Color

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT-HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT-HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE M. A. HAMZA

 

DATE: 7th MAY, 2026                              SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/73/2025

BETWEEN                                     

DANIEL I.G AHIAKWO …………………………………. CLAIMANT

AND

PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL …………… DEFENDANT

COURT OF NIGERIA

 

REPRESENTATION:

 Christopher Okafor Esq. for the Claimant.

H.A. Bello, SAN appearing with S.K. Deemua and D.C. Amani for the Defendant.

 

JUDGMENT

1.    On the 24th of October 2025, the Claimant commenced this action against the Defendant/Respondent by way Originating Summons, and by the amended Originating summons, seeking for the determination of the following:

1.     Whether the practice direction 2022 made by the Respondent made pursuance to Section 12 of the National Industrial Act and Section 254F is not a gross violation of Section 46 CFRN 1999.

2.     Whether the provision of Practice Direction 2022 made by the 1st Respondent is superior to the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999?

3.     Whether barrister called to bar in Nigeria practicing in Lagos State and Abuja are superior to those practicing elsewhere?

4.     Whether the provision of the Practice Direction, as it relates to filing of all trade union matters in Abuja and Lagos State not discriminatory?

 

2.    The Claimant also claimed against the Defendant/Respondent jointly and severally for a declaration of the following:

1.     A Declaration of this Honourable Court that the Practice direction 2022 by the Respondent directing for the filing of all matters in trade in Abuja and Lagos is inconsistent  with the provision of Section 46 (1) of CRFN 1999 and thus void pursuance to Section 1 (3) CFRN 1999.

2.     A Declaration of this Honourable Court that the provisions of Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 is superior to the provisions the Practice Direction made by Respondent. 

3.     A Declaration of this Honourable Court that the provisions of the Practice Direction issued by the Respondent is discriminatory of lawyers practicing in other States, especially Rivers State, where the Applicant practices.

4.     A Declaration of this Honourable Court that based on the Legal Practitioners Act, all Lawyers called to the Nigeria Bar are equal.

5.     A declaration of this Honourable Court that Nigeria is Federation of thirty- six State and that no State of the Federation is superior to the other.

Preliminary Objection

3.    On the 8th of December 2025, Counsel to the Defendant filed Notice of Preliminary Objection brought pursuant to Section 254f of The 1999 Constitution; Sections 36 And 52 (1) Of The National Industrial Court Act 2006; Section 2(A) of the Public Officers Protection Act 2004; Order 18 Rule 2(2) Of The National Industrial Court Of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, praying for an order of the Court dismissing this Suit in limine, for want of jurisdiction. The preliminary objection is supported by a 5 paragraph Affidavit deposed to by Reuben Noah Harbooson a litigation Clerk in the law firm of D.D Dodo & Co and a written address wherein Counsel formulated the issues for determination as follows:

1.     Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this Suit, the Applicant/Respondent’s Suit is statute barred?

2.     Whether the Instant Suit as presently constituted has disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the Respondent/Applicant?

4.    Arguing the first issue of the preliminary objection, on whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this Suit, the Applicant/Respondent’s suit is statute barred, Counsel submitted that the Applicant/Respondent’s action is statute-barred by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, 2004. He submitted that it has been settled beyond any shadow of doubt that where an action is statute-barred, it goes to the root of adjudication and robs the Court of jurisdiction to entertain same. Citing KARSHI V. GWAGWA (2022) 9 NWLR (PT. 1834) 139 AT 183, PARAS. G-H: ABUBAKAR V. MICHELIN MOTOR SERVICES LTD. (NO.2) (2020) 12 NWLR (PT. 1739) 579 AT 594, PARAS. A-B: ONI V. FAYEMI (2020) 15 NWLR (PT. 1746) 59 AT 86, PARAS.C-D AND SYLVA V. I.N.E.C (2015) 16 NWLR (PT. 1486) 576 AT 630, PARAS. A-B.

