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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE B. B. KANYIP, PHD, OFR, bpa PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

DATE: 13 NOVEMBER 2025                                                        

SUIT NO. NICN/ABJ/112/2024

BETWEEN

Dr Abubakar Gidado Halilu - Claimant

 

AND

  1. The Chief of Naval Staff
  2. The Nigerian Navy                                                   -                                                                                   Defendants

 

REPRESENTATION

Umar Ango, holding the brief of M. A. Danmama, for the claimant.

I. J. Mbatsavdue, with T. C. Adaga and S. N. Kanshio, for the defendants.

 

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

  1. The claimant claims that he has the right to voluntarily retire from the Nigerian Navy, and that his letter of voluntary retirement is effective from the date it was received. He accordingly filed this suit on 4 April 2025 vide an originating summons praying this Court to answer the two questions he posed in his favour. The two questions are:
    1. WHETHER or not, the Claimant has a right of voluntary resignation From Public service.
    2. WHETHER or not, the Claimant’s letter of voluntary retirement is effective from the date of its issuance/receipt.

 

  1. If the answers to the above questions are in the affirmative, the claimant seeks the following reliefs/declarations:
    1. A DECLARATION that the Claimant has a right to voluntarily exit from the service of the Defendants.
    2. A DECLARATION that the Claimant’s letter of voluntary retirement dated 12th December, 2024 is valid and effective.
    3. AN ORDER deeming the letter of voluntary retirement dated 12th December, 2024 as valid and effective.
    4. AN ORDER setting aside any action (including Declaration of RUN, AWOL OR DESERTION) that was subsequently carried out by the Defendants against the Claimant having regard to his voluntary retirement.


 

  1. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court restraining the Defendants, their agents, privies or any person/body claiming through them from carrying out any action having regard to his voluntary retirement.
  2. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendants to issue to the Claimant his Retired Personnel Identity Card, Nigerian Navy Certificate of Service and Nigerian Navy record of Service as well as all entitlements accorded to retired Personnel having voluntarily retired from the service of the Defendants.
  3. ANY FUTHER ORDER/ORDERS this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.

 

  1. The grounds upon which the reliefs are sought are:
  2. The Claimant was enlisted into the Nigerian Navy in August, 2012 before his subsequent commissioning on the 25th day of May, 2013 as sub-lieutenant vide Direct Short Service Course 21 with service number NN/3787.
  3. The Claimant having been commissioned as a sub-lieutenant was posted to Nigerian Navy Ship Ekpe, Lagos wherein he served for three months, and to Jos, plateau State as sub-sector commander operation safe heaven, he was subsequently posted to Eastern Naval command Calabar, as duty with command communication and information technology officers, thereafter to Western Navy command Lagos as officer of the watch western Regional Control Centre, and to Naval headquarters, Abuja as officer of the watch main control centre before his final posting to Defence Space Administration as staff officer 2, network security, Abuja being his last place of duty, the Claimant has since formally tendered his voluntary retirement.
  4. The Claimant in exercise of his Constitutional right issued a letter of voluntary retirement dated 12th December, 2024, same was duly received and acknowledged by the Defendants.
  5. That despite the Claimant’s due diligence in the discharge of his duties while in service, his letter of retirement was not approved notwithstanding his desire to voluntarily exit and the due acknowledgment of his letter of retirement by the Defendants.

 

  1. In support of the originating summons is an affidavit with Exhibits, A, B, C, D, E and F attached, and a written address.

 

  1. The defendants filed a joint counter-affidavit with Exhibits NN1, NN2, NN3, NN4, NN5 and NN6 attached, and a written address. To this, the claimant filed a further affidavit in opposition to the defendants’ counter-affidavit with Exhibits G and H attached, and a reply on points of law.

 

THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT

  1. To the claimant, he was enlisted into the service of the defendants in August 2012 before his subsequent commissioning on 25 May 2013 vide Direct Short Service Course 21 with Service Number NN/3787. Upon his commission as a sub-lieutenant, the claimant was posted to Nigerian Navy Ship, Ekpe, Lagos State wherein he served for three months, and to Jos Plateau as sub-sector commander operation Safe Heaven. He was subsequently posted to Eastern Naval


 

Command, Calabar, as Duty with command communication and information technology officer. Thereafter, to Western Naval command Lagos as Officer of the Watch Western Regional Control Center, and to Naval Headquarters, Abuja, and finally to Defence Space Administration as Staff Officer 2, Network Security, Abuja being his last place of duty where he formally tendered his resignation. That he has since voluntarily resigned from the service of the defendants vide a letter of voluntary retirement dated 6 October 2023; same was duly received and acknowledged by the defendants.

 

  1. To the defendants, by the provisions of HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), an officer who has taken benefit of any training/course whether sponsored or self-sponsored over a period of time must serve for a number of years before he will be entitled to voluntarily retire. That the instant claimant, who took the benefit of a sponsorship by the defendants, failed to comply with the requirements of HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised).

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE CLAIMANT

  1. In the light of the reliefs sought and the facts in support of this application, the claimant formulated two (2) issues for the determination of the Court, namely:
    1. Whether or not, the claimant is entitled to voluntarily resign from the service which he voluntarily joined.
    2. Whether having regard to the claimant’s letter of voluntary retirement, viz-a-viz, the acknowledgement of same by the defendants, the claimant is still in the service of the defendants.

 

  1. On issue (1), the claimant submitted that he is entitled to voluntarily resign from the service which he voluntarily joined, urging the Court to so hold. To the claimant, the 1999 Constitution enjoins and allows resignation of any person from any office established by the Constitution once a letter signifying such resignation is received by the authority or person to whom it is addressed or by a person authorized by that authority or person to receive it, citing section 306(1) and (2) of the 1999 Constitution, and Onukwubiri & anor v. Ibeakanma & ors [2014] LPELR-23804(CA). That this constitutional provision applies to all public officers in as much as it relates to an office established by the Constitution.

