WD

THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ENUGU JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ENUGU

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE O.O. AROWOSEGBE

DATE:  THURSDAY AUG 06, 2024      SUIT NO: NICN/EN/23/2020

BETWEEN:

MR AFAMEFUNA NWANKWO………..…………………APPLICANT

AND

1.                 ONITSHA SOUTH TRANSPORT COMPANY

LTD

2.                 HON. MARTINS MGBODILE

3.                 MR. EBERE MBAMALU                                         RESPONDENTS

4.                 MR. BENJAMI UKIWA

5.                 SERGENT OKON PEACE

6.                 THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE                                

APPEARANCES:

1.                 LEARNED O.K. EMMANUEL  – FOR THE APPLICANT.

2.                 LEARNED C.E. ASOGWA – FOR THE 1^ST-4^TH RESPONDENTS.

3.                 NO REPRESENTATION FOR THE 5^TH-6^TH RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

ORIGINATING APPLICATION [OA] commenced this suit Jul 16, 2020 and, it has Affidavit in Support [AS]. The following reliefs were formulated for the suit:

1.                           DECLARATION that the act of the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 5^th, and 6^th Respondents subjecting the applicant to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment on the 27^th day of March, 2019 is wrong, improper, illegal, unconstitutional and a violation of the Applicant’s fundamental rights as enshrined under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

2.                           A DECLARATION, that the unlawful arrest and detention of the Applicants [sic] by the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 5^th and 6^th Respondents from the 27^th day of March, 2019 to the 11^th day of April 2019 is wrong, improper, illegal, unconstitutional and a violation of the Applicant’s fundamental rights as enshrined under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

3.                           ORDER directing the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 5^th and 6^th Respondents whether jointly or severely [sic], pay the sum of N900,000.00 (Nine Hundred thousand [sic] Naira) to the Applicant as general damages for torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.

4.                           ORDER directing the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 5^th and 6^th Respondents whether jointly or severely [sic] pay the sum of N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) to the Applicant as general damages for the unlawful arrest and detention of the Applicant from the 27^th day of March, 2019 to the 11^th day of April, 2019.

5.                           A PUBLIC APOLOGY by the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th 5^th [sic] and 6^th Respondents to the Applicant for breach and violation of the fundamental rights of the applicant.

6.                           AND FOR SUCH FURTHER order or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to grant in the circumstance.

GROUNDS FOR SEEKING THE RELIEFS:

a.     By virtue of ORDER 2 RULE 1 of the fundamental rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009. Any person, (The Applicant in this case) who alleges that any of the fundamental rights as provided for in the 1999 Constitution or African charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act and to which he is entitled, has been, is being or is likely to be infringed, may apply to the court in the state where the infringement occurs or is likely t occur, for redress.

b.     The Applicant’s rights as enshrined in Section 34(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 frown [sic] at arbitrary denial of right to dignity of human person, (in this case, the Applicant).

c.      The Applicant’s rights as enshrined in Section 35(1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 frowns [sic] at the unlawful arrest and detention of any person, (in this case, the Applicant).

d.     The provisions of Section 35(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 entitles the applicant to compensation and public apology. [sic] Where the Respondents are found to have contravened the fundamental rights of the Applicant.

e.     The petition forwarded by the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd and 4^th Respondents to the 5^th and 6^th Respondents clearly contained facts adjudicated under civil causes but the 5^th and 6^th Respondent [sic] acted incompetently and negligently by unlawfully arresting and detaining the Applicant.

The applicant filed Affidavit in Support of the Application [ASA] and a Written Address [WA]. The 1^st-4^th respondents filed Counter Affidavit [CA] and a WA against these. The applicant reacted to the CA by Further Affidavit [FA] titled: “Reply to Respondent Counter Affidavit”. The matter came up first before me Apr 18, 2023 in the absence of the respondents. It was adjourned for definite hearing. It came up next Oct 26, 2023 and one Chijioke P. Ajogwu appeared for the respondents. The matter was adjourned for mention, as the claimant said he was just served with CA in court. It came up again Jan 17, 2024 in the absence of the respondents and their lawyer. It was adjourned for hearing. And it came up next Mar 14, 2024 and learned C.E. ASOGWA appeared for the 1^st-4^th respondents while the 5^th-6^th respondents were absent and unrepresented by lawyer and the matter was adjourned for hearing while Hearing Notices were ordered to be served on the 5^th-6^th respondents. It came up May 16, 2024 as adjourned. The Court confirmed that the 5^th&6^th respondents were served at p. 69-70 of the Process File.

Thereafter, the learned O.K. EMMANUEL moved the application. Thereafter, the learned C.E. ASOGWA relied on the CA and adopted the WA against the application and, urged the Court to dismiss the application because the 1^st-4^th respondents merely reported a case to the police [the 5^th&6^th respondents] who on their own volition decided to investigate the matter and charged the applicant to Court. The learned counsel argued that the applicant agreed it absconded with their vehicle for about fifty days, on which basis report was made to the police. Thereafter, the learned claimant’s counsel adopted the FA filed against the CA and urged the Court to grant the applicant’s prayers. Thereafter, the learned applicant’s counsel asked for adjournment to enable him file RPL in respect of the FA without RPL and the Court refused the application. Thereafter, the case was adjourned to Jul 2, 2024 for judgment. As the judgment was not ready on this date, it was adjourned sine die and when it was ready, date was communicated to the learned counsel to the parties. Having done with the introduction to the case let me now summarise the processes filed.

SUMMARY OF THE CASES MADE BY THE PARTIES

A: Applicant’s Case

            The applicant said he personally deposed the ASA and that he was employed a commercial driver with the 1^st respondent and that the 2^nd-4^th respondents are the alter egos of the 1^st respondents while the 5^th&6^th respondents are the policemen. He deposed that while on a journey with passengers he got a call that his wife died, and disembarked the passengers and made a detour to Cross-River State and was compelled by circumstances to bring the wife back to Anambra State for burial but that, all along, he was with the vehicle. He deposed that he told his employer that he could not leave the village and that, they should come and pick the vehicle and they failed to come and that, after the burial, he returned to his place of work with the vehicle on Mar 27, 2019 and that the 3^rd and 4^th respondents beat him up with bamboos, sticks and punches and thereby subjected him to inhuman and degrading treatment at his place of work and thereafter dragged to the 4^th&5^th respondents at the police station.

He deposed that he was unlawfully arrested and detained from Mar 27, 2019 till Apr 11, 2019 and insisting that he paid the N750,000 for the days he made away with the vehicle at N15,000 per day but that he agreed he only owed N200,000. He deposed that the 1^st respondent had not paid him salary since he started working with it. He deposed that applications to take his bail were rebuffed on the condition that he must pay the N750,000 and that he was subsequently arraigned in court 11^th April 2019 and that as a result, he had been subjected to degrading and inhuman treatments and had lost all sense of esteem and became psychologically traumatised. He deposed that these violated his fundamental rights.

N.J. ENYOSIOBI-ABAFOR franked the applicant’s WA in support of the application and submitted two issues for the determination of the application:

1. Whether the applicant’s fundamental rights was [sic] breached?

2.  Whether the applicant is entitled to the reliefs sought?

Arguing issue 1, the learned counsel submitted that arrest pending investigation is unlawful and cited Duruaku v. Nwoke & Ors (2015) NWLR (Pt. 1483) 419 and a host of other cases. The learned counsel also argued that, there was no basis to arrest him as the allegations against him were pure breach of contract of employment and that the 4^th&5^th respondent acted on financial inducement to arrest him and thereby breached SS. 34(1) & 35(3) of the Constitution. The learned counsel cited S. 382 of the Criminal Code that the definition of stealing therein does not cohabit with the facts of breach of contract and submitted that this breached the applicant’s fundamental rights. There ended arguments on issue 1 and the learned counsel moved to issue 2.

Arguing issue 2, the learned counsel submitted that the applicant is entitled to the reliefs claimed because S. 35(6) of the Constitution gives anybody unlawfully arrested right to compensation and that the 1^st respondent is vicariously liable for the acts of the other respondents resulting in his detention for 15 days from Mar 27, 2019 to April 11, 2019 and cited Bello v. Dankisi (2016) LPELR-40337 (CA) and Idjghere & Ors v. Agbinone & Ors (2019) LPELR-46428 (CA). Thus ended the WA. I move to the 1^st-4^th respondents’ CA and WA.

B: The CA And WA Against the Application

The 2^nd respondent counter-deposed against the ASA and said paras 9-15 of the ASA are not to their knowledge and that the claimant never communicated them of these and that the truth was that the applicant absconded with the company’s vehicle and plied another route and that all efforts to get him proved abortive as he switched off his phone and his guarantor could also not trace him which made them to report a case of missing vehicle and stealing to the police. He counter-deposed that the applicant never came back to his office but was arrested with the vehicle on a tip-off by themselves and the police and that they did not beat the applicant at all or hit him with anything and did not tear his cloth. He also counter-deposed that the applicant was not dragged to the police station but was conveyed in the same vehicle he absconded with to the police station, as the distance was not far and that the arrest was easy as the applicant willfully surrendered.

He counter-deposed that the 1^st-4^th respondents were not in a position to give orders to the police on how to do their work and that the applicant admitted absconding with the vehicle for about 50 days before he was arrested. He also counter-deposed that the applicant agreed to be remitting N15,000 daily which made the N750,000 for the 50 days from Feb 6-Mar 27, 2019 and that the company did not owe the applicant any money before he absconded with the vehicle and that the guarantor withdrew from being his surety after he was caught and that because the applicant could not produce surety when the police granted him bail, that was why he was detained and that it was not true that they insisted on N750,000 payment to release the applicant from detention. He counter-deposed that they did not maltreat the applicant at all. Thus ended the CA. I move to summary of the WA in its support.

C.E. ASOGWA franked the applicant’s WA in support of the CA. The learned counsel argued that apart from totally denying all the material assertions of the applicant about violation of his rights, the applicant failed to support these assertions with cogent material proofs and that it is the applicant’s duty to proof his case. The learned counsel cited SS. 131-133 of the Evidence Act and AG Anambra State v. Onuselogu (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 663) 547 and other cases. The learned counsel argued that the contention of the applicant that he was detained for long has no basis because he was immediately granted administrative bail pending investigation but could not perfect it, which was the reason he was held and released when he provided surety and submitted that, as such, he was not denied bail. The learned counsel cited Jim Jaja v. COP (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 123) CA 375 to the effect that, a person could be detained if he is reasonably suspected to have committed an offence.

The learned counsel cited CCB Nigeria Plc v. Okpala (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt. 159) 673 to the effect that counsel must not try to deceive the court. The learned counsel submitted that there is no proof that the 1^st-4^th respondents ordered the applicant’s arrest and detention. Learned counsel submitted that the applicant is not entitled to damages because he did not proof his case. Thus ended the WA. I move to the FA filed without RPL.

In it the applicant, who had another person depose for him, stated that he was not arrested at the market but beaten up in the 1^st respondent’s office and handed over to the police and that it was the magistrate that granted the applicant bail and not the police. The deponent also said the applicant was subjected to torture and inhuman treatment for the period he was detained. Thus ended the FA. I move to give my decision.

But before then, I need to address some salient issues that are very germane to enforcement of fundamental rights in the NIC. It would seem that the decisions of the Court of Appeal, which is the ultimate appellate court for the NIC, have not been settled on the issue whether the NIC has jurisdiction on enforcement of fundamental right simpliciter. While some Court of Appeal authorities have held that it did not have, some have held that it has. Therefore, I need to examine the issue of the NIC’s jurisdiction on this case first before I go on to the merit of the case, even though, this was not raised by any of the three sets of parties, who apparently believe the NIC has jurisdiction on the case. This is because the jurisdictional question touches violently on the substantive jurisdiction of the Court, which any of the parties could lawfully raise for the first time on appeal. It therefore behoves on me to air my views on the issue now for the benefit of the Court of Appeal. For this reason, the decision shall be divided into two parts. Section A shall examine the issue of the question of the substantive jurisdiction of the NIC over the case, while Section B shall examine the merits of the case.

Besides, I have taken note that the matter is to be decided on affidavit and for this reason, I have to state that I am aware of the law on how to resolve conflicts in affidavit evidence, either by documentary evidence or by non-cogency of one of the affidavits. I have also taken pains to research personally on relevant authorities to enable me give a good decision, especially on the recondite issue of the Court’s substantive jurisdiction on the matter. There I go.

COURT’S DECISION AND THE RATIONES DECIDENDI

Section A: Does The NIC Have Jurisdiction Over This Case?

The question to answer in this part is: Does the NIC have jurisdiction on enforcement [application] of fundamental rights? First, let me say, that being an issue of substantive jurisdiction of the Court, it is a radical issue of law that could be raised and determined by the Court suo motu – Galadima v. Tambai & Ors (2000) LPELR-1302 (SC) 21, E-F. Be that as it may.

Now, the first question to investigate is whether violation of fundamental rights could be challenged at the NIC via the Fundamental Rights [Enforcement Procedure] Rules 2009 [FREP Rules]. By virtue of the non-obstante S. 254C-(1)(d) and 254F-(1) of the Constitution, the NIC’s jurisdiction to entertain fundamental right actions relating to labour is not subject at all to S. 46 of the Constitution and consequently, the FREP Rules made pursuant to S. 46 of the Constitution are not directly or ordinarily applicable to the NIC. By virtue of S. 254F-(1) of the Constitution, the NIC’s jurisdiction on Chapter IV of the Constitution is directly subject to the NIC Rules made by the HPNICN and under which fundamental right actions as main claims are to be normally filed and lawfully adjudicated by the NIC. And the NIC’s jurisdiction and procedure in this regard are non-obstante all the provisions of the Constitution without exception and therefore, totally subjugate the provisions of S. 46 of the Constitution and the FREP Rules to have an unobstructive existence. However, by virtue of S. 254D-(1) of the Constitution, construed along with Order 1, R. 4 & 9(1)-(3) of the NIC Rules, filing an action under the FREP Rules in the NIC would not be out of the place, as the NIC could borrow the rules of any court to do substantial justice in case of vacuum in its rules. By virtue of Order 1, R 9(1)-(3) and Order 5 of the NIC Rules, the ratio decidendi established by the Supreme Court in Abacha v. Fawehinmi (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 660) 228 (SC) is fully in force in the NIC. The Supreme Court held that:

“When there is no provision as to the procedure to be followed in enforcing the jurisdiction conferred, the plaintiff is entitled to bring the case in the usual form of an action and have it heard. This is because courts make less fuss about complaints based solely on adjectival law that tend only to impede the attainment of justice…’ – [293, E-F; 321, B-D]

An aggrieved person can enforce his rights under the African Charter by way of an action commenced by a writ or by any other permissible procedure such as the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1978. It follows that either the procedure for fundamental rights, or judicial review or common law or statutory procedure for obtaining declarations, an injunction or damages may be used where appropriate. On this case, the Court of Appeal was wrong to have held that the respondent commenced his action under the Charter by way of a wrong procedure and the trial court similarly wrongly declined jurisdiction to entertain the action for the same reason.” – [293-294, F-A; 348-349, H-B, E-F]

Similarly the Supreme Court in FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu (2003) LPELR-3173 (SC) has recently reinforced the above-quoted ratio in Abacha v. Fawehinmi with greater vigour by removing the lingering shade of restriction in Abacha v. Fawehinmi, which obliquely restricted the flexibility to only where there is vacuum, by negating this restriction in the following beautiful words:

“The manner in which the court is approached for the enforcement of a fundamental right is hardly objectionable once it is clear that the originating court process seeks redress for the infringement of the right so guaranteed under the Constitution. The court process could come by the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules or by originating summons: see Saude v. Abdullahi (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 116) 387. That seems to underline the concerns in regard to redressing a contravention of a fundamental right by liberalizing the type of originating process without the person affected being inhibited by the form of action he adopts. It is enough if his complaint is understood and deserves to be entertained.” 

The law, as laid down by the Supreme Court in 2003 in FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu, is that, the important thing is understanding the complaint, once understood, form shall not matter, such action brought on Chapter IV of the Constitution should be heard, even against the rules of the court and, being the latest, that is the extant on the issue. The NIC, being a labour court, makes much less fuss about procedure and technicalities but a lot of desire to do substantial justice and would readily jettison any of its procedural rules that tend to impede substantial justice much more than the Federal High Court, State High Court and, the High Court of the FCT [hereinafter jointly called High Courts] that are common law courts – Order 1, Rs 4 & 9 and Order 5 of the NIC Rules. This is so because labour courts are largely informal in their procedures because litigants often personally litigate their cases and being generally uninformed workers, they cannot be expected to be in the know of the nitty-gritty of procedures. As such the procedures of labour courts around the world are very flexible.

By virtue of Order 1, Rs 4 & 9 and Order 5 of the NIC Rules combined with S. 12-15 of the National Industrial Court Act [NICA] and S. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution, which compositely gives the NIC the overriding vires to do substantial justice against technicality than the High Courts, the NIC can jettison its rules, if it conceives that the FREP Rules better conduce to substantive justice than its rules with regard to the adjudication of breach of fundamental rights. That would be in tandem with its own natural predisposition to do substantial justice and the Supreme Court’s repeated prescriptions in Saude v. Abdullahi (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 116) 419, B-C and, 422, G; Abacha v. Fawehinmi and; FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu [supra]. The Supreme Court clearly laid down the precedent in Saude v. Abdullahi [supra], which it has repeatedly followed that:

“It is my view that it would not matter by what manner that the application has been made, once it is clear that it seeks redress for infringement of the rights so guaranteed under the Constitution. Assuming the Statutory Instrument – S. 1.1 of the 1979 had not been made, the person seeking redress could bring the action to court in any manner that clearly depicts complaint of the infringement of the Rights. Indeed the Statutory Instrument is so clearly worded that it does not lay the procedure therein as the only procedure by which redress could be sought. 

