WD
IN THE
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE
YOLA JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN
AT YOLA
BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HON JUSTICE J.T. AGBADU FISHIM, JUDGE
DATE:
THURSDAY 30TH JANUARY, 2025
SUIT
NO: NICN/YL/09/2023
BETWEEN:
REJOICE SILAS SANGA (AS ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE ESTATE OF WILLIAM JEDIEL) --------------------------------
------------CLAIMANT
AND
1.
ADAMAWA STATE GOVERNMENT
2.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
OF ADAMAWA STATE………………………………DEFENDANTS
REPRESENTATIONS:
BALA
SANGA ESQ, for the Claimant. With him are P.R. AJUMEBOR
and R.N. GBAA ESQ.
A.A.
YAKUBU ESQ, Senior State Counsel 1, Adamawa State Ministry
of Justice, for the Defendants.
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
AND CLAIM
1.
The Claimant, by
a Complaint and Statement of Fact dated 12th of September, 2023 but
filed the 3rd of October, 2023 seeks against the Defendants the
following reliefs:
i.
The liquidated
sum of N1, 154,548.49 (One Million, One Hundred and Fifty Four Thousand, Five
Hundred and Forty Eight Naira, Forty Nine Kobo) representing the outstanding
gratuity due to the Late William Jediel.
ii.
The sum of N5 Million
being general damages for the trauma, distress and the breach of obligations of
the Adamawa State Government to the Estate of the late William Jediel.
iii.
The sum of N5 Million
being the cost of this action.
iv.
10% interest on
the judgment sum in this suit, from date of judgment, and interest to so
continue to run until the date of liquidation of the said judgment sum by the
Defendants.
2.
The originating
process is accompanied by Claimant’s Statement on Oath, lists of Documents to
be relied on trial, Witness(es) to be called by the Claimant and frontloaded
copies of documentary exhibits.
3.
In reaction to
the Suit, the Defendants on the 10th of October, 2023 entered
appearance out of time and filed a Joint Statement of Defence accompanied by
the Defendants’ List of Witnesses and Statement on Oath of Mr. Dennis Haslon,
all regularized upon the Defendants’ Motion on Notice dated and filed on the
same 10th of November, 2023 by the order of Court granted on 7th
of December, 2023.
4.
It is on the
above pleadings that the Claimant and the Defendants effectively joined issues
in this case.
5.
On the 21st
of February, 2024, the Claimant opened her case and adopted her Statement on
Oath as her evidence-in-chief in this case. She as CW1 testified that the
deceased was her cousin and tendered in evidence Exhibits LFC1 to LFC5. Defendants Learned Counsel cross examined the
CW1.
6.
The Defendants
opened their defence on the 25th September, 2024 and called their
sole Witness, Dennis Haslon as DW1 who adopted his Statement on Oath as his
evidence-in-chief in this case and was cross examined by the Claimant Learned
Counsel.
7.
Upon the close of
evidence for the defence on the 25th of September, 2024, parties
were directed to file their respective Final Written Address. The Defendants
put in their Final Written Address dated and filed on 16th of
October, 2024 while the Claimant on the 13th of November, 2024 filed
her Final Written Address dated 12th of November, 2024 but
regularized on the 13th of November, 2024.
CASE OF
THE CLAIMANT
8.
By the averments
of the Claimant’s Statement of Facts and evidence led by CW1 in proof thereof,
the case of the Claimant is thus:
9.
The Claimant is a
Nigerian Citizen, Christian, Adult, Female, resident at Ganye, Adamawa State
and the Administrator of the Estate of Late William Jediel, who was her cousin.
10. The Late William Jediel was employed by Letter dated 10th
June, 1985 and served the Defendants till his death on 30th May,
2018, a period of 32 years and 11 months of meritorious service.
11. The Adamawa State Pension Board which is an agency of the 1st
Defendant issued an “Approval for Payment of Pension and Gratuity” dated 1st
December, 2020 which detailed the years of service and all necessary service
details and further issued a copy of document dated 3rd December,
2020 which is a Computation of Retirement Benefit stating his entitlement to
the sum of N1, 154,548.49 as his gratuity. That neither the Late William Jediel
nor his Estate has been paid the gratuity.
