IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HONORABLE JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

DATE:23^RD JULY, 2026           

SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/151/2025

 

BETWEEN:

PATRICIA EHINOMHEN EREMIONKHALE...................CLAIMANT

AND

ECOBANK NIGERIA LIMITED .................................... DEFENDANT

 

REPRESENTATIONS:

Celina N.E. Ezeh Esq, with Rebecca S. Tyogyer Esq for the claimant.

Bonnyameen Babajide Lawal, SAN, with Umar Faruq Hussain Esq, Amina Abdulrahman Zubair Esq for the defendant.

 

JUDGMENT

1.The Claimant commenced this suit by a General Form of Complaint accompanied by other originating processes filed on 21 May 2025 wherein Claimant sought the following reliefs against the Defendant:

1. A DECLARATION that the Defendant’s letter dated 22 December 2023 titled “SERVICE NO LONGER REQUIRED” and the purported termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant is wrongful, unlawful, illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
2. A DECLARATION that the reason of “unsatisfactory performance” given by the Defendant for the purported termination of the Claimant’s employment is false, baseless, unfounded and a calculated attempt to damage the Claimant’s hard-earned professional reputation and career.
3. A DECLARATION that the Claimant is still a valid and subsisting employee of the Defendant and is entitled to all her salaries, allowances, emoluments, promotions and all other benefits attached to her position as an Assistant Manager or its equivalent.
4. A DECLARATION that the Claimant’s 22 years of dedicated and unblemished service to the Defendant cannot be terminated in the manner portrayed by the Defendant’s letter of 22 December 2023.
5. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court setting aside the Defendant’s letter of 22 December 2023 and reinstating the Claimant to her position as Assistant Manager in the employment of the Defendant without any loss of seniority, rank or entitlements.
6. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay to the Claimant all her arrears of salaries, allowances, and other emoluments from the date of the purported termination of her employment until the date of judgment in this suit.
7. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to promote the Claimant to the rank of Deputy Manager or its equivalent, which she was due for before the purported termination of her employment.
8. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay to the Claimant all her bonuses and other performance-related entitlements for the 2023 financial year.
9. THE SUM OF N500,000,000.00 (Five Hundred Million Naira) only as general damages for the wrongful and unlawful termination of the Claimant’s employment and the attendant psychological trauma, emotional distress and loss of career prospects.
10. THE SUM OF N300,000,000.00 (Three Hundred Million Naira) only as exemplary and aggravated damages for the Defendant’s oppressive and high-handed conduct in the purported termination of the Claimant’s employment.
11. THE SUM OF N15,000,000.00 (Fifteen Million Naira) only being damages for character assassination and defamation of the Claimant’s professional reputation.
12. THE SUM OF N7,000,000.00 (Seven Million Naira) only as the cost of prosecuting this suit.
13. 25% interest per month of the Judgment sum from the date of Judgment until the judgment sum is liquidated by the Defendant.

2.The Defendant entered appearance, filed a Statement of Defence on 3rd October, 2025 (deemed properly filed on 9th December, 2025), and defended the action to the hilt. 

THE CLAIMANT'S CASE

3.The Claimant was employed by the Defendant on 4th August, 2006 as an Executive Assistant on Band K (Exhibit PAT 1), and her appointment was confirmed on 19th November, 2007 (Exhibit PAT 3). Over the years she rose through the ranks, earned commendations from senior management (Exhibit PAT 4), and was promoted to Assistant Manager on 14th December, 2018. She served in the Nyanya, Mararaba and Jabi Branches, where, on her account, she contributed to the growth of the balance sheet of the Jabi Branch from ?600 million to ?1.1 billion between 1st August, 2022 and the date of her exit — a growth of 93%. She points to a commendation letter of 5th February, 2023 (Exhibit PAT 9), a monthly performance report for May 2023 (Exhibit PAT 8A), a branch performance report (Exhibit PAT 8B), and other exhibits to make good her case of diligent and productive service.

4.She complains that the termination was wrongful on three fronts: first, that the notice given was short of the contractual one month; secondly, that the reason of “continued unsatisfactory performance” was neither pleaded nor proved; and thirdly, that the statement of that reason in Exhibit PAT 12 was injurious to her professional reputation. She invites the Court to set aside the letter of termination, restore her to her position with all benefits, promote her to the next grade, and to award her substantial general, exemplary and aggravated damages together with costs and interest.

THE DEFENDANT'S CASE

5.The Defendant admits the employment history but denies any wrongdoing. Its case, put shortly, is that following the Claimant’s promotion to Assistant Manager in 2018 her performance declined significantly and she was rated 2 out of 5 (“Below Average”) in the 2021 and 2022 appraisal cycles (Exhibits Francis A and Francis B), where her own self-appraisal repeatedly assigned itself the score of 2 across a range of key performance indicators, including Active Xpress Point Agents, Asset Growth, CASA, Customer Acquisition, POS/Ecobankpay Transaction Value, Total Revenue, and Total Deposits. Consequent upon that decline, the Claimant was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) in August 2022, and her performance did not improve to the requisite standard. Her services were thereafter terminated on 22nd December, 2023 in accordance with Item IV of the contract of employment (Exhibit PAT 1), which permits termination by one month’s notice or payment in lieu of notice, the Defendant having elected the latter and having, in addition, allowed the Claimant a period between the date of the letter and its effective date on 31st January, 2024.

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

6.The Claimant testified as CW1 and tendered Exhibits PAT 1 to PAT 13. The Defendant led evidence through one witness, Mr. Francis Dehinbo (DW1), and tendered Exhibits Francis A (the 2021 end-of-year performance review) and Francis B (the 2022 end-of-year performance review). Final written addresses were filed and duly adopted, and I have read them with the attention they deserve. I acknowledge, with gratitude, the industry of both learned counsel.

CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS

7.Learned Counsel to the Claimant, Celina N. E. Ezeh and Rebecca S. Tyogyer, submitted that pursuant to Order 45 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017, they were filing the Claimant's Final Written Address. They submitted that the Claimant commenced this action by Complaint filed on 21 May 2025 seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary reliefs arising from the wrongful termination of her employment by the Defendant, and that the Defendant having entered appearance and filed its Statement of Defence, parties joined issues and the matter proceeded to trial.

On Issue One: Whether Exhibits PAT8A and PAT8B are admissible and properly before the Court

8.Learned Counsel submitted that by Section 12(2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, this Honourable Court may regulate its proceedings as it thinks fit and may depart from the strict provisions of the Evidence Act in the interest of justice. They relied on the Court of Appeal decision in Ribadu v. National Boundary Commission [2024] LPELR-80018 (CA) which reaffirmed that the National Industrial Court is a specialised court established to ensure labour disputes are determined expeditiously and on substantial justice devoid of technicalities, and the Supreme Court decision in Anyimba v. Onovo [2025] LPELR-80876 (SC) which held that courts are established to ensure substantial justice is done and seen to be done. They submitted that the Claimant tendered Exhibit PAT13, being a certificate of compliance supporting Exhibits PAT8A and PAT8B, and that assuming without conceding any defect in the certificate, the exhibits are relevant to the issue of performance. They cited Aondoakaa v. Obot & Anor [2021] LPELR-56605 (SC) where the Apex Court restated that relevance remains central to admissibility, and Ezewudo v. Ezenwaka [2016] LPELR-41019 (CA) where the Court held that relevancy is the meat of admissibility. They therefore urged the Court to retain the said exhibits.

9.On Issue Two: Whether the Claimant proved that the termination was wrongful

10.Learned Counsel submitted that it is settled law that parties are bound by the terms of their contract, citing Isaac Ezekiel v. Westminster Dredging Nigeria Ltd [2001] FWLR (Pt.60) 1564; BFI Group Corp v. BPE [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt.1332). They argued that Exhibit PAT1 provides for termination by one month notice or salary in lieu of notice, and that although the letter of termination (Exhibit PAT12) is dated 22 December 2023, Exhibit PAT11 (the WhatsApp chat) shows that the Claimant was notified on 2 January 2024 at 9:08pm, long after close of the day’s business, to pick up Exhibit PAT12 with the termination taking effect from 31 January 2024, which constitutes less than a month’s notice as agreed by the parties.

11.On the allegation of continued unsatisfactory performance, Learned Counsel submitted that once an employer gives a reason for termination, it must justify same, citing SPDC Ltd v. Olarewaju [2008] LPELR-3046 (SC) and First Bank v. Momoh [2020] LPELR-51517 (CA). They relied on Dangote Cement Plc v. Ager [2024] 10 NWLR (Pt.1945) where the Supreme Court held that parties are legally bound by the terms regulating employment and any breach attracts liability, and Longe v. FBN Plc [2010] LPELR-1793 (SC) where the Court emphasised that the contract and conditions of service govern termination. They submitted that the Claimant tendered commendation letters, promotions, performance reports and growth records comprising Exhibits PAT4A, PAT4B, PAT6, PAT7, PAT8A, PAT8B and PAT9, demonstrating commendable service. They further submitted that where evidence is withheld by a party in possession of same, the Court may presume it would be unfavourable to that party under Section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, citing Bakari v. Ogundipe [2021] 5 NWLR (Pt.1768), Oparaji v. Ohanu [1999] LPELR-2747 (SC) and *Inuwa v. Bayero University Kano* (2016) LPELR-41615 (CA). They submitted that DW1's testimony was materially inconsistent, citing Ayeni v. People of Lagos State [2016] LPELR-41440 (CA) where the Court held that an untruthful witness deserves no credibility. They submitted that the allegation of unsatisfactory performance was therefore not proved, noting that DW1 under cross-examination testified that the period of assessment of performance is January to December, and that from the date on the termination letter, Exhibit PAT12, it was obvious that the defendant’s decision was premature and premeditated. They further submitted that the phrase “continued unsatisfactory performance” is injurious to professional reputation, citing Enertech Eng. Co. Ltd v. Alpha Praxis Nig Ltd [2014] LPELR-41105 (CA) where defamation was described as any imputation lowering a person in the estimation of right-thinking persons or injuring the person in profession or trade.

12.On Issue Three: Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought

13.Learned Counsel submitted that in Polaris Bank Plc v. Pinheiro [2024] LPELR-80293 (SC), the Supreme Court held that damages compensate for loss arising from the wrong of a defendant. They submitted that the modern position on damages for wrongful termination was restated in Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun [2024] 15 NWLR (Pt.1960) that damages need not be restricted to salary in lieu of notice, but may extend to consequential loss having regard to age, earnings and retirement prospects. They submitted that the same authority recognised that courts may consider whether laid down procedure was followed, whether the authority was competent, and whether fair hearing was afforded, and that it is their submission that the laid down procedures were not followed. They submitted that where termination is declared null in appropriate circumstances, parties revert to status quo, citing Principal Bassey v. A. G. Akwa Ibom State [2016] LPELR-41244(CA).

DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS

14.Learned Counsel to the Defendant, Boonyameen Babajide Lawal, SAN, Umar Faruq Hussain, MCIArb (UK) and Amina Abdulrahman Zubair, submitted that pursuant to Order 45 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules 2017 and the order of Court made on 12 March 2026, they were submitting the Defendant's Final Written Address. They recounted that the Claimant commenced the suit by General Form of Complaint filed on 21 May 2025 seeking various reliefs including declarations that the termination was wrongful and orders for reinstatement and damages, and that the Defendant filed its Statement of Defence on 3 October 2025. They noted that the Claimant testified as PW1 and tendered Exhibits PAT1–PAT13, while the Defendant called Francis Dehinbo as DW1 who tendered Exhibits Francis A and Francis B.