Fundamental Rights are important and they are not just mere rights. They are fundamental. They belong to the citizen. These Rights have always existed even before orderliness prescribed rules for the manner they are to be sought.”

If the High Courts, a set of courts rooted in common law technicalities, are made to treat the procedure of challenging the violation of fundamental rights with flexibility, the NIC, a labour court that normally downplays procedures for substantial justice, has no business at all to insist on strict form for seeking redress for violation of fundamental rights over which it has jurisdiction. It was actually in deference to the Supreme Court’s settled decisions in Saude v. Abdullahi, Abacha v. Fawehinmi as reinforced more emphatically by FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu that, the Hon. the CJN, in order not to deny citizens the extraordinary rights conferred in fundamental rights by reason of mere form, decided that there must be marked flexibility in the procedure of commencement of actions for breach of fundamental rights, and reflected this as improvement in the extant 2009 FREP Rules and its Order 2 R 2 in order to correct the defect in the 1978 FREP Rules:

“An application for the enforcement of the Fundamental Right may be made by any originating process accepted by the Court which shall, subject to the provisions of these Rules, lie without leave of Court.”

In virtue of Order 1, Rs 4 & 9 and Order 5 of the NIC Rules, none of the rules in the NIC Rules is compulsory against substantial justice. The NIC therefore cannot defer from the very commendable approach to the issue laid down by the Supreme Court in the above-quoted three cases, even though, not bound by the FREP Rules, as the NIC is bound by the Supreme Court’s pertinent decisions on the issue that, enforcement of fundamental rights must not be bugged down by strict adherence to forms of actions and that; once the complaints are clear and understood by the court, it must assume jurisdiction to determine the questions of breach of fundamental rights raised irrespective of the form by which the action was commenced.  That is in tune with the extraordinary nature of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court’s decisions in these three pertinent cases, being on Chapter IV of the Constitution, over which the NIC also exercises jurisdiction, is fully binding on the NIC, just like the High Courts. That being the pertinent law, the NIC must kowtow.

Therefore, any mode of commencement of actions for the enforcement of fundamental rights must be acceptable to the NIC once it makes it easy, quick and efficient to attend to the complaints therein. S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, which confers the NIC with jurisdiction on fundamental rights as they relate to industrial relations and workplace occurrences actually presupposes that originating applications or motions in the nature of the FREP Rules are ordinarily the appropriate processes to apply or enforce fundamental rights in the NIC, taking a cue from how its jurisdiction thereon is couched. Its jurisdiction is couched in terms of interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV, that being the usual method, since time immemorial; by which suits for the application or enforcement of statutory provisions or rights are begun. The jurisdiction could not be couched in terms of application and we begin to talk about pleadings to commence the actions thereto. Originating applications otherwise called originating motions better commence them.

Such suits have always been begun by originating processes like petitions, applications and motions or other similar originating processes, praying for the application or enforcement of the rights created in the statutes, as they relate to their cases. For example, the Indian case of J. Aswartha Narayana v. The State of Ap[1] [delivered December 17, 2021], was begun with writ petition[2] with accompanying affidavit. The NIC’s locus classicus on the enforcement of fundamental rights as they relate to industrial relations: Oreka Maiya v. The Incorporated Trustees of Clinton Health Access Initiative Nigeria & Ors[3]; was equally brought by originating application under the FREP Rules with affidavit as the pleading and evidence. Even under common law, suits asking for enforcement of rights were normally begun under the petition of rights, which were normally accompanied with affidavits. This is so because, normally, fundamental rights are of the nature that is extrinsic to the merits of cases but intrinsic to the procedures and for these reasons, facts relating to their breaches are not often disputed and are most often easily proved. What are often disputed are the interpretation and application of the statutory provisions to the factual situations.

For example, if a person says, on account of sex she was discriminated against by the virtue of conditions of service in the Staff Handbook, there can be no dispute on the fact on which the discrimination is alleged. The dispute would now be on the reason informing the policy and the decision would be whether there is specific job requirement sufficient to justify an exception to violation of S. 42 of the Constitution. Likewise, if the complaint is that of illegal detention, the fact of the detention is not often disputed and, what the court looks at is the nature of the offence alleged against the victim, whether there is a court within forty kilometer radius of the detention facility, was the victim taken to a court within the time limit, and if there is no court within forty kilometer radius, was the time limit complied with, if not, is there any exculpating circumstances to warrant exception to violation of S. 35(5) of the Constitution. For example, if a person says his earned salary was not paid and thereby his fundamental rights to life, dignity of human person and to property were infringed, there is usually no dispute about the non-payment. What might be disputed is the result of the application of the law to the circumstances warranting the non-payment to see if they are exculpatory of SS. 33, 34 & 44(1) of the Constitution.

Likewise, it is not often difficult to prove that a person was not heard at all before decisions were taken against him or her as it is for the respondent to show how he or she heard the victim. It is like that in virtually all instances of alleged violation of fundamental rights. Only applications of the law are often disputed. This is because like I said earlier on, they are normally extrinsic to the disputes but intrinsic to the procedure. For these reasons, it is often sheer waste of time to insist that such cases be commenced by way of pleadings. While there might be few instances of seriously disputed facts, this is the reason why there must be flexibility for the victim to choose, which originating process is most suited to his grievance with respect to speed and efficiency and the court retains the power to order specific originating process where it comes to the conclusion that the proposed originating process would not work efficiently.  

The marked distinction between jurisdiction and power must be underscored here because; there have been arguments that the NIC has no jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights, as it is not mentioned in S. 46 of the Constitution and the FREP Rules – Abdullahi Saliu Ishola et al, “Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court in Human Rights Enforcement in Nigeria: Lessons From South Africa[4]”. The NIC has also held in Thomas Inebui v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2014) 47 NLLR 221, A-C; Comrade (Evang.) Olowo Preye Grace v. PENGASSAN & Ors[5] and; Akinsola v. NURTW & Ors (2013) NLLR (Pt. 96) 399, that the NIC was not contemplated in the FREP Rules and as such, an action cannot be commenced at the NIC via the FREP Rules. That is only true at the superficial level as the Hon. the CJN, by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(d)&254F(1) of the Constitution lacks the vires to make rules for the NIC on any aspect of its jurisdiction, including Chapter IV of the Constitution, but the fact remains that Chapter IV of the Constitution, on which the NIC now exercises jurisdiction as they relate to industrial relations and workplace occurrences, the NIC is so contemplated, as the High Courts originally had composite jurisdiction on Chapter IV of the Constitution before the bifurcation in favour of the NIC.

So, in a way, in as much as we are talking about enforcement of fundamental rights, which is contemplated by the FREP Rules, the NIC, which postdates the FREP Rules, contemplates the use of the FREP Rules, where appropriate, especially when it is remembered that the NIC can exercise all the powers of the High Courts, which includes the powers granted in the FREP Rules – SS. 6(1), (3), (5)(cc), 6(a)&(b), 254A-(1)&254D-(1) of the Constitution, 12-15 & 54(1)&(2) of the NICA and Order 1, Rs 4 & 9 and Order 5 of the NIC Rules. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Saude v. Abdullahi, Abacha v. Fawehinmi and, FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu [supra], as explained earlier, have actually made the objection a non-starter. Therefore, whether it is the FREP Rules that contemplate the NIC or the other way round, does not matter: it is the same difference. Therefore, the NIC, by its voluntary choice can elect the use of the FREP Rules. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that the FREP Rules did not confer jurisdiction on the High Courts but only procedural powers relating to how to file and adjudicate fundamental right actions: the procedure of litigating, hearing and determining fundamental right actions. Also, S. 46 of the Constitution did not confer fundamental rights jurisdiction on the NIC but S. 254C-(1)(d).

And by dint of the above facts, the NIC, pursuant to SS. 6(1), (3), (5)(cc) & (6)(a)-(b), 254A-(1)&254D-(1) of the Constitution and S. 54(1)&(2) of the NICA, which give it the right to exercise all the powers of a High Court, which includes the powers conferred on the High Courts by the FREP Rules, construed along with Order 1, Rs 4 & 9(1)-(3) and Order 5 of the NIC Rules, which gives it the power to borrow the rules of any other court and, to discard any of its rules embodying technical irregularity, which might impede substantial justice, undoubtedly has the vires to entertain an application filed under the FREP Rules or any other rules deemed permissible by it, where there is inadequacy in its own rules regarding the matter or if it conceives that the FREP Rules conduces better to substantive justice than its own rules. And when its jurisdiction is activated pursuant to the FREP Rules, and it exercises its powers, distinct from its jurisdiction in this regard, it does not thereby exercise them under S. 46 of the Constitution or pursuant to the FREP Rules but purely under SS. 6(1), (3), (5)(cc) & (6)(a)-(b), 254A-(1)&254C-(1)(d); 245D-(1) & 254F-(1) of the Constitution and SS. 12-19 & 54(1)&(2) of the NICA. And for this purpose, the FREP Rules become its own rules by legal fiction or fiction of law[6].

And I find that serious inadequacies exist in the NIC Rules relating to litigation of fundamental rights. Order 3, R 1(c) of the NIC Rules provides for originating motion as a means of commencing actions in the NIC without specifying the types of actions that are to be so commenced under it while Order 3, R 2(b), which says, where a suit is for interpretation and application of fundamental rights, it must be begun with complaints, is obviously at variance with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Saude v. Abdullahi; Abacha v. Fawehinmi and, FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu [supra] and Order 1, Rs 4 & 9 and Order 5 of the NIC Rules which demand flexibility in the application of the NIC Rules. Besides the fact that Order 3, R 2(b) of the NIC Rules does not conduce with flexibility and the power to waive non-compliance with the NIC Rules, it does not also conduce with speed and efficiency and thus, run counter to Order 1, R. 4 of the NIC Rules. And also, there is the failure of the NIC Rules to make provisions for commencement of actions pursuant to fundamental rights contained in other statutes than Chapter IV of the Constitution. I think the NIC must study the FREP Rules very carefully for an improvement on its own rules.

And the NIC has the greatest burden to apply the fundamental rights in other statutes by reason of its jurisdiction under S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution. For the foregoing reasons, the commencement of this suit seeking redress for the alleged violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights via the FREP Rules is proper. The FREP Rules can properly activate the NIC’s jurisdiction once the applicant’s complaints are clearly understood and the Court can effectively deal with the complaints i.e. effectively adjudicate the complaints via the vehicle of the FREP Rules employed to activate its jurisdiction. I have carefully read the processes in this suit and believe I can more conveniently and efficiently adjudicate the case under the FREP Rules and than under complaint. And, according to the Supreme Court in Saude v. Abdullahi, Abacha v. Fawehinmi and FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu, that is what matters. And I so hold.

For all practical purposes, where the questions concerned the adjudication of cases over which the NIC has non-obstante jurisdiction, it is a High Court and, much more, by virtue of the combined effects of SS. 254D-(1) of the Constitution, 12-19 & 54(1)&(2) of the NICA, which gives the NIC exclusive powers to make all the orders the High Courts can make and the powers to make more orders than are permissible in the High Courts. And it must be noted that S. 46(2) of the Constitution, directly and expressly subjects itself to all other provisions of the Constitution. I found this has not been reflected upon in all the authorities and legal writings post-Third Alteration Act that I have read. I believe if this had been adverted to, the insistence that the High Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights, as main claims, even when the causes of action arose from a workplace or from industrial relations, would have been pursued with caution. S. 46(2) of the Constitution cannot therefore be urged to whittle down the non-obstante jurisdiction of the NIC over fundamental right questions as they relate to labour relations or matters that arose from workplace. This is more particularly so, as S. 46(2) of the Constitution directly gives room for any other court to have original jurisdiction over the hearing and determination of any application for redress of breach or threatened breach of fundamental rights, notwithstanding the provisions of S. 46(1) of the Constitution, provided this is constitutionally sanctioned. And S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution sanctioned the NIC’s exclusive civil jurisdiction in this wise.

It must be noted that the FREP Rules, though made pursuant to S. 46 of the Constitution, is nevertheless a subsidiary legislation and could therefore not negate S. 54(1)&(2) of the NICA and Order 1, R 9 of the NIC Rules, aside the fact that, S. 254D-(1) of the Constitution is superior to the FREP Rules, being direct constitutional provision, granting the NIC all the powers of a High Court, of which the powers contained in the FREP Rules are part. It must be noted too that, S. 254D-(1) of the Constitution now directly validates S. 54(1)&(2) of the NICA and that, S. 46(2) of the Constitution, granting the High Courts original jurisdiction on matters contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution directly subjects itself to all the other provisions of the Constitution, meaning that, S. 46 is even subject to all other provisions of the Constitution, aside the extraordinary non-obstante provisions of S. 254C, which makes S. 46 of the Constitution much more subject to S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution. All other authorities on this issue did not consider the implications of SS. 6(1), (3), (5)(cc), (6)(a) & (b), 254A-(1)&254D-(1) of the Constitution, 12-19 & 54(1)&(2) of the NICA; Order 1, Rs. 4 & 9(1)-(3) and Order 5 of the NIC Rules nor, do they take into consideration the Supreme Court’s decisions in Suade v. Abdullahi; Abacha v. Fawehinmi and FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu [supra] and the self-limiting proviso in S. 46(2) of the Constitution. For these reasons, they cannot be authorities for this case, where these statutory provisions are newly construed. And I so hold.     

The argument that breach of labour/employment rights cannot amount to breach of fundamental right is also, with the utmost respect, not correct under the current configuration of the Third Alteration Act. That might have been the position before the enactment of the Third Alteration Act but since the inception of the Third Alteration Act, the position has radically transformed such that, the former authorities could no longer be applicable to the current state of the law – Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola (2020) LPELR-51806 (CA) to the effect that, the Third Alteration Act revolutionised labour law in Nigeria. By virtue of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, this Court is bound to take into consideration in its adjudication of labour cases, questions of international best practices, conventions and international labour standards. SS. 33, 34, 35 & 44(1) of the Constitution guarantee the rights to life, the right to dignity of human person and, the right to personal liberty and, property.

The right to dignity of human person forbids degrading or inhuman treatments and subjection to slavery or servitude. S. 44 of the Constitution guarantees right to property in Nigeria. Arts 4, 5, 6, 17, 23 & 30 of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights[7] [UDHR] to which Nigeria is signatory[8], having been admitted as member of the UN in 1960[9], guarantee the rights: not to be enslaved, against cruel treatment, to be treated equally, to own property, to income [salary] and, above all, Art 30 prohibits all persons and authorities from interfering with the rights guaranteed under the treaty. Having made provisions on the basic labour rights as fundamental rights, S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution makes these international best practices contained in this treaty applicable in Nigeria together with the associated Arts in line with composite construction of composite instruments. This is in tandem with the objective of expansive construction of Chapter IV of the Constitution as envisaged under Para 3(a) of the Preamble to the FREP Rules. Part of the complaints in this suit is failure to pay salaries as ancillary claims. And the superior courts in India, including the Indian Supreme Court, in interpreting similar provisions of the Indian Constitution and associated treaties, have derived inspirations from these treaties and repeatedly held that, right to salary is fundamental right to life and property and that, arbitrary refusal to pay earned salary, amounts to violation of fundamental rights: to life & property; rights against inhuman and degrading treatments under the Indian Constitution – J. Aswartha Narayana v. The State of Ap [supra].

Rule 2 of the FREP Rules defines fundamental rights as encompassing the rights contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution and the rights contained in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act [ACHPRA] and, such rights in other similar international instruments – Para 3(b) of the Preamble to the FREP Rules. This signifies that fundamental rights in Nigeria, like in Indian, are not only contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution. Art 14 of the ACHPRA guarantees right to property and that, right to property could only be lawfully violated in accordance with a law that is just and, Art 35 of the ACHPRA guarantees right to work under equitable and satisfactory conditions, which includes, equal pay for equal work. Implicit in “equal pay for equal work” is the plenitude that, the right to pay for work done is pedestal and totally inviolate as fundamental right because, the right to pay for work done must be logically implied as more fundamental than the right to equal pay for equal work, which has been elevated to fundamental right. A worker must first enjoy right against whimsical seizure of his salary before he begins to talk of right to equal pay for equal work. Art 23 of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights directly guarantees right to salary.

Hence, right to pay earned wages/salaries is fundamental right in Nigeria and could be sued upon or enforced alone as breach of fundamental right simpliciter in the NIC. This brings to the fore the nature of jurisdiction conferred on the NIC by S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution when construed along with S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution. And it shows that labour rights are generally fundamental rights. And it is clear that the rights cited above are purely situated in labour relations. For further example, S. 254C-(1)(g) of the Constitution provides for the NIC’s jurisdiction on disputes: “relating to or connected with any dispute arising from discrimination or sexual harassment at the workplace”.  Likewise is S. 254C-(1)(i), which gives the NIC exclusive jurisdiction on child labour, child abuse and human trafficking and matters connected with them. You will agree with me that these are elongations of SS. 34&42 of the Constitution purely as fundamental rights within industrial relation and workplace occurrences. It is thus made manifest that the intendment of the non-obstante provisions of S. 254C-(1)(d)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution is to make the breach of fundamental rights as they relate to labour relations enforceable in the NIC as main claims.

