IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA IN THE IBADAN JUDICIAL DIVISION HOLDEN AT IBADAN BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE Y. M. HASSAN DATE: 30TH JULY, 2026 SUIT NO: NICN/IB/102/2020 BETWEEN MR. ISHMAEL ADESINA SANNI --------------------------------------------------- CLAIMANT AND STERLING BANK PLC. ------------------------------------------------------------ DEFENDANT REPRESENTATION - A.D. Abiona for the Claimant. - U.S. Ngugah for the Defendant. JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION 1. The Claimant instituted this suit via a General Form of Complaint, Statement of Facts and other Originating Processes dated and filed on 30th day of October, 2020, claiming against the Defendant as follows: 1) A DECLARATION that the purported dismissal of the Claimant from the employment of the Defendant vides a letter dated September 11, 2020 without notice or payment in lieu of notice premised upon a false/ill-conceived allegation against the Claimant is malicious, an after-thought, wrongful and unlawful. 2) A DECLARATION that the incitement of the police coercive power against the Claimant by the Defendant in order to recover debt through false and malicious allegations is unlawful and a violation of the Claimant’s fundamental rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty, freedom of movement and right to property. 3) AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N2,500,000.00 (Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira), being the unpaid salaries of the Claimant from April, 2020 to September, 2020 when the appointment of the Claimant was purportedly terminated and other entitlements of the Claimant. 4) INTEREST on the said sum of N2,500,000.00 (Two Million, Five Hundred Thousand Naira), at the rate of 20% per month from 30th September, 2020 until the date of judgment and thereafter at the rate of 10% per annum until the said sum is fully liquidated. 5) AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N500,000,000 (Five Hundred Million Naira) representing general damages suffered by the Claimant as a result of the Defendant unlawful termination of the Claimant’s appointment and violation of the Claimant’s fundamental rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty, freedom of movement and right to property. 6) AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of N1,000,000,000 (One Billion Naira Only) as general damages for the injuries caused by the Defendant against the Claimant from its tortious act of defamation. 7) COST of N500,000 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) for prosecuting this action. 2. In defence, the Defendant filed statement of defence and Counterclaim dated 25th day of June, 2021 and filed on 30th day of June, 2021. The Defendant amended the Counterclaim pursuant to the order of the Court and Counterclaims against the Claimant as follows: 1) The sum of N8,164,521.07 (Eight Million, One Hundred and Sixty Four Thousand, Five Hundred and Twenty One Naira, Seven Kobo) only being the outstanding balance as at 11th November, 2020 on all the banking facilities granted to the Defendant by the Counter-claimant on both principal and interest. 2) An order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to refund the sum of N3,398,468.99 (Three Million, Three Hundred Nine Eight Thousand, Four Hundred and Sixty Eight Naira, Ninety-Nine Kobo) only being the sum that was inadvertently paid to the Defendant by the Counter Claimant as benefit upon his dismissal from the Counter-Claimant’s employment. 3) Interest on the aforesaid sum in (a & b) above at the rate of 10% per annum from the 11th day of November, 2020 and thereafter at the rate of 10% per annum until the final liquidation of the judgment sum. 4) Interest on 10% on the judgment sum until the whole judgment sum is fully liquidated. 5) N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only as general damages. 3. In response, the Claimant filed Amended Claimant’s reply to the statement of defence and defence to Counterclaim on 26th July, 2022. In the further response, the Counter-Claimant filed reply to the Claimant’s Defence to Counterclaim on 24th September, 2021 as well as the Defendant/Counter Claimant’s Consequential Amendment to the Claimant’s Defence to Counterclaim on 14th day of November, 2022. 4. Pleadings having been settled, trial in this suit commenced on 29th May, 2024 and concluded on 18th day of December, 2025. Both the Claimant and the Defendant called two witnesses each. CASE OF THE CLAIMANT 5. The Claimant opened his case on 29th May, 2024 when he called one Mrs. Fehintola Rhoda Sanni, who testified as CW1, adopted her statement on oath dated 30th day of October, 2020 as her evidence-in-chief. 6. Under cross-examination, CW1 stated inter alia that her husband used to be a staff of the Defendant. That in the course of her husband’s employment with the bank, he has disciplinary issues where he was queried and also invited to the Defendant’s disciplinary committee. That during the course of her husband’s employment, he has reason to take loans or borrow money from the Defendant and that she does not know whether the loans were fully repay. That the car alleged to have been sold was not sold because they came with it this morning. That her husband was not alleged of supression of cash deposit of customers. That when the police came to their house, her husband was not arrested. 7. The Claimant himself testified as CW2, adopted his statements on oath as his evidence-in-chief and tendered in evidence 12 documents which were admitted and marked as Exhibits A to L respectively. 