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IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE YOLA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT YOLA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP, HON  JUSTICE J.T AGBADU FISHIM, JUDGE

DATE: 14TH OCTOBER, 2024                                    SUIT NO: NICN/YL/04/2017

BETWEEN:

ZACHARIAH ISHAYA --------------------------------------------------------- CLAIMANT

    AND

1.   FIDELITY BANK PLC                       

2.     FIDELITY UNION SECURITIES LTD                                      DEFENDANTS

3.     FIDELITY PENSION MANAGERS LTD

 

REPRESENTATIONS:

Chief L.D. Nzadon Esq with Daniel Danladi Esq, Bobgah Samuel Esq, O.M. Bankole Esq, C.M. Bamaiyi Esq for the Claimant;

Bello Bakari Esq, with M. E. Goro Esq, Abubakar Suleiman Esq for the Defendants.

 

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION AND CLAIM

1.     The Claimant initiated this action by a Complaint dated and filed on the 12th of June, 2017 initially against the 1st Defendant and by subsequent application which was granted by the order of this Court joined the 2nd and 3rd Defendants to this Suit. By the Amended Complaint and Amended Statement of Facts respectively dated 20th of June, 2019 and filed on the 21st of June, 2019, the Claimant seeks against the Defendants jointly and severally the following reliefs:

i.                    The sum of N1,600,000.00 (One million, six hundred thousand naira only) being the accrued sum due to the Claimant from the Defendants following the circular by the Defendants to all members of staff of the Defendants on “CESSATION OF GRATUITY AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS” which amount the Defendants have neglected, failed and/or refused to pay despite repeated demands.

ii.                 N5million damages for suffering hardship and psychological trauma visited on the Claimant by reason of the Defendants’ refusal to meet their responsibilities to the Claimant after years of meritorious service.

iii.               10% interest per annum commencing from January, 2017 till judgement and 10% interest per annum till final liquidation.

iv.                Further or better reliefs.

v.                  Cost of this suit.

2.     The three Defendants filed a Joint Statement of Defence dated the 24th of June, 2019 but filed the 2nd of July, 2019 accompanied with the Statement on Oath of John Odibe. The Defendants subsequently by order of Court sought and obtained substituted their witness and filed an Amended Joint Statement of Defence dated 26th of May, 2022 but filed on the 21st of July, 2022 and accompanied by the new witness Statement on Oath of Umar Usman Iliyasu.

3.     It is on the above pleadings that the Claimant and the Defendants effectively joined issues.

4.     This Honourable Court will in a jiffy give a synopsis of the trajectory of this case before it finally began de novo before me. It is pertinent to note that after the Claimant has testified as CW1 before my Learned Brother N.C.S. Ogbuanya, J. the matter started afresh before K.D. Damulak, J. before it then came up afresh before Sanusi Kado, J and after the Claimant had closed his case and matter adjourned for defence, the case came up for trial de novo before my immediate predecessor in this Judicial Division, Mustapha Tijjani, J before whom both the Claimant and the Defendants’ Witness had testified and the matter was adjourned for the Defendants to present their subpoenaed witness.

5.     However sequel to the transfer of Mustapha Tijjani, J., the trial in the suit commenced de novo before me and the Claimant testified as his sole witness, CW1, he was duly cross examined by the Defendants Counsel and he closed his case on 28th of February, 2024. The Defendants in a change of direction on the 24th of May, 2024 when the matter came up for defence, elected not to call any witness or lead evidence in support of their defence of the case and consequently this Honourable Court foreclosed defence and directed parties to file final address.

6.     Claimant’s Final Written Address is dated and filed on the 14th of June, 2024 while that of the Defendants is dated 9th of July, 2024 but filed on the 11th of July, 2024.

CASE OF THE CLAIMANT

7.     By the averments of the Claimant’s Amended Statement of Claim and evidence led by Claimant in proof thereof, the case of the Claimant is that he was an employee of the 2nd Defendant and a former Driver 1 at the 1st Defendant’s Yola Main Office, Jimeta-Yola, Adamawa State.

8.     That the 1st Defendant is Public Liability Company and a financial institution that carries on banking business in Nigeria with its Head Office in Lagos and other branches in Nigeria including Yola, at No. 13, Galadima Aminu Way, Jimeta-Yola, Adamawa State while the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are limited liability companies and subsidiaries of the 1st Defendant and located at No. 13, Galadima Aminu Way, Jimeta-Yola, Adamawa State.

9.     That the 1st Defendant was the company under whom the Claimant served directly and in charge of the payment of his salaries and allowance throughout the period of his employment while the 2nd Defendant was his employer who seconded him to the 1st Defendant. That the 3rd Defendant is the company in charge of registration and payment of retirement benefits of the Claimant.

10.                        That the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants are three different entities capable of suing and being sued and are all necessary parties to the just determination of this Suit as it relates to matters in controversy.

11.                        That he was employed on 26th September, 2008 by the 2nd Defendant as Driver 2 and seconded to the 1st Defendant at its Jimeta-Yola branch, Adamawa State. The Letter of Employment dated 26th September, 2008 is Exhibit C1.

12.                        That his contract of employment with the 2nd Defendant was confirmed with effect from October, 2008. The Contract of Employment/Conditions of Offer dated 13th October, 2008 is Exhibit C2.

13.                        That he was in the service of the 2nd Defendant at Jimeta-Yola branch from 2008 – 2017 where he served as Driver 2 and was later promoted to Driver 1 with effect from January 1, 2011 by the 2nd Defendant. The Promotion Letter dated 31st December, 2010 is Exhibit C3.

14.                        That sometimes in January 2017, he was redeployed by the 1st Defendant from Jimeta-Yola branch to Maiduguri branch even though it is the practice for employees of the Claimant’s category to request for such a posting and the Claimant had at no point in time requested for such a transfer. The photocopy of Internal Memo of Redeployment dated 13th January, 2017 is Exhibit C4. That when a posting like his is made, he ought to be given an allowance for the first one month to enable him settle down in the new station but he was not given the said allowance. That he had nobody to reside with at Maiduguri and had a family of 4 (wife and 3 children) at Yola and when he complained to the Defendant’s officer, he was asked to resign if he does not immediately report to Maiduguri.