Likewise, the right to personal liberty within the context of industrial relations or workplace events, if violated, could only be sued upon in the NIC, as the main claim, as is the main complaint here. Likewise is violation of fundamental right to privacy in cases of unlawful access to the medical records of employees by their employers for the purposes of employment discrimination can only be redressed in the NIC as main claims simpliciter. Most of the rights covered by Chapter IV of the Constitution are also replicated in ILO instruments and other international bills of rights verging on labour relations, which are applicable as fundamental rights in Nigeria by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution and are often resorted to, to construe the nuances of the provisions of Chapter IV in labour relations. Para 3(a)&(b)(i)-(ii)&(c) of the Preamble to the FREP Rules similarly expects the High Courts to do similar extrapolative expansive construction of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution imported from other international bills of rights but only on non-labour instruments because of non-obstante S. 254C-(1)&(2) of the Constitution.

That this is so is gathered from S. 254C-(1)(a)&(d) of the Constitution, and particularly from the phrase “matters arising from workplace”, which connotes any civil matter that arose in the worksite. “Matters arising from workplace” connotes main claims and is markedly distinct from the other phrases like “arising from” “relating to”, “incidental to” and “connected with” that surfeit S. 254C-(1)(a) and must enjoy its distinctive flavour within the context of its use therein. While all the other phrases connote ancillary, accessory and secondary matters, the radical phrase “matters arising from workplace” connotes independent causes of action, which stand alone, and could be sued upon independently as main causes of action. Otherwise, it would not have been used there, if the intention were to make no difference from the other phrases. Legislatures use no words in vain. NIC’s jurisdiction on fundamental rights is tied to all the matters over which it has exclusive civil jurisdiction and by virtue of the phrase “matters arising from workplace” the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over fundamental rights issues arising from the arrest of a worker at his workplace in relation to allegations of breach of contract of employment, which also amounts to crimes, being that, a civil matter that arose in the worksite and in the course of industrial relations. Let me reproduce the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(a)&(d) of the Constitution in order to clarify this issue beyond disputation:

“254C-(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters –

(a) relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith;

(b) …

(c) …

(d) relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution as it relates to any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer’s association or any other matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine.”

This shows clearly that any such infringement could singly be isolated as main claim for trial [interpretation and application] in the NIC. The Court of Appeal’s decisions in MHWUN v. Ehigiegba (2018) LPELR-44972 (CA) and Omang v. Nsa (2021) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1781), even though, did not specifically consider the phrase “matters arising from workplace” but only considered the phrases “incidental to” “connected with”, it is clear they both said the NIC has extensive jurisdiction on anything connected with labour. When effect is given to the phrase “matters arising from workplace” which I have not found construed in any authority, but being part and parcel of the NIC’s exclusive civil jurisdiction, it must be construed and given effect. It cannot be left as if it did not exist. If the other phrases have been construed to give the NIC expansive jurisdiction on any matter connected with labour/industrial relations, when the construction of the phrase “matters arising from workplace” is taken into consideration, it must add something different to the meaning and, this can only mean that all civil matters without distinction, that arise from workplace, the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over them.

The use of the word “workplace” is deliberate. It is to make a distinction from matters “relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations”. That is why the phrase began again with “matters…” to mark it out as capturing entirely different set of matters distinct from the ones captured before it. The meaning of workplace is then significant in this wise.

Article 2(c) of the ILO R164 says: “the term workplace covers all places where workers need to be or go by reason of their work and which are under the direct or indirect control of the employer.” In fact, this definition was a direct adoption of Article 3(c) of the ILO C155, the parent Convention of R164. Nigeria ratified ILO C155 May 3, 1994 and by virtue of S. 254C-(2) of the Constitution, it is fully applicable in Nigeria. ILO R164 made pursuant to it is automatically fully applicable in Nigeria too by the doctrine of incorporation by reference – Northern Assurance Co. Ltd v. Wuraola (1969) LPELR-25562 (SC) 11-13, C-E and Iwuoha v. Nigerian Railway Corporation (1997) LPELR-1570 (SC) 16, A-C. In any case, the ILO regards recommendations that are made pursuant to a Convention, as part of the parent Convention. Either the applicant in the instant suit was arrested at the 1^st respondent premises and taken to the police station as deposed by him or, he was arrested inside the vehicle he allegedly absconded with, the fact remains that the vehicle was his place of work by the definition quoted above; and as such, the cause of action crystalised in the workplace and comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NIC by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(a)&(d) of the Constitution for the purposes of hearing and determining the questions of the alleged breach of the applicant’s fundamental rights that arose from the complaints and in the course of industrial relations.

In any case, the complaints arose from industrial relations and are closely connected with industrial relations and the NIC would still have had jurisdiction had the clause “matters arising from workplace” not been inserted into S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution and doubly has, because the jurisdiction of the NIC covers all matters that arose from the workplace. The phrase “matters arising from workplace” removes any iota of doubt on the exclusive civil jurisdiction of the NIC in this regard. In a nutshell, “matters arising from workplace” denotes independent and main causes of action that arose from the workplace. It therefore covers the alleged unlawful arrests allegedly instigated by the employer in the course of industrial relations or arising from workplace. So, the NIC has the exclusive civil jurisdiction to enforce the alleged breach of fundamental rights in this regard and I so hold. The complaints here could also be sued upon as breach of fundamental rights under ILO C190.

In the same manner discrimination on account of sex in employment relations could be sued upon, as breach of fundament right simpliciter at the NIC exclusively, as was the case in Oreka Maiya v. The Incorporated Trustees of Clinton Health Access Initiative Nigeria & Ors[10], which was commenced via originating motion pursuant to Order 2 of the FREP Rules by a female employee for discrimination against her on account of pregnancy, as breach of fundamental rights simpliciter under SS. 34(1)(a), 42 and 254C(1)(d)(f) & (g) of the Constitution and Arts 2, 5, 15 & 19 of the ACHPRA. And the NIC lawfully assumed exclusive jurisdiction and found for the claimant. Hypothetically too, where there is published, guidelines for interview for jobs in Nigeria, specifying that people from certain tribes are not eligible, a prospective employee negatively affected by these guidelines could take a preemptive action at the NIC, by filing an application to enforce [apply] his/her fundamental right against discrimination in employment simpliciter as the main claim. Such prospective employee could also take action while the recruitment is still ongoing to seek redress for the continuing violation of his/her fundamental rights against discrimination. Other good examples are the various regulations in the police and paramilitary institutions, barring women from marrying without the consent of the police or other similar paramilitary authorities, which restrictions are not extended to their male counterparts and also, the regulations that forbid unmarried policewomen from being pregnant without being married, at the pains of dismissal.

The above infringements are purely situated within employment relations and are violative of workplace rights as fundamental rights – Regulations 126 & 127 of the Nigeria Police Regulations made under the Police Act Cap. 19, LFN, 2004 are impacted. These regulations and similar others could only be sued upon in the NIC as the main cause of action exclusively, as violative of the fundamental rights enshrined in SS. 37, 42, 254C-(1)(g) of the Constitution, the UN CEDAW and, the ILO Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111) [C111] and, its Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Recommendation, 1958 (No. 111) [R111] simpliciter, as the main claims by any impacted female security personnel. In the same manner, right to unionise and to go on strikes [S. 254C-(1)(C) of the Constitution] specifically guaranteed by S. 40 of the Constitution, are fundamental rights exclusively situated in industrial relations, even in their abstract state, when construed with S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution.

It would be difficult in the extreme to think that the High Courts would continue to have jurisdiction on the enforcement in these hypothetical examples, as main causes of action when S. 254C-(1)(a) & (c)-(d) of the Constitution has ceded to the NIC non-obstante jurisdiction over these matters. And it becomes more difficult to fathom how the High Courts would be able to effectively exercise their jurisdiction thereto, when they lack jurisdiction to apply international best practices, international labour standards, conventions and instruments, which are often resorted to, to delineate the breadth of these fundamental rights within the context of industrial relations. International best practices and international labour standards and treaties beam light of clarity on the meanings of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution as they relate to industrial relations and workplace disputes and could only be sidetracked at serious detriments to the fundamental rights of citizens as they relate to workplace and industrial relations.      

The in-thing in labour jurisprudence around the world these days is that, some labour rights and, including the right to payment for work done, rights against discriminations at workplaces on accounts of race, colour, political leanings, and discrimination, especially against women and sexual harassments, and rights against violence at workplace and harassments generally, are treated as fundamental human rights across the globe[11]. And more important is the fact that, in the determination of these fundamental rights’ questions, the extrapolative all pervasive influence of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution hovers over them, as a guide on the determination of the expanse of these rights in the context of industrial relations and workplace occurrences over which the High Courts lack jurisdiction – S. 254C-(1) of the Constitution. These are the things S. 254C-(1)(a)&(d) of the Constitution covered when it talks about “matters arising from workplace”, which might not be known to non-experts in labour law and which might make the NIC’s expansive jurisdiction under the Third Alteration Act look strange. But with this explanation, things are made clear and readily plausible.

Hence, by virtue of the non-obstante S. 254C-(1)(d), (f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, which now enjoins the NIC to take cognisance of international best practices, conventions, international labour standards and, treaties, all previous authorities decided prior to the Third Alteration Act or after the enactment of the Third Alteration Act, which did not consider the implications of the combined effects of S. 254C-(1)(d), (f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution in relation to the application of international best practices and international labour standards and conventions to the adjudication of labour matters in the area of fundamental rights as they relate to industrial relations and workplace disputes, are distinguished from the facts of the present case, wherein these are being now newly considered in line with Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola [supra]. They are therefore not authorities for this case, wherein the applicability of these provisions to the question of rights to personal liberty and dignity of human person and right to payment of wages is considered as fundamental rights in line with international best practices in labour relations, conventions and international labour standards and its violation, as violative of fundamental rights to life and dignity of human person. Virtually all the rights covered by Chapter IV of the Constitution and much more are covered by ILO Conventions as fundamental human rights in employment relations.

It is also necessary to draw attention to the fact that, the rights secured in S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution are actually more fundamental rights, that are even superior to the rights secured in Chapter IV of the Constitution by reason of their non-obstante status, which make them stand above all other provisions of the Constitution, including the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution. I do not think that this fact is noted. The reason for this is that, apart from life itself, labour is the next most important factor that sustains life, without food and other necessaries, life expires and labour relations are the only means by which food and all other necessaries of life are produced; which is the reason the ILO predates the League of Nations and UNO with the agenda that peace can only be attained in the world if labour rights are well secured as universal rights thus, its Conventions as preeminent fundamental rights. In fact, the ILO was created in 1919 as part of the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War[12].   

But the fact remains that the rights secured in S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2), are outside the confines of Chapter IV of the Constitution and therefore, outside the confines of S. 46 of the Constitution and the FREP Rules. But they could be enforced lawfully too under the FREP Rules or any other rules like the originating motion provided by Order 3, R 1(c) of the NIC Rules. Applications under the FREP Rules are actually originating motions by virtue of the definition of “originating application” under Order 2 of the FREP Rules. After all, the FREP Rules extended the frontiers of the fundamental rights beyond the confines of Chapter IV of the Constitution to the ACHPRA and made the ACHPRA justiciable under the FREP Rules – Order 2 of the FREP Rules, a thing which S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution did much better for labour rights, by which rights contained in the labour treaties are made fundamental rights that, are even above Chapter IV of the Constitution. But it must be noted that when the NIC’s jurisdiction is activated under the FREP Rules, its jurisdiction is not thereby activated pursuant to S. 46 of the Constitution, but purely, pursuant to S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution by way of legal fiction, as explained earlier in this decision.

S. 254D-(1) of the Constitution and Order 1, Rule 9 of the NIC Rules only borrowed the vehicle of the FREP Rules to carry the soul, spirit and body of the NIC’s jurisdiction under S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution to its destination of applying or enforcing fundamental rights, as they relate to industrial relations. It is a universal legal practice that coordinate courts or superior courts borrow procedural rules from themselves or even from foreign courts, to fill the vacuums in their own rules and, this does not mean the borrowing court exercises the jurisdiction of the court from which it borrows. It still exercises its own jurisdiction. And for that period and purpose, by the legal fiction engendered by S. 254D-(1) of the Constitution and Order 1, Rs 4&9 of the NIC Rules, the borrowed rules become that of the borrowing court, i.e. the NIC in this instance, as if they were originally made by the NIC. That is the essence of the legal fiction. That the above surmise is correct is underscored by the Supreme Court when it underlined the need to be flexible on the procedure of litigating fundamental rights in Saude v. Abdullahi and FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu [supra] and held that, any originating process that makes clear the grievance, is sacrosanct. Whether the NIC is mentioned in S. 46 of the Constitution and the FREP Rules is immaterial, as it does not exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate fundamental-rights under S. 46 of the Constitution and the FREP Rules, but pursuant to S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution while it is listed as a superior court in S. 6(5)(cc) of the Constitution. That is what matters.

 The law in the NIC is that, notwithstanding non-compliance with its rules, the important thing is substantial justice of the case. And in this, forms and precedents are mere guides that cannot becloud the doing of substantial justice – Order 1, Rs 4 & 9 & Order 5 of the NIC Rules. And wherever the NIC Rules tend to becloud the doing of substantive justice, the NIC has the burden-duty, by virtue of SS. 254C-(1)(f) of the Constitution, SS. 12-15 of the NICA and Order 1, Rs 4 & 9 and Order 5 of the NIC Rules, to jettison its rules for substantive justice, which is denoted by unhindered access to hearing cases on the merits without undue regard for technicalities. And when one considers the provisions of Order 11, R. 10 of the NIC Rules, which enjoins the NIC to place any matter relating to arrears of salaries on the fast track and, Order 3, R. 12 of the NIC Rules, which gives the details to be met in actions relating to arrears of salaries/wages, which itself is breach of fundamental right, when this is combined with the allegations of direct breach of other fundamental rights, it becomes clear beyond doubt that the applicant employed the best originating process, which was tailor-made for allegations of breach of fundamental rights and has been tested and found to conduce with speed and efficiency, equitable and fair disposal of labour cases, which are the essence of a labour court – Order 1, R 4 of the NIC Rules and Adegboyu v. UBA[13]. The FREP Rules were specially made for fundamental right actions in order to avoid tardiness in matters brought pursuant to Chapter IV of the Constitution. Similar thing was done under the Indian Constitution[14] and it has been applied in that manner in the case of J. Aswartha Narayana v. The State of Ap [supra].

  Why should the procedure be different in the NIC, which even prides speed and efficiency as watchwords in the adjudication of all labour matters, as attested by the Court of Appeal in Adegboyu v. UBA [supra]. To insist on any other originating process than the OM or FREP Rules in this instance, is to encourage delay and crass technicality, which are anathema to labour courts all over the world – Adegboyu v. UBA [supra]. As a matter of fact, the NIC must amend its rules to provide for something similar to the FREP Rules to take care of its adjudication of fundamental right cases with greater efficiency, but in the meantime, the law permits it to borrow the FREP Rules. But even at that, it must still make whatever specific rules it makes in that regard not to appear compulsory just like the FREP Rules did in Order 2, R 2. That would be in obedience to the Supreme Court in Saude v. Abdullahi, Abacha v. Fawehinmi and FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu. Be that as it may, I now move to a related question, which is germane to the NIC’s jurisdiction on fundamental rights as they relate to labour matters.

I move to the question of arguments that the NIC has no jurisdiction over applications for enforcement of fundamental rights or rather, no jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights[15]. This question touches on the substantive jurisdiction of the NIC on fundamental rights as they relate to labour directly. These arguments are based on the use of the words “enforcement” and “enforcing” in S. 46(2) of the Constitution, which conferred the High Courts with jurisdiction and powers over fundamental right issues. I observed that, there have been a lot of literatures on this, both academic and judicial. Let me examine the academic fronts first because; they seemed to lay very strong foundations for the judicial fronts and are well articulated by carefully reviewing the previous judicial authorities on point.

I will look at two highly cerebral but antagonistic representative articles in this regard. The trio of Abdullahi Saliu Ishola, Adekunbi Adeyeye and Daudu Momodu in their learned article titled: “Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court in Human Rights Enforcement in Nigeria: Lessons from South Africa” [supra], argued that when the question is strictly for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the NIC lacks jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the cause of action is situated frankly in industrial relations because, it has no jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights but only jurisdiction for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights as they relate to industrial relations. They sought to make a distinction between interpretation and application at one hand and, enforcement at the other hand. In essence, they posit that the NIC only has jurisdiction to adjudicate fundamental right questions as ancillary and not as main claims.

The learned authors took the view of enforcement as being wider than interpretation and application. They took the view that “application” and “enforcement” are not synonyms and do not collocate, which view, with utmost respect, misread the contexts of their usages in SS. 46(2) & 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution. This error of thought, with the greatest respect, leads to the palpable suggestion that the NIC could only entertain questions of fundamental rights, only if they arose as ancillary matters within a suit and not as the main claim or cause of action. The meanings of words and phrases are determined in contexts and not in abstractions. The truth of the matter is that, while it is true that the word “enforcement” is ordinarily wider than “application” but in judicial parlance, which is our concern here; they are often treated as synonyms and as collocative, especially in adjudication by courts. But before going further, let me state that I shall not delve into the other issues raised in the article, which are not directly relevant to the issue of the NIC’s jurisdiction on fundamental rights. Let us go back to our discussion.