8. Under cross-examination of CW2 by the Defendant’s Counsel, he testified amongst other things that some of the documents that regulate his relationship with the Defendant are Offer Letter, Letter of Confirmation and Employees’ Handbook. That in the course of his relationship with the Defendant, there was a time he was alleged to have diverted the sum of Three Million Naira meant for Toyota Camry, the subject of loan facility without fully paying same and abandonment of duty. That he was issued query and invited to staff disciplinary committee meeting and stated his own story. That at the conclusion of his evidence at the disciplinary committee meeting, his employment with the Bank was placed on indefinite suspension before his dismissal. That he enjoyed several facilities from the Bank during the course of his employment with the Bank. That those facilities include car loan and visa credit card loan and were given in different time and conditions. That the car was registered in his name and Bank’s name, a joint ownership. That at the time of dismissal, all the loan were not fully liquidated. That he is still owing Bank now. That it is new to him that he was paid Three Million Naira after his dismissal. That suppression of customers’ cash never happened. That he was not arrested by the police. That he was granted bail that same day when he went to volunteer statement to the police. 9. The Claimant’s Counsel tendered from the bar 5 documents meant to be tendered by a subpoena witness and the documents were admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits M to Q respectively. CASE OF THE DEFENDANT 10. The Defendant opened their defence on 10th December, 2025 by calling one Samuel Atotuomah, Esq., Regional Legal Officer in the employment of the Defendant, who testified as DW1, adopted his statements on oath as his evidence-in-chief and tendered in evidence three documents out of which one was objected to by the Claimant’s Counsel and ruling on same reserved and the document admitted provisionally and marked as Exhibit R. Other not objected were admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibits S and T respectively. 11. DW1 stated under cross-examination inter alia that he did not work in the same branch with the Claimant. That he was nit at the disciplinary session when the Claimant was summoned. That he saw the copy of the complaint of suppression of funds against the Claimant as a Regional Legal Officer. That copy of the complaint is in the Bank’s file. That pursuant to the complaint and further issues – particularly the selling of the Bank’s assets, the Claimant was placed on suspension. That the Bank has same photocopies facilities documents including that of the car loan and other loans obtained by the Claimant. That he was not at the police station when the Claimant was invited. That he is not aware that police attempted to arrest the Claimant at Osogbo while he was still under suspension. That the source of payment of the car loan and other loans obtained by the Claimant is through salaries and other sources. That he is not aware that the car is still with the Claimant as we speak because the Claimant informed the Bank that he sold the car to raise money for travelling purposes but thereafter provided the car at the police station contrary to his earlier assertion. That he was not there physically when the Claimant made that assertion but got that information from the Bank’s record. That the disciplinary committee session was both video and audio depending on what the next work will permit. 12. On 18th December, 2025, Tinuke Oyinlola, Head, Human Capital Compliance, Employment Conduct and Wellness in the employment of the Defendant/Counter-Claimant, testified as DW2, adopted her statements on oath as her evidence-in-chief and tendered three (3) documents in evidence out of which one was objected to and ruling on same was admitted provisionally and marked as Exhibit U1 Other two were properly admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibit U2 and V respectively. 13. Testifying under cross-examination, DW2 stated amongst other things that she did not work in the same branch the Claimant. That she is not an information technology personnel of the Bank. That she was not at the police station when the Bank petition was being investigated by the police. That the Claimant was placed on suspension for observed irregularity on his role. That she was not aware that police attempted to arrest the Claimant in Osogbo. That she is not aware that the car in question is in the Claimant’s possession as at today because the Claimant himself at the disciplinary committee hearing admitted to the selling the car. That the disciplinary committee hearing was video conferencing and she is also the Secretary of the meeting. That she did not know that the Claimant was paid some amount after his disengagement. FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESSES 14. At the close of trial and pursuant to the direction of the Court, learned Counsel on either side filed their final written addresses and reply on points of law. 15. The Defendant filed its final written address of 15 pages dated and filed on 11th day of February, 2026. In it, learned Counsel to the Defendant, Sunday Ikeh, Esq., distilled 4 (four) issues for determination, to wit: a) Whether the Claimant’s dismissal from the Defendant’s employment was justified and lawful. b) Whether the Claimant is entitled to the payment of salary during the period of suspension in which he was later dismissed. c) Whether the Claimant had sufficiently proved his case against the Defendant to be entitled to the claim of damages. d) Whether the Counter-Claimant had sufficiently proved her case against the Defendant to Counter-Claim and is entitled to same. 16. In arguing the issues, learned Defendant’s Counsel submitted on issue one that the law is settled that in an employment that is not governed by statute, an employer may summarily dismiss an employee for gross misconduct especially where the misconduct touches on dishonesty, fraud, breach of trust, abuse of office or any other conduct designated by the employee’s handbook as gross misconduct. 17. Learned Counsel contended that gross misconduct is a conduct of a grave and weighty character as to undermine the confidence which should exist between the employee and his employer or working against the deep interest of the employer. He cited the cases of NJC & ORS v. SENLONG & ORS (2010) LPELR-4582(CA); OLANIYAN v. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR part 9, 599; OMAGBEMI v. FBN (2021) LPELR-54155(CA). 18. In another submission, Counsel submitted that parties are bound by an agreement they freely entered into. He added that the Defendant is also bound by the provision of the Defendant’s employee’s handbook which was incorporated in paragraph C of the Claimant’s offer of employment, Exhibit A. reliance was placed on the case of OFORISHE v. NIG. GAS COMPANY LTD. (2017) LPELR-42765(SC) and the testimony of CW2 under cross-examination. 