IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD, OFR, bpa PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

DATE: 18 JUNE 2025                                                                   

SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/148/2024

BETWEEN

Honourable Chinedu Joshua Obika                       -                                                        Applicant

AND

Federal Character Commission                             -                                                     Respondent

REPRESENTATION

Chukwunweike Okafor, for the claimant. Michael A. Ugwu, for the defendant.

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

1.  The applicant filed this suit on 5 June 2024 vide an originating summons; brought pursuant to sections 153(1)(c) and 245C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, sections 4 and 5 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act Cap F7 LFN 2004, Part I, paragraph 6 and Part II, paragraph 3 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act (Subsidiary Legislation) LFN 2004, Order 2 Rule 2(3)(II) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The claimant submitted four questions for determination, namely:

(A)  Whether the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory are not entitled to the statutory provisions of Part I, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act, 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation) which entitles them to 1 percent of all staff recruitment exercise conducted both in the civil and the public services of the Federation by Federal Government Ministries Parastatals, security agencies, bodies corporate owned by the Federal Government.

(B)    Whether the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory are not deprived of their employment opportunities into the civil and public services of the Federation in respect of the 1 percent employment opportunity enshrined in the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act, 2004 as a result of the Respondent’s inability to enforce compliance in respect of the said provisions of Part I, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act, 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation).

(C)     Whether the inability by the Respondent to promote, monitor and enforce the provisions of Part I paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act, 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation) as regards the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory

does not amount to dereliction of its duties as contained in the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act 2004.

(D)   In the event that the above three questions are answered in the affirmative, whether the Respondent is not mandated to enforce the 1 percent of all staff recruitment exercise conducted both in the civil and the public services of the Federation by Federal Government Ministries, Parastatals, security agencies, bodies corporate owned by the Federal Government.

2.  Upon the determination of the above questions, the applicant prayed for the following reliefs:

(1)  A DECLARATION that indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory are entitled to the 1 percent of all staff recruitment exercise embarked upon in the civil and the public services of the Federation by Federal Government Ministries, Parastatals, security agencies, bodies corporate owned by the Federal Government.

(2)  A DECLARATION that the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory are deprived of their employment opportunities into the civil and public services of the Federation by the Respondent’s inability to enforce compliance in respect of the 1 percent employment opportunity enshrined in the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act, 2004.

(3)  A DECLARATION that the inability of the Respondent to enforce compliance with the provisions of Part I, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act, 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation) in respect of the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory is tantamount to dereliction of duty.

(4)    AN ORDER directing the Respondent to ensure compliance by all the Federal Government Ministries, Parastatals, security agencies, bodies corporate owned by the Federal Government, of the provisions of Part I, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act, 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation) in respect of the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory.

(5)  ANY CONSEQUENTIAL ORDER as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances and pursuant to the enabling laws and regulations as applicable.

3.   In support of the originating summons is an affidavit sworn to by the applicant with copies of Nominal Rolls of selected Federal Government establishments attached, and a written address.

4.    In reaction, the respondent filed a counter-affidavit sworn to by Mohammed U. Faruk, a counsel in the Legal Department of the respondent, and a written address.

5.   The applicant reacted to the defence processes by filing a “Further Affidavit in Support of Originating Motion”. The applicant did not, however, file any reply on points of law.

THE CASE OF THE APPLICANT

6.    The applicant is aggrieved with the apparent subversion of the statutory provisions as it concerns the extant provisions of the Federal Character Establishment Act LFN 2004, which state that the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) shall provide 1 percent of the work force in any establishment of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) — hence this suit.

7.   To the applicant, the indigenes of the FCT are constantly short changed by the recruitment/ employment policies of the FGN being implemented by the respondent. That the functions of the respondent include working out a formula for the distribution of all cadres of post in the civil service and public service of the Federation, subject to the approval of the President, to enforce compliance with the principles of proportional sharing of all posts in the Government of the Federation, to ensure that public officers shall in the performance of their duties, adhere to rules and regulations made in respect of the setting up of the respondent.

8.   The applicant went on that the enabling Act of the respondent and its subsidiary legislation provide that each State of the Federation shall provide 2.5% of the work force in any Federal Government establishment while the indigenes of the FCT shall provide 1% of the work force in any establishment of the FGN.

9.  That the respondent in its supervisory powers of Federal Government agencies and parastatals in their staff recruitment drive have neglected to reflect the mandatory provisions of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act as it relates to the indigenes of the FCT. That Ministries and agencies of the FGN in their recruitment of staff to their Ministries and agencies have constantly failed to recruit 1% of indigenes of the FCT into its work force. That the respondent, created pursuant to section 153(1) of the 1999 Constitution, is mandated to conform and adhere strictly to the provisions of its enabling Act in carrying out the functions, objectives and purposes of its creation.

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPLICANT

10.  The applicant submitted a lone issue for determination: whether the respondent’s inability to enforce compliance in respect of the 1 percent employment opportunity contained in the provisions of Part I, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation) has not denied the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory their employment opportunities in Federal Establishments.