Thus, application or enforcement of fundamental rights simpliciter under the FREP Rules without the interposition of any other cause of action, is tagged main claim or main cause of action, over which the NIC lacks jurisdiction, even if within the context of industrial relations or workplace occurrences, while when mingled with another cause of action, as ancillary claim, and if within the context of industrial relations, the NIC would have ancillary jurisdiction. First, I wish to point out that neither S. 46(1)&(2) nor 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution talked about main claims and ancillary claims. The introduction of these tags is purely interpretative and must be supported by the pertinent contexts of SS. 46(2) and 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, to stand. Secondly, and more importantly, if the idea that the NIC’s jurisdiction on enforcement of fundamental rights questions, is intended to be ancillary, as posited, it would not have been necessary at all, to make the special provisions of S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, as all courts, including even the inferior courts and tribunals, have the jurisdictions to interpret, apply and enforce the Constitution, including the provisions of Chapter IV, as incidentals to all matters over which they have jurisdiction, the Constitution being the grundnorm from which all other laws spring, has bearings on the construction, meanings and efficaciousness of all other laws.

Thus, the magistrates’ courts, even customary courts and other inferior courts and tribunals, apply or enforce the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution daily, as incidentals or ancillaries or accessories or secondary to the main causes of actions brought before them, without reliance on S. 46 of the Constitution and the FREP Rules. That this is so is made clearly manifest by S. 295(1) of the Constitution, which provides for reference of substantial questions of law as to the interpretation and application of the Constitution from the inferior courts to the High Courts and the NIC. By virtue of SS. 251(1), 257(1), 272(1) of the Constitution, the High Courts have jurisdiction to apply or enforce all the provisions of the Constitution, including the fundamental rights provisions of Chapter IV as ancillary, incidental, accessory and secondary to all the main causes of action before them without any further assurances and, they do this daily. Likewise do the Customary Courts of Appeal and Sharia Courts of Appeal have the jurisdictions to apply and enforce the provisions of Chapter IV as accessory within the matters before them, by virtue of the relevant constitutional provisions relating to their jurisdictions.

It would be seen too that S. 295(2) of the Constitution, which provides for references of substantial questions of law on the interpretation and application of the provisions of the Constitution from the High Courts and the NIC to the Court of Appeal, says without further assurance, that either a High Court or the NIC: “…in which the question arose shall dispose of the case in accordance with that decision” of the Court of Appeal thereto. This clearly implies that, upon application of the law to the facts of a case, a court disposes of a case without further assurances. It shows that making orders or granting reliefs at the end of cases to dispose of cases is part and parcel of application of the law to cases: its very acme. To dispose of a case means to make the necessary consequential orders either in granting the reliefs to which the suer is entitled or the dismissal of the case. It would be seen that the consequential disposal of a case is not repeated with respect to S. 295(3) of the Constitution, which deals with reference of substantial questions of law from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court simply because the Court of Appeal generally has no original jurisdiction to dispose of a matter in terms of deciding the rights of the parties but is only limited to confirming or reversing the decisions of the trial courts.

A careful study of the use of the phrase “practical application of any law in force in Nigeria…” in S. 42(1)(a) of the Constitution and repeated in Subsection (b) shows irrefutably that the word “application” is synonymous with and collocative of “enforcement” in legal parlance because that is the only sense in which the phrase “practical application of any law in Nigeria” could be used in that context. And good enough, this was employed in Chapter IV of the Constitution, which S. 46(1)&(2) and 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution revolved round. It shows the correlative contexts of the usages of the words: “application”, “enforcement” and “enforcing”: as interchangeable in the contexts of their usages in these sections and that, the arguments about a distinction between them is like making a distinction without a difference. One will find that the same phrase “interpretation and application” is not limited regarding the NIC’s jurisdiction to only S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, which deals with its jurisdiction on fundamental rights but extends to S. 254C-(1)(h), (j) &(2), which deals with other aspects of the NIC’s jurisdiction. Are we to infer that the NIC will lack jurisdiction to make the necessary orders to enforce its decisions in the adjudication of cases falling under these other provisions. It would be found that this phrase is employed with respect to statutory provisions and instruments as the usual language that collocate with the enforcement of statutory provisions. Para 1 & 3(a) of the Preamble to the FREP Rules used exactly the same words “applies or interprets” and “interpreted and applied”, just like S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, to denote enforce and enforcement of Chapter IV. By this, it is clear that these words are interchangeable and, are normally used in that manner in legal parlance, especially in adjudications.

The learned authors, Ishola et al, concentrated efforts mainly on construing the meaning of “interpretation” and abandoned “application” as if they mean the same thing. They talked about “application” having connections with law while “enforcement” has to do with rights. Are rights not contained in statutory provisions [laws]? They are and this is particularly true of fundamental rights created in the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution as purely statutory rights. So, when you are applying statutory provisions [laws], it goes without saying that, you are enforcing the rights contained therein. The correlation shows that both terms in the context of adjudication are used interchangeably. English is not an instrument of mathematical precision. And more so, is there really a distinction between “a use to which something is put”, which the learned authors say, “application” is and, “to carry out effectively”, which they say, “enforcement” is? I think the distinction between them is the same difference.   

Thus, S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution has sufficiently clothed the NIC with the general jurisdiction to interpret, apply and enforce the pertinent provisions of the Constitution, including those of Chapter IV that are pertinent or ancillary or incidental or accessory or secondary to the determination of all causes of action over which it has jurisdiction just like the other courts and the inferior courts can do. That S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution specially and specifically provides for NIC’s jurisdiction on Chapter IV of the Constitution, is a pointer to the fact that S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution is not talking about ancillary causes of action but about main causes of action and as a direct answer to S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution in accordance with the special nature of industrial relations law and the specialised nature of the NIC.

The philosophy is clearly to put the NIC in exactly the same footing as the High Courts under S. 46 of the Constitution, with regard to Chapter IV of the Constitution but within the context of industrial relations and workplace occurrences. The unalloyed rule of interpretation is that the legislatures do not use words in vain. The NASS and the State Houses of Assembly could not have inserted S. 254C-(1)(d) into the provisions of S. 254C of the Constitution with the aim of merely repeating what S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution has sufficiently and priorly covered. That S. 254C-(1)(d) is specially inserted into S. 254C-(1) of the Constitution is to serve a purpose different from all the other provisions of S. 254C. And we know the purpose in the context of S. 46(1)&(2), which had earlier done similar thing for the High Courts, as both mentioned Chapter IV of the Constitution as the reason for their separate existences. The NIC, having been subsequently made a superior, but specialised court, has to be specially catered for, with respect to the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts by S. 46 of the Constitution, which is the reason for S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution. This; the learned trio of Ishola et al in their erudite article, failed to appreciate.    

However, Temple Adewari Damiari[16], in his erudite article: “Revisiting the Controversies on the jurisdiction of National Industrial Court of Nigeria over Labour-related Human Rights Matters”, appreciated this and carefully articulated an opposing view to Ishola et al. The learned author reviewed the state of the law and concluded more convincingly, how and why the NIC has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights as main claims as they relate to labour. The learned author consequently showed too that the attempt to make a distinction between application and enforcement for the purpose of thwarting the NIC’s exclusive jurisdiction in that wise is nonstarter. Listen to the learned author:

“What then is the actual purport of Section 46(1)? The provision of Section 46(1) contemplates an action seeking remedy over breach or threatened breach of fundamental rights. This has erroneously been viewed as accommodating only remedies for enforcement and not remedies for interpretation and application of labour-related human rights breaches or threatened breaches. Going by the wordings of Section 46(1) of the Constitution, it is absolutely possible to have a breach or threatened breach upon which a suit may be commenced at the NIC for purposes of interpretation and application of an employee’s fundamental right.”

The learned author gave the hypothetical example of where a boss harasses a female employee on the grounds that she could not perform her duties because of her sex and gender and more particularly so, from a particular tribe in Nigeria and, proceeded to constitute a panel to be headed by himself, to investigate the woman for general inefficiency. The learned author posited that the woman could take a preemptive action to safeguard her fundamental rights: to dignity of human person, against discrimination on account of sex and tribe and, to safeguard her right to fair hearing against the boss being the accuser, prosecutor and judge or, wait till the conclusion of the panel’s deliberations, to challenge the consummated infringements, by applying to the NIC for the interpretation and application of these provisions, as they apply to his/her employment. Clearly, the learned author is of the view that in their acceptations within the contexts of their usages in SS. 46(2) and 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, the words “enforcement” and “application” are collocative and mean the same thing. Evidently, the hypothetical scenario painted above depicts the fundamental rights secured by SS. 34, 36, 42(1)&(2) of the Constitution. I cannot agree more with the learned author’s position, except that he too did not quite appreciate the correlations between “enforcement” and “application” in the contexts in which they were used in SS. 46(2) and 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, even though, while appreciating that both words correlate. Let us now examine the truism that both words mean exactly the same thing in the contexts in which they are employed in SS. 46(2) & 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution.

The words “enforcement” and “application” as used in S. 46(2) and S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution mean exactly the same thing. Both words are synonyms in the contexts and collocate. It must be noted that S. 46(2) of the Constitution has two parts. The first deals with the original jurisdiction of the High Courts over matters contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution as a continuation of S. 46(1) of the Constitution, which grants the High Courts jurisdiction over Chapter IV of the Constitution, by way of elaboration, depicting the nature of the High Courts’ jurisdiction over Chapter IV of the Constitution, as original jurisdiction. The second segment captures the orders, which the High Courts can make or, the powers they can exercise while adjudicating on Chapter IV of the Constitution and these, are after the assumption of jurisdiction pursuant to S. 46(1) and the first segment of S. 46(2) of the Constitution. Thus, it is clear the second part of S. 46(2) of the Constitution did not confer jurisdiction but only the powers to make any orders or issue any writs or give any directions for the purposes of enforcing [applying] or securing the enforcement [application] of the fundamental rights which the suers might be entitled to and, after the High Courts have assumed jurisdiction.

First, it must be noted that S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution did not at any point give the High Courts jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution, but only gives them the jurisdiction to “hear and determine” any application [mark the word “application”] brought for the purposes of seeking redress for breach or threatened breach of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution. That is the jurisdiction granted. And that exactly is the same jurisdiction granted the NIC too. Both used the word “application” in the relevant sections with respect to the jurisdiction granted. It means for both, “application” of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution to the complaints of violations of Chapter IV brought before the courts is the operative word. It must also be noted that S. 46(3) of the Constitution did not also grant power to make rules for the enforcement of fundamental rights but power to: “make rules with respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court for the purposes of this section.”

It is clear from a very careful reading of the entire S. 46(1)-(4) that the High Courts are not at any point granted the jurisdiction [distinction between jurisdiction and power impacted] to enforce fundamental rights, but the jurisdiction to adjudicate applications brought to apply the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution, just like the NIC. This is made more clear when S. 46(4) of the Constitution goes on to reinforce the second segment of S. 46(2), by saying, the NASS can grant additional powers: “…necessary or desirable for the purpose of enabling the court more effectively to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by this section”. Note that, the words: “enforce” and “enforcement”: used in S. 46(2) were abandoned in S. 46(4), which is a continuation of the second segment of S. 46(2) and, the concentration was on “powers” and “jurisdiction”, showing clearly that the words “enforcement” and “enforcing” that appeared in S. 46(2) are used strictly in relation to powers, which had been erroneously interpreted to impact jurisdiction. S. 46(4) clearly marked the distinction between power and jurisdiction and, these powers are made manifest, as purely necessary for the purposes of better effectuating the jurisdiction conferred. It is therefore erroneous to have, by this, inferred that S. 46(2) in its second segment gives the High Courts jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights. It does not. It is S. 46(1) and the first part of subsection (2) that give the High Courts jurisdiction thereto, while the second part gives powers.

From the foregoing, it is self-evident that the words “enforcing” and “enforcement” that appeared in the second segment of S. 46(2) are relative to the powers: orders, writs, directions etc. that the High Courts could exercise in the course of adjudicating applications brought for the purposes of applying [enforcing] the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution. The issue of enforcing or enforcement only comes up in relation to the powers of the High Courts to make any orders, issue any writs or any directions for the purposes of effectuating their decisions on the application of the provisions of Chapter IV. From this arose the mistaken conception that fundamental rights are standalone concepts, which could be applied or enforced in the abstracts, without contexts. This, I beg with respect to say, is not correct. Fundamental rights cannot be applied or enforced in vacuum, as their existences can only be made known in contexts and, they could only be violated or breached in contexts. They are contextual rights, which contexts cannot be divorced from their adjudications. That S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution now says the NIC will interpret and apply them in the context of industrial relations and workplace occurrences does not mean that the NIC can only apply them as ancillary matters within other labour disputes. They are always enforced or applied in the contexts in which their violations occurred in the High Courts too, just like in the NIC. The reliefs claimed and how the complaints are framed determine whether they are the main causes of action simpliciter or ancillary. That has no effect on the contexts.  

So, the idea of their enforcement or application simpliciter can only be, and it is, a relative term and not absolute or abstract. The truism of this argument is proved by the fact that, the superior courts of first instance in Nigeria [the High Courts], before the Third Alteration Act, were jointly given the jurisdiction to apply Chapter IV and these courts, equally had jurisdiction over all subjects relative to the fundamental rights, the only divergence being on the parties with regards to the Federal High Court. It was therefore not necessary that time to stress the contexts of their application, which was why the context was not stressed but had to be stressed now, with respect to the NIC which is a specialised court with exclusive jurisdiction to prevent it from going beyond its remits and, prevent the High Court from interfering in its exclusive remits. In that event, the issue of whether application or enforcement of fundamental rights was in the context of industrial relations could not and did not arise in the High Courts, since they all alike hitherto had jurisdiction over labour relations and all subject matters relative to the adjudication of fundamental rights within their territorial jurisdictions.

In this regard, it must be noted that the Federal High Court is not a specialised court but a general jurisdiction court on federal matters exclusively. So, when the NIC was subsequently established as a specialised superior court with exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction on industrial relations, and, which thereby completely cut off this subject non-obstante the High Courts, it is natural that the situation could not remain the same with S. 46 of the Constitution, which was why S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution cuts off the jurisdiction of the High Courts over application [enforcement] of fundamental rights relative to industrial relations and placed it squarely non-obstante in the hands of the NIC and stressed the context in order to avoid confusion, which unfortunately has reared up its head despite the clear attempt to prevent such.

If it is realised that S. 46(2) of the Constitution actually subjects the jurisdiction granted the High Courts to the other provisions of the Constitution, the futility of arguing that the High Courts have exclusive jurisdiction to apply fundamental rights in the context of industrial relations, becomes very apparent. For example, the fundamental right against slavery or servitude only exists relative to labour/industrial relations, likewise the newly created fundamental right to earned salary/wage, which entirely exists in the context of employment relations. Would it be plausible to say applications to apply or enforce these rights simpliciter could only be entertained by the High Courts, to the exclusion of the NIC, even when S. 46(2) of the Constitution itself clearly indicates that another court outside the High Courts could have original exclusive jurisdiction over Chapter IV of the Constitution, provided the Constitution sanctioned it and, S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution clearly grants the NIC exclusive jurisdiction in this regard? The answer is capital no.

The High Courts never had exclusive original jurisdiction over Chapter IV of the Constitution at any point. That this is so, is manifested by S. 46(2), which conferred the High Courts with original jurisdiction on fundamental rights, when it begins thus: “Subject to any other provisions of this Constitution…” To tow the line suggested by the authorities that say only the High Courts can enforce fundamental rights is to grant the High Courts exclusive jurisdiction on all aspects of application of Chapter IV, which S. 46 itself did not grant it. I have not found that attentions have ever been paid to this in any of the literatures I have read and its implications. The Constitution clearly left the room open for interpositional jurisdiction of any other court sanctioned by the Constitution to have original jurisdiction on the application of the provisions of Chapter IV, and this; the Constitution did with regard to the NIC in S. 254C-(1)(d). Let us get this right because, it is important for the understanding of our subsequent discussions. In as much as we agreed that powers, and not jurisdiction, are granted in the second segment of S. 46(2) of the Constitution, and taken into consideration the significance of the distinction between jurisdiction and power - Adigun & Ors v. AG Oyo State & Ors[17] - there is no basis for the contention that the NIC cannot exercise the powers to enforce the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution simpliciter within the context of labour relations and workplace disputes.

The question is: without the second segment of S. 46(2), would the High Courts have had the powers to make their jurisdiction therein fructify? The answer is yes. Exercise of powers to back up superior courts’ decisions is an inherent power in all superior courts – S. 6(6)(a) of the Constitution; Bola & Anor v. Latunde & Anor (1963) LPELR-15475 (SC) and, Ugba & Anor v. Suswan & Ors (2014) LPELR-22882 (SC) 109, A-C. The whole essence of hearing and determining a suit is the making of the necessary orders to secure the enforcement of the decisions reached, which is also the essence of the application of the law to the facts of cases to arrive at the apportionment of rights and wrongs and, the making of the appropriate orders in consonance with the decisions thrown up by the application of the laws to the facts of the cases. That is exactly the purpose, which the words “enforcing” and “enforcement” served in S. 46(2) of the Constitution, in the sense of power to carry into effect the decisions reached i.e. enforcing [applying] the provisions of Chapter IV as distinct from enforcing a judgment, which comes after the decision.