19. In his further argument, Counsel stated that the Claimant was afforded fair hearing, he was invited to enter his defence with respect to the allegations made against him whereupon, the Claimant in clear terms admitted the allegation of diverting the sum of N3,000,000 (Three Million Naira) meant for a customer to his personal account to boost his account running for the purpose of his Canada visa application and the sale of the Toyota Camry, a collateral to a facility without recourse to the bank. He refers the Court to Exhibit U1 the audio recording of the Disciplinary proceedings. 20. The learned Defendant’s Counsel submitted that the law is settled that where an employee confessed or admitted to allegations before the disciplinary panel, the employer is no longer required to prove the offence beyond the admission but can proceed to either terminate or dismiss the employee and such admission satisfies the requirements of fair hearing. He relied on the cases of SPDC v. OLAREWAJU (2008) 18 NWLR (pt. 1118) Pg. 1; DANGOTE v C.S.C PLATEAU STATE (2001) 9 NWLR, pt. 717, 132 at 159; NAIGE v. AHAMAD & ANOR (2019) LPELR-48136(CA) and also Section 123 of the Evidence Act. 21. Again, Counsel submitted that the dismissal of the Claimant was done in compliance with the rules of fair hearing and in accordance with the Defendant’s Staff Handbook, in that: i. The Claimant was placed on suspension. ii. The Claimant was issued query. iii. The Claimant was issued a letter of invitation stating the allegations against him. iv. He was invited to disciplinary panel. v. He was given the opportunity to respond to the allegations therein. vi. He was heard before dismissal. That the requirement of fair hearing was duly accorded to the Claimant before his dismissal. He relied on the case of IMONIKHE v. UNITY BANK (2011) 12 NWLR-1262, 624; (2011) LPELR-1503(SC). 22. Learned Counsel added in another submission that where an employee is well informed of the allegations against him, afforded the opportunity to defend himself and observance of the disciplinary procedure set by the employer, the dismissal is lawful and justified. He cited the case of MOMOH v. CBN (2007) LPELR-8842(CA) (pp. 21-23, para. D). 23. On the issue of selling a collateral Counsel submitted that a borrower has no right to dispose off a charged asset without the consent of the lender. In this respect, Counsel cited the case of AFRIBANK PLC v. AKANDE (2009) 5 NWLR (pt. 658) 521; Article 11.3(XIII) of the Defendant staff handbook and Article 13.3.3(i). 24. In his final submission on issue one, Counsel stated that the Claimant's dismissal from the Defendant’s employment was lawful, in compliance with the disciplinary procedure of the Defendant and in conformity with the rule of fair hearing. In other words, the Claimant was informed of the allegations, invited to defend himself, attended the hearing, and was heard before dismissal, thereby satisfying the requirements of fair hearing. The Claimant’s suit is an attempt to use the Court to sanitize admitted dishonesty which the law does not permit and urged the Court to so hold and resolve the issue in favour of the Defendant. 25. On issue two, Counsel submitted that Exhibit U2 is binding on the parties and relevant in the determination of this issue. Counsel maintained that Exhibit U2 clearly disentitled a staff on suspension who was later dismissed from salaries during the suspension period. He further argued that a staff will only be entitled to payment of salaries for the period he was on suspension is he is not found wanting of the allegations that necessitated his suspension. Reference was made to Article 11.3.1 and 13.3.3(ii). 26. In his final submission on issue two, Counsel stated that the Claimant is not entitled to the payment of salaries within the time of his suspension to the date he was dismissed from the Defendant’s employment and urged the Court to so hold and resolve this issue in favour of the Defendant. 27. On issue three, Counsel submitted that it is a settled principle of law that the burden of proof lies on the party who asserts the existence of a fact to prove same with credible evidence. In other words, a party who desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. He referred to Section 131, 132 & 133(1) of the Evidence Act and the cases of NIGERIAN BREWERIES PLC v. AUDU (2009) LPELR-8863(CA) and ABUBAKAR & 1 OR v. JOSEPH & 1 OR (2008) LPELR-48(SC). 28. Counsel further submitted that it is also settled principle of law that a Plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defence. In other words, a Claimant who commences an action must present credible and compelling evidence to substantiate his claims. He cited the case of LAIYAOJA v. EGUNLA (1974) LPELR-1644(SC). 29. In another submission, Counsel stated that law trite that an employee who is validly and lawfully dismissed for gross misconduct is not entitled to damages or benefits. In this respect, Counsel relied on the cases of SULE v. NIGERIAN COTTON BOARD (1985) 2 NWLR (pt. 5) page 17; NEPA v. ADEYERI (2007) 3 NWLR (pt. 1021) pg. 1. 30. Consequently, Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s dismissal is lawful and justified, which renders the Claimant’s claim of damages unsustainable and a gold digging exercise and urged the Court to so hold. 31. On issue four, Counsel referred the Honourable Court to the testimony of CW2 under cross-examination and paragraphs 36 of the Claimant’s Statement of Defence and Counterclaim as well as paragraph 17 of Amended Reply to the Statement of Defence to Counterclaim and submitted that facts admitted need no further proof and the Claimant having admitted of enjoying facility from the Defendant, the Claimant is under obligation both moral and legal to repay his debt and cannot be protected by this Honourable Court. In this respect, Counsel cited the cases of CANUASS FARM (NIG.) LTD. & ORS v. AMICO & ANOR (2021) LPELR-54650(CA); OMISORE & ANOR v. AREGBESOLA & ORS (2015) LPELR-24803(SC); CROWN FLOUR MILLS LTD & ANOR v. OLOKUN & ANOR (2007) LPELR-8534(CA). 