11.  The applicant, however, considered this lone issue under two sub-issues, namely:

(i)      Constitutional and legal framework that mandates the respondent to ensure compliance with the provisions of Part I, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act and its subsidiary legislation; and

(ii)   Non-Enforcement of the provisions of Part I, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act, (Subsidiary Legislation) by the respondent in respect of indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory.

12.  On sub-issue (i), the applicant submitted that the issues canvassed are both constitutional and statutory, and the legal framework for that is contained in section 153(1)(c) of the 1999 Constitution, sections 4 and 5 of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act Cap F7 LFN 2004 and Part I, paragraph 6, Federal Character Commission Establishment Act 2004

(Subsidiary Legislation). That paragraph 6 of Part I of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation) provides thus:

Each State shall produce 2.75 percent of the total work force in any Federal establishment while the Federal Capital Territory shall produce 1 percent for the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory provided that the Commission may adopt a range so that the indigenes of any State of the Federation shall not constitute less than the lower limited or more than the upper limit of the range as set out in paragraph 12(a).

13.   To the applicant, the principles as set out in the afore-mentioned legal framework are as follows:

(a)    To promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the provisions of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act.

(b)     To prosecute Heads of Government establishment that fail to comply with the provisions of the Act.

(c)  To ensure that public officers adhere to the provisions of the Act.

(d)  To prosecute defaulters of the provisions of the Act.

(e)  To enforce compliance with guidelines connected with its statutory mandate.

(f)   Compel Boards of Directors of Federal Government owned companies to adhere to the provisions of the Act.

(g)   Ensure compliance in respect of the 1 percent employment opportunity enshrined in the Act for indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory.

14.   The applicant went on that from the contents of his Exhibits A1 to F9, it could be cleaned (sic) that indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory have not filled 1 percent of the employment opportunities in the Federal Government Ministries and parastatals contained therein. That a cursory examination of the legal framework for the implementation of the statutory provisions relating to the 1 percent employment opportunity availed indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory in the Act will establish that the respondent has a bounden duty to ensure compliance with the statutory provisions as contained in the provisions of sections 4(1)(a) to (h), 5(1)(a) to

(h)   and (2) of the Federal Character (Establishment) Act LFN 2004, and Part 1, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation).

15.  That from the statistics available (Exhibits A1 to F9) and the analysis of the data contained in the affidavit in support of his application, the respondent has failed in its responsibility to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Federal Character (Establishment) Act as it relates to the 1 percent employment opportunity availed the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory in the Act.

16.  The applicant then urged the Court to hold that the respondent has failed to comply with the laws that regulate the 1 percent employment opportunity in respect of the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory.

17.  Regarding sub-issue (ii), the applicant submitted that his Exhibits A to F do establish the fact that the respondent failed to ensure the 1 percent employment opportunity availed the indigenes

of the Federal Capital Territory under the Act. That a summary of the personnel employed by the stated Federal Government agencies are so follows:

(i)     The total number of the staff of the National Environmental and Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA), exhibited in our application is 9,684. The total number of indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the above Parastatal is 41. The indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the said government parastatal is less than 1 percent of the employed staff.

(ii)  The total number of the staff of the Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation exhibited in our application is 14,894. The total number of indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the above Ministry is 142. The indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the said government parastatal is less than 1 percent of the employed staff.

(iii)   The total number of the staff of the National Health Insurance Scheme exhibited in our application is 5,888. The total number of indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the above Parastatal is 58. The indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the said government parastatal is less than 1 percent of the employed staff.

(iv)     The total number of the staff of the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) exhibited in our application is 19,692. The total number of indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the above Parastatal is

135. The indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the said government parastatal is less than 1 percent of the employed staff.

(v)  The total number of the staff of the Nigerian Institute for Trypanosomiasis Research exhibited in our application is 7,710. The total number of indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the Parastatal is 21. The indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the said government parastatal is less than 1 percent of the employed staff.

(vi)    The total number of the staff of the Nigerian Agency for the Control of Aids exhibited in our application is 2,503. The total number of indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the Parastatal is 20. The indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory employed by the said government parastatal is less than 1 percent of the employed staff.

18.  To the applicant, the respondent is in flagrant violation of the provisions of Part 1, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment ) Act 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation). That the courts have highlighted the need for courts to apply mandatory provisions of statutes, citing Mako v. Umoh [2010] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1195) 82. That a community reading of the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of the Federal Character (Establishment) Act 2004 and Part I, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation), will establish that the respondent has a bounden responsibility to not only ensure that the 1 percent employment opportunity availed indigenes of the FCT in the Act is implemented by Government Ministries and parastatal but to prosecute the Head of any Government Ministry or parastatal that fails to implement the provisions of the law sited above.