15.On Preliminary Issue: Whether, having regard to the mandatory provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011, the documents admitted as Exhibits PAT 8A and 8B are inadmissible in law and liable to be expunged from the record of this Honourable Court.

16.Learned Counsel submitted that the Defendant respectfully urges the Court to discountenance and expunge Exhibits PAT 8A and 8B from the record, contending that these exhibits, being computer-generated evidence, were tendered and admitted in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 84 of the Evidence Act 2011. They submitted that the law is well settled in a long line of authorities, most notably the Supreme Court decision in Kubor v. Dickson [2013] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534, that for electronic evidence to be admissible, it must be accompanied by certificate or oral evidence identifying the device used in its production and certifying that the device was in proper working condition at the material time. They noted that although the Claimant filed a Certificate of Compliance, the said certificate is limited solely to the Claimant’s mobile phone and her printer, and crucially, the certificate is silent on, and does not extend to, the computer or server from which PAT 8A and 8B were actually generated, stored, or retrieved, which fact was unequivocally confirmed by the Claimant during cross-examination. They relied on the Court of Appeal in Multichoice (Nig.) Ltd. v. M.C.S.N. Ltd.Gte. (2020) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1742) 415 at pages 536-537, paras. H-G which emphasised that the conditions stipulated under Section 84 are not mere formalities but conditions precedent to admissibility, quoting that "By virtue of section 84(1) and of the Evidence Act, 2011, in any proceedings a statement contained in a document produced by a computer shall be admissible as evidence of any fact stated in it of which direct oral evidence would be admissible, if the following conditions are satisfied..." They submitted that a certificate that relates to devices other than the one used to generate the document is fundamentally defective, and that the failure to identify and certify the actual source device creates a gap in the evidentiary foundation. They submitted that where a document is wrongly admitted, the Court has the power and indeed the duty to expunge it at the stage of writing its judgment, citing Nwaogu v. Atuma [2013] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1364) 117 at pages 155-156, para. H where the apex court stated that "Where a document is wrongly admitted in evidence by a court, the same court has the power and jurisdiction to expunge it at the judgment stage since it can only base its judgment on legally admissible evidence and documents..."

17.On Issue 1: Whether the Claimant has proved that the termination of her employment was wrongful, unlawful, or illegal.

18.Learned Counsel submitted that it is trite that in an employment relationship not governed by statute, the rights and obligations of the parties are circumscribed by the contract of employment, but by virtue of Section 254C(1)(f) and (h) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), this Court is empowered to apply international best practices in labour relations. They cited the ILO Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158) providing that an employee can only be terminated based on justifiable ground connected with capacity or conduct. They submitted that this Honourable Court has consistently held, most notably in Mr Ebere Onyekachi Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc [2015] 58 NLLR (Pt. 199) 92, that the old common law master-servant rule has been replaced by the constitutional mandate to apply international best practices. They submitted that the Defendant strictly adhered to these global standards, documenting the 2/5 (Below Average) ratings in Francis A and B and placing the Claimant on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) in August 2022, thereby giving her a fair opportunity to remediate her performance before termination. They submitted that assuming the ILO Convention does not apply, an employer can terminate employment with or without any reason so long as it complies with the contractual terms contained in PAT 1, citing Keystone v. Afolabi [2017] LPELR-42390 (CA). They submitted that the Claimant admitted under cross-examination that her performance ratings declined by 2022, that she was placed on a PIP, and that she did not challenge the Key Performance Indicators during her employment, relying on Section 123 of the Evidence Act 2011 and Ibrahim v. Usman [2023] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1911) 515 at page 536, paras. C-E for the proposition that facts admitted require no further proof. They submitted that on the issue of the Living Faith Church Worldwide account, the Claimant admitted the account predated her involvement and that her actions were pursuant to directives from a superior officer, and that she failed to provide documentary evidence in support of her assertion that she recovered N200,000,000.00 in bad debts. They submitted that it is ironic that pre-termination, the Claimant acknowledged her shortcomings and repeatedly promised to improve yet contends in this suit that her performance was satisfactory, pointing to her 2021 self-ratings in Exhibit Francis A where she rated herself 2 out of 5 for Active Xpress Point Agents Count because her branch "achieved a total of 43 out of a budget of 170 which is 25% achievement," for Asset Growth (Gross Loans) because her branch "achieved N46, 604M out of a budget of N111,702. Which is 42% of my budget," for CASA because her "branch achieved N2,189,911,000 out of a budget of N4,102,385,000. Which is 53% of my budget," for Customer Acquisition because her branch "achieved 1111 out of a budget of 2797. Which is 40% of my budget," for POS/Ecobankpay because she "achieved N1,151,620 out of a budget of N4,147,141 which is 28% of budget," for Total Revenue because she "achieved N123,374M out of a budget of N224,393 which is 55% achievement," and for Total Deposits because she "achieved total deposit of N2,548,141 out of a budget of N6,136,877 which is 42% of budget." They further submitted that in 2022, the Claimant’s performance admittedly declined and she summarized her performance in Exhibit Francis B as follows: "PERIOD UNDER REVIEW I WAS TRANSFERED FROM MY BRANCH WHERE I WAS DOING LITTLE ABOVE AVERAGE IN MOST OF MY LINES ESPECIALLY IN CASA. ALSO, THERE WAS NO MAJOR PDO (S3). HOWEVER, I WILL PUT IN MY BEST TO ENSURE I GET A BETTER RESULT IN 2023". They submitted that the Defendant is a private commercial entity that relies on exceptional performance to thrive and reserves the right to review employment of any affected employee, and that the responsibility to determine which performance standards are acceptable lies solely with the Defendant, urging the Court to resist the Claimant’s invitation to have the Court decide what performance metrics the Claimant must be adjudged by.