32. Arguing further, Counsel submitted that the said debt is due for repayment and demand had been made, the Claimant having been dismissed from the Defendant’s employment, the debt became due for repayment. He referred the Court to Article 13.3.3(i) and the cases of UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. SOARES (2012) 11 NWLR (pt. 1312); AKPAN v. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2011) 12 NWLR (pt. 1262) 224. 33. Again, Counsel referred the Court to paragraph 27 and 28 of Consequential amendment to the Claimant’s defence to Counterclaim and CW2 testimony under cross-examination and submitted that the Claimant having admitted the payment of erroneous payment and his non-entitlement to same, the said sum of N3,398,468.99 is recoverable under restitution for unjust enrichment and urged the Court to so hold. Reference was made to the cases of UBA PLC v. BTL INDUSTRIES LTD (2006) 19 NWLR (pt. 1013) 61; A.G. FEDERATION v. ALC LTD (2000) 10 NWLR (pt. 675) 283. 34. Finally, Counsel urged the Court to resolve all the issues in favour of the Defendant/Counter-Claimant, dismiss the Claimant’s case against the Defendant/Counter-Claimant and enter judgment in favour of the Defendant/Counter-Claimant. 35. The final written address of the Claimant is dated and filed on 29th day of April, 2026 wherein learned Counsel to the Claimant, Adejorin D. Abiona, Esq., formulated also four (4) issues for determination to wit: 1) Whether or not Exhibit U1 (Audio CD Plate) is admissible in evidence and deserves any evidential weight. 2) Whether or not the dismissal of Claimant is wrongful and unlawful and the Claimant is entitled to damages sought. 3) Whether the other actions of the Defendant amounted to defamation and breach of fundamental rights for which the Claimant is entitled to damages. 4) Whether or not the Defendant/Counter-Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought in the Counter-Claim. 36. In arguing the issues, Counsel submitted on issue two that it is settled that even though an employer need not give any reason for dismissing his employee, however, where he has proffered a reason, he has an onus to satisfactorily prove same. Reference was made to the case of INSTITUTE OF HEALTH ABU HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT BOARD v. ANYIP (2011) LPELR-1517(SC). 37. Learned Counsel referred the Court to Exhibit J and submitted that the reason cited by the Defendant is false, ill-conceived and could not be satisfactorily proven by the Defendant, as such, that the dismissal by the Defendant is wrongful. 38. Arguing issue two further, Counsel submitted that a property purchased through a loan cannot be said to be an asset of the Lender and that once a loan is granted to a Borrower, the loan sum and the property purchased with the same are the property of the Borrower and not that of the Lender. In this respect, Counsel cited the case of NWAOBOSHI v. FRN & ORS (2023) LPELR-60698(SC). Consequently, Counsel referred the Honourable Court to Articles 12.1 and 13.5.1 of the staff handbook and contended that the Defendant’s reason for dismissing the Claimant is based upon a misconceived false allegation against the Claimant. He added that the car was not sold and the Defendant could not present any evidence to support the allegation against the Claimant. 39. Learned Counsel contended that the Claimant was clearly dismissed for an offence which was not in existence and which he did not in fact commit. He referred the Court to the testimonies of DW1 and DW2 under cross-examination and Section 11.3 of the staff handbook and submitted that refusal of a party to tender evidence which ought to have been produced will be presumed not to have favourable effect on the party’s case. Reliance was placed on Section 167(d) of Evidence Act and the cases of AKINGBOLA v. FRN & ANOR (2014) LPELR-24258(CA); DADO v. NUMSHUWAN (1991) 8 NWLR (pt. 212) 696 at 702. 40. It was submitted by the learned Counsel that the Claimant has satisfied the onus to prove that the dismissal was wrongful. He relied on the cases of ORUMU OIL PALM COMPANY LTD. v. ISERHIENRHIEN (2001) LPELR-2471 (p. 8-9), para E-G) (SC); ANAJA v. UBA PLC (2025) LPELR-81179(SC) (pp. 54-54, paras. A-D). To this end, Counsel submitted that the Claimant has placed before the Honourable Court the terms of employment and also how the terms were breached by the dismissed premised on a misconceived reasons and facts. 41. In another submission, Counsel stated that an employer has duty to act in good faith and not be oppressive against the employee. Counsel referred the Court to Exhibits M and J and submitted that the Defendant has not acted in good faith towards the Claimant. Reliance was placed on the case of PILGRIMS AFRICA LTD v. BOYSON (2025) LPELR-80992(CA). 42. On damages to which the Claimant is entitled to, Counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to the damages similar to that of general breach of contract and urged the Court to grant the damages prayed for as compensation for the wrongful termination of his employment. Reference was made to the cases of SKYE BANK PLC v. ADEGUN (2024) LPELR-62219(SC) (pp. 13-14) paras. B-E; MATRIX INT’L ACADEMY & ANOR v. ODINEZE (2025) LPELR-82838(CA) (pp. 23-30) paras. B-E. 43. On issue three, Counsel submitted that for a Claimant to succeed in an action for defamation, such Claimant is required to prove the essential elements of the tort. In this respect, Counsel cited the cases of SKYE BANK & ANOR v. AKINPELU (2010) LPELR-3073(SC); OLOGE & ORS v. NEW AFRICA HOLDINGS LTD (2013) LPELR-20181(SC) (pp. 18-18, paras. C-D). 44. Therefore, Counsel submitted that libel is actionable per se, and in essence, the Claimant does not need to prove that he has suffered injuries from the defamation to be entitled to damages. He referred the Court to the case of CROSS RIVER STATE NEWSPAPER CORPORATION v. ONI v. ORS (1995) LPELR-898(SC) (pp. 33-33, paras. B-D). Consequently, counsel referred the Court to Exhibit M and submitted that the Claimant has established the elements of defamation against the Defendant and he is entitled to damages and pray the Honourable Court to so hold. 45. In another argument, Counsel stated that it is settled law that it is not within the civil duty of a citizen to instigate the unlawful arrest of another person. Reference was placed on the cases of ZENITH BANK v. IYAMU (2021) LPELR-54150(CA) (pp. 6-6, paras. B-D); IBIYELE v. GOLD (2012) ALL FWLR (pt. 659) 1074; MCLAREN v. JENNINGS (2003) FWLR (pt. 154) 528 and KURE v. COP (2020) LPELR-49378(SC) (pp. 32-33, paras. A-E). 