Besides, S. 6(1), (3) & (6)(a)&(b) of the Constitution vests all the superior courts alike with the same powers to make their decisions fructify. When these provisions are construed with S. 6(6)(a), the inescapable conclusion is that, irrespective of the second segment of S. 46(2) of the Constitution, the High Courts would have had the powers to make their decisions on Chapter IV of the Constitution fructify by making the appropriate orders and granting the necessary reliefs. And good enough, S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution is also couched in terms of the NIC having the “jurisdiction to hear and determine” causes of action arising from Chapter IV of the Constitution, as they relate to labour relations exactly like the jurisdiction conferred by S. 46(1)&(2) on the High Courts. “To hear and determine” is actually the very last phrase in S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution. Since it is undoubted that S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution gives the NIC the jurisdiction to interpret and apply [enforce] the provisions of Chapter IV as they relate to industrial relations and workplace occurrences for the purposes of hearing and determination of any suits brought on Chapter IV of the Constitution, it follows that, by dint of S. 6(1), (3), (5)(cc), (6)(a)&(b), 254A-(1)&254D-(1) of the Constitution, together with SS. 13-19 & 54(1)&(2) of the NICA, the NIC is equally imbued with the powers in the second segment of S. 46(2) of the Constitution, to make efficacious its hearing and determination of causes of actions on Chapter IV of the Constitution as they relate to industrial relations.

In any case, as I have hinted earlier on, the words “enforcement” and “application” mean exactly the same thing in the contexts in which they are employed in SS. 46(2) & 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution. The word “application” in S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution could be perfectly replaced with “enforcement” and vice versa. The words “enforcing” and “enforcement” in S. 46(2) of the Constitution could also be perfectly replaced with ‘applying’ and ‘application’. The words “enforcing” and “enforcement” in S 46(2) of the Constitution cannot be divorced from the contexts of “redress” and “hearing and determination” which denote the jurisdiction actually granted the High Courts over Chapter IV of the Constitution, and not the second segment of S. 46(2), which only denotes the powers exercisable after assumption of jurisdiction. When the second segment of S. 46(2) of the Constitution used the words “enforcing” and “enforcement”, they were used to reiterate the word “redress”, which S. 46(1) had earlier employed as the relief which the applicants under Chapter IV of the Constitution may be entitled to, such that, the words “enforcing” and “enforcement” in the second segment of S. 46(2) of the Constitution could also be substituted with ‘redressing’ and ‘redressment’.

Therefore, the words “enforcement” and “application” collocate in the sense in which they were employed in SS. 46(2) and 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution in the sense of adjudication of causes on Chapter IV of the Constitution. In this wise, the Online Thesaurus[18] says  “enforcement” is a noun “as in requirement to obey; implementation of rule(s)” and says, its synonyms are “administration” and “application”. The erudite authors, Remus Daniel Berlingher, Ph.D and Georgeta Valeria Sabau, Ph.D, in their brilliant joint article: “General Considerations on the Enforcement (Application) of Law[19]” showed that, while these words do not collocate generally, as the word “enforcement” is wider than “application” but nevertheless, they mean the same thing [collocate] in the context of judicial adjudication. And for this reason, they are often used in loose sense as the same words. As could be seen, the learned authors showed that both words are synonymous and collocate in the sense of construing and applying statutory provisions, which is why the word “application” is put in bracket as synonym to “enforcement” in the article’s title. Hear how they expatiate on this:

“As regards judicial authorities, however, it should be underlined, in this context, that they do not have competence to issue normative acts, but only acts of individual application (judicial resolutions, decisions, sentences etc.) in relation to specific case.”

What the authors meant by “application” was explained in the enumerated list of the words that follow it in bracket: “(judicial resolutions, decisions, sentences etc.). Clear from the above is that when used in relation to adjudication of cases before judgment, the words “application” and “enforcement” collocate and mean that, in the application of the law to the facts of the case, the court engages, amongst others, in: the resolutions and decisions [hearing and determination] and, the making of the necessary orders [sentences in criminal cases] or, the granting of the necessary reliefs, in terms of civil cases, which is why the word “etc.” was employed to denote that “application” still extends to other things not listed. Obviously, that exactly is the sense in which the word “enforcement” is used in S. 46(2) of the Constitution as collocative with “application” used in S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution and vice versa. It is therefore in the sense of “enforcement” as employed in S. 46(2) of the Constitution that the word “application” is employed in S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution and not otherwise because; that is the only logical meaning the words could have in their instant contexts. The word enforcement, in the context of S. 46(2) of the Constitution actually collocate with the word application contrary to the position of Ishola et al in the contexts in which they were employed in SS. 46(2) & 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution. Illustrating the above is well honed by quoting how the Indian High Court arrived at its decision and orders in J. Aswartha Narayana v. The State of Ap [supra]:

“Applying the principle laid down in the above judgment to the present facts of the case, the fourth respondent dried up financial resources to meet the liability to pay salaries to its employees is not a ground and the fourth respondent cannot run away from discharging its duty to pay salaries having extracted work from the employees and such act is violative of the fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India and Human Right under Article 25(1) of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Hence, the plea of lack of financial resources to meet the liability is not a ground to defer payment of salary.

…In view of the foregoing discussion, I have no hesitation to hold that the action of Respondent No. 4 in not paying gross salaries to the petitioner since April & May, 2019 is nothing but pay docking, it is illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India, Human Right to livelihood guaranteed under Article 25(1) of Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In the result, writ petition is allowed declaring the action of Respondent No. 4 in not paying salaries to the petitioner from April & May 2019 as illegal and arbitrary. Respondent No. 4 is directed to pay deferred salary to the petitioner since April & May 2019, within two months from today, together with interest @ [sic] 6% per annum on the deferred salary. No costs.”

Note the word “applying” which began the quotation, and which is the real focus of the lengthy quotation. It clearly shows that application of law [principle] or the application of the provisions of the relevant statutes to the facts of cases, is the same as enforcement of the law or statutory provisions when used in the context of adjudication in courts and that, making of the necessary orders or granting the necessary reliefs, as the acme of the application, is part and parcel of the application [enforcement] of the law or statute to the facts of the case and directly consequent to the application of the statutes. It would be observed that the necessary orders were made in this Indian case, to carry into effect the result of the application of the law to the facts of the case without any further assurances. A statute is ‘applied’ to a factual situation for the purposes of deciding live issues, as distinct from mere interpretation, which is theoretical and, when live issues are determined by the application of law to the hard facts of a case to arrive at the apportionment of blames and rights, with the utmost respect, it will be preposterous to argue the same court will lack the authority to make the appropriate consequential orders, flowing from the declarations of rights and wrongs.

Interpretation leads to declarations whereby the court states emphatically what the statute says or means and, application leads to findings of wrongs and rights [decision] based on the declaration of what the law is, applied to the factual situation to arrive at the making of the necessary or consequential orders or, the granting of the necessary reliefs to effectuate the decisions arrived at by the application of the law to the facts of the case. It is in this sense that the Black’s Law Dictionary employs the collocative meanings of ‘apply[20]’ and ‘enforce[21]’ in the context of laws and statutes, as meaning: “to apply the law to the facts of a case” and: “to give force or effect to (a law, etc.)” while ‘application[22]’ is defined in terms of a request or petition for a relief and, ‘enforcement[23]’ is defined as, “the act of or process of compelling compliance with law…” Implied in both is the making of orders or the granting of reliefs or prayers.

It is quite certain that the means by which enforcement of the law, in the realm of court adjudication, is done, where there is violation or threatened violation of statutory rights challenged through the courts, is by the application of the law [the statute] to the facts of the case and the declarations of the rights and the making of the consequential orders or the granting of the necessary reliefs to assuage the violations or the threatened violations. This is distinct from enforcement after judgment, which is meant mainly to secure obedience to the orders and the reliefs already granted in the judgment. Even at this, it is still the application of the law to the facts of the case. And it is sure that the contexts of these words in SS. 46(2) & 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution are pre-judgment in relation to adjudication of suits or adjudication of applications for the enforcement of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution. Since there is no argument that the NIC has the jurisdiction to interpret and apply the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution in labour and workplace contexts, it follows that, if it cannot enforce the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution, by making the necessary orders, the unsavoury result would be created that the applicants would have to go back to the High Courts to obtain the necessary orders consequent on the interpretation and application the NIC had done! It would mean the NIC is still an inferior Court in spite of the provisions of S. 6(1), (3), (5)(cc), 6(a)&(b), 254A-(1) & 254C of the Constitution and SS. 12-19 & 54(1)&(2) of the NICA. That could not have been the constitutional intendment.

And the opposite proposition is logically rife in that, S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution did not say the High Courts have the jurisdiction to interpret and apply the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution, whereas, S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, which confers the NIC with exclusive jurisdiction over Chapter IV of the Constitution, as they relate to industrial relations says, it has the jurisdiction to interpret and apply these provisions in the hearing and determination of causes of action over which it has jurisdiction. This clearly implies that, it has the jurisdiction to enforce these provisions within the context of industrial relations and workplace disputes as main claims, whether the suit is purely for enforcement, since enforcement is synonymous and collocative with application or mere interpretation, so far it is with regard to adjudication of applications pursuant to infringements of the statutory rights contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution. It is important to note that S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution did not introduce any distinction between ancillary and main claims, as the governing logic is, whether the suit asking for the interpretation and application of Chapter IV of the Constitution is in the context of industrial relations and workplace occurrences and this does not mean they cannot be main claims or main causes of action simpliciter.

Like I held earlier, S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution is actually the direct equivalence of S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution and confers exactly the same jurisdiction on the NIC, except that NIC’s jurisdiction in that wise, is non-obstante within the context of labour relations and workplace occurrences, in line with the specialised nature of industrial relations and, the NIC’s specialised exclusive civil jurisdiction. Hence, if a distinction is to be made with regard to ancillary and main claims, the NIC’s jurisdiction under S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution covers application or enforcement of fundamental rights in industrial relations and workplace contexts as the main claims while S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution covers its ancillary or incidental or accessory or secondary jurisdiction on the application of fundamental rights in other main causes of actions in industrial relations and workplace disputes, where the enforcement of fundamental rights is only incidental to these other main industrial relations claims that are outside fundamental rights. The failure to understand the place of S. 254C-(1)(a) in S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution is partly the cause of this confusion.

Another angle to this inquiry is that, since the High Courts are not directly conferred with the jurisdiction to interpret and apply the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution, in the logic of the objection against the NIC’s jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution, it follows that, the High Courts, which could only enforce these provisions, as they opined, must send the fundamental right cases filed before them, relating to labour relations and workplace disputes to the NIC to first interpret and apply these provisions, since the High Courts lack jurisdiction on labour matters and, the NIC has non-obstante jurisdiction over interpretation and application of labour related fundamental rights, before the NIC’s reversion to the High Courts, in a merry-go-round, for the enforcement: making of the necessary orders and grating of the necessary reliefs[24]!

And the question would be: Can the High Courts enforce causes of action within the context of labour relations and workplace disputes or can adjudication of the same case be bifurcated into halves for two courts of coordinate jurisdiction to adjudicate piecemeal? No. How do you apply a law or statute to the facts of a case other than to decide the real issues [questions] and the reliefs submitted for adjudication: the reliefs being a logical essence of the issues? Being practically impossible to do otherwise, it means application in the context of adjudication of cases, encompasses enforcement of the law [statutes] and the rights engendered therein. In a nutshell, “application” and “enforcement” in the context of adjudication mean exactly the same thing. I do not think there is any other way than that; except we seek to limit the meaning of “application” to “interpretation” and, the two words are clearly different. It would seem therefore that “interpretation” is being confused with “application” as is apparent in Ishola et al’s article. 

 That is the preposterous implication of the arguments against NIC’s jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution in the context of industrial relations and workplace occurrences, simpliciter! But the truth of the matter, like I have stated earlier, is that S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution did not give the High Courts the jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution but the jurisdiction to hear and determine applications brought for redress for the violation or threatened violation of the rights conferred in Chapter IV of the Constitution, just like S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution also confers on the NIC the exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and apply these provisions as they relate to industrial relations and workplace occurrences in the hearing and determination of these causes of actions, which are brought to it as main causes of action simpliciter for enforcement. By this, it is plainly manifest that the argument that when the application is for pure enforcement as the main claims, the matter cannot come to the NIC is with respect, unsupportable in logic and law.

To accede to the above suggests that, by some incongruous means, the High Courts still retains jurisdiction over industrial relations and workplace occurrences, which S. 254C of the Constitution took away from them non-obstante. This cannot be. To interpret the provisions of SS. 46 and 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution in that manner is to create absurdity without any ambiguity inherent in the provisions. It must be noted that prior to the Third Alteration Act, the High Courts had jurisdiction over all industrial relations and workplace occurrences and the impacts of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution over them, whether the application was for enforcement simpliciter or otherwise and for that, the distinction being made now was not necessary. But since the bifurcation of the jurisdictions of the High Courts in favour of the NIC in industrial relations and workplace occurrences exclusively, there is no way the High Courts can still retain an iota of jurisdiction on any aspect of labour relations be it in the context of fundamental rights claims that occurred in the place of work or arise from industrial relations. Had this been intended, the non-obstante S. 254C-(1)(a)&(d) of the Constitution would not have been necessary at all.

To make necessary orders or to grant the necessary reliefs is definitely part and parcel of the application of the law to the facts of a case because the necessary orders or reliefs are never granted as a matter of course but also upon the application of the law to the facts that support the reliefs. For example, S. 35(6) of the Constitution says anyone illegally arrested or detained is entitled to both compensation and public apology. Is it not still the application of S. 35 of the Constitution to the facts of a case when the court makes orders for compensation and public apology?  I think it is. Is it being said that the NIC shall not be able to make these orders directly embedded in S. 35(6) of the Constitution when adjudicating cases under it? At least these powers are not in S. 46(2) of the Constitution. S. 46(2) of the Constitution did not say, making any necessary orders via the inherent powers of the court or via any statutory power for the purposes of enforcing or applying Chapter IV of the Constitution is forbidden. That this is so is made clear by Para 1 of the Preamble to the FREP Rules when it says other statutory powers are available to the High Courts on the enforcement or application of Chapter IV of the Constitution. It is just an assurance against common law that any of its principle cannot impede the granting of any order contemplated by the High Courts while adjudicating questions of fundamental rights as main claims. And the NIC has the full statutory empowerment to grant all the orders and reliefs contemplated by S. 46(2) of the Constitution by virtue of S. 12-19 of the NICA and so did not need to be specially taken care under S. 46(2) of the Constitution.     

I think the problem is the reluctance to forgo the previous knowledge of the High Courts’ jurisdiction on Chapter IV of the Constitution and the consequential attempts to interpret S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution in its shadow, an approach to statutory interpretation, which the Court of Appeal warned against in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Oyebola [supra]. The construction of a new statute must be approached tabula rasa. Had there been no knowledge of S. 46 of the Constitution and the FREP Rules, all these objections against the NIC’s jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights as they relate to labour might not have arisen. And do not forget that fundamental rights are purely contextual rights when it comes to their application or enforcement. Even when fundamental rights violations occurred in cases like Abacha v. Fawehinmi [supra], they were still contextual in the contexts of either defamation or criminal incitement of the public to disaffection against the government or insurrection. The FGN definitely must have a context, however feign it might be, to feign justification for the arrest, just like the applicant, Chief Gani Fawehinmi must have had the context of his action to establish the unlawfulness of the arrest too. And these, the courts would examine to arrive at the decision whether the fundamental rights of the applicant were breached or not. And the High Courts that have jurisdiction over all subjects then would logically be the courts to attend to them. But this cannot be with S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution’s bifurcation of the High Courts’ jurisdiction in favour of the NIC in areas relating to enforcement of fundamental rights as they relate to industrial relations.

It was the entire jurisdiction [main and ancillary] that the High Courts exercised hitherto with respect to fundamental rights in the context of labour relations that was excised and vested absolutely in the NIC by S. 254C-(1)(a)&(d) of the Constitution. Once this is understood, it would not be difficult to appreciate that the constitutional intendment is to give the NIC exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any application for the enforcement of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution as they relate to industrial relations and workplaces occurrences as main claims simpliciter under S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, while S. 254C-(1)(a) takes care of ancillary applications of fundamental rights in other employment main claims. I think the confusion also came partly from Order 3, Rs 1(c) & 2(2)(a)&(b) of the NIC Rules, which could not make a clean bill between what is entailed in originating motions, originating summons and complaints [writs]. Had Order 3, R 1(c) been elaborated upon in the fashion of the FREP Rules, part of this confusion would have been cleared. S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution did not use the words ‘main claims’ and ‘ancillary claims’. As a result, the coinage cannot be invented to thwart the real intendment to give the NIC the same footing as S. 46 of the Constitution gave the High Courts.

To argue otherwise is to suggest that by some oblique logic, the High Courts continue to have exclusive jurisdiction over some aspects of industrial relations and workplace occurrences arising from the enforcement of Chapter IV of the Constitution in spite of the clearly non-obstante provisions of S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution and, contrary to the clear proviso in S. 46(2) of the Constitution that the High Courts’ original jurisdiction thereto is subject to the provisions of the Constitution, demonstrating in very clear terms, that the High Courts’ original jurisdiction on Chapter IV is not absolute but subject to any other provisions of the Constitution, which are not even non-obstante, not to talk of the clearly non-obstante provisions of S. 254C of the Constitution, which are impacted in this discourse.

