WD

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE M. A. HAMZA

DATE: 4^TH MAY, 2026                                                            

SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/04/2018

BETWEEN

1.  MR. AKPEKWU CHRISTOPHER IMBUFE
2.  MRS. BUNMI TOKI-DUROJAIYE
3.  MR. CHIJIOKE NWANKPA
4.  MR. PHILIP EZUMA                                                          …………… CLAIMANTS
5.  MR. IYALL ADAYE

(Suing as Joint Claimants)

AND 

1. MR. ABDUWAHID ODUSILE

2. ALHAJI LIMAN SHUAIBU

3. ELDER EDDY EGUDE

    (FOR HIMSELF AND FOR AND ON BEHALF 

    OF NIGERIA UNION OF JOURNALISTS - NUJ)

4. MISS UCHE AGBAM

5. MR. ANAYOONUKWUGHA                                                         

    (FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR AND ON BEHALF               ………….. DEFENDANTS                  

    OF RIVERS STATE COUNCIL, NUJ)

6. MR. JOSEPH EZUMA

    (FOR HIMSELF AND FOR AND ON

    BEHALF OF THE ELECTION COMMITTEE,

    CORRESPONDENTS CHAPEL, NUJ, 

    RIVERS STATE COUNCIL)

7. SIR (CHIEF) ERNEST CHINWO

8. CHIEF GODFREY AZUBUIKE

9. MRS. ALICE ONUKWUGHA

REPRESENTATION:

Edmund Ebri, Esq.  appearing with C.I. Nwani Esq. for the Claimants

Ifeoma J. Ekedozie, Esq.  appearing with I.J. Ositah (Mrs.) and M.M. Solomon Esq. for the Defendants

JUDGMENT

1.      On the 24^th day of January, 2018, the Claimants brought an action against the Defendants by way of complaint seeking for the following reliefs:

1. A declaration that by the provisions of the constitution of the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), particularly Section 7(a) of Article 6 thereof, the 1^st, 2^nd , and 3^rd Claimants are eminently eligible to contest the elections (and present their respective manifestoes before the election proper) for the offices of Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Financial Secretary, respectively, of the Correspondents Chapel, NUJ, Rivers State Council, fixed for Friday, 26^th January, 2018, having fulfilled all the requirements under the said constitution for contesting the elections.
2. A declaration that by the provisions of the said constitution, particularly Section 6 of Article 6 thereof, the responsibility of the State Working Committee (SWC) of the Rivers State Council of NUJ with respect to the said elections starts and ends with supervision of the elections but does not extend to screening of candidates or contestants vying for the elections as that is the primary responsibility of the Election Committee of the Correspondents Chapel, represented by the 6^th Defendant.
3. A declaration that by the provisions of Section 1(a) and 2(a) of Article 3 of the NUJ constitution, for anyone to qualify to be registered as a member of NUJ, he/she shall possess a minimum of Diploma and cognate experience in Journalism or Mass Communication obtained from a recognized institution, with a working experience of not less than 12 months in a recognized media establishment, and that it is NUJ un-constitutional for the 4^th and 5^th Defendants, actively encouraged and supported by the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants, to insist that since the Diploma possessed by the 1^st – 3^rd Claimants, respectively, is not in Journalism, they are for that singular reason not eligible to contest for the said elections, as the said sections are applicable to only would-be-members of NUJ at the point of their entry into the union and not to those who have already become members of NUJ and are paying check off dues to NUJ, and participating in other activities of NUJ; AND that it is also NUJ un-constitutional for the 6^th Defendant, instigated by the 4^th and 5^th Defendants, to purportedly disqualify the 1^st-3^rd Claimants who are already members of NUJ, paying check off dues to NUJ, and to their local chapel and participating in NUJ activities over the years, from contesting for the elections for that same singular reason.
4. An order setting aside the purported disqualification by the 6^th Defendant of the 1^st-3^rd Claimants from contesting the said elections, instigated by the 4^th and 5^th Defendants and endorsed by the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Defendants.
5. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1^st -6^th Defendants by themselves, their servants, agents, privies, and all those claiming through them, however so called, from continuing to exclude the 1^st ,2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants or any of them from contesting the said elections and/or from presenting their respective manifestos before the said elections proper.
6. An order that any elections (including any manifesto presentation leading to the election proper) conducted and/or supervised by any of the 1^st-6^th Defendants in respect of the offices of Chairman, Vice Chairman and Financial Secretary, respectively, of the Correspondents Chapel, NUJ, Rivers State Council, on Friday, 26^th January, 2018, or on any other date, without the participation of the 1^st-3^rd Claimants as contestants, shall be null and void and of no effect.
7. An order of mandatory injunction compelling the 1^st-6^th Defendants or any of them to restore the names of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants and the respective offices being contested for by them in the List of Contestants for the said elections.
8. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the 1^st -5^th Defendants by themselves, their servants, agents, privies, and all those claiming through them, however so called, from taking any disciplinary action against the Claimants (including but not limited to suspending or expelling any of them from the NUJ) on the ground that they instituted this suit against the Defendants, as the suit was instituted as a very last resort in order to seek redress, against the infringement by the 1^st-6^th Defendants of the rights of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants to contest the said elections and of the right of majority members of the Correspondents Chapel, NUJ, to have a free, fair, transparent and level playing field Chapel elections.
9. A declaration that by the provisions of the NUJ constitution, particularly Section 10 of Article 6 thereof, the 7^th Defendant is not eligible to contest the elections fixed for 26^th January, 2018, having already served as Chairman of the Correspondents Chapel for five consecutive years.
10. An order nullifying the candidacy of the 7^th Defendant on the grounds that it violates the provisions of the said Section 10 of Article 6.
11. An order setting aside the two notices published on the notice board at the secretariat of the Correspondents Chapel, NUJ, Rivers State Council, at NO. 47 Ikwerre Road, Mile 1 Diobu, Port Harcourt, on 10^th January, 2018, purportedly disqualifying the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants from contesting the said Chapel elections fixed for Friday, 26^th January, 2018 for no justifiable reason.
12. The sum of ?50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only being special and general damages for the unlawful purported disqualification of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants from contesting the said elections, litigation expenses only, and injured feelings and inconveniences suffered by the Claimants as a result of the said unlawful disqualification.

2.      Other initiating process was filed along with the complaint in line with the Rules of this Court. In response, the Defendants entered appearance through their counsel and filed Statement of Defense together with other processes in compliance with the Rules of this Court.

The case of the Claimants as pleaded

3.      The Claimants, all members of the Correspondents Chapel of the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), Rivers State Council, instituted this action to challenge what they contend is a deliberate, unlawful, and manipulated electoral process orchestrated by the Defendants in respect of the Chapel elections scheduled for January, 2018. At all material times, the 1^st-5^th Claimants were qualified, financially up to date members of the Chapel with substantial professional experience in journalism. The 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants, in particular, duly purchased nomination forms, were screened, and were initially cleared by the Election Committee (chaired by the 6^th Defendant) to contest for the offices of Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Financial Secretary respectively. Their names were published on the official list of cleared candidates, and no valid objections subsisted against the 2^nd and 3^rd Claimants, while the 1^st Claimant successfully defended an earlier objection and was cleared. The Claimants asserted that the electoral process was properly set in motion, with guidelines duly adopted by Congress on 8^th November, 2017, which expressly provided that eligibility was based on membership of the Chapel, and not solely on possession of a diploma in journalism or mass communication.

However, the process became fraught with irregularities when the Rivers State Council of NUJ (through the 4^th and 5^th Defendants) began to interfere unlawfully by demanding submission of membership lists and credentials of candidates as a precondition for conducting the elections an act the Claimants contended as ultra vires their constitutional supervisory powers. Despite Congress rejecting this interference and rescheduling the elections, further disruptions occurred, including: the suspension of the December, 2017 elections through a questionable letter read by rival candidates (7^th – 9^th Defendants), rather than the Election Committee, continued insistence by the State Council on credible verification contrary to earlier resolutions. Subsequently, under pressure, the Claimants complied and submitted their credentials. Notwithstanding this compliance: the 6^th Defendants unilaterally disqualified the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants, citing absence of journalism specific diplomas, this disqualification was done without authority, without consultation with the committee, and without affording the Claimants a hearing, congress condemned this act and directed its withdrawal, which was initially complied with. Despite the withdrawal, the 6^th Defendant later republished a list disqualifying the 1^st – 3^rd Claimants, marking their names with asterisks, and rescheduled the elections for 26^th January, 2018 again without due process or fair hearing.