46. Arguing further, Counsel referred the Court Exhibits M and Q and maintained that it instigated the police against the Claimant and led to the breach of the fundamental rights of the Claimant and that the Claimant is entitled to compensation for the breach of his fundamental right in accordance with the provisions of the Nigeria 1999 Constitution (as Amended). Reference was made to Sections 34, 35 and 41 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as Amended) and the case of INYANG v. OKON & ORS (2025) LPELR-81632(CA) (pp. 15-15, paras. B-D). 47. On issue four (4), Counsel submitted that it is settled law that whoever asserts must prove such assertion. Reference was made to Section 131 of the Evidence Act and the case of FBN PLC v. YEGWA & ORS (2022) LPELR-59630(SC) (pp. 17-17, paras. B-C). 48. Arguing issue four further, Counsel submitted that in loan recovery cases, the lender has the legal burden and first evidential burden of establishing that he indeed granted and disbursed the loan to the borrower and how much liability is. Reference was made to the cases of FBN LTD v. ROYAL PAVILION (NIG) LTD & ANOR (2022) LPELR-57742(CA) (pp. 38-39, paras. B-B); NEJO v. ACCESS BANK & ORS (2019) LPELR-47960(CA), per Ogakwu, JCA at pages 20-21, para. B; FIRST INLAND BANK v. CRAFT 2000 LIMITED & ANOR (2011) LPELR-4167(CA), per Akeju, JCA at page 23, para. A; UNION BANK v. RAVIH ABDUL & CO. LTD. (2018) LPELR-46333(SC), per BAGE, JSC at pages 13-16, para. D. 49. It is the learned Counsel contention that in the instant case, while the Defendant to Counterclaim did not deny that he took some loans from the Counter-Claimant including the Car loan, the amount of the loan stated by the Counter-Claimant is disputed and the loans are in fact insured and protected by job loss insurance and as such, in the instance that he losses the job, the insurance ought to cover for any loss accruable to the Counter-Claimant. Reliance was placed on Exhibit K. 50. Learned Counsel contended that the claim for refund of certain amount paid after the commencement of the suit is ill-conceived and misleading as the sum was tagged as entitlement of the Claimant which was apparently deducted immediately as part repayment for loan. The sum was never stated to be the salary of the Claimant for his suspension period and the Claimant never admitted to this as his salary at any point during trial. He cited the case of AGOM-EZE v. UMAHI & ORS (2022) LPELR-58785(CA) (pp. 31-31, paras. B-D). 51. To this extent, Counsel submitted that it will not amount to justice according to the law where a person who fails to prove his assertion in Court is granted the relief sought and as such, he prayed this Honourable Court to dismiss the reliefs of the Counter-Claimant as same were not substantially proved. 52. In conclusion, Counsel urged the Court to resolve all the issues raised in favour of the Claimant, grant all the reliefs sought by the Claimant and dismiss the Counterclaim. 53. On the other hand, the Defendant filed a reply on points of law to the Claimant’s final written address. The said reply is dated 11th day of May, 2026 and filed same day. COURT’S DECISION 54. I have carefully and meticulously perused the processes filed in this suit by both parties. I have equally evaluated the entire evidence adduced both oral and documentary by the parties at the trial of this suit and I have listened carefully to the testimonies of witnesses called and watched their demeanours carefully. In addition, I have studied the final written addresses of Counsel as well as the reply on points of law and I have listened to their oral arguments at the point of adopting same. Having done all these, it is my considered opinion that the issues for determination formulated by Counsel in their respective final written addresses can be narrowed into two to wit: 1. Whether the Claimant has proved his case on the preponderance of evidence to be entitled to the reliefs sought. 2. Whether the Defendant/Counter-Claimant has proved his Counterclaim as required by law to be entitled to grant of same. 55. Before I consider the issues for determination, let me quickly resolve some preliminary issues that bother on admissibility of document sought to be tendered during the trial of this case. 56. It is on record that at the proceedings of 18th December, 2025 when the Defendant’s Counsel sought to tender in evidence audio CD plate, the Claimant Counsel objected to admissibility of same. The Honourable Court directed Claimant’s Counsel to address the Court at address stage on the grounds of his objection and for the Defendant’s Counsel to respond. The said audio CD was provisionally admitted in evidence and marked as Exhibit U1 57. The arguments of the Claimant’s Counsel on the grounds of his objection are contained in the Claimant final written address at paragraphs 4.1.1 to 4.1.3 wherein Counsel submitted inter alia that it is settled position of law that for an audio recording to be relevant and admissible as evidence in Court, it must be played in open Court to the hearing of the parties and the judge. That Exhibit U1 tendered by the Defendant was not played in the open Court to the hearing of the parties and the judge. Consequently, Counsel submitted that the exhibit is inadmissible as evidence in this case and urged this Honourable Court not to admit Exhibit U1 as evidence in this case and in the very unlikely event that same is admitted in evidence, this Honourable Court should not attach any value or weight to same. Reliance was placed on the cases of GEO MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTRE & ANOR v. N.D.E (2013) LPELR-20796(CA) (pp. 33-34, paras. D-C); NWAFOR v. ECOBANK (NIG.) LTD & ANOR (2024) LPELR-61814(CA) (pp. 48-50, paras. B-A). 