15.                        That on 27th January, 2017, he tendered his letter of resignation to the 1st Defendant and the 1st Defendant acknowledged same and did photocopy as the acknowledgement copy. The Letter of Resignation of Appointment dated 27th January, 2017 with stamp of acknowledgment of receipt by Fidelity Bank Plc Yola Branch on 30th January, 2017 is Exhibit C5.

16.                        That he had contributed immensely to the growth and prosperity of the Defendants in Yola and this can be acknowledged by the long and meritorious service he rendered since 2008.

17.                        That a memo dated 23rd December, 2016 was sent to all the members of staff of the 1st Defendant whereby it was stated that the gratuity scheme for members of staff with a minimum of 5 years in service remained operational up to 31st December, 2015. That the Circular was photocopied by the 1st Defendant’s staff and distributed to all staff within Yola Branch and Jalingo. This Circular is however not tendered by the Claimant in this case.

18.                        That he had been an employee of the 2nd Defendant for 7 years at the time of the Circular of 23rd December, 2016. That as a former staff of the Defendants who had spent 8 years before the Defendants introduced the Personal Financial Management Scheme, he is entitled to the sum of N1,600,000.00 as his Gratuity Benefit. That the assurance given by the Managing Director to pay the sum of N200,000.00 per annum on gratuity for members staff who worked 5 years as at 31st December, 2015 entitles the Claimant to the sum of N1,600,000.00.

19.                        That sometime in March, 2017, he instructed his Solicitors, Messrs L.D. Nzadon and Co to demand for the immediate payment of his accrued earnings and entitlements in the sum of N1,600,000.00 (One Million, Six Hundred Thousand Naira only). That pursuant to the instructions, his Solicitors wrote a letter to the 1st Defendant demanding the immediate payment of the amount. The Claimant’s Solicitors Letter of Demand to Settle Gratuity dated 7th March, 2017 is Exhibit C6.

20.                        That in spite of the demand for payment of his earnings and entitlements by his Solicitors, the Defendants failed, refused and/or neglected to pay same. That the 1st Defendant replied on the 8th and 13th March, 2017 that the Claimant had been in the services of the 1st Defendant as a non-core staff and that a non-core staff is not qualified for gratuity. The 1st Defendant’s Reply Letters dated 8th and 13th of March, 2017 and respectively marked “WITHOUT PREJUDICE” are Exhibits C7 and C8.

21.                        That no such distinction between core and non-core staff was made in the Circular by the Defendants’ Managing Director under reference and a colleague of his Mr. Chidi Paul Ojiako whose appointment was terminated at about the time and was paid his month’s salary in lieu of notice and a severance package of N223,489.03K on 27th January, 2017. Claimant pleaded the said Letter dated 27/01/2017 titled Service No Longer Required” but did not tender same at the trial of this case.

22.                        That several other members of staff of the Defendants in the Claimant’s category had been paid their gratuities as per the Circular of the Defendants’ Managing Director. However, none of these several other members of staff was called to establish this assertion of the Claimant in this case.

23.                        That he has suffered serious financial loss and untold hardship, psychological disturbance/trauma, as a result of the conduct of the Defendants and their failure or refusal to pay his accrued earnings and entitlements.

24.                        The Claimant pleads the Notice of Registration dated 21st February, 2011 issued to him by the 2nd Defendant, a subsidiary of the 1st Defendant informing the Claimant that he had successfully completed his registration formalities for his pension. The said Notice of Registration was not tendered by the Claimant in this case.

25.                        The Claimant also pleads the copy of the Defendants’ Personnel Policies and Procedure Guide (PPPG). That same was given to him by the Defendants and contains all policies regarding his employment. A photocopy of the 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policies and Procedure Guide (PPPG) is Exhibit C9.

26.                        CW1 also admitted in the course of cross examination that he resigned on the 27th of January, 2017 and was about 39 years old then. That he was driver with the Defendant. He also admitted that he is now working with the Adamawa State Judiciary in Yola as a Registrar. That he joined the Adamawa State Judiciary in January, 2017. He also maintained that he addressed his Resignation Letter to the 1st Defendant.

CLAIMANT’S FINAL ADDRESS

27.                        In the adopted Final Written Address dated and filed on the 14th of June, 2024, Claimant formulated a sole issue for determination of this Honourable Court as follows:

Whether from the circumstances of this case and the totality of the evidence before this Honourable Court, the Claimant has proved his claim against the Defendants to entitle him to the reliefs sought?

28.                         Claimant Learned Counsel cited and relied on the authorities of PAN v Oje (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt 530) 625 at 634 – 635 paras H – A, 635 paras C – D (CA) to the effect that an employee of a company whose employment is determined by retirement or resignation is entitled to benefits in accordance with the company’s pension and gratuity scheme. Learned Counsel referred to Exhibit C9 in this case and relied on paragraph 7.20.3 thereof to the effect that Gratuity benefits will be paid to any core member of staff who has served for a minimum of five years and who exits the Bank for reasons other than dismissal.

29.                        Claimant’s Learned Counsel referred to Exhibits C1, C2, C5 and C9 to note that the Claimant in this case who served the Defendants for a period of 9 years before resignation on 30th of January, 2017 is qualified and entitled to Gratuity benefits. Learned Counsel posited that from the contents of the above documentary exhibits, the Claimant was not a temporary staff but a core staff of the Defendants. Learned Counsel referred to paragraph 3.12 of Exhibit C9 which provides that “Temporary staff are sometimes engaged to fill non-core positions during periods of high work activity or pending the engagement of paramount staff into an established position.”

30.                        Learned Counsel argued that the Claimant is a core member of staff of the Defendants, who was employed vide Exhibit C1, given permanent status vide Exhibit C2 and subsequently promoted vide Exhibit C3. Learned Counsel argued that this unchallenged evidence has established that the Claimant was not a non-core staff but a permanent staff.

31.                        Claimant Learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant has discharged the burden of proof based on the preponderance of evidence or balance of probability in this case, more so when the evidence led by the Claimant remain uncontroverted and unchallenged by the Defendants and thus this Honourable Court can act on the unchallenged evidence to enter judgment in favour of the Claimant in the absence of evidence in rebuttal. On the above submission, Learned Counsel cited Iseogbekun v Adelakun [2013] 2 NWLR (Pt 1337) 140 at 165 paras G – H (SC); Elema & Anor v Akenzua [2000] 13 NWLR (Pt 683) 92 at 106, paras A – B; Elegushi & Ors v Oseni & Ors (2005) LPELR – 1111 at 28 paras A – B (SC).

