IN THE NATIONAL
INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN
THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT CALABAR
BEFORE: HONOURABLE
MR. JUSTICE SANUSI KADO
28TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026 SUIT NO. NICN/CA/59/2024
BETWEEN:
Eval John Ekpe Bassey ……………………………………………………………………….
claimant
AND
1.
2. HRH Oval Solomon Edward
(Paramount Ruler, Abi Local Government Area defendants
3. Secretary Abi Traditional Rulers Council
JUDGMENT.
1. On 10/10/2024, the claimant took out a general
form of complaint commencing this action. The general form of complaint was
accompanied by the statement of facts, witness statement on oath, list of
witnesses, list of documents to be tendered as exhibits. In the statement of
facts the claimant claims against the defendants as follows:-
a. A declaration that the stoppage of the
claimant’s monthly entitlements by the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants is unlawful, null and void.
b. The sum of ?1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) only as
unpaid stipends of ?40,000.00 monthly for 25 months.
c. The sum of ?5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) as
exemplary and aggravated damages against the Defendants for the loss of income.
d. The sum of ?5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) only as
general damages.
e. The sum of ?1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) only as cost
for instituting this action.
2. Upon being served with the originating
process commencing this suit, the 1st defendant on 14/2/2025, filed
statement of defence wherein the claimant’s claim was denied. While the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants filed their (joint) Statement of Defence and Counterclaim on
19/6/2026 after obtaining leave of this HonourableCourt.The claimant responded
to the 2nd and 3rd defendants’ processes by filing
Claimant’s Reply to 2nd and 3rd defendants’ Statement of
Defence and Defence to Counterclaim on 30/10/2025.
3. The 2nd and 3rd
defendants also filed their joint statement of defence and incorporating there
in a counter claim in the counter claim, the 2nd and 3rd
claimants are claiming as follows:-
I.
A declaration that
any money paid to or received by the claimant after the dismissal of his action
in suit No. HUG/16/2018 is a fraud.
II.
Refund of all monies
paid and collected by the claimant by reason of holding himself as village head
and clan head of Ngarabe clan.
III.
By reason of his
refusal to pay the cost awarded in favour of the defendants in suit No.
HUG/9/2023 (of his same claim in the High Court of justice, Ugep) the claimant
is thereby continuing contempt of court.
IV.
An order of perpetual
injunction restraining the claimant from parading or holding out himself or
being projected anywhere as the village Head of Ngarabe Village and or the Head
of Ngarabe Clan.
V.
An order perpetual
injunction restraining the claimant either by himself, agents, servants,
privies or assigns from disturbing or further disturbing, the 2nd
and 3rd defendants in the performance of his functions and duties
and from exercising the rights and privileges of their respective offices.
VI.
The sum of ten
Million Naira, N10,0000,000.00 damages.
THE CASE OF THE CLAIMANT.
4. The case of the claimant as can be gathered
from the statement of facts, witness statement on oath and the evidence on
record is that the claimant claimed to be a traditional ruler,
certificated Village Head and Clan Head
in Ngarabe Community, Ekureku of Abi Local Government Area of Cross River
State.According to the claimant the 2nd defendant has been using his position as the
paramount ruler of Abi Local Government Area to instigate violence and unrest
in Ngarabe Community with the aid of one Mr. Iyakumazi Pius to challenge his
authority as Village Head and Clan Head respectively. To demonstrate his
support for his lackey, the 2nd defendant instructed the 3rd
defendant to stop paying the claim ant his monthly stipend of N40,000.00 (Forty
Thousand Naira) and the 3rd defendant obliged and stopped the claimant’s
monthly emoluments for over two years untilthe recent intervention of the
permanent secretary in the department of chieftaincy affairs, Cross River State
Governor’s office and other well. The claimant received his monthly emoluments
for about four months after the intervention of the then permanent secretary,
but the 2nd defendant again ordered the stoppage of the claimant’s
emoluments for the past five months.
5. The claimant through his solicitor’s sent in
a letter to complained to the governor of Cross River State through special
adviser of chieftaincy affairs dated 5/6/2024 but nothing has been done to
resolve the non-payment of the claimant’s entitlements.
THE CASE OF THE 1ST DEFENDANT.
6. The case of the 1st defendant is
that the claimant is not a traditional ruler in Ngarabe community of Abi Local
Government Area of Cross River State recognised by the Traditional Rulers Law,
Cap T4, Volume 6, Laws of Cross River State having been long replaced as clan
head of Ngarabe Clan. It was also stated that the certificate which the
claimant has pleaded was long withdrawn and the claimant was directed to return
same via letter of nullification/re-election of village/clan head dated
1/2/2017. The claimant challenged nullification of his recognition before the
High Court and same was dismissed. Following withdrawal of his recognition the
privilege of the said office was withheld by stoppage of his stipends. The
payment of stipends is not actionable or enforceable right but merely a
privilege enjoyed by some traditional rulers which the claimant is not. The
claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought against 1st
defendant.
7. The 1st defendant urged the court
to dismiss the claim of the claimant for lacking in merit and for want of
jurisdiction of this court to entertain same as claimant has not established any
type of labour relationship between him and the defendants nor show how the
terms of that relationship was breached, in any way that is capable of activating
the jurisdiction of this court.
THE CASE OF THE 2NDAND 3RDDEFENDANTS.
8. The 2nd and 3rddefendants
in their defencedenied the claimant’s claim of being a traditional ruler. That
at no time the 2nd defendant instigated violence and unrest as
alleged in paragraph 4 of the claimant’s statement of facts.Also at no time the
claimant was identified or selected and/or recognisedas the village head of
Ngarabe village or clan head of Ngarabe clan. It was further stated no governor
of Cross River State has ever issued any certificate of recognition in his
favour, either as village head of Ngarabe or as clan head of Ngarabe Clan, but
he keeps parading himself as such unabashedly.
9. By the end of 2016, the untoward claimant
started planning for his coronation to the chagrin and consternation of
everybody. Unknown to them (including the 2nd defendant) the
claimant had surreptiously and fraudulently made available to himself
certificate of recognition purportedly issued by Senator LiyelImoke, former
governor of Cross River State. Until its exhibited the so-called certificate
the Ngarabe people believed he was merely joking. Upon investigation by Abi
local government Area, it was discovered that the claimant was parading fake
documents as chieftaincy certificates.
10. The claimant dragged 2nd and 3rd
defendant before the high Court of Cross river state seeking for declaration
that the claimant is the authentic village head of Ngarabe and clan head of
Ngarabe. The case was dismissed and N50,000.00 damages awarded against the
claimant, which he is yet to complied with.
THE CLAIMANT’S REPLY TO THE 2ND AND 3RD DEFENDANTSS’
STATEMENT OF DEFENCE.
11. According to the claimant the 2nd
defendant being an interested party has done everything within his power to
revoke the recognition of the claimant as chief but has woefully failed. The
claimant remains the authentic village head and clan head of his clan. The
judgment referred to by the defendants is on appeal as merit of the case was
not decided. The parties before the court are different from the parties in the
case decided by High Court.
THE SUBMISSION OF THE 1ST
DEFENDANT.
