IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONOURABLE JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD

 

DATED: 14^TH DAY OF JULY, 2026             SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/87/2024

 

BETWEEN:

MR. DARLINGTON PAUL IGWE .................................... CLAIMANT

AND

EVERYDAY GROUP OF COMPANY LTD ............................. DEFENDANT

 

REPRESENTATIONS:

Steve Elijah Esq. for the Claimant.

A. O. Madukwe Esq. for the Defendant.

 

 

JUDGEMENT

This suit was commenced by way of a General Form of Complaint filed on the 22^nd day of November, 2024, accompanied by a Verifying Affidavit, Statement of Facts, Witness Statement on Oath, List of Witnesses, List of Documents and copies of the documents to be relied upon at trial.

 

By the Complaint and Statement of Facts, the Claimant claims against the Defendant the following reliefs:

1.     A declaration that the Defendant’s purported verbal termination of the Claimant’s employment is wrongful and contrary to the contract of employment between the parties as embodied in the Defendant’s Employee Handbook.

2.    A declaration that the Defendant’s purported verbal termination of the Claimant’s employment and the publication of a disclaimer against the Claimant on 17th April, 2024 without affording him an opportunity to be heard is contrary to the principles of fair hearing in disciplinary proceedings as contained at page 16 of the Defendant’s Employee Handbook, the spirit of Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), applicable international labour standards and the rules of natural justice, and consequently constitutes a violation of the Claimant’s legal rights in the workplace.

3.    A declaration that the Defendant’s use of physical force and violence against the Claimant on 17th April, 2024 at the Defendant’s premises situate at No. 400 Ikwerre Road, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, in denying him access to his office as an employee of the Defendant, is unlawful and constitutes a breach of his right to dignity in the workplace.

4.    The sum of ?689,200.00 (Six Hundred and Eighty-Nine Thousand, Two Hundred Naira) being pension contributions and entitlements due to the Claimant.

5.    The sum of ?100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) as exemplary damages for the Defendant’s alleged violation of the Claimant’s legal rights in the workplace.

6.    The sum of ?50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) as general damages for wrongful termination of employment and breach of contract.

7.    The sum of ?5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) as cost of litigation.

8.    An order of mandatory injunction compelling the Defendant to pay all claims arising from insurance policies, pension interests and other benefits allegedly due to the Claimant.

9.    Post-judgment interest at the rate of 20% per annum until the judgment sum is fully liquidated.

In response to the Complaint and Statement of Facts, the Defendant entered a conditional appearance on the 16th day of January, 2025 and subsequently filed a Statement of Defence on the 24th day of February, 2025, together with a Witness Statement on Oath, List of Witnesses, List of Documents and copies of the documents to be relied upon at trial.

The Claimant thereafter filed a Reply to the Statement of Defence on the 24th day of June, 2025.

Trial commenced on the 14th day of October, 2025 with the Claimant opening his case. The Claimant, Mr. Darlington Paul Igwe, testified for himself as CW1. He adopted his Witness Statements on Oath deposed to on the 22nd day of November, 2024 and the 26th day of June, 2025 respectively, marked as C1(a) and C1(b).

During the course of his testimony, CW1 tendered sixteen (16) documents which were admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits C2 to C17, while Exhibits C14, C15 and C17 were admitted under protest. The documents admitted in evidence are as follows:

·         Exhibit C2 – Claimant’s Staff Identity Card as Driver dated 26th May, 2023.

·         Exhibit C3 – Claimant’s Staff Identity Card as Driver dated 15th April, 2021.

·         Exhibit C4 – Offer of Employment dated 1st May, 2023.

·         Exhibit C5 – Claimant’s Staff Identity Card as Logistics Supervisor.

·         Exhibit C6 – Claimant’s Bank Statement.

·         Exhibit C7 – Defendant’s Employee Handbook.

·         Exhibit C8 – Defendant’s Official Disclaimer.

·         Exhibit C9 – Solicitor’s Letter dated 23rd April, 2024.

·         Exhibit C10 – Defendant’s Letter dated 30th April, 2024.

·         Exhibit C11 – Solicitor’s Letter dated 27th May, 2024.

·         Exhibit C12 – Claimant’s Solicitor’s Professional Receipt.

·         Exhibit C13 – Purported Termination Letter dated 17th April, 2024.

·         Exhibit C14 – Solicitor’s Letter dated 18th April, 2025.

·         Exhibit C15 – Solicitor’s Letter dated 9th April, 2025.

·         Exhibit C16 – Printout of WhatsApp Message Trails.

·         Exhibit C17 – Letter of Resignation dated 17th April, 2024.

Arising from the Statement of Facts and Witness Statements on Oath, the case of the Claimant is that he was employed by the Defendant sometime in April 2015 as a Driver on a monthly salary of ?35,000.00 (Thirty-Five Thousand Naira). The Claimant averred that the Defendant initially paid his salary in cash before subsequently commencing payment through his bank account in 2016. He added that he proceeded on study leave in 2017 and remained away until the latter part of 2018, after which he fully resumed his duties in January 2019.

The Claimant further contended that on the 1st day of May, 2023, he was promoted to the position of Logistics Supervisor. He however maintained that the Defendant presented the said promotion as though it constituted a fresh offer of employment, a development to which he objected. According to the Claimant, his salary was progressively increased from ?35,000.00 to ?100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Naira) prior to the termination of his employment in 2024.

The Claimant also asserted that throughout the period of his employment, spanning from 2015 to 2024, the Defendant consistently deducted 8% pension contributions from his salary, while the Defendant was required to contribute an additional 10% under the contributory pension scheme. He maintained that he served the Defendant diligently and faithfully until April 2024, when a newly appointed Managing Director allegedly mounted pressure on him to resign his employment. Upon his refusal to resign, the Defendant allegedly terminated his employment verbally on the 17th day of April, 2024 in what he described as a humiliating and dehumanizing manner contrary to the provisions of the Defendant’s Employee Handbook.

Upon cross-examination, CW1 testified that his employment was terminated on 17th April, 2024 and that the termination was communicated orally in the office of the Defendant’s Managing Director. He further stated that following the oral termination of his employment, he instructed his Solicitor to write to the Defendant. CW1 maintained that no letter of termination was ever served on him and that he was never subjected to any disciplinary proceedings before the termination of his employment. He also confirmed that he was employed in April 2015 and that his employment was terminated on the same day as one Nneka Akabong, whom he stated was employed approximately seven years after his own employment.

Upon the discharge of CW1, the Claimant closed his case.

The Defendant thereafter opened its defence on the 9th day of March, 2026 and called one witness, Mr. Sunny George, the Defendant’s Head of Marketing and Legal Services, who testified as DW1. DW1 adopted his Witness Statement on Oath deposed to on the 24th day of February, 2025, marked as D1.

Through DW1, three (3) documents were tendered and admitted in evidence as Exhibits D2 to D4 as follows:

·         Exhibit D2 – Letter of Termination dated 17th April, 2024.

·         Exhibit D3 – Claimant’s Offer of Employment dated 1st May, 2023.

·         Exhibit D4 – Defendant’s Employee Handbook.

From the Statement of Defence and Witness Statement on Oath, the case of the Defendant is that the Claimant was initially employed as a Driver and was subsequently appointed as Logistics Supervisor with effect from 1st May, 2023. The Defendant denied the allegation that it attempted to disguise the Claimant’s promotion as a fresh employment. The Defendant maintained that the Claimant’s employment was lawfully terminated by a Letter of Termination dated 17th April, 2024.

The Defendant further averred that all pension deductions and contributions made in respect of the Claimant were duly remitted to the Claimant’s Pension Fund Administrator and credited into his Retirement Savings Account. The Defendant also contended that management had determined in April 2024 that the services of the Claimant were no longer required and consequently terminated his employment in accordance with Article 15 of the Defendant’s Employee Handbook.

The Defendant denied terminating the Claimant’s employment in any humiliating or dehumanizing manner and equally denied publishing any falsehood or malicious statement against the Claimant.

Upon cross-examination, DW1 testified that he had been in the employment of the Defendant for approximately five years. He stated that there were documents evidencing that the Claimant had been queried during the course of his employment, but admitted that none of such documents was before the Court. He further alleged that there was an oral indictment against the Claimant and that the Defendant had a redundancy plan for staff, although he equally admitted that no such document was produced before the Court.

DW1 further testified that the Defendant operates a WhatsApp platform known as the “Managers Forum Group” through which information is disseminated to staff members. He confirmed that the Defendant operates a contributory pension scheme under which the Defendant contributes 10% while deductions are made from employees’ salaries. He however stated that it is the responsibility of each employee to open a Retirement Savings Account and furnish the Defendant with the relevant account details. DW1 admitted under cross-examination that he had no evidence before the Court to show that the Defendant remitted pension contributions into the Claimant’s Retirement Savings Account.