58. On the other hand, the Defendant’s Counsel response is contained in the Defendant’s reply on point of law to the Claimant’s final written address at paragraphs 1.2 to 2.10 wherein he submitted amongst other things that Exhibit U1 is admissible, having satisfied all the requirements for admissibility. He submitted that the law is settled that the admissibility of evidence is principally governed by three criteria, namely: Relevance, properly pleaded and admissibility under the provision of the Evidence Act. He contended further that the mere fact that the audio recording was not played in open Court does not render it inadmissible. That playing the content of the recording goes to the weight to be attached to the evidence and not to its admissibility. Consequently, Counsel submitted that having been duly pleaded and found to be relevant to the issues before the Court, and tendered in compliance with the applicable provisions of the Evidence Act, Exhibit U1 is properly before this Honourable Court and should be so regarded. 59. Arguing further, Defendant’s Counsel stated that the admissibility of audio or electronic evidence is primarily governed by its relevance and compliance with the conditions stipulated under Section 84 of the Evidence Act, 2011, and not by whether it was played in open Court. He added that the law is well settled that once a proper foundation is laid as to the making of the recording, its authenticity and the manner of its production which was clearly stated in the certificate of compliance attached to the said exhibit, such evidence becomes admissible, and the objection of the Claimant is misconceived and ought to be discountenanced. Reliance was placed on the case of FRN v. FANI-KAYODE (2020) 14 NWLR (pt. 1214) 481 amongst other cases. 60. I have considered the argument of Counsel for and against the admissibility of the audio recorded compact disc but before I rule on same, let me say that the Defendant’s Counsel filed an Affidavit challenging the record of proceeding of this Honourable Court. The said Affidavit was filed on 12th May, 2026. The Claimant’s Counsel equally filed Counter Affidavit against the Defendant’s affidavit challenging the record of proceeding of this Honourable Court. The Defendant from the affidavit filed is principally challenging the record of proceedings of this Honourable Court of 18th day of December, 2025 that the portion where both Counsel agreed not to play the audio recorded compact disc in open Court after several unsuccessful attempts were omitted from the record of proceeding of the said 18th day of December, 2025. However, the Claimant deposed in their counter affidavit inter alia that there at no time during the trial on the said date did they agree that any audio CD should not be played in open Court. 61. From the foregoing, it is clear that the basis for challenging the proceedings of this Honourable Court of 18th day of December, 2025 is that there was an agreement by both Counsel to the parties to dispense with playing of audio CD. I have perused the proceeding of this Honourable Court of the date in question i.e. 18th day of December, 2025, I do not see therein where any of such agreement was reached and/or captured. In fact, the deposition of the Claimant’s Counter Affidavit particularly at paragraph 3(c) reflects the true position of the recordings of the said date. For clarity, let me reproduce the said paragraph hereunder. It reads thus: “That contrary to the paragraph 5 of the Affidavit challenging the record of proceedings, he as the Counsel to the Claimant never at any time during trial agreed that any Audio CD should not be played in the open Court and in fact, he objected to the admissibility of the Audio CD tendered.” Consequently, it is trite law that parties are bound by the records of the Court. In this respect, I refer to the case of UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. OBIAJURU (2024) LPELR-62345 per AMINA AUDI WAMBAI, JCA at page 14-15, paras. A-B, where it was held thus: “The presumption being a rebuttable one, the onus lies on the party alleging otherwise to indict the integrity of the record or cast aspersion to its sanctity. Where a party alleges that the record of the Court is not a true reflection of the record of proceedings of the Court, the onus lies on him to impeach the record, failure of which he cannot be heard to complain of the incorrectness of the record no matter how much pained he feels he is without properly impeaching the record. A mere allegation is not sufficient. The party must proceed to prove not only the incorrectness of the record but also show how the correct proceedings ought to be. In OJENGBEDE v. ESAN & ANR (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 771, Belgore JSC (as he then was) had this to say: “Whenever there is a clear evidence of an incorrect record of proceedings, this Court will always demand that the correct proceeding be transmitted in accordance with laid down procedure of this Court. But the person asserting incorrect or faulty record of proceedings carries the burden of not only proving the incorrectness of the proceedings he also must supply clearly what the proceedings actually ought to be. To posit simply that the proceedings are defective without more is not enough; it must be clearly indicated in the application the true proceedings. What is missing or what is a surplusage must be indicated.” 62. In the light of the above, it is my considered opinion that the Defendant’s Counsel has no basis for challenging the record of proceeding of this Honourable Court of the said date in question. I so hold and discountenanced the Affidavit challenging the record of proceeding of this Court filed on 12th May, 2026 by the Defendant. 