1. J. O. Odong, Esq; senior State Counsel 1,
Ministry of Justice Calabar, representing the 1st defendant adopted
the final written address of the 1st defendant as his argument. In
the final written address the 1st defendant formulated twin issues for resolotion as follows:-
1. Whether in view of the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case, the Court is clothed with Jurisdiction to entertain
and determine this suit?
2. Whether the claimant has discharged the
evidential burden required to entitle him to the reliefs sought?
ARGUMENT:
12. Issue 1: Whether in view of the peculiar
facts and circumstances of this case, the Court is clothed with Jurisdiction to
entertain and determine this suit?
13. Counsel submitted that, Jurisdiction is
fundamental and the bedrock of any judicial proceedings. Jurisdiction is the
authority and power which the Court has to adjudicate over matters brought
before it. It follows that before a court of law entertains any matter brought
before it for adjudication, it must ensure that it possesses the jurisdiction
to sit over the matter, failing which the proceedings no matter how well
conducted amounts to a nullity. Procedurally, jurisdiction of a court does not
exist in a vacuum. No court of law can assume Jurisdiction without being
statutorily empowered to do so. A Court’s authority or jurisdiction is a
product of constitution or other specific statutes and the enabling law
creating a Court often prescribes the scope of its jurisdiction. To support
this contention counsel relied on the case of ALADE V. ALEMULOKE & ORS
(1988) LPELR-398(SC).
14. For the jurisdiction of this court counsel refers
to the provisions of section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended) and section 7 of the National
Industrial Court Act, 2006, and argued that these provisions confers on this
Court, with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate civil causes and matters
relating to labour, industrial trade union and industrial relations and
environment and conditions of work, health, safety and welfare of labour and
matter incidental thereto amongst others.
15. Counsel submitted that from the foregoing,
the Constitution has not conferred jurisdiction on the National Industrial
Court to hear and determine chieftaincy matters. In relation to the instant
suit, Section 254C (1) (k) of the Constitution provides that the National
Industrial Court shall have jurisdiction in matters relating to or connected
with dispute arising from payment or non-payment of salaries, wages, pensions,
gratuities, allowances, benefits and any other entitlement of any employee,
worker, political office holder, judicial officer or any civil or public
servant in any part of the federation, and matters incidental thereto. A suit
predicated on Chieftaincy affairs and traditional matters cannot be instituted
in this Court.
16. Counsel further argued that the dethronement
or withdrawal of certificate of recognition of a traditional ruler cannot, by
any stretch of imagination, be said to be connected with a “dispute arising
from the entitlement of an employee, worker, political office holder, judicial
officer or any civil or public servant in any part of the federation and
matters incidental thereto.” The payment of stipend to a traditional ruler by a
state government cannot turn him into an employee or a public officer, and
suspension of such stipend after withdrawal of certificate of recognition
cannot be said to be a breach of an employment relationship.According to
counsel the debate over whether traditional rulers are public officers was laid
to rest in the case of CHIEF JOHN EZE V OKECHUKWU 2002] 14 SCM 105.
17. Given that Section 277 of the 1979
Constitution (as referenced in the above decision) and section 318 of the 1999
Constitution are in parimateria, a traditional ruler cannot be said to be a
public officer whose removal from office and subsequent suspension of stipends
can be challenged at the National Industrial Court. In EFA V EFA (2018) 18 WRN,
the Court of Appeal stated that it is apparent that traditional offices do not
fall into any of the categories of public service of a state. The Court further
held that: “These are not persons who can be held accountable to the high
office and demands of a public service of a State and that they are persons
versed in traditional matters and whose assignment is to guide the State or
Local Government council on such related matters.”
18. Counsel submitted that in the instant suit, it can be gleaned from the
parties and the facts of the case that the matter is clearly a traditional
rulers’ and chieftaincy dispute. As a result, there exist no form of
contractual obligation between the 1st Defendant nor the Government
of Cross River State and the Claimant. The only connection between the Claimant
and the 1st Defendant is that the Claimant alleges he is the Village
Head of the Ngarabe Community, to which the Claimant’s purported certificate of
recognition has been revoked for not being original and authentic, thereby
casting aspersions on his claim to the throne of the Ngarabe Community.
19. Counsel also submitted that in paragraph 12
of the 1st Defendant’s Statement of Defence, the 1st
Defendant pleaded the issue of jurisdiction of this court to entertain this
suit, stating that this Honourable Court is bereft of jurisdiction to determine
this suit as the Claimant has not establish any type of labour relationship
between him and the Defendants.
20.Counsel argued that since there exists no
document of any kind that establishes any contract of employment or appointment
between the Claimant and the 1st Defendant or Government of Cross
River State. The Claimant has not established any type of labour relationship
between him and the 1st Defendant nor shown how the terms of that
relationship was breached in a way that is capable of activating the
jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, the institution of this matter at this
Court for the entitlement of stipends to the Claimant is a gross disregard for
the tenets of powers in relation to the jurisdiction of this honourable court.
21. Counsel also argued that assuming but not
conceding that the Claimant was in fact the Village Head of Ngarabe Community,
the Claimant would still not be within the confines of the jurisdiction of this
court where the case was that his stipends were withheld. This is because, the
Claimant is not considered an employee, neither is he a public office holder.
This was further resounded by the Claimant himself when asked during
cross-examination on the 10th December, 2025, if he is an employee
of the Government of Cross River State. The Claimant stated unequivocally and I
quote;
“I am not an employee of the Government of Cross River State but I am a
traditional ruler in Cross River State.”
22. It is submission of counsel that the payment
of salaries to traditional rulers from the funds of local/state governments
does not confer jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court.A traditional
ruler who was dethroned or removed is not without a legal redress. But in
challenging said removal from the throne, the appropriate court to seek redress
is the state High Court. See CHIEF JOSEPH ODETOYE OYEYEMI V COMMISSIONER FOR
LOCAL GOVT., KWARA STATE & ORS. (1992)2 SCNJ 266.
23. Counsel submitted that the proper court for
the Claimant to challenge the suspension of his stipends which was a
culmination of the revocation and nullification of his Certificate of
recognition is the High Court of Cross River State and we also submit that the
Claimant had done so already. This was confirmed during cross-examination of
the Claimant on the 10th December, 2025 by the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants’ counsel wherein he acknowledged that he had already instituted
three matters against them in the High Court and all three were decided against
him. See exhibits DW1A - DW1D.
24.According to counsel flowing from exhibits
DW1A – DW1D, it is clearly without a doubt that the Claimant in the instant
suit had in fact channeled his claims through the right process but did not get
favourable decisions. It is also our submission that the Claimant came to this
Court with the intention to mislead this Court into believing he is the
authentic Village Head of Ngarabe Community and is entitled to stipends which
was suspend. When in fact it has been adjudged by a competent court of law,
clothed with the veil of jurisdiction, that the Claimant is not the Village
Head of Ngarabe Community.
25. Counsel contended that the Claimant
deceitfully phrased his reliefs in the instant suit in such a manner to suggest
that he is the current village head of Ngarabe and his entitlements as a
traditional ruler were unlawfully and erroneously suspended. That
notwithstanding, the payment of salaries to traditional rulers from the funds
of state governments does not confer jurisdiction on the National Industrial
Court to entertain chieftaincy matters.