DW1 also confirmed that Exhibit C8, the Defendant’s official disclaimer, emanated from the Defendant. He admitted that the disclaimer indicated that the Claimant’s employment was terminated on 17th April, 2024 notwithstanding that the letter of termination was allegedly issued on 18th April, 2024. He further confirmed that the Defendant provides severance benefits to its employees and that, having not been summarily dismissed, the Claimant was entitled to severance benefits. DW1 added that salary in lieu of notice formed part of the Claimant’s severance benefits payable in full and final settlement of his employment.

Upon the discharge of DW1, the Defendant closed its case and the matter was thereafter adjourned for the adoption of Final Written Addresses.

In the Defendant’s Final Written Address filed on the 10th day of April, 2026, learned counsel to the Defendant, A. O. Madukwe, Esq., formulated a lone issue for determination as follows:

Whether considering the totality of evidence placed before this Honourable Court, the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

 

Before addressing the issue, counsel argued on the admissibility of Exhibits C14, C15, and C17, contending that the documents are irrelevant to the issues before the Court and should be rejected and expunged from the record. Counsel submitted that Exhibit C14, a letter dated 18th April 2025 issued by the law firm of Atejimah & Steve on behalf of one Mr. Chukwuma Agaziem, relates to a separate transaction with the Defendant and bears no relevance to the present suit, while Exhibit C15, dated 9th April 2025, was merely a response thereto. Counsel further argued that Mr. Agaziem is neither a party nor a witness in this suit. With respect to Exhibit C17, counsel contended that the resignation letter was authored by one Nneka Akabogu, who is also not a party to this action.

 

Counsel relied on African Continental Bank Ltd vs. Alhaji Umaru Gwagwada (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 342) 25, Per Olatawura J.S.C at page 36, paras. A-B for the proposition that relevancy is the foundation of admissibility. He also cited Oluwatimilehin Ifaramoye v. State (2017) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1568) 457 Per AUGIE, J.S.C. (P. 491, paras. A-C) to emphasize that relevant evidence is evidence connected with the facts in issue and properly applicable to the matters before the Court.

 

Counsel submitted that although the documents relate to employee disputes, they concern matters and parties not before the Court, and are therefore irrelevant. Counsel further argued that the Claimant’s reliance on portions of Exhibit C15 as constituting an admission under the Defendant’s Employee Handbook is misconceived, as an admission must relate directly to the issues between the parties before the Court.

 

Counsel added further that the makers of Exhibits C14, C15 and C17, were neither witnesses nor called to testify in this suit. He cited Ladoja v Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 89 at Pp. 146-147, paras. G-A. Counsel also argued that the documents were made during the pendency of this suit by persons interested in its outcome, contrary to Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act, 2011, thereby rendering them inadmissible. Counsel accordingly urged the Court to declare the documents irrelevant, inadmissible, and liable to be expunged from the record.

 

In arguing the lone issue which is whether considering the totality of evidence placed before this Honourable Court, the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to the reliefs sought, counsel canvassed that for the claimant to succeed he must succeed on the strength of its case and not on the weakness of the Defendant’s defence. He cited Dankula V. Shagamu (2008) All FWLR (Pt. 413) At 1280, Pp. 1309, Paras. C-D.

Counsel submitted that the claimants case is anchored on four allegation which are; That the Claimant’s employment was wrongfully terminated by the Defendant on 17th April 2024 without recourse to his contract of employment, particularly, the Employee Handbook; That the Defendant’s official disclaimer published was a violation of the Claimant’s right to dignity of human person and against the rules of natural justice and fair hearing; That the Defendant, through its security personnel, physically assaulted and abused the Claimant; That the Defendant has refused to remit the Claimant’s pension contributions and other benefits.

 

Counsel submitted that the burden of proving the terms of employment and the manner of their breach rests on the Claimant. He relied on Aji v. C.B.D.A. (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1486) 554. Counsel argued that although the Claimant alleged that his employment was verbally terminated, the Defendant maintained that a formal termination letter dated 17th April 2024 (Exhibit D2) was issued but refused by the Claimant, after which it was forwarded through the Claimant’s solicitor vide Exhibit C10 (letter dated on 30th April 2024).

 

Counsel contended that wrongful termination arises only where the termination is contrary to the contract of employment. Relying on Article 15(a) of the Employee Handbook and Ben O. Chukwumahv. Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, counsel argued that the relationship between the parties was one of master and servant, entitling the Defendant to terminate the Claimant’s employment at any time in accordance with the contract terms. Counsel maintained that Exhibit D2 validly terminated the Claimant’s employment and that the Claimant failed to show which contractual provision was breached.

 

Counsel pointed out that the Claimant was not subjected to any disciplinary proceedings and his employment was simply terminated on the grounds that his services were no longer needed. Counsel contended that the Claimant, who has the burden to prove how the termination was wrongful, has not discharged that burden by identifying which provisions of the contract of employment violated.

On salary in lieu of notice, counsel submitted that payment was offered to the Claimant but rejected by him, relying on Oforishe v. N.G.C. Ltd. (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) (Pp. 55-56, paras. D-C) to argue that rejection of the offer does not render the termination unlawful. Counsel therefore urged the Court to hold that the termination was lawful and in compliance with the contract and Employee Handbook.

 

Regarding the disclaimer publication, counsel argued that it merely informed the public that the Claimant and other listed persons were no longer employees of the Defendant and were unauthorized to act on its behalf. Counsel maintained that the publication did not portray the Claimant as dishonest or impugn his character. Relying on Access Bank Plc v. Muhammad (2014) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1404) 613, counsel submitted that in an action for damage to reputation, the complained words must be false, whereas the publication was true since the Claimant was no longer in the Defendant’s employment. Counsel added that the Claimant failed to prove any reputational harm suffered.

 

On the allegation of assault, counsel argued that such allegations must be proved by credible and convincing evidence pursuant to Sections 131–133 of the Evidence Act, 2011. Counsel submitted that the Claimant produced no medical report, photographs, or eyewitness evidence in support of the allegation, relying on Olarewaju v. Bamigboye (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 353. Counsel further argued that allegations of crime in civil proceedings must be proved beyond reasonable doubt under Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011, citing Ilori v. Ishola (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1641) 77.

 

Counsel also contended that the Claimant failed to establish any nexus between the alleged acts of the security personnel and the Defendant, as the persons accused were not joined as parties to the suit. Relying on A.D.C. v. Bello and N.F. and V.C.B. v. Adegboyega (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1545) 112, counsel argued that the absence of the alleged perpetrators deprived the Court of the opportunity to fairly determine the allegations. Counsel therefore described the assault claim as speculative and lacking probative value.

 

On the allegation that the defendant refused to remit his pension contributions, counsel submitted that under Sections 4 and 11 of the Pension Reform Act, 2014, the Defendant’s duty was limited to deducting and remitting pension contributions to the Claimant’s Retirement Savings Account (RSA) through a Pension Fund Administrator (PFA). He stated that the employer is not a custodian of the pension funds once remitted.

 

Counsel argued that the Claimant failed to prove that he maintained an RSA and notified the Defendant of same, while insisting that all deductions and contributions were duly remitted. Counsel further contended that Exhibit C6, the Claimant’s bank statement, was incomplete and that the Claimant’s self-generated computations were speculative. Counsel cited See Okunzua v. Amosu (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 248) 416.

Finally, counsel submitted that the Claimant was not entitled to costs of litigation, having failed to prove his claims, and urged the Court to dismiss the suit in its entirety.

Responding to the foregoing submissions, the claimant filed their final written address on the 27^th of April, 2026 and arising therefrom, counsel to the Claimant Steve Elijah, Esq. formulated a sole issue for determination as follows;

Whether considering the totality of evidence placed before this Honourable Court, the Claimant has proved his case on the balance of probabilities to be entitled to the reliefs sought?

Counsel commenced by addressing the objection to Exhibits C14, C15, and C17, arguing that Exhibits C14 and C15 are relevant because they show the Defendant acknowledged Exhibit C7, and not Exhibit D4, as the applicable Employee Handbook. Counsel submitted that the documents were pleaded and are admissible under Sections 7 and 9 of the Evidence Act, relying on Ayaka v. State [2020] 3 NWLR (Pt 1712) 538 at 575, paras C-E; 576. 

Counsel submitted that Exhibits C14 and C15 which by themselves or connection with other facts make the existence or non-existence of Exhibit D4 probable or improbable is relevant in this case.

With regards to the contention that Exhibits C14 and C15 were made when this suit was pending by persons who are interested in the outcome of this suit, and as such inadmissible by reason of section 83(3) of EA. Counsel argued that Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act does not apply, as the Claimant was not the maker of the documents.

On Exhibit C17, counsel submitted that it was tendered to support the Claimant’s allegation that the Defendant had a practice of coercing employees to resign, relying on the resignation of one Nneka Akabogu as a similar instance. Counsel argued that the exhibits were frontloaded and that it is not mandatory in every case for the makers of documents to testify before such documents become admissible, relying on section 83(2)(a) of EA and Unity Bank Plc v. Raybam Engineering Ltd and Olomo v. Ape [2018] 12 NWLR (Pt 1633) 214 at 230, paras A-F Counsel therefore urged the Court to admit the exhibits.

 

Counsel added that the criteria for admissibility of documents are; pleading (whether the document is pleaded; relevancy (whether the document is relevant to the proceedings); and (c) admissibility in law (whether the document is in an admissible form). He relied on Olomo v Ape [2015] 14 NWLR (Pt 1478) 46 at 61, para G. Finally, counsel urged the court to discountenance the objections of the Defendant on the admissibility of Exhibits C14, C15, and C17.

 

In arguing the main issue for determination which, whether considering the totality of evidence placed before this Honourable Court, the Claimant has proved his case on the balance of probabilities to be entitled to the reliefs sought. Counsel posited that a party seeking declaratory reliefs must not rely on the weakness of the case of the adversary, but must prove his case on the balance of probability. Counsel relied on Rector, Kwara State Polytechnic v Adefila 7 [2007] 15 NWLR (Pt 1056) 42 at 113, para-E, and Takori v Matawalle [2020] 17 NWLR (Pt 1752) 165 at 187-188, paras H-B.

 

Counsel added that in civil case where a claimant seeks for declaratory reliefs, he is permitted to take advantage of facts or evidence in defendant's case that supports the facts in his case. Counsel citedAdamu v Nigerian Airforce [2022] 5 NWLR (Pt 1822) 159 at 183, paras C-D. Counsel submitted that from the evidence placed before this Honourable Court, the Claimant creditably proved his case on the balance of probabilities to be entitled to all the reliefs sought.

 

Counsel submitted that Exhibits C2–C5 established the Claimant’s employment, while Exhibit C7 governed the employment relationship. Counsel argued that the Defendant failed to plead facts showing that Exhibit D4 governed the contract and that Exhibits C14–C16 support the Claimant’s position that Exhibit C7 was the operative handbook, relying on Chiduluo v Attansey [2020] 6 NWLR (Pt 1719) 102 at 124, paras D-G. Counsel further stated that the Claimant also tendered Exhibit C8 as a documentary proof of the Defendant’s breach of the parties’ contract of employment.

 

Counsel contended that having worked from 2015 to 2024 before his employment was verbally terminated on 17/04/2024, the Claimant was entitled to one month’s written notice under Section 11 of the Labour Act and Exhibit C7. Relying on University of Benin v. Erinmwionren [2001] 17 NWLR (Pt 743) 548 at 563, paras E-F. Counsel argued that there was no evidence of payment in lieu of notice. Counsel further submitted that under Exhibit C7 particularly on page 16, termination could only follow disciplinary proceedings or redundancy procedures, neither of which the Defendant complied with, and that no redundancy plan was tendered. Counsel also relied on Article 4 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158).

 

Counsel argued that by the provision of Exhibit C7 the Defendant can only terminate the Claimant’s contract of employment after it must have given him the opportunity to be heard on the allegation made against him (if any). He cited Daramola v Federal University of Technology, Yola16 [2026] 4 NWLR (Pt 2033) 181 at 204, paras A-C.

Counsel argued further that the termination of an employee’s contract must be based on grounds of misconduct and following disciplinary actions as contained on page 16 of Exhibit C7, or on the ground of redundancy as contained on page 19 of Exhibit C7 and not as of cause. 

Counsel further contended that the Defendant published Exhibit C8 at a time the Claimant was still a staff of the Defendant. Thus, that Exhibit C8 falsely portrayed the Claimant as no longer employed while he was still in service, amounting to degrading treatment, contrary to section 34(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as Amended), and principle and right of a safe and healthy working environment as contained in Article 2(e) of ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up 1998 (as Amended in 2022).

 

On pension contributions, counsel submitted that the Claimant specifically pleaded and proved his entitlement to N689,200.00 as unpaid pension contributions, relying on Akinlade v. Ayinde [2021] 1 NWLR (Pt 1750) 407 at 447, paras C-E. Counsel noted that DW1 admitted the pension deductions and the Defendant’s obligation to contribute 10%, but failed to produce evidence of remittance to any pension fund manager or that it paid to the Claimant.

 

Counsel further argued that the Claimant was entitled to exemplary damages for the Defendant’s unconstitutional conduct of making deductions from the Claimant’s salaries as part of his pension contributions and withheld same contrary to Pension Reform Act., relying on Odogu v. Attorney-General of the Federation [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt 456) 508 at 519, para F.

 

He further contended that the claimant is entitled to general damages for psychological trauma and economic loss, he cited Mekwunye v. Emirates Airlines [2019] 9 NWLR (Pt 1677) 191 at 215-216, paras A-F and Article 4 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (No. 158) and Article 2(e) of ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up 1998 (as Amended in 2022).

 

Counsel also urged the Court to award litigation costs relying on Anazodo v. Pazmeck Intertrade Nigeria Ltd [2023] 10 NWLR (Pt 1891) 1 at 21, paras G-H. Counsel stated that the rational of the relief for the costs of litigation is further based on the rule that costs follow the event and on the principle that the party who is in the right is to be indemnified for the expenses to which he has been necessarily put in the proceeding, as well as compensated for his time and effort in prosecuting the suit. 

 

With regards to relief of mandatory injunction compelling the Defendant to pay all claims arising from insurance policy, interests on contributory pension and other benefits to the Claimant. Counsel submitted that apart from evidence of the claimant to the said entitlement to his contributory pension, DW1 in the course of cross examination confirmed that the Claimant is entitled to gratuity and severance benefits from the Defendant company as full and final settlement. Counsel urged the court to grant this relief.

 

Finally, counsel contended that the claimant is entitled to post judgment interest of 20% as provided under order 47 rule 7 of the Rules of this court. Counsel relied also on GTB Plc v Obosi Micro Finance Bank Ltd [2022] 4 NWLR (Pt 1821) 455 at 523-524, paras C-E. Counsel concluded by stating that the Claimant has proved his case to be entitled to the judgment of this Honourable Court and urged the court to enter judgment for the Claimant.

 

In response to the submission of the claimant’s counsel, counsel for the defendant on the 6^th day of May, 2026 filed a reply on points of law, on the issues of admissibility of Exhibits C14, C15 and C17. Counsel contended that relevance is not the only basis for admissibility, that a relevant document must also satisfy other legal requirements that would render it admissible for the purpose of determining a dispute. Counsel relied on Section 2 of the Evidence Act.

 

In reply on points of law, Defendant’s counsel argued that relevance alone does not determine admissibility and relied on Section 2 of the Evidence Act. Counsel further submitted that the Claimant failed to satisfy the conditions under Section 83(2) of the Evidence Act for admitting documents through persons other than their makers, as there is nothing placed before this Court by the Claimant to show that any attempt was made to procure the makers of the documents under reference and such attempts failed or that. Counsel relied on Sanusi v. State (2023) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1892) 253 and Osigwelem v. I.N.E.C.

Counsel also argued that Section 83(3) applies to documents made by interested persons during pending litigation. Counsel cited Ladoja v Ajimobi (2016) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1519) 89 at Pp. 146-147, paras. G-A. Counsel stated that Exhibits C14, C15 and C17 are irrelevant to the issues before the Court and urged the court to expunge them.

 

On the substantive issue, counsel contended that Exhibit C4 did not require written notice before termination and that the Court could not import terms not agreed by the parties, relying on A.I.B. Ltd. v. I.D.S. Ltd (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 1 and Koiki v. Magnusson (1999) 8 NWLR (Pt. 615) 492. Counsel maintained that in a master-servant relationship, the employer need not give reasons for termination, citing Ifeta v. SPDC (2006) 8 NWLR (Pt. 983) 585, and argued that the Claimant’s employment was validly terminated with payment in lieu of notice, which the Claimant refused to accept.

 

Counsel added that by the terms of contract the claimant’s termination may be effected either by one month notice which could be written or verbal or payment in lieu of such notice. Counsel submitted that the Defendant’s case remains that termination of the Claimant’s employment was accompanied by payment in lieu of notice which was offered but rejected by the Claimant. Finally, counsel urge the court to refuse the claims and reliefs of the Claimant and enter judgment in favour of the Defendant.

Based on the totality of the pleadings, evidence and submissions canvassed before this Court, I have carefully evaluated all the processes filed by the parties in this suit. I have equally considered the testimonies of the witnesses called by both parties, observed their demeanour, and meticulously examined all the exhibits tendered and admitted in evidence. I have also given due consideration to the submissions of learned counsel to the respective parties in their Final Written Addresses.