32.                         Learned Counsel to the Claimant contended that the Claimant having demanded for the settlement of his entitled Gratuity benefits vide Exhibit C6 and the 1st Defendant’s Replies vide Exhibits C7 and C8 refusing, failing or neglecting to pay the Gratuity on the wrong premise that the Claimant was not a core member of its staff and thus not qualify, this Honourable Court is urged to grant the relief sought in view of the fact that the Claimant has by his unchallenged testimony and Exhibits C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6 and C9 established his case.

33.                        Learned Counsel also submitted that in the Circular by the Defendants Managing Director under reference with respect to the Gratuity Benefits, there was no distinction made between core and non-core member of staff of the 1st Defendant. Learned Counsel also referred to the evidence-in-chief of CW1 to the effect that several members of staff of the Defendants, including one Mr. Chidi Paul Ojioko, who are in the Claimant’s category, had been paid.

34.                        Claimant Learned Counsel relied on the authorities of Military Governor, Lagos State v Adeyiga (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt 1293) 291 at 331 – 332. Paras H – B; Kayili v Yilbuk [2015] 7 NWLR (Pt 1457) 26 at 57 – 58 paras H – A; and submitted that the unchallenged evidence of the Claimant is deemed admitted by the Defendants and thus the onus of proof required under Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 2011 is discharged upon minimal proof met by the adduced evidence in this case.

35.                        With respect to the pleadings of the Defendants as contained in their Amended Joint Statement of Defence, Claimant Learned Counsel relied on the judicial authority of Ajikawo v Ansaldo (Nig) Ltd [1991] 2 NWLR (Pt 173) 359 at 375 para D and C – F to the effect that pleadings cannot take the place of evidence and as such, the Defendants having not called oral evidence in support of their defence, their pleadings are deemed abandoned, dead and of no evidential value in this case.

36.                        Claimant Learned Counsel also relied on the authority of Okolie v Marinho [2006] 15 NWLR (Pt 1002) 316 at 340 paras D – E (CA) to the effect that the Defendants are presumed to have accepted the evidence adduced by the Claimant in this case in the light of the fact of their failure to call evidence in defence. Learned Counsel thus urged this Honourable Court to resolve the sole issue in favour of the Claimant and enter judgment accordingly.

37.                        On point of law, Claimant Learned Counsel orally replied in the open Court to the contention of the Defendants that Exhibit C9 was dumped on this Court. Learned Counsel argued that Exhibit C9 was pleaded and relevant in this case and as such, the contention of the Defendants is very unfounded.

38.                        On the second issue, Claimant Learned Counsel argued that the resignation of the Claimant was on 27th of January, 2017 while the Claimant took a new employment on the 30th of January, 2017. Learned Counsel also posited that the service of the Resignation Letter complied with the Policies of the Bank as same contained the receiving stamp of the 1st Defendant endorsed thereon. Learned Counsel referred to the case of Bank of Industry v Obeya (2022) 4 NWLR (Pt 1821) 589 to the effect that service on a branch of a company is good and adequate service on the company.

DEFENDANTS FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

39.                        The Defendants Learned Counsel adopted the Defendants’ Final Written Address as his oral argument and legal submission to urge this Honourable Court to dismiss the case of the Claimant. Four issues were distilled for determination thus:

1.     Whether Claimant is not bound by the terms and conditions of his employment contain in Exhibit C1?

2.     Whether the Defendant will be bound by the purported letter of resignation Exhibit C5?

3.     Whether an employee under the service of the 2nd Defendant can claim benefits exclusively designed for the staff employed by the 1st Defendant (contain in Exhibit C9)?

4.     Whether tendering a document alone without leading evidence through it does not amount to dumping of same on the court?

40.                        On Issue 1, Defendants Learned Counsel relied on the Latin maxim pacta sunct servanda and the authorities of A/G Nasarawa State v A/G Plateau State (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt 1309) 419 at 450 paras A – B, 458 para D; Antonio Oil Ltd v Access Bank Plc (2020) 17 NWLR (Pt 1752) 99 at 119 paras B – D, Enemchukwu v Okoye (2017) 6 NWLR (Pt 1560) 37 at 56 para A to the effect that parties to a contract are bound by the terms thereof.

41.                        Learned Counsel thus contended that Exhibit C1 and C2 bind the Parties in this case. Learned Counsel referred to the last note titled PERIOD OF NOTICE in this Exhibit and noted that a month’s notice of intention to resign is required from the Claimant to validly resigned from the service of the 2nd Defendant. Learned Counsel also referred to Section 3.16.1 of Exhibit C9, the 1st Defendant’s Staff Policies which the Claimant is relying on and submitted that by this provision the Resignation letter is required to be submitted in writing through his Group/Division/Sector Heads to HR.

42.                        Learned Counsel contended that the resignation of the Claimant vide Exhibit C5 was in fundamental breach of the terms of the contract of employment. Learned Counsel cited the pronouncement of the Court in Oceanic Bank Intl Nig Ltd v G. Chitex Ind. Ltd (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt 661) 464 at 478 para D. Learned Counsel argued that not only is the fact that the Claimant failed to submit the letter to the right officer but also the letter was addressed to none of the Defendants. Learned Counsel thus relied on Nwaolisah v Nwabufoh (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt 1268) 600 at 633, para C to the effect that this breach is a fundamental breach of the terms and conditions of employment in this case and the Claimant can no longer lay any claim to any benefit therefrom. Learned Counsel cited IMNL v Pegofor Ind. Ltd (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt 947) 1 at 18 paras A – B.

43.                        Defendants Learned Counsel thus urged the Court to hold that the Claimant is bound by the terms and conditions of service and having breached same, he is not entitled to any of the reliefs available to prudent staff of his cadre, having intentionally and out of malice abandoned his duty post.

44.                        On Issue 2, Defendants Learned Counsel contended that the Defendants cannot be bound by Exhibit C5, the letter of resignation which was never addressed to them and none of the Defendants is situate at No. 2 Kofo Abayomi which the Claimant addressed the letter to. Learned Counsel referred to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Amended Statement of Fact to note the address pleaded as the location of the three Defendants. Learned Counsel also referred to Exhibit C1 to note the address of the 2nd Defendant. Learned Counsel thus argued that it is obvious that the Claimant did not serve any of the Defendants with the letter but abandoned his duty post without putting his employer on notice and properly handing over property in his custody including the staff ID card.