26.Counsel also submitted that from paragraphs
5.13 to 5.17 of this written address, the instant suit is also an abuse of
court process.Counsel urged this Honourable Court to dismiss this suit for
lacking in merits and for want of jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to
entertain same as the Claimant did not establish any type of labour
relationship between him and the Defendants.
27. Issue 2: Whether the claimant has discharged
the evidential burden required to entitle him to the reliefs sought?
28.In arguing issue 2, counsel reiterated the
law is settled that the burden of proof in civil suits is on the party who
asserts.This settled principle of law is encapsulated in Section 131 of the
Evidence Act, 2011, as amended. While this burden may shift from side to side
as it does in civil cases, it remains principally on the party who would fail
if no evidence is led on an issue. For as Section 133 (1) of the Evidence Act,
2011, states:
“In civil, cases, the burden of proving the
existence or non-existence of a fact lies on a party against whom the judgement
of the court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side…”
29.
Counsel submitted
that this settled principles of law were reiterated by the supreme court in
BENJAMIN NWAKUBA IROAGBARA V. UFOMADU (2009) 11 NWLR (PT. 1153) 587, Per
Aderemi JSC delivering the lead judgement said at page 599 paras.
30. To further support his contention counsel
relied on the cases of SHIDDI V. JIMKUTA (2023) 17 NWLR (PT. 1913) 303, SC.;
FOLARIN V. AGUSTO (2023) 11 NWLR (PT. 1896) 559, SC.; NATIONAL BANK OF NIGERIA
LTD V. DEBORAH OPEOLA (1994) 1 NWLR (PT. 319) 126 AT P. 139; AKINFOSILE V.
AJOSE (1960) SCNLR 447; OKECHUKWU & SONS V. NDAH (1967) NMLR, 368; NSML V.
AFOLABI (1978) 2 SC 79; OMISORE V. AREGBESOLA (2015) 15 NWLR (1482) 205, SC and
AKINBADE V. BABATUNDE (2018) 7 NWLR (PT. 1618) 366, SC where the above
principles of the law were embraced, stated and restated.
31. According to counsel, the direct implication
of the legal principle above is that the burden of proof that the Claimant is
the Village Head of Ngarabe Community and entitled to be paid his monthly
stipends; twenty-five-month arrears of stipends, inter alia, is on the
Claimant. The Claimant has failed to discharge the burden of proof required to
entitle him to the reliefs claimed.
32. Counsel submitted that the Claimant has
failed to establish to this Honourable Court that he is the true and authentic
village head of Ngarabe Community. As the Claimant merely claimed in paragraph
3 of his Statement of Facts and written statement on oath respectively, that he
is the Certificated village head and clan head of Ngarabe Community. This was
specifically traversed in paragraphs 2 of the both the 1st
Defendant’s statement of defence and the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants’ joint statement of defence.
33. Counsel further submitted that the 1st
Defendant further averred in paragraph 3 of its statement of defence that the
said certificate of recognition the Claimant’s claim is hinged on has been
withdrawn and revoked, which the Claimant did not deny nor dispute. The 2nd
and 3rd Defendants also stated in paragraph 4 of their statement of
Defence that no Governor of Cross River State has ever issued any Certificate
of recognition in favour of the Claimant, either as Village Head or Clan Head
of Ngarabe Community but the Claimant keeps parading himself as such
unabashedly.
34. Counsel submitted that the Certificate of
Recognition of the Claimant tendered was contested by the Defendants for being
a false document on the ground that the Certificate of Recognition sought to be
tendered was different from the Certificate of Recognition pleaded in the
Claimant’s Statement of Facts. The Certificate of Recognition pleaded in the
Statement of Facts is dated 30th March, 2002 and signed by Mr.
Donald Duke, while the Certificate of Recognition tendered by the Claimant is
dated 15th May, 2015 and signed by Sen. LiyelImoke.
35. It is the submission of counsel that an
election was conducted wherein the Claimant lost to one Eval Pius NkanuIyoku
who was duly selected and recognized as the Village/Clan Head of Ngarabe
Community. See Paragraph 4 of 1st Defendant’s statement of Defence
and paragraph 5 of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ statement
of defence.And in paragraph 6 of the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants’ statement of Defence, they also averred that the Claimant had
surreptitiously and fraudulently made available to himself Certificate of
Recognition purportedly issued by Senator LiyelImoke. But the people of Ngarabe
have always been in stiff opposition to the Claimant’s claim to the throne.
There is no information as to how and when he ascended the throne.
36. Counsel contended that the Claimant failed to
challenge all the averments contained in the 1st Defendant’s
statement of Defence and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’
statement of defence. The Claimant also failed to lead any evidence to dispute
or controvert all the averments of all the Defendants
37. Counsel submitted that the case of the
Defendants was further given credence during examination and cross-examination
of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ sole witness, Mr. Peter
EbortyEzor, on 29th April, 2026 and 9th June, 2026
respectively, wherein he stated he is the immediate past youth president of
Ngarabe Community, from 2013 to 2023, a period of ten years. He stated that in
that period, the Claimant was never the Village Head of Ngarabe Community.
38. Counsel submitted that the Claimant never
challenged the fact that Mr. Peter EbortyEzor was the youth president for the
period between 2013 to 2023. And further argued that it is conventionally
impossible for the youth president and the village/clan head of any community
to not cross paths during the tenure ship of their reign. The Claimant’s
purported certificate of recognition tendered during hearing is dated 15th
May, 2015, supposedly issued during the tenure of Mr. Peter EbortyEzor as the
Youth President of Ngarabe Community. It is the case of the Defendants that Mr.
Peter EbortyEzor is in the best position to tell this Court who truly is the
recognized and selected Village head of Ngarabe Village.
39.Counsel is of the view that premised on the
foregoing and the evidence presented, the Defendants have revealed there is nothing
in the evidence of the Claimant that challenges the evidence of the Defendants.
Where evidence is unchallenged or uncontroverted, the court has an obligation
to act on such evidence before it. See OBULOR vs. OBOR (2001) FWLR (PT.47)
1004.
40.
Counsel argued that,
to address the Claimant’s entitlement to all the reliefs sought, the following
question begs for answer and is answered in the negative. Is the claimant who
is not the selected and recognized village head of Ngarabe community entitled
to be paid monthly stipends or arrears of stipends?
41. Counsel also drew the courts attention to the
main defence in the instant case which is that the Claimant is not the selected
and recognized Village Head of Ngarabe Village. As a result of the above, the
Claimant who had been collecting monthly stipends under false pretense, had his
purported certificate of recognition revoked and cannot be entitled to monthly
stipends. That stated, it is submitted that a claim for stipends or arrears of
stipends presupposes entitlement to such stipends.
42.Counsel submitted that there is no
employer/employee relationship whatsoever that can warrant the claim for salary
or arrears of salary or that can entitle the claimant to be paid salaries. To
support his contention counsel refers to the case of LAGOS STATE UNIVERSITY
TEACHING HOSPITAL & MANAGEMENT BOARD V. PRINCE M.B. ADEWOLE (1998) 5 NWLR
(PT.550) 406 the court clarified that:
“When a claim is for salary arrears, such claim pre-supposes entitlement
to such salary and a denial of payment when and as it fell due [e.g.], where
the claim is for wrongful dismissal”.