Arising from the issues raised and argued by learned counsel on both sides, I find that the issues that call for determination in this suit are as follows:

1.     Whether the termination of the Claimant’s employment was wrongful.

2.    Whether, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and the evidence before the Court, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought.

Before delving into the substantive issues, it is imperative to first determine the objection raised by learned counsel to the Defendant regarding the admissibility of Exhibits C14, C15 and C17.

The record reveals that during the testimony of CW1, learned counsel to the Defendant objected to the admissibility of the said exhibits. The exhibits were nevertheless admitted under protest and parties were directed to address the Court on their admissibility in their respective Final Written Addresses.

The objection of the Defendant is principally predicated on three grounds, namely:

a.    That the documents are irrelevant to the issues before the Court;

b.    That the makers of the documents were neither called as witnesses nor subjected to cross-examination; and

c.    That the documents were made by interested persons during the pendency of this suit contrary to Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act, 2011.

Exhibit C14 is a Solicitor’s letter dated 18th April, 2025, Exhibit C15 is a reply thereto dated 9th April, 2025, while Exhibit C17 is a resignation letter dated 17th April, 2024 authored by one Nneka Akabogu.

The law is settled that the primary consideration in determining the admissibility of documentary evidence is relevance. Once a document is relevant to the facts in issue and is not otherwise rendered inadmissible by any provision of law, the document is admissible.

In ROYORK NIGERIA LIMITED v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL AND COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE, SOKOTO STATE & ANOR (2017) LPELR-42506(CA), the Court held thus:

“The position of the law is that evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issues and when it is also competent. The usual catch phrase is that admissibility of evidence is governed by relevance. The issue of competence comes into the scene when the piece of evidence is not excluded by law or some Rules of Court.”

It is equally settled that admissibility is distinct from the weight or probative value to be attached to a document. Thus, a document may be admissible even though the weight to be attached to it may ultimately be little or none.

In the instant case, both parties tendered separate Employee Handbooks. While the Claimant contends that Exhibit C7 governs the employment relationship, the Defendant insists that Exhibit D4 is the applicable handbook. Exhibits C14 and C15 were pleaded and tendered by the Claimant in an attempt to demonstrate that the Defendant had, in another context, acknowledged the existence of a handbook different from Exhibit D4.

In the circumstance, I am unable to agree with learned counsel to the Defendant that Exhibits C14 and C15 are wholly irrelevant to the issues before the Court. By virtue of Sections 7 and 9 of the Evidence Act, facts which render the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue probable or improbable are relevant facts. The documents therefore possess sufficient nexus with one of the issues joined by the parties and are consequently relevant.

With respect to Exhibit C17, the Claimant pleaded that the Defendant had a practice of compelling employees to resign from its employment and relied on the resignation letter of one Nneka Akabogu as an example of such alleged conduct. Since the Defendant joined issues with the Claimant on that assertion, the document cannot be said to be completely irrelevant to the matters in controversy.

On the contention that the makers of the documents were not called as witnesses, it is settled law that not every document must be tendered through its maker before it becomes admissible. The absence of the maker may affect the evidential value to be attached to the document but does not automatically render the document inadmissible.

See UNITY BANK PLC v. RAYBAM ENGINEERING LTD (2017) LPELR-41622(CA).

Accordingly, I find no merit in the objection founded solely on the fact that the makers of the documents were not called as witnesses.

The final objection is predicated on Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act, 2011.

A careful examination of Exhibits C14 and C15 reveals that they are correspondences exchanged between legal practitioners in relation to another dispute involving one Mr. Chukwuma Agaziem and the Defendant. The documents were not authored by the Claimant and were not created for the purpose of this suit.

Similarly, Exhibit C17 is a resignation letter authored by another employee of the Defendant.

For Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act to apply, the Court must be satisfied that the statement was made by a person interested in the outcome of the proceedings and at a time when the proceedings were pending or anticipated.

Having carefully examined the contents of Exhibits C14, C15 and C17, I am not persuaded that the Defendant has established sufficient facts to bring the documents within the ambit of Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act. The mere fact that the documents were made during the pendency of this suit is insufficient without demonstrating that the makers were persons interested in the outcome of the present proceedings within the contemplation of the law.

Accordingly, I hold that the objection founded on Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act is misconceived and therefore fails.

In the final analysis, I find that Exhibits C14, C15 and C17 are relevant to matters arising from the pleadings and are not rendered inadmissible by any provision of the Evidence Act.

Consequently, the objection of the Defendant to the admissibility of Exhibits C14, C15 and C17 is hereby overruled.

The exhibits shall accordingly remain part of the record of this Court, with the weight to be attached to them to be determined in the course of evaluating the totality of the evidence before the Court.

It is equally pertinent to state that this Court is empowered by virtue of Section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 to depart from the strict application of the provisions of the Evidence Act where the interest of justice so demands.

In the instant case, having found that Exhibits C14, C15 and C17 possess sufficient relevance to the issues arising from the pleadings and evidence before the Court, and considering the broad discretionary powers conferred on this Court under Section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act, I am further satisfied that the justice of this case will be better served by retaining the said documents as part of the evidential record before the Court.

Accordingly, and notwithstanding the objections raised by learned counsel to the Defendant, this Court affirms the admission of Exhibits C14, C15 and C17 and shall ascribe to them such probative value as may be warranted upon a holistic evaluation of all the evidence before the Court.

Having resolved the issue relating to the admissibility of the documents, I now turn to the substantive issues formulated for the determination of this suit, namely:

1.     Whether the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful.

2.    Whether, having regard to the facts, circumstances of this case and the evidence before the Court, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought.

The Claimant has sought three declaratory reliefs, the principal of which is the declaration that the termination of his employment was wrongful. In considering declaratory reliefs, it is settled law that the burden rests squarely on the Claimant to establish his entitlement thereto by credible, cogent and convincing evidence. Such reliefs are not granted as a matter of course, nor can they be granted merely because the defence is weak or because the Defendant has made admissions.

In DIAMOND BANK PLC v. YAHAYA & ANOR (2011) LPELR-4036(CA), the Court held thus:

"The law is settled that the courts do not grant declaratory relief based on the admission of the defendant. The plaintiff must satisfy the court by cogent, credible and convincing evidence called by him that he is entitled to the declaratory relief. So where the plaintiff on his own evidence fails to prove his claim for declaration, his claim must fail."

See also Ayanru v. Mandilas Ltd (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 462 and Ndayako v. Dantoro (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187.

While there is no dispute that civil cases are determined on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence, the initial burden of establishing the facts upon which the reliefs sought are founded rests on the Claimant in accordance with the elementary principle that he who asserts must prove.

In TSOKWA OIL MARKETING CO. NIGERIA LTD v. BANK OF THE NORTH LTD (2002) LPELR-3268(SC), the Supreme Court held that:

"It is one thing to aver a material fact in issue in one's pleadings and quite a different thing to establish such a fact by evidence. Where a material fact is pleaded and is either denied or disputed by the other side, the onus of proof clearly rests on he who asserts such a fact to establish the same by evidence. An averment in pleadings is not and does not tantamount to evidence and must therefore be established by satisfactory evidence unless the same is expressly admitted."

Guided by the foregoing principles and having carefully considered the evidence led by the parties, I shall now proceed to examine the reliefs sought by the Claimant with a view to determining whether he has discharged the burden placed upon him by law and is consequently entitled to the reliefs sought in this action.

Relief One seeks "A declaration that the Defendant's purported verbal termination of the Claimant's employment is wrongful and contrary to the parties' contract as embodied in the Defendant's Employee Handbook."

The law is settled that an employee who alleges wrongful termination of employment bears the burden of placing before the Court the terms and conditions regulating the employment relationship and proving the manner in which those terms were breached by the employer.

In ORGAN & ORS v. NIGERIA LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS LTD & ANOR (2013) LPELR-20942(SC), the Supreme Court held thus:

"In the instant case where the appellants alleged wrongful termination of their employment by the 1st respondent, the onus is on them to prove not only the existence of a contract of employment between them and the 1st respondent but the terms of the very contract their employer breached in bringing the contract to an end."

Similarly, in U.T.C. NIGERIA LTD v. PETERS (2009) LPELR-8426(CA), the Court held that:

"It is a fundamental and well settled principle that the terms and conditions of employment is the bedrock on which any claim predicated thereupon ought to squarely rest. Thus, where an employee complains of wrongful termination of his employment, he has the onus to place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and to prove the manner in which those terms were breached."

Flowing from the foregoing authorities, the Claimant bears the burden of establishing:

a.    The existence of a contract of employment between the parties;

b.    The terms and conditions governing the employment relationship;

c.    The particular term or condition allegedly breached by the Defendant; and

d.    The manner in which the breach occurred.