 

  1. That the claimant in this case was a public officer having served under the service of the defendants, and it is not in doubt that the defendants, particularly the 2nd defendant, is a creation of the Nigerian Constitution, citing section 217 of the 1999 Constitution. That it is also not in doubt that the defendants are equipped, maintained and funded by the Federal Government of Nigeria as provided under the aforementioned section of the Constitution. The claimant went on that this submission becomes necessary in order to elucidate on the ingredients of public offices established under the law, citing Apama v. State [1982] LPELR -523(SC): “…To make the office a public office, the pay must come out of National and not local funds…”; and PDP v. INEC & ors [1999] LPELR–245(SC): “… public offices are created for the benefit of the public, and not created or granted for the benefit of the incumbent who has no contractual vested or property right in the office…”


 

  1. The claimant continued that he was a public officer and so has a constitutional right to put up resignation as provided above, same backed by law, citing Yesufu v. Government of Edo State & ors [2021] LPELR 3520(SC); and Ibrahim v. Abdullahi & ors [2019] LPELR-48984 (SC), where the Supreme Court held thus:

…On the issue that the cross respondent/Applicant as Plaintiff had no locus standi to institute this suit at the Federal High Court because he is still a public officer working with the Nigerian Custom, I hold that the evidence before me is that the cross Respondent (Plaintiff) Exhibits his letter of Resignation and acknowledgment of same, which suffices to Preponderate evidence in his favour that he had duly resigned his appointment from the date it was received as endorsed thereon, resignation needs not be formally accepted before it takes affect.

 

  1. That assuming without conceding that there exists any law prohibiting or refusing the claimant or any public officer from enjoying his right of resignation, then that law is outrightly inconsistent with the 1999 Constitution, and to the extent of such inconsistency null and void, citing section 1 of the 1999 Constitution, which is not only the basic law of the land, but the supreme law and its provisions have binding force on all authorities, institutions or persons including the defendants in this suit, citing AG, Bendel State v. AG, Federation & ors [1981] LPELR-605(SC).

 

  1. That assuming any other Act or Law of the country provides anything contrary to the Constitution, such Act or Law broods no ground for classification into specific or general provisions to defeat the Constitution, citing FRN v. Osahon & ors [2006] LPELR-3174(SC). That the constitutional provisions are not cited for fun sake, but for strict adherence by all its citizens and authority including the defendants. That whenever the Constitution speaks, any authority remains otiose and silent, citing Saraki v. Federal Republic of Nigeria [2016] LPELR-40013(SC).

 

  1. The claimant then submitted that the defendants cannot hide under any legislature to refuse the claimant his right of resignation. That this, if done, is tantamount to an affront disregard and disobedience to the clear provisions of the Constitution, urging the Court to so hold.

 

  1. Regarding issue (2) i.e. whether having regard to the claimant’s letter of voluntary retirement viz-a-viz, the acknowledgement of same by the defendants, the claimant is still in the service of the federation, the claimant answered in the negative, urging the court to so hold.

 

  1. It is the claimant’s submission that he had on 12 December 2024 notified the defendants of his voluntary exit from service vide a letter of voluntary retirement addressed to the 1st defendant and forwarded to the authority saddled with such responsibility. That the said letter of voluntary retirement was duly received and acknowledged by the defendants as further evidenced from their letter of 7 February 2025, which emanated from the defendants. That this action of the defendants automatically gave effect to the claimant’s letter of voluntary retirement,


 

referring to Sunday v. Olugbenga & ors [2008] LPELR-4995(SC), which held thus: “…A letter of resignation becomes effective when the employee has given notice of his resignation to his employer and the letter is received by the employer”. That once a letter of resignation is received, it does not require an acceptance or any form of approval to make it effective, citing Sunday v. Olugbenga & ors and WAEC v. Oshionebo [2006] 12 NWLR (Pt. 994) 258.

 

  1. To the claimant, Exhibits A, B, C, D and E preponderantly and evidently indicate the voluntary retirement of the claimant form the service of the defendants, urging the Court to so hold; and citing Onukwubiri & anor v. Ibeakanma & ors. Furthermore, that assuming without conceding that the defendants are refusing to approve (purportedly) the claimant’s exit despite his resignation, that it will amount to forced labour, contrary to section 34(1)(c) of the 1999 Constitution, citing Yesufu v. Governor of Edo State [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 517. That the rights and procedure of resignation are constitutional and cannot be altered or taken away by any Act, law or any statute, citing INEC v. Musa [2003] LPELR-24927(SC). That the Constitution does not provide for the alteration of the condition set out in section 306 of the 1999 Constitution, citing Musa & ors v. INEC & ors [2002] LPELR-11119(CA) and Elkanah John Garang v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/117/2023.

 

  1. The claimant then urged the Court to grant all the reliefs he seeks.

 

THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS

  1. To the defendants, the claimant’s two issues for determination can be conveniently subsumed into whether the claimant who was sponsored by the defendants for a training in the United Kingdom can voluntarily retire/resign from the Nigerian Navy without complying with the provisions of 03.12 of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised); and, secondly, whether the Court is possessed of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the claimant’s suit having not complied with the condition precedent.

 

  1. On whether the claimant, who was sponsored by the Defendants for a training in the United Kingdom, can voluntarily retire/resign from the Nigerian Navy without complying with the provisions of 03.12 of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), the defendants quoted Paragraph 03.12 of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), which provides as follows:

Any officer sponsored by any of the services or released on sponsorship (including self- sponsorship) for any course, military or civil, lasting up to a session of 9 months shall not be allowed to proceed on voluntary retirement or resign his appointment within 3 years from the completion of the course except on recommendation by his Service Chief and approved by his Service Council/Board. Where the course lasts more than one session, the period of debarment from resignation or retirement shall be 5 years. This provision does not apply to Officers on resettlement pending retirement.