12. The Claimant through Counsel Messr. Lexfield Chambers, demanded for the
payment of the outstanding emoluments and gratuity due to the Late William
Jediel giving the Defendants one month notice of intention to sue dated 7th
of August, 2023 and upon the expiration of same, and the Defendants still not
making any effort to liquidate the outstanding gratuity, the Claimant filed
this action.
13. That under the circumstances, given the laws, policies and letters of
appointment, the Defendants have no good defence to the claim. That the
Claimant is the Next of Kin of the deceased employee and has obtained Letter of
Administration of the deceased Estate dated 15th of August, 2023.
14. That through her Counsel, letter dated 10th of August, 2023
was written to the Adamawa State Pension Board requesting for the CTC of the
Computation of Retirement Benefits but till date, she has not been availed and
the Defendants were given notice to produce same.
15. In her cross examination, CW1 answered thus: I cannot remember off hand
when the deceased was employed. He died on 30th May, 2018. I don’t
know if there are arrangements to be made before gratuities are paid. I don’t
know of any retiree in 2018 who has been paid his or her gratuity.
16. In all the Claimant tendered the following documentary exhibits which
were admitted in evidence and marked thus:
Exhibit LFC1:
Statement of Final Emoluments dated 3rd of December, 2020
Exhibit LFC2:
Office of the Executive Chairman’s Adamawa State Government Pension Board
document titled “Approval for Payment of Pension and Gratuity” dated 1st
December, 2020 and addressed to The Director of Finance of the Pension Board
Exhibit LFC3:
Acknowledgment copy of Claimant’s Solicitors Pre-Action Notice dated 7th
August, 2023
Exhibit LFC4:
Claimant’s Letter of Administration (Without Will) of the Estate of the
deceased retiree dated 15th August, 2023
Exhibit LFC5:
Claimant’s Solicitors Letter for CTC of Computation of Gratuity dated 10th
August, 2023.
CASE OF
THE DEFENDANTS
17. By the averment in defence and the evidence led by the Defendants, DW1
testified that he is Dennis Haslon, civil servant with the Adamawa State
Pension Board, particularly he is the Director of Administration. The
Defendants admitted paragraphs 2, 3 and 8 but denied paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 9 – 13
of the Statement of Facts. DW1 testified that he has been working for the
Defendants for the period of 31 years. That the Defendants never issued or
authorized anybody to issue to the Claimant or anybody, any document titled
Approval for Payment of Pension and Gratuity dated 1st December,
2020, and Computation of Retirement Benefits dated 3rd December,
2020 and that the Defendants are not in a position to produce original of the
document not being aware of its existence and having not sanctioned the
production of any such document to or for the Claimant in this matter or any
other body or person.
18. That there is a laid down procedure and requirements for payment of
gratuity and other entitlements of either serving or retired employees of the
Defendant and the said requirement and procedure are being followed by the
relevant government department in respect of employees’ entitlements.
19. That all the Defendant’s employees are aware or at least should be aware
that gratuities of retired employees are paid according to year of retirement
and the Defendant does not tolerate queue-jumping.
20. That all serving or retired employees who have satisfied the
requirements and are entitled to be paid have been receiving their payments in
accordance with the laid down procedure put in place by the Defendant. That the
Defendants are not liable to the Claimant or any other person for any general
or special damages in this matter.
21. In his cross examination, DW1
admitted thus: Yes, there is no written policy in respect that retirees should
queue up before getting their entitlements. It was an in-house arrangement to pay
him first. Civil servants are not informed at the point of entry that they have
to wait and queue before they get their entitlements.
DEFENDANTS’
FINAL ADDRESS
22. In the adopted Final Written Address, Defendants formulated two issues
for determination follows:
i.
Whether the Claimant has failed
to present sufficient evidence to establish her claims, thereby failing to meet
the required standard of proof?
ii.
