some torts falling within 5 years and other torts exempted from limitation. He
contended that the Claimant's claim rooted in negligence is a tort claim and
falls within section 16 of the Limitation Law. Counsel submitted that Mulima v
Usman (supra) cited by the claimant is an obiter.
Counsel contended further that
the Claimant failed to adduce evidence of any continuing injury. He added that
the claim arose from one accident and not from a series of events. Counsel
submitted that the Courts look at the cause and not the effect to determine
whether an injury is Continuing. He cited Olaosebikan V. Williams (1996) 5 NWLR
(Part 449) 437 at 456. Counsel contended that while the Claimant proved that
she underwent scan and MRI in 2022, she failed to disclose to the court the
result of the tests. Hence it would be improper to make a finding of continuing
injury when there is no medical evidence of injurious effect of the legal
injury. In the contention that the defendant promised to continue payment of claimant‘s
salary, Counsel argued that there is no evidence before the Court that the
Defendant promised to take care of the Claimant by continuing to pay her salary
for life even without her working for the Defendant.
Upon a careful
consideration of all the processes filed by the respective parties in this
suit, I have diligently evaluated the pleadings, considered the oral and
documentary evidence adduced at trial, and observed the demeanour of the
witnesses who testified before this Court. I have also meticulously reviewed
the exhibits tendered and admitted in the course of proceedings.
Furthermore, I have taken due
account of the reliefs sought by the Claimant vis-à-vis the arguments canvassed
by learned Counsel on both sides in their respective Final Written Addresses
and Reply on Points of Law.
Upon a comprehensive appraisal of
the facts, legal submissions, and evidence placed before this Court, I am of
the considered view that the issues for determination can be succinctly stated
as follows:
1.
Whether or not this Court is
vested with jurisdiction to entertain this suit.
2.
If Issue One is resolved in the
affirmative, whether or not, in view of the facts and evidence before the
Court, the Defendant owed a duty of care to the Claimant, and whether the
Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought.
It is imperative to note that the
Defendant has raised a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of this Court
on the ground that the Claimant‘s action is statute-barred, having been
commenced more than thirteen (13) years after the cause of action arose.
Therefore, before delving into the substantive merits of the case, it is
essential to first determine whether this Court is clothed with the requisite
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.
It is trite that the issue of
limitation, once raised, directly impacts the jurisdiction of the Court.
Jurisdiction, being fundamental, is a threshold issue that must be determined
at the earliest opportunity, as it can be raised at any stage of proceedings.
The Supreme Court in Dr. Joseph Nwobike, SAN v. Federal Republic of Nigeria
(2021) LPELR56670 (SC) held:
“The law is
well settled that where a Court of law deals with a matter without
jurisdiction, so doing amounts to embarking on a worthless exercise because no
matter how brilliantly well the case is conducted, it will be a complete
nullity. It is the law that an order of the Court made without jurisdiction is
a nullity”.
See also Odofin v.
Agu (1992) NWLR (Pt. 229) 350; Nidocco v. Gbajabiamila (2013) 14 NWLR (Pt.
1374) 350; Ekpeyong v. Nyong (1975) 2 SC (Reprint) 65 at 73–74.
Similarly, in Alhaji Zubairu
Muhammad Tarauni v. Alhaji Aliyu Salihu Darma (2022) LPELR-57402 (CA), the
Court of Appeal reiterated:
“Jurisdiction is
the live wire of any litigation. It is fundamental and crucial to the
adjudication process. It is settled law that it is the plaintiff‘s claim at the
trial Court that determines the jurisdiction of the Court”.
See Tukur v.
Government of Gongola State (1989) 9 SCNJ 1.
It is beyond dispute that the
plaintiff‘s claim is the determining factor upon which the Court must decide
whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain a suit. As stated in Mr.
Alalade of Hydra Agency Nig. Ltd. & Ors v. The Presiding President of the
Ota Grade 1 Customary Court & Ors (2021) LPELR-55656 (CA):
I consider it well
settled that jurisdiction is determined by the claim of the plaintiff. It is
what the plaintiff submits to the Court for adjudication, that is to say, the
subject matter and claim that determines whether the Court has jurisdiction to
entertain the claim or not. Therefore, the process to be examined in
determining if the Court has jurisdiction is the plaintiff‘s claim.
Based on the facts presented before
this Court, the Claimant asserts that she was employed by the Defendant as an
Assistant Pizza Cook on the 14th of December, 2009, and that under the
Defendant‘s Staff Handbook she was entitled to a full complement of Personal
Protective Equipment (PPE) in line with industrial safety standards. She
alleges that despite repeated requests, the Defendant failed to provide her
with safety boots and that on the 7th of January, 2010, she slipped, fell, and
sustained injuries to her fingers as well as an alleged brain injury.