43. According to counsel in the instant case it has been proved that the
Claimant is a traditional ruler and not an employee of the Government of Cross
River State.
44.
In any case, the
court has held that in a claim for arrears of salary, there is a presupposition
that the salary was previously earned and a claim for previously earned salary
is in the realm of special damages which must be pleaded and proven strictly.
See CHARLES UDEGBUNAM V. FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ORS (1996)
5 NWLR (PT. 449) 474 AT P.485, PARA F; A-G OYO STATE V. FAIRLAKES HOTELS LTD
(NO.2) (19890 5 NWLR (PT.121) 255.
45.The law is that there must be proof of
damages and costs claimed by a party to warrant any award of such. See GUINESS
NIG PLC V. EMMANUEL NWOKE (2000) 15 NWLR (PT.689) P.135. The Claimant’s claim
for damages is greatly unfounded and as such could not be proved.
46.
Moreso, we have shown
in our arguments above that the Claimant is not the authentic Village Head of
Ngarabe Community and his purported Certificate of recognition had been
withdrawn. Thus, we submit that the Claimant is not entitled to his principal
relief for a declaration that the stoppage of the Claimant’s monthly entitlements
by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants is unlawful, null and void.
47.In any event, Reliefs B, C, D and E in the
Complaint are ancillary as they are dependent on the principal relief that the
stoppage of the Claimant’s monthly entitlements by the 2nd and 3rd
Defendants is unlawful, null and void. However, since we have shown that
Claimant is not the authentic Village Head of Ngarabe Community andis not
entitled to monthly stipends, we submit that the said ancillary reliefs are
liable to be dismissed because in GOV. OF KOGI STATE & ANOR v. SIMON (2024)
LPELR-73317, it was held per Inyang JCA at page 57 paras C that–
"…where a principal declaratory relief fails, the ancillary relief
which depends on it automatically collapses.
48.
It is finally
submitted that the law remains that a relief claimed must be proven before the
court can grant it, no matter how strongly the court is persuaded to do so. See
ODINKEMERE V. IMPRESIT BAKALORI (NIG) LTD. (1995) 8 NWLR (PT.411) 52. The
claimant has failed to establish entitlement to any of the reliefs sought, by
credible evidence, this honourable court is therefore urged to dismiss the
claimant’s suit with cost in favour of the 1st Defendant as same is
gold digging and unmeritorious.
49.
In concluding his
submission counsel submitted that this suit for lacks merit for want of
jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to entertain same as the Claimant did not
establish any type of labour relationship between him and the Defendants.
Furthermore, the reliefs claimed must be proven before the court can grant
them, no matter how strongly the court is persuaded to do so.The claimant has
failed to establish entitlement to any of the reliefs sought, by credible
evidence, this honourable court is therefore urged to dismiss the claimant’s
suit with cost, in favour of the defendants as same is gold digging and
unmeritorious.
THE SUBMISSION OF THE
2ND AND 3RD DEFENDANTS.
1. Whether the case of the claimants has been
proved as required by law or whether the Claimant is entitled to the Reliefs
Sought?
2. Whether the Defendant/Counterclaimant is not
entitled to the reliefs sought, having regards to the evidence before the
Court.?
ARGUMENT:
50.Issue 1: Whether the case of the claimant has
been proved as required by law or whether the Claimant is entitled to the
Reliefs Sought?
51. In arguing issue 1, counsel refers to section
136 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, and submitted that the burden of first
proving a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the court would
be given if no evidence is produced on either side. It is also settled law that
a plaintiff, must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the
weakness of the defendant's case.
52. Counsel contended that it is imperative
mentioning that the case of the claimant does not mention ‘how’ and ‘when’ the
claimant was selected as a traditional ruler or selected as a village head of
Ngarabe Village or Clan Head of Ngarabe Clan to be entitled to a monthly
stipend from Government coffers. He merely claims: “the claimant remains the
authentic Village Head and Clan Head of his Clan” and exhibited his Certificate
of Recognition. The claimant did not
mention whether or not his appointment was terminated.
53. Counsel posited that it is the case of the
defendants that when the issue of the claimant’s chieftaincy was brought to
limelight, it aroused public interest such that all the stakeholders including
(Abi Traditional Rulers Council, Abi Local Government Council and the Office of
the Chieftaincy Affairs, Governor’s Office, Calabar) were all involved and
tried to verify the truth or otherwise of the claimant’s claim.In the end, it
was discovered that the claimant was brandishing fake Chieftaincy Certificates
and parading himself as traditional ruler, to the extent that he was being
payrolled and paid stipend of ?40,000 each month.Counsel argued that the claimant
has not challenged or controverted all these.
54.Counsel further contended that the law is
trite that a Court is at liberty to accept and act on unchallenged and
uncontroverted evidence. In support of this contention reliance was placed on
the case of OKAFOR V. OKAFOR & ORS (2014) LPELR-23561(CA)
55. According to counsel from the evidence
adduced, the defendants have shown that there is nothing in the evidence of the
lone witness for the claimant that controverts or challenges the evidence of
the defendants. In the circumstance, of unchallenged and uncontroverted
evidence, the court has an obligation to act on such evidence, before it. To
support this submission counsel relied on the case of MOBIL PRODUCING NIG
UNLIMITED V MONOKPO No2 2001 FWLR pt 78 p1210 at 1218 R6; ATT- GEN ANAMBRA
STATE V ATT GEN FEDERATION 2005 Pt 268 p1557 at 1565 R6. YA’U V DIKWA 2001 FWLR
pt 62 p1987 at 19996 R18 and ZABOLEY INTERNATIONAL LTD V OMEOGBEIN 2005 AFWLR
pt 278 p 1172 at 1175 Rs 5 & 6.
56.Counsel also submitted that there is no
information whatsoever as to how and when he purportedly came to the throne.
The only allegation which cannot even be expatiated or substantiated is that
the defendants have stopped payment of monthly emolument to the claimant.
Before stoppage of monthly stipend to the claimant and after the verification
and selection exercise, the stakeholders were in search of the claimant to,
among others, warn him to give peace a chance and stop his unwholesome
activities in Ngarabe village.Rather than heed this piece of advice, the
claimant decided and dragged HRH Eval Pius NkanuIyoku, HRM Ovai Edward Osim
Solomon (Paramount Ruler of Abi LGA and 2nd defendant herein) as
well as the Special Adviser on Chieftaincy Affairs, Calabar to the High Court
of Justice, Ugep to seek redress in Suit No. HUG/16/2018. The case was
dismissed as can be gleaned from Exhibits DW1C and DW1D which were tendered
without any objection.Despite dismissal of his case, the claimant instituted Suit
No. HUG/9/2023, based on similar reliefs to Suit No. HUG/16/2018, against the
incumbent Clan head of Ngarabe and one HH Eval Matthew Ekpoto now deceased. In
Suit No. HUG/16/2018 the claimant intentionally sued the incumbent Clan head of
Ngarabe as EVAL PIUS NKANU IYOKU, whereas in Suit No. HUG/9/2023 he named him
MR. IYOKU MAZI PIUS. The 1st Relief contained in Exhibit DW1D is
that the claimant should be declared “the substantive village head of Ngarabe
Village and clan Head of Ngarabe Clan . . . .” While in Exhibit DW1B, the 1st
Relief (contained in the Statement of Facts) the claimant seeks for “A
Declaration that the Claimant is the authentic village Head of Ngarabe village
in Ngarabe Community and Clan Head of Ngarabe
. . .” The High Court of Justice Ugep still dismissed Suit No.