19. On Issue 2: Whether the Claimant is entitled to the declaratory and monetary reliefs sought.

20.Learned Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s claims for Reliefs (a)–(m) are predicated on the assumption that the termination of her employment was wrongful, which having failed to establish, all consequential reliefs must necessarily fail. They submitted that it is trite that declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course but must be proved by credible and cogent evidence, citing Adamu v. Nigerian Airforce [2022 5 NWLR (Pt. 1822) 159 where the apex court held that "Declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course. The claimant must satisfy the court on balance of probability to be entitled to same... The grant of a declaratory relief is discretionary." They submitted that on the reliefs seeking reinstatement, the law is firmly settled that a Court will not impose a willing employee on an unwilling employer in a master-servant relationship, citing the Supreme Court in Damisa v. U.B.A. [2025] 19 NWLR (Pt. 2021) 409 at page 425 where the court held that "The only remedy available for wrongful dismissal of employee is a claim for damages for the wrongful dismissal and nothing more... a court will not impose a willing employee on an unwilling employer." They submitted that the claims for general damages and exemplary damages are speculative, ridiculously excessive, and unsupported by law, citing Obanye v. U.B.N. Plc [2018] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1648) 375 where the Supreme Court stated that "In a claim for wrongful dismissal from employment, the measure of damages is prima facie the amount that the plaintiff would have earned had the employment continued according to the contract... He was not given the said one month notice. The amount of damages he was entitled to, in the circumstance, was one month’s salary in lieu of notice and no more." They submitted that on the claim for defamation, the Claimant has failed to establish the essential elements, and the defence of justification avails the Defendant, citing A.S.U.U. v. Ogunsanwo [2014] 17 NWLR (Pt. 1437) 475 at page 493, paras. D-F, and that the communication falls within qualified privilege, citing Sule v. Orisajimi [2019] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1681) 513 at page 531, paras. A-B where the apex court explained that "An occasion is privileged when the person who makes a publication has a moral duty to make it to the person to whom he does make it and the person who receives it has an interest in hearing it."

COURT’S DECISION

21.Having meticulously considered the pleadings filed by both parties, the entirety of the evidence adduced during the trial, and the comprehensive submissions of learned counsel on both sides, this Court has carefully distilled the following pivotal issues as sufficient and determinative for the just and conclusive disposition of this suit:

(1) Whether Exhibits PAT 8A and PAT 8B are admissible in law, having strict regard to the mandatory provisions of section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011.

(2) Whether the Claimant has discharged the burden of proving that the termination of her employment by the Defendant’s letter dated 22nd December, 2023 (Exhibit PAT 12) was wrongful, unlawful, and/or constituted an unfair labour practice within the meaning and contemplation of section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered).

(3) Whether, flowing from the resolution of the preceding issues, the Claimant is legally entitled to the declaratory and monetary reliefs sought in her Statement of Facts.

22.This matter, I must say at the onset unequivocally that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court, being a dispute connected with labour, employment, and the conditions of service of an employee of a private commercial bank. By virtue of the express provisions of section 254C(1)(a), (f), (h), and (k) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010), and further reinforced by section 7 of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, this Court is invested with comprehensive and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Furthermore, this Court is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to have regard to good conscience, equity, and international best practices in labour and industrial relations in its adjudicatory process. This significant constitutional expansion of jurisdiction and the accompanying adjudicatory tools were definitively and authoritatively affirmed by the Supreme Court, per Nweze, J.S.C., in the landmark case of Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu [2017] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 24, and this pronouncement has since become the foundational cornerstone of modern labour jurisprudence within this jurisdiction, guiding all subsequent determinations.

PRELIMINARY MATTER

23.Before proceeding to a substantive consideration of the issues distilled, it is imperative that this Court first addresses and disposes of the Defendant’s preliminary objection. This objection, strenuously urged in its Reply Address, posits that the Claimant’s Final Written Address falls substantially short of the mandatory requirements stipulated by Order 45 Rules 2 and 3 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the address omits the prescribed list of authorities, fails to set out the reliefs in the manner directed by the Rules, and structurally departs from the established template for a final address. Consequently, the Defendant urges this Honourable Court to strike out the Claimant’s address in its entirety and proceed as though no such address had been filed.

24.This Court has anxiously and thoroughly considered the Defendant’s objection. While it is acknowledged that the Claimant’s address, indeed, does not serve as a model of strict compliance with the procedural dictates of Order 45, this Court remains acutely mindful of the established legal principle that a final address, irrespective of its brilliance or perceived deficiencies, does not and cannot substitute for substantive evidence adduced during trial. Conversely, a defective address, however imperfect its presentation, cannot, by itself, defeat a case that has otherwise been substantially made out on the strength of the evidence presented. See Niger Construction Ltd v. Okugbeni [1987] 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 787; Obodo v. Olomu [1987] 3 NWLR (Pt. 59) 111. The Rules of this Court are fundamentally designed to serve as handmaidens of justice, facilitating the fair and efficient administration of justice, rather than acting as rigid impediments. This Court, being one expressly enjoined by section 12(2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, to depart from technical rules where the interest of substantial justice so requires, is inherently disinclined to summarily shut out a party’s written submissions on the basis of a purely structural or formalistic objection, particularly where the substantive arguments and their underlying merits are clearly discernible on the face of the address. Therefore, this Court declines the Defendant’s invitation to strike out the Claimant’s Final Written Address. However, in the ordinary course of adjudication, this Court shall attach to the said address only such weight as its content and substantive merit demonstrably warrants, rather than its formal compliance.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE

25.The Defendant vigorously contends that Exhibits PAT 8A (a monthly performance report for May 2023) and PAT 8B (a branch performance report), being documents generated by a computer, are fundamentally inadmissible in law due to a critical failure to comply with the mandatory conditions stipulated in section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The Defendant specifically argues that the Certificate of Compliance (Exhibit PAT 13) tendered by the Claimant speaks exclusively to the Claimant’s mobile phone and printer, and is conspicuously silent on the identity of the primary computer or server from which the underlying data for these documents was originally generated. For this proposition, the Defendant relies principally on the Supreme Court decisions in Kubor v. Dickson [2013] 4 NWLR (Pt. 1345) 534; Multichoice (Nig.) Ltd v. Musical Copyright Society of Nigeria Ltd/Gte ([2020] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1742) 415; and Nwaogu v. Atuma [2013] 11 NWLR (Pt. 1364) 117, urging the Court to expunge these documents at this judgment stage.