5.    Counsel submitted that the Respondent/Applicant herein falls within the definition of “Public Officer” and under the contemplation of the provisions of the Public Officers Protection Act referring to Section 318(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) (As Amended): IBRAHIM V. J.S.C. (1998) 14 NWLR (PT. 584) 1 AT 38, PARAS. D-F: RAHAMANIYA UNITED (NIG.) LTD V. MIN., F.C.T. (2021) 17 NWLR (PT. 1806) 481 AT 495, PARAG. B. Counsel noted that while the Applicant/Respondent in the instant Suit is challenging the Practice Direction 2022 issued on 31st May, 2022 pursuant to Section 1(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (As Amended). Counsel argued that the  Applicant/Respondent’s cause of action accrued on 31st May, 2022 when the said Practice Direction was issued and the Applicant/Respondent ought to have filed the instant Suit within 3 (three) months and the cause of action lapsed on 31st August, 2022. The Applicant/Respondent herein however chose to wait for 3 years, two months before filing the instant Suit on 24th October, 2025. Counsel submitted that this delay is fatal to the case of the Applicant/Respondent.

6.    Additionally, Counsel went on to argued that in the unlikely circumstance that this Court, chooses to reckon with the day the Applicant/Respondent became aware of the Practice Direction 2022 as opposed to the date the said Practice Direction was issued i.e. 31st May, 2022, He submitted that the Applicant/Respondent’s Suit is still caught up by the limiting provisions of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act referring the Court to paragraph 21of the Affidavit in Support of the Applicant/Respondent’s Originating Summons and Exhibit DIG 3 was filed on 28th May, 2025.Counsel argued that rather than the Applicant/Respondent instituting his action within the statutory 3 (three) month period on or before 28th of August, 2025, the Applicant/Respondent still willfully chose to file this instant Suit on 24th October, 2025, clearly outside the 3 months allowed by Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act. Counsel referred the Court to RAHAMANIYA UNITED (NIG.) LTD V. MIN., F.C.T. (SUPRA) AT 499, PARAS. E-G.

7.    Arguing issue two, on whether the suit as presently constituted has disclosed a reasonable cause of action against the Respondent/Applicant. Counsel submitted that Applicant/Respondent failed to establish a cause of Action. He submitted that an Applicant/Respondent who is seeking redress/remedy from this Court must not only plead facts but must be able to demonstrate the violation of a right or personal injury suffered as a result of the actions or omissions of the Respondent/Applicant which gives rise to a legally enforceable claim. Citing ODUA INV. CO. LTD. V. MICHAEL (2024) 12 NWLR (PT. 1952) 335 AT 348, PARAS. D-E: IKPEKPE V. W.R. & P. CO. LTD. (2018) 17 NWLR (PT. 1648) 280 AT 293, PARAS. D-E.: A.G., FEDERATION V. A.G., ABIA STATE (2001) 11 NWLR (PT. 725) 689 AT 733, PARAS A – B; RINCO CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD. V. VEEPEE INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANOR (2005) LPELR – 2949 (SC).

8.    Counsel argued that in so far as this instant Suit seeks to challenge an act carried out in discharge of the Respondent’s judicial duty i.e. the National Industrial Court Practice Direction, 2022, the Respondent is cloaked with immunity by virtue of the provisions of Section 52 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. Section 52(1) of the Act. He referred the Court to the cases of BUHARI V. INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (PT. 1120) 246 AT 341, PARAS. G – H: Section 36 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act: Order 1 Rule 8(2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017.

9.    Further, Counsel submitted that the Applicant/Respondent has not disclosed nor demonstrated that the Respondent/Applicant has committed any infraction of the Applicant/Respondent’s legal right. He referred the Court to Affidavit in support of the Applicant/Respondent’s Originating Summon: ATIBA IYALAMU SAVING & LOANS LTD V SUBERU (2018) 13 NWLR (PT. 1637) 387 AT PAGE 413 PARAS. A-E. Counsel submitted that the Applicant/Respondent has not shown that he has incurred any cost or suffered any loss occasioned by the Practice Direction which he now prays this Court to declare as void.  That the law is firmly settled that a Courts of law act only on proved facts and not on speculation citing AGBI V. OGBEH(2006) 11 NWLR (PT. 990) 65 AT 135, PARAS. E-F.