HUG/9/2023, this time with cost in favour of Eval Pius NkanuIyoku (incumbent
Clan Head) and against the claimant which the claimant has not paid till date
before coming to institute the instant case. According to counsel, the claimant
has admitted all these facts.
57. Counsel submitted that throughout the gamut
of his evidence, the claimants has not alluded either directly or indirectly to
any agreement being breached by the defendants. This means that where no such
term of an agreement has been breached, no one will be justified to draw such
inference or run to such conclusion that the act of the defendant was wrongful.
58.Counsel further submitted that the
defendants’ action was not wrongful and ipso facto the claimant is not entitled
to damages for the so called "stoppage of payment of stipend”
59.Counsel submitted that assuming but without
conceding that there was "wrongful termination of employment." The
next relevant question would have been: how much damages is the claimant
entitled to. The case of Isievwore v NEPA (2002) FWLR pt 124 p398 at 401 H6 is
very instructive. Here the Supreme Court stated:
"Where an employee is able to establish that his appointment was
wrongly terminated, he would be entitled to damages. And this would be what was
due to him for the period of the notice."
60.
Counsel argued that the
Claimant has woefully failed to prove their case respecting all the claims. The
law remains that he who asserts must prove. A claimant must prove his case with
credible and reliable evidence to be able to succeed in his case. See Atadi v
UBN Plc (2005) All FWLR Pt 285 P 517 at 519 H2.
61. In view of the foregoing, counsel urged the Court
to dismiss all the reliefs of the claimant.
62.Issue 2; Whether the
Defendant/Counterclaimant is not entitled to the reliefs sought having regards
to the evidence before the Court.?
63. In arguing this issue counsel submitted that
the counterclaimants have shown by their evidence that they don’t have peace of
mind and have made a lot of sacrifices due to the belligerent and fraudulent
nature of the claimant.According to counsel throughout the length and breadth
of his evidence the claimant was approbating and reprobating and has failed to
discharge the onus on him to prove his case with credible evidence. Since 2016,
the claimant has been disturbing and threatening the lives of the defendants.
To support his submission counsel relied on the case of Huang v Bello (1990)
NWLR (pt 251) 671 at 678 the court adopted the ratio in the case of Governor of
Lagos State v Ojukwu & Anor. (1986) 2SC 277 and reaffirm the position of
the court thus:
“The court system cannot be maintained without the willingness of
parties to abide by the findings and orders of a competent court until reversed
on appeal. This presupposes that no party and no court of subordinate or even
co-ordinate jurisdiction can say:- ‘I do not like the order made and I will not
obey it’. And that is exactly what the Lagos State Government is doing in this
case. And that posture has to be condemned in the strongest of terms if we are
not to say good-bye to the Rule of Law.”
64.
Counsel urged this
Honourable Court to condemn what the claimant has done by disobeying the Order
of the High Court of Justice, Ugep to pay the sum of ?50,000 the
defendants.
65.Counsel further submitted that the claimant
is deliberately disturbing the Defendants/Counterclaimants and has subjected
them to grave inconveniences and untold hardship. Also, that the court will not allow any
person or party or body to benefit from his own wrong. In support of this
contention reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in BMNL vs. Ola
Ilemobola Ltd. 2007 All FWLR pt 379 p1340 at 1352 H12.
66.
In concluding his
submission counsel submitted that the Claimant has woefully failed to prove his
case respecting all the claims. The law remains that he who asserts must prove.
A claimant must prove his case with credible and reliable evidence to be able
to succeed in his case. See Atadi v UBN Plc (2005) All FWLR Pt 285 P 517 at 519
H2.
67.In view of the foregoing, counsel urged the Court
to grant the reliefs of the Counterclaimants.
THE SUBMISSION OF THE CLAIMANT.
68.
The
counsel for the claimant in the final written address of the claimant adopted
the issues for determination as distilled by the 1st Defendant to
wit.
1. Whether in view of
the peculiar facts, the court is clothed with jurisdiction to entertain and
determine the suit?
2. Whether the Claimant
has discharged the evidential burden required to entitle him to the reliefs
sought?
ARGUMENT.
69.
Issue
1: Whether in view of the peculiar facts, the court is clothed with
jurisdiction to entertain and determine the suit?
70.Counsel for the
claimant submitted that the contention that this court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain this suit is misconceived. Section 254C(1)(k) properly quoted by the
1st Defendant in his final address does not oust the jurisdiction of
the court but affirms it as the instant suit is not about chieftaincy dispute
but about a worker who happens to be a chief whose entitlements were unlawfully
stopped by the 2nd Defendant in spite of the protestation of the
State Government through its highest-ranking civil servant (the Permanent
Secretary) in the State department of Chieftaincy Affairs. No evidence was led
to rebut the fact that upon the intervention of the Permanent Secretary, the
Claimant was restored to the payroll but the 2ndDefendant
maliciously prevented him from being paid after four months of regular payment.
71. Counsel submitted
that the Supreme Court has posited in BANK of INDUSTRY LTD v. OBEYA (2022) 4
NWLR (pt 1821) 589 that “A claimant’s claim in his statement of claim
determines which court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim”. In the instant
suit, the claimant only seeks the payment of his entitlements which is within
the purview of this Court’s jurisdiction. Counsel urged the court to so hold.
72. Issue 2: Whether the
Claimant has discharged the evidential burden required to entitle him to the
reliefs sought?
73. Counsel in arguing
issue 2, submitted that the Claimant has successfully established his case as a
traditional ruler entitled to monthly emoluments from government, having been
properly selected by his community and accorded official recognition by the
Governor of Cross River State as evident before this court. To buttress his
contention counsel relied on the case of DUKE v. GOVERNOR OF CROSS RIVER STATE
(2013) 8 NWLR (pt 1356) 347 where the Supreme Court held that “By virtue of the
provision of section 6 of the Traditional Rulers Law of Cross River State 2004,
the appointment or selection of a Village or Clan Head is a matter which is
entirely within the competence of the village community or clan concerned”.
74.According to counsel
in the instant case, the Paramount Ruler who is the 2nd Defendant is
a meddlesome interloper who out of malice seeks to nullify the appointment of
the claimant despite neither being from that village nor clan. There is no
evidence in this court showing that another certificate of recognition has been
issued to any other person apart from the claimant in spite of the hue and cry
about its withdrawal, relocation, forgery or anything of sort.
75. Counsel submitted
that the 1st Defendant filed a statement of defence with the 3rd
Defendant deposing to a statement on oath that was eventually abandoned.
Strangely, another statement of Defence was filed on behalf of the 2nd
and 3rd Defendant.
76.The witness was later
substituted with another impostor who was procured to make outlandish and
unsubstantiated allegations as the purported judgements of the Cross River
State High Court never touched the validity of the claimant certificate of
recognition but were founded on technical grounds. In SPLINTERS NIG. LTD. V.