26.The Claimant, conversely, invokes section 12(2) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, and the overarching principle of the primacy of substantial justice in labour adjudication. She relies on cases such as Ribadu v. National Boundary Commission [2024] LPELR-80018 (CA); Anyimba v. Onovo [2025] LPELR-80876 (SC); Aondoakaa v. Obot [2021] LPELR-56605 (SC); and Ezewudo v. Ezenwaka [2016] LPELR-41019 (CA), to assert that relevance constitutes the “meat of admissibility” and that the Court should therefore retain the exhibits.

27.The relevant legal principle governing the admissibility of computer-generated documents is settled beyond any peradventure and has been consistently applied by superior courts. Section 84(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011, unequivocally lays down mandatory conditions precedent for the admissibility of any statement contained in a document produced by a computer. Where a certificate of compliance is relied upon, as in the instant case, it must, as a matter of strict legal requirement, identify the document, describe the manner in which it was produced, and crucially, identify the specific computer by which it was produced. The Supreme Court, in Kubor v. Dickson (supra) and in Dickson v. Sylva [2017] 8 NWLR (Pt. 1567) 167, has consistently and emphatically held these conditions to be conditions precedent to admissibility, not mere idle formalities or technicalities that can be waived. Their purpose is to ensure the integrity and reliability of electronic evidence.

28.It is, however, equally settled that section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, empowers this Court, in the interest of justice, to depart from the strict provisions of the Evidence Act. That power, however, is not unfettered or at large. It has been authoritatively recognised in Ribadu (supra) and by the President of this Court in a consistent line of decisions, including Ebere Onyekachi Aliba v. Access Bank Plc (Unreported, Suit No. NICN/LA/566/2012, judgment delivered 30th April, 2017), that such departure is strictly confined to removing formalistic or procedural obstacles that impede the attainment of substantial justice. It does not, and cannot, extend to overriding statutory conditions precedent that are specifically designed to ensure the fundamental reliability, authenticity, and integrity of electronic evidence, particularly in matters where such evidence is hotly disputed and forms a critical part of a party’s case. To do so would undermine the very essence of fair adjudication.

29.On the material evidence before this Court, Exhibit PAT 13, the Certificate of Compliance, is explicitly limited in its scope, speaking only to the Claimant’s mobile phone and printer. It conspicuously fails, on its face, to identify the specific computer or server that generated the underlying data contained in Exhibits PAT 8A and PAT 8B. This critical omission constitutes a fundamental breach of section 84(2)(b) and (c) of the Evidence Act, 2011. Furthermore, the Claimant herself conceded this material gap in the evidential foundation of the exhibits under cross-examination. This is a fatal defect. I am therefore of the considered view, and I so hold, that Exhibits PAT 8A and PAT 8B fall demonstrably short of the mandatory requirements of section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011, and are consequently liable to be expunged from the record at this stage of judgment. This holding is in perfect accord with the Supreme Court’s decision in Nwaogu v. Atuma (supra), which affirmed the inherent power and solemn duty of a court to purge its record of documents that were wrongly admitted in evidence. Issue One is accordingly resolved in favour of the Defendant.

30.I should, however, sound a crucial caveat: the expunging of these two exhibits does not, without more, automatically dispose of the substantive question of whether the Claimant’s termination was wrongful. The Claimant retains her other admissible exhibits (including Exhibits PAT 1, PAT 3, PAT 4, PAT 9, PAT 11, and PAT 12), and the ultimate resolution of this case must, in the final analysis, be based on a holistic assessment of the totality of all admissible evidence properly before the Court.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO 

31.I begin with a brief but precise characterization of the legal relationship between the parties. Exhibit PAT 1 constitutes a private contract of employment entered into between the Claimant and a commercial bank. It is undisputed that there is no specific statute regulating the terms of her engagement, and her employment is neither in the public service nor imbued with any statutory flavour. See Olaniyan v. University of Lagos [1985] 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599; Idoniboye-Obu v. NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589. Consequently, the fundamental rights and obligations of the parties are to be primarily found and interpreted, in the first instance, within the four corners of Exhibit PAT 1. See Amodu v. Amode [1990] 5 NWLR (Pt. 150) 356; Ihezukwu v. University of Jos (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598.

32.It is, however, no longer legally tenable or sufficient to speak of the employer’s common-law power to “hire and fire at will” as though it were an absolute or unfettered prerogative. Since the coming into force of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration) Act, 2010, this Court is constitutionally enjoined to apply international best practices in labour and to actively intervene where an act of termination amounts to an unfair labour practice under the explicit provisions of section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution. The President of this Court, Kanyip, P.J., has articulated this modern position with characteristic clarity and authority in Ebere Onyekachi Aliba v. Access Bank Plc (Unreported, Suit No. NICN/LA/566/2012, judgment delivered 30th April, 2017), and reiterated it in Mr. Bassey Effiong Otu v. Central Bank of Nigeria (Unreported, NICN/CA/58/2015). In these seminal decisions, His Lordship held that where an employer voluntarily offers a reason for termination, that stated reason must be objectively justified on the evidence. Furthermore, where the reason relates to the capacity or conduct of the employee, the employee must have been duly put on notice and afforded a fair opportunity to be heard, consistently with the fundamental principles enshrined in Article 7 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158), which is binding on this Court.

33.As eloquently stated by Kanyip, P.J., in Ebere Onyekachi Aliba v. Access Bank Plc (NICN/LA/566/2012, 30 April 2017):

“The employment relationship in Nigeria today is no longer the wholly private affair the common law once conceived it to be. Under section 254C(1)(f) of the 1999 Constitution as altered, this Court is duty-bound to intervene where an employer’s conduct amounts to an unfair labour practice, measured against international best practices in the field.”

34.The Court of Appeal in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Mrs. Olawunmi Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806 (CA), and the Supreme Court in Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun [2024] LPELR-62219 (SC), have both unequivocally endorsed the constitutional imperative that, in a fit and proper case, the measure of damages for wrongful termination may extend beyond the traditional notice period to reflect consequential loss, having due regard to factors such as age, earnings, and career prospects. These modern authorities, however, do not displace the antecedent and fundamental question, which is whether the termination in the specific case at hand was, in fact, wrongful in the first instance.

35.Item IV of Exhibit PAT 1, the contract of employment, clearly stipulates that either party may terminate the employment by giving one month’s notice or by making payment of one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The operative word here is the disjunctive “or,” which signifies that the two modes are alternative options. The employer’s election of either mode constitutes a valid and complete discharge of its contractual obligation. See FBN Merchant Bank Ltd v. Owotemu [2023] LPELR-60451 (CA); Bako v. British Council (Nig.) [2022] LPELR-58127 (CA); Afribank Nig. Plc v. Osisanya [1999] LPELR-5206 (CA). The Defendant has led credible evidence through DW1 and by reference to Exhibit PAT 12, demonstrating that it elected to pay salary in lieu of notice. Furthermore, the Defendant, ex gratia, afforded the Claimant an additional period between 22nd December, 2023 (the date of the termination letter) and 31st January, 2024 (its effective date). The Claimant, having demonstrably received both the payment in lieu of notice and the benefit of this extended interval, cannot, in the same breath, legitimately complain that the notice provided was insufficient. Such conduct amounts to impermissible approbation and reprobation, which the law does not countenance. See Ude v. Nwara (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt. 278) 638; Ajide v. Kelani [1985] 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 248.

36.Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the notice actually given fell short by a matter of days, the established measure of damages recoverable for a purely notice-based irregularity in a master-servant relationship is strictly confined to the salary for the shortfall period. See Isaac Ezekiel v. Westminster Dredging (Nig.) Ltd [2001] FWLR (Pt. 60) 1564; Katto v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 390; Ifeta v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria Ltd [2006] 8 NWLR (Pt. 983) 585. Such a minor irregularity cannot, of itself, sustain the far-reaching declaratory and substantial monetary reliefs that the Claimant now seeks.

37.Crucially, the Defendant elected, in Exhibit PAT 12, to state a specific reason for the termination: “continued unsatisfactory performance.” It is a trite and well-established principle of labour law that where an employer voluntarily offers a reason for termination, that reason must be objectively justified on the preponderance of evidence adduced before the Court. See SPDC Ltd v. Olarewaju [2008] LPELR-3046 (SC); First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Momoh [2020] LPELR-51517 (CA); Dangote Cement Plc v. Ager [2024] LPELR-61800 (SC). The onus of proving such justification lies squarely on the employer.

38.As affirmed by the Court of Appeal in First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. Momoh [2020] LPELR-51517 (CA):

“Where an employer in a master and servant employment gives reason for the termination of the employment, the employer is obliged to lead evidence in justification of the reason and, if the reason is not justified, the termination becomes wrongful.”

39.I have anxiously and meticulously examined the entire evidence presented, with this fundamental principle firmly in mind. Exhibits Francis A and Francis B are the Claimant’s own end-of-year appraisals for 2021 and 2022, respectively. It is highly instructive that in Exhibit Francis A, the Claimant herself, in her self-appraisal, unequivocally awarded herself a rating of 2 out of 5 across a range of key performance indicators. She expressly recorded, inter alia, that her branch had achieved only 25% of budget on Active Xpress Point Agents, 42% on Asset Growth (Gross Loans), 53% on CASA, 40% on Customer Acquisition, 28% on POS/Ecobankpay Transaction Value, 55% on Total Revenue, and 42% on Total Deposits. Furthermore, in Exhibit Francis B, the Claimant herself summarised her performance for 2022 in the following unmistakable and self-incriminating terms: “PERIOD UNDER REVIEW I WAS TRANSFERRED FROM MY BRANCH WHERE I WAS DOING LITTLE ABOVE AVERAGE IN MOST OF MY LINES …. HOWEVER, I WILL PUT IN MY BEST TO ENSURE I GET A BETTER RESULT IN 2023.” These statements constitute formal admissions against interest, contained in the Claimant’s own hand, and were made in the ordinary course of the Defendant’s established performance management process.

40.Under rigorous cross-examination, the Claimant further made several crucial admissions that significantly bolster the Defendant’s case: (i) that her performance ratings had demonstrably declined by 2022; (ii) that she was formally placed on a Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) in August 2022; (iii) that she did not utilise the Defendant’s internal grievance channels to challenge the Key Performance Indicators which she now belatedly describes as “arbitrary”; (iv) that she could not produce any documentary support whatsoever for her claim of a ?200 million bad-debt recovery; (v) that the Living Faith Church Worldwide account was a pre-existing institutional client, and that her involvement was merely pursuant to a directive from a superior officer, not her individual initiative; and (vi) that the overall success of a bank branch is inherently a collective institutional effort rather than an individual achievement.