10. Responding to the Notice of Preliminary objection, Counsel to the Respondent/Applicant filed a 5 paragraph Counter Affidavit deposed to by Daniel I. G Ahiakwo. And a Written Address where Counsel formulated the issue for determination of the Court as following:

1.     Whether this suit is statute barred?

2.     Whether this suit disclosed a reasonable cause of action?

11.  Arguing the first issue, Counsel argued that this suit is not statute barred. Counsel agreed to the laws cited by the Applicant that when an action is statute barred, it strikes at the life of the suit, and renders it lifeless. Along that track, a lifeless suit is non-existent before the Court and deserves no attention of the Court in its judicial function. Citing KARSHI VGWAGWA (2022) 9 NWLR PT1634 139 AT 183 AND ABUBAKAR V MICHELIN MOTOR SERVICES LIMITED (NO 2) (2020) 12 NWLR PT 1739 579 AT 594. Counsel submitted that the reality of statute of limitation is that it is a general concept bedeviled with exceptions and even the Acts that provide for limitation times with the right hand, generously grant exceptions with the left hand within a particular context. While noting that section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act substantially provides that an action in Court to challenge any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any act or law, or of any public duty, or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, law, duty, or authority, must be done within 3 months next after the act, neglect, or default complained or in case of continuance of damage or injury, within (3) three months next after the ceasing thereof.

12.  To Counsel, the focus in this case is that of the continuance of injury and the reckoning of the 3 months begins after the cessation of the injury or damage caused by the act or law or neglect. He argued that until the cessation of the continued injury or damage, the time does not start to run for the purpose of the application of statute of limitation. He submitted that the practice direction 2022 was actually made in 2022 but the negative effects and the injury it dishes out to litigants and lawyers still pervade to this minute. The injury is continual and has not ceased to enable 3 months reckoning. Referring to paragraph 21 of his affidavit and exhibit DIG 3, he argued that he has shown the Court that in 2025, he was to defend a suit in Abuja on behalf of his clients who reside in Port Harcourt but the practice direction made the suit to be filed in Abuja instead of Port Harcourt.  He required N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) just for transport to travel to Abuja to appear in the matter and this prohibitive logistic cost made his client to de-brief him and look for a lawyer in Abuja.  To Counsel, the direction is discriminatory, injury and revenue denying effect on the Applicant, is continual and has not ceased. He referred the Court to CBN v AMAO & ORS (2010) 16 NWLR (PT. 1219) 271:AG RIVERS STATE V AG BAYELSASTATE (2013) 3 NWLR PT 1340 123 SC: NATIONAL REVENUE MOBILIZATION & FISCAL COMMISSION V. JOHNSON (2019) 2 NVWLR PT 1656 247 SC.

13.  Counsel submitted that the Applicant used Originating Summons to challenge the provisions of the Practice Direction 2022 which directly affronts his fundamental right under section 42 of the Constitution. Flowing from the premise, the public officer’ Protection Act is not applicable in this case which borders on the enforcement of Fundamental right of the Applicant.

14.  Arguing issue two, on whether this case discloses reasonable cause of action, Counsel answered the issue in affirmative, Counsel submitted that the Applicant/Respondent has established that he is a Lawyer called to the Nigerian bar and licensed to practice law as a means of earning a livelihood.

He went on that while lawyers and litigants resident in Abuja stroll across the next street to commence action in Court on intra trade union election matters, Lawyers from Port Harcourt and other States of the federation must travel thousands of kilometers, running the risks of accident and banditry to commence action in the same subject matter.  He argued that the provision of the Practice direction is discriminatory and against his fundamental right to commence this suit citing section 42 of the 1999 Constitution as Amended, UZOUKWU V EZEONU11 (1991) 6 NWLR (PT 200) 708: JIM-JAJA V COP RIVERS STATE (2013) 6 NWLR PT 1350 225 CA: ODOGU V AG FEDERATION (1996)6 NWLR PT 456 508CA.