OASIS FINANCE LTD (2013) 18 NWLR (pt 1385) 188 it was held that a “witness
statement on oath, not having been duly adopted based on an abandoned statement
of Defence cannot be elevated to the level of affidavit evidence or any
evidence at all”. In the instant case, the 1st Defendant, having abandoned his
pleadings along with the statement on oath of the 3rd Defendant
shows they had no Defence to the suit.
77.
Similarly,
a statement on oath was filed on behalf of one Peter Eborty dated 22/01/2026
with no amendment to the pleadings to reflect the statement of the new witness.
His testimony therefore amounts to nothing as there is no nexus between the
pleadings and the statement on oath. To support this contention, counsel relied
on the case of PDP v. INEC (2022) 18 NWLR (pt 1863), where the Supreme Court
held that a “statement on oath has no legal value where no pleadings anchor or
support it”. Counsel urged the court to so hold in the instant case.
COURT’S
DECISION:
78.I have considered the
processes filed in this suit, the evidence adduced at the trial, the exhibits
tendered and admitted in evidence as well as the written and oral submission of
counsel for the parties.
79.From the facts and
evidence before the court, the claimant is seeking for declaration that the stoppage
of his monthly entitlement by the 2nd and 3rd defendants
as unlawful, null and void. Payment unpaid stipends of N40,000.00 monthly for
25 months. The sum of N5,000,000.00 as exemplary and aggravated damages against
the defendants for the loss of income. The sum of N5,000,000.00 general damages
and cost in the sum of N1,000,000.00.
80.
The
claimant predicated his claims before the court on alleged stoppage of his
entitlement (allowance) by the 3rd defendant in this case based on
orders or directive of the 2nd defendant. According to the claimant
he is a recognised traditional ruler under the Traditional Rulers Law cap T4,
Laws of Cross River State and the 2nd and 3rd defendants
have no power to stop payment of the sum of N40,000.00 (Forty Thousand Naira)
his monthly entitlement.
81. The defendants on
their part denied that the claimant is entitled to any of the reliefs sought.
The 1st defendant in paragraph 12 of the statement of defence has
averred that this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain this suit, as
the claimant has not established any type of labour relationship between him
and the defendants nor show how terms of that relationship was breached in a
way that is capable of activating the jurisdiction of this court.
82.Before proceeding to
determine the claim and counter claim, it behooves on me to first and foremost
deal with the objection of the 1st defendant to the jurisdiction of
this court to hear and entertain this suit.
83. The 1st
defendant has argued in his final written address as issue 1, that this court does not have the
vires to hear and entertain this suit. The counsel for the claimant adopted the
said issue in his final written address and insisted that this court has
requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine the claimant’s claim.
84.
The term
jurisdiction is varied and ubiquitous, thus why it has been variously described
as the livewire of any case, the authority of a court to determine any dispute
tabled before it by contending parties. Hence, the law compels a court to treat
first an issue of jurisdiction where it is raised in any proceeding or suo motu
by the court. In essence, jurisdiction denotes a court’s power to decide a case
or issue a decree. See R.S.H.A. v. Govt., Rivers State (2025) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1990)
591. The issue of jurisdiction is very vital and fundamental in Nigerian
jurisprudence and a judgment or an order of court given where such a court
lacks jurisdiction is a nullity. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR
341; U.B.A. Plc v. Trident Consulting Ltd. (2023) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1903) 95.
85.One important realization is that the jurisdiction of a court is not a matter of
conjecture or convenience; it is a strict question of law that must be properly
established. The question of jurisdiction is never a mere technicality. It is a
substantive issue that strikes at the core of adjudication. Thus, the
jurisdiction of a court being a hard matter of law it can only be determined in
the light of the enabling statute or constitutional provisions conferring
jurisdiction on the court in question. In any event, a court of law cannot add
to or subtract from the provisions of a statute or constitution. As a matter of
law, a court must blindly follow and apply the jurisdictional limits and
limitations as contained or provided in a statute or constitution. In that and
other situations, the constitution or statute is the master and all that a
court of law can do is to interpret the provisions of the constitution or a
statute to obtain or achieve the clear intentions of the lawmaker. A court
cannot do more than that. See Anibi v. Shotimehin (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 282) 461;
Elelu-Habeeb v. A.-G., Fed. (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1318) 423; Madumere v. Okwara
(2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1368) 303; Opara v. Amadi (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1369) 512;
Standard Alliance Ins. Co. Ltd. v. F.C.M.B. Ltd. (2025) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1998) 133.
86.
In order
to establish that a court has jurisdiction over a matter, it must be shown that
it is properly constituted with respect to the (a) number and qualification of
its members; the subject matter of the action is within its (b) jurisdiction;
(c) the action was initiated by due process; and any condition precedent to the
exercise of its (d) jurisdiction has been fulfilled. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim
(1962) 2 SCNLR 341; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels Ltd. (2018) 7 NWLR
(Pt.1619) 518; Leedo Presidential Motel Ltd v. Bank of the North Ltd. (1998) 10
NWLR (Pt. 570) 353; Afribank (Nig.) Plc v. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (Pt. 2002)
255.
87.As pointed out earlier in this
judgment a court of law is said to have and possess the requisite jurisdiction
to entertain and adjudicate over a cause or matter when: it is properly
constituted as to the number (a) and qualifications of its members; and any
condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction has been fulfilled or
satisfied; (b) and the subject matter of and parties to the (c) action are
within its jurisdiction; and the cause or matter has been brought to the court
by due processes of the law as provided for in the Constitution or the (d)
relevant statute. In essence, a court is seized of requisite jurisdiction where
the subject matter and parties to the action are within its jurisdiction. In a
civil matter, what determines the jurisdiction of the court is the claim of the
claimant. In a case like the one at hand, what the court considers is the pleading
together with the reliefs being sought. See SCC (Nig.) Ltd. v. George (2024) 18
NWLR(Pt.1971) 421; SCC (Nig.)
Ltd. v. Joseph (2026) 1 NWLR (Pt.2025) 227; ELEGBE & ANOR V. HP INTL SCHOOLS LTD & ORS
(2026) LPELR-83245(SC).When court is to determine whether or not it has
jurisdiction to entertain a matter, the
court is being called upon to look the law vis-à-vis the pleadings, in this
case, the pleadings and the reliefs sought to see if the dispute submitted for
resolution comes within the ambit of its jurisdiction as provided for by the
constitution or statute establishing it as the case may be.
88.
In the instant case, the reliefs sought by the claimant
and the pleadings clearly shows that the claimant is contesting validity of
stoppage of payment of his allowance in the sum of N40,000.00 (Forty thousand
Naira), being paid to him as traditional ruler and head of Ngarabe Village and
Head of Ngrabe Clan of Abi Local Government Area of Cross River State. He is
also seeking for payment of same allowances amounting to the sum of
N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira) for 25 months. There are also reliefs
bordering on exemplary damages, general damages and cost.
89.
The counsel for the 1st defendant in
arguing against the jurisdiction of this court
to entertain this suit relied on the provisions of section 254C(1) of
the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended and
section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006.