45.                         On proof of service of document on a company and the valid way to effect service of process on company, Learned Counsel to the Defendants referred to Yadis Nig Ltd v Great Nig Ins. Ltd (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt 725) 529 at 540 paras G – H, Leadership News Group Ltd v Mantu (2017) 2 NWLR (Pt 1548) 15 at 40 paras B – C, 41 – 42 paras A – E and Bank of Industry Ltd v Obeya (2022) 4 NWLR (Pt 1821) 589 at 611 – 612 paras E – A.

46.                        Learned Counsel argued that assuming without conceding that the letter was properly addressed, there is still no evidence that it was served on any of the Defendants. Learned Counsel relied on Leadership News Group Ltd v Mantu (Supra), that the best evidence is a copy of what was served and authenticated by any director, secretary or other principal officer of the company. Learned Counsel argued that there is no piece of evidence tendered by the Claimant to show that the officer assigned to receiving such document received same from the Claimant.

47.                        On Issue 3, Defendants Learned Counsel contended that the Claimant was not an employee of the 1st Defendant but only on secondment to the 1st Defendant by the Claimant’s employer who is the 2nd Defendant as evidenced in Exhibit C1, C2, and C3. Learned Counsel thus submitted that the Claimant being employee under the service of the 2nd Defendant cannot claim benefits exclusively designed for the staff employed by the 1st Defendant as contained in Exhibit C9.

48.                        Learned Counsel also referred to paragraph 8 of the Amended Statement of Facts and paragraphs 6 and 8 of the CW1 evidence-in-chief to the effect that 2nd Defendant was the Claimant’s employer, not 1st Defendant. Learned Counsel also argued that the Circular on Cessation of Gratuity and Retirement Benefits was also designed and issued to the staff of the 1st Defendant and not meant for the 2nd Defendant’s staff.

49.                        Defendants Learned Counsel cited and relied on the authority of EcoBank Trans Inc v Broad Comms. Ltd (2021) 5 NWLR (Pt 1769) 209 at 217 and  MV Samsung v IBG Inv. Co. Ltd (2024) 8 NWLR (Pt 1939) 35 to the effect that 2nd Defendant, being a subsidiary to the 1st Defendant, has a status and legal personality separate and distinct from the 1st Defendant and it is trite that the policies and conducts of the mother company do not apply to the subsidiary company save where it is expressly stated.

50.                        Defendants Learned Counsel thus urged this Court to hold that the Claimant being under the employment of the 2nd Defendant cannot claim benefit of the policies exclusively designed for the employees of the 1st Defendant, more so when there is no where in Exhibit C9 it is expressly stated that the staff on secondment to the 1st Defendant stands to benefit from the policies and privileges designed for the 1st Defendant’s staff.

51.                        On Issue 4, Defendants Learned Counsel submitted that the way and manner in which Exhibit C9 was tendered in evidence by the Claimant without leading evidence through it amounted to dumping of the said exhibit on this Court. Learned Counsel argued that the Claimant did not lead oral evidence to show which part of the document concerns the Claimant that he wants this Court to make use of in deciding his right. Learned Counsel relied on the authority of ACN v Nyako (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt 1491) 352 and Ogboru v Okowa (2016) 11 NWLR (Pt 1522) 84 to urge this Honourable Court to not embark on any voyage of discovery but to discountenance the Exhibit C9 accordingly.

52.                        Defendants Learned Counsel also noted that Exhibit C9 is a photocopied document not meant for the use of employees of the 2nd Defendant and same is not certified by the 1st Defendant whom the Claimant alleged to be the maker/producer, and much more the document was not tendered by any staff of the 1st Defendant but was dumped on this Court by the Claimant who could not and did not lead any evidence on it and could not be cross examined on the content thereof, being not the maker. Learned Counsel urged the Court to hold that the document has no link or connection with the Claimant.

COURT’S DECISION

53.                         Upon my discrete voyage into the pleadings and evidence adduced before this Honourable Court and having waded through the Final Written Addresses of the respective parties in this case, particularly noting the issues for determination formulated by parties for the determination of this Honourable Court, I am of the firm view that the issues for determination formulated by the Claimant and the Defendants can be resolved under the following two issues which I now donated thus:

1.     Whether in the circumstances of this case, the 1st Defendant is a necessary party to this Suit?

2.     Whether the Claimant has proved his case against the Defendants as required by law and thus entitled to the reliefs sought?

54.                        Before venturing into the issues for determination, this Honourable Court shall first and foremost comment on the choice of the Defendants in electing not to call any evidence in defence, in spite of the fact that the Defendants filed an Amended Joint Statement of Defence in this case.

55.                        The implication of this choice of the Defendants is primarily that the Defendants have by so doing adopted, accepted and admitted hook, line and sinker the gamut of the evidence led by the Claimant as their own and as the true state of affairs between parties which is the only evidence this Honourable Court will consider and act on in the determination of the claim put up by parties. There is no evidence on the other side of the imaginary scale which the Court can weigh side by side with the evidence presented by the Claimant.

56.                        In Baba v Nigerian Civil Aviation Training Centre (1991) LPELR – 692 (SC), the Infallible Court held in this regard thus: “…whenever on an issue, evidence comes from one side and this is unchallenged and uncontradicted, it ought normally to be accepted on the principle that there is nothing to be put on the other side of the balance, unless of course it is of such quality that no reasonable tribunal should have believed it. So, when evidence goes one way, the onus of proof is discharged on a minimal of proof. This is the result of all the decided cases including NICON v Power & Ind. Engineering Co. Ltd (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt 14) 1 p.27; Nwabuoku v Ottih (1961) 2 SCNLR 232; Nigerian Maritime Service Ltd v Afolabi (1978) 2 SC 79.” See also Ojigho v NBA (2019) All FWLR (Pt 1002) 871 at 891 paras E – F (SC); Bue v Dauda (2003) FWLR (Pt 172) 1892 at 1911 – 1912 (SC).