In proof of the employment relationship, the Claimant tendered Exhibit C4, being the Offer of Employment dated 1st May, 2023. To establish the terms regulating the relationship, the Claimant relied on Exhibit C7, while the Defendant relied on Exhibit D4 as the applicable Employee Handbook.

Having carefully examined Exhibit C4 together with the Employee Handbooks tendered by the parties, I find that the relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is one of master and servant. The employment is therefore not one protected by statute nor clothed with statutory flavour.

The law remains settled that in a master-servant relationship, an employer reserves the right to terminate the employment of an employee for good reason, bad reason or no reason at all, provided the termination is carried out in accordance with the terms of the contract governing the relationship. See MR. SANNI MUFUTAU OLASUNKAMI v. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2022) LPELR-59296(CA).

The principal contention of the Claimant is that his employment was verbally terminated contrary to the contract of employment, without notice or payment in lieu of notice, and without recourse to disciplinary proceedings.

With regard to the assertion that the termination was purely verbal, the evidence before the Court does not support that contention.

Exhibit D2, the Letter of Termination dated 17th April, 2024, was tendered by the Defendant. In addition, Exhibit C10, being the Defendant's Solicitor's response to the Claimant's Solicitor's letter, expressly referred to and forwarded the said Letter of Termination.

More importantly, Exhibit C13, tendered by the Claimant himself, is the same Letter of Termination dated 17th April, 2024.

In the circumstance, I find that the Defendant did in fact issue a formal Letter of Termination and the Claimant's contention that his employment was terminated solely verbally cannot be sustained.

The Claimant further contended that he ought to have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings before his employment could be terminated.

I am unable to agree with that submission.

The evidence before the Court discloses that the Defendant did not terminate the Claimant's employment on grounds of misconduct. Rather, Exhibits C13 and D2 indicate that the Defendant simply determined that the Claimant's services were no longer required.

In an ordinary master-servant relationship, an employer is under no obligation to assign any reason for terminating an employee's appointment, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise. The disciplinary provisions contained in an Employee Handbook become relevant where the employer seeks to punish, discipline or dismiss an employee for misconduct. They do not ordinarily operate as a condition precedent to the exercise of the employer's right to terminate employment simpliciter.

I therefore find that the absence of disciplinary proceedings did not, in the circumstances of this case, render the termination wrongful.

The next question is whether the Defendant complied with the contractual provisions relating to notice or payment in lieu of notice.

Having examined Exhibit C4 and the relevant provisions of the Employee Handbook, I find that the contract permits termination upon the giving of one month's notice or payment of salary in lieu thereof.

The Defendant maintained that payment in lieu of notice was offered to the Claimant but that the Claimant refused to accept same. The Claimant, on the other hand, denied ever receiving or being offered any such payment.

Where an employer relies on payment in lieu of notice, the burden rests on the employer to establish the fact of such payment or offer. Mere assertion is insufficient. Evidence ought to be produced showing the amount computed, the manner in which the payment was made or offered, and the circumstances of the alleged refusal.

See Sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

In the instant case, apart from the oral assertion of DW1, no documentary evidence was tendered showing that salary in lieu of notice was paid or genuinely offered to the Claimant.

Indeed, Exhibit C6 reveals that the Defendant had consistently paid the Claimant's salaries through his bank account. No explanation was offered as to why the salary in lieu of notice, if truly intended, was not similarly paid or tendered through the same channel.

In the absence of any credible evidence establishing payment or a genuine offer of payment in lieu of notice, I find that the Defendant failed to establish compliance with the contractual requirement relating to notice.

Consequently, while the Defendant possessed the contractual right to determine the Claimant's employment, it failed to establish compliance with the condition relating to notice or payment in lieu thereof.

Accordingly, Relief One succeeds to the extent that this Court hereby declares that the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful for failure to comply with the contractual requirement relating to notice or payment in lieu of notice.

For the avoidance of doubt, this finding does not render the termination null and void nor does it revive the employment relationship between the parties. The employment was effectively brought to an end on 17th April, 2024, subject only to the Claimant's entitlement to the remedies flowing from the Defendant's failure to comply with the notice provisions of the contract.

Relief Two seeks "A declaration that the Defendant's purported verbal termination of the Claimant's employment and the open publication of a disclaimer against the Claimant on 17/04/2024 without affording him the opportunity to be heard is contrary to the rule of fair hearing in disciplinary procedure as contained on page 16 of the Defendant's Employee Handbook and/or the spirit of Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), international labour conventions, and the rules of natural justice; and therefore constitutes a violation of the Claimant's human and legal rights in the workplace."

The foundation of this relief is the Claimant's contention that by virtue of page 16 of Exhibit C7, being the Defendant's Employee Handbook, the Defendant was under an obligation to accord him fair hearing before terminating his employment and before publishing Exhibit C8, the notice of disclaimer.

The Claimant further contended that the Defendant's failure to comply with its disciplinary procedure violated the principles of fair hearing and natural justice. He also argued that the publication of Exhibit C8 while he remained an employee of the Defendant portrayed him negatively before the public and amounted to degrading and inhuman treatment contrary to Section 34(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) and applicable international labour standards.

The Defendant, on the other hand, maintained that the Claimant's employment was not terminated on grounds of misconduct warranting disciplinary proceedings. The Defendant's case is that the Claimant's services were no longer required and his employment was consequently terminated in accordance with the terms of the contract. The Defendant further argued that Exhibit C8 merely informed members of the public that the listed persons were no longer employees or representatives of the Defendant and did not contain any allegation of fraud, dishonesty, misconduct or other wrongdoing against the Claimant.

I have carefully considered the evidence before the Court.

At the risk of repetition, it is settled law that in an ordinary master-servant relationship, an employer possesses the right to hire and fire, subject only to compliance with the terms and conditions regulating the contract of employment.

In MUHAMMED ABDULKARIM AWULU v. POLARIS BANK LIMITED (2022) LPELR-58783(CA), the Court of Appeal held thus:

"It should be stated that every employer has and retains the right and power to fire his staff, just as he has the right and power to hire. But such power must be properly exercised in compliance with the document regulating the contract of employment."

It is equally settled that where an employment is terminated simpliciter and not on grounds of misconduct, fraud, dishonesty or any disciplinary infraction, the employer is ordinarily not under an obligation to conduct disciplinary proceedings before exercising its contractual right of termination, unless the contract expressly makes such procedure a condition precedent.

The Claimant relied heavily on the disciplinary provisions contained on page 16 of Exhibit C7. I have carefully examined the said provisions.

The provisions relate to disciplinary measures, investigation of infractions, misconduct and sanctions applicable to employees who commit acts warranting disciplinary action. Such provisions become operative where the employer seeks to discipline, punish or dismiss an employee on account of misconduct.

In the instant case, however, the evidence before the Court does not disclose that the Claimant's employment was terminated for misconduct.

Exhibits C13 and D2, being the termination letters before the Court, merely communicate the Defendant's decision to terminate the Claimant's employment. No allegation of theft, fraud, dishonesty, misconduct or any other disciplinary infraction was levelled against the Claimant therein.

Indeed, the Defendant's consistent position throughout these proceedings is that the Claimant's services were no longer required.

In the circumstance, I agree with the submission of learned counsel to the Defendant that the disciplinary provisions relied upon by the Claimant were not activated by the facts of this case.

Accordingly, I hold that the Defendant was under no contractual obligation to subject the Claimant to disciplinary proceedings or afford him a hearing before exercising its right to terminate his employment simpliciter.

The Claimant also relied on Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

With due respect to learned counsel for the Claimant, the reliance on Section 36 of the Constitution is misplaced.

The provisions of Section 36 primarily regulate the determination of civil rights and obligations by Courts, tribunals and bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They do not ordinarily apply to the exercise of contractual rights by parties in a private master-servant relationship, except where the employer is required to act judicially or where the employment enjoys statutory flavour.

See BABA v. N.C.A.T.C. (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt. 192) 388.

The employment relationship between the parties in the instant suit is one founded purely on contract and devoid of statutory flavour.

Consequently, the Claimant cannot successfully invoke Section 36 of the Constitution to impose constitutional fair hearing obligations on the Defendant in the exercise of its contractual right to terminate employment.

I now turn to the complaint relating to Exhibit C8, the notice of disclaimer.

The Claimant contended that the publication exposed him to ridicule and portrayed him negatively before members of the public.

I have carefully examined Exhibit C8.

The publication merely informed members of the public that the persons listed therein, including the Claimant, were no longer employees, agents or representatives of the Defendant and were therefore not authorized to transact business on behalf of the Defendant.