15.  Counsel further argued that the promulgation of the Practice Direction 2022 does not fall into the category of the Respondent/Applicant’s judicial duty as provided in 52(1) of the Industrial Court Act 2006 but an administrative or at best a legislative duty, citing BAMGBOYE V UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN (1999) 10 NWLR (PT 622) 290 SC.

Reply on point of law on the Preliminary Objection

16. Referring to paragraphs 3.1 – 3.4 of the Applicant/Respondent’s Written Address, Counsel submitted that the Applicant/Respondent’s client SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/54/2025 was dismissed for lack of appearance of the Applicant/Respondent, and it is beyond dispute that from the 25th July 2025 when the said SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/54/2025 was dismissed to the 24th October 2025 when the Applicant/Respondent instituted the instant suit against the Respondent/Applicant, the prescribed three (3) months within which the Applicant/Respondent could institute the suit, pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, had already lapsed. That the cases of CBN V AMAO & ORS and A.G. RIVERS STATE V A.G. BAYELSA STATE cited by the Counsel in paragraph 3.3 of their Written Address are inapplicable.

17.  Counsel went on that contrary to the Applicant/Respondent contention in paragraph 3.5 of their Written Address that the Practice Directions issued by the Respondent is discriminatory and contravenes Section 42 of the Constitution; Counsel submitted that the said Practice Directions does not have any provision which discriminates any person, state, religion, religion or sex in Nigeria. He submitted that the restrictive or limitative provision complained of applies uniformly and indiscriminately to all citizens, without distinction as to community, ethnicity, place of origin, sex, religion, or political opinion, such provision cannot be said to be discriminatory in order to amount to a breach of Section 42 of the Constitution. Citing UZOUKWU V. EZEONU II (1991) 6 NWLR (PT. 200) 708 @ 766 PARAS A-B.

18.  Responding to the Applicant/Respondent contention in paragraph 3.3 - 3.5 of their Written Address, Counsel submitted that the Applicant failed to place anything on record before this Court to substantiate any of his claims and invariably invites this Court to delve into the realm of speculation, which this Court lacks the vires to do. Citing MAGAJI V. LADO (2023) 14 NWLR (PT. 1905) 435 AT 462-463, PARAS. H-A: AYIDA V TOWN PLANNING AUTHORITY (2013 10 NWLR (PT. 1362) P.226 @ 266, PARAS. D – E.

19. On issue two, responding to the paragraphs 4.0 - 4.2 of the Applicant/Respondent’s Written Address, Counsel submitted that the Applicant/Respondent’s complaint against the Respondent/Applicant revolves around the exercise of the Respondent/Applicant’s discretionary powers under Section 254F of the 1999 Constitution (As Amended), Section 36 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 and Order 1 Rule 8(2) of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. He submitted that such complaint by the Applicant/Respondent is unreasonable and shall have no chance of success before the Court of law. He argued that the law is settled that where a person exercises his constitutional or statutory power, the Court can only invalidate such act where it is established by the complainant that the said act is contrary to the Statute that empowers him to act.

20. Counsel submitted that none of the authorities cited by the Applicant/Respondent in paragraphs 4.3 and 4.4 of the Applicant/Respondent’s Written Address, including BAMGBOYE V. UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN; DENLOYE V. MEDICAL AND DENTAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY COMMITTE AND OKAFOR V. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ANAMBRA STATE, has limited judicial duty to only proceedings in Court.

21.  Counsel submitted further that the phrase “any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty” used by the legislature in Section 52 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act, clearly and plainly means and contemplates any duty discharged by a judicial officer of this Court acting as such, including the administrative duties conferred on the Respondent/Applicant under Section 254F of the 1999 Constitution (As Amended) and Sections 36 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. Citing SANI V. PRESIDENT F.R.N. (2020) 15 NWLR (PT. 1746) P. 151 @178-179, PARAS. H-A: ABACHA V. A.G. FEDERATION (2021) 10 NWLR (PT. 1783) P. 129 @158, PARAS. C-D.

 

On the substantive case.