57.                        As a corollary to the above, it is trite law that pleading upon which no evidence is led is deemed abandoned. The Defendants having elected not to call any evidence in proof of their averments in denial or rebuttal, it thus follows that those averments of the Defendants and the entirety of the Amended Joint Statement of Defence is deemed abandoned. See Olomada v Mustapha (2011) All FWLR (Pt 559) 1080 at 1137 paras D – E; Jolayemi v Alaoye (2004) All FWLR (Pt 217) 584 at 603.

58.                        While it is good law that the Defendants have the right to rest their case on the evidence of the Claimant, it is also important to sound it loudly and clearly that such approach comes with a great danger if at the end of evaluation of evidence, the Court comes to a conclusion that the Claimant has made out a prima facie case of his claim. See The Admin & Exec. of the Estate of Abacha v Eke-Spiff & Ors (2009) LPELR – 3152 (SC); Aguocha v. Aguocha (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt 906) 165 at 184; Newbreed Organisation Ltd v Erhomosele (2006) LPELR – 1984 (SC); Mobil Producing (Nig) Unlimited & Anor v Monokpo & Anor (2003) LPELR – 1886 (SC).

59.                        That being said, the claims of the Claimant in this case only requires minimal proof to succeed. Now to Issue 1 formulated by this Honourable Court, whether in the circumstances of this case, the 1st Defendant is a necessary party to the suit? The Court have held in plethora of judicial decisions on the yardstick that makes one a necessary party to an action but suffices to mention the case of NBA v Kehinde (2017) 11 NWLR (Pt 1576) and Okoli v Ejiakor (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt 479) 48.

60.                        From the above cited judicial authorities, it is settled that a necessary party is one who should be bound by the outcome of the litigation and the questions to be settled, one in the absence of whom the suit is likely to be defeated; one whose absence will make it impossible for the Court to determine the issues in the litigation; one whose non-joinder will occasion injustice to the Claimant. In considering the above, the Court must look at the reliefs sought by the Claimant to determine whether same can be granted in the absence of that person, in this case the 1st Defendant.

61.                        I have in line with the above dictates of the principle of the law examined the reliefs sought by the Claimant and noted that the reliefs are sought jointly and severally against the Defendants. I have noted the pleading and evidence of the Claimant on the role played by each of the Defendants in the employment of the Claimant.

62.                        While the Claimant at all time maintained that the 2nd Defendant was his main employer, the Claimant joined the 1st Defendant as the one in whose office and under whom the Claimant served directly and in charge of the payment of his salaries and allowance throughout the period of his employment while the 2nd Defendant was his employer who seconded him to the 1st Defendant. 2nd Defendant is a subsidiary of the 1st Defendant. There is no evidence of an Outsourcing Agreement between the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

63.                         From the pleading and evidence, not only that the 1st Defendant was the one paying Claimant’s salary and allowance but also exercised control over the Claimant and can deploy the Claimant to any of its branches as done sometimes in January 2017, as evidenced in Exhibit C4 when the Claimant was redeployed by the 1st Defendant from Jimeta-Yola branch to Maiduguri branch without a recourse to the 2nd Defendant.

64.                        Aside the above facts of the employment, it is also my finding that though the appointment, confirmation and promotion of the Claimant were issued on the letterhead of the 2nd Defendant, the content thereof is more or less like the 1st Defendant was the employer. In Exhibit C1, the Claimant was not to be taken through the 2nd Defendant’s mission, vision, and shared values, the letter stated that “As you come in, the Bank’s Human Resources team will take you through the Bank’s mission, vision and shared values, which constitute their charter of conduct.”

65.                        Also, in Exhibit C2, under REMUNERATION, it is clear that it is the Bank that is responsible for the payment of the remuneration of the Claimant. Under CONDITIONS OF THE OFFER, the 2nd Defendant used the phrase “Our Bank”, “our customers, the institution or the staff, with parties outside the bank”. Under PERIOD OF NOTICE the 2nd Defendant categorically put the Bank (1st Defendant) as the one who will give termination notice, when it stated thus: “During probation, staff is required to give minimum of two weeks written notice of intention to resign his/her employment with the bank. On confirmation, the minimum notice period is one month. The Bank undertakes to give a maximum of one month notice of any termination of employment or will pay salary in lieu thereof.” [Underlining is mine] This also has made it clear to this Honourable Court that it is the Bank that will handle this severance package of the Claimant.

66.                        The Promotion Letter Exhibit C3 at paragraphs 2 and 3 thereof also read thus: “Your promotion is a formal acknowledgement of your contribution to the Bank’s growth and realization of its objectives during the last appraisal period. We trust that this gesture of management will spur you to superior performance and greater commitment to the Bank.”

67.                         The above facts present an appropriate scenario where the Court will adopt the principle of primacy of fact as against the principle of privity of contract. It is now settled that in determining the nature of relationship between parties in employment dispute that presents this type of relationship, this Honourable Court is to apply the primacy of facts which simply implies that it is the facts that determines when a person is in a contract of employment or not and not only the presentation of a contract document. Thus, the practice of triangular employment and co-employer status has been welcome and adopted by this Court in deserving cases to find for an employee. See PENGASSAN v Mobil Producing Unlimited Suit No. NICN/LA/38/2010 delivered on 21st of March, 2012 per B.B. Kanyip and Obaseki-Osaghae, J.J.

68.                        Where a company which is subsidiary to another is so integrated into and under the control of the parent company, the Court will hold that co-employment exist and both companies will be bound by the duties and obligations in respect of the employment. Thus, in the above case of PENGASSAN it was opined that the determination of the existence of an employment relationship should be guided by the facts of what was actually agreed and performed by the parties and not just by the name the parties have given the contract.

69.                        The Court considers the fact of the policy under which the employee performs his responsibility, who is responsible for the payment of the employee’s salary and exercises control and disciplinary powers over the employee.

70.                        In Union Beverages Ltd v Pepsicola International Ltd (1994) JELR 44691 (SC), the apex Court held that, “If the companies are to all intent and purposes one, their corporate veil could be pierced and each could be held liable for the action of the other. If one company can be said to be the agent or employee or tool or simulacrum of another, the two companies would be treated as one.”

71.                        In Oyeyemi Oyetayo v Zenith Bank Plc [2012] 29 NLLR (Pt 84) 370, this Court held that both Zenith Bank and its subsidiary Zenith Securities Ltd were co-employers of the Claimant based on this principle even though the letter of employment was issued by the Zenith Bank who then transferred the Claimant to Zenith Securities Ltd who then confirmed the appointment of the Claimant as its staff.

72.                        In Mr. Morrison Owupele Inimgba v Integrated Corporation Securities Ltd & Ecobank (2015) 57 NLLR (Pt 195) 268 which is very analogous to the fact of this case, with the Employment Letter issued by the Integrated Corporation Securities Ltd stating that the ICS Ltd was the employer and seconded the Claimant to Ecobank, the Court held that on the basis of these crucial roles, rights and powers of the Ecobank in the employment over the Claimant, both ICS Ltd and Ecobank are co-employer of the Claimant.

73.                        In Anthony Agum v UNICEM & Anor NICN/CA/71/2013 delivered on 3rd of March, 2017 per B.B. Kanyip, J, there was Service Agreement between the 2nd Defendant MSO and the 1st Defendant UNICEM. MSO employed the Claimant and outsourced to the 1st Defendant. Payment of salary was sole responsibility of 2nd Defendant. Claimant brought the action against both MSO and UNICEM and this Court held that it was within the Claimant’s right to have sued both of them as co-employer. See also the case of Tunde Ayoola-Johnson v 1004 Estates Limited & Anor NICN/LA/100/15 delivered on 18th January, 2018; Nobert Chukwuemeka Nworah v Zenith Securities Ltd & 3 Ors NICN/EN/48/2019 delivered on 29th June, 2022 and Stephen Ayaogo & Ors v Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited [2013] 30 NLLR (Pt 85) 95.

74.                        The facts of this case clearly present a case of triangular employment where co-employment status is made out by the facts of the operation of the employment, unlike the case of Luck Guard Limited v Felix Adariku & 5 Ors CA/A/1061/2020 delivered by the appellate court on 15th December, 2022 where the Court could not find evidence of triangular employment.

75.                        In this instance where the 1st Defendant under the employment is not only responsible for the payment of salary of the Claimant but also has the power to redeploy the Claimant without recourse to the 2nd Defendant as well as the right to terminate the contract and issue notice or pay salary in lieu of notice to the Claimant, coupled with the evidence that the 1st Defendant handles the arrangement with the 3rd Defendant on gratuity and pension for the Claimant, this Honourable Court cannot but hold that the 1st Defendant is a necessary party to this Suit in the light of the above facts.

76.                        The 2nd Defendant is just a tool being used by the 1st Defendant, as it is the 1st Defendant who exercises employer’s powers and performs employer’s duties over the Claimant. Both the 1st and 2nd Defendants are co-employers of the Claimant in this case. It is therefore within the right of the Claimant to have brought this action against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendants based on their respective roles which definitely affect the claim of the Claimant in this case on the Gratuity handling and payment. This issue is hereby resolved against the Defendants. I so hold

77.                        On the second Issue, whether the Claimant has proved his case as to be entitled to the reliefs sought? The law is immutable and sacrosanct that in civil cases like this instant case, the onus probandi lies on the Claimant to establish by credible, cogent and compelling evidence his claims before the Court. The Claimant bears this legal burden which is also pontificated in Section 131 to 134 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended) thus:

“131.(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts shall prove that those facts exist.

(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.

132. The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.

133. (1) In civil cases, the burden of first proving existence or non-existence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, regard being had to any presumption that may arise on the pleadings.

(2) If the party referred to in subsection (1) of this section adduces evidence which ought reasonably to satisfy the court that the fact sought to be proved is established, the burden lies on the party against whom judgment would be given if no more evidence were adduced, and so on successively, until all the issues in the pleadings have been dealt with.

(3) Where there are conflicting presumptions, the case is the same as if there were conflicting evidence.

134. The burden of proof shall be discharged on the balance of probabilities in all civil proceeding.”

See also APC & Anor v Obaseki & Ors (2021) LPELR – 55004 (SC)

Nduul v Wayo & Ors (2018) LPELR – 45151 (SC)

78.                        In line with the above principles of evidence law, the Claimant who claims that he validly resigned from the services of the Defendants and thus entitled to Gratuity benefit bears the burden to prove his entitlement.

79.                        What is resignation in the first place? The Court in University of Calabar Teaching Hospital & Anor v Bassey (2008) LPELR – 8553 (CA) held thus  “In Black’s Law Dictionary (with Pronunciations) Sixth Edition, page 1310, the word “Resignation” is defined as: “Formal renouncement or relinquishment of an office. It must be made with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied with the act of relinquishments.”” In INEC & Ors v Orji & Ors (2009) LPELR – 4320 (CA) the Court also held: “Resignation from employment is by giving of the required length of notice or payment in lieu of notice.”

80.                        The penultimate Court in Sunday v Olugbenga & Ors (2008) LPELR – 4995 (CA) per J.A. Fabiyi, JCA delivering the leading Judgment, further dilated on when a notice of resignation takes effect thus:

“It is clear to me that a notice of resignation is effective, not from the date of the letter or from the date of the purported acceptance, but from the date the letter was received by the employer or his agent…. Put bluntly, resignation takes effect from the date notice is received by the employer or its agent”

81.                        The Court further cited the pronouncement of the Court in Benson v Onitiri thus:

“Further, it is clear on the authority of Riodan v. The War Office (1959) 3 All ER 522, 588 that resignation dates from the date notice was received. There is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept notice. In the present case, I do not think it matters to whom the notice of resignation was addressed, whether to the Minister who made the appointment or to the Board, on which Benson was serving … I am of the view that notice of resignation to either of them is good, nor do I think it necessary for the Board or anybody else to reply that the resignation is accepted. For more elucidation on the point under consideration, the Supreme Court further held in the same case of Benson v. Onitiri (supra) as follows:- “That there is common law right to resign unless there is reason to show that the holder of the office cannot and the appellant’s common law right remains unfettered as the Lagos Town Planning Law was silent on resignation. The appellant was entitled to send his notice of resignation to LEDS, a Corporation which was serving and which had right to receive it and since the LEDS sent a copy thereof to the Ministry and the Permanent Secretary dealt with it, notice to the Permanent Secretary is notice to the Minister since it is a matter not requiring the exercise of the Minister’s personal discretion. The effective date of resignation was when the Permanent Secretary in the absence of the Minister accepted the notice of resignation and considered and treated the appellant as having resigned.””

82.                        In the above case, the resignation letter was submitted to the Akinyele Local Government where he was serving for onward transmission to the Local Government Service Commission of Oyo State who is the employer and same was received by the Local Government Authority. The Court held that submission to the Akinyele Local Government is proper, more so when there is evidence that it got to the Authority.

83.                        In Zubairu & Anor v Mohammed & Ors (2009) LPELR – 5124 (CA) the Court also pronounced thus:

“The legal position is that resignation from employment is by giving the required length of notice or payment in lieu of notice. Resignation dates back from the date the notice is received. There is absolute power to resign and no discretion to refuse to accept the notice of resignation. It must be emphasized that where a person has taken the step he is required by law to take, in this case, submit his letter of resignation, the refusal, failure, neglect of the relevant officials to do their part, in this case, stop the payment of his salary cannot be visited on the person.”

84.                        An employee who failed to comply with the requirement for valid resignation also faces an insurmountable challenge as such an employee cannot legally claim that he has left the service of the employer. It is now settled that where the employee is mandatorily required by law to give certain length of notice to resign and he failed to give the required length of notice of intention to resign, he will be deemed to still be in the employment of the employer for the requisite duration imposed by law from the date of that notice. See Rufus Femi Amokeodo v IGP (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt 607) 467 (SC) and this Court judgment delivered on the 4th of July, 2017 in Mrs Uduak Yemi-Eweka v Nigerian Bottling Co. Ltd NICN/LA/458/2013.

85.                        The Court in WAEC v Oshionebo (2006) LPELR – 7739(CA) per Aderemi JCA delivering the Leading Judgment shed more light on the position of the law thus:

“I here pause to discuss the law relating to notice of resignation, the law is that a notice of resignation is effective not from the date of the letter, nor from the date of any purported acceptance, but from the date on which the letter was received by the employer or his agent. Tendering of a letter of resignation carries with it the right to leave the service automatically without any benefit subject to his paying any of his indebtedness to his employer. While giving notice of retirement carries with it the right to be paid a pension or gratuity; but it does not confer the right to withdraw from the service immediately and automatically. See (1) Benson v. Onitiri (1960) 5 ESC 69, (2) Osu v. PA.N Ltd (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt.731) 627 and (3) Yesufu v. Gov. of Edo State & Ors. (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt.731) 517.”

86.                        Thus, where an employee elected not to give the requisite length of notice and also failed to pay the requisite salary in lieu of notice but chose to immediately leave the service of the employer with the tendering of his resignation letter, three legal consequences will inevitably follow. His Lordship B.B. Kanyip Ph.D dilated on this in Dr (Mrs) Ebele Felix v Nigerian Institute of Management NICN/LA/321/2014 delivered on 4th July, 2017 where my Noble Lord held that the three legal effects of resignation with immediate effect are: (1) the right to leave service automatically, (2) the employee’s forfeiture of any benefit apart from his earned salary, and (3) the employee’s paying any indebtedness to his employer. See also Dr Dave Nwabor v Oilflow Services Limited NICN/LA/552/2015.

87.                        Now, this Honourable Court shall apply the above position of the law on resignation from employment to this case. I have examined the conditions stipulated for valid resignation of the appointment as contained in Exhibit C2, the Contract of employment as well as Exhibit C9, 1st Defendant’s Personnel Policies and Procedure Guide which the Claimant has vehemently relied on.

88. Exhibit C2 under PERIOD OF NOTICE specified thus: “During probation, staff is required to give minimum of two weeks written notice of intention to resign his/her employment with the bank. On confirmation, the minimum notice period is one month. The Bank undertakes to give a maximum of one month notice of any termination of employment or will pay salary in lieu thereof.”

89.                        Exhibit C9 on the other hand provides at Section 3.16 thereof thus:

“3.16 Termination of Employment

Termination of employment can either be initiated by the Bank or the employee (Resignation) in accordance with the appropriate clause in the individual’s Contract of Service.

3.16.1 Termination by Employee (Resignation)

Resignation is termination of employment at the instance of the employee concerned. The employee should submit in writing his/her resignation through his/her Group/Division/Sector Heads to HR. If the employee is a senior staff, the functional Division/Sector Head should be informed. A recommendation for acceptance or rejection of the resignation is forwarded to HR for action. HR Division shall then prepare a letter specifying the separation terms.

3.16.2 Notice Period

Confirmed members of staff should give the Bank one-month in the case of officer cadre and three in the case of management staff of AGM and above or pay one months basic salary in lieu of notice (for officer) and three months in lieu of notice for management staff of the grade of AGM and above.

Staff on probation should give the Bank notice or pay money in lieu of notice as stipulated in the letter of appointment.

Accumulated leave in respect of completed calendar year service may be incorporated in the notice period. In these circumstances, if the staff is entitled to leave terms, they will be paid the appropriate leave allowance.”

90.                        This Honourable Court has noted the Letter of Resignation of Appointment Exhibit C5 dated 27th January, 2017, submission and receipt of which was acknowledged on 30th January, 2017. The Claimant stated in the Exhibit C5 thus:

“This is to inform you of my intention to resign my appointment with the bank effective January 30th 2017.”

91.                        It is in evidence that this 30th of January, 2017 was the same date the Claimant tendered the Resignation letter which was acknowledged by Fidelity Bank Plc Yola Branch 2017 JAN 30 at about 1:03pm as stamped on Exhibit C5. The Claimant also admitted under cross examination that he is now working with the Adamawa State Judiciary in Yola as a Registrar. That he joined the Adamawa State Judiciary in January, 2017. The exact date the Claimant joined the services of Adamawa State Judiciary was the same 30th January, 2017.

92.                        From the above adduced documentary evidence, the Resignation of the Claimant, in my view, is nothing different from resignation with immediate effect. Neither did the Claimant pay one month’s salary in lieu of notice, having failed to give the requisite length of notice as required by his terms and conditions of appointment evidenced in Exhibit C1/C2 and the Exhibit C9.

93.                        Having left the services of the Defendants with immediate effect on the same date he tendered his resignation letter, the Claimant has accepted to be visited with the legal implication of that manner of resignation as dilated in the earlier cited cases of Dr Dave Nwabor v Oilflow Services Limited (Supra); Dr (Mrs) Ebele Felix v Nigerian Institute of Management (Supra) and WAEC v Oshionebo (Supra). The Claimant has therefore forfeited all his terminal benefits apart from earned salary less any indebtedness to the Defendants. I so hold.

94.                        Moreover, I have also looked at the Addressee part of the Resignation Letter and confirmed the truth of the contention of the Defendants that the Resignation was addressed thus: “The Head, Human Resources, No. 2 Kofo Abayomi Street, Victoria’s Island, Lagos.”

95.                        Though the Resignation Letter was physically submitted to and receipted by the 1st Defendant Yola Branch as evidenced by the stamp of receipt embossed on this acknowledgment copy, Exhibit C5. The Defendants denied being located or situate in that address. To the Claimant’s view, the Claimant addressed the Resignation to the 1st Defendant.

96.                        Assumably on the part of the Claimant, he addressed the Resignation to the 1st Defendant’s Head of Human Resources at that address. However, the Claimant himself adduced evidence that the 1st Defendant’s Head Office is in Lagos while it has other branches in Nigeria including Yola, at No. 13, Galadima Aminu Way, Jimeta-Yola, Adamawa State. That the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are located at No. 13, Galadima Aminu Way, Jimeta-Yola, Adamawa State.

97.                        What the terms and conditions of the appointment requires by Exhibit C9 is that the Claimant who intends to resign should submit in writing his resignation through his Group/Division/Sector Heads to HR of the 1st Defendant. That however, was not what the Claimant did in this instance. Notwithstanding the flaw in the submission process, the Resignation Letter got to the The Head, Human Resources. The question is Head, Human Resources of who at that address No.2 Kofo Abayomi Street, Victoria Island, Lagos, where the letter was sent to? Is it the 1st or 2nd Defendant? No one can tell since it is in evidence that none of the Defendants is situate in that address.

98.                        Clearly, the Resignation is in total violation of the procedure agreed upon by parties for a valid resignation of the appointment as set out in Exhibit C2 and C9. I am therefore in agreement with the Defendants that a party who has not validly and lawfully resigned from an appointment cannot be heard to lay claim to the gratuity benefit or any benefit that should have derived from the valid termination or valid resignation from the appointment. This is in line with the position of the law as enunciated in the earlier cited judicial authorities.

99.                        Generally, and ordinarily, an employee who has not validly or lawfully resigned from an appointment is deemed to still be in the employment of the employer as such invalid resignation has not validly put an end to the relationship. The employer can rightly reject an invalid resignation and if not rejected, the law has provided a succor for the employer, in that the employee can no more lay claim to retirement or terminal benefits including gratuity. The employee is deemed to have forfeited his right to those benefits under the contract of employment by that breach or failure.

100. In this case where upon the invalid resignation, the Defendants did not express rejection or acceptance. It is also in evidence that the Claimant on that same date of resignation started work in another employment. This piece of fact was put in evidence by the Claimant himself under cross examination. It requires no further proof. The only inference is that the Claimant has chosen to go on with his life without the normal entitlements which would have accrued to the Claimant if he had validly and properly resigned from the services of the Defendants and the Defendant has taken it that the Claimant was no longer in their employment. I so hold.

101. In the light of the foregoing findings and holdings of this Honourable Court from the evaluated oral and documentary evidence adduced by parties in this case, I am satisfied that the Claimant has not proved on the balance of probability and neither scale through the requisite minimal proof of his entitlement to gratuity benefit that attached to a valid resignation from the services of the Defendants in this case. This Honourable Court hereby hold that the first Relief sought by the Claimant failed and same is by order of this Honourable Court refused accordingly.

102. The second Relief which is claim of damages for suffering, hardship and psychological trauma visited on the Claimant by reason of the Defendants’ refusal to meet their responsibilities to the Claimant after years of meritorious service, this Honourable Court is of the view that the Claimant has not adduced any proof of what he suffered as a result of his invalid and improper resignation from the services of the Defendants.

103. Moreover, it is in evidence that the Claimant resigned with immediate effect on the same date the Claimant started a new job with the Adamawa State Judiciary. It is therefore mischievous and laughably so, on the part of the Claimant to allege any suffering, hardship and psychological trauma in this case. This claim also failed and is hereby refused.

104. All the other Reliefs also collapse with the failure of the main Relief 1 in this case.

105. In Adamu v Nigerian Airforce (2022) 5 NWLR (Pt 1822) 159 (SC) at 182, the Supreme Court held that:

“A defendant need not prove anything if the Plaintiff has not succeeded in establishing his case, at least, prima facie, in order that the necessity of the defendant to confront the case so made may arise. Where the Plaintiff fails to prove his case as required by the law, it shall be dismissed.”

See also, Umera v NRC (2022) 10 NWLR (Pt 1838) 349 (SC) 387 paras G – H and Ibrahim v. Ibrahim (2006) LPELR – 7670 (CA).

106. The Court have held in myriads of decided cases, suffice to mention Okoye & Ors v Nwankwo (2014) LPELR – 23172 (SC); Zurmi v Okonkwo & Anor (2018) LPELR – 46964 (CA); and Akaninwo & Ors v Nsirim & Ors (2008) LPELR – 321 (SC), that where the Claimant fails to discharge this burden of proof to show his entitlement to the reliefs sought before the Court, the Claimant’s claims cannot succeed; as the order the Court will make in such a case is a dismissal of the action for lack of proof. A Claimant who fails to prove its entitlement to the relief or reliefs sought goes home without victory.

107. This Honourable Court is also of the view that the Defendants who had been made to suffer and sacrifice in time and resources in defence of this frivolous and unmeritorious suit, are entitled to cost in this instance, judging from the conduct of the Claimant.

108. The Cliamant terminated his appointment with immediate effect in flagrant violation of the terms and conditions of his appointment, eloped with a new employer without properly putting an end to his relationship with the Defendants and still with boldface like a gold-digger dragged the employers to this Court on a claim of terminal benefit when the Claimant was already gainfully employed in Adamawa State Judiciary on the same date he resigned by breach and not in compliance with the terms of his contract of employment with the Defendants. This is very unconscionable on the part of the Claimant.

109. For the above reason, coupled with the principle of law that cost follows event, the claims of the Claimant are hereby dismissed in its entirety with a cost of N200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand Naira) against the Claimant in favour of the Defendants jointly and severally.

Judgment is entered accordingly.

                                                                                                ________________________

                                                                                Hon. Justice J.T Agbadu Fishim

                                                                                                    Judge

                                                                                                  14/10/2024