19.  In the context of his submission, the applicant went on that the Court is bound to consider the provisions of the Act all together in its interpretation of sections 4, 5 and Part I, paragraph 6 of

the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation) in order to discover the intention of the legislature, referring to Orakul Resource Ltd v. NCC [2007] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1060) 270, Barbedos Ventures Ltd v. FBN Plc [2018] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1609) 241, Iwok

v. Nyang [2022] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1855) 175, Union Bank Ltd v. Ozigi [1994] 3 NWLR (Pt. 333)

385 and Obi v. INEC [2007] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1046) 565.

20.    The applicant continued that in his paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the supporting affidavit, he established that indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory are the least employed in the Civil and Public Service of the Federation. That 70 percent of indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory, who are graduates, are not employed. That the Federal Capital Territory is not an industrial hub where the private sector can employ the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory. Finally, that the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory are in dire need of employment into the Civil and Public Service of the Federation. That the respondent failed in their statutory assigned responsibility to ensure compliance by heads of government bodies in respect of the provisions of the Federal Character (Establishment) Act 2004.

21.  In conclusion, the applicant urged the Court to grant all his reliefs.

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT

22.  The respondent submitted four issues for determination, namely:

(1)   Whether this matter is competent before this Court as it relates to section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 on the jurisdiction of this Court.

(2)   Whether the Law that created the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) created it for the original inhabitants.

(3)  Whether anybody is deprived of his employment opportunities into the Civil or Public Service of the Federation.

(4)   Whether the respondent has complied with its duty to promote, monitor and enforce the provisions of the Federal Character Commission Act as regards the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory.

23.   On issue (1), the respondent submitted that this matter is not competent before this Court, citing section 7(1)(a) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution. To the respondent, the issue of jurisdiction of court is a constitutional matter and “section 251(i)(a)” stated clearly the court that has jurisdiction to entertain any matter that affect the operation and interpretation of the Constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies. That “section 251(i)(v)” states that any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies — this sentence appears incomplete. That “the National Industrial Court was not mentioned as among the court that has jurisdiction and therefore this case is not competent before this court”.

24.   The respondent went on that for us to understand whether the prayer or relief sought by the applicant comes under the National Industrial Court, we have to understand the differences

between Labour and Employment. That the word Labour according to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 7th edition is defined as work, especially physical work, manual labour; while the Black’s Law Dictionary define Labour as work of any type, including mental exertion. That the word employment is defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, as work especially when it is done to earn money. The state of being employed. That Labour means the collective economic or political interest of employees/workers; and Employment deals with Master and servant relation. It also refers to those who work for wages rather than to earn profits.

25.   To the respondent, labour dispute can only arise between an employer and employees. That there can never be a dispute between an employer and the person that has no employment with him.

26.    That the Constitution did not provide that the Civil Service Commission should employ everybody in Nigeria or that all the villages in Nigeria have percentage to be employed. That “if our constitution provided that all the villages in Nigeria have a percentage to be employed in the Civil and Public Service then the Constitution would have said so and all the villages would have come up to demand for their own slots of the employment”. That there can never be a dispute between two people who have no labour relations. That the National Industrial Court is established to settle labour dispute and not to force an organisation to give employment. That the Court has no jurisdiction to force an organization to employ anybody from anywhere in Nigeria. That section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 is very specific as to the jurisdiction of the Court.

27.    The respondent continued that a court of law is said to be competent to entertain and determine a matter placed before it if the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction and there is no feature in the case which prevents the court from exercising its jurisdiction, and the case comes before the court initiated by the process of the law and upon fulfilment of any condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction. That any defect in competence is fatal, for the proceedings are a nullity, however well conducted and decided, the defect being extrinsic to the adjudication, citing APC Ltd v. NDIC Ltd [2006] 11 MJSC 70 at 83, Western Steel Works Ltd v. Iron and Steel Workers Union [1986] 3 NWLR (Pt. 30) 617 and Madukolu & ors v. Nkemdilim & ors [1962] 2 SCNLR 314; [1962] 1 All NLR (Pt. 4) 587.

28.  That in the case at hand, the applicant filed at the National industrial Court of Nigeria within the Abuja Judicial Division for an order of court directing the respondent to enforce the 1 (one) percent staff recruitment opportunity in favour of the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory. That the word of the applicant is recruitment of one percent of the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory. That the word of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 is labour disputes, including trade unions and Industrial relations. That the case before the Court has nothing to do with labour dispute, which robs this Court of its competence. The applicant then urged the Court to find and hold that this Court has no jurisdiction.

29.    Regarding issue (2), the respondent contended that the Federal Capital Territory was not created for the original inhabitants. That the word of the Act that created the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria states in section 1(1) as follows: There is hereby established a Capital Territory in and for the Federal Republic of Nigeria to be designated as the “Federal Capital Territory for Nigeria”. The respondent also referred to the opening words for the Act i.e. the short title, which is: “An Act to establish for Nigeria, a Federal Capital Territory and to provide for the Constitution of a Federal Capital Development Authority for exercising the various powers set out in this Act, to execute other projects connected therewith…” That section 297(1) of the 1999 Constitution states that there shall be a Federal Capital Territory Abuja. And section 297(2) states that “The ownership of all lands comprised in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja shall vest in the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”. While section 298 states that “The Federal Capital Territory, Abuja shall be the Capital of the Federation”.

30.   To the respondent, the short title of the Act that created the Federal Capital Territory is not ambiguous. That there is no ambiguity that will make anybody to think that the Federal capital Territory is created for the original inhabitants of the Federal Capital Territory. That the word Nigeria is defined in section 2(1) of the 1999 Constitution i.e. Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble Sovereign State to be known by the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. And that section 1(3) of the Federal Capital Territory Act states that “The area contained in the original Territory shall as from the commencement of this Act, cease to be a portion of the States concerned and shall thenceforth be governed and administered by or under the control of the Federation to the exclusion of any other person or authority whatsoever and the ownership of lands comprised in the Federal Capital Territory shall likewise vest absolutely in the Government of the Federation”.

31.   The respondent went on that it is a fact that the Federal Capital Territory belongs to the Federal Republic of Nigeria and it is the Law that whoever owns the land owns what is in the Land and on the Land. That Mr ‘A’ cannot own a land and Mr ‘B’ will be contending that what is on top of the land belongs to him. That the inhabitants of the Federal Capital Territory are Nigerians, the citizens of Nigeria. That someone can be an inhabitant of the Federal Capital Territory but without being a Nigerian. That section 25(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution states that the following persons are citizens of Nigeria by birth: “Every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria”. And that section 31 of the 1999 Constitution states thus:

For the purposes of this Chapter, a parent or grandparent of a person shall be deemed to be a citizen of Nigeria if at the time of the birth of that person such parent or grandparent would have possessed that status by birth if he had been alive on the date of independence; and in this section, “the date of independence” has the meaning assigned to it in section 25(2) of this Constitution.

32.  The respondent continued that the Constitution did not say or regard any person who resides within the Federal Capital Territory as the indigene of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. That you have to be a citizen of Nigeria in accordance with the 1999 Constitution before being an

indigene of the Federal Capital Territory. That section 1(3) of the Federal Capital Territory Act is very clear that FCT was not created for any inhabitant or indigene of any place in Nigeria rather it is created for Nigerians and that is the reason why Honourable Chinedu Joshua Obika could contest for a member of House of Representative in Abuja and win. The respondent then urged the Court to find and hold that any law that is contrary to the Act that created the Federal Capital Territory or the Constitution is null and void to the extent of the inconsistency. Also that the Court should find and hold that the provisions of the Federal Capital Territory Act are valid; that FCT Abuja is created for Nigeria and, therefore, the Nigerians who reside therein are its indigene.

33.   Issue (3) asks whether anybody is deprived of his employment opportunity into the civil or public service of the Federation. It is the respondent’s contention that nobody is deprived of the employment opportunity into the civil or public service of the Federation. That in Nigeria, one has to obtain requisite qualification before one can be employed to any category of employment. That it is not enough that you are a Nigerian. The respondent then asked: if you have what it takes to be employed, have you applied? Is there any vacant position for the job you applied for? That a man cannot be in his room and complain that he was not made a Vice Chancellor of a University or a Chief Judge of the Federation. He must have the requisite qualification and cognate experience, there must be vacant position in the University or at the Supreme Court.

34.   That the applicant has not shown to this Court that any of this people applied for any job in both civil or public services of the federation, with their qualification and evidence of vacant positions. That the applicant has alleged that his people were not employed, but he has no evidence of those who were qualified, for a specific job(s) in both civil and public services of the federation who applied where there are vacant positions and were not employed. That in our judicial system, courts deal with evidence, with facts, and not on assumption and therefore it is not enough to make assertion, it has to be on credible facts.

35.  The respondent then urged the Court to find and hold that the applicant has not presented any credible evidence that this Court can rely on in this matter.; and so the Court should dismiss this matter with a cost of N100,000,000.00 for wasting the time of this Court, as the case is memorable for its polemic rather than its substance.

36.    Issue (4) is whether the respondent has complied with its duty to promote, monitor and enforce the provisions of the Federal Character Commission Act as regards the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory. It is the contention of the respondent that it has complied with its duty to promote, monitor and enforce the provisions of the Federal Character Commission Act as regards the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory. That for one to understand this issue properly, one has to go to section 297(1) of the 1999 Constitution, which states that there shall be a Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. That section 297(2) states that “the ownership of all lands comprised in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja shall vest in the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”.

37.  That section 1(1) of the Federal Capital Territory Act states that “There is hereby established a Capital Territory in and for the Federal Republic of Nigeria”; and the citation stated “An Act to establish for Nigeria…” That the question is, who is Nigeria? That this question is answered by the first paragraph of the citation of the Constitution and section 2(1) and (2) of the Constitution. The first paragraph of the citation of the 1999 Constitution states that “We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria…” and section 2(1) states; Nigeria is one indivisible and indissoluble sovereign state to be known by the name of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”. Section 2(2) states that “Nigeria shall be a Federation consisting of States and a Federal Capital Territory.” That these provisions of the Constitution answer the question what is Nigeria and what comprises Nigeria. That these provisions of the Constitution clear the doubt on who the Federal Capital Territory is created for.

38.   The respondent proceeded that it is very clear from the various sections of the Constitution that Federal Capital Territory Abuja is created for Nigeria and who is a Nigerian is also clear from the various sections of section 25, 26 and 27 of the 1999 Constitution. From the various sections of the Constitution cited, the respondent urged the Court to find and hold that the respondent has complied with its duty to promote, monitor and enforce the provisions of the Federal Character Commission Act as regards the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory as the word is Nigeria and not the purported indigenous people, more so when section 297(2) of the 1999 Constitution states that “the ownership of all lands comprised in the Federal Capital Territory Abuja shall vest in the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”. Therefore, the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja are Nigerians and not any other person or persons.

39.     The respondent concluded by urging the Court to dismiss this action with a cost of N100,000,000.00.

40.  The applicant did not file any reply on points of law.

COURT’S DECISION

41.  I took time to consider the processes and submissions of the parties. In paragraphs 4.02, 4.03 and 4.04 of its written address, the respondent referred to a number of statutory provisions: “section 7(a)(i)” and “section 7(a)(ii)” of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006, and sections “254C(i)”, “251(i)(a)” and “251(i)(v)” of the 1999 Constitution. I must state that as cited, these respective provisions are not known to the NIC Act and 1999 Constitution.

42.     The applicant’s case is hinged on the following laws: section 153(1)(c) of the 1999 Constitution, which creates the Federal Character Commission (FCC); sections 4 and 5 of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act Cap F7 LFN 2004, which respectively provides for the functions and powers of the FCC; and Guideline (paragraph) 6 of Part I of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation), which according to the applicant provides thus:

Each State shall produce 2.75 percent of the total work force in any Federal establishment while the Federal Capital Territory shall produce 1 percent for the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory provided that the Commission may adopt a range so that the indigenes of any State of the Federation shall not constitute less than the lower limited or more than the upper limit of the range as set out in paragraph 12(a).

43.  The subsidiary legislation to the Federal Character Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act No. 34 of 1996 is actually titled, “Guiding Principles and Formulae for the Distribution of All Cadres of Posts No. 23 of 1997” made pursuant to section 4(1)(a) of the Principal Act. This subsidiary legislation is in three Parts: Part I consisting of Guidelines (paragraphs) 1 to 9 is titled, “Guiding principles and formulae: Guiding principles and formulae for the distribution of posts”; Part II consists of Guidelines (paragraphs) 1 and 2, and is titled, “Definitions, etc”; and Part III consists of Guidelines (paragraphs) 3 to 6, and is titled, “Application of general principles: National level”. The Guideline (paragraph) 6 just quoted is that of Part I of the subsidiary legislation. One noticeable point from it is that it is not known which “paragraph 12(a)” is referable to by Guideline 6 given that neither the Principal Act nor the Subsidiary Legislation has a paragraph

12(a). I had cause to make this same point in paragraph 82 of the earlier case of Sunday Nyam Bot & ors v. Nigeria Christian Pilgrims Commission (NCPC) unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/ 173/2024, the judgment of which was delivered on 19 February 2025.

44.  The respondent had in its issue (1) raised the issue of the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine this matter. Citing “section 251(i)(v)”, when it should be section 251(1)(r), of the 1999 Constitution, the respondent argued that this Court was not mentioned as among the courts that have jurisdiction — as such the case is not competently before this Court. The respondent’s counsel cannot be said to be oblivious to section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, inserted by the Third Alteration Act 2010, which deals with the jurisdiction of this Court given that he cited it as “section 254C(i)”.

45.   Even from section 251(1)(r) of the 1999 Constitution, it seems that the respondent counsel did not appreciate that for the said section 251(1)(r) to apply, it is “the validity”, not outcome, of the executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies that must be in issue if the Federal High Court is to have jurisdiction in the first place. In determining the application of the said section 251(1)(r) relative to the State High Court, His Lordship Hon. Justice Affen, JCA in IGP & ors v. Essien [2022] LPELR-58341(CA) succinctly intoned thus:

The point to vigorously underscore is that it is not all actions or proceedings for a declaration or injunction touching upon an executive or administrative action or decision of the Federal Government or any of its agencies that is exclusively cognisable by the Federal High Court under Section 251(1)(r) CFRN. Quite the contrary, the proceedings must have a bearing on the validity of such executive or administrative action or decision of the Federal Government or any of its agencies before the jurisdiction of the State High Court can be ousted. I reckon that if the Constitution intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court over all executive or administrative actions or

decisions of the Federal Government or its agencies, Paragraph (r) of Section 251(1) would simply have read: any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies' without any qualification whatsoever. But it is the wisdom of the Constitution to confer the Federal High Court with exclusive jurisdiction only in respect of proceedings for declaration or injunction affecting the validity of executive or administrative actions or decisions by the Federal Government or its agencies.

…the term validity is an abstract noun and derivative of valid which is defined as binding, possessing legal force or strength, legally sufficient… binding. Validity signifies legally sufficient in contradistinction to mere irregularity. It would seem therefore that an action or proceeding affecting the validity of any administrative action or decision of the Federal Government or any of its agencies in the context of Section 251(1)(r) CFRN must be one that transcends mere irregularity or wrongfulness of the executive or administrative action or decision complained of. The legal force, binding-ness or legal sufficiency of the executive or administrative action or decision, or the legal competence, capacity or authority of the Federal Government or its agency to take the executive or administrative action or make the executive or administrative decision must be a front- burner issue in an action or proceeding before it can be said to affect the validity of any such executive or administrative action or decision.

46.   I must make the point that, under section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, this Court has jurisdiction over all labour and employment matters and matters incidental thereto to or connected therewith, including of course employment policy issues. His Lordship Ogbuanya J put the matter in Attorney General of Abia State v. Abia State Judicial Service Commission (Excluding the Claimant) & ors unreported Suit No. NICN/OW/05/2024, the judgment of which was delivered on 26 July 2024 in these words:

[35]    …A cursory conceptualization of the legal regime of employment rights claims would reveal three stages of employment claims, thus: Pre-Employment, Subsisting Employment and Post-Employment. Certain employment rights arise at these stages, and claims, including policy issues, arising fall within the remit of the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court.

[36]   …employment policy litigation permeates, and can occur at any of the three stages of employment rights claims, and being policy matters, there is no requirement for prior or subsisting employer/employee relationship for such matter to be cognizable litigation at the National Industrial Court. Examples of labour/employment policy matters, include matters involving issues of constitutional interpretation/construction of statutes/laws/ policies on subject matter of labour/employment or connected matter, strike actions/ labour agitations, minimum wage issues, discriminatory terms and practices on labour/ employment matters, retirement age of public/civil servants, and appointment and removal from public office not of political nature, which are all matters within the jurisdictional turf of the National Industrial Court.

[37]    Just recently, in Shell Petroleum Development Co Ltd. v. Minister of Petroleum Resources & 2 Ors (Suit No.NICN /ABJ/178/2022, Judgment of which was delivered on 28th July 2022), the National Industrial Court per the Hon. President of the Court, His Lordship Hon.Justice B.B Kanyip, PhD, OFR, adjudicated a dispute on employment policy issue regarding application of the GUIDELINES FOR THE RELEASE OF STAFF IN THE NIGERIAN OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 2019, issued by the then Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), which parties in the suit are not in any employment relationship but involved in a dispute over the application of the employment policy on security of employment of Nigerian workers in the Oil & Gas Industry. Also, in Incorporated Trustees of O-E’la Obor Eleme Organization & Anor v. Nigeria Content Development & Monitoring Board (NCMDB) and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) Limited (Suit No.NICN/PHC/32/2022, Judgment delivered on June 07 2023), involving the issue arising during the 2020 NNPC Graduate Trainee Recruitment exercise, around non-compliance with the employment quota reserved for the host community under the Community Content Guidelines 2017, made pursuant to Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010, and administered by the Nigerian Content Development And Monitoring Board. The National Industrial Court, per His Lordship NCS Ogbuanya J, assumed jurisdiction and resolved the employment policy issue in dispute bordering on enforcement of employment quota.

47.   His Lordship Williams-Dawodu, JCA in First Bank of Nigeria Ltd v. Nnaemeka Emenike & ors [2022] LPELR-58536(CA) also recognised the three stages of employment rights in these words:

The three levels in respect of employment upon which certain rights enure are pre- employment rights, rights that enure to the job, employment rights which arise during the pendency of the employment rights and the post-employment. The Court in my view and humbly was equally right to have considered the twin issues, 'employment 'and' nonemployment’…

48.  Accordingly, the argument of the respondent, that labour dispute can only arise between an employer and employees, and that there can never be a dispute between an employer and the person that has no employment with him, is very much misplaced. Aside from not appreciating the three stages of employment rights and hence claims, the respondent seems to forget as I just indicated that by section 254C(1) of the 1999 Constitution, this Court’s jurisdiction extends to matters incidental to or connected with labour, employment, etc. To restrict the jurisdiction of this Court to only when there exists an employment relationship is simply too myopic a view. It is accordingly my holding that this Court has jurisdiction over this case. I so rule.

49.  The respondent’s arguments as to its issues (2) and (4), especially in terms of citing sections 2, 25, 26, 27 and 297 of the 1999 Constitution and section 1 of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Act, combine to make it one that is difficult to reconcile with the case of the applicant. The applicant’s case is that the indigenes of the FCT have not enjoyed the 1% quota enjoined by

paragraph 6 of Part I of the “Guiding Principles and Formulae for the Distribution of All Cadres of Posts” enacted pursuant to the FCC Act for Federal appointments in the country. It is not the case of the applicant the rights of other Nigerians — just the rights of indigenes of the FCT.

50.    Even if the FCT is meant for all Nigerians, and not just the original inhabitants, the applicant’s case is that the FCT’s employment representation in Federal Government establishments is not up to the 1% enjoined by Guiding Principles made under the FCC Act. So, even if the FCT is meant for all Nigerians, the applicant’s question is whether the 1% quota has been met. The respondent is not answering to this question. Instead, it descends to emotions arguing that the FCT is for all Nigerians and that is why the claimant could contest for elective office and win. The applicant’s case is not about land ownership either as to make section 297 of the 1999 Constitution relevant. It is also not clear how the questions, what is Nigeria and what comprises Nigeria, prove that the respondent has complied with its duty to promote, monitor and enforce the provisions of the FCC Act as regards the indigenes of the FCT.

51.   However, a look at the questions posed and the reliefs prayed for by the applicant will show that they are too general. Firstly, questions (A) and (B) respectively deal with the entitlement of “indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory” and the deprivation of the employment opportunities of “the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory”, without indicating who actually the victim indigenes are.

52.     Secondly, question (B) talks of FCT indigenes being “deprived of their employment opportunities into the civil and public services of the Federation in respect of the 1 percent employment opportunity enshrined in the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act, 2004”. Questions (A), (B) and (D), as well as reliefs (1) and (2), all talk of “the civil and [the] public services of the Federation”, and relief (4) talks of “all the Federal Government Ministries, Parastatals, security agencies, bodies corporate owned by the Federal Government”. How can reliefs such as these be considered and granted when there are government establishments that are not subject to the control of the respondent. See, for instance, section 158(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution, which provides that:

(1)  In exercising its power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons, the Code of Conduct Bureau, the National Judicial Council, the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Federal Judicial Service Commission, the Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission, the Federal Character Commission, and the Independent National Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person.

(2)   The National Population Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person -

(a)  in appointing, training or arranging for the training of enumerators or other staff of the Commission to assist it in the conduct of any population census

53.   These provisions constitutionally mean that not all Federal establishments (as the questions posed and the reliefs sought for suggest) can be controlled or directed as to who to employ when

making appointments. If these establishments cannot be so controlled or directed, then even the monitoring duty of the respondent makes no meaning — and this remains so despite section 14(3) of, and paragraph 8 of Part I of the Third Schedule to, the 1999 Constitution. For present purposes, what this means is that because the questions posed and the reliefs sought for relate to ALL Federal establishments, the questions cannot be answered in favour of the applicant, nor the reliefs prayed for granted as prayed.

54.  Thirdly, the questions posed and the reliefs sought for, are hinged on who are the indigenes of the FCT, the beneficiaries of this case. This issue is central to the case of the applicant, but which none of the parties alluded to. And identifying who the FCT indigenes are is not even sufficient, as they must be indigenes who have shown interest to be employed, were qualified for the offices they applied for, but were not taken, and so are victims. All this, the applicant did none.

55.  Under Guideline (paragraph) 1 of Part II, the Definitions part, of the “Guiding Principles and Formulae for the Distribution of All Cadres of Posts”, an indigene of the FCT is defined thus:

(3)  An indigene of the Federal Capital Territory -

(a)  is a Nigerian citizen, other than by naturalisation, who cannot lay claim to any State of the Federation; or

(b)   is a person born in the Federal Capital Territory and whose descendants lived in the area presently constituting the Federal Capital Territory before 26 February, 1976 and has continued to reside in the Federal Capital Territory after that date.

56.   By this definition, though it is the argument of the respondent that the Constitution did not say or regard any person who resides within the FCT as the indigene of the FCT Abuja, we have a working definition as just quoted.

57.    From the above definition, two classes of Nigerians qualify as indigenes of the FCT: Nigerian citizens who are not citizens by naturalisation who cannot lay claim to any State of the Federation; and persons born in the FCT and whose descendants lived in the area presently constituting the FCT before 26 February 1976 and have continued to reside in the FCT after that date. Did the applicant identify these categories of FCT indigenes for purposes of his suit? The answer is in the negative.

58.   The reliefs claimed relate and are for the benefit of indigenes of the FCT. The indigenes as defined above are those who can benefit from this case of the applicant, but who are so general a class that it is foolhardy to attempt any discerning as to how to apply a favourable verdict in their favour. The applicant did not tell this Court who the actual indigenes of the FCT are; and so would be the beneficiaries of this suit. The evidence before the Court in terms of paragraphs 10 and 11 of the affidavit in support does not answer this question as those revealed are those already employed, not those who lost the employment. The point is that the reliefs sought, even if granted, cannot be enforced by this Court as they are difficult to police and enforce. AG, Federation v. ANPP & ors [2003] LPELR-630(SC), relying on Nigerian National Supply Company Ltd v. Alhaji Hamajoda Sabana and Company Limited [1988] 2 NWLR (Pt. 74) 23,

held that: “Courts of law can only make enforceable orders, and like nature, they do not act in vain”. In this sense, the reliefs as prayed cannot be granted.