 

  1. The defendants then submitted that the claimant, who is an officer with the Nigerian Navy, is absolutely and completely bound by the provisions of HTACOS Officers 2017 having benefited in no small measure by the largesse extended to him by virtue of being sponsored by the Nigerian Navy for a course of study lasting for four years which is evidenced by exhibits NN1 - NN6. That the success of the claimant’s reliefs before this Court is his ability to establish before this Court that he is not bound by the provisions of HTACOS Officers 2017.

 

  1. The defendants went on that the claimant made heavy weather as to the fact that a person’s right to voluntarily resign from any organization cannot be clogged or denied, relying on section 306 of the 1999 Constitution and a couple of authorities to argue that the resignation of any person from any office established by the Constitution shall take effect when the writing signifying the resignation is received; and that once a person’s letter/application for voluntary retirement is received, then by the provisions of the Constitution, the person is deemed to have resigned.

 

  1. To the defendants, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, both the constitutional provisions and the authorities do not apply. That it is not the argument that the claimant cannot voluntarily resign from the Nigeria Navy, for he is entitled to so do. But that his right to resign is subject to compliance with the provisions of HTACOS Officers 2017, which he freely and unequivocally subscribed to. That in the law of contract, there is what is termed as sanctity of contract, citing Biggs v. Hidinat (1898) L.R. 2 C.D. 313, Laver v. Fielder (1862) 32 Bear 13, C & Inv. Ltd v. Sterling Bank Plc [2025)] 1 NWLR (Pt. 1974) 453 at 504 - 505 and Adiele Ihunwo v. Johnson Ihunwo & ors [2013] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1357) 550 SC at 583.

 

  1. The defendants continued that there is no doubt that the provisions of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), are binding and apply mutatis mutandis to the claimant as same are neither contrary to the Constitution/laws of Nigeria nor fraudulent. That in the circumstance, the section 306 of the 1999 Constitution and the authorities cited by the claimant to justify his right to retire voluntarily are not on all fours with the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case as the law is firmly settled that it is the facts of a case that frame issues for determination and as such case should not be cited across board without taking into consideration their peculiar facts and circumstances, citing Green v. Green [1987] LPELR-1338(SC) and APC v. INEC & ors [2014] LPELR-24036(SC).

 

  1. The defendants then submitted that following the sound reasoning of the courts that it is the facts of a case that frame issues for determination, the constitutional provision as well as the cases cited by the claimant do not apply to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this instant case. That it is against this that this Court and the appellate courts have always sounded a note of warning that citing a gargantuan number of cases is not a sign of industry but merely an attempt at being showy coupled with a poor understanding of law.


 

  1. Citing section 1 of the 1999 Constitution, the claimant had stressed the supremacy of the Constitution vis-a- vis other laws of the land. To the defendants, the key question(s) to be asked here is: what is the basis of this submission? Is there any constitutional provision that has been breached when the defendants refused to accept the voluntarily resignation of the claimant? Can it be said that the provisions of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), which the claimant freely subscribed to are inconsistent with any provisions of the 1999 Constitution and, therefore, void to the extent of the inconsistency?

 

  1. In answer, the defendants submitted that the provisions of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), are not contrary to any provision of the 1999 Constitution. That the claimant having subscribed to the provisions of same and not being contrary to the law, nor fraudulently entered into cannot be said to be inconsistent with any provision of 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria based on the principle of sanctity of contract already canvassed. Additionally, that the peculiar facts of this case which by the provisions of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), require an officer who benefited from the sponsorship of the defendants must put in a number of years after the sponsorship before voluntarily resigning from the Nigerian Navy constitute an exception to the general provision that a party cannot be estopped from voluntary resignation and the refusal to accept the letter of voluntary retirement put forward by the claimant does not amount to a transgression of law and the provisions of the 1999 Constitution.

 

  1. On the claimant’s reliance on Elkanah John Garang v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor

unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/117/2023, a judgment of this Court delivered by the Hon. Justice

O. Y. Anuwe, the defendants submitted that the facts of Elkanah John Garang v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor are not on all fours with the facts of the instant case and, therefore, the case is not applicable. THat the claimant in Elkanah John Garang v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor did not take benefit from a sponsorship preceding his application for voluntary retirement and was not, therefore, bound by the provisions of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), requiring him to remain in the service for a period of time before voluntarily exiting the Nigerian Air Force. That it is not industrious to cite cases merely for the sake of citing them, referring to APC v. INEC & ors [2014] LPELR-24036, Ibrahim v. JSC [1998] 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 1 and

Dangtoe v. C.S.C. Plateau State [2001] 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 132 at 155. That the facts of this case are distinct from the facts in Elkanah John Garang v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor and so Elkanah John Garang v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor is not applicable to the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.

 

  1. The defendants then urged the Court to resolve the 1st issue posed for determination against the claimant on the footing that the claimant who was sponsored by the defendants for a training in the United Kingdom cannot voluntarily retire/resign from the Nigerian Navy without


 

complying with the provisions of 03.12 of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised).

 

  1. On whether the Court is possessed of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the claimant’s suit having not complied with the condition precedent, the defendants submitted that there is a consensus that in the course of the claimant’s employment with the defendants, he was sponsored to study in the United Kingdom, referring to Exhibits NN1 - NN6 as well as Paragraph 03.12 of the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised). That the question, however, remains: whether the claimant after successfully completing his training in the United Kingdom has complied with the express terms and conditions contained in The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised).

 

  1. That a quick check has revealed that he did not comply with the terms and condition contained in Paragraph 03.12 of The Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised). That the claimant has proudly signposted the different places he served in his affidavit in support of the originating summons but deliberately left out his prestigious training in the United Kingdom. That there is no mention of the fact that he was sponsored by the defendants to undertake this intellectually enriching training in the UK.

 

  1. To the defendants, the substratum of issue number 2 herein is whether the failure to comply with Paragraph 03.12 of the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), has not robbed this Court of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this action. In other words, can the jurisdiction of this Court be activated when the claimant did not comply with Paragraph 03.12 of the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), requiring him to serve a number of years after being sponsored by the defendants before sending in a letter of voluntary resignation? Are the letters sent in by the claimant asking for voluntary retirement not pre-mature and, therefore, rob the Court of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this matter? Is the requirement that the claimant must serve a number of years before voluntary retirement having been sponsored by the defendants not a condition precedent to activating the jurisdiction of this court?

 

  1. The defendants then submitted that complying with Paragraph 03.12 of the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), which requires the claimant after benefiting from the sponsorship by the defendants to serve a number of years before submitting his letters of voluntary retirement is a condition precedent to activating the jurisdiction of this Court. That if the claimant had complied with the provisions of 03.12 of the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised), before instituting this action, then the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the action would not have been in doubt. Additionally, the defendants would not have contested the action.


 

Again, that this action would not have arisen in the first place as his letter of voluntary retirement/or resignation would have been accepted wholeheartedly.

 

  1. It is thus the defendants’ submission that this action is pre-mature having failed to comply with the condition precedent before instituting this action and consequently this Court is without jurisdiction to entertain this action, citing Nigercare Dev. Co. Ltd v. Adamawa S.W.B. [2008] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1093), which defined a condition precedent as “one which delays the vesting of a right until the happening of an event”. That where there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent before an action is filed, the court is not competent to entertain the matter, citing Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] SCNLR 341. That any defect in competence is fatal, for the proceedings are a nullity however well conducted and decide: the defect is extrinsic to the adjudication.

 

  1. The defendants went on that given Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra), it is without doubt that at the time the claimant instituted his action, there was a feature in the case which prevents this Court from exercising its jurisdiction; and the case was not initiated by due process of law, and upon fulfilment of a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction and that feature which presents this Court from exercising its jurisdiction and non-fulfilment of the condition precedent is the failure to comply with the Paragraph 03.12 of the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, short titled HTACOS Officers 2017 (Revised. That if the claimant had complied with the said Paragraph 03.12 by serving out a period of 5 years after the completion of his course, this Court would have had the competence to entertain this suit.

 

  1. That the claimant’s sponsorship having lasted for more than one session (referring to Exhibits NN1 - NN6), he is required to retire after 5 years when he returned from his training from the United Kingdom and his urge to hurriedly and voluntarily retire without complying with the said Paragraph 03.12 simply implies that the condition precedent for activating the jurisdiction of this Court has not been met and consequently, the Court is denuded of the requite jurisdiction to entertain this action. The defendants then urged the Court to answer the 2nd issue posed for determination against the claimant.

 

  1. In conclusion, the defendants urged the Court to dismiss the claimant’s claims as same are lacking in merit.

 

THE CLAIMANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW

  1. In replying on points of law, the claimant asked: “Whether the provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) are construed subject to the provisions of the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers 2017 (Revised)”.

 

  1. But first, on the defendant’s first issue, the claimant submitted that the defendants fallaciously contemplated that the claimant was sponsored by the defendants for a training in the United  Kingdom,  whereas,  the  claimant  was  sponsored  by  the  Petroleum  Technology


 

Development Fund (PTDF); and by his letter of 12 December 2024 the claimant has since ceased to be a public servant. That it is beyond all doubt that the claimant had forwarded a letter of voluntary retirement, which was acknowledged by the defendants vide their letter of 28 July 2023. Same was ignored by the defendants which prompted the claimant to rewrite another letter of 6 October 2023. The defendants did not also act on that. A third letter of 12 December 2024 was equally forwarded to the defendants and acknowledged by them via their letter of 7 February 2025, referring to Exhibits A, B, C, D and E of the originating summons. That these facts are not countered or denied by the defendants in their counter-affidavit, citing Inegbedion v. Sello Ojemen & anor [2013] LEPRL-19769(SC).

 

  1. Citing section 306 of the 1999 Constitution, the claimant then reiterated that the 1999 Constitution exhaustively enumerated the procedure for voluntary retirement by any public officer. Therefore, no other subsidiary legislation can alter the said procedure. What followed was a rehash by the claimant of earlier made submissions as to section 36 of the 1999 Constitution and case law authorities earlier cited and relied on.

 

  1. On the contention of the defendants that the claimant is bound by the provisions of HTACOS 2017 by virtue of being sponsored by the Nigerian Navy for a course of study lasting for 4 years, the claimant submitted that this is a falsehood calculated to mislead the Court. That assuming without conceding that the above position is true, the claimant asked whether the procedure for voluntary retirement takes place of the procedure enshrined in section 306(2) of the Constitution.

 

  1. The defendants had also contended that in as much as the claimant retains the right to voluntary resignation from their service, it must be done in line with the extant rule or provisions of the HTACOS 2017, notwithstanding its outright conflict with the Constitution. To the claimant, this is a flagrant disregard to the provisions of the Constitution because the procedure enumerated in the HTACOS 2017 runs contrary to section 306 of the Constitution and as such must be null and void, citing INEC v. Musa [2003] LPELR-24 927(SC).

 

  1. On the contention of the defendants that Elkanah John Garang v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor is not on all fours with the instant case and so not applicable, the claimant submitted that the defendants’ position is misconceived as in both cases te Armed Forces Act and HTACOS 2017 require the approval of the Council before any officer may be permitted to voluntarily retire from service.

 

  1. The defendants had argued that, given the provisions of HTACOS 2017, the claimant must put in a number of years after the sponsorship before voluntarily resigning; and that this constitutes an exception to the general provision that a party cannot be stopped from voluntary resignation. To the claimant, this is a clear transgression of the constitutional provision, which does not stipulate any number of years. That it only enjoins the receipt or acknowledgement of the notice of voluntary retirement, referring to section 306(2) of the Constitution as well as Yesufu v. Governor of Edo State [2001] 13 NWLR (Pt. 731) 517.


 

  1. The claimant would reiterate his arguments as to sections 1 and 217 of the 1999 Constitution, only that this time he added section 218(4) of same Constitution, which vests on the National Assembly powers t make laws for the regulation of members of the Armed Forces. But that the National Assembly is not empowered to make any law on contravention of any constitutional provision however couched.

 

  1. To the claimant, it is instructive to point out here that the law does not force an unwilling servant on a willing master, citing Muhammad v. Nigerian Army Council and anor [2021] LPRLR-53390(CA).

 

  1. Regarding the defendants’ second issue, on jurisdiction, the claimant pointed out that the defendants had contended that the claimant was sponsored to study in the United Kingdom, but deliberately refused to mention the sponsoring authority, which is the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF). In fact, that upon successful completion of the study as sponsored by the PTDF, the claimant duly returned to his service and served for some years diligently. That assuming without conceding that the claimant did not comply with the provision of HTACOS 2017, his failure to comply with HTACOS will not rob this Court of jurisdiction over this suit.

 

  1. That by section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution, the claimant has an unfettered right to approach this Court over such dispute. That contrary to the argument of the defendants, the only condition to activate the judicial powers of this Court by the claimant is the “application/ notification/request to voluntary resign” and to be acknowledged by the receiving authority which was duly complied with by the claimant in this suit.

 

  1. That the mere fact that the claimant did not purportedly put in some years (contrary to the constitutional provision) cannot prevent him from approaching the Court having put the necessary notification of voluntary retirement with due acknowledgement. However, that the defendants failed to approve the said request in total disregard of the laid down procedures provided under the 1999 Constitution.

 

  1. To the claimant, by the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, it is a legal apostasy to suggest that the provisions of the Constitution shall be construed subject to subordinate statutes or subsidiary legislation. That even where there exist any inconsistency or conflict between the provisions of the Constitution and any other Act, that conflict is resolved in favour of the 1999 Constitution, and to the extent of such conflict or inconsistency, that provision of the Act becomes null and void, referring to section 1 of the 1999 Constitution. To point out the clear conflict and inconsistency of the provisions of the Armed Forces Act with the 1999 Constitution, that the Armed Forces Act provides that for a voluntary retirement from service to be valid, the approval of Navy Council must be given, while the 1999 Constitution provides that once the letter of resignation is received by the authority or person to whom it is addressed, the said resignation takes effect immediately without any reply or approval of the authority, citing section

306 of the 1999 Constitution as well as Onukwubiri & anor v. Ibeakanma & ors [2014]


 

LPELR-23804(CA). However, that even the HTACOS contains the provisions contrary to the constitutional provision and as such is void, citing Musa & ors v. INEC & anor (supra).

 

  1. On the issue formulated by the claimant i.e. whether the provisions of the 1999 Constitution are construed subject to the provisions of the Armed Forces Act or any subsidiary legislation, the claimant submitted that it will amount to a legal treachery to suggest that the 1999 Constitution, being the supreme law of the land, is to be made or construed subject to any law, enactment, status or Act. That the Supreme Court frown at such position in plethora of cases such as Adisa v. Oyinwola & ors [2000] LPELR-186(SC). That the entire submissions of the defendants run completely foul of the law. That the rights and procedure of resignation are constitutional and cannot be altered or taken away by the HTACOS or any statute.

 

  1. Finally, that the Constitution does not limit the right of the claimant to voluntary resignation whatsoever, citing Tsaro Igbara Tuamene Godswill v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/364/2024, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 March 2025, where this Court, according to the claimant, held thus:

It is my view that section 306 CFRN 1999 is the applicable provision under which to determine the validity of the claimant’s resignation.

I look through the Constitution to see if it provided any limiting provision to section 306. I found none.

 

  1. The claimant concluded by submitting that the defendants’ position is an outright misconception of the law, urging the Court to discountenance same.

 

COURT’S DECISION

  1. I took time to consider the processes and submissions of the parties. Although not raised by the defendants, some of the averments in the claimant’s affidavits in this matter are offensive to section 115 of the Evidence Act 2011. In this respect, paragraphs 21 and 22 of the claimant’s affidavit in support, and paragraphs 8, 12(a), (b) and (c), 15, 16, 19, 20 and 21 of the further affidavit in opposition to the defendants’ counter-affidavit are all offensive to section 115 of the Evidence Act 2011 in that they are legal arguments and conclusions. On the authority of Mbah & ors v. Akwuole & ors [2024] LPELR-62924(CA), they are accordingly discountenanced and so struck out for purposes of this judgment.

 

  1. In opposing the claimant’s claims, the defendants argued that by Paragraph 03.12 of the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service (HTACOS) for Nigerian Armed Forces Officers 2017 (Revised), HTACOS 2017 for short, the claimant is barred from retiring from Service for a period of 5 years given that the corporate sponsorship the claimant got for his 4-year PhD programme in the United Kingdom. As a defence to the suit, this is in order. But the defendants proceeded to argue that even the fact of having to serve for 5 years after the claimant’s PhD programme is one that makes this Court lack jurisdiction to determine the claimant’s case since in not serving for 5 years, the claimant lacks the competence to come to Court.


 

  1. What I find worrying is how the defence of the claimant not serving 5 years after his PhD programme raises the question of the jurisdiction of this Court to hear and determine the claimant’s claims as the defendants did in the question as to jurisdiction that they raised. To the defendants, the claimant’s failure to comply with Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 robs this Court of the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this action. In other words, the requirement that the claimant must serve a number of years before voluntary retirement having the corporate sponsorship the claimant had, which was approved by the defendants, is a condition precedent to activating the jurisdiction of this Court.

 

  1. A submission such as this can be disturbing for in it one finds a strained effort to make what is ordinarily and simply a defence to the action as one of jurisdiction. Did it cross the minds of the defendants that Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 may not even be enforceable on grounds of unreasonableness and unfair labour practice as it qualifies as a training bond? And training bonds approximate to contracts in restraint of trade as held by this Court in Overland Airways Ltd v. Captain Raymond Jam [2015] 62 NLLR (Pt. 219) 525. After reviewing the writings of some commentators, this Court in Overland held thus:

All of these commentators are agreed on the enforceability of training bonds, once it is ascertained that they are reasonable; and reasonability is determined taking into account the duration of the bonding period, how slavish or restrictive the covenants are, the amount required to be paid in the event of breach or exit from the employment in issue, etc.

 

  1. Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017, which is at the centre of the defendants’ defence, provides as follows:

Any officer sponsored by any of the services or released on sponsorship (including self- sponsorship) for any course, military or civil, lasting up to a session of 9 months shall not be allowed to proceed on voluntary retirement or resign his appointment within 3 years from the completion of the course except on recommendation by his Service Chief and approved by his Service Council/Board. Where the course lasts more than one session, the period of debarment from resignation or retirement shall be 5 years. This provision does not apply to Officers on resettlement pending retirement.

 

  1. Relying on Madukolu v. Nkemdilim [1962] SCNLR 341, the defendants argued that complying with Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017, which requires the claimant, after benefiting from the corporate sponsorship approved by the defendants, to serve a number of years before submitting his letters of voluntary retirement, is a condition precedent to activating the jurisdiction of this Court. I am at a loss how to read this argument. The defendants did not show to this Court where it is stated in the HTACOS 2017 that the claimant cannot come to court or that coming to court is contingent on the claimant serving for 5 years after his studies. That there is a requirement of 5 years of service before one can resign, does that translate to the claimant being forestalled from coming to court? How is even serving 5 years after the sponsorship a condition precedent as to dictate jurisdiction?


 

  1. If this Court does not assume jurisdiction over the claimant’s claims as the defendants would want, how can it resolve even the issues raised by the defendants? The point is that what the defendants raised about Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 is an issue of defence to this suit, not one of jurisdiction to hear and determine the case. This being so, I rule that the defendants inappropriately raised the issue of jurisdiction in that context, and so is hereby discountenanced and dismissed. I hold that this Court has jurisdiction over this action. I so rule.

 

  1. The claimant framed two questions for the determination of this Court i.e. whether he has the right of voluntary resignation from the public service; and whether his letter of voluntary retirement is effective from the date of its issuance/receipt. This Court has been asked similar questions in earlier cases, and this Court answered the two questions in favour of the respective claimants. See, for instance, Elkanah John Garang v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/117/2023, the judgment of which was delivered on 29 February 2024, Tsaro Igbara Tuamene Godswill v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/ 364/2024, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 March 2025 and Dr Michael Ikuesan v. The Chief of Naval Staff & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/18/2025, the judgment of which was delivered on 8 May 2025.

 

  1. So, it is tempting to treat the instant case as an open and closed case. But the difference, though the claimant did not see it as such or he deliberately did not initially make it an issue until the defendants did, between the instant case and the earlier cases decided by this Court and just cited is that in the instant case there is a plea of Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017. In other words, the fact of the claimant undergoing a PhD programme, for which the defendants expect him to serve for at least 5 years after the PhD programme, has been made an issue on the premise that Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 is not in conflict with section 306 of the 1999 Constitution and so should be given effect to. This naturally throws in a new dimension to the cases so far decided by this Court and so serves as the distinguishing factor in the discourse.

 

  1. So, ordinarily, and going by section 306 of the 1999 Constitution and cases such as Elkanah John Garang v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/117/2023, the judgment of which was delivered on 29 February 2024, Tsaro Igbara Tuamene Godswill v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/364/2024, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 March 2025 and Dr Michael Ikuesan v. The Chief of Naval Staff & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/18/2025, the judgment of which was delivered on 8 May 2025 earlier decided by this Court, the answer to the two questions posed by the claimant in the instant suit ought to be answered in his favour.

 

  1. But because the claimant did a PhD programme sponsored by the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) and approved by the defendants, is Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 applicable to him as to qualify the answers to his question as earlier given in the cases previously decided by this Court? This remains the pertinent question.


 

  1. I hinted earlier that Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 may not even be enforceable on grounds of unreasonableness and unfair labour practice as it qualifies as a training bond — and training bonds approximate to contracts in restraint of trade as held by this Court in Overland Airways Ltd v. Captain Raymond Jam [2015] 62 NLLR (Pt. 219) 525. The argument of the claimant is that Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 cannot supersede section 306 of the 1999 Constitution since the Constitution is the grund norm. If the 1999 Constitution does not have any limiting provision to section 306 of same Constitution, as I pointed out in Tsaro Igbara Tuamene Godswill v. The Chief of Air Staff & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/364/2024, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 March 2025, why should Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 be the limiting provision, more so when as a training bond clause it is one in restraint of trade and so is unenforceable unless the defendants can show that it is reasonable?

 

  1. No where in the averments of the defendants in their counter-affidavit did they show that Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 is reasonable more so as the debarment from resignation or retirement for 5 years relates to a sponsorship that was provided by the Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) with the defendants merely giving the claimant permission to undertake the PhD programme. Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 talks of “Any officer sponsored by any of the services or released on sponsorship (including self-sponsorship) for any course, military or civil…” Is a provision such as this reasonable especially where it includes self-sponsorship? Having to debar the claimant from retiring for 5 years, is this reasonable especially when Overland Airways Ltd v. Captain Raymond Jam [2015] 62 NLLR (Pt. 219) 525 acknowledged that reasonability is determined by taking into account factors like the duration of the bonding period, how slavish or restrictive the covenants are, etc? I do not think so.

 

  1. I must state here that though not directly relevant to the instant case in terms of its application to “all undertakings and all commercial activities within, or having effect within, Nigeria” (section 2), section 68(e) of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2018 puts not more than 2 years as the time limit for which an employee may be bound by a contract in restraint of trade. So if 2 years is the generally accepted period now under Nigerian law, why should Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 provide for a higher duration of 3 or 5 years as the case may be?

 

  1. Section 306 of the 1999 Constitution and the cases such as Onukwubiri & anor v. Ibeakanma & ors [2014] LPELR-23804(CA) are quite specific that the section applies and resignation is effective once the person authorised to receive the notice of resignation actually received it. Exhibit A of the claimant dated 28 July 2023 is evidence that the defendants received the claimant’s notice of voluntary retirement. In it, the Naval Unit of the defendants recommended that the claimant’s request be considered since efforts to dissuade the claimant from retiring were unsuccessful and his continued stay in the Navy could have adverse effects on his future performance. Exhibit C dated 9 October 2023 reinforced this and actually recommended the claimant’s application. Exhibits B dated 6 October 2023 and D dated 12 December 2024 are repeated requests by the claimant to voluntarily retire from the Navy. These repeated requests to retire were due to the fact that the claimant did not get any favourable response from the


 

defendants each time he wrote — hence the instant action. See paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the claimant’s affidavit in support of the originating summons.

 

  1. It is clear from Exhibit A that the claimant’s PhD course ran from January 2018 to July 2022. The claimant had argued that upon successfully completing his study as sponsored by the PTDF, he duly returned to his service and served for some years diligently. No where in the claimant’s affidavits (affidavit in support and the further affidavit) is there any averment as to the years the claimant served after his studies. Exhibit A no doubt acknowledged the claimant to have “diligently and assiduously” performed his duties though “his interest in the NN has significantly diminished”. Because Exhibit A is dated 28 July 2023 and the claimant concluded his PhD in July 2022, it cannot be said that he served for some years upon successfully completing his PhD course.

 

  1. Smart A. Amough v. The Nigerian Air Force & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/ 453/2024, the judgment of which was delivered on 30 September 2025 was recently decided by Anuwe J. It dealt with two questions similar to what is before this Court in the instant case: whether by Paragraphs 03.12 and 05.04(a) of HTACOS) 2017 the claimant can voluntarily retire from the service of the Nigerian Air Force; and whether by same Paragraphs the defendants can validly refuse the claimant's application to voluntarily retire from the service of the Nigerian Air Force.

 

  1. In Amough, the claimant was sponsored by the Nigerian Air Force for a number of courses, which cumulatively did not exceed 9 months. The application to voluntarily retire was rejected on the basis of Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017. The claimant was told that he can only retire after 3 years of his conclusion of the courses i.e. November 2026.

 

  1. The Court found that the cumulative period of the courses was less than the 9 months provided by Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017; and that accordingly Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017 cannot apply to the circumstances of the claimant. The claimant was thus held not to be affected by the conditions in Paragraph 03.12 of the HTACOS. Justice Anuwe, however, went on to hold thus:

Besides the fact that the provisions of paragraph 03.12 of the HTACOS 2017 does not affect the right of the claimant in paragraph 05:04 of the HTACOS Officers 2017 to voluntarily retire from the service of the 1st defendant, which is the same as resignation from service, the claimant has the unfettered right under section 306 [1] and [2] of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 to resign from service and the defendants have no right to refuse or decline the resignation. The 1st defendant, who employed the claimant, is an office established by the Constitution in Section 217[1] of the CFRN 1999. By the provisions of section 306 [1] and [2] of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, any person who is either appointed or elected or selected to any office established by the Constitution has the right to resign from the office and the resignation of that person shall take effect when the letter of resignation is received by the employer or the authority or the person authorized to receive it. Thus, the


 

claimant being employed into the 2nd defendant derived a right from section 306 [1] and

[2] of CFRN 1999 to resign from the employment at any time he desired. By the provisions of section 1[1] and [3] of the CFRN 1999, the provisions of the Constitution is superior to provisions of statutes, laws, subsidiary legislations and other regulations and where a right has been conferred by the Constitution, it cannot be taken away by any other statutory provisions or subsidiary legislations or Regulation, like the HTACOS 2017, except the Constitution itself. See SARAKI vs. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (2016) LPELR 40013(SC); ARGUNGU vs. ARGUNGU [2010] All FWLR [Pt. 510] 681; ANKPA vs. MAIKARFI [2010] All FWLR [Pt. 506] 1977.

 

Let me also emphasize the fact that when the Constitution provides that the resignation takes effect when the letter of resignation is received by the relevant authority, it implies that the authority has no input to make to the resignation. That is to say whether the authority accepts the resignation or not, the appointment stand terminated the moment the letter of resignation is received by the authority or on the date indicated in the resignation letter. It is the law that tendering a letter of resignation by an employee effectively and automatically put an end to the employment on the date indicated in the resignation letter. Whether or not the employer accepts the resignation, once the letter is received, resignation becomes effective. See IBRAHIM vs. ABDALLAH [2019] 17 NWLR [Pt. 1701] 293 At 315; WAEC vs. OSHIONEBO [2006] 12 NWLR [Pt. 994] 258 at 272;

ADEFEMI vs. ABEGUNDE [2004] 15 NWLR [Pt. 895] 1 at 28.

 

In view of Section 306 of the CFRN 1999, the claimant has an unconstrained right to resign from his appointment with the 1st defendant. Therefore, when the claimant tendered his letter of voluntarily retirement to the 1st defendant on 4th September 2024, he properly exercised his right in Section 306 of the CFRN 1999 to resign from the service of the 1st defendant. In his letter, the claimant indicated 30th September as the effective date of his exit from the employment. The claimant’s resignation accordingly took effect from the date he indicated in the letter and the defendants, upon receipt of the letter, are not in the position to refuse the resignation as they purport to have done in Exhibit SAA 9.

 

  1. I share these viewpoints of Justice Anuwe and adopt them for purposes of the instant case. Section 306 of the 1999 Constitution cannot be qualified by Paragraph 03.12 of HTACOS 2017. The claimant has an unfettered right to voluntarily retire. I so rule. I accordingly answer the two questions posed by the claimant in his favour i.e. that he has the right to voluntarily retire; and his letter of voluntary retirement is effective from the date it was received.

 

  1. But the claimant served on the defendants several letters of voluntary retirement. So, which one is valid and applicable? Exhibit A dated 28 July 2023 is a letter from the Naval Unit Abuja to the Chief of Administration Naval Headquarters acknowledging that the claimant requested for voluntary retirement. I shall accordingly take 28 July 2023 as the date the claimant’s request for


 

voluntary retirement was received by the defendants. 28 July 2023 is accordingly the effective date of the claimant’s retirement going by section 306 of the 1999 Constitution. I so hold.

 

  1. The submission of the claimant that his voluntary retirement is 12 December 2024 as per Exhibit D, and upon which reliefs (2) and (3) are made, is accordingly wrong. Once his first resignation was received by the defendants, there was no service for which the claimant continued up to 12 December 2024. The logic of this position can be found in Jombo v. PEFMB [2005] 14 NWLR (Pt. 945) 443 SC, which held that it is elementary that an employee cannot be dismissed from an employment that had ceased to exist; and, therefore, a dismissal coming after the termination of appointment would be a futile exercise. The claimant in the instant case could not have retired a second or third time since upon the receipt of the letter of voluntary retirement, the said retirement became effective in virtue of section 306 of the 1999 Constitution. There was accordingly no service that the claimant could legitimately have been into after the receipt of his notice of voluntary retirement by the defendants. Reliefs (2) and (3) cannot accordingly be granted as prayed.

 

  1. Relief (5) is for an order of this Court restraining the defendants, their agents, privies or any person/body claiming through them from carrying out any action having regard to his voluntary retirement. This relief is too broad and an example of inelegant drafting on the part of the claimant’s counsel. To grant it will mean that even those things that are good to the claimant such as the claims in relief (6) are included. I do not think that the claimant’s counsel thought of the broadness of the relief before couching it as he did. Relief (5) is accordingly not granted. I so rule.

 

  1. Relief (6) is for an order of this Court directing the defendants to issue to the claimant his Retired Personnel Identity Card, Nigerian Navy Certificate of Service and Nigerian Navy record of Service as well as all entitlements accorded to retired Personnel having voluntarily retired from the service of the defendants. In paragraph 16 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, the claimant averred that he demanded from the defendants the issuance of his Retired Personnel Card, Nigerian Navy Certificate of Service and Nigerian Navy record of service as well as all entitlements accorded to retired personnel having voluntarily retired from the service of the defendants, but to no avail.

 

  1. In an originating summons, the affidavit in support and the counter-affidavit are the pleadings upon which the case of the claimant and the defence of the defendant will be determined. See Mainstreet Bank Capital Ltd & anor v. Nigeria Reinsurance Corp. Ltd [2018] LPELR-44905(SC) and Muhammed v. The Executive Governor Kano State & ors [2024] LPELR-62086(CA). So, is the averment in paragraph 16 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons sufficient pleading to grant the claimant all that he prays for in relief (6)? There isn’t much problem as regards the prayer for “Retired Personnel Identity Card, Nigerian Navy Certificate of Service and Nigerian Navy record of Service”, although the claimant did not indicate to this Court what entitled him to all these. But they can be implied, which I hereby do.


 

  1. The problem, however, is with the claim for “all entitlements accorded to retired Personnel”, which is a claim for special damages, which must be specifically pleaded, and strictly proved by credible and compelling evidence. See NNPC v. Clifco Nigeria Ltd [2011] LPELR-2022(SC), 7UP Bottling Company Plc v. Augustus [2012] LPELR-20873(CA) and UTC Nig. Plc v. Samuel Peters [2022] LPELR-57289(SC). In Otokpa Ezekiel v. Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/159/2024, the judgment of which was delivered on 2 July 2025, the claimant’s prayers for a declaration as to his entitlement to half salary and an order to that effect without proof of the half salary was rejected and dismissed by this Court. This Court in paragraph 41 went on to caution lawyers in these words:

I cannot conclude this judgment without remarking on a noticeable stratagem amongst lawyers when adjudicating claims for special damages. It is becoming fashionable for legal practitioners in this Court claiming employment entitlements of claimants in terms of emoluments to simply ask in general terms for declarations and orders that their emoluments be computed and paid by the employer without [indicating] what the emoluments are and their quantum. This they do as a shortcut to a verdict, and bypassing the burden of proof placed on them. By doing this, they do not have to prove as strictly required of them the quantum of what they ask for and how they arrived at it. This has placed additional and secondary burdens on the Court when judgments derived therefrom are sought to be enforced. New suits have to be filed in order to proof the quantum of what is the entitlement. This stratagem by legal practitioners is uncalled for and needs to be discouraged. It is one that does not help the claimant at all. Lawyers should accordingly wise up.

 

  1. In the instant case, there is no proof as to what the “all entitlements accorded to retired Personnel” are. This part of relief (6) cannot accordingly be granted. It fails and so is dismissed.

 

  1. In all, having answered the claimant’s questions in his favour, the claimant’s case succeeds but only in terms of the following declarations and orders:
    1. It is declared that the claimant has a right to voluntarily exit from the service of the defendants.
    2. It is declared that the claimant voluntarily retired as from 28 July 2023.
    3. Any action (including Declaration of RUN, AWOL OR DESERTION) that was subsequently carried out by the defendants against the claimant having regard to his voluntary retirement is hereby set aside.
    4. The defendants are hereby ordered to issue forthwith to the claimant his Retired Personnel Identity Card, Nigerian Navy Certificate of Service and Nigerian Navy Record of Service.

 

  1. Judgment is entered accordingly. I make no order as to cost.

 

 

…………..…………………………………… Hon. Justice B. B. Kanyip, PhD, OFR, bpa