Significantly, the publication contains no allegation of fraud, dishonesty, misconduct, criminality or unethical conduct against the Claimant.

An employer is entitled to protect its business interests by notifying members of the public that a former employee no longer possesses authority to transact business on its behalf. Such a precautionary notice, standing alone, cannot be construed as a violation of the right to dignity of the human person.

For a publication to constitute degrading treatment or an actionable injury to reputation, there must be evidence that the words complained of conveyed imputations capable of lowering the Claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society or exposing him to hatred, ridicule or contempt.

I find no such imputation in Exhibit C8.

Furthermore, no credible evidence was led before this Court showing that the publication subjected the Claimant to ridicule, humiliation or public opprobrium.

With respect to the reliance placed on international labour conventions and international best practices, while this Court is empowered by Section 254C of the Constitution to apply international labour standards and international best practices in appropriate cases, such standards cannot be invoked in a manner inconsistent with the clear contractual rights of parties in a master-servant relationship where no disciplinary allegation was made against the employee.

International labour standards relating to fair hearing and procedural safeguards are principally engaged where termination is predicated upon misconduct or disciplinary accusations capable of stigmatizing the employee.

The facts before this Court disclose no such situation.

In the final analysis, I find that the Claimant has failed to establish that the Defendant violated the rule of fair hearing, the principles of natural justice, Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), or any human or legal right of the Claimant in the workplace.

Accordingly, Relief Two is devoid of merit and is hereby refused and dismissed.

Relief Three seeks "A declaration that the Defendant's use of physical force and violence against the Claimant on 17/04/2024 at the Defendant's premises located at 400 Ikwerre Road, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, in order to deny him access to his office as a staff of the Defendant is unlawful and a breach of the Claimant's constitutional right to dignity of the human person and anti-torture right in the workplace."

In support of this relief, the Claimant pleaded and testified that on 17th April, 2024, following the termination of his employment, he visited the Defendant's premises at No. 400 Ikwerre Road, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, where security personnel allegedly acting on the instructions of the Defendant's Managing Director prevented him from accessing his office and employed force and violence against him.

The Claimant contended that the Defendant's conduct amounted to degrading treatment and a violation of his constitutional right to dignity of the human person, including his right to be free from torture and inhuman treatment in the workplace.

The Defendant denied the allegation in its entirety and contended that the allegation of assault, battery, violence and use of force is criminal in nature and therefore requires strict proof. The Defendant argued that the Claimant failed to produce any credible evidence in support of the allegation, pointing out that no medical report, police report, photograph, video recording or eyewitness testimony was tendered before the Court.

The Defendant further submitted that the security personnel alleged to have committed the acts complained of were not joined as parties to this action.

The law is settled that declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course. A party seeking a declaration must succeed on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the defence.

See DUMEZ NIGERIA LTD v. NWAKHOBA & ORS (2008) LPELR-965(SC).

The burden therefore rests squarely on the Claimant to establish by credible evidence that:

a.    Physical force or violence was in fact used against him;

b.    The acts complained of were attributable to the Defendant;

c.    The conduct complained of was unlawful; and

d.    The alleged conduct constituted a violation of his constitutional rights.

It is not in dispute that the allegations made by the Claimant substantially border on assault, battery and the unlawful use of force.

Although this is a civil proceeding, Section 135(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides that where the commission of a crime is directly in issue in any proceeding, whether civil or criminal, such allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In AYODELE ILORI & ORS v. ALHAJA RISIKAT ISHOLA & ANOR (2018) LPELR-44063(SC), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle.

Similarly, in DR. CHIEDU ODINMA & ANOR v. CHIEF LAWRENCE NJIOKWU (2021) LPELR-56702(CA), the Court held that:

"When an allegation of the commission of a crime is in issue in any civil or criminal matter, the burden rests on the party alleging the crime to prove same beyond reasonable doubt."

In the instant case, the Claimant alleged that security personnel physically assaulted him and forcefully denied him access to the Defendant's premises.

However, apart from his oral testimony, no independent evidence whatsoever was produced in support of the allegation.

The Claimant did not tender:

i.             Any medical report showing injuries allegedly sustained;

ii.            Any police report made in respect of the incident;

iii.          Any photograph or video recording of the alleged assault;

iv.           Any witness statement from persons who allegedly observed the incident; or

v.            Any other independent evidence capable of corroborating his testimony.

The Court is mindful that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt. Nevertheless, there must be credible evidence establishing the occurrence of the alleged criminal conduct.

The evidence placed before this Court falls considerably short of that standard.

Furthermore, the Claimant alleged that the security personnel acted pursuant to the instructions of the Defendant's Managing Director. However, no credible evidence was led to establish the existence of such instructions.

While the failure to join the security personnel as parties may not necessarily be fatal in every circumstance, the absence of the alleged actors, coupled with the absence of corroborative evidence, substantially weakens the evidential foundation upon which the Court could make a finding that the alleged acts occurred.

The Claimant also relied on Section 34(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), which guarantees the dignity of the human person and protects individuals from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment.

There is no doubt that the constitutional protection afforded by Section 34 is fundamental and jealously guarded by the Courts.

However, constitutional violations are not presumed. They must be established by credible evidence.

The mere fact that an employee was denied access to workplace premises following the termination of his employment does not automatically amount to torture, inhuman treatment or a violation of the right to dignity of the human person. There must be credible evidence demonstrating unlawful physical abuse, humiliation or degrading conduct.

In the instant case, the Claimant failed to establish by credible evidence that he was subjected to physical violence, torture, degrading treatment or any conduct capable of constituting a violation of Section 34 of the Constitution.

The Court must also observe that following the determination of an employee's appointment, an employer retains the managerial right to regulate access to its premises, provided such right is exercised lawfully and without violence.

In the absence of credible evidence establishing the alleged use of force, assault, battery or degrading treatment, this Court is unable to grant the declaration sought.

Accordingly, I find that the Claimant has failed to establish the allegations warranting the grant of the relief sought.

Relief Three therefore fails and is hereby refused and dismissed.

Relief Four seeks "The sum of ?689,200.00 (Six Hundred and Eighty-Nine Thousand, Two Hundred Naira) as pension contributions/entitlements."

The Claimant's case is that throughout the duration of his employment with the Defendant from 2015 to 2024, pension deductions were consistently made from his salary at the rate of 8%, while the Defendant was obligated to contribute an additional 10% pursuant to the contributory pension scheme established under the Pension Reform Act.

The Claimant contended that despite the deductions made from his salary, the Defendant failed to remit the deducted sums together with its counterpart contributions into his Retirement Savings Account (RSA), thereby entitling him to the sum claimed.

The Defendant denied the allegation and maintained that all pension deductions and employer contributions relating to the Claimant were duly remitted in compliance with the Pension Reform Act, 2014.

The law is settled that a claim for a specific monetary sum is in the nature of special damages and must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved.

See AKINLADE v. AYINDE (2021) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1750) 407.

The first issue that arises is whether the Claimant established that pension deductions were indeed made from his salaries toward pension contribution.

From the evidence before the Court, particularly the testimony of DW1 under cross-examination on 9^th March, 2026, there is no real dispute that deductions were made from the Claimant's salary as pension contributions and that the Defendant was equally obligated to make employer contributions under the contributory pension scheme. That admission substantially establishes that the Claimant participated in the Contributory Pension Scheme operated by the Defendant.

Furthermore, Exhibit C6, the Claimant's Statement of Account, reveals a consistent difference between the gross salary alleged by the Claimant and the sums ultimately credited into his account. While Exhibit C6 does not by itself establish the precise nature of every deduction made, it lends support to the Claimant's assertion that deductions were made from his earnings.

The next and more crucial question is whether the Defendant remitted the deducted contributions and its counterpart employer contributions into the Claimant's Retirement Savings Account as required by law.

By Sections 4 and 11 of the Pension Reform Act, 2014, every employer is obligated to deduct and remit pension contributions into an employee's Retirement Savings Account maintained with a Pension Fund Administrator chosen by the employee.

The obligation to remit pension contributions is a statutory duty imposed on the employer.

In the instant case, the Defendant asserted that all deductions and employer contributions were duly remitted.

However, notwithstanding that assertion, the Defendant failed to tender before the Court any pension remittance schedule, evidence of remittance, Pension Fund Administrator records, payment receipts, acknowledgment slips, or any other documentary evidence demonstrating compliance with its statutory obligations.

Most significantly, DW1 admitted during cross-examination that he had no evidence before the Court showing that the pension deductions and contributions were remitted into the Claimant's Retirement Savings Account.

The Court notes that although the Claimant alleged non-remittance of pension contributions deducted from his salary, a claimant who alleges pension default bears the initial burden of producing credible evidence showing that deductions made by the employer were not remitted into his Retirement Savings Account (RSA). Such evidence may include the details of the Retirement Savings Account, statements from the Pension Fund Administrator (PFA), RSA account statements, correspondence from the PFA confirming non-remittance, or any other documentary evidence establishing default in remittance.

 

In the instant case, the Claimant pleaded that his monthly salary was N35,000.00 from 2015, from which the Defendant deducted 8% pension contribution amounting to N2,800.00 monthly. He further stated that after the Defendant commenced payment of salaries through his bank account in 2016, the deductions continued. According to the Claimant, his salary was subsequently increased to N50,000.00 in January 2019, resulting in monthly pension deductions of N4,000.00; increased again to N65,000.00 in July 2020, with deductions of N5,200.00 monthly; and finally increased to N100,000.00 in July 2023, with pension deductions of N8,000.00 monthly.

 

The Court has carefully examined Exhibit C4, the Claimant’s letter of employment dated 01/05/2023, which confirms an annual salary of N1,200,000.00, translating to N100,000.00 monthly. The Court has also reviewed Exhibit C6, the Claimant’s bank statement, which consistently reflects net salary payments of N93,994.67. Similar discrepancies are evident in earlier periods when the Claimant earned N35,000.00 monthly, as the amounts reflected in the bank statement were less than the stated salary. Although there are no records covering the period between 2019 and 2020, particularly in view of the Claimant’s assertion that he was on study leave without pay between 2017 and 2018, the evidence before the Court supports a reasonable inference that deductions were made from the Claimant’s salary. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Claimant has established prima facie evidence that pension deductions were effected from his earnings.

 

More significantly, the Defendant admitted making pension deductions from the Claimant’s salary. However, despite such admission, the Defendant failed to tender any pension remittance schedules, evidence of payment, Pension Fund Administrator records, RSA remittance reports, or any documentary evidence whatsoever demonstrating that the deducted sums were duly remitted in accordance with the Pension Reform Act.

 

The Court finds that the records relating to pension remittances are peculiarly within the custody and control of the Defendant. Having admitted making deductions, the evidential burden shifted to the Defendant to demonstrate that the deductions, together with the employer’s counterpart contributions, were duly remitted. The Defendant failed to discharge that burden.

 

While the Court agrees with the Defendant that the Claimant’s personal computation of alleged pension entitlements does not, without more, constitute strict proof of the precise amount outstanding, the absence of exact proof of the quantum does not relieve the Defendant of its statutory obligation to account for pension deductions admittedly made from the Claimant’s salary. An employer who deducts pension contributions from an employee’s earnings holds such funds in trust for onward remittance and cannot lawfully retain them.

 

Consequently, the Court is satisfied that the Defendant remains under a continuing statutory obligation to account for all pension deductions made from the Claimant’s salary and to establish that such deductions, together with the employer’s statutory counterpart contributions, were duly remitted into the Claimant’s Retirement Savings Account.

 

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The Defendant shall, within thirty (30) days from the date of this Judgment, furnish the Claimant with complete documentary evidence of all pension remittances made in respect of the Claimant throughout the period of his employment with the Defendant from 2015 to 2024.
2. Upon reconciliation of the Claimant’s Retirement Savings Account with the relevant Pension Fund Administrator, any pension deductions and employer counterpart contributions found to be outstanding, unpaid or unremitted shall be remitted forthwith by the Defendant into the Claimant’s Retirement Savings Account in accordance with the Pension Reform Act 2014.
3. The Defendant shall, in addition, pay all accrued penalties, interests and other statutory charges arising from any delayed or outstanding remittances in accordance with the provisions of the Pension Reform Act, 2014 and all applicable Regulations made thereunder.

Relief Five seeks "The sum of ?100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) only as exemplary damages for the Defendant's unconstitutional and obnoxious conduct in violating the Claimant's human and legal rights in the workplace."

The law is settled that exemplary damages, also known as punitive damages, are awarded only in exceptional circumstances. They are intended not merely to compensate a claimant but to punish a defendant whose conduct is shown to be oppressive, arbitrary, unconstitutional, malicious, high-handed or outrageous.

See ROGO LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL & ORS v. HON. NASIRU DALHA ROGO (2023) LPELR-59598(CA).

The purpose of exemplary damages is not merely compensatory but intended to punish the Defendant and deter similar conduct. However before such damages can be awarded, the conduct complained of must be proven by credible and compelling evidence.

The Claimant anchored this relief principally on the alleged violation of his constitutional and human rights arising from the termination of his employment, the publication of Exhibit C8 and the alleged use of force against him.

However, this Court has already found that:

(a)          the Claimant failed to establish that Exhibit C8 violated his constitutional rights or right to fair hearing;

(b)         the Claimant failed to prove the allegation of physical assault, violence or degrading treatment;

(c)          the employment relationship between the parties was one of ordinary master and servant; and

(d)         the Defendant retained the contractual right to terminate the Claimant's employment subject to compliance with the terms of the contract.

The mere fact that a termination of employment is wrongful does not automatically render the employer's conduct unconstitutional, oppressive or malicious so as to warrant an award of exemplary damages. Exemplary damages are reserved for exceptional cases involving egregious misconduct. The Claimant has failed to establish such exceptional circumstances in this case.

In OHN OFORISHE v. NIGERIAN GAS COMPANY LTD (2017) LPELR-42766(SC), the Supreme Court reiterated that the remedy for wrongful termination ordinarily lies in damages and not in punitive awards.

Furthermore, unlike situations where an employee is dismissed under a cloud of criminality, dishonesty or misconduct capable of permanently damaging his reputation and employability, no such circumstance has been established in the instant case.

The Claimant has therefore failed to establish the exceptional circumstances required to justify an award of exemplary damages.

Accordingly, Relief Five fails and is hereby refused.

Relief Six seeks "The sum of ?50,000,000.00 (Fifty Million Naira) only as general damages for wrongful termination and breach of contract of employment."

The law is settled that general damages are those damages which the law presumes to flow naturally from the wrongful act complained of. Unlike special damages, they need not be specifically proved.

In SEVEN-UP BOTTLING COMPANY PLC v. NKANGA & ORS (2008) LPELR-8462(CA), the Court held:

"General damages are those damages which the law implies in every breach and in every violation of a legal right. It is the loss that flows naturally from the defendant's act and its quantum need not be pleaded or proved as it is generally presumed by law."

The manner in which general damages is quantified is by relying on what would be the opinion and Judgement of a reasonable person in the circumstances. What this court would put into consideration are the basis for which the Claimant is seeking damages. In the instant suit, the Claimant is seeking general damages against the Defendant for breach of contract.

This Court has already found under Relief One that although the Defendant possessed the contractual right to terminate the Claimant's employment, it failed to establish compliance with the contractual requirement relating to notice or payment in lieu of notice. Consequently, the termination was held to be wrongful.

I am mindful of the traditional principle that damages for wrongful termination are generally measured by what the employee would have earned during the applicable notice period.

However, I am equally guided by the more recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in SKYE BANK PLC v. ADEDOKUN OLUSEGUN ADEGUN (2024) LPELR-62219(SC) where the apex court held that:

 

“The new labour jurisprudence with the 3rd Alteration to the 1999 Constitution and the provisions of the law in that regard, particularly section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act mandates that every court in the land shall have recourse to good or international best practices in labour or industrial relations. I do not think the courts should continue to use the former settled position of the law which is that no matter how hurtful, unreasonable or wrongful the termination of appointment is, the employee is only entitled to one month’s salary in lieu of notice to determine the quantum of damages. Every case must be determined on its facts.

In British Airways v. Makanjuola (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 311) Pg. 276 at 288 per Ubaezonu JCA, the court awarded the equivalent of two years’ salary to the employee whose employment was wrongfully terminated after unfounded allegations of malpractice which carried a stigma on the character of the employee and made it difficult for him to get another job. The facts of that case are very similar to the facts of this case. There is no doubt that the policy of the legislature to introduce new labour relations principles and international best practices into the adjudication of the law in employment and labour relations in yet a fluid policy, merely pointing the judex to the new road to follow, there must not be confusion. The award of general damages to compensate the employee whose character has been besmirched and whose ability to work upon wrongful dismissal has been greatly diminished cannot be by rule of thumb, but must be based on sound legal principles. The employee claimant must plead and prove the entitlement to the quantum of the general damages claimed apart from the failure to pay salary in lieu of notice. The claimant must prove that he suffered damages much more than the ordinary”.

In the instant case, while the Claimant has established wrongful termination, he did not establish any reputational injury, stigmatization, and loss of future employment opportunities or other exceptional circumstances warranting a substantial award of damages.

Nevertheless, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the Defendant failed to comply with the contractual provisions governing the determination of the employment relationship. The Claimant was thereby subjected to a wrongful termination which entitled him to compensation.