90.
The counsel for the 1st defendant was
right in arguing that the jurisdiction of this court can be found in section
254C(10 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, (as amended). Section 254C (1) which conferred
this court with exclusive jurisdiction. The section provides thus:
“The National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters.
(a). Relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions,
industrial relations and matters arising from workplace, the conditions of
service, including health, safety, welfare of labour, employee, worker and
matters incidental thereto or connected therewith;
(b). Relating to, connected with or arising from Factories Act, Trade
Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Labour Act, Employees' Compensation Act or any
other Act or Law relating to labour, employment, Industrial relations,
workplace or any other enactment replacing the Acts or Laws;
(c). Relating to or connected with the grant of any order restraining
any person or body from taking part in any strike, lock-out or any industrial
action, or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of a strike, lock-out
or any industrial action and matters Connected therewith or related thereto;
(d). Relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation
and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution as it
relates to any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade Unionism,
employer's association or any other matter which the Court has jurisdiction to
hear and determine;
(e). Relating to or connected with any dispute arising from national
minimum wage for the Federation or any part thereof and matters connected
therewith or arising there from;
(f). Relating to or connected with unfair labour practice or
international best practices in labour, employment and industrial relation
matters;
(g). Relating to or connected with any dispute arising from
discrimination or sexual harassment at workplace;
(h). Relating to, connected with or pertaining to the application or
interpretation of international labour standards;
(i). Connected with or related to child labour, child abuse, human
trafficking or any matter connected therewith or related thereto;
(j). Relating to the determination of any question as to the
interpretation and application of any-
(i). Collective agreement;
(ii). Award or order made by an arbitral tribunal in respect of a trade
dispute or a trade union dispute;
(iii). Award or judgment of the Court;
(iv). Term of settlement of any trade dispute;
(v). Trade union dispute or employment
dispute as may be recorded in a memorandum of settlement;
(vi).Trade union constitution, the constitution of an association of
employers or any association relating to Journal of Law, Policy and
Globalization employment, labour, industrial relations or work place;
(vii). Dispute relating to or connected with any personnel matter arising from
any free trade zone in the Federation or any part thereof;
(k). Relating to or connected with disputes arising from payment or
nonpayment of salaries, wages, Pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits and
any other entitlement of any employee, worker, Political or public office
holder, judicial officer or any civil or public servant in any part of the
Federation and matters incidental thereto;
(l).Relating to-
(I). Appeals from the decisions of the Registrar of Triade Unions, or
matters relating thereto or connected therewith;
(ii). Appeals from the decisions or recommendations of any
administrative body or commission of enquiry, arising from or connected with
employment, labour, trade unions or industrial relations; and
(iii). Such other jurisdiction, civil or criminal and whether to the
exclusion of any other court or not, as may be conferred upon it by an Act of
the National Assembly;
(m). Relating to or connected with the registration of collective
agreements.
91. Also, section 7 of the National Industrial
Court Act, 2006, has conferred on this Court, the exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate civil causes and matters relating to labour, industrial trade union
and industrial relations and environment and conditions of work, health, safety
and welfare of labour and matter incidental thereto amongst others.
92.
In the statement of facts and the witness statement on oath the
claimant is seeking for grant of Five reliefs. Reliefs a, b, c, d, and e.
reliefs a and b, are the main claims of the claimant while reliefs c, d and e,
are ancillary claims dependent on grant of the main reliefs.
93.As pointed out earlier in this judgment, the
reliefs being sought by the claimant and the facts pleaded in the statement of
facts, it is clear the grouse of the claimant is his complaint about purported
stoppage of payment of allowances as traditional ruler, village head and clan
head of Ngarabe community of Abi Local Government Area of Cross River State as
well as payment of 25 months allowances at N40,000.00 per month amounting to
sum of N1,000,000.00 (One Million Naira). The remaining reliefs borders damages
and cost.
94.
It is clear to me from the reliefs sought and the pleadings of the
claimant that the claimant reliefs all relates to his entitlement to allowances
as a recognised traditional ruler pursuant to the provisions of the Traditional
Rulers Law Cap T4 Laws of Cross River State.
95.The primary question for the court to resolve
is whether it has jurisdiction to entertain a claim for allowances by a
traditional ruler. The 1st defendant argues that there is no employment
relationship between the claimant and the defendants, and that payment of
traditional rulers' allowance is not payment of salary, thus falling outside this
court’s jurisdiction.
96.
I have earlier in this judgment reproduced the
provision of section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, 1999, as amended which confers on this court with exclusive jurisdiction to entertain
matters in civil causes and matters, relating to or connected with any labour,
employment, trade unions, industrial relations and matters arising from
workplace, the conditions of service, including health, safety, welfare of
labour, employee, worker and matters incidental thereto or connected therewith.
97.The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed
the exclusive jurisdiction of this court in matters relating to labour,
employment, and industrial relations. In ELEGBE & ANOR v. HP INTL SCHOOLS
LTD & ORS (2026) LPELR-83245(SC), the Supreme Court reiterated that Section
254C(1)(a) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the NIC in civil causes and
matters relating to or connected with any labour, employment, trade unions,
industrial relations. Similarly, in SCC (NIG) LTD & ANOR v. GEORGE &
ANOR (2024) LPELR-62865(SC) Pp. 34-37, Paras. B-A, the Supreme Court held that
Section 254C(1)(d) provides for the NIC's exclusive jurisdiction in disputes
over the interpretation and application of Chapter IV of the Constitution as it
relates to employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer's
association or any other matter. The Court of Appeal in KURMI LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COUNCIL v. ATTAH & ORS (2025) LPELR-82117(CA) also held that matters
relating to, arising from or connected with labour, employment or the payment
of salaries and allowances vest exclusive jurisdiction in the NICN by virtue of
Section 254C(1).
98.
Furthermore, GASKIYA
TEXTILE MILLS PLC v. KHOSLA (2014) LPELR-24606(CA) Pp. 23-24, Paras. F-A,
clarified that the jurisdictional scope of this court was widened by Section
254C(1) to include exclusive jurisdiction in respect of all matters relating to
or connected with any labour or employment matters or dealing with disputes
arising from payment of salaries, wages, pensions, gratuities, allowances, benefits
any other entitlement of any employee or worker.
99.
However, in the case
at hand the critical question for the court is whether a traditional ruler’s
allowances falls within the definition of allowances in respect of "labour,
employee, or worker" in the context of an "employment
relationship." The National Industrial Court of Nigeria is a specialisedcourt
of limited jurisdiction, specifically tailored to matters "closely related
to labour and employment matters" and "cannot entertain any matter
outside its constitutionally prescribed subject matter area.see BISONG v.
UNICAL (2016) LPELR-41246(CA) Pp. 37-38, Paras. E-E).
100.