It is necessary to mention in this regard that, as in all industrial relations and workplace occurrences related adjudications; the NIC is enjoined to take into consideration international best practices, conventions and international labour standards, whose extrapolative or moderating effects extend to the adjudication of labour-related aspects of Chapter IV of the Constitution. Thus, the High Courts lack the jurisdiction to obey these constitutional provisions, since only the NIC is exclusively conferred with the jurisdiction to utilise them: meaning that their beneficial effects would be lost to the stakeholders, if the High Courts continue to exercise jurisdiction over labour-related aspects of Chapter IV of the Constitution for enforcement simpliciter. For example, the treatment of failure to pay earned salary and some other purely labour rights by virtue of international best practices, as breaches of fundamental rights to life, property, human dignity, right to labour unions etc. in the international labour arena, which labour rights now come squarely as breach of fundamental rights, would be denied to workers in Nigeria if they are to be litigated in the High Courts that have no jurisdiction to apply international best practices as main cause of action instead of the NIC.

Whether as main cause of action or main claims, S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, is applicable to the construction of the provisions of Chapter IV when they are applicable to workplace occurrences and industrial relations. I have shown the example that by the extrapolative application of how failure to pay salary was treated by courts in Indian as breach of fundamental rights to life, property and dignity of human person, failure to pay salary in Nigeria is also breach of the fundamental rights protected in SS. 33, 34, 35 & 44(1) of the Nigerian Constitution. The unsavoury effect of denying this advantage to Nigerian workers by consigning the adjudication of fundamental rights as main claims to the High Courts cannot therefore be the contemplation of the Third Alteration Act. The correct position of law in this regard is as demonstrated by the NIC in Oreka Maiya’s case and Amaechi Lauretta Onyekachi v. Stanqueen Investment Limited[25] in which the NIC entertained as main claims, questions of breach of fundamental rights and used the extrapolative jurisdiction of the Court to invoke international labour treaties to expatiate Chapter IV of the Constitution and gave the claimants justice in the two cases.

Whether or not the application is for fundamental right enforcement simpliciter as the main cause of action, so far it is in the context of industrial relations, the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution have moderating extrapolative effects on S. 254C-(1)(d) like all other provisions of S. 254C of the Constitution, which the High Courts lack jurisdiction to consider. I think part of the problem is also in the title of the FREP Rules, which stressed the powers conferred by the second segment of S. 46(2) of the Constitution instead of the jurisdiction. The FREP Rules could as well have been titled ‘Fundamental Right (Procedure) Rules’ without emphasis on the powers the High Courts could exercise thereto or just, ‘Fundamental Rights Violation Redress (Procedure) Rules’.

For example, taking a cue from the Indian case of J. Aswartha Narayana v. The State of Ap [supra] by the utilization of the extrapolative jurisdiction of the NIC under S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, the NIC knew that whimsical deprivation of salary is not only regarded as breach of fundamental right to property under Arts 19(1)(f), 21, 31(1) & 300-A of the Indian Constitution, impari materia with similar provisions of SS. 33, 34, 35 & 44(1) of the Nigerian Constitution, but also breach of fundamental rights to life and dignity of human person by the deprivation of means of livelihood. Thus, the NIC borrowed a leaf from this, to arrive at the same conclusion in Basil Offoh v. Institute of Management and Technology Enugu & Ors[26]. The High Courts, which have no such extrapolative [cosmopolitan] jurisdiction to take into consideration international best practices when construing the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution under S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution, would definitely come to a different disservice decision on the breach of the provisions of Chapter IV extrapolated from the context of industrial relations by adherence to the narrow interpretation of these provisions thus, defeating the avowed constitutional intendment of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution to make industrial relations in Nigeria cosmopolitan.

It was also observed in the Indian case [supra] that the action was brought via writ petition to enforce the fundamental rights violated as the main claims and by way of affidavit and not by pleadings. This shows emphatically that NIC has the non-obstante jurisdiction to apply or enforce fundamental rights as the main cause of action simpliciter. Clearly, the writ petition employed in the Indian case is similar to the FREP Rules in Nigeria and, the originating motion approved by the NIC vide Order 3, R 1(c) of the NIC Rules, though inelegantly. And the NIC’s locus classicus on the application or enforcement of fundamental rights as the main cause of action in Maiya’s case [supra] had laid down the precedent that originating motion pursuant to the FREP Rules is a proper process to enforce fundamental rights as main claims within the contexts of industrial relations and workplace occurrences. And this is in agreement with the precedents the Supreme Court laid down in Saude v. Abdullahi; Abacha v. Fawehinmi and FRN & Anor v. Ifegwu [supra] that the procedure of enforcing fundamental rights in Nigeria must not be bugged down in forms.  

Though, the Indian case was heard and determined in an Indian High Court, but as the NIC is a superior court in Nigeria, duly conferred with all the powers of a High Court and with specific jurisdiction on this matter, it goes without saying that the Indian example is illustrative of what should happen procedurally and jurisdiction-wise with regard to the question agitating our minds in the instant case, which negates the example of concurrent jurisdiction suggested by Ishola et al with regard to South Africa because, the industrial court of South Africa is not created in the South African Constitution and thus, enjoyed similar jurisdiction as the erstwhile NIC under NICA unlike NIC under the Third Alteration Act, which enjoys full jurisdiction as a superior court. This shows irrefutably that, the NIC has the unobtrusive jurisdiction to entertain all suits on the application or enforcement of Chapter IV of the Constitution as they relate to industrial relations and workplace occurrences, whether brought as application for enforcement simpliciter [main claims] pursuant to S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution or, in combination with other causes of action as ancillary claims pursuant to S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution; and I so hold.

We can now see that the conclusion of the trio of Ishola et al in their brilliant article cannot be correct, while Damiari’s conclusion in his equally brilliant article is more plausible. It is necessary before rounding up on the academic reviews of the NIC’s jurisdiction over Chapter IV of the Constitution to indicate that some previous local judicial authorities were cited in these articles, holding that the NIC only had jurisdiction to deal with questions of fundamental rights when they come up as ancillary questions in other main employment causes and therefore, cannot entertain questions of fundamental rights as the main cause of action. And the learned Damiari in his seminal article had shown that the conclusions reached in these authorities were erroneous, a position I share. We have seen that the confusion partly came from the view that actions cannot be brought at the NIC pursuant to the FREP Rules, and as such, the NIC lacks jurisdiction over Chapter IV of the Constitution as main cause of action and partly because, sufficient attentions were not paid to the details of the provisions of S. 46 & 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution and the impacts of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution and the previous pertinent Supreme Court’s authorities earlier cited in this decision.

I have shown sufficiently above, reasons for the errors and that, even when an action is filed at the NIC under the FREP Rules, NIC’s jurisdiction is not invoked under S. 46 of the Constitution but purely under S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, which confers it with the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain actions on breach of fundamental rights as they relate to industrial relations and workplace occurrences. As my review has indirectly dealt with the municipal judicial authorities cited in these two learned works, it is no longer necessary to treat these municipal authorities individually more so that they are older authorities. I shall only now concentrate on the most recent NIC’s and the Court of Appeal’s decisions in this area of the law, which now represents the current faces of the judicial dichotomies.

The Court of Appeal’s recent pertinent decisions are: Ferdinand Dapaah & Anor v. Stella Ayam Odey (2018) LPELR-46151 (CA) delivered Dec 6, 2018; Diamond Bank Plc v. Chijioke Unaka & Ors (2019) LPELR-50350 (CA) delivered Jul 3, 2019 and; Extension Publication Limited v. Sunday Oyedepo (2022) LPELR-57302 (CA) delivered Mar 25, 2022. These are the most recent Court of Appeal’s decisions available to me on this thorny issue. Let me say first that I considered Phillip Biokpo v National Drug Law Enforcement Agency & Ors (2021) LPELR-56250 (CA), though recent, but largely irrelevant to our inquiry here because, it only held that fundamental rights actions must be the main claim and not that, this cannot happen within employment contexts. It did not therefore decide that the NIC has no jurisdiction on enforcement of fundamental rights as main claims. Just like the controversies identified in the two leading learned articles reviewed earlier in this decision, it appears that the three Court of Appeal’s decisions I considered relevant had divergent opinions on the issue too. But first of all, I need to point out that all the Supreme Court cases referred to in these decisions were not decided under the Third Alteration Act and so, did not consider the innovations brought by the Third Alteration Act on this issue, as I have earlier shown above. It suffices to say in that in Extension Publication Ltd [supra], the Court of Appeal held that:

“Section 46 Subsections (1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution…provide the court which can exercise jurisdiction in cases of enforcement of fundamental rights to be High Court. Under Order 1 Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules…the word court is defined to mean:

‘the Federal High Court or the High Court of a State or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.

So in cases, strictly for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the Federal High Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja as well as the High Court of any of the 36 States of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, such as Osunde v. Nasiru Shaibu Baba (2014) 44 WRN 65 and Nigeria Tobacco Plc v. Osifeso (2000) 14 WRN 37, are grossly inapplicable to this case because the claims therein were not totally or strictly for enforcement of fundamental rights. In those cases the claims for enforcement of fundamental rights were merely ancillary reliefs to other main claims.

Having regard to the respondents claims in this case and the clear and unambiguous provisions of Section 46 of the Constitution…and the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rule made thereunder, the National Industrial Court did not have nor share concurrent jurisdiction whether full or partial with the Federal High Court over the suit.”

The cause of action in Extension Publication Ltd was arrest and detention in the course of industrial relations and workplace occurrences and the claimant filed application at the Federal High Court for enforcement of his fundamental rights simpliciter. Earlier, in Dapaah’s case [supra], the Court of Appeal had held for similar reasons, as above, that the NIC had jurisdiction because, fundamental rights were merely ancillary to the main claims founded on dismissal. The cause of action in Dapaah’s case was sexual harassments, leading to dismissal of a female employee and she filed a complaint [writ] in the NIC. So, these two Court of Appeal cases are in agreement that NIC only had jurisdiction over fundamental rights, as ancillary claims. However, in the interpositional Court of Appeal’s decision in Diamond Bank’s case [supra], the Court of Appeal held to the contrary, and most emphatically that, the NIC has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights relating to industrial relations and workplace occurrences as main claims or main causes of action in the following words:

“It is obvious from the claims sought and the case made out on the pleadings that the major plank rested upon by the first Respondent in propagating his complaints was the fundamental rights provisions contained in Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution… It is correct, as stated by Counsel to the Appellant, that hitherto, before the subsequent amendments, by the provisions of Section 46(1) and (2) of Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution…and Order 1, Rule 2 of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, the High Court and the Federal High Court were the two courts vested with concurrent original jurisdiction to hear and determine all applications for enforcement of fundamental rights irrespective of the causative subject matter or the status of the parties concerned…

In 2011, Section 254(1) of the 1999 Constitution…amended by Section 6 of the Constitution of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act 2010 which came into effect on 4^th of March, 2011…

Applying these principles to the above provisions it is crystal clear that they invest the National Industrial Court with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine complaints of breach of fundamental rights in cases relating to or connected with labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, or relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or nonpayment of salaries, wages, etc. The present position of law therefore is that, the High Court and the Federal High Court have a concurrent jurisdiction in cases of fundamental rights irrespective of the causative subject matter or the status of the parties concerned, except where the breach of fundamental is in cases, the subject matter of which falls within the area of exclusive jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court. By the provision of Section 254C(1)(d) of the Constitution…only the National Industrial Court has jurisdiction in respect of breach of fundamental rights in cases relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, or relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or nonpayment of salaries, wages…

The facts and circumstances of this case shows [sic] that it is one squarely within the jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court…”

The Court of Appeal in the above quotation, for the very first time, clearly and rightly appreciated the impacts of the phrase “matters arising from workplace” in the configuration of the NIC’s exclusive jurisdiction on enforcement of fundamental rights within the contexts of industrial relations and workplace occurrences as main causes of action and gave the NIC exclusive jurisdiction. The claimant in this instance was a banker and was arrested in the course of his employment by the employer in respect of alleged fraud that took place in the bank, his workplace, and his account with the bank was frozen in relation to the alleged fraud. The police found nothing against him and therefore released him after brief detention, but his account remained frozen, while he was subsequently constructively dismissed by not lifting the suspension slammed on him. He commenced action in the NIC by complaint for the enforcement of his fundamental rights simpliciter. The NIC assumed jurisdiction and found for him and the Court of Appeal dismissed the objection against the NIC’s jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights as main claims and held that, only the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over such main claims in fundamental rights once the alleged violations arose from the workplace or from industrial relations. Thus, Diamond Bank’s case interposed the Court of Appeal’s contrary decisions in Dapaah’s case and Extension Publication Ltd. Dapaah’s case was decided in 2018 while Extension Publication Ltd was decided in 2022 and, the interpositional Diamond Bank’s case was decided in 2019.

Being inconsistent with Dapaah’s case earlier decided to the contrary, it impliedly overruled Dapaah’s case, while Extension Publication Ltd, decided later and contrarily, also impliedly overruled it. It is clear from the above scenario that the law is very much unsettled in this area, as these three cases did not take cognisance of the previous Court of Appeal’s contrary decisions on the point. They individually did their own thing but Diamond Bank’s case seemed to fully cover the field as it considered the phrase “matters arising from workplace” which all other authorities, previous and later, never construed. It could be seen clearly that there is therefore no discernible ratio decidendi common to the Court of Appeal’s decisions in this area of the law, whereas, the NIC has consistently held that it has the jurisdiction over Chapter IV as main claims or principal claims as far as the causes of action arose in workplace or are related to labour relations - Okoto v. Guinness Nigeria Plc[27]; Oreka Maiya’s case; Amaechi Lauretta Onyekachi v. Stanqueen Investment Limited and, Basil Offoh v. Institute of Management & Technology Enugu & Ors, delivered Jul 19, 2024.

And when this is considered along with the earlier NIC’s conflicting decisions and the Court of Appeal’s cases cited in the two academic articles earlier reviewed in this judgment, it becomes much more poignant that, the law is very much unsettled in this area and that, there is no discernible ratio decidendi common to the decisions of both the NIC and the Court of Appeal in this area of the law. In situations like this, the Supreme Court provides the panacea in NEPA v. Onah (1997) LPELR-1959 (SC) 9-10, C-A; also in (1997) 1 NWLR (Pt. 484) 680; Osakwe v. F.C.E. (Technical) Asaba (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1201) 36, B-C; Chime v. Elikwu (1965) NMLR 71 and, the Court of Appeal in Ngun v. Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited (2013) LPELR-20197 (CA) 31-32 to the effect that, the trial court has the rare liberty to choose which to follow amongst the several oscillating conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal which have no clear-cut ratio decidendi common to them and, give its reasons. And the essence of this exceptional power granted the trial court is that, the last appellate decision might not necessarily be binding on the lower court thus, creating an exception to the general rule of stare decisis, which is to follow the last decision.

This is to enable the appellate courts to have the opportunity of looking afresh on the irreconcilable decisions with a view to resolving them and coming up with a locus classicus to settle the matter for the benefits of the much needed certainty in law. This is more particularly so because, different schools of thoughts cannot exist in the jurisprudence of a judicature patterned on the tradition of ratio decidendi and stare decisis of the common law. But because different judges at the trial courts and different panels at the appellate levels, sit on similar issues and might not be aware of the previous decisions to the contrary, this occasionally happens, and the only way of correcting this, is that when the trial court is faced with these conflicting decisions, without discernible ration decidendi common to them, it could make a choice and thereafter bring the irreconcilable conflicting decisions to the notice of the appellate courts, with reasons offered for his choice, for a possible resolution by the Court of Appeal itself or by the Supreme Court, by way of case stated to it, either by the parties or the Court of Appeal, suo motu.

And I have decided against stating a case to the Court of Appeal in this instance for three reasons. The first is that, I observed that the new angle of vision brought to this issue has never been considered in any of the previous judicial authorities on point and I felt, stating a case to the Court of Appeal, might not well articulate this, which might make the new angle of vision lost because, in stating a case, the arguments cannot be fletched up like in deciding the issue by siding with one of the confliction authorities and giving argued reasons for the choice.

Secondly, I was cognizant of the fact that, even though, the Court of Appeal is the ultimate labour court, but because of the irreconcilable divergence of the Court of Appeal’s decisions on this issue, as I have shown above, cases on the same cause of action would continue to be filed at the High Courts and the NIC simultaneously, which appeals against those filed at the High Courts would end at the Supreme Court and, whatever the Supreme Court decides, would have strong influence on the Court of Appeal for reason of hierarchy, even though, the Court of Appeal stands in the place of the Supreme Court in labour matters. The third reason is that, even though, the Court of Appeal is the Supreme Court for labour matters, there is still the avenue of case-stated, from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, which is yet open to the litigants and the Court of Appeal itself, in cases like this, to state a case to the Supreme Court, even though, in labour cases; and whatever decision the Supreme Court gives on the stated-case becomes everlasting ratio on the issue.

It is for these reasons, particularly because of the possibility of case-stated, even yet on labour matters to the Supreme Court and the everlastingness of its decision thereto that, I decided to go the way of making a choice between the welter of irreconcilable conflicting decisions without discernible ratio decidendi common to both the NIC and Court of Appeal on this very recondite issue so that, if by chance, a case is stated to the Supreme Court, it would have the benefits of the new angle of vision into the issue to enable it decide the issue to finality with all angles of visions carefully considered and, if the Court of Appeal decides it without stating a case to the Supreme Court, it would have the benefits too, to also consider the new angle of vision in handing down a robust locus classicus to bring an end to the irreconcilable conflicting decisions from itself on the issue and from the NIC too.