41.By virtue of section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011, facts that are formally admitted require no further proof. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that admissions made under oath, particularly during cross-examination, constitute the highest form of evidence and legally estop the maker from contending to the contrary. See Ibrahim v. Usman [2023] 16 NWLR (Pt. 1911) 515; Egbunike v. African Continental Bank [1995] 2 NWLR (Pt. 375) 34; Cardoso v. Daniel [1986] 2 NWLR (Pt. 20) 1. These unequivocal admissions, in my respectful view, entirely neutralise the Claimant’s assertions of exemplary and unbroken performance, and provide independent, compelling corroboration of the Defendant’s case that her performance was indeed unsatisfactory.

42.Article 7 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158), which this Court is constitutionally enjoined to apply under section 254C(1)(h) of the Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, mandates that before an employee is terminated for reasons related to his or her conduct or performance, he or she should have been given a fair opportunity to improve. On the material evidence before me, the Defendant’s conduct demonstrably answers and fully satisfies this international standard. The Defendant did not spring the termination on the Claimant arbitrarily; it meticulously documented the sub-par ratings across two full appraisal cycles; it formally placed her on a structured Performance Improvement Plan in August 2022, thereby affording her a defined and reasonable opportunity to remediate her performance deficiencies; and it proceeded to terminate her employment only when the documented shortfall persisted despite these interventions. This course of action is materially and fundamentally different from the kind of arbitrary, precipitate, or oppressive termination which the doctrine of unfair labour practice under section 254C(1)(f) is specifically designed to strike down. See Bello Ibrahim v. Ecobank Plc (Unreported, Suit No. NICN/ABJ/144/2018, judgment delivered 17th December, 2019); Aloysius v. Diamond Bank Plc [2015] 58 NLLR (Pt. 199) 92.

43.The Claimant invites this Court to draw an adverse inference under section 167(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011, contending that the Defendant’s failure to produce certain internal documents, despite a notice to produce, signifies that such documents would, if produced, have been adverse to its case. I am unable to accede to this invitation. The Supreme Court in Nweke v. State [2017] LPELR-42103 (SC) has authoritatively settled the principle that a notice to produce merely entitles the party serving it to lead secondary evidence of the document, and does not, of itself, impose an automatic duty on the recipient to produce the document. Furthermore, the presumption in section 167(d) is discretionary, not automatic, and is unsuitable where the recipient (the Defendant) has already tendered contemporaneous documents (Exhibits Francis A and Francis B) that directly speak to the very matters in issue. See Oduola v. Coker [1981] 5 SC 197. Moreover, the Claimant herself led no secondary evidence of her own concerning the withheld matters, and cannot now seek to derive advantage from her own procedural abstention or inaction.

44.I have also carefully considered the Claimant’s further contention that the recital of the reason “continued unsatisfactory performance” in Exhibit PAT 12 was defamatory of her professional reputation. The essential elements required to establish the tort of defamation are: (i) a defamatory imputation; (ii) reference to the plaintiff; (iii) publication to a third party; and (iv) the absence of a valid defence. See Iloabachie v. Iloabachie [2005] 13 NWLR (Pt. 943) 695; Guardian Newspapers Ltd v. Ajeh [2011] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1256) 574. The Claimant has led no credible evidence whatsoever that the termination letter, which was addressed to and delivered to her personally, was published to any third party by the Defendant. If, as the Defendant persuasively urges, any awareness the wider public may now have of the reason for termination stems from the very institution of these proceedings by the Claimant, that cannot, by any stretch, be construed as a publication attributable to the Defendant. Moreover, occasions of internal employer-to-employee communication, particularly concerning performance, attract, prima facie, the defence of qualified privilege. See Chief Ojo Maduegbunam v. AG, Anambra State [1998] 6 NWLR (Pt. 553) 337; Enertech Eng. Co. Ltd v. Alpha Praxis Nig. Ltd [2014] LPELR-41105 (CA). In addition, having found (above) that the reason given for termination was substantially true on the overwhelming evidence, the defence of justification would, in any event, avail the Defendant. See Suleiman v. Adamu [2016] LPELR-40316 (CA). I therefore unequivocally reject the defamation limb of the Claimant’s claim.

45.Weaving the above threads of evidence and legal principles together, I find and hold that the Defendant fully complied with Item IV of Exhibit PAT 1 in the mode of termination; that it discharged the burden of substantiating the volunteered reason of “continued unsatisfactory performance” through the compelling evidence of Exhibits Francis A and Francis B, and through the Claimant’s own unequivocal admissions under cross-examination; that it observed the substantive requirements of international best practice by placing the Claimant on a formal Performance Improvement Plan and allowing a reasonable period for remediation before proceeding to termination; and that neither the section 167(d) presumption nor the defamation claim can, on the record before this Court, be sustained. Issue Two is accordingly resolved in its entirety in favour of the Defendant. The termination was neither wrongful nor unlawful, nor did it amount to an unfair labour practice within the meaning of section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution (as altered).

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE THREE 

46.Having determined that the Claimant’s termination was lawful and did not constitute an unfair labour practice, the question of her entitlement to the various reliefs sought necessarily follows. Since the foundational premise of wrongful termination has failed, all consequential reliefs must similarly fail.

(a) Declaratory reliefs

47.Reliefs (a) to (d) of the Statement of Facts are declaratory in nature. It is settled beyond argument that declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course or discretion, and cannot be granted even on the default or admission of the opposing party. A claimant seeking a declaration must succeed strictly on the strength of his or her own case, and not on the weakness of the defence. See Adamu v. Nigerian Air Force [2022] 5 NWLR (Pt. 1822) 159; Bello v. Eweka [1981] 1 SC 101; Motunwase v. Sorungbe [1988] 5 NWLR (Pt. 92) 90; Dumez (Nig.) Ltd v. Nwakhoba [2008] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 361. Having failed to establish a case for wrongful termination, the Claimant fails equally in her prayers for declarations that the termination was unlawful, that the reason given was false, that she remains a subsisting employee, and that her 22 years of service could not be so terminated. Reliefs (a) to (d) accordingly fail and are hereby refused.

(b) Reinstatement and promotion

48.Reliefs (e) (seeking an order setting aside the termination and reinstating the Claimant) and (g) (an order compelling promotion to Deputy Manager) are legally untenable and cannot be granted by this Court. The Supreme Court has consistently reiterated in Damisa v. UBA [2025] 19 NWLR (Pt. 2021) 409, and long before in Chukwumah v. Shell Petroleum Development Co. of Nigeria Ltd [1993] 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, that in a pure master-servant employment relationship, a Court will not force a willing servant on an unwilling master. The appropriate remedy, where a termination is found to be wrongful, is, at best, an award of damages, not reinstatement. This position was also firmly affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ecobank (Nig.) Ltd v. Ibrahim [2025] LPELR-81870 (CA). As for promotion, the settled legal position is that promotion is not an absolute right but remains a matter within the employer’s discretion, exercisable strictly within the internal framework and policies of the institution. This Court will not, save in exceptional circumstances which are demonstrably not present here, make an order in the terms of relief (g). See N.N.P.C. v. Ayoola [2013] 3 NWLR (Pt. 1341) 315; Iderima v. Rivers State Civil Service Commission [2005] 16 NWLR (Pt. 951) 378. Reliefs (e) and (g) also fail and are hereby refused.

(c) Arrears, bonuses and further monetary reliefs

49.Reliefs (f), (h), and (m) (seeking arrears of salary and emoluments from the date of termination to judgment; bonuses and performance-related entitlements for 2023; and 25% monthly post-judgment interest) all rest on the antecedent premise of wrongful termination, which this Court has unequivocally rejected. It is settled law that the common-law principle of “no work, no pay” applies rigorously to a validly terminated master-servant employment. See Ihezukwu v. University of Jos [1990] 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 598; Adamu v. C.B.N. [2016] LPELR-40538 (CA). As to bonuses, the Claimant has led no evidence whatsoever of a contractual entitlement, as distinct from a discretionary payment. This Court will not import a term into the parties’ bargain that they have not themselves incorporated into their contract. See BFI Group Corporation v. Bureau of Public Enterprises [2012] 18 NWLR (Pt. 1332) 209. The claim for 25% monthly interest is, in any event, entirely unsupported by any legal basis and is grossly excessive. See Ekwunife v. Wayne (W.A.) Ltd [1989] 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 422; Order 47 Rule 7 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017. Reliefs (f), (h), and (m) are accordingly refused.

(d) General, exemplary and aggravated damages

50.Reliefs (i) (?500 million general damages), (j) (?300 million exemplary and aggravated damages), and (k) (?15 million damages for defamation) all presuppose either a proven breach of contract or a completed tort. Neither has been established by the Claimant in this suit. Damages, whether general or otherwise, do not run at large; they must be firmly founded on a proven wrong. See Polaris Bank Plc v. Pinheiro [2024] LPELR-80293 (SC); British Airways v. Atoyebi [2014] 13 NWLR (Pt. 1424) 253; Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (on the strictly confined categories in which exemplary damages may be awarded). No case having been made out for the underlying wrong, no damages, whether general, exemplary, or aggravated, can properly flow. Reliefs (i), (j), and (k) accordingly fail and are hereby refused.

(e) Costs

51.As to costs, though the Defendant has succeeded in its defence and would ordinarily be entitled to costs against the Claimant under Order 55 Rules 1 and 4 of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017, this Court is mindful of its unique role as a court of equity and conscience in labour matters. The Claimant is an individual who, after twenty-two years of dedicated service, sought recourse to this Court in the honest, if ultimately mistaken, belief that she had been wronged. This Court is unwilling to burden a former employee, whose livelihood has already been affected by the termination of her employment, with the additional weight of an adverse costs order in circumstances of this kind. See Rewane v. Okotie-Eboh [1960] SCNLR 461; NNPC v. Clifco (Nig.) Ltd [2011] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1255) 209. In the judicious exercise of the Court’s inherent discretion, I shall make no order as to costs.

52.For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Judgment is to be taken or construed as a licence for highhanded, arbitrary, or oppressive dealing with employees by employers. The Third Alteration Act, 2010, has emphatically enlarged the protective canopy this Court holds over the Nigerian workplace, and where an employer’s conduct in terminating an employment is found to be arbitrary, oppressive, or unsupported by any credible material evidence, that conduct will be swiftly and decisively struck down as an unfair labour practice under section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution. However, that is demonstrably not the case here. This Defendant meticulously documented its case, provided the Claimant with a clear opportunity to improve through a formal Performance Improvement Plan, and acted only when the required improvement failed to materialise. This diligent and procedurally sound approach is the very antithesis of the unfair labour practice at which the doctrine is aimed.

53.On the whole, for the comprehensive reasons given above and for the avoidance of any doubt, this Court makes the following definitive ORDERS:

[1] The Claimant’s suit against the Defendant, filed on 21st May, 2025, fails in its entirety and is hereby DISMISSED.

[2] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Exhibits PAT 8A and PAT 8B, having been admitted in breach of the mandatory provisions of section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011, are hereby EXPUNGED from the record of this Court, and no probative value shall attach to them or to any argument founded upon them.

[3] IT IS HEREBY DECLARED that the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant’s letter dated 22nd December, 2023 (Exhibit PAT 12) was lawful, was in strict accordance with Item IV of Exhibit PAT 1, and did not amount to an unfair labour practice within the meaning of section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as altered by the Third Alteration Act, 2010).

[4] The Claimant’s prayers for declaratory reliefs, reinstatement, promotion, arrears of salary and emoluments, bonuses, general damages, exemplary and aggravated damages, damages for defamation, costs, and post-judgment interest (Reliefs (a) to (m) of the Statement of Facts) are, each and severally, REFUSED.

[5] There shall be no order as to costs; each party shall bear its own costs of this suit.

54.Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

……………………

Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

JUDGE