59.    The applicant’s case is devoid of live examples of victims who have suffered from the respondent’s inability to perform its duty as enjoined by law. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the applicant’s affidavit in support show that what the applicant deposed to are the names of FCT indigenes who are employed by the named Federal establishments, and who according to him, did not meet up the 1% threshold allowed by Part I of the “Guiding Principles and Formulae for the Distribution of All Cadres of Posts”. This is insufficient to ground the case of the applicant. It is not those who are employed that are complaining or for whom the applicant is complaining. It is those who are not employed within the 1% threshold quota that are critical to this case. They are the ones required to show that they applied for work in the requisite Federal establishments, were qualified for the jobs, but were not given — hence the instant case. Only if victims of the non-observance of the federal character principle are identified would a valid case of infringement be established.

60.  The respondent addressed this issue as its issue (3), arguing that the applicant did not show to this Court qualified applicants for the jobs who applied but were denied employment. All of this makes the applicant’s instant case more of an academic exercise. And courts of law do not embark on academic exercise because they are not academic institutions. See AG, Federation v. ANPP & ors [2003] LPELR-630(SC) relying on Adelaja v. Alade [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 608) 544,

Okulate v. Awosanya [2000] 2 NWLR (Pt. 646) 530, UBN Plc v. Sepok (Nig.) Ltd [1998] 12

NWLR (Pt. 578) 439, Nnubia v. AG, Rivers State [1999] 3 NWLR (Pt. 593) 82 and AG, Kwara

State v. Alao [2000] 9 NWLR (Pt. 671) 84.

61.   The kind of specificity required of the applicant can be seen in Incorporated Trustees of O- E’La Obor Eleme Organisation & anor v. Nigerian Content Development and Monitoring Board & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/PHC/32/2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 7 June 2023 by His Lordship Ogbuanya J. The suit was filed as one representing the Ten (10) Communities of Eleme in Eleme Local Government Area of Rivers State; and was specific as to the NNPC 2019/2020 recruitment exercise, which involved 1050 graduate trainees, and for which the 10% host community quota of 105 people was not observed. The Court at paragraph 63 of the judgment reviewed and believed the evidence of the claimant in these words:

[63] I have further reviewed the exhibits and storyline of the Claimants on their narrative averments of their rough experience with the 2nd Defendant, to timely ensure that the 2nd Defendant would comply with the said Guideline in their favour, but all to no avail, due to the obstinate stance of the 2nd Defendant on the issue, compounded by the 1st Defendant, being looked upon for legal intervention, but it stood aloof. And despite press releases, physical and online media protest and formal petition to the National Assembly, the 2nd Defendant remained adamant and even, after promising to revisit the exercise, still fell back and ignored the Claimants, and left them with the cynical sarcasm innuendo: ‘Go to Court’! Undaunted, the Claimants are indeed in court to litigate their

agitation for their entitlement to the 10% employment quota, set up in the Community Content Guideline 2017.

62.  And in paragraph 71 of the judgment, the Court held thus:

[71] In discharging their onerous burden to proof, the Claimants had shown by evidence the number of 2nd Defendant’s operations and facilities domiciled in their 10 Eleme communities, which qualified them as host communities within the meaning of the Community Content Guideline. The Defendants did not dispute this fact.

63.  The Court went on to find in favour of the claimants.

64.  The instant case falls short of the specificity required to ground the applicant’s case. I so hold and rule.

65.   There is the additional point as to the applicant’s argument that the respondent is in flagrant violation of the provisions of Part 1, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation). The question that, however, arises is: what is the remedy imposed by law for breach of the federal character principle? Section 4(3) of the Federal Character Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 provides that:

Any person who fails to comply with the guidelines issued under paragraph (h) of subsection (1) of this section is guilty of an offence under this Act and liable to penalties specified in section 15(1) of this Act.

66.  And by section 5(2):

For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, the Commission shall have power to take such legal action including the prosecution of any person whether corporate or unincorporated who, being obliged to comply with the provisions of this Act, fails to do so.

67.  No where in the Act is it stated that the respondent is at fault for the breach of the Act by any government establishment. And the applicant’s case as per this suit is not one for statutory negligence. Relief (4), which is for an order directing the respondent to ensure compliance by all the Federal Government Ministries, Parastatals, security agencies, bodies corporate owned by the Federal Government, of the provisions of Part I, paragraph 6 of the Federal Character Commission Establishment Act 2004 (Subsidiary Legislation) in respect of the indigenes of the Federal Capital Territory, is not specific to those who breached the federal character principle. The relief is not even asking for the prosecution of those who infracted the principle, for this is the remedy enjoined by law. See Sunday Nyam Bot & ors v. Nigeria Christian Pilgrims Commission (NCPC) unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/173/2024, the judgment of which was delivered on 19 February 2025.