Having arrived at this juncture and with the review of the issue already done, I axiomatically side with the penultimate decision of the Court of Appeal in Diamond Bank’s case. I now proceed to give my additional reasons to justify my choice. In the latest of the three Court of Appeal’s decisions, which is Extension Publication Ltd, the Court of Appeal, with the utmost respect, did not consider the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(d) and their impacts on S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution. It did not also consider the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution and their extrapolative moderating impacts on S. 46 of the Constitution and the FREP Rules. In fact, S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution is the most radical of the jurisdiction conferred on the NIC to effect radical changes in the corpus juris of industrial relations and workplace occurrences law in Nigeria and it hovers overridingly on all other aspects of its jurisdiction and on the whole Constitution, particularly S. 46 of the Constitution in this regard. It must always be taken into consideration in any adjudication relating to industrial relations and workplace disputes. And I have shown its effects on Chapter IV of the Constitution on the nature of fundamental rights in labour relations. It is the greatest indicia to unraveling the frontiers of the NIC’s jurisdiction in cases of doubt.

The Court of Appeal also, with grave respect, did not consider the opening phrase, which is a proviso to S. 46(2) of the Constitution, and which actually says S. 46 is subject to all the provisions of the Constitution with regards to the High Courts’ original jurisdiction on fundamental rights and, S. 254C, which grants NIC’s non-obstante jurisdiction. Whereas, in Diamond Bank’s case, the Court of Appeal took into consideration some of these factors and arrived at a different decision. For example, the Court of Appeal, for the first time, carefully considered the effect of the phrase “matters arising from workplace” on the expansive and exclusive civil jurisdiction of the NIC and more particularly, the restrictive effects on S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution. Though, it did not consider the effects of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution but, the consideration of the phrase “matters arising from workplace” sufficiently gave it the lee way to the true position of the law.  

I also found relevant to this issue SS. 241(1)(d) & 243(2) of the Constitution, which provide for appeal without leave to the Court of Appeal against the decisions of the High Courts on questions of fundamental rights contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution, while S. 243(2) of the Constitution separately provides for the same right of appeal without leave to the Court of Appeal against NIC’s civil decisions on Chapter IV of the Constitution as they relate to industrial relations and workplace disputes. It would be seen that S. 243(2) of the Constitution is the direct equivalence in the Constitution of S. 241(1)(d) of the Constitution with respect to Chapter IV of the Constitution, and serves exactly the same purpose. This proves to the hilt that the intendment is that S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution is meant to give the NIC exactly the same jurisdiction and powers over application or enforcement of fundamental rights within the context of industrial relations. Otherwise, it would not have been necessary at every material point in the Constitution, where the issue of Chapter IV comes up, to make exactly the same provisions made for the High Courts for the NIC. That is why the questions of Chapter IV of the Constitution as they relate to the NIC was taken out of the general restrictions placed on the right of appeal against the NIC’s civil decisions in order to give them the special treatment they were given with regard to the High Courts.

Had the Constitution considered the NIC as only having jurisdiction over fundamental rights when litigated as ancillary to other main labour causes of action, and that they cannot stand alone as a main cause of action in the NIC, it would not have been necessary to specially guide appeals on these rights in the NIC, just like it was done with respect to the High Courts, by providing the extraordinary exception to the general ban of appeal without leave on NIC’s civil decisions. They would have been subjected to the leave of the Court of Appeal as mere question of law like all other issues of appeal against NIC’s civil decisions, being merely incidental or ancillary causes of action/claims, and not for enforcement of fundamental rights as the main cause of action/claim. It is therefore clear that, the intendments of both SS. 241(1)(d) and 243(2) of the Constitution are to specially cater for appeals on the enforcement of fundamental rights as the main causes of actions simpliciter, as they relate to the jurisdictions of the two sets of trial courts we now have in Nigeria: the High Courts with general jurisdiction and, the NIC with specialised exclusive jurisdiction.

The non-requirement of leave, just like it was done with respect to the High Courts, shows clearly that S. 254C-(1)(d), like S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution, is meant for the enforcement of fundamental right as main claims in the NIC, just like in the High Courts but within workplace and industrial relations contexts in line with the exclusive and specialised jurisdiction of the NIC. The Court of Appeal did not also consider the international best practices, which specifically regard right to earned salary as fundamental right to life, dignity of human person and also as right to personal property and, the cutting-edge practice worldwide, to now regard many employment rights as fundamental rights simpliciter, as I have pointed out earlier. The Court of Appeal’s decision in Diamond Bank’s case, though did not consider some of these points too, but clearly understood the philosophy that underpinned S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution and clearly appreciated that S. 254C-(1)(d) is the same with S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution when it comes to questions of application or enforcement of fundamental rights in Chapter IV of the Constitution as the main claims, as they apply to industrial relations and workplace occurrences.

It clearly considered the impacts of S. 254C-(1)(d) on S. 46 of the Constitution and arrived at the conclusion that, S. 254C-(1)(d) has overriding effects on S. 46 of the Constitution and took away totally, the High Courts’ jurisdiction on enforcement of fundamental rights as they relate to industrial relations and matters that arose from place of work and ceded it to the NIC non-obstante. It also quite appreciated the distinction brought into play in the phrase “matters arising from workplace” in S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution, as embracive of matters that occur in the workplace simpliciter whether or not they are labour matters and its impact on the conferment of expansive exclusive civil jurisdiction on the NIC to enforce workplace-related fundamental rights.

It is also clear that in Extension Publication Ltd that the Court of Appeal found that the cause of action was not at all related to employment or labour relations, whereas, the Court of Appeal found in Diamond Bank’s case that, the cause of action was situated squarely within employment relations and workplace context. It means Diamond Bank’s case was decided squarely on point, while that was not the case with Extension Publication Ltd and for that reason, Diamond Bank’s case, being the latest on point, is the authority for this case. It means that Diamond Bank’s case did not conflict with Extension Publication Ltd. But I note that it conflicted with an earlier Court of Appeal’s decision in SSAUTHRIAI v. Olotu (No. 2) (2016) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1531) 9 at 18, B-H, delivered Jun 12, 2015, and therefore impliedly overruled by Diamond Bank’s case, which is later in time. Therefore, the position of Diamond Bank’s case remains unscathed as the authority for this case.

It comes about that it is necessary for the applicant, as done in this case, to carefully plead the nexus of the breach of their fundamental rights as main claims within employment relations or workplace contexts and, also reflect these in the reliefs as the main claims, to earn the NIC’s exclusive jurisdiction. Once done, the NIC’s jurisdiction for enforcement [application] of fundamental rights within industrial relations context or workplace context is fully activated, as it was held in Diamond Bank’s case. The NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction over the enforcement of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution in workplace contexts as main claims simpliciter, without adding any other main claims. The NIC therefore has the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain this action, which arose from the workplace and in the course of industrial relations.

It is also necessary to point out that the courts have the burden to avoid multiplicity of actions and, this is particularly necessary in the NIC by virtue of S. 14 of the NICA. This partly informs why the Third Alteration Act fused all matters related to industrial relations and workplace occurrences into the NIC’s jurisdiction, in order to eschew a situation whereby the hapless workers would be tossed about in different courts to litigate causes of action that arose in the same transactions. That is the rationale for the jurisdictional phrase “matters arising from workplace”. It is to bring under one canopy, all matters that arose in the workplace, which workers, employers and even third parties might want to litigate. And it is for this reason that the Court of Appeal held in Sunday Ainabebholo v. Edo State University [EDSU] Workers Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society & Ors  (2015) LPELR-24513 (CA) 23, A-C that:

“Thus, it would be highly preposterous for the Appellant to assume, as he did, that the lower Court would sever the Appellant’s claim with a view to transferring the aspect of the labour to the NIC, and proceeding to entertain and determine the ancillary libel claim. Undoubtedly, the Lower Court has no jurisdictional competence to sever the claim, with a view to transferring a part, and determining a part thereof.”

Demonstrated in the above quotation is that the Court of Appeal clearly understood the philosophy that all civil matters that arose from the workplace are to be entertained by the NIC exclusively. Clearly, the holding that the NIC lacks jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights and that, applications could be brought to enforce fundamental rights claims that occurred at workplace or in the course of industrial relations in the High Courts as main claims, has the unintended consequence of severing the causes of action into pieces, whereby the High Courts would try the part that deals with enforcement of fundamental rights, even though, occurring within workplace context, and the NIC would try the other part that deals with the same workplace context, but which did not mention enforcement of fundamental rights. This definitely is not the constitutional intendment of the Third Alteration Act and I so hold. And the holding that when questions of fundamental rights are ancillary to other causes of action in labour relations, that NIC would have jurisdiction, with the utmost respect, appears to say that, at one stretch, the NIC has exclusive jurisdiction on both questions of enforcement of fundamental rights and other causes of action that are considered main claims, but not on enforcement of fundamental rights as main claims simpliciter, even though, arising from workplace and in the course of industrial relations but, surprisingly, at another stretch, the NIC would cease jurisdiction simply because, the same cause of action is brought as main cause of action, with the tag of enforcement of fundamental rights without joining other causes of action! How can these be!

How can a cause of action enjoy such ambivalent status as both ancillary and main cause of action depending on where the action is filed and the tag applied, which did not change the substance! This gives room to the dodging of NIC’s jurisdiction by mere artifice against the Third Alteration Act’s intendment to have all issues relating to industrial relations and all matters that arose from workplace under the NIC’s canopy, for which reason, the NIC was granted expansive exclusive civil jurisdiction and for which its jurisdiction to apply or enforce fundamental rights in S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution is tied to all matters over which it has jurisdiction, which definitely includes all matters that arose from the workplace. Unless we refuse to give effect to the phrase “matters arising from workplace” can we arrive at the conclusion that NIC lacks jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights as main claims simpliciter. And it is legally infeasible to run away from the literal meaning of this phrase because, it appears within various other phrases that covers ancillary issues as a distinctive flavour of the NIC’s exclusive civil jurisdiction. The phrase “matters arising from workplace” in S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution is the impacted alchemy, which was ignored in the contrary interpretation of NIC’s jurisdiction over enforcement of fundamental rights as main claims simpliciter in the context of industrial relations. 

These and other distinctions make my choice of Diamond Bank’s case, with the utmost humility, sacrosanct. Before I round up, I wish to make one last comment on the rationale for the jurisdiction of the NIC to enforce or apply fundamental rights within the context of workplace occurrences and industrial relations. It cannot be disputed where an employee is brutalized and arrested in the workplace and, as a result of disputes arising from industrial relations and, taken to the police station and unlawfully kept there interminably, that this definitely would produce a traumatizing effect on the victim-employee and, the entire workforce and it is for the NIC to determine, with its expertise by virtue of S. 254B-(3)&(4) of the Constitution, the exact effect these have on the victim and workforce, and the general environment of the workplace by the application of international best practices. These come briskly under the canopy of S. 254C-(1)(a) of the Constitution relating to the jurisdiction of the NIC to adjudicate on “…conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith”.

The need for environments of work free from violence and harassment cannot be downplayed in workers/employees’ welfare, health, sustainable industrial relations and economic development and, their whistle blowing right, which redounds to their welfare, health and the benefits of the whole society. Where violence and harassment are unchecked in the workplace, a climate of fear predominates in the workplace, and the whistle-blowing[28] right of the workforce becomes stifled. And the stifling of whistle-blowing right in the workforce is a fertile avenue for enslavement and the practice of serious employment/labour abuses, which are often detrimental to workers and violative of SS. 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40 & 42 of the Constitution. The High Courts lack the jurisdiction and expertise needed to pick the nuances in these labour-related applications of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution – S. 254B-(3)&(4)&254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution.  

In the instant case involving allegations of physical assaults in the workplace and as a result of industrial relations and, illegal detention, which if proved, are clearly violations of fundamental rights to personal liberty and human dignity within the context of the need for safe and decent work environment, the case cannot be heard in any other court than the NIC, by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(a)&(d) of the Constitution, which covers health and safety of the workforce, even though, sued upon mainly as violation of fundamental rights as the only claims, more particularly so, because of the series of ILO conventions and instruments verging on these issues and, which this Court has the burden to apply while construing Chapter IV of the Constitution by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution. This idea of extrapolative construction of the provisions of Chapter IV is even sanctioned on the High Courts too, by Para 3(a)(i)-(d) of the Preamble to the FREP Rules, only that the High Courts are excluded by S. 254C-(1)(b),(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution from construing any statutes or international labour instruments or international best labour practices in favour of the NIC exclusively.    

This explains the rationale for the conferment of exclusive civil jurisdiction on the NIC by S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution to enforce fundamental rights in the context of industrial relations and workplace occurrences as main or principal claims or main causes of action. For example, ILO C190: Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 and its Recommendation R206 are impacted in the instant case. Nigeria ratified ILO C190 Nov 8, 2022 thus, making issues of violence and harassment at workplace fundamental human rights of workers and, harassment is complete with a single occurrence of an unwholesome act described therein – Art 1(a) of ILO C190. And by virtue of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(h)&(2) of the Constitution, these international labour instruments are fully in force in Nigeria and all are geared towards the achievement of the ILO core objective, which is decent work relations for sustainable industrial relations and economic development, and above all, sustainable world peace with the hindsight of what led to the World War I and the founding of the ILO. There cannot be better fundamental rights than the bills of rights contained in the fundamental ILO treaties. All these have bearings on how to interpret the fundamental rights provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution in relation to workplace and industrial relations, an act the High Courts are constitutionally forbidden to engage in.

The existence of ILO C190, dealing directly with violence and harassment at workplaces and on which, only the NIC has exclusive civil jurisdiction to apply, nullifies the previous NIC’s decision in Manasse v. Sterling Bank Plc & Ors[29] to the contrary that, the NIC has no jurisdiction over assaults at workplace, reputational grievances [defamations] and injured feelings arising from industrial relations. The case did not advert to ILO C190, which reinforces the tenor of the provisions of S. 254C-(1)(f)-(i)&(2) of the Constitution on NIC’s exclusive civil jurisdiction on enforcement or application of the fundamental right contained in S. 34(1)(a) of the Constitution as it relates to workplace assaults and harassments. And harassments cover workplace injuries to reputational feelings [defamations] and psychological and mental traumas resulting from industrial relations[30]. How can a dispute “over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV…” of the Constitution arise, as used in S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, without an allegation that “any of the provisions” of Chapter IV of the Constitution “has been, is being or likely to be contravened…in relation to him”, as used in S. 46(1) of the Constitution? There is no way: it is simply impossible. This proves to the hilt that S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution stands in exactly the same position with regard to the NIC’s non-obstante civil jurisdiction on enforcement or application of fundamental rights within workplace contexts, as S. 46(1)&(2) of the Constitution, with regard to the High Courts’ civil jurisdiction in that wise.

As a court of law lacks jurisdiction over hypothetical issues; a person can only have a dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Constitution as they relate to industrial relations when there is a life issue or dispute on alleged violation or threatened violation of his fundamental rights within workplace context to be resolved, as the reason for approaching the court. It is in this context that the NIC’s decision in Manasse v. Sterling Bank Plc & Ors [supra] and the Court of Appeal’s decision in SSAUTHRIAI v. Olotu [supra] should be viewed in contradistinction to the Court of Appeal’s later decision in Diamond Bank’s case [supra], which held that the NIC has exclusive jurisdiction on the enforcement of fundamental rights within the context of industrial relations and workplace occurrences when litigated as the main or principal claims, as the extant and binding precedent.

This proves to the hilt the counterproductiveness of denying NIC, in appropriate cases, the enforcement or application of fundamental rights as main causes of action; as applicants-employees/workers could sue mainly on infringement of their fundamental rights in the workplace or in the course of industrial relations without joining any other cause of action and any other reliefs in the NIC, as has happened in the instant case. And for this reason, the NIC has consistently held that it has the jurisdiction to enforce fundamental rights simpliciter that arose in the workplace or in the course of industrial relations – Okoto v. Guinness Nigeria Plc[31]; Oreka Maiya’s case; Amaechi Lauretta Onyekachi v. Stanqueen Investment Limited and, Basil Offoh v. Institute of Management and Technology Enugu & Ors delivered Jul 19, 2024. The only area of irreconcilable conflict in the NIC is on the use of the FREP Rules as the NIC said in some of its decisions that it can only enforce fundamental rights only when brought pursuant to its rules – Manasse v. Sterling Bank Plc & Ors [supra], and this extant decision has since shown, why it is preferable to follow the contrary NIC’s precedent laid down in Oreka Maiya’s case being that, the NIC can borrow, for its own purposes, the FREP Rules or any other rule.

It would therefore amount to disservice to the Constitution to consign the enforcement of fundamental rights as main claims or main causes of action in workplace disputes or industrial relations disputes to the High Courts, which have no jurisdiction to take all the factors enumerated above into consideration in determining such questions of enforcement of fundamental rights within workplace contexts as the NIC is empowered to do. I think it is now sufficiently settled beyond doubt why NIC has non-obstante jurisdiction in the application or enforcement of fundamental rights as main or principal causes of action [claims], once the alleged breaches occurred in the course of labour relations or at the workplace.

I therefore find that this action, which arose purely from the workplace, and was majorly filed to enforce or apply the applicant’s fundamental rights as they relate to employment relations and workplace issues as the main claims, in virtue of S. 254C-(1)(d) of the Constitution, was properly so filed in the NIC. I therefore hold that, that being so; the NIC has the non-obstante civil jurisdiction over the matter. The procedure adopted to bring it by way of FREP Rules, is also proper and lawful. Having settled the issue of the NIC’s jurisdiction over the matter, raised and determined suo motu by the Court, I now proceed to examine the case on its merits. I therefore turn to: Part B: Decision on the Merits.