Whether the Defendants are
entitled to dismissal or judgment in their favour due to the Claimant’s lack of
credible and relevant evidence, or due to legal or procedural flaws in their
case?
23. On Issue i, Defendants Counsel posited that the evidence presented by
the Claimant failed to meet the required standard of proof in this case, as it
is insufficient to establish the claim of the Claimant. Defendants Counsel
argued that DW1 maintained that the Defendant never issued or authorized those
documents on Approval and Computation of benefits etc and thus raised
reasonable doubt about the Claimant’s allegation.
24. Defendants Counsel referred to Sections 134 and 136 of the Evidence Act,
2011 on the burden and standard of proof in this case and submitted that the
burden is on the Claimant to establish her claim. Learned Counsel also relied
on the authority of Kate Enterprises Ltd v Daewoo Nigeria Ltd (1985) 7 SC 1
and Sawaba v Gaadi (2006) All FWLR (Pt 823) 1880 para B.
25. Defendants Counsel argued that the Claimant did not establish a clear
causal link between the Defendants’ actions and the alleged damages. That
alternative explanations for the Claimant’s losses remain unaddressed and thus
leaving the claim in speculation.
26. Defendants Counsel submitted that the evidence of the Defendants in
rebuttal is more compelling narrative and thus the unsubstantiated allegations
of the Claimant should be rejected. Learned Counsel cited and relied on the
case of Adighije v Nwaogu (2010) 12 NWLR (Pt 1209) 419 at 43. Defendants
Counsel argued that this Court should consider the fact that the Claimant
failed to provide evidence of the Defendant’s authorization or issuance of the
documents in questions, and this constitute failure to discharge the burden of
proof.
27. Defendants Counsel submitted that the evidence in rebuttal has proved
that the Defendants followed established procedures for employee entitlements.
Counsel noted that the Defendant has a well-established procedure which
relevant departments diligently follow and this procedure outlines specific
requirements for paying gratuities and other entitlements, ensuring that all
employees are treated fairly and consistently. Counsel argued that retired
employees receive their gratuities according to their year of retirement and
the Defendants strictly enforce this rule to prevent any queue-jumping.
28. Defendants Counsel contended that it is in evidence that serving or
retired employees who have satisfied the requirements are receiving their
payments in accordance with the established procedure which underscores the
Defendant’s commitment to transparency and accountability in handling employee
entitlements. Learned Counsel submitted that in light of these facts, the
Defendants have fulfilled their obligations regarding employee
entitlements.
29. On Issue ii, Defendants Counsel posited that the Defendants are entitled
to a dismissal of this action. Reliance is placed on the provisions of Sections
109, 90(c), 89 – 91, 102 – 105 of the Evidence Act, 2011 as well as the
authorities of IGP v Ubah (2015) 11 NWLR (Pt 1471), Alamieyeseigha v FRN
(2006) 16 NWLR (Pt 1004) 1; Araka v Egbue (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt 848); Rowaye
Jubril v FRN (2018) Legalpedia 40217 (CA); CDO Tudun-Maliki Quarters v Mohammed
(2015) 9 NWLR (Pt 1465) 585 to the effect that Exhibits LFC2, LFC3 and LFC4,
being uncertified copies of public documents are not admissible and as such,
this Honourable Court should expunge same out of its record.
30. Defendants Counsel also relied on the authorities of Mata v Kano
State Public Complaint and Anticorruption Commission (Supra) and Ugo v Obiekwe
(1989) LPELR – 3319 (SC) to the effect that the failure of certification of
these public documents also established that the documents were wrongly
obtained and consequently vitiate whatever case is erected on it.
31. Learned Counsel to the Defendants also cited and relied on the judicial
precedents of Ironkwe v UBA Plc (2017) All FWLR (Pt 879) 658 paras C – E;
Iyere v Bendel Feed and Flour Mill Ltd (2009) All FWLR (Pt 453) 1217 at 1252
paras C – D; to the effect that the prayer of the Claimant, being special
damages ought to be specially pleaded and specifically proved, as such cannot
be granted upon speculation. Learned Counsel argued that the Claimant has
failed to discharge this onus of proof and her case should be dismissed with
punitive cost.
32. Defendants Learned Counsel argued that the Defendants have presented
compelling and un-contradicted evidence in rebuttal of the case of the Claimant
and as such, the case of the Defendants should prevail.
CLAIMANT’S
FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS
33. In the adopted Final Written Address, Claimant distilled a lone issue
for determination thus:
1. Whether
the Claimant has sufficiently proved her case to entitle her to the reliefs
sought?
34. On the lone Issue, Claimant Learned Counsel posited that the Claimant
has by credible and cogent evidence established that her Cousin, the deceased
worked as the employee of the 1st Defendant till his demise and was
entitled by Pension Act and contract to the gratuities and benefits claimed and
till date has not been paid by the Defendants.
35. Claimants Learned Counsel pointed out that by Exhibits LFC1 and LFC2,
Claimant established that the deceased was an employee of the 1st
Defendant until his demise in service of the 1st Defendant and his
gratuity approved by Exhibit LFC2, the gratuity computed to be the sum claimed
in this Suit by Exhibit LFC1.
36. Claimants argued that Exhibits LFC2, LFC3 and LFC4 are original
documents which remain unchallenged or impeached by the Defendants but only
that the Defendants are seeking to defeat this action by technicalities that
Exhibits LFC2, 3 and 4 are uncertified and that the issuance of Exhibits LFC1 and
2 are not authorized, not that the documents did not emanate from the
Defendants. Learned Counsel relied on the authorities of Ajuwon & 4 Ors
v Akanni & Ors (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt 316) 182 and The Admin. & Exec. of the
Estate of Abacha v Eke-Spiff & Ors (2009) LPELR – 3152 (SC) 59 – 60 para D
to the effect that these bare assertions of the Defendants that are not
supported by evidence go to no effect.
37. Claimant Learned Counsel also referred to Exhibit LFC5 by which the
Claimant’s Solicitors applied for the CTC of Exhibit LFC1 and same was not
certified and thus the Claimant put the Defendants on notice to produce the
document but the Defendants still failed to produce it. Learned Counsel relied
on Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
38. Claimant Learned Counsel cited and relied on the judicial authority of Anagbado
v Faruk (2018) LPELR – 44909 (SC) to the effect that Exhibits LFC2, 3 and 4
being originals, do not require certification.
39. Claimant Learned Counsel also referred to all the averments of the Joint
Statement of Defence wherein the Defendants only claim to deny and put the
Claimant to the strictest proof. Learned Counsel relied on the authorities of Kopek
Construction Ltd v Ekisola (2010) LPELR – 1703 (SC) to the effect that such
traverse means nothing and where those ineffective denials are struck out,
there is no defence to the claim of the Claimant in this case.
40. Claimant Learned Counsel argued that the defence of queue policy erected
by the Defendants was not substantiated by the Defendant but was demolished
under cross examination of DW1 which is to the effect that there was no such
written policy in existence. Claimant Counsel cited and relied on the authority
of Comptroller General of Customs & Ors v Comptroller Abdullahi B. Gusau
(2017) LPELR – 42081 (SC) to the effect that unwritten policies create
ambiguity in labour matters and are unacceptable and inapplicable and as well
contrary to international best practices.
41. Finally, on Exhibit LFC2, Claimant Learned Counsel argued that even if
it were correct and true that this was not properly certified, this Court can
admit same on the authority of Victor Adegboye v UBA (2022) LPELR – 58778
(CA) and Tabik Investment Limited v GTB Plc (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt 1276) 240,
in the light of the overwhelming evidence before the Court establishing the employment
status and death in service and failure to pay the outstanding gratuity, this
Honourable Court is to hold that wrong certification is a technical issue which
should not be allowed to work hardship on the Claimant and moreover, since
judgment is yet to be delivered and this issue of non-certification is coming
up now, this Honourable Court should order parties to certify the documents
ahead of its judgment and re-tender them. Learned Counsel referred to Section
12(2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria Act, 2006 and Order 5 Rule
6(2) of the Rules of this Court on the need to do substantial justice by
dispensing with rigidity of the rules of evidence.
42. With respect to the damages being claimed by the Claimant in this case,
Claimant Counsel pointed out that the contention of the Defendants Counsel that
same was special damages is misplaced. Learned Counsel contended that the
relief on damages in this case is a claim for general damages and not special
damages while the relief on the sum of gratuity is established by Exhibit LFC2.
Learned Counsel cited and relied on Order 55 Rule 5 of the Rules of Court to
submit that the award of general damages is at the discretion of the Court.
43. Claimant Learned Counsel argued that given the fact that the Claimant’s
cousin died in service, it is odious and illegal for the Defendants to expect
that the Administrator should join a queue, whereas the gratuity ought to have
been paid by the Defendants since 2018, and in the face of the dwindled value
of Naira, this Honourable Court ought to award general damages sought in this
instance.
COURT’S
DECISION
44. Upon my discrete voyage into the pleadings and evidence adduced before
this Honourable Court and having waded through the Final Written Addresses of
the respective parties in this case, particularly noting the issues for
determination formulated by parties for the determination of this Honourable
Court, I am of the firm view that the two issues for determination are straight
forward:
1.
Whether the Claimant has proved
her entitlement to the reliefs sought as required by law?
2.
Whether the Defendants have any
defence exonerating them from liability?
45. The law is immutable and sacrosanct that in civil cases like this
instant case, the onus probandi lies on the Claimant to establish by credible,
cogent and compelling evidence her claims before the Court. The Claimant bears
this legal burden which is also pontificated in Section 131 to 134 of the
Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended) thus:
“131. (1) whoever
desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent
on the existence of facts which he asserts shall prove that those facts exist.
(2) When a person
is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof
lies on that person.
132. The burden
of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no
evidence at all were given on either side.
133. (1) In civil
cases, the burden of first proving existence or non-existence of a fact lies on
the party against whom the judgment of the court would be given if no evidence
were produced on either side, regard being had to any presumption that may
arise on the pleadings.
(2) If the party
referred to in subsection (1) of this section adduces evidence which ought
reasonably to satisfy the court that the fact sought to be proved is
established, the burden lies on the party against whom judgment would be given
if no more evidence were adduced, and so on successively, until all the issues
in the pleadings have been dealt with.
(3) Where there
are conflicting presumptions, the case is the same as if there were conflicting
evidence.
134. The burden
of proof shall be discharged on the balance of probabilities in all civil proceeding.”
See also APC & Anor v Obaseki & Ors (2021)
LPELR – 55004 (SC)
Nduul v
Wayo & Ors (2018) LPELR – 45151 (SC)
46. In line with the above principles of evidence law, the Claimant who
claims that William Jediel, her cousin died in the employment of the Defendants
and entitled to gratuity which had been demanded but remained unpaid and the
said employee being now deceased, the Defendants are liable to pay the Claimant
the reliefs sought, must adduce credible and cogent evidence in proof of these
facts.
47. It is now settled that contract of employment may be in any form and it
may be inferred from agreement of parties and can be shown that such contract
was intended, although it is not expressed. See Johnson
& Sons v Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited & Ors (2009) LPELR -8280
(CA).
48. At this stage, this Honourable
Court will resolve the contention of parties on the admissibility of Exhibits
tendered in evidence by the Claimant. The sole ground of objection is that
these are public documents which are not certified true copy.
49. However, I observed while perusing the respective parties Final Address
that both are mistaken on the correct marking of the Exhibits. They both
mistook the Computation of benefits as Exhibit LFC2, whereas the said Statement
of Final Emolument is marked Exhibit LFC1 while the Approval for Payment of
Pension and Gratuity is marked Exhibit LFC2 this Honourable Court. As such, in
the resolution of the impasse between parties on the admissibility question,
the Court will proceed in accordance with its records.
50. I have looked at and examined Exhibit LFC1 and noted that it is indeed a
photocopy of computation document issued by the 1st Defendant’s Pension
Board while Exhibit LFC2 is an original document issued by the same Pension
Board in favour of the Claimant with respect of the deceased William Jediel.
Exhibit LFC3 is the Acknowledgment copy of the Pre-Action Notice of the
Claimant while Exhibit LFC4 is the Claimant’s original letter of
administration.
51. On Exhibit LFC1, I have seen at paragraph 13 of the Statement of Fact
that the Defendants were given notice to produce the original. I have also seen
Exhibit LFC5 by which the Claimant’s Solicitors applied for the Certified True
Copy of the Exhibit LFC1 but curiously neither did the Defendants respond to
the Notice to Produce nor avail the Claimant the Certification sought. In my
view, the Court is not left without solution in this circumstance. It is the
appropriate circumstance where the Court is empowered to allow the secondary
copy to be admitted in the interest of justice, more so when it is the
form/certification that is being challenged and not the content thereof and
moreso where the Defendants were the one who failed to oblige the certification
nor present the original, even with Notice to Produce given to it.
52. See Onyekwuluje & Anor v Benue State Govt & Ors (2015) LPELR
– 24780 (SC) where the infallible Court pronounced that an exception for a
secondary evidence will be made where it is proven that aside notice to produce
which the other party failed to comply with, the aggrieved took extra mile to
get a certified copy but the other party also rejected or failed to oblige him
the certified copy. I am of the view that the Claimant has established this
exception in this case. I so hold.
53. The Defendants who failed in all respect cannot, after withholding the
original as well as failure to oblige the request for certification, turn
around to hold the Claimant on to technicalities by all means in order to
defeat the interest of justice. It is no doubt that the Defendants were given
notice to produce the original. The Defendants said they are not in the
position to produce the original since they were not aware of its existence.
Exhibit LFC1 emanated from the Defendant’s Pension Board which is an agency of
the 1st Defendant and the appropriate and relevant statutory and
constitutional body responsible for the act upon which the document was
competently issued. It is therefore preposterous for the Defendants in this
case to dissociate themselves from the official acts of their statutory agency
which acts are within the Board’s statutory and constitutional competence.
54. With respect Exhibit LFC2 which is an original document, it has been
held in Gov. Ekiti State v Ojo (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt 1007) 95 at 129 paras B –
D, that the fact that an employer happens to be the Government does not
render a document issued to a private person a public document. See also the
case of Abuul v BENSU (2003) 16 NWLR (Pt 845) 59.
55. The Court has held that the original document emanating from and issued
by a public body to a private individual can be competently tendered by the
addressee or the recipient beneficiary of the document who can produce that
original from his private custody and competently tender same in Court.
56. Put differently, the law is that the original produced from his private
custody is a private document and requires no certification. It is only where
the copy sought to be tendered is said to be the one from the custody of the
public body that same will require certification. This has been settled in the
following cases by the infallible Court as well as the intermediate Courts:
PDP v INEC & Ors (2014) LPELR – 23808 (SC); See Onnoghen, JSC in
Iteogu v LPDC (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt 1171) 614. See also Anagbado v Faruk
(2016) LPELR – 41634 (CA); Dana Impex Ltd v Aderotoye (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt 966) 78
at 103 paras B – D; and Omale v Federal Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban
Development & Ors (2015) LPELR – 25906 (CA).
57. The above principle of law of evidence is also applicable to Exhibit
LFC4 which is the original letter of administration issued to the Claimant.
58. With respect to Exhibit LFC3, which is the Acknowledgment copy of the
Pre-Action Notice written by the Claimant’s Solicitors to the Defendants, the
contention of the Defendants is that only the one with the Defendants can be
tendered and that it is the certified copy that will be the only admissible
evidence. The Defendants have not contended that they were not given pre-action
notice as required by the law.