22.  In the written address in support of the Amended Originating summon and the 33 paragraphs affidavit deposed to by Daniel I. G Ahiakwo, Counsel framed the issues for determination of the Court as follows:

1.     Whether this Honourable Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit?

2.     Whether the Practice Direction 2022 is not a gross violation of the provision of CFRN 1999 and or whether Rules made pursuance to a legislative enactment is superior to the enactment?

23.  Arguing issue one on whether this Court has the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit, Counsel to the Applicant answer the question in the affirmative. Citing GARBA VS. MOHAMMED & ORS (2016) LPELR – 4061(SC) PAGE 62 – 67; Section 254 C 1a of Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (CFRN 1999). That the basic quarrel of the Applicant against the Respondent is on the applicability of Section 46 CFRN 1999 with the practice direction of 2022 and the inability of the Applicant to approach the Court of law within the meanings of Section 46 CFRN 1999,nearest to him.

24. Referring to Section 7 (1)(a) of National Industrial Court Act, 2006,Counsel submitted that the applicable section to the cause of action of the Applicant is the issue of safety of the Applicant, in travelling by road to Abuja or Lagos State. That our roads are not.  Counsel submitted that it is injustice to subject a litigant in pay avoidable logistical cost in filing processes in over two hundred kilometers away from Port Harcourt. Counsel argued that the practice direction tends to place great value on the Courts in Lagos State and Abuja over and above other Courts of coordinate in jurisdiction with it. To Counsel, the Practice Direction is discriminatory in nature, when it makes the Court in Abuja and Lagos to be superior that can adjudicate over matters as contained in it. Citing Section 42 CFRN 1999; LAFIA LOCAL GOVT VS. EXECUTIVE GOV. NASARAWA STATE & ORS. (2012) LPELR – 20602(SC).

25. Arguing issue two on whether the Practice Direction 2022 is not a gross violation of the provision of CFRN 1999 and or whether Rules made pursuance to a legislative Enactment is superior to the Enactment, Counsel submitted that the Practice Direction, is unconstitutional and a gross violation to section 46 (1) of the 1999 Constitution. Counsel argued that there is no mischief that the Respondent wants to cure that should override the provision of the Constitution. Citing OBASANJO& ORSVS. YUSUF& ANOR (2004) LPELR 2151 (P.62). Counsel submitted further that the practice is not on its own an Act of the National Assembly and should not be allowed to replace the law. Citing BUHARI V. INEC & ORS (2008) LPELR 814 (SC).

26. Counsel went on that the nearest Court is not the one that is more than two hundred kilometers but it is the one within forty degree radius of where the litigant is. He submitted that the Practice Direction is injurious to the right of the Applicant to practice law citing AUWALU VS. FRN (2017) LPELR 43824 SC.

Response to the Originating Summons

27. Counsel to the Respondent filed a 7 paragraph Counter Affidavit and a written Address wherein Counsel as a preliminary point, submitted that paragraphs 18, 25, 26 and 27 of the Affidavit in support of the Applicant’s Amended Originating Summons are incompetent and liable to be struck out for offending the provisions of section 115(2) of the Evidence Act, 2011 (As Amended). Counsel submitted that Applicant deviated from factual depositions and opted to canvass legal arguments and make conclusions in clear violation of the provision of section 115(a) of the Evidence; ATTORNEY GENERAL ADAMAWA STATE V. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION (2005) 18 NWLR (PT. 958) 581 AT 657, PARAG.H AND PAGE 676, PARAS. G-H.

28.  Counsel further formulated the sole issue for determination as follows:

 Whether having regard to the facts of the instant suit and the law thereto, Applicant is entitled to the reliefs sought?