In exercising the powers conferred on this Court under Section 19(d) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, and taking into consideration the circumstances of this case, including the period of service rendered by the Claimant, the failure of the Defendant to establish payment in lieu of notice, and the need to award reasonable compensation for the breach established before this Court, I find that an award of damages is justified.

Accordingly, Relief Six succeeds in part.

The Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as compensation for the wrongful termination of his employment.

Relief Seven seeks "The sum of ?5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) as costs of litigation."

The law is settled that the award of costs is entirely at the discretion of the Court, although such discretion must be exercised judicially and judiciously. Ordinarily, costs follow events and are intended to compensate a successful party for part of the expenses reasonably incurred in prosecuting or defending an action.

In Anyaegbunam v. Osaka (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 294) 449 and Obayagbona v. Obazee (1972) 5 SC 247, the Supreme Court emphasized that costs are not intended as a punishment against an unsuccessful party but rather as compensation to the successful party for part of the expenses incurred in the course of litigation.

It is equally settled that solicitor's fees or professional legal charges are generally not recoverable against an adverse party as special damages unless such recovery is expressly provided for by statute, contract or exceptional circumstances recognized by law.

In the instant case, the Claimant specifically claims the sum of ?5,000,000.00 as costs of litigation. The Court has examined Exhibit C12, being the Solicitor's Professional Receipt tendered by the Claimant. While the said exhibit establishes that the Claimant engaged the services of legal practitioners, it does not automatically entitle him to transfer the entirety of his solicitor's fees to the Defendant as damages.

The Court must equally consider the nature and outcome of the case. Although the Claimant succeeded in part by establishing wrongful termination and obtaining certain consequential reliefs, his claims relating to constitutional violations, assault, fair hearing, exemplary damages and substantial portions of his monetary claims were unsuccessful.

In the circumstance, this Court finds the claim for ?5,000,000.00 as costs of litigation to be excessive and unsustainable.

Nevertheless, having regard to the partial success of the Claimant's case, the necessity of instituting this action, the expenses reasonably incurred in prosecuting the suit, and the overall circumstances of this case, this Court, in the exercise of its discretionary powers, considers it just and equitable to award moderate costs in favour of the Claimant.

Accordingly, costs assessed at ?500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) are hereby awarded against the Defendant and in favour of the Claimant.

Relief Eight seeks "An order of mandatory injunction compelling the Defendant to pay all claims arising from insurance policy, interests on contributory pension and other benefits to the Claimant."

The law is settled that a mandatory injunction is an equitable relief granted to compel the performance of a specific legal obligation. Being an extraordinary remedy, it will only be granted where the applicant establishes a clear legal right, the obligation sought to be enforced is specific and ascertainable, and there is credible evidence establishing entitlement to the relief sought.

In considering this relief, the Court has carefully examined whether the Claimant established entitlement to insurance policy benefits, contributory pension entitlements and other employment-related benefits.

With respect to the claim relating to insurance benefits, the Claimant failed to place before the Court any insurance policy document, group life insurance schedule, staff benefit handbook, insurance certificate or any other documentary evidence establishing the existence of a specific insurance policy in his favour, the terms thereof, the benefits accruing thereunder or the amount allegedly due to him.

The Court cannot grant an omnibus order compelling payment of unspecified insurance benefits in the absence of credible evidence establishing both the existence and scope of such entitlement. Reliefs founded upon vague, uncertain and unparticularized claims are incapable of judicial enforcement. Accordingly, the Claimant has failed to establish entitlement to any specific insurance policy benefit.

With respect to contributory pension and accrued interests thereon, this Court has already found under Relief Four that pension deductions were made from the Claimant's salaries and that the Defendant admitted its statutory obligations regarding pension contributions but failed to produce satisfactory evidence of remittance.

The Court further held that although the Claimant failed to strictly prove entitlement to the specific monetary sum claimed as pension arrears, the Defendant remains under a continuing statutory obligation to account for and remit all pension deductions and employer counterpart contributions due in respect of the Claimant.

To that extent, the Court finds merit in the Claimant's claim and holds that the Defendant must fully account for and discharge all outstanding pension-related obligations due to the Claimant in accordance with the Pension Reform Act, 2014.

With regard to the claim for "other benefits", the Claimant failed to specifically plead and prove the precise nature, computation and contractual basis of the alleged benefits sought. Consequently, the Court cannot grant vague and speculative reliefs unsupported by credible and cogent evidence.

However, the Court takes cognizance of the admission made by DW1 under cross-examination that the Claimant may be entitled to certain terminal or severance benefits under the Defendant's employment structure.

It is trite that an admission against interest constitutes credible evidence against the maker. Consequently, this Court finds that the Defendant is under an obligation to compute, reconcile and communicate to the Claimant any gratuity, severance or terminal benefits due to him under the contract of employment and applicable company policy.

Accordingly, Relief Eight succeeds only in part.

Consequently, an Order of Mandatory Injunction is hereby granted directing the Defendant to remit any outstanding pension deductions, employer contributions, accrued interests and statutory penalties due in respect of the Claimant into the Claimant's Retirement Savings Account in accordance with the provisions of the Pension Reform Act, 2014.

The Defendant is further directed to compute, reconcile and communicate to the Claimant any gratuity, severance or terminal benefits due to him under the contract of employment and applicable company policy and shall pay any sum found due within thirty (30) days from the date of this Judgment.

Relief Nine seeks "Post-judgment interest at the rate of twenty percent (20%) per annum until the judgment sum is totally liquidated."

The law is settled that interest on a monetary claim may arise in one of two ways, namely:

         i.        Where the entitlement to interest is claimed as of right; or

        ii.        Where the award of interest is conferred by statute and granted in the exercise of the Court's discretion.

In AMS Logistics Ltd & Anor v. Infinity Tyres Ltd (2022) LPELR-56846(CA), the Court restated the principle earlier enunciated by the Supreme Court in Himma Merchants Ltd v. Alhaji Inuwa Aliyu (1994) LPELR-1366(SC), wherein Onu, JSC held thus:

"Indeed, there are legally two ways by which a claim for interest on a sum of money claimed as a debt can arise. Firstly, as of right; and secondly, where there is a power conferred by statute to do so in exercise of the Court's discretion. Before a party can claim pre-judgment interest as of right, he must plead not only his entitlement but also the basis of such entitlement — whether by statute, contract, mercantile custom, or equitable principle."

In the instant case, there is no evidence before this Court establishing that the Claimant is entitled to interest as of right, whether by contract, statute, custom or any other recognized legal basis.

However, this Court is vested with the discretionary power under Order 47 Rule 7 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 to award post-judgment interest on judgment sums.

Having regard to the circumstances of this case and the reliefs granted herein, I find it appropriate to exercise that discretion in favour of the Claimant.

Accordingly, Relief Nine succeeds only to the extent that the Defendant shall pay all monetary sums awarded in this Judgment within thirty (30) days from the date of delivery of this Judgment, failing which the judgment sums shall attract interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum until fully liquidated.

In the final analysis, the Claimant has succeeded in part and the issues formulated for determination are resolved accordingly.

For the avoidance of doubt, Reliefs 2, 3 and 5 fail and are hereby dismissed, while Reliefs 1, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 succeed only to the extent stated in this Judgment.

Accordingly, the Court hereby makes the following declarations and orders:

1.     A Declaration that the termination of the Claimant's employment was wrongful for failure of the Defendant to establish compliance with the contractual requirement relating to notice or payment in lieu of notice.

2.    An order directing:-

a.    The Defendant to within thirty (30) days from the date of this Judgement, furnish the Claimant with documentary evidence of all pension remittances made in respect of the Claimant's employment from 2015 to 2024.

b.    Upon reconciliation of the Claimant's pension records, the Defendant shall remit any outstanding pension deductions and employer contributions due in respect of the Claimant into his Retirement Savings Account in accordance with the Pension Reform Act, 2014.

c.    Such remittance shall include all applicable statutory interests, penalties and charges prescribed by the Pension Reform Act, 2014 in respect of any established default.

3.    The Defendant shall pay to the Claimant the sum of ?500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as compensation for the wrongful termination of his employment.

4.    Costs assessed at ?500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) are hereby awarded against the Defendant and in favour of the Claimant.

5.    An Order of mandatory injunction is hereby granted directing the Defendant to compute and remit to the Claimant any gratuity, severance or terminal benefits due to him under the contract of employment and applicable company policy and shall pay any sum found due within thirty (30) days from the date of this Judgment.

6.    All monetary sums awarded in this Judgment shall be paid within thirty (30) days from today.

7.    Failure to comply with Order 8 above shall attract interest at the rate of 10% per annum until the judgment debt is fully liquidated.

Judgment is accordingly entered.

 

...........................................

HON. JUSTICE Z. M. BASHIR, PhD

JUDGE