59. It is now settled beyond peradventure that private correspondences
addressed to public institution do not ordinarily automatically form part of
public record of private document. While the private document is in the hand of
the private individual, it remains a private document but when it gets to the
custody of the public institution, it becomes part of record of private
document kept in public custody and thus a public document. At all times, and
particularly where the public institution denied being in custody of the said
private document, the author or the person who authored and sent the document
can validly tender his own filed copy in his private custody as copy of what he
authored and sent to the public institution. This does not also require
certification since it is a private document. Apt on this position of the law
are the judicial precedents of Suu v Jobak (Nig) Ltd (2012) LPELR – 7932
(CA); IGP v Bello (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt 1865) 265; Onwuzurike v Edoziem (2016)
LPELR – 26056 (SC); Ipigensi & Anor v INEC & Ors (2019) LPELR – 48907
(CA).
60. This Honourable Court is a specialized Court and so empowered by Section
12(2)(b) of its enabling Act thus: “Subject to this Act and any rules
made thereunder, the Court – (b) shall be bound by the Evidence Act but may
depart from it in the interest of justice.”
61. In Giwa & Ors v WEMA Bank (2021) LPELR – 54851 (CA), the
penultimate Court dilated that, “The phrase ‘in the interest of justice’
refers generally to the cause of fairness and equity and is subject to the
discretion of the Judge, taking into cognizance the peculiar circumstance of
each case.”
62. In the light of the foregoing dilated established position of the law, I
am of the view that this Honourable Court rightly admitted Exhibits LFC1, 2, 3
and 4 in evidence and I am on a firm ground to act on same in the determination
of this case. I so hold.
63. In this instance, the Claimant presented Exhibit LFC1 and 2. The fact
that the deceased employee worked and died in the service of the 1st
Defendant as alleged is established.
64. In light of Exhibits LFC3, 4 and 5, placed before this Honourable Court,
the Claimant has shown by Exhibit LFC4 that William Jediel died intestate on 30th
May, 2018 and the Claimant has been legally appointed as the Administrator of
the deceased Estate on 15th August, 2023. The Claimant has also
established the employment relationship of the deceased with the 1st
Defendant vide Exhibit LFC1 and 2. The Claimant has further established by
Exhibit LFC2 the approval for payment of the deceased gratuity. I have seen in
Exhibit LFC1 which contains the computation of the deceased gratuity put at
N1,154,548.49 as calculated by the 1st Defendant’s Pension Board.
This figure tallies with the claim of Claimant in this case.
65. The Claimant also put it in evidence that this gratuity has remained
unpaid till date in spite of the demand for same. I have seen Exhibit LFC3
dated 7th August, 2023, the Claimant’s Solicitors Pre-Action Notice
in proof of this demand for payment.
66. In view of the above, I am totally convinced and without hesitation
moved to the bone by the evidence of the Claimant and to my view, the Claimant
has sufficiently established her entitlement to the Relief 1 claimed by her
except the Defendants can show any exonerating defence in this case.
67. Upon my calm review of the pleadings and adduced evidence, the only
defence raised by the Defendants is that there exist a queue policy and
requirements which the Defendants follow in the payment of gratuity and that
the deceased employee and other State employees are aware of this policy by
which payment is based on year of retirement subject to release of funds for
same.
68. However, I have noted the response of the Defendants sole witness in the
course of cross examination where the DW1 answered thus: Yes, there is no
written policy in respect that retirees should queue up before getting their
entitlements. It was an in-house arrangement to pay him first. Civil servants
are not informed at the point of entry that they have to wait and queue before
they get their entitlements.
69. It is thus obvious that there is no established legal policy in the
Defendants as averred by the Defendants. The Defendants did not tender any
documentary evidence of such policy document of the State Government to
substantiate the existence of same and the applicability of same to the
deceased retiree in the instant case.