The case of the Defendants as pleaded

4.      The Defendants’ case is anchored on the strict application of the Constitution of the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), particularly Article 3, which prescribes a minimum qualification of a Diploma in Journalism or Mass Communication for eligibility to contest elective positions within the Union. The Defendants contended that the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants were validly disqualified from contesting in the Correspondents’ Chapel election held on 26th January, 2018 for failure to meet this constitutional requirement. Specifically: the 1^st Claimant (Chairmanship aspirant) was disqualified for lacking the requisite qualification, while the 7^th Defendant emerged winner, the 2^nd Claimant (Vice Chairmanship aspirant) was similarly disqualified, and the 8^th Defendant won the election, the 3^rd Claimant (Financial Secretary aspirant) was also disqualified on the same ground, with the 9^th Defendant emerging winner. The Defendants further asserted that the 3^rd Claimant had earlier been disqualified in 2014 for presenting a Diploma in Computer Engineering, which does not meet the NUJ constitutional requirement. Notably, the 1^st Claimant served as Secretary of the Committee that effected that disqualification, thereby acknowledging at the time that only a Diploma in Mass Communication or Journalism suffices. The Defendants maintained that the election process was properly conducted, in compliance with laid down guidelines, and that all contestants purchased nomination forms and were subjected to screening by the Elections/Credentials Committee. They emphasize that there exists a 3-4 day window for lodging petitions against candidates, and any petition by the Claimants outside that period is an afterthought. The Defendants argued that this suit is premature, having been filed on 24^th January, 2018 before the election was conducted on 26^th January, 2018. That other contestants participated in the elections, some winning unopposed or by default, and are not parties to this suit. That all actions taken by the Elections Committee, State Council, and National Secretariat were proper, including the submission and verification of candidates’ credentials.

5.      In the course of hearing of the case, the Claimants called 3 witnesses namely; Mr. Christopher Akpekwu who testified as CW1, Mr. Chijioke Nwankpa as CW2, and Mr. Philip Ezuma as CW3. The Defendants also called 3 witnesses namely; Sir Ernest Chinwo who testified as DW1, Mr. Amaechi Okonkwo as DW2, and Ms. Uche Agbam as DW3. The Court subsequently directed Counsel to the parties to file their respective final written addresses in line with the Rules of this Court and they complied with the said direction.

Defendants’ Final Written Address

6.      In the Defendants’ Final Written Address at page 1504 of the record, Counsel raised issues for determinations:

1. Whether the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants had the requisite qualifications to contest the 26^th January, 2018 Chapel elections.
2. Whether the suspension of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants and others who are not parties to this suit, for anti-union activities, was valid in line with the Constitution of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ).
3. Whether from the totality of evidence before this Honourable Court, the Claimants have established their case to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

7.      Arguing issue one on whether the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants had the requisite qualifications to contest the 26^th January, 2018 Chapel elections. Counsel submitted that the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants were not qualified to contest the 26^th January, 2018 NUJ Chapel elections and were therefore rightly disqualified. The argument is anchored on the principle that the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), being a voluntary association, is strictly governed by its Constitution which is Exhibit C31, binding on all members. He referred the Court to the case of INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF UNITED VISIONARY YUOTH OF NIG. V. SUKUBO (2021) LPELR-52916 (CA), where the Court affirmed that members of an association are bound by its constitution and cannot selectively comply with its provisions.

8.      Counsel submitted that under Article 3(1) and (2) of the NUJ Constitution, eligibility for membership and by extension, to contest elections requires: proper registration by the National Secretariat upon recommendation of the State Council, possession of a minimum of a Diploma in Mass Communication or Journalism with at least 12 months’ cognate experience; or qualification under Article 3(3)(b) for persons with at least five years’ journalism experience prior to the Nigerian Press Council Act. He submitted that the phrase “in addition to” in Article 3(2)(a) makes the educational qualification mandatory, not optional alongside registration. This interpretation was supported by ADERIBIGBE & ANOR V. ABIDOYE (2009) LPELR-140, where “addition” was construed to mean something that must be added cumulatively. Also, the use of the word “shall” denote compulsion, as affirmed in OMATEK COMPUTER LTD V. FBN LTD (2021) LPELR-56812 (CA) 

9.      Counsel added that the Election Guidelines which is Exhibit D4, particularly paragraph 3, reinforce this requirement by mandating the same minimum academic qualification for aspirants. That under cross-examination CW2 presented a Diploma in Computer Engineering (Exhibit C2G) and failed to produce any journalism related qualification. His admission under cross-examination is binding, because admitted facts requires no further proof. See the case of IRONBAR V. FEDERAL MORTGAGE FINANCE LTD (2024) LPELR-62186 (SC). Also, that the 1^st Claimant possessed a Diploma in Public Administration as evidence in Exhibits C4 and C32 and did not meet the alternative experience requirement under the Constitution, which renders the foundation of their membership defective, relying on the case of LABOUR PARTY V. OIL & ORS (2023) LPELR-60825 and the principle that one cannot “put something on nothing and expect it to stand.”Additionally, the 4^th Claimant voluntarily withdrawn from the election, he cannot complain of any injury, invoking the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria. Therefore, the NUJ State Council acted within its supervisory powers under Article 5(G)(4) of the NUJ Constitution in disqualifying the Claimants via Exhibit C27 for non-compliance with the constitutional requirements. Citing the cases of YUSHAU& ANOR V. INEC (2019) LPELR-49629 (CA) and PDP & ORS V. BADAREI& ORS (2019) LPELR-47063 (CA).

10.    Arguing issue two on whether the suspension of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants and others who are not parties to this suit, for anti-union activities, was valid in line with the Constitution of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ). Counsel submitted that the suspension of 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants and others was grounded on Article 7(2)(v) of the NUJ Constitution as Exhibit C31, which provides for the automatic suspension of any member who institutes legal proceedings against the Union without first exhausting internal dispute resolution mechanisms. As a voluntary association, the NUJ is governed by its constitution, which is binding on all members. That the Claimants failed to utilize available internal remedies, such as the Ethics Committee, Elders’ Forum, and appeals to the National Body, before commencing the suit. Although, the Claimants claimed to have written protest letters as seen in Exhibits C11, C12, C13, C2F1, and C2F2, there is no evidence they were received or that the Claimants awaited any response. Notably, some letters were dated the same day the suit was filed, indicating a lack of intention to exhaust internal remedies. He submitted that failure to comply with a condition precedent renders an action premature and incompetent. Citing the following case of OBE V. MTN (NIG.) COMMUNICATION LTD (2021) ALL FWLR (Pt. 1111) 580 @ 587 Ratio 11.

11.    It was further submitted that the suspension was lawful and consistent with the rules of a voluntary association, citing the case of UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR V. ESIAGA (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 502) 719 @ 739 SC and GANIYU YASIRU OLAKUNLE V. ALH. ARIYU KILIYA & ORS (2023) (NIC/BAU/02/2023), which affirm that members are bound by the constitution of their association. That courts should not interfere in internal affairs of associations except in cases of illegality or breach of rights, relying on OSI V. ACCORD& ORS (2016) LPELR-41388 (SC), and concluded that the suspension via Exhibit C20 was validly executed due to the Claimants’ non-compliance with internal dispute resolution procedures.

12.    Arguing issue three on, whether from the totality of evidence before this Honourable Court, the Claimants have established their case to be entitled to the reliefs sought. Counsel submitted that the alleged bye-election that produced the 7^th Defendant was neither pleaded nor proved with particulars such as date, venue, or supporting documents. By Section 131(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, he contended that the burden of proof lies on the party asserting a fact, and failure to discharge this burden is fatal, citing the case of ALAO V. AKANO& ORS (2005) LPELR-409 (SC) and UBA PLCV. OLA-OLUWA AINA WIRE IND. (NIG.) LTD (2021) All FWLR (Pt. 1111) 629 @ 637 Ratio 12. He submitted further that evidence not supported by pleadings goes to no issue and must be disregarded, and that oral evidence cannot substitute documentary proof where required. He referred the Court to the following cases:  AGBAREH & ANOR V. MIMRA & ORS (2008) LPELR-43211 (SC), EZE V. ENE & ANOR (2017) LPELR-41916 (SC) AND EMEGOKWUE V. OKADIGBO (1973) 4 SC 113. He added that failure to file a Reply to the Statement amounts to admission of the Defendants’ averments. Citing DUROSARO V. AYORINDE (2005) LPELR-967 (SC). He added that a Claimant must succeed or fail on the strength of his own case, and evidence which he brought before the Court, and not the weakness of the Defendants’ case or defense. Citing the case of CHARNEL BROTHERS TRADING CO. (NIG.) LTD V. AMCON (2022) LPELR-57092 (CA) and Sections 131–133 Evidence Act, 2011.

13.    Learned Counsel posited that the said election of Friday, 26^th January, 2018 for which the Claimants are in court seeking the various reliefs as contained in their Amended Statement of Claim, has been conducted and the tenure spent as well, up to the National Body. That after the 26^th January, 2018 election, elections have been conducted with two (2) tenures having elapsed while the third tenure is about to elapse, rendering the suit academic as of no utilitarian value. Citing the case of P.D.P V. JARIGBE (2021) ALL FWLR (pt. 1090) 1574 @ 1576 Ratio 1.He submitted that the Court cannot grant reliefs not specifically claimed. Referring the case of IBRAHIMV. MAIRIGA (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1315) 540 @ 553–554. That Exhibit C31 is irrelevant, inadmissible, and of no probative value for breaching Section 83(3) Evidence Act, 2011. Citing the case of A.P.C V. B.S.I.E.C (2015) All FWLR (Pt. 770) 1367 @ 1370 Ratio 2.