29.  Arguing the said issue, Counsel referred the Court to Section 254F (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) (As Amended): Section 36 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006: CARNATION REG. LTD.V. PRESIDENT, N.I.C.N. (2023) 14 NWLR (PT. 1905) 581 AT 605-606, PARAS. H-B, Order 1 Rule 8 (1) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017:  BRITTANIA-U (NIG.) LTD.V. SEPLAT PET. DEV. CO. LTD. (2016) 4NWLR (PT. 1503) 541 AT 594 – 595, PARAS. H – I. Counsel submitted that the Constitutional and statutory powers of the Respondent to make Rules of Court also makes room for the issuance of Practice Directions. Counsel submitted that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Filing of Applications/Motion in Trade Union Matters marking of Exhibits) Practice Direction (No. 1) 2022 as issued by the Respondent, pursuant to the powers vested in him under Section 254F of the Constitution and Section 36 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, is intra vires, lawful and has the force of law.

30. Counsel submitted that the law is trite that rights are not absolute and may be detracted from, thus though parties enjoy a right to access to Court, such a right is not absolute as parties must conform to regulations prescribed for the commencement of such action. Citing AYIDA V. TOWN PLANNING AUTHORITY (2013) 10 NWLR (PT. 1362) 226 AT 266, PARAS. D – E,

31. Counsel argued that the Applicant failed to demonstrate how his constitutionally guaranteed right of access to Court has been infringed upon by the Practice Direction.  He maintained that all the allegations raised by the Applicant in his Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons are baseless, unfounded and not material to make this Court interfere with the Constitutional and Statutory powers of the Respondent, as explicitly vested by the constitution and other statutory provisions. Citing APC V. A.S.I.E.C. (2022) 12 NWLR (PT1845) P.411 @457 – 458, PARAS, F-A: MAGAJI V. LADO (2023) 14 NWLR (PT. 1905) 435 AT 462-463, PARAS. H-A.

32.  Counsel submitted that the Respondent made the said National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Filing of Applications/ Motions in Trade Union Matters marking of Exhibits) Practice Direction (No.1) for convenience purposes and the Applicant does not have a stance to challenge the exercise of the Respondent’s Powers in the circumstance of the instant suit.

On the whole, Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Applicant's Amended Originating Summons for lacking in merit and resolve the sole issue distilled for determination in favour of the Respondent with substantial cost.

Reply on Point of Law

33.  In the reply on point of law, Counsel referred the Court to the case of LAFIA LOCAL GOV. NASRAWA STATE & 0RS (2012) LPELR 20602 SC on liberal rule of interpretation. The Applicant went further to reargue his case in the said reply.

 

COURT’S DECISION

34.  I have carefully gone through the exhibits, affidavits and the arguments of Counsel as contained in the various Written Addresses in both the preliminary objection and the substantive suit as presented by the parties. From all of these, I am of the considered view that the following issues need to be resolved by the Court between the parties as they are the thrust of action. Other ancillary issue(s) may be subsumed in the determination of these issues.

On The Preliminary Objection

1.     Whether the provision of Section 2(A) of The Public Officers Protection Act 2004 is applicable in this case?

2.     Whether Section 54 of the NIC Act 2006 operates as an absolute bar to a constitutional challenge brought under Section 46 of the Constitution against an official Act of the President of the National Industrial Court?

On the substantive suit

3.     Whether the Practice Direction 2022 is constitutes unconstitutional discrimination under Section 42 of the Constitution of 1999 Constitution as amended?

ON THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

On whether the provision of Section 2(A) of The Public Officers Protection Act 2004 is applicable this case

35. I will like to succinctly state that the case of the Claimant from the affidavit in support of the Originating summons centers on the enforcement of his fundamental right as grantees under Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution. While the issue of Public Officers Protection Act is a matter of limitation as to the institution of action, there are exceptions to its application. The issue of fundament right is an offshoot of the Constitution. I must hasten to add however a complaint against the violation of the fundamental right of a person is a complaint against a violation of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The position of the law is that the provision of Section 2 (a) of POPA is subject to the provision of 1999 Constitution (as amended). In fact, a Public Officer who violates the fundamental right of a person cannot claim protection under Section 2 (a) of POPA. See MINISTER OF DEFENCE V. YAGANAMI & ANOR (2022) LPELR-57700 (CA): TAJUDEEN VS. FIRS (2020) 12 NWLR (PT 1739) 459. The Public Officers Protection Act or Law and the Statute of Limitation do not apply to fundamental rights, even if the matter was not raised under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Rules. See the cases of SHABA V. GARA & ORS (2025) LPELR-82538(CA)(PP 50 - 51 PARAS F - B). The instant case being one is the breach of Section 42 of the Constitution and thus, no other law can bar its enforcement. Therefore, I hold that The Public Officers Protection Act do not apply in the circumstance of this case to fundamental rights cases of the Claimant.

On the 2nd issue of the preliminary objection, on Whether Section 54 of the NIC Act 2006 operates as an absolute bar to a constitutional challenge brought under Section 46 of the Constitution against an official Act of the President of the National Industrial Court.

36.  While it is the Applicant\Respondent’s position in preliminary objection is that Section 54 is clear and unambiguous. Counsel argued that the section provides that "No Judge or other person acting judicially shall be liable to be sued... for any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duty." To Counsel, the issuance of a Practice Direction is an Act done in a judicial capacity which includes administrative duties, therefore, the Defendant is statutorily immune. On the other hand, the Respondent\Applicant's Position in the Preliminary Objection is that this is not a suit against the Defendant in his judicial duty but that of the administrative duty on the basis of its collusion with section 42 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. He argued that the Practice Direction is made subject to the constitution.

37.  In resolving this issue, the Court must distinguish between Personal Liability and Judicial Review of Administrative Action. Section 54 of the NIC Act is designed to protect the independence of the judiciary by ensuring that Judges are not harassed by civil suits for their decisions. However, I am of the view that this section, cannot be interpreted to mean that the administrative instruments or Practice Directions issued by the Head of a Court are above the Constitution.

?38.  While the Applicant\Defendant cannot be sued for "damages" or held personally liable for the exercise of his discretion, the Office of the President is a creation of Constitution and its actions must align with Chapter IV of the Constitution. To this effect, where a litigant alleges that an administrative directive restricts access to the Court, thereby impacting his rights, the Court has a duty to examine that claim under Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution.

?       The immunity in Section 54 the NIC Act protects the person of the Judge; it does not immunize the legality of a Practice Direction from constitutional scrutiny. I find that while the Applicant \Respondent is protected from personal civil liability, this suit which seeks a declaratory relief regarding the constitutionality of a Practice Direction is a proper invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction under the Constitution.

?       The Preliminary Objection is hereby overruled.

I shall proceed to the substantive suit:

ON THE SUBSTANTIVE SUIT:

39.  Whether the Practice Direction 2022 constitutes unconstitutional discrimination under Section 42 of the Constitution of 1999 Constitution as amended?

INTRODUCTION

The Applicant, Daniel I.G Ahiakwo, a legal practitioner, commenced this action via an Originating Summons on the 24th of October 2025, seeking a declaration that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Filing of Applications/Motions in Trade Union Matters and marking of Exhibits) Practice Directions (No. 1) 2022 (hereinafter referred to as "the Practice Direction") is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 46(1) of the 1999 Constitution and thus void pursuant to section 1(3) of the 1999 Constitution. The Applicant specifically contended that the directive requiring certain trade union matters to be filed only in the Abuja or Lagos Judicial Divisions violates Section 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), which prohibits discrimination.

2.    THE APPLICANT’S CASE

The Applicant argued that by restricting the filing of specific trade union applications to only the Abuja and Lagos divisions, the Respondent has discriminated against litigants and Counsel in other judicial divisions, thereby violating their right to freedom from discrimination under Section 42 of the Constitution.  That the Practice Direction made him not to be able to appeared in Court in Suit No NICN|ABJ|54|2025 slated for hearing on the 25th of July 2025 as his client could not afford his transportation for 1 Million Naira. That the matter was subsequently dismissed for lack of appearance in Court.

3.    THE RESPONDENT’S CASE

The Respondent contended that the Practice Direction is a valid exercise of powers conferred by Section 254F of the Constitution and Section 36 of the National Industrial Court Act 2006. The Respondent asserted that these provisions authorize the Court to regulate its own practice and procedure to ensure the "orderly conduct of business" and "expeditious disposal of cases." The Respondent further argued that administrative convenience and the specialized nature of trade union litigation necessitate centralizing certain sensitive matters in specific divisions, and this does not constitute "discrimination" within the meaning of Section 42.