To my mind a traditional
ruler's allowance paid due to recognition accorded to his office in pursuance
to the Traditional Rulers Law, Laws of Cross River state is typically statutory
or customary, not based on a conventional employment contract. While they may
receive allowances, as provided for in section 32 of the Traditional Rulers Law
cap T4, Laws of Cross River State, these are generally considered stipends for
holding a public or traditional office, rather than a salary or entitlement
arising from an employer-employee relationship. The 1st defendant’s
argument that there is no employment relationship is crucial and on a solid
pedestal. Since the claim of the claimant borders on payment of allowances as a
traditional ruler, his claim is not based on an "employee" or
"worker" and that the allowances do not arise from a
"labour" or "employment" relationship as contemplated by
Section 254C(1)(a), therefore, the claim of the claimant is not within the
purview of jurisdiction of this court, as the subject matter is outside the
items of jurisdiction enumerated in section 254C of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended.
101.
In interpreting
whether allowance used in section 254c(1)(k) is same with allowance in section
32, recourse must be had to the ‘ejusdem generis’ rule of interpretation. The
latin phrase ‘ejusdem generis’ means ‘’of the same kind or nature’’. It is
employed in interpretation to limit the
scope of general words. Therefore, the word allowance used in section
254C(1)(k) cannot be interpreted to include allowances of traditional rulers.
The section use specific categories like employees, public servants, and
judicial offers, this means that associated allowances refers to or apply only
to those established employees or workers. See Elegbe v HP Int’l Schools
(supra); Buhari
v. Yusuf (2003) 14 NWLR (Pt. 841) 446; SPDCN v FBIR (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt.466) 256.
102.
In view of the
foregoing, I have no choice than to come to the conclusion that this court has
no jurisdiction to delve into the issue of stoppage of allowance for
traditional ruler pursuant to the provisions of Traditional Rulers Law Cap T4
Laws of Cross River State. As the case is claim for allowances of a traditional
ruler whose office is not typically considered an employment, does not fall
within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
103.
The question as to whether a traditional ruler is an employee pursuant
to the provisions of Traditional Rulers Law of Cross River State becomes
pertinent at this juncture.Under the Traditional Rulers Law, a traditional
ruler as a custodian and trustee of culture and customs of his people or his
community occupy a unique position, which is not that of employer employee
relationship. In Cross River State a traditional rulers’ function is regulated
by the customs and the Traditional Rulers Law. While employees are regulated by
Common law, the Labour Act and other employment legislations.
104.
It is my view that appointment, selection or recognition of a
traditional ruler under the law does not, by itself, create a contract of
employment, as under the Labour Act, a worker was defined ‘as a person who works under a
contract with an employer, whether the contract is for manual labour or
clerical work, but it does not include persons exercising administrative,
executive, technical of professional functions as public officers or
otherwise. See section 91 of Labour Act.
Going by the Labour Act a traditional ruler’s appointed, selected or recognised
under the Traditional Rulers Law of Cross River State is not an employee of the
Government that recognised him
105.
The modern way of looking at employment
relationship is by focusing on factual existence of a contract of service and
the nature of the relationship rather than the given title, position or post
being occupied. This approach is in tandem with ILO jurisprudence which
emphasizes the principle of primacy of facts. The principle emphasizes that the
existence of an employment relationship should be guided by the facts of what
was actually agreed and performed by the parties and not by the name they have
given the relationship or contract. See SHENA
SECURITY CO. LTD V. AFROPAK (NIG) LTD & ORS(2008) 18 NWLR (Pt.1118) 77;
(2008) LPELR-3052(SC).
106.
Therefore, the question of whether this court has
jurisdiction to entertain this suit will depend on the finding on whether a
traditional ruler is an employee of his appointer. Going by the provisions of
Traditional Rulers Law and the processes that led to recognition, it will be
correct to state that a traditional ruler is not an employee as the services he
renders is to the community in general and is not based on payment of salary.
107.
From the foregoing and having regards to the
pleadings and reliefs sought by the claimant, as well as exhibit C1 which is
the main document which the claimant is relying to assume that he is in an
employment relationship, I would like to straight away say that the claimant is
not in any contract of employment with the defendants in this case, based on
labour or common law guiding contract of service. This is because as pointed
out earlier in this judgment employment is determined by the existence of a
substance of contract of service rather than by a formal title or post or
office. Thus, why court is guided by a number of factors in determining
existence of contract of service, such as intention of the parties, remuneration, mutual obligations, degree of
control and integration into the organization. In SHENA SECURITIUES V AFROPAK
LIMITED (supra), the Supreme court emphasized the totality of the relationship
of relationships between the parties as determinant of status of employment.
108.
In view of the foregoing, and having regard to the
totality of the reliefs and pleadings of the claimant it will be correct to
come to the conclusion that exhibit C1, is not a letter of employment capable of creating a contract of
service, because it is in deficit of the factors that point to employment
status being created.
109.
For service rendered, under the Nigerian labour
jurisprudence an employer is duty bound to pay to employee agreed wages as
consideration for service rendered by employee. In MOBIL PRODUCING (NIG.)
UNLIMITED & ANOR v UDO (2008) 3 WRN 53, Omokri, JCA, as he then was
observed that:
‘’It is well
settled that in the contract of employment that service and wages are the twin
pillars upon which a contract rests’’.
110.
In the case at hand, the absence of provision for
wages in exhibit C1, points directly to the fact that exhibit C1, being a
certificate of recognition is not an offer for employment capable of creating
employer employee relationship.
111. Furthermore, the absence of provision for payment of regular salary or
wages, which is a fundamental pillar
of a master-servant relationship (employment) under Nigerian labour law
strongly negates an employment relationship as per exhibit C1.
112.
Furthermore, under the provision of Traditional
Rulers Law for payment of allowance was at the discretion of the governor who
fixes the allowance, this goes to show that the provision of allowance is not a traditional employment salary or wages. Therefore,
the provision for payment of allowance to recognised traditional
rulers clearly goes to suggest that the
services rendered is not that of employment.
113.
After a painstaking examination and
analysis of exhibit C1 and pleadings of the claimant, I have no choice than to
come to the conclusion that in the absence of a separate distinct contract of
service, the claimant’s action can only be determined using the provisions of Traditional
Rulers Law Cap T4 Laws of Cross River State, and not employment rules and
regulations or law regulating employment, in the circumstances, this court
lacked the requisite jurisdiction to hear and entertain this suit, which
borders on stoppage of payment of allowance, as the question on entitlement to
allowance is fit to be determined by High Court of Justice of Cross River State
pursuant to the provisions of section 272(1) of the Constitution of the Federal
republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended.
114.
In view of my finding on lack of
jurisdiction by this court to entertain suit of the claimant, I hereby pursuant
to the provision of section 24(2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006,
order transfer of this suit to High Court of justice of Cross River State,for
hearing and determination, as may be directed by the Chief judge of Cross River
State.
115.
It deserves to be stressed that the provisions of
section 24 of the National Industrial Court, Act, act as a jurisdictional safety net, explicitly in unambiguous term barring
judges from of this court from striking out suits simply because they were
filed in the wrong court. Instead, it mandates that the case must be
transferred to the appropriate court with valid jurisdiction.
116.
The Registrar of this court is hereby ordered to
act accordingly.
Sanusi Kado,
Judge
REPRESENTATION:
Daniel Mgbe, Esq; for the claimant appearing with O. E. Oku, Esq;
J. O. Odong, Esq; State Counsel 1, appearing for the 1st
defendant.
K. Ntem Ikpi, Esq; for the 2nd and 3rd
defendants.