14.    Counsel submitted that declaratory reliefs require strict proof. Citing the case of MUHAMMAD V. WAMMAKO (2017) LPELR-42667 (SC). That the sum of ?50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only as damages is speculative and unsubstantiated, and the sum of ?10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) can only be claimed as special damages if the legal fees were reasonably incurred as a direct result of the Defendants’ wrongful act. He urged the Court to dismiss the suit with substantial cost.

Claimants’ Final Written Address

15.    In the Claimants’ Final Written Address in page 1550 of the record, Counsel to the Claimants also formulated several issues for determination of the Court to writ:

1. Whether or not this case is now a mere academic exercise, unfit for the precious time, energy and attention of this court?
2. Whether or not Article 7(1a) and 7(2v) of the NUJ Constitution applies to the respective petitions of the 1^st,2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants in this case and if it does, whether or not the Claimants exhausted the internal mechanisms for dispute resolution under the said Article before instituting the present suit?
3. Whether or not the purported disqualification of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants in particular is wrongful?
4. Whether or not the purported suspension of the Claimants in particular is wrongful?
5. Whether or not the 7^th and 8^th Defendants were qualified to contest as Chairman and Vice Chairman respectively under Article 6(10) of the NUJ Constitution, having previously served back for two years through a bye-election and for three years through a regular election, respectively?
6. Whether or not the right of the State Council of the NUJ to supervise Chapel elections under Article 6(6) of the NUJ Constitution includes the right to screen, clear and/or disqualify candidates for such election and impose a date for holding such elections?
7. Whether or not the Claimants are entitled to their respective declaratory and other reliefs in this suit?

16.    Arguing issue one on whether or not this case is now a mere academic exercise, unfit for the precious time, energy and attention of this court? Counsel submitted that the suit is not a mere academic exercise, but raises live, justiciable issues warranting the Court’s adjudication. Thus, Reliefs (a), (b), (c), and (i) are declaratory in nature, seeking judicial interpretation of specific provisions of the Constitution of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (Exhibit C31), particularly Articles 3(1a), 3(2a), 6(7a), and 6(10). He also submitted that declaratory reliefs serve to: define and establish legal rights, clarify disputed or ambiguous constitutional provisions, provide binding guidance for future application, prevent recurring disputes and litigation. Hence, the reliefs cannot be characterized as academic, as they have present and prospective legal consequences.

17.    Counsel submitted further that Reliefs (d) and (k), seek to set aside Exhibit C27, and the handwritten notice dated 11/01/2018, both of which remain part of the NUJ’s official records. He argued that these documents allegedly continue to: affect the Claimants’ legal status within the Union, and impair their professional reputation. Thus, their nullification would produce real, operative legal effects, not merely theoretical outcomes.

18.    Counsel also submitted that Reliefs (e), (f), (g), and (h) are injunctive, aimed at: preventing future unlawful exclusion from elections, and restraining further disciplinary actions, including potential expulsion. That these reliefs are forward-looking and protective, reinforcing the practical and continuing relevance of the suit. In response to the Defendants’ argument that the case has been overtaken by events, Counsel submitted that this contention is misconceived, and relied on the settled principle of law that: Courts retain the jurisdiction to nullify acts done in breach of due process, even if such acts have been completed. That the impugned elections were conducted during the pendency of the suit and in defiance of pending restraining applications, and as such, the Defendants cannot rely on actions taken in disregard of court process to render the suit academic.

19.    Arguing issue two on whether or not Article 7(1a) and 7(2v) of the NUJ Constitution applies to the respective petitions of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants in this case and if it does, whether or not the Claimants exhausted the internal mechanisms for dispute resolution under the said Article before instituting the present suit? Counsel submitted that Article 7(1) does not apply to the Claimants’ complaints, and that even if it does, non-compliance does not bar access to court, and that the Defendants’ preliminary objection is misconceived and unsustainable. He submitted that Article 7(1) of the NUJ Constitution governs professional and ethical misconduct, as well as enforcement of the Code of Conduct. That the Claimants’ complaints (Exhibits C11, C13, C2F1 and C2F2) are pre-election disputes, and not disciplinary matters. Thus, Article 7(1) does not apply.

20.    Counsel submitted that Article 7(2)(v) provides that a member who resorts to legal action without exhausting internal remedies shall be suspended. That the provision prescribes for only sanction which is suspension, and does not provide for striking out of suits or denial of access to court. That the Defendants’ contention that exhaustion is a condition precedent to litigation is therefore unsupported by the Constitution of the Union. Thus, internal rules cannot override the jurisdiction of the Court.

21.    Counsel submitted that the cases of MUTUAL LIFE& GEN. INS. LTD V. IHEME (2014) NWLR (pt. 1389) 670 @ 681, Ratios 19 & 20 and OBI V. MTN (NIG.) COMMUNICATIONS LTD (2021) ALL FWLR (pt. 1111) 580 @ 587, Ratio 11, cited by the Defendants were authorities cited out of context, that the facts are materially different, and they do not apply to the present case. He submitted further that the alleged failure to exhaust internal remedies raised by the Defendants were not proved. That they failed to discharge this burden.

22.    Arguing issue three on whether or not the purported disqualification of the 1^st, 2^nd. And 3^rd Claimants in particular is wrongful? Counsel submitted that the disqualification of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants is wrongful, unconstitutional, and based on a misinterpretation of Article 3(2a) of the NUJ Constitution. He submitted that the provision establishes two distinct and independent requirements: a minimum of a Diploma from a recognized institution; and cognate experience in journalism or mass communication of at least 12 months. That these are not conjunctive requirements mandating a Diploma specifically in Journalism or Mass Communication. That imposing such a restriction would amount to judicial legislation, contrary to settled principles of statutory interpretation as affirmed in A. G. BENDEL STATE V. AIDEYE (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 118) 646 SC and NAFI’U V. THE STATE (1980) 8-11 SC 130, which require courts to give words their ordinary meaning.

23.    Counsel further submitted that Sections 19(1)-(3) and 37 of the Nigerian Press Council Act, 1992, provides that the law recognizes qualification through experience and competence, requiring only a minimum of a Diploma without restricting the field of study. He maintained that the Defendants’ interpretation is inconsistent with this statutory framework. That the NUJ, being a trade union governed by the Trade Unions Act, 2004, cannot impose rigid academic requirements akin to a professional regulatory body. That membership is primarily based on active engagement in journalism, payment of dues, and participation in union activities.

24.    Counsel submitted that the Claimants possess relevant academic qualifications and extensive professional experience, and are duly registered, financially up-to-date members of the NUJ. He submitted that, by virtue of Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011 admitted facts (such as their membership) require no further proof. Citing the following cases: BENDEL PILGRIM WELFARE BOARD V. IRAWO (1995) 1 NWLR (pt. 369) CA; NARIDEX TRUST LTD V. NICMB LTD (2001) FWLR (pt. 49) 1546/ 4 SC (pt. 11) 25 SC; DANIEL& ANOR V. IROERI (1985) 1 NSCC 628.

25.    Counsel submitted that the Defendants are estopped from denying the Claimants’ eligibility, having previously recognized them as members, issued ID cards, collected dues, and allowed participation. That by virtue of Section 169 of the Evidence Act, 2011 they cannot approbate and reprobate. Citing the following cases: WILSON V. OSHIN (1994) NWLR (pt. 366) 90 CA; A-G RIVERS STATE V. AKWA-IBOM STATE (2011) 8 NWLR (pt. 1248) 31 SC; BWACHA V. IKENYA (2011) 3 NWLR (pt. 1235) 610 SC.

26.    Arguing issue four on whether or not the purported suspension of the Claimants in particular is wrongful? Counsel submitted that the purported suspension and disqualification of the 1^st, 2^nd, and 3^rd Claimants are unlawful, wrongful, and void for non-compliance with governing rules and due process. That in labour jurisprudence, disciplinary actions must strictly conform to contractual and regulatory provisions; otherwise, they are wrongful. Citing the case of AKINFE V. UBA PLC (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 189 and TEXACO V. KEHINDE (2000) LPELR-6869 (CA), which established that breach of terms renders such actions wrongful, while CHUKWUMA V. SHELL PETROLEUM DEV. CORP (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) affirms entitlement to damages.

27. Counsel submitted that from a tort perspective, wrongful acts involve interference with legal rights of another, as stated in IHENACHO V. UZOCHUKWU (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 487) 257 (SC) and OWENA BANKV. NIGERIAN SWEETS& CONFECTIONARY CO. LTD. (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 290) 698 (CA). He submitted that the principle that no party should benefit from its wrongdoing was reinforced in OWODUNNI V. REGISTERED TRUSTEESOF CELESTIAL CHURCHOF CHRIST (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 210) 391.

28.    Counsel further relied on decisions of the National Industrial Court, including Obed Omah V. Gabriel Nwanetanya & 3 Ors. (2019) (unreported ruling of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Port Harcourt Division, in Suit No. NICN/PHC/137/2018), Mr. Noah Aremu Olukan & 4 Ors. V. Mr. F. J. Ajayi & 4 Ors. (2020) (unreported judgment of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Ibadan Division delivered on 24/6/2021, in Suit NO. NICN/IB/37/2019), Section 40 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), Comrade Prince Uduma Ewona& 5 Ors. V. The Nigeria Civil Service Union & Ors. (2020) (unreported judgment of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Calabar Division, delivered on 1/2/2024 in Suit No. NICN/CA/09/2020), Comrade Ezekiel Musa Yelwa && Ors. V. Nigeria Union of Local Government Employees (NULGE) (2024) (unreported judgment of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, Abuja Division, in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/127/2024), and Stella Okoh-Essien V. Nigeria Association of Women Journalists (NAWOJ) (2020) (unreported decision of the NICN, Abuja Division, in Suit No. NICN/LA/663/2019), which consistently condemn arbitrary disqualification in trade union elections as unconstitutional and capable of nullifying the process.

29.    Counsel submitted that the principle of fair hearing is fundamental. Citing the case of GARBA V. UNIVERSITYOF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 556; (1986) ALL N.L.R where the Supreme Court held that any decision reached in breach of fair hearing is a nullity. He submitted that the Claimants were disqualified without notice, hearing, or adherence to procedure despite being duly qualified and cleared. That the actions of the Defendants are procedurally defective, malicious, and unconstitutional.

30.    Arguing issue five on whether or not the 7^th and 8^th Defendants were qualified to contest as Chairman and Vice Chairman respectively under Article 6(10) of the NUJ Constitution, having previously served back-to-back for two years through a bye-election and for three years through a regular election, respectively? Counsel submitted that the 7^th and 8^th Defendants were not qualified to contest the elections of 26^th January, 2018, having exceeded the maximum tenure permitted under Article 6(10) of the NUJ Constitution. That Article 6(10) clearly provides that no member of the Union shall hold any particular office for more than two terms of three years each. The evidence before this Honourable Court, particularly from DW1 under cross-examination, established that the 7^th and 8^th Defendants served two years (April 2012- April 2014) via a bye-election, and three years and eight months (April 2014- January 2018) via a regular election.

31.    Counsel submitted that the argument of the Defendants that the initial two-year tenure should be discounted on the basis that it arose from a bye-election and was held in an “acting capacity”. That the term “acting capacity” denotes a temporary appointment pending the return of a substantive office holder. It is not attained through an electoral process. In the present case, the Defendants emerged through a full democratic process involving nomination, screening, campaigning, voting, and swearing-in. This clearly negates any suggestion of an acting role.

32.    Counsel submitted further that the NUJ Constitution does not recognize or provide for “acting capacity” in the context advanced by the Defendants. Where a statute or constitution is silent, the Court cannot import extraneous concepts into it. That Articles 6(8) and (9) of the Constitution expressly contemplate bye-elections, thereby bringing such tenures within the constitutional framework. Consequently, there is no basis for excluding them from the computation under Article 6(10). Also, that Article 6(10) makes no distinction between tenures obtained via regular elections and those via bye-elections. The settled principle of interpretation is that where words are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning without importing limitations. Any contrary interpretation would lead to absurdity. Therefore, that the two-year tenure must be counted, the cumulative tenure exceeds the permissible limit the Defendants were constitutionally disqualified from contesting.

33.    Arguing issue six on whether or not the right of the State Council of the NUJ to supervise Chapel elections under Article 6(6) of the NUJ Constitution includes the right to screen, clear and/or disqualify candidates for such election and impose a date for holding such elections? Counsel submitted that the powers of the State Working Committee (SWC) of the NUJ under Article 6(6) of the NUJ Constitution are strictly supervisory and do not extend to pre-election functions such as screening, clearing, or disqualifying candidates, nor to fixing election dates. That the supervision is confined to the election-day processes, including: accreditation of voters, casting of votes, counting and collation of votes, declaration of results, and does not include: screening or clearing candidates, requesting candidates’ credentials or CVs, determining eligibility criteria, fixing or postponing election dates, as was reinforced by the evidence of DW3 under cross-examination on the 23^rd day of June, 2025, who admitted that the State Council does not possess the power to screen candidates.   

34.    Counsel further submitted that the actions of the State Council, particularly through Exhibit C25, wherein it purported to clear candidates, halt elections, and impose conditions, constitute an ultra vires assumption of powers and a direct interference with the Chapel’s autonomy. That the threat of “consequences” for non-compliance constitutes institutional intimidation and undue interference in the internal affairs of the Chapel. He submitted that pre-election responsibilities including; screening, clearance, publication of candidates, resolution of objections, and preparation of guidelines and timetable which are vested exclusively in the Chapel Election Planning Committee, and not in the State or National bodies. That the reference to a “final list of contestants” was interpreted as procedural rather than substantive, conferring no authority for re-screening or disqualification by higher bodies.

35.    Arguing issue seven on whether or not the Claimants are entitled to their respective declaratory and other reliefs in this suit? Counsel submitted that declaratory reliefs are granted upon credible evidence establishing entitlement, and that the Claimants have discharged this burden on a balance of probabilities. That the Claimants are qualified members of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), satisfied all eligibility criteria, and were unlawfully and unconstitutionally disqualified. He submitted that the disqualification (Exhibit C27) lacks legal foundation and should be set aside, with the Claimants’ names restored. Consequently, any election conducted in their absence is null and void. That the suspension of the Claimants (Exhibit C20), carried out during the pendency of the suit, is oppressive, retaliatory, and amounts to an abuse of court process. Relying on Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), he urged the Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to set aside the suspension and, where appropriate, invoke its contempt powers.

36.    Additionally, Counsel submitted that the 7^th and 8^th Defendants exceeded the tenure limits prescribed under Article 6(10) of the NUJ Constitution, rendering their candidacy invalid. That the notices of disqualification issued against the Claimants are unconstitutional and should be nullified. He submitted that the Claimants suffered significant harm, including loss of professional opportunities, reputational damage, emotional distress, and financial deprivation. That the suspension lasted over eight (8) years and that the two (2) affected individuals died within that period. He submitted that the Court should award ?50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as general damages, describing it as modest under current economic realities. Also, that the claimed of ?9,600,000.00 (Nine Million, Six Hundred Thousand Naira) as accumulated unpaid allowances: ?20,000 (Twenty Thousand Naira) monthly times eight (8) years per Claimant from January 2018 to date, and ?10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as special damages for solicitor’s fees, supported by Exhibit C3H.  He referred the Court to MAUDE V. SIMON (2014) ALL FWLR (pt. 753) 1873; REWANE V. OKOTIE-EBOH (1960) NSCC 155; NWANJI V. COASTAL SERVISES (NIG) LTD (2004) 11 NWLR (pt. 885) 552,and urged the Court to grant all the reliefs and damages as claimed. 

Reply on Points of Law

37.    The Defendants’ in their Reply on points of law dated the 3^rd day of March, 2026. It was submitted that the Defendants joined issues with the arguments of the Claimants as contained in their Final Written Address and respond accordingly. The Claimants had in their issue one called on the Court to legalize an illegality by ruling against the future of an organization, as can practically be seen in Paragraph 8 on page 24 of their Claimants' final written address.

38.    Counsel argued that this Court cannot grant what was not asked for in its claims and Counsel cannot at this stage amend a relief. He urged the court to look at these situations and discountenance the prayers of the Claimants above as it is a violation of public policy- the court will not enforce or legitimize acts that are contrary to public policy or statutory prohibitions. In this suit, my Lord the Claimants were disqualified because they were not qualified for the post and the qualified candidates contested and won. And the elective system of the Union has been in continuum. Therefore, to grant the Claimants' request would amount to endorsing an illegal act, which is against the fundamental principles of Law and Justice. Also, any actions or requests by the Claimants that seek to validate an act beyond the powers conferred by law is ultra vires and void. The Claimant praying to this Honorable court to nullify any chapel elections, including FUTURE ones is an illegality. The Court cannot sanction an illegality, as itlacks jurisdiction to legalize what the legislature has expressively forbidden, and more so, relying on the maxim Nemo Judex in Causa Sua (no one can be a judge in their own case). The Claimants' request essentially asks the Court to approve their own illegal conduct which offends Natural justice and the Rule of Law.

39.    It was further argued that it is trite that no action can arise from a dishonourable, baseless or illegal cause seen in the doctrine of illegality expressed in the maxim Ex Turpi Causa Non Oritur Actio'. The court consistently refuses to aid parties who base their claims on illegal acts, and no relief can be grantedto enforce or legitimize such acts or prayers. The court's duty is to uphold the law and not to legitimize its breach by disqualified candidates who were not qualified at the time of the Chapel Elections in 2018. Citing the case of NPF & Ors V. Police Service Commission & Anor (2023) LPELR- 60782 (SC) where the court held that "The mere fact that a person has persisted in illegality does not confer the illegality with the cloak of legality. An illegality remains so, irrespective of how long it has been practiced. As the Latin maxim goes - dormiunt legesaliquando, nunquammoriuntur (the laws sometimes sleep, but they never die). The fact that a law has not been enforced for so long does not change its status as a law"

40.    Counsel also posited that Exhibit C22 as presented in paragraph 5 on page 4 of the final address and further argued in issue three, nowhere is it stated that the congress unanimously agreed that eligibility to contest the elections shall be based, amongst others, on membership of Chapel, and not on the singular fact of possession of a Diploma in Journalism or Mass Communication, or that diploma in either Journalism or Mass Communication shall not be a qualifying requirement to contest the elections, and that at least a diploma in any field or area of studies would suffice for that purpose. There was no evidence before this Court to that effect. Exhibit C22 was explicit on the three (3) resolutions taken by congress that fateful day as found on its page 4 with regards to attendance, collection and submission of forms and the cost of forms. These resolutions were moved by the 3rd Claimant to be adopted for the working of the chapel. Referring to page 4 of Exhibit C22 and urgemy lord not to be misled by counsel in his desperate attempt to distort facts to suit his case. Citing OGUNDELE VS AGIRI (2010) ALL FWLR (PT 507) PG. 20.

41.    On Exhibit C2 on the production of the Guidelines, it was submitted that the law is trite that a party cannot make a case on a document not tendered and admitted as evidence before the Court. Claimants had the right/option to have applied for an order of a subpoena duces tecum on the defense for the production of the said document to establish their case or tender what they have, but they did not. In NWEKE VS. STATE (2017) LEPLR-42103 (SC) the Court held that a party on whom notice to produce is served is not under any obligation to produce the document. The service of the notice to produce only entitles the party serving the notice to adduce secondary evidence of the document in question by virtue of S. 91 of the Evidence Act, 2011. It is unnecessary to serve a notice to produce, when the secondary copies of those documents are not in the possession of the party serving the notice. Also, in BUHARI & ANOR VS. OBASANJO & ORS (2005) LPELR-815 (SC) the Court held that “in notice to produce procedure, it is supposed that the person asking for the document knows of the contents, perhaps has a copy of it. If the person to produce fails to produce it, the secondary evidence of it can be admitted in evidence.

42.    Learned Counsel further submitted that the Claimants have also argued in their issue one that this suit still has life and my lord, the courts including the apex court has severally determined what amounts to an academic suit and what the court should do. The Apex Court in Iheme & Ors. Vs A. G. Rivers State & Ors. (2025)LPELR- 80198 (SC) held that a suit becomes academic where it appears theoretical, makes empty sound and lacks practical utilitarian value to the plaintiff even if judgment is given in his favour. Once a suit no longer has live issues for determination, such a suit becomes academic and the court must on no account invest precious judicial time toiling and slaving to resolve such hollow, insignificant, worthless and academic issues. A major question we ask here is: "what is the utilitarian value of this suit to the parties especially where the election has been conducted and the tenure has already elapsed?"

43.    It is trite law according to Counsel, a Court does not give an order in vacuum. Thus, this Court cannot be hand-twisted as the Claimants are doing in order for the court to make an order in vain. Citing the case of ADEOGUN & ORS. VS FASHOGBON & ORS. (2008)LPELR-131 (SC). Similarly, the provisions of the NUJ Constitution is binding on all who subscribe to it and thereby cannot pick and choose which part of it to obey and which part to disobey. Therefore, once agreed upon, it becomes effective and legally binding. Citing JEGEDE & ANOR V INEC & ORS. (2021) LPELR-55481 (SC); THOMPSON & ANOR V AKNGBEHIN (2020) LPELR-58287 (SC); FRN VNGANJIWA (2022) LPELR-58066 (SC).

44.    It was further argued that Article 7(2) of the NUJ Constitution which is Exhibit C31 has prescribed a procedure for complaint by aggrieved members and also other channels of redress especially where any of the party is not satisfied with either the procedure or the decision. But the Claimants who claim to be aggrieved, never followed the procedure neither did they await the outcome, but rather resorted to filing a Suit against the Union (NUJ), which is a fundamental violation of the Constitution and for which penalty is automatic suspension from the Union, which operates without any form of intervention as clearly spelt out in Article 7(2)(v) of the NUJ Constitution (Exhibit C3 1).

45.    On the Claimants who have also argued that the said Article 7 does not apply to protest letters of the 1, 2nd, and 3rd Claimants. This argument is misconceived of the intent of the said provision of the Constitution. It is important to state that a protest letter is a formal written objection or complaint about an issue, often addressed to an authority figure. It is used to express dissent or disagreement and can be a precursor to further action. The Black's Law Dictionary, 9^thEdition at page 1344, defines a protest as a formal statement or action expressing dissent or disapproval under some circumstances, a protest is lodged to preserve a claim or a right.

46.    Counsel submitted also that the Claimants have argued especially in paragraphs 11-13 of their issue 2, that the penalty of automatic suspension, does not dispose of their right to sue. In response, it was argued that the provisions of Article 7 of the NUJ Constitution., is a condition precedent to follow. The Court in FRN VNGANJIWA (supra) has held that a condition precedent is a formality super-imposed on the law. It is one which delays the vesting of a right until the happening of an event. Citing also ORAKUL RESOURCES LTD & ANOR VNCC & ORS (2022) LPELR-56602 (SC); THOMPSON & ANOR V AKINGBEHIN (SUPRA); NNAJI& ANOR VNDUBUISI & ORS. (2023) LPELR-61 131 (SC).

47.    On the argument of the Claimants that they have responded by opposing to the Defendants Preliminary Objection through their pleadings, evidence adduced and exhibits tendered and admitted in court and that the issues are those bothered on Article 7 of the NUJ Constitution. It was submitted that the Claimants seem to wallow in immense misapprehension as to the purport of a preliminary objection and what to file in response if at all they choose to. It is trite that the purpose of filing a preliminary objection, is to bring the action to an end for being incompetent and fundamentally defective thereby robbing the court of jurisdiction. Where same is rightly upheld, the matter comes to an end. Citing IHEME & ORS VA.G. RIVERS STATE & ORS. (SUPRA), Preliminary objections are separate applications filed at the trial stage and in rare cases, in the final address.

48.    In response to issue three Claimants' final address, to wit, whether or not the purported disqualification of the 1s, 2nd and 3rd Claimants is wrongful? it was submitted that the suspension of the 1st, 2^nd, 3rd Claimants is not wrongful and that same is in accordance with the NUJ Constitution. It is trite law that statutes are interpreted first in their literal meaning especially where there is no ambiguity. Referring to LAWRENCE vs. PDP (2018) 5 NWLR (Pt 1613) 464.The NUJ Constitution in Article 3 (2)(a) has clearly provided the minimum qualification for membership which can be interpreted literally without any form of ambiguity. The Courts have severally held that by the cardinal rule of interpretation, statutes must be construed as a whole and sections in the statutes must not be read in isolation in order to discover the true intention of the particular statutes or enactment. Citing FALEKE V INEC (2016) 18NWLR (Pt1543) 61; Metuh v FRN (2018) 3 NWLR (Pt 1605) 1.

49.    Counsel submitted also that the misplacement or re-arrangement of the provisions of the statutes by the Claimants, offends the rules of interpretation, as the laws meant to be read holistically, word-for-word and sections as well as subsections in their literal meaning. Thus, Article 3 of the NUJ Constitution (Exhibit C31) provides thus:

1 (a) – a person shall not be a member of the Union, except if registered by the National Secretariat of the Union on the recommendation of the State Council.

2 (a) – In addition to the provision in Article 3 (1), a person to be so qualified shall also possess a minimum of Diploma and cognate experience in Journalism or Mass Communication obtained from a recognized institution with a working experience of not less than 12 months in a recognized media establishment.

(b)- A person shall be entitled to be registered as a journalist, if he has not less than five years' experience as a journalist prior to the Nigerian Press Council Act 85 of 1992.

            Hence, the word as used by the said provision above gives a minimum qualification of a Diploma and cognate experience in Journalism or Mass Communication. Citing BUHARIVINEC& ORS (2008) LPELR-814 (SC)interpreted the word 'AND' in a Statute to mean a conjunction performing the function of joining two expressions or sentences which could be inseparable, integrated, joint or matched.

50.    He argued that it does not matter that the 1^st - 3rd Claimants have been registered by the NUJ by them presenting themselves that they are so qualified whereas they were never qualified. This became manifest when they were to present their requisite qualifications. It was submitted that the Claimants who have deceitfully held themselves as qualified members, were never qualified hence, their payment of dues and being involved in the activities of the union over the years, does not in any way metamorphose into proper membership.

Citing WEMA BANK V DE-UNITEDHARDWARE LTD & ANOR. (2018) LPELR-4457 (CA); AGI V PDP & ORS. (2016) LPELR.

51.    On issues five and six of the Claimants' final address, it was contended that the only argument on the issue of bye-election as raised by the Claimants is that the said bye-election was not pleaded (making evidence at variance with pleadings), there is no proof as to place, date and time, establishing the conduct of the said bye-election. Claimants argued that there were forms purchasing, manifestos, swearing in, etc., yet not a single document or picture in proof of same was tendered/exhibited, not even the minutes of Chapel meeting where the resolution to conduct a bye-election was reached, was tendered before this Honourable Court.

52.    Similarly, no member contested or protested against the candidacy of the 7th and 8th Defendants, not even the Claimants. So if really and indeed the 7th and 8th Defendants were not so qualified to contest the election of 26/1/2018, why were they not opposed to? Why was no petition raised against them? Why did the National (the Body that takes the final decision) clear them to contest the said election? As a matter of fact, in Exhibit C13, the letter of protest dated 19/1/2018,paragraph 5 thereof, the only protest 1st Claimant had against the 7^thDefendant (his fellow contender for the office of Chairman), is on the number of years of experience to have been qualified to contest.  However, the fact that the only protest letter that was acknowledged receipt of, is the one written by the 1% Claimant to the Chairman of the election committee and received by the Secretary, same person of whom it was alleged as ELECO Secretary in Exhibit C6 to have great deal of complicity between herself and the Chairmanship contestant, Mr. Chris Imbufe, 1^stClaimant. This allegation was never refuted by either of the parties. 

53.    Counsel further argued that Article 6 (1) of the NUJ Constitution requires candidates for election into any of the National and State offices to submit their forms and Curriculum Vitae to the National Secretary, while Article 6 (1) (i) provides that election into Chapel offices shall be conducted within a period of 30 days ... in accordance with Article 6 (1) above. Article 6 (7)(g) provides that immediately the names of the contestants are published, members shall have the right to raise objections before the National Secretariat publishes the final list of contestants. This goes to show that the criteria used for State and National elections will be applicable to Chapel elections. The wordings of these constitutional provisions are so clear and unambiguous that one begins to wonder what the arguments of the Claimants are based on. 

54.    In response to issue seven of claimants' final address, Defendants maintain and adopt Issue No. 3 of its Final Address filed on 18/12/2025, to support their argument herein. It was submitted that Courts are encouraged to refrain from granting a relief not claimed. Citing the cases of NIRCHANDANI VS. PINHEIRO (2001) FWLR (pt. 48) PG. 307 @ 1315 RATIO 22: NBC PLC Vs OBOH (2000) FWLR (pt. 29) 2379 @ 2383 RATIO 6: SODIPO VS OGIDAN (2008) NWLR (Pt. 1077) PG. 342 @ 347 RATIO 5: WILSON VS OSHIN (1994) 9 NWLR (PT. 366) PG. 90 AT 95 RATIO5.

55.    Learned Counsel urged the court to take cognizance of the following:

a)      That the Claimants cannot threaten or make a case for the Court on Defendants having defied the court by carrying on with the elections in2018, when no court order was served or has ever been served on the Defendants putting a stop to the said elections.

b)     Claimants Counsel not only assumed the role of a Legislature, formulating, interpreting, and passing laws and its intendment but also assumed the role of a Judge too, who analyzed the evidence and documents before the Court as it deemed fit. What was left was to enter judgment and pass sentence. Unfortunately, one cannot be a Judge in his/her own case - Nemo .Judex in Causa Sua (no one should be a Judge in their own case) preventing individuals with a personal, financial or ideological stake from deciding their own case. We urge the Court not to be swayed or misled by submissions of Claimants.

c)      Paragraph 5 (a) and (b) of Defendants Amendment Statement of Defense are explicit. These documents were pleaded and admitted in evidence to support Defendants' assertions that the 1^st Claimant disqualified the 3rd Claimant in 2014 for not possessing the requisite qualification. Nowhere is it written in the pleadings of Defendants that these documents, ExhibitsD4 and D5, were Guidelines to the 2018 elections. This piece of evidence was not controverted by Claimants.

d)     Nowhere in Exhibits C22 and C6 was it mentioned that the issue of qualification of members as per possessing a Diploma in Journalism or Mass Communication, will be done away with.

e)      Claimant filed this Suit in their individual capacities, not representing or on behalf of others.

f)      Exhibit C27 - letter dated 16/01/2018 explicitly stated that the Chapel had no power to grant waivers on the criteria for election, to the contestants.

g)      No such person as Mrs. Bunmi Toki-Durojaiye (2nd Claimant) works in City People as at today, this is because the said 2nd Claimant passed on to eternal glory on 23rd February, 2023. The Claimants should not have referred to her in the present, as a living being. This is brought to the attention of the Court to avoid the Court making orders against a dead person.

h)     None of the Claimants have held any elective positions in the Chapel, State, Zonal or National Body of the NUJ.

i)       The issue of wrongful termination does not apply in this Suit as there is no contract of employment existing between the NUJ and the Claimants.

j)       Worse off for the 3rd Claimant is that he has no identity card and membership number. His ID and Registration number has not been brandished as those of the 1st and 2nd Claimants, Can it then be really said that he is a registered member of the Union?

k)      No bye election was held, same was not pleaded. For want of sounding repetitious, there is no document/evidence in proof of the said bye elections.

l)       The Judge has the sole function of interpreting the documents tendered before him. There is a plethora of cases on this.

m)    Claimants did not file a Reply to Defendants' original Statement of Defense nor the Amended Statement of Defense.

n)     Even though this is a Reply on Points of Law, Defendants are forced to react on some of the hugely distorted facts as contained in Claimants’ final address, desperately aimed at misleading the Court.

o)     Defendants were not availed the copies of the unreported cases cited by Claimants in their final address.

56.    Finally, the Defendants place reliance on the evidence and documents before this Honourable Court, and further adopt the argument in its Final Written Address filed on 18/12/2025, and state that this case is academic and that the authorities and cases cited by the Claimants are not applicable and should be discountenanced by this Honourable Court. Defendants have proved their case to be entitled to judgment, and urged the Court to hold in favour of the Defense and dismiss this Suit with substantial cost.

COURT'S DECISION

57.    After going through the facts of this case as pleaded and deposed to by the parties, the evidences and various Exhibits tendered and admitted together with their final written arguments including their cited authorities; statutory and case laws which is to the effect that the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) is a voluntary professional association governed by the provisions of its Constitution (Exhibit 3a), the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Claimants were members of the Union who sought to contest various positions in the chapter's election scheduled for the 26th day of January, 2018. Meanwhile, the State Council of the NUJ, purportedly acting under its supervisory powers as enshrined in Article 6(6) of the Constitution intervened in the election process.

58.    Furthermore, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Claimants were disqualified from contesting the elections on the grounds that they did not meet with the mandatory educational requirements stipulated in Article 3 of the NUJ Constitution. For the 1st Claimant holds a Diploma in Public Administration (Exhibit C4 and (32) and the 2nd Claimant holds a Diploma in Computer Engineering (Exhibit (2a), whereas, the said Constitution requires a Diploma in Journalism or Mass Communication.

59.    Pursuant to the disqualification and subsequent disputes, the Claimants were suspended from the Union for alleged anti-union activities. Whereas, the 7th and 8th Defendants contested and were accordingly elected as Chairman and Vice Chairman respectively, despite the Claimants' contention that they had exhausted their constitutionally permitted terms as provided under Article 6(10). Consequently, the Claimants instituted this action seeking for declaratory reliefs to interpret the Constitution as well as the injunctive reliefs to set aside the election results and their suspension. The Defendants on the other hand challenge the suit on the grounds that it is an academic and that the Claimants failed to exhaust the internal dispute resolution mechanisms provided in Article 7 of the NUJ Constitution.

60.    Based on the above facts, this Court has distilled the following issues for determination as they are the thrust of action. Other ancillary issue(s) may be subsumed in the determination of these issues to wit:

a.    Whether the suit has become an academic exercise or remains a live and justifiable controversy.

b.    Whether the Claimants' failure to exhaust the internal dispute resolution mechanisms under Article 7 of the NUJ Constitution ousts the jurisdiction of the Court.

c.     Whether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Claimants possessed the requisite educational qualifications to contest the 2018 Chapter elections under Article 3 of the NUJ Constitution.

d.    Whether the suspension of the Claimants for alleged anti-union activities was valid and in accordance with the NUJ Constitution.

e.    Whether the 7th and 8th Defendants were qualified to contest for the offices of Chairman and Vice Chairman under Article 6(10) of the NUJ Constitution.

f.     Whether the State Council's power to supervise chapter elections under Article 6(6) of the NUJ Constitution includes the power to screen and disqualify candidates.

g.    Whether or not the Claimants are entitled to their respective declaratory and other reliefs in this suit.

61.    On issue No. 1, it is within the contention of the Defendants that the suit is academic due to the passage of time and events, the reason being that once a suit no longer has live issues for determination, such a suit becomes academic and the court must on no account invest precious judicial time toiling and salvaging to resolve such a hollow, insignificant, worthless and academic issue. Citing ADEOGUN & ORS VS. FASHOGBON & ORS (supra), while the Claimants argued that it remains a live controversy because Reliefs (a), (b), (c) and (i) are declaratory seeking judicial interpretation of Article 3(1a) 3(2a), 6(7a) and 6(10) of the NUJ Constitution (Exhibit (31). While Reliefs (e), (f), (g) and (h) are injunctive and aimed at preventing future unlawful exclusion and disciplinary actions.

62.    Thus, the Supreme Court in the case of ANYANWU VS EZE & ORD (2019) LPELR - 48740 (SC) Per Galumje JSC held:

"To consider a matter which has been overcome by events is to into futility. A suit is academic where it is thereby theoretical makes empty sound and of no practical utilitarian value to a party even if judgment is given in his favour. Once a suit no longer has live issues for determination, such a suit is academic and a Court should on no account spend judicial time or engage in academic exercise. Courts are to determine live issues."

See also APC VS EVAN ENWEREM & ORS (2022) LPELR - 57816 (SC); ALBASU VS NYAMEH & ORS (2022) LPELR & BLACK LAW DICTIONARY.

63.    Although the said 2018 election cycle has concluded, the reliefs sought as rightly argued by the Claimants include the interpretation of the NUJ Constitution and setting aside of their suspensions. A suspension from a professional body like NUJ or any other professional body carries a stigma and affects the ongoing rights of membership as can be seen from the depositions of the Claimants which cannot be dismissed as theoretical simply because time has passed as suggested by the Defendants. See FRN VS IDAHOSA & ORS (2021) LPELR - 58990 (CA); LONGTERM GLOBAL CAPITAL LIMITED & ANOR VS STANBIC IBTC BANK PLC & ANOR (2022) LPELR - 59027 (SC).

64. Similarly, declaratory reliefs are intended to clarify the legal relationship between parties for the future if the court is to decline jurisdiction on the grounds of the matter being an academic, it would leave the Claimants' professional status in issue and also fail to address the alleged ultra vires conduct of the State Council. Consequently therefore, it is my considered opinion that there are subsisting legal interest that requires judicial determination. So,I hold.

65.    On issue No 2, which is to the effect "whether the Claimants' failure to exhaust the internal dispute resolution mechanisms under Article 7 of the NUJ Constitution ousts the jurisdiction of this Court. It is the contention of the Claimants that Article 7(1) of the NUJ Constitution governs professional and ethical misconduct and the code of conduct, whereas the Claimants' complaint as reflected on Exhibits C11, C13, C2F1 and C2F2 are pre-election disputes making the Article inapplicable. Thus, Article 7(2)(v) prescribes suspension as a sanction for members who sue without exhausting internal remedies but does not provide for the striking out of suit or the denial of Court access. Therefore, internal rules cannot override the jurisdiction of the Court.

66.    On their part, the Defendant argued that the suspension of the Claimants was grounded in Article 7(2)(v) of the NUJ Constitution which mandates automatic suspension for members who sue the Union without exhausting internal dispute resolution mechanisms. Thus, the Claimants failed to utilize the Ethics Committee, Elders Forum, or Appeals to the National Body before filing the suit. even the protest letters as contained in Exhibits C11, C12, C13, C2F1 and C2 F2 do not constitute exhaustion of remedies as there is no proof of receipt and some were dated the same day the suit was filed, indicating a lack of genuine intent to resolve the matter internally. Similarly, that a breach of the constitution is not just a mere irregularity or technicality but substantial and fundamental and cannot be remedied.

67.    Meanwhile, the Supreme Court in the case of OGOLOLO & ORS VS UCHE & ORS (2005) LPELR - 2312 (SC) Per Belgore, JSC (as he then was) held that:

"Where a law has given exclusive power to a body to decide, the Court cannot come in before that body has exercised that power. Court can come in only where there is exhaustion of all remedies before that body and Court will then be able to decide whether that power had been exercised lawfully. See also, PDP & ORS VS NNEBOMYI & ORS (2022) LPELR - 57144 (CA).

68.    It is imperative to say that the content of Article 7(2) is not much in doubt, which is to the effect that:

i.      Where a complaint has been made against a particular journalist, the Journalist shall be notified of such a complaint in writing and given at least twenty one days notice within which he shall prepare his defence and appear before the Committee.

ii.    Where the complaint is on a member of the Committee, he shall not sit in the hearing of the complaint by the Committee.

iii.   The NEC shall have powers to call for the minutes and account books of a State Council at any time for the purpose of inspection or investigation based on concrete in formations or dates.

v.     Members who resolve to legal action against the Union without exhausting all internal mechanisms for resolving dispute shall automatically be suspended from the Union.

69.    Flowing from the above provision of the Constitution of NUJ, it suffice saying that the provision is primarily directed at "professional misconduct" and disciplinary issues related to journalism ethics. Therefore, contrary to the assertion of the Defendants, the current dispute, however, involves the interpretation of constitutional eligibility for election and the legality of the State Council's intervention in Chapter affairs which are matters of constitutional vires rather than mere misconduct as contemplated by the Claimants. See OLISA AGBAKOBA VS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION & ANOR (2021) LPELR - 55906 (CA).

70.    Furthermore, where the internal machinery of an Association is not specifically designed to address the legal interpretation of its Constitution as in Exhibit C31, or where the grievance involves the very body that would oversee the internal remedy, the Court must exercise its jurisdiction. I therefore find the argument as well as the judicial authorities cited by the Claimants' Counsel as wise and apt in this wise. Consequently, the suit is not premature and the Claimants are entitled to have their grievances adjudicated by this Court to ensure that the Union's leadership acts within the bounds of the governing document. So, I hold.

71.    On issue No. 3, i.e. whether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Claimants possessed the requisite educational qualifications to contest the 2018 Chapter election under Article 3 of the NUJ Constitution. It is within the contention of the Claimants that their disqualification was wrongful, unconstitutional, and based on a misinterpretation of Article 3(2a) of the NUJ Constitution. Whereas, Article 3(2a) establishes two (2) distinct and independent requirements for any candidate willing to contest, which the Claimants asserted that they have met.

72.    The Defendants on the other hand, alleged that the Claimants have failed to establish the fundamental facts of their eligibility. Since the foundation of their membership and candidacy were defective. Similarly, the evidence presented by the Defendants including the Claimants' owns academic records and the NUJ Constitution according to them outweighs the claim made by the Claimants.  

73.    The question that called for determination at this juncture is whether the provision of Article 3 of the NUJ Constitution was really given the required interpretation by the Defendants at it affects the eligibility of the Claimants to contest the election or not in accordance with the principle of interpretation of Constitution. The Supreme Court in the case of NWOBIKE VS FRN (2021) LPELR - 56670 (SC) Per Ogunwumiju JSC, held that:

"The literal rule of interpretation is the oldest rule and followed by Judges all over the world. The rationale behind the literal rule is that it prevents Court from making biased decisions when the issue relates to sensitive and political matters by sticking to the dictionary meaning without discretion (without expansion or contradiction) of the very words used in the statute. Thus, when the words of the statute are very clear, plain and unambiguous without equivocation, then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of the consequences."

74.    Article 3(1a) and (2a) of the NUJ Constitution for ease reference provides this:

1a.    A person shall not be a member of the Union except if registered by the National Secretarial of the Union on the recommendation of the State Council.

2a.    In addition to the provision in Article 3(1), a person to be so qualified shall also possess a minimum of Diploma and cognate experience in Journalism or Mass Communication obtained from a recognized institution, with a working experience of not less than 12 months in a recognized Media Establishment."

75.    Disqualification of the 1st - 3rd Claimants was said to be predicated upon the provision of Article 3(2a) as posited by the Defendants. The Defendants have even opined that the Claimants lacks the foundational base to be members of NUJ for lack of basic requirement. whereas, it is the duty of the Court in the interpretation of these clear and unambiguous words to ascribe ordinary grammatical meaning to them. See OLANREWAJU COMMERCIAL SERVICES LTD VS SOGAOLU & ANOR (2004) LPELR - 24086 (CA); OWONI BOYS TECHNICAL SERVICES LTD VS UBN LTD (2003) 15 NWLR (PT. 844) P 545. Flowing from the above judicial authorities, the phrase a person to be so qualified shall also possess a minimum of Diploma and cognate experience in Journalism."

76.    In plain English, the phrase connotes that for a person to be a member of NUJ, he must have a minimum educational qualification of Diploma and mandatory cognate experience in Journalism. Therefore, applying the principle of interpretation of Constitution as mentioned above, and eloquently posited by the Learned Defence Counsel in his Reply on points of law, it could conceivably be deduced that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Claimants have adequately complied with the requirement as envisage. There is no doubt that all of them have their Diploma as indicated in the Exhibits stated above. Although, in Computer Engineering and Public Administration respectively, there is no way the drafters of the NUJ Constitution provided that Diploma in Journalism is mandatory. What is mandatory is cognate experience in Journalism. 

77.    The use of "or" in statute is to provide alternative option. The Defendants have never shown that the Claimants have no such cognate experience in Journalism. That was why they were duly registered and have been paying their check off dues and practicing the profession for quite sometimes. Although, the Defendants contended that the Claimants have deceitfully held themselves as qualified members, whereas they are never qualified. Hence their payment of dues and involved in the activities of the union over the years, does not in any way metamorphose into proper membership. 

 78.   Therefore, it is conspicuous from Article 3 (2a) that two (2) entry requirement into the Union are provided i.e. either with a minimum qualification of Diploma in any field in addition to cognate experience in Journalism or in the alternative a Diploma in Mass Communication which can be accepted even without cognate experience in Journalism. So, for the Defendants to doubt the lawful membership of the Claimants at this stage is an understatement. Evidence has shown that they are duly registered and financial members for more than five years as required by the NUJ constitution without any issue. Why have they been so registered in the first place; who did the registration for them; what were the documents they have submitted in the course of registration? Defendants have failed woefully to give answer to those questions. It is my considered opinion that Claimants are Bonafide members of NUJ Rivers State Chapel. So, hold.

79.    Although, the Defendants have placed so much concern and reliance on Exhibit D4 which is little as NUJ Federated Correspondent Chapel Election 2014 Guidelines, it is to the effect that:

"In accordance with Constitutional provision of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), every aspirant seeking to take part in the forthcoming Executive elections of the Federated Correspondents Chapel in Rivers State scheduled for November 12th, 2014 must strictly adhere to the following guidelines of particular importance in items 3 which provides:

He/she must have obtained a minimum of Diploma in Mass Communication and Journalism or extremely related field in verifiable institutions except where he or she started media practice within the period waived by the Constitution.

80.    From the content of item 3 stated above, it is without doubt that it is mandatory for any intended contestant to the said election to have a minimum qualification of Diploma in either Mass Communication or Journalism. Notwithstanding the saying however, that for Democracy to grow and thrive in an atmosphere where the rule of law will equally prevail, manipulation and intrigues all in the name of political exigencies including professional bodies like NUJ should not be the order of the day, the fact remain as rightly posited by the Defendants that courts have no right whatsoever to interfere with the internal arrangement of UNION. I seem to agree with the reasoning and authorities cited by the Defendants' Counsel for being apt. While I disagree with the position of the Learned Claimants’ Counsel.

81.    It is apparent as contained in both the testimonies of the Claimants, the Exhibits they tendered as well as responses of DW1, DW2 & DW3 under cross examination several objections raised by some members of the union that the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Claimants have no educational qualification in either Journalism or Mass Communication as stipulated under Exhibit D4. Therefore, to be a member of NUJ is one thing and to be eligible to contest in the union election is another. Evidences of Degree Certificates cannot salvage them. If that is settled, then position of the Defendants in disqualifying the Claimants from contesting the election was never done in bad faith as argued by Learned Counsel to the Claimants, but was a proper application of internal regulation. The Claimants’ argument for a broader interpretation fails because the Union, as a professional body, is entitled to restrict its leadership to those with specific professional training as defined in its governing document. So, I hold that Claimants are not qualify to contest the election.

82.    On Issue No 4, whether the suspension was wrongful and lacks constitutional justification within the framework of the NUJ Rules. While the Claimants argued that the suspension was wrongful as in Exhibit C20, the Defendants posited that the suspension was lawful and consistent with the rules of a voluntary association, citing UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR VS ESIAGA (Supra) and GANIYU YUSIRU OLAKUNLE VS ALH. ARIYU KILIYA & ORS (Supra) which affirmed that members are bound by the Constitution of the association. That Courts should not interfere in the internal affairs of association except in cases of illegality or breach of right.

83.    The question that called for determination at this juncture is whether the Claimants by filing this suit before this Court in order to register and pursue the course of justice as a result breach of their rights. There is no doubt that Exhibits C11, C13, C2F1 and C2F2 are petitions and complaints filed by the Claimants which were grievances over pre-election disputes. The question is whether the Defendants have any mechanism for resolving such an issue. Infact, the Defendants’ witnesses had admitted under cross-examination that no such an institution or body charged with that responsibility. If that is settled, then as rightly argued by the Claimants' Counsel and the authorities cited to that effect, disciplinary procedure under Article 7(1) cannot entertain this kind of issues except Court of Law as stated in resolving issue (2) above. So, I hold.

84.    On issue No 5, whether the 7th and 8th Defendants were qualified to contest for the offices of Chairman and Vice Chairman under Article 6(10) of the NUJ Constitution. The Claimants contended that the 7th and 8th Defendants were disqualified under Article 6(10) because they had already served terms totaling five (5) years. Two (2) years via bye election and three (3) years via regular election). Therefore, their continued holding of office constitutes a breach of the Constitutional limit on tenure.

85.    On their part, the Defendants argued that no member contested or protested against the candidacy of the 7^th and 8^th Defendants, not even the Claimants. Similarly, why did the National body that takes the final decision cleared them to contest the election? Even their occupation of office in 2012 was in acting capacity and no bye-election was held to herald their administration.

86.    There is no doubt that the 7th and 8th Defendants have served two (2) as rightly indicated by the Claimants which was also confirmed by the Defendants, but the Defendants argued that the 1^sttenure was a product of bye-election and not regular election. So according to them that constituted an exemption. I seem to agree with this position in the sense that Article 6(10) of the NUJ Constitution provides to the effect that:

“No member of the Union shall hold any particular office for more than two terms of three years each.”

87.    Flowing from the above provision of the law, the question that called for consideration is whether the bye-election and the tenure attached therewith is equivalent with the regular election. According to Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Edition defines a 'Bye-election at page 557 as "an election specifically held to fill a vacant post”. Furthermore, Section 164 of the Electoral Act settled that question as to the meaning of a bye-election as opposed to a general election as follows: "a general election involves an election at regular intervals to fill all the seats available in the entire constituency, whereas, a bye-election refers to an election to fill a particular vacant seat or position created either by death, resignation or impeachment. See INCORPORATED TRUSTEES OF UNITED VISIONARY YOUTH OF NIGERIA VS AMBASSADOR SUKUBO SARAIGBE SUKUBO (2021) LPELR - 5616 (CA).

88.    Perhaps, a bye-election is not an election that comes periodically after the expiration of tenure. See LABOUR PARTY VS INEC (2009) 6 NWLR (PT. 1137) 315. Therefore, even if the two (2) types of election have similar implication or otherwise, could the 7th and 8th Defendants be said to be in breach of Article 6(10) of the NUJ Constitution. The answer is no. the reason being that the requirement or stipulation therein is for three (3) years. That is to say the period they served under the bye-election was for two (2) years and not three (3) years. Indeed, two (2) years can never be taken as the same with three (3) years as contemplated by the drafters of the NUJ Constitution. Consequently, I see reason with the Defendants in this wise. I hold accordingly that the 7th and 8th Defendants were lawfully qualified to contest the said election.

89.    On Issue No 6, whether the State Council's power to supervise Chapel Elections under Article 6(6) of the NUJ Constitution includes the power to screen and disqualify candidates.

         The Claimants argued that power to supervise under Article 6(6) does not equate to the power to screen, clear or disqualify candidates. The State Council according to them does not have the constitutional rights to unilaterally impose election dates on the Chapels. The Defendants on the other hand, maintained that the State Council acted in accordance with the NUJ Constitution. They also posited that Article 6 (1) requires candidates for election into any of the National and State offices to submit their forms and CV to the National Secretary. It suffice saying that by the adequate application of the principle of interpretation of constitution, the power to “ supervise” an election as captured in Article 6(6) of the NUJ constitution, does not include the power to screen candidates for the said election. For that squarely comes under the powers of election committee. Submitting form to the National Secretary is only for administrative purpose without more as provided by Article 6(1). I seem to agree with Learned Claimants’ Counsel and authority cited to that effect. Contrary to the assertion of the Defendants, it is never within the contemplation of the drafters of NUJ constitution that State Counsel should usurped the power of the election committee. So, I hold.

90.    On issue No 7, whether or not the Claimants are entitled to their respective declaratory and other reliefs in this suit. The Claimants have contended that they have established through evidence and legal argument that their constitutional rights were violated. Therefore, the reliefs sought are necessary to correct the wrongful action of the Defendants and to ensure future adherence to the NUJ Constitution. The Defendants on their part argued that the Claimants are not entitled to any damages having failed to establish their case.

91.    It is the testimonies of the Claimants that their suspension from the Union have negatively affected them because they lost their jobs and daily earnings which created an untold hardship to them and their families to the extent that two (2) of them even lost their lives during the pendency of the suspension. The Defendants have failed to prove otherwise. It is my considered opinion that the Claimants are entitled to damages in accordance with judicial authorities of NEW IDEA CONSTRUCTION CO LTD VS AGIM (2024) LPELR - 62346 (CA); EGESIMBA VS ONUZURUIKE (2002) FWLR (PT. 128) 1227. So, I hold.

On the whole, I hold and declare as follows:

1. I declare and hold that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Claimants are eminently not eligible to contest the election of Correspondent Chapel, Rivers State Council in accordance with Section 7(a) of Article 6 of the NUJ Constitution.
2. I declare and hold that the power of the State working Committee of the Rivers State Council of NUJ is limited to supervision of the election only. But does not extend to screening of candidates or any other responsibility of the Election Committee.
3. I declare and hold that for anyone to qualify to be registered as a member of NUJ, he or she shall possess a minimum qualification of Diploma and cognate experience or Diploma in Mass Communication obtained from a recognized institution with a working experience of not less than 12 months in a recognized Media establishment as provided under Section 1(a) and 2(a) of Article 3 of the NUJ Constitution.
4. I declare and hold that the suspension of the Claimants was unlawful and it is hereby set aside. 
5. Prayers e, f, g, h, i, j and k are hereby refused for being overtaken by event.
6. I ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the Claimants the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) only as damages and cost of this action.

Judgment entered accordingly.

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Hon Justice M. A. Hamza

Judge

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Hon Justice H. A. Muhammad

Judge