COURT’S ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

40.  The Court has carefully considered the submissions of Counsel. The central issue for determination is whether the designation of specific judicial divisions for the filing of certain types of cases constitutes unconstitutional discrimination under Section 42 of the Constitution.

41.  On the Nature of Practice Directions: it is worthy to note that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Filing of Applications/Motions in Trade Union Matters and marking of Exhibits) Practice Directions (No. 1) 2022.The Practice Direction is subsidiary legislation designed for the efficient management of the Court's administrative functions. The Practice Direction ­do not alter the jurisdiction of the Court but regulate the manner in which that jurisdiction is exercised.

42.  On the Allegation of Discrimination, while Section 42 of the Constitution prohibits discrimination based on community, place of origin, sex, religion, political opinion, or circumstances of birth. The Practice Direction in question is based on administrative criteria specifically, the need to centralize complex or sensitive trade union matters for consistent judicial oversight. It does not target any group based on their protected characteristics. It is before the Court by Exhibit 1, the Certificate of Call to Bar that the Applicant was called to the Nigerian Bar. It is not the case that his right to practice as a legal practitioner in Nigeria is restricted by the directive to Lagos and Abuja by the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Filing of Applications/Motions in Trade Union Matters and marking of Exhibits) Practice Directions (No. 1) 2022.

43.  However, from the Exhibit 3 attached to the Amended Originating summons which is the Memorandum of Appearance, the Applicant filed the memo as Counsel to the 4th Defendant while in paragraph 22 of the affidavit in support of the Originating Summons, the Applicant stated that the case with suit No NICN|ABJ|54|2025 was dismissed for lack of his appearance in Court. Exhibit 3 and paragraph 22 of the Affidavit in support of the Originating Summons is somewhat contradictory for a Counsel appearing for the 4th Defendant and not the Claimant in Suit No NICN|ABJ|54|2025 to have the matter dismissed for his none appearance in Court. To this effect, I am of the view that the Applicant has not shown reasonable cause of action for the institution of this case.

44.  Similarly, Section 254F (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) (As Amended) provides as follows:

"Subject to the provisions of any Act of the National Assembly, the President of the National Industrial Court may make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the National Industrial Court"

45.  Section 36 (1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 empowers the Respondent to make rules for the proper regulation of practice and procedure of the Court, thus:

"The President of the Court may make Rules of Court for carrying into effect the provisions of this Act, and in particular-

(a) Regulating the practice and procedure of the Court, including all matters connected with the forms to be used and the fees to be paid;

(b)…”

Order 1 Rule 8 (1) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure Rules) 2017 said Rules provides thus:

"The President of the Court may give Practice Directions, for the effective implementation of these Rules"  

46.  The above Sections of the constitution, NIC Act and the provision of the Rules of Court presuppose the specialized nature of the Court in its administrative Efficiency. I am of the view that the authority to direct where specific high-stakes applications are filed is a legitimate administrative function aimed at ensuring uniformity in decisions concerning trade unions, which are often national in scope. This is a matter of judicial policy, not an infringement on the rights of legal Practitioners.

47.  In conclusion, this Court finds that the Practice Direction; the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Filing of Applications/Motions in Trade Union Matters and marking of Exhibits) Practice Directions (No. 1) 2022 was issued within the statutory and constitutional competence of the President of the National Industrial Court. The requirement to file certain matters in Abuja or Lagos is a procedural directive aimed at ensuring the efficient administration of justice. This I must state is not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, nor does it inhibit a lawyer’s right to practice.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1.     The Preliminary Objection is hereby overruled

2.     That the Applicant’s claims are without merit.

3.     That the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Filing of Applications/Motions in Trade Union Matters and marking of Exhibits) Practice Directions (No. 1) 2022 is declared valid, intra vires, and constitutional.

4.     That the suit is hereby dismissed.

 

 

--------------------------------------------

Hon Justice M. A. Hamza

Judge