The Defendant‘s contention is
that the cause of action accrued on the said 7th of January, 2010, whereas this
suit was commenced in December 2022, over twelve (12) years after the
occurrence of the event complained of.
By virtue of Section 16 of the
Limitation Law, Cap. 80, Laws of Rivers State, actions founded on tort or
contract must be commenced within five (5) years of the accrual of the cause of
action. The provision states:
“No action
founded on contract, tort or any other action not specifically provided for in
Parts I or II of this Law shall be brought after the expiration of five years
from the date the cause of action accrued”.
It is clear from the wording of
Section 16 that actions founded on tort, including negligence, must be
commenced within five (5) years from the date the cause of action arose.
The essence of limitation
statutes was aptly stated in Nwanosike & Anor v. Udenze & Anor (2016)
LPELR-40505 (CA):
“The whole
purpose of a Statute of Limitation is that a prospective litigant must
institute an action over a right that accrues to him within the time stipulated
to claim his entitlement from the adversary who is making effort to take away
his right or property. Where a claimant institutes his action after or outside
the time prescribed by statute of limitation upon becoming aware of the
wrongdoing, his right of action, enforcement, or vindication becomes terminated
or extinguished”.
In addition, the Supreme Court in
Ibrahim v. Lawal & Ors (2015) LPELR-24736 (SC) stated the rationale for the
existence of limitation statutes in the following terms:
“One may wonder why
a person‘s right of access to court should be extinguished by law. The
rationale for the existence of statutes of limitation is that long dormant
claims have more of cruelty than justice in them and that a defendant may have
lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and that a person with a good
cause of action should pursue it with reasonable diligence.
Per OKORO, J.S.C.
See also Oba J.A. Aremo II v. S.F. Adekanye & Ors (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 891)
572 at 592 A–H”.
The yardsticks for determining
whether an action is statute-barred were clearly laid down by the Court in
Ajayi v. Adebiyi (2012) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1310) as follows:
a)
The date when the cause of action
accrued;
b)
The date of commencement of the
suit as indicated on the originating process (in this case, the Complaint and
Statement of
Facts);
and
c) The
period of time prescribed by the relevant statute for bringing the action.
Applying the above yardsticks to
the facts of this case, I have carefully examined the Statement of Facts, which
clearly discloses that the accident giving rise to the Claimant‘s cause of
action occurred on the 7th of January, 2010. This was the date when the alleged
damage occurred.
In Bank of the North v. Geina
(2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 296) 862 at 881, the Court held that:
“A cause of
action arises at the date or time when a breach or any act that will warrant
the person who is adversely affected by the act to take action in court”.
I therefore find that, on the
Claimant‘s own pleadings, the cause of action arose on the 7th of January,
2010, when she allegedly slipped and fell due to the absence of safety boots,
sustaining injuries in the course of her employment with the Defendant. This is
the proper date from which the computation between the accrual of the cause of
action and the filing of the suit must be made.
By this reckoning, the present
action, commenced on the 22nd of December, 2022, was instituted approximately
twelve (12) years and eleven (11) months after the alleged incident.
That notwithstanding, learned
counsel for the Claimant has relied on Sections 17, 18, 23, 24, and 31 of the
Limitation Law to contend that the Claimant‘s injuries are of a continuing
nature and/or arose from fraud or concealment. It is further argued that the
injury has not ceased, and that in cases of continuance of damage or personal
injury, the cause of action only accrues when the injury ceases.
Indeed, the law recognizes
certain exceptions to statutory limitation periods. These include cases
involving fraud, deliberate concealment by the defendant, mistake, or a
continuing injury/fresh damage arising from the same wrongful act. In such
cases, each fresh occurrence of damage or the continuance of the wrongful act
may give rise to a fresh cause of action.
However, for the continuing
injury?
exception to apply, the injury itself must be ongoing and must result from
continuing acts or omissions of the defendant not merely from the lingering
effects of a completed wrongful act. In Mr. George Onyeekwumma Kwuhodu &
Ors v. Independent National Electoral Commission (2021) LPELR-55214 (CA), the
Court held:
“……what is a
continuance of damage or injury? In Obiefuna v. Okoye (1961) All NLR 357 at
360, which was quoted in INEC v. Ogbadibo Local Government (supra), the
following answer was provided: ?Continuance of injury or damage means
continuance of the legal injury and not merely continuance of the injurious
effects of a legal injury.”
Similarly, in Michael Onuoha
Nwankwo & Anor v. Abel C. Ogbonnaya Nwankwo (2017) LPELR-42832 (CA), the
Court held:
“Indeed,
there are some exceptions to the limitation law set by various limitation
statutes. These statutory limitations cover cases such as fraud, deliberate
concealment by the defendant, or mistake, or in a circumstance where there is a
continuing injury or fresh damage arising from the same injury. Each fresh
damage arising from the same injury or a continuing injury gives rise to a
fresh cause of action. The term “continuing injury or damage” is an injury that
is still in the process of being committed.
See Black‘s Law
Dictionary (8th Ed.) p. 801. In Aremo II v. Adekanye (2004) ALL FWLR (Pt. 224)
2113 at 2132–2133, the Supreme Court per Edozie, JSC, stated:
“Admittedly
legal principles are not always inflexible. Sometimes they admit of certain
exceptions. The law of limitation of action recognizes some exceptions. Thus,
where there has been a continuance of the damage, a fresh cause of action
arises from time to time, as often as damage is caused.”
A continuing damage
or injury is not merely the continuance of the injurious effects of a legal
injury but the continuance of the legal injury itself. It is the continuance of
the act which caused the damage… Continuation of injury means the continuation
of the act which caused the injury.
See also Abiodun v.
Attorney-General of the Federation (2007) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 359.
From the foregoing authorities,
the term “continuance of injury”
refers to the persistence of the legal injury itself, not merely to the
enduring consequences of that injury. In the present case, the act complained
of the alleged failure to provide safety boots resulting in the fall and injury
occurred once, on the 7th of January, 2010.
There is no evidence before this
Court that the Defendant has since that date engaged in any continuing act or
omission constituting the same wrongful conduct.
Accordingly, I hold that the “continuing
injury”
exception is in applicable in the present case, and the Claimant‘s attempt to
bring her claim within that exception is misconceived, untenable and is hereby
rejected.
The Claimant also sought to bring
her case within the exceptions to the limitation period by alleging fraud and
concealment. On this point, the law is settled that it is only in cases of
concealed fraud that the statute of limitation becomes inoperative. In Alfa
Arowosaye v. Felix Oluwaseun Ogedengbe & Anor (2008) LPELR-3701 (CA), the
Court of Appeal held:
“It has long
been established that it is only in cases of concealed fraud that the statute
of limitation becomes inoperative. Thus, the true position is that the statute
of limitation does not apply in cases of concealed fraud so long as the party
defrauded remains in ignorance of the fraud without any fault of his own”.
Similarly, in Duzu & Anor v.
Yunusa & Ors (2010) LPELR-8989 (CA), Garba, JCA, stated that the law
requires that the facts of fraud be specifically pleaded and proved by the
party alleging it. It is also trite that limitation laws do not apply where the
claimant was, at the time the cause of action accrued, under a legal disability
— namely infancy or unsoundness of mind as was held in UBA v. BTL Ltd (2006) 19
NWLR (Pt. 1013) 67. Physical incapacity, however, does not constitute a legal
disability for limitation purposes.
The law is equally clear that any
party relying on fraud as an exception must plead the particulars of such
fraud, and those particulars must appear in the Statement of Claim, since it is
the pleadings that determine limitation issues.
Upon a careful examination of the
Claimant‘s pleadings, she alleged that following the accident, due to her
incapacity to perform her duties, the Defendant allowed her to remain at home
while awaiting a medical solution to her condition, and continued paying her
salary until March 2020. The Claimant contends that she only realized in 2020
that she had been deceived and defrauded when the Defendant stopped paying her
salary and provided no further treatment.
It is not in dispute, and indeed
there is uncontroverted evidence, that the Defendant continued to pay the
Claimant‘s salary and medical allowance up until March 2020, notwithstanding
that she was not performing any official duties. However, the primary cause of
action in negligence accrued on the 7th of January, 2010, when the alleged
damage occurred. By Section 16 of the Rivers State Limitation Law, the
limitation period of five years expired on the 6th of January, 2015.
The continued payment of salary
and medical allowance does not, in law, stop or extend the limitation period
for negligence unless there is an acknowledgment in writing of liability for
the injury. No such written acknowledgment has been produced in this case. The
payments appear to have been made either as an act of benevolence or pursuant
to employment terms, and not as an admission of liability in negligence.
More importantly, there is no
averment in the Statement of Facts setting out the particulars of fraud, nor is
there any credible evidence substantiating any of the essential elements of
fraud or deliberate concealment. The pleadings are bereft of the material facts
necessary to activate this exception.
In the light of the foregoing,
this Court finds that none of the recognized exceptions to the limitation
statute, whether on the basis of continuing injury, fraud, concealment,
mistake, or legal disability has been established on the facts of this case.
The act complained of and the damage occurred once, on 7/1/2010, and there is
no evidence of any continuing wrongful act thereafter.
Accordingly, I hold that the
Claimant‘s cause of action accrued on 7/1/2010 and became statute-barred on
6/1/2015. This suit, having been commenced on 22/12/2022, is therefore
statute-barred by virtue of Section 16 of the Limitation Law of Rivers State.
This Court consequently lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the cause of
action is hereby declared stale and moribund, and is accordingly dismissed.
With regard to Issue Two —
whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought having found that this
action is statute-barred, this Court is precluded from examining the merits. As
the Supreme Court held in Barr. Okey Uzoho & Ors v. National Council of
Privatization & Anor (2022) LPELR-57680 (SC), once a court finds that it
lacks jurisdiction, it must bring the proceedings to an end. See also
Skenconsult (Nig.) Ltd v. Ukey [1981] 1 SC 6; Adesokan & Ors v. Adetunji
& Ors [1994] LPELR-152 (SC); Metilelu v. Olowo-Opejo & Anor [2006] LPELR-11598
(SC).
Nevertheless, and for
completeness, even if the suit were competent, the settled principle is that
for negligence to be actionable, the Claimant must establish:
(a) that the Defendant owed her a duty of
care;
(b)
that the Defendant breached that
duty; and
(c) that the breach caused her damage. See
Lufthansa German Airlines v. Ballanyne
(2012) LPELR-7977 (CA).
The evidence before the Court
indicates that the Claimant was provided with PPE in the form of an apron,
gloves, kitchen cap, and canvas shoes which is standard in a kitchen
environment. She admitted being given some PPE but alleged the absence of
safety boots. There is, however, no evidence linking the absence of safety
boots to her fall, nor any medical expert evidence establishing that she
suffered brain injury caused by the fall. The medical reports tendered Exhibits
C11, C12, and C14 were prepared some 12 years after the incident, without
supporting expert testimony, and cannot be accorded probative weight sufficient
to prove the alleged injury.
In the result, the action fails
at the threshold. It is accordingly dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
On the balance of probabilities,
the Court finds that negligence has not been proved. The mere occurrence of an
accident does not, without more, establish negligence. In Mr. Obadare Onaolapo
v. ZTE Nigeria Limited (2022) LPELR-57592 (CA), the Court of Appeal restated
the position thus:
“The term
negligence has been variously defined, but the central key that runs through
all such definitions is that it is an omission to do something which a
reasonable man guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily
regulate human affairs would do, or doing something which a reasonable and
prudent man would not do. Thus, negligence is the failure to use such care as a
reasonably prudent and careful person would use under similar circumstances, or
the doing of some act which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done
under similar circumstances. In order to establish negligence against a
defendant, one pertinent question arises for consideration, and that is
whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the person who has suffered
damage, there is sufficient relationship of proximity or neighbourhood such
that, in the reasonable contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part
may be likely to cause damage to the latter? It is firmly established that a
party who alleges negligence should not only plead the act or acts of
negligence, but should also give specific particulars. It is not open to the
Court to find reasons other than those pleaded to find for the plaintiff in the
tort of negligence. The particulars of the alleged negligence must be pleaded
in sufficient detail and must be supported by credible evidence at the trial”.
See also A.G. Leventis Nig. Plc
v. Chief Christian Akpu (2007) 6 SC (Pt.
1) 239; (2007) 17 NWLR
(Pt. 1063) 416; Aku Nmecha Transport Services Nig. Ltd & Anor v. Atoloye
(1993) 6 NWLR (Pt. 298) 233 at 248; UBN Plc v. Emole (2001) 12 SC (Pt. 1) 106;
Aemareli v. AIC Ltd (1986) NWLR (Pt. 443) 449; Rabiu Hamza v. Peter Kure (2010)
10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 630.
Having considered the questions
raised for determination, and having found that the Claimant‘s cause of action
is statute-barred, the legal capacity to maintain the instant suit is
extinguished. Even if the suit were competent, the Claimant has failed to
justify the grant of any of the reliefs sought by placing before the Court
cogent and credible evidence establishing the pleaded particulars of
negligence. It is therefore clear that Issue Two would, in any event, be
resolved in favour of the Defendant.
In the final analysis, I find and
hold that the Claimant‘s case is statute-barred, having been instituted outside
the five-year limitation period prescribed by Section 16 of the Limitation Law
of Rivers State. This Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to entertain same.
The case is hereby dismissed in its entirety.
Judgment is accordingly entered.
I make no order as to costs.
…………………………………………………………………
HON. JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD
JUDGE.