70. It is trite law that a bare assertion which requires documentary exhibit
to substantiate same remains an ipse dixit without the supporting document and
it is not admissible where the further proof by documentary exhibit required is
missing. See Busari & Anor v Adepoju & Ors (2015) LPELR – 41704
(CA); WEMA Bank Plc v Folorunso (2013) LPELR – 22040 (CA). There being no
proof of the existence of the statement of policy relied upon by the
Defendants, let alone any proof that such policy has been made into a
legislation or subsidiary legislation or same written into the contract of
employment between the Claimant and the Defendants, the assertion of the
Defendants remain unsubstantiated before this Honourable Court. See generally
the case of Comptroller General of Customs & Ors v Gusau (Supra)
which is a decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The defence of the
Defendants failed woefully in this case.
71. The Claimant is claiming the sum of N5 million as general damages for
the trauma, distress and the breach of obligations by the Adamawa State
Government. The contention of the Defendants Counsel that this amount to
special damages which must be pleaded and proved is not supported by the
position of the law.
72. Distinction between special and general damages must be carefully
observed. General damages are damages such as the law will presume to be the
natural or probable consequence of the Defendant’s act. It needs not be
specifically pleaded. It arises by inference of law and need not be proved by
evidence and may be averred generally. Whereas special damages is such a loss
as the law will not presume to be the consequence of the Defendant’s act but
which depends in part, at least, on the special circumstances of the case. It
must be specifically pleaded and proved by credible and cogent evidence. See Incar
(Nig) Ltd v Benson Transport Ltd (1975) LPELR – 1512 (SC); NARINDEX
Trust Ltd & Anor v NICMB Ltd (2001) LPELR – 1939 (SC).
73. It is a notorious
position of the law that the award of general damages is at the discretion of
the Court. It is my view that the deceased employee, who put in 32 years in
service to the Defendants and died in service should not be made to face the
unconscionable obnoxious unwritten policy of queue which is totally
unacceptable and contrary to international labour practice. The Claimant is
therefore entitled to nominal general damages in this case which I assess at
N500,000 only in favour of the Claimant for the trauma and hardship caused the
Estate of the deceased employee in this case.
74. The Claimant’s claim for the sum of N5 million as the cost of this action.
This
Honourable Court has now been given enormous discretion and powers to award
cost of action by the provision of Section 40 of its enabling Act. This is in
tandem with the principle that a successful party in litigation is entitled to
be indemnified of the cost and expenses he was put through as a result of the
litigation by the opposing party. This Honourable Court hereby grant the relief
to the extent that N500,000 is by order of this Honourable Court assessed as
the cost of the action against the Defendants in favour of the Claimant.
75. This Honourable Court is empowered to grant claim of post judgment
interest and I am of the view that it is appropriate to incline to the granting
of the post judgment interest sought by the Claimant in this instance in light
of the consistently plummeting value of Naira and run-away inflation rate.
Accordingly, 10% interest on the judgment sum in this suit, from date of
judgment, and interest to so continue to run until the date of liquidation of
the said judgment sum by the Defendants is by order of this Honourable Court
granted as prayed.
76. The two issues for determination formulated by this Court are hereby
resolved against the Defendants and in favour of the Claimant. Judgment is
hereby entered to the extent set out herein below:
i.
The Defendants are by order of this Honourable Court
to pay the liquidated sum of N1,154,548.49 (One Million, One Hundred and Fifty
Four Thousand, Five Hundred and Forty Eight Naira, Forty Nine Kobo) representing
the outstanding gratuity due to the Late William Jediel to the Claimant.
ii.
A sum of N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) is
by order of this Honourable Court awarded as nominal general damages for the
trauma, distress and the breach of obligations of the Adamawa State Government
to the Estate of the late William Jediel.
iii.
A sum of N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) is
assessed by order of this Honourable Court as the cost of action against the
Defendants in favour of the Claimant.
iv.
10% interest on the total judgment sum in this suit,
after 60 days of this judgment, and interest to so continue to run until the
date of liquidation of the said judgment sum by the Defendants is by order of
this Honourable Court granted.
77. This is my Judgment and it is entered accordingly.
_____________________________________________
HON. JUSTICE J.T. AGBADU FISHIM PhD
PRESIDING JUDGE
30/1/2025