63. Having resolved this, I will now proceed to rule on the admissibility or otherwise of the audio recorded compact disc. I have perused the Defendant’s pleadings, it is apparent that the said audio recorded compact disc was pleaded in paragraph 15 of the statement of defence and counterclaim. Therefore, the said audio recorded Compact Disc having been pleaded is equally relevant to the just determination of this suit. To that extent, it is trite law that relevancy is key to admissibility. This position was reinstated in the case of ODOGUN v. STATE (2025) LPELR-80680 where the Supreme Court per MOHAMMED BABA IDRIS, JSC at page 36-36, paras. B-F held that: “I agree with the submission of learned Counsel for the Appellant that relevance is fundamental to the admissibility of evidence, whether oral or documentary. The established principle in our law of evidence is that once a piece of evidence is relevant, it is admissible. Admissibility, being one of the cornerstones of our evidentiary roles, is determined by the relevance of the fact sought to be introduced. A fact in issue is admissible if it bears direct reliance to the matter before the Court. Accordingly, relevance serves as the precursor to admissibility, and any exclusion of relevant evidence without just cause would amount to a miscarriage of justice...” See also the case of OKON & ANOR v. EKPO & ANOR (2025) LPELR-80901(CA). 64. It should be noted that the failure to play the said audio recorded Compact Disc will go to the weight to be attached to it and not its admissibility. Consequently, the objection of the Claimant’s Counsel is misconceived and is hereby overruled. Therefore, the said audio recorded Compact Disc is hereby properly admitted in evidence as already been marked as Exhibit U1. See the case of NWAFOR v. ECOBANK (NIG.) LTD & ANOR (2024) LPELR-61814(CA). 65. Similarly, in the proceeding of 10th December, 2025 when the Defendant’s Counsel sought to tender in evidence an offer letter, the Claimant’s Counsel objected to the admissibility of same. Also, leave was granted Counsel to address the Court on the grounds of his objection at address stage and the said offer letter was provisionally admitted and marked as Exhibit R. 66. However and surprisingly, the Claimant’s Counsel did not address the Court as directed in the Claimant’s final written address. This simply means that the Claimant’s Counsel has abandoned the objection raised. To that extent therefore, the objection having been abandoned is hereby overruled and the said offer letter is now properly admitted in evidence as already been marked. 67. The coast appears to be cleared. I will now turn to the issues for determination formulated above. 68. On issue one which is whether the Claimant has proven his case on the preponderance of evidence to be entitled to the reliefs sought. 69. It is germane to state at the beginning that from the pleading and evidence before this Honourable Court, the Claimant was employed by the Defendant as shown in Exhibit A. The Claimant’s appointment was confirmed as shown in Exhibit B. The Claimant was suspended by the Defendant as shown in Exhibit C and he was eventually dismissed by the Defendant as shown in Exhibit J. Parties are unanimous on these facts. However, what appears to be in dispute as can be seen from the reliefs sought by the Claimant particularly relief (1) is that his dismissal is malicious, an after-thought, wrongful and unlawful. In other words, the Claimant is challenging his dismissal as wrongful and unlawful and sought for declaration to that effect. 70. Therefore, the law remains trite and elementary that he who approaches the Court for redress has the burden of adducing credible, cogent and admissible evidence in support of his case. This position was encapsulated in Section 131(1) of Evidence Act, 2011 which provides thus: “Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts shall prove that those facts exist.” Judicial decisions from the appellate Court support this position of law. In this respect, I refer to the case of ALAWIYE v. MINISTER OF FCT & ORS (2015) LPELR-82002 where the Supreme Court per ADAMU JAURO, JSC at page 36-36, paras. A-E thus: “Any person who desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. In other words, he who asserts must prove. This is a trite position of the law.” Similarly, Court of Appeal equally held in the case of ANSTEL LTD & ANOR v. ACCESS BANK LTD (2025) LPELR-81825 Per FOLASADE AYODEJI OJO, JCA, at pages 37-38, paras F-A thus: “The law is trite that he who asserts must prove and the onus is on the one who desires a Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence or non-existence of facts which he asserts.” See Sections 132, 133, 134 and 136 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (as amended) as well as the cases of NNEJI & ANOR v. INEC & ORS (2024) LPELR-63033 (SC); OBAJE v. NAMA (2023) LPELR-61645 (SC); AKINBADE & ANOR v. BABATUNDE & ORS (2017) LPELR-43463 (SC); OKEKE v. OKEKE (2019) 17 NWLR (pt. 1702); MUSTAPHA v. ZARMA & ORS (2018) LPELR-46326(CA); NSEFIK v. MUNA (2007) 10 NWLR (pt. 10) 502. 71. As pointed out earlier, the Claimant’s main grouse is that his dismissal by the Defendant is malicious, and after-thought, wrongful and unlawful. Therefore, the law is trite that an employee who approaches the Court with a case for wrongful or unlawful termination of employment or dismissal from employment, must in order to succeed, plead and prove the terms and conditions of his employment and how same were breached by his employer. In this respect, I refer to the case of ANAJA v. U.B.A. PLC (2025) LPELR-81179 where Supreme Court per HELEN MORONKEJI OGUNWUMIJU, JSC at page 54-54, paras. A-D held thus: “The employee who complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated has the onus: (a) To place before the Court the terms of employment and (b) To prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. It is not the duty of the employer as a defendant in an action brought by the employee to prove any of these facts.” In the same vein, Court of Appeal held in the case of FIRST BANK v. MOMOH (2020) LPELR-51517, per MONICA BOLNA’AN DONGBAN-MENSEM, JCA at page 16-16, paras. D-E that: “Where an employee challenges the termination of his employment, he bears the onus of proving the manner in which the terms and conditions were breached by the employer.” See also the cases of W.A.E.C v. OSHIONEBO (2007) ALL FWLR (pt. 370) 1501 at 1512: ANTE v. UNIVERSITY OF CALABAR (2011) FWLR (pt. 41) 1909 at 1928: OLORUNTOBI-OJU v. ABDUL. RAHEEM (2009) ALL FWLR (pt. 497) 1 at 42; OKUMU OIL PALM COMPANY LTD v. ISERHIENRHIEN (2001) LPELR-2471 (pp. 8-9, paras. E-G) (SC); IBAMA v. SPDC (NIG) LTD (2005) LPELR-1381 (SC); AMODU v. AMODE & ANOR (1990) LPELR-466. Furthermore, the position of the law that an employee challenging his dismissal or termination of his employment must plead, prove and found his case on the condition of service is applicable to both master and servant employment and employment protested by statute. This was held by the Apex Court in the case of AJI v. CHAD BASIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (2016) ALL FWLR (pt. 824) 175 at 190 as follows: “Whether one is suing for wrongful dismissal from an employment with statutory flavor or under common law principle of master and servant, the fact of the employment and the terms and conditions of same must not only be pleaded, but must be proved by evidence before a determination of the wrongful nature of his termination/dismissal can be considered by the Court.” 72. From the foregoing, the first duty placed on the Claimant who is seeking that the Court should declare his dismissal wrongful and/or unlawful, is to plead and prove the terms of his employment and how the terms were breached when he was dismissed. That is to say that the Court can only determine the wrongful nature of the termination or dismissal based on the terms and conditions of the employment. In this respect, I refer to the case of AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC v. OSISANYA (2000) 1 NWLR (pt. 642) 598 where the Court held inter alia that: “...the terms of contract of service is the bedrock of any case where the issue of wrongful termination of employment calls for determination.” 73. It should be borne in mind that the first 2 reliefs sought by the Claimant heein are declaratory in nature. That being the case, the law is that declaratory reliefs are not granted as a matter of course nor are they granted on weakness of the case of Defendant. Such relief must be proved with credible, cogent and admissible evidence before the Claimant seeking same can be entitled to the grant of the declaration sought. In this respect, I call in aid recent decision of Supreme Court in the case of MARVELOUS & ORS v. FRN & ORS (2026) LPELR-83271 per MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, JSC at pages 8-9, paras. F-B, where is was held thus: “The law has long been settled that a party seeking declaratory reliefs must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of his opponent’s case.” Similarly, it was held in the case of A.G. OF THE FEDERATION v. A.G. OF ABIA STATE & ORS (2024) LPELR-62576 per MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JSC at pages 94-95, paras. F-D thus: “The reliefs sought by the Plaintiff, being declaratory, the law requires that the Plaintiff by way of credible, cogent and sufficient evidence, must prove his entitlement to the reliefs which cannot and should not, be granted even on admission by the Defendants. In law, the absence of a defence or weakness of such a defence, would not entitle the Plaintiff to the grant of the declaratory reliefs sought since he is to succeed only on the strength of his case.” See also the cases of J.M. KODILINYE v. MBANEFO ODU (1935) 2 WACA 336 at 337; ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF RIVERS STATE v. ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF BAYELSA STATE (2013) 3 NWLR (pt. 1340) 123 at 160-161; CHUKWUWAH v. S.P.D.C.N. LTD. (1993) 4 NWLR (pt. 289) 512 (SC); INAKOJU v. ADELEKE (2007) 4 NWLR (pt. 1025) 423 (SC); AYIDA v. TOWN PLANNING AUTHORITY (2013) 10 NWLR (pt. 1362) 226 (SC); EMENIKE v. P.D.P & 3 ORS (2011) 12 NWLR (pt. 1315) 556 at 590; SULE v. HABU (2012) ALL FWLR (pt. 312) 664. 74. In the instant case, the Claimant, in proof of his case, testified for himself as DW2, adopted his statements on oath as his evidence-in-chief and tendered documents which were admitted in evidence and marked accordingly. The Claimant equally called one Mrs. Fehintola Rhoda Sanni, who testified as CW1, adopted her statements on oath as evidence-in-chief. 75. From the totality of evidence of the Claimant before this Honourable Court, the Claimant stated that his dismissal is unlawful and an after-thought. For clarity and ease of reference, let me refer to paragraph 35 of CW2 statement on oath dated 30th October, 2020 which reads thus: “That the purported dismissal by the Defendant is malicious, ill-conceived, unlawful and an after-thought and that the allegation stated in my invitation to face the Defendant’s Disciplinary Committee was “selling the 2010 Toyota Camry Model he acquired with the Bank’s loan without recourse to the Bank” and the letter of dismissal stated the case as “sale of the Bank’s assets.” 76. In the light of the foregoing, it is my considered opinion that the Claimant did not lead any credible and admissible evidence to prove that his dismissal is in breach of their employment. No any fact pleaded and evidence led by the Claimant to that effect. To put it clearly, the Claimant did not lead credible and admissible evidence to prove his entitlement to the first declaration sought. This simply means that the burden of proof is still on the Claimant to prove to this Honourable Court satisfactorily that his dismissal by the Defendant is wrongful i.e. was in breach of terms and conditions of his employment. In this regard, I refer to the case of OVIVIE v. DELTA STEEL CO. LTD (2023) 14 NWLR (pt. 1904) 203 at 228-229, paras. E-A, where ABBA AJI, JSC delivering the leading judgment held thus: “...It is the law that when an employee complains that his employment has been wrongfully terminated, he has the onus, first, to place before the Court the terms of the contract of employment and, second, to prove in what manner the said terms were breached by the employer. It is not in principle for the employer who is a Defendant to an action brought by the employee to prove any of these...” 77. In addition, although at the trial, the Claimant tendered in evidence his letter of offer of employment which was admitted and marked as Exhibit A. Aside from that, the Claimant did not plead any fact in his pleading and lead evidence on how his dismissal by the Defendant was in breach of the said Exhibit A, which contains the terms and condition of his employment contract with the Defendant. This failure is crucial to the Claimant’s case. 78. Let me re-echo it here as stated supra, that the burden is still on the Claimant who is seeking declaration