Section B: Decision On The Merits

In deciding this part of the judgment, I shall adopt the lone issue formulated by the learned counsel to the 1^st-4^th respondents, which is a fusion of the two issues formulated by the learned applicant’s counsel but shall still shun it of verbosity. The slightly reformulated issue is now: Has the applicant proved breach of his fundamental rights and entitled to the reliefs claimed? I cite Fajemirokun v. Commercial Bank (Credit Lyonnais Ltd) & Ors (2009) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1135) 588 at 600 where the Supreme Court held that:

“Generally, it is the duty of citizens of this country to report cases of commission of crime to the Police for their investigation and what happens after such report is entirely the responsibility of the Police. The citizens cannot be held culpable for doing their civic duty unless it is shown that it was done mala fide. However, the person who report [sic] a matter or draws the attention of the police or security agency to commission of crime or its imminent commission has no control over the method or manner of investigation, invitation or even the prosecution of the person suspected to have committed or planning to commit such an offence.”

What this signifies is that for a person who reported an alleged commission of crime against any person to the police to be held to have done wrong, the victim must prove additionally that the person did more than merely reporting him/her and goaded the police to take unlawful steps against him. Mala fide does end with the initial report to the police but includes what was done after the report to keep the victim at the police detention beyond necessary. This is especially so where the reporter is the victim of the alleged offence reported.

In the instant case, the applicant admitted absconding with the 1^st-4^th respondents’ vehicle for about 50 days and that, his contract of employment was to the effect that each day, he made deposit of N15,000, for the use of the vehicle for commercial transport. He gave a very laughable and unreasonable reason for absconding with this vehicle for the 50 days, which was that, he learned of the sudden death of his pregnant wife while on duty transporting some passengers and, had to make a detour to Cross-River State and brought the wife’s corpse to Anambra State for burial, for which reason, he kept the commercial vehicle with himself obsolescent for the 50 days!

He tendered no death certificate. Even if he did, this would not excuse the irresponsible act of having his employer’s commercial vehicle with him for 50 days with the spurious explanation that this happened because the wife died and he called his employer to come and pick the vehicle and they failed to do so and that; after the 50 days, he went to his employer’s office to report for duty and the 1^st-4^th respondents pounced on him, physically assaulted him and dragged him to the nearby police station! Enough of stories meant for the marines. This is a court of law. A court of law is not bound to believe utterly unreasonable and preposterous evidence, which is totally against human nature and the natural causes of things, simply because it was deposed in affidavit, even if not challenged by the other side – Anzaku v. Gov., Nassarawa State (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 919) 448 at 502, C–F and Dibiamaka & Ors. v. Osakwe & Ors. (1989) LPELR–940 (SC) 16, D–E. A piece of evidence has to be reasonable and cogent to earn probative value.

And what is even more, the 1^st-4^th respondents denied the above and said the applicant absconded with the vehicle for 50 days and could not be traced, even after his guarantor was contacted and that, he was later apprehended on a tip-off while he was using the vehicle for commercial activities. The 1^st-4^th respondents said they reported a case of stolen vehicle and theft of the accrued daily deposits to the police shortly after the applicant vamoosed with the vehicle and was untraceable, even with the assistance of his guarantor and that, they and the police went together on the eventual tip-off to effect the applicant’s arrest and that; because the applicant voluntarily surrendered to the arrest, he was not ruff-handled. Note that the applicant did not tender a medical certificate to show that he was assaulted and actually sustained injuries. And I wonder how and where he had the opportunity to take a picture of bandaged parts of his body [Exhibit A] when he said he was beaten up, wounded and dragged to the police station immediately and spent 15 unbroken days in the police custody.

Was it at the police station he took the picture and had the opportunity to bandage his body or, was it that his alleged wounds did not heal till he got out 15 days later and took the exhibited picture and, the wounds did not fester and kill him or degenerate to more serious one! It is clear his evidence in this regard lacks cogency while that of the 1^st-4^th respondents looks more credible and believable. I therefore attach more credence to the 1^st-4^th respondents’ evidence and totally disbelieved the applicant’s evidence in this regard. I accordingly find that the applicant was not assaulted and did not sustain any injury as feigned. It is therefore clear that the 1^st-4^th respondents have good and justifiable reason to report the applicant to the police. A clear case of theft by conversion of the applicant’s employer’s money in the daily deposits and illegal detinue of the employer’s vehicle was rightly reported against the applicant and, his arrest was therefore lawful. The applicant’s argument that the allegations against him were purely breach of contract is mistaken.

There is a thin line between contract and crime. As a result, the same facts can give rise to both breach of contract and crime and, simultaneous criminal and civil actions could therefore commence on the same set of facts. And in line with the Supreme Court’s decision above, the 1^st-4^th respondents are totally excused from any liability in the arrest of the applicant by the police and the police [5^th-6^th respondents] are also excused in the arrest. But that is not the end of the matter as the continued detention of the applicant beyond normal is part of the case. I need to now look more critically at the detention for 15 days without being charged to court. Are the 1^st-4^th respondents culpable? I think so.

The 1^st-4^th respondents have said in their CA that the applicant’s failure to produce surety was the reason for his detention for a whopping 15 days and that; they did not ask the applicant to pay the sum of N750,000 as condition for his release. The applicant has deposed that his guarantor came for his release but he was not released as both he and his guarantor could not raise the N750,000 or part demanded as condition for his release. The 1^st-4^th respondents did not give any further explanation for the detention of the applicant for a whopping 15 days. I therefore believe the applicant’s story in this regard as consistent with the truth more so that the charge sheet actually contained the N750,000. And in law, the explanation they gave is nonstarter, as it has no relevance to unlawful detention. Because what the law says, according to S. 35(1)(c) & (4)-(7) of the Constitution is that, a person arrested for non-homicidal offence must be brought to a court within one day after the arrest, if there is a court within forty kilometer radius of the detention facility and two days, where there is no court within that radius. Obviously, the detention for 15 days is not explained away by the fact that the applicant could not produce a surety to take him on bail, as his being taken to a court is not contingent on the production of a surety. And being taken to a court after arrest is the issue here. But I take note that the case of the 1^st-4^th respondents is an explanation that they did not do anything than the report to warrant the applicant’s prolonged detention and that; it was entirely the police decision.

Had the 1^st-4^th respondents stopped at their defence that they had no control over how the police conducted their investigation and the decision to detain the applicant, it would have done them good, but by venturing to find an excuse for the police, it makes their evidence suspect in that regard and, tends to their culpability in the illegal detention. They held forte for the police and must be tested on that forte. Giving a reason for the unlawful detention shows that they knew the truth about why the applicant was unreasonably and illegally detained beyond normal and just decided to lie about the true reason. And let me state here that there is actually nothing to investigate further about the alleged offence as the applicant, as much confessed the offence and the necessary witnesses were the 1^st-4^th respondent and the investigating police officer, while the exhibit is the said vehicle, which was recovered from the applicant. Therefore, there was absolutely no basis for the continued detention beyond the remit permitted by law before being charged to court.

Now, the applicant had said that, he was not granted bail because the bail condition was that he paid the N750,000 or part of it the 1^st-4^th respondents claimed and the charge sheet – Exhibit B – had the N750,000 as Count II of the charge, which is corroborative of the applicant’s story. Since I have held that the evidence volunteered for the 5^th-6^th respondents by the 1^st-4^th respondents is nonstarter, and being that there is no other explanation why the 5^th-6^th respondents detained the claimant for such an unreasonable time, the only plausible explanation is that, the applicant was detained by the 5^th-6^th respondents at the 1^st-4^th respondents’ behest for failing to cough up the N750,000 or part of it. The 1^st-4^th respondents have a duty in law not to encourage official authorities to engage in unlawful acts. The duty of obeying the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution is that of all the citizens and residents of Nigeria alike and not that of the security agencies alone. The 1^st-4^th respondents, having been found wanting in instigating the 5^th-6^th respondents in the illegal detention of the applicant for 15 days, are therefore liable for the wrongdoing. They are part and parcel of the culprits for the illegal detention. Be that as it may. I move to the issue of the 5^th-6^th respondents.  

I now come to the issue of the 5^th&6^th respondents. But before I go further, let me say the 5^th-6^th respondents did not participate in this matter from the inception till date. They did not file any process. They are therefore deemed to concede to the facts against them. I need to state that from the inception of the case till the application was moved, Hearing Notices for Apr 18, 2023 [p. 35-37 of Process File]; Originating Process [p. 57-60 of Process File served on them May 11, 2023]; Hearing Notice for Oct 26, 2023 [p. 62-63 of Process File]; and finally Hearing Notice for May 16, 2024 [p. 69-70 of Process File] were served on the 5^th-6^th respondents and yet, they failed to appear in court or to file any process. Now back to the treatment of the evidence relating to them.   

The applicant’s case against them is that they illegally detained him more than provided by the law and failed to grant him bail even while his guarantor was there to take him on bail, insisting that he paid the sum of N750,000 or part of it owed his employer before he could secure his bail and that, he was detained by the police from 27^th Mar 2019 to 11^th Apr 2019 when he was eventually charged to a magistrate’s court, which released him on bail the same day. The applicant made a case that the allegations against him were not crimes but purely breach of contract. I say that there is a thin line between breach of contract and crimes. The same facts could give rise to both, as in the instant case, where theft by conversion and illegal detinue are alleged. Thus, the applicant’s allegation here is that the police illegally detained him for a period of 15 days before charging him to court. What does the law say about reasonable length of time a citizen could be detained before charging him to court for the offences of theft: a non-homicidal offence? The Court of Appeal said in Idweokolo v. Akpoyibo & Ors (2017) LPELR-41882 (CA) that:

“By all odds, the Police has [sic] the statutory power to investigate, arrest, interrogate, search and detain any suspect… The only qualification is that the power must be exercised in accordance with law.”

Now, S. 35(1)(c)&(4)-(7) of the Constitution says a person arrested on the suspicion of committing crimes other than homicide must be brought to court within one day, if there is a court within forty kilometer radius of the detention facility and if not, within a period of two days, as may be extended by a court of law – The Chief of Defence Staff & Anor v. Tijan (Makama) (2016) LPELR-40818 (CA) 29-38, F; 57-61, F-E and 61-71, F-A. It is clear the applicant did not fall within any of the situations to warrant his detainment for a whopping 15 days before being charged to court. The lame excuse of the 1^st-4^th respondents that the applicant was so kept because he could not perfect the police bail granted him, as he could not produce a surety, is definitely untenable and rather corroborates the applicant’s evidence that he was illegally detained. What the law says is that he must be brought to court within two days latest.

I must state at this juncture that the fault here is not about whether the applicant truly committed the crimes in issue or not but about the procedure and processes before he was eventually charged to court. The applicant deserved his constitutional right of being presumed innocent until otherwise pronounced by a court of law and therefore, could not be sentenced by the respondents to serve punishment before the proper trial and conviction, as the respondents have done in this case by taking the law into their hands. The police are not debt collectors and must always act within the confines of the law at all material times to escape condemnation for violating citizens’ fundamental rights. When they act for motives not connected with their lawful duties and authority, they are on a frolic of their own and not covered by law. The applicant and the 1^st-4^th respondents ought to pursue the accusation of indebtedness from the one and the recrimination from the other via civil litigation, which they have not done in the instant case as no reliefs were farmed for the monetary claims nor Counter-Claims filed. The applicant did not even clarify what he was being owed. They were just made as ancillary points to buttress the breach of fundamental rights.    

The law as espoused in S. 35 of the Constitution did not talk about producing a surety before the Police but about being brought to a court of law within one day of the arrest, if there is a court within forty kilometer radius of the detention facility or two days, where the radius is beyond forty kilometers to a court - The Chief of Defence Staff & Anor v. Tijan (Makama) [supra]. The place of arrest and detention of the applicant are in Enugu City and, I take judicial notice that there must be a magistrate court within forty-kilometer radius thereto; and even where there is none, the 5^th-6^th respondents did not comply with the requirement of two days for detention facilities outside forty-kilometer radius. I therefore find that the 5^th-6^th respondents did not act within the radius of the law in detaining the claimant illegally for a whopping 15 days for a non-homicidal offence of theft by conversion before belatedly charging him to court. The 5^th-6^th respondents are therefore at fault and in contravention of SS. 34&35 of the Constitution, which the 1^st-4^th respondents also contravened, as I have explained earlier on.

The 1^st-4^th respondents must learn how to relate with their workers and not illegally use their weight economic-wise to tilt the scale of the coercive powers of the state against their workers. The conduct of the 1^st-4^th respondents in this instance amounts to harassment and inhuman treatment contrary to ILO C190 and its R206 and SS. 34&35 of the Constitution. They must be contented in reporting crimes against their workers and only insist in the lawful investigation of their case; as anything outside that, which verges on illegality would make them liable irrespective of the culpability of their employee in the allegations reported to the police. I therefore find the 1^st-6^th respondents liable for the illegal detention of the applicant and hold that the applicant proved his case with regard to the illegal detention beyond the remit of the law. Let me now examine the reliefs claimed to find out, which the applicant is entitled to.

I refuse reliefs 1 & 3, having earlier held that I did not find the case of brutalization on the date of arrest and illegal arrest proved against the 1^st-4^th respondents. Reliefs 1 & 3, which are anchored on them are therefore not grantable. I accordingly dismiss them. With respect to relief 5, S. 35(6) of the Constitution makes it mandatory that in cases of illegal detention the authorities and persons responsible must be made to tender public apologies as part of the reliefs grantable, apart from compensation. Though, I found that the applicant did not state the means and manner by which the public apology must be tendered but a mandatory constitutional provision cannot be denied the applicant for mere minor error in asking for it. I therefore rely on S. 14 of the NICA to fill the vacuum by ordering that the 1^st-4^th respondents jointly at one side and the 5^th-6^th respondents jointly at the other side, tender public apologies separately to the applicant within seven days of this judgment in a national newspaper that circulates in Enugu and file up the evidence via affidavit before this Court within seven days of the publication and, serve the applicant also within the seven days. The judgment of this Court is the law that so specify in accordance with the dictates of S. 35(6) of the Constitution.  

I also grant reliefs 2 & 4, which are anchored on my findings that the applicant was illegally detained beyond the warrant granted the 5^th-6^th respondents under S. 35 of the Constitution and that, the 1^st-4^th respondents who goaded the 5^th-6^th respondents to commit this illegality are equally liable. But my grant of reliefs 2 & 4 is minus the word “arrest” which featured in them. The applicant was legally arrested but only illegally detained beyond legal remits and so entitled to compensation even if he did not frame a relief for it – Jim Jaja v. Commissioner of Police & Ors (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 225 at 254: “Where a breach of fundamental rights is proved, the victim is entitled to compensation EVEN if no specific amount is claimed.” Under international best practices too, cases of inhuman treatments, harassments and psychological traumas in employment relations warrant punitive damages - Harmon v. State, reviewed in Luth Levush, “Israel: National Labor Court Quintuples Compensation in Occupational Harassment Case[32]” and, the ILO, “Judgment 121: Twentieth Ordinary Session of the Administrative Tribunal of the League of Nations[33], 1968[34]”, involving Agarwala v. United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization [FAO].

Be that as it may, I now come to the question of cost. Cost follows events. I assessed the cost of this action at N1Million [One Million Naira], taking into consideration that it was filed Jul 07, 2020 [more than four years ago] and the inflationary trends in the nation. Pursuant to Order 47, R 7 of the NIC Rules, I also grant 25% simple interest rate per annum on the judgment sums until fully liquidated. The judgment takes immediate effect except as relates to the public apology, which shall follow the directives given. The case must come to an end.

CONCLUSION  

In conclusion I reiterate the reliefs granted as follows:

1.     A declaration, that the unlawful detention of the applicant beyond legal remit by the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 5^th and 6^th respondents from Mar 27, 2019 to Apr 11, 2019 is wrong, improper, illegal, unconstitutional and a violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights as enshrined under the Constitution.

2.     An order directing the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th, 5^th and 6^th respondents jointly or severally to pay the sum of N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) to the applicant as general damages for the unlawful detention of the applicant from Mar 27, 2019 to Apr 11, 2019.

3.     A public apology by the 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, 4^th respondents at one side jointly and, the 5^th & 6^th Respondents at the other side jointly, to the applicant for the violation of his fundamental rights within seven days of this judgment, which publication must thereafter be filed in this Court in an affidavit and also served on the applicant within the seven days of the publication.

4.     Cost of N1Million (One Million Naira) only.

5.     25% simple interest per annum until the judgment sums are completely liquidated pursuant to Order 47, R 7 of the NIC Rules.

6.     The judgment takes immediate effects in all ramifications except with respect to the apology, which must abide the directives of the 1^st-4^th respondents at one side jointly and, the 5^th-6^th respondents at the other side jointly, tendering public apologies within seven days of this judgment and thereafter, file up the evidence in an affidavit in this Court within the seven days of the publication and, get the applicant served within the same seven days.

That is the Court’s judgment on this case. Having reached this juncture, there is nothing more to do than to enter the judgment. The decision is accordingly entered today Tuesday Aug 06, 2024 under my very hand and signature as the presiding judge.

…………………………..

HON. JUSTICE OLUWAKAYODE O. AROWOSEGBE

Presiding JUDGE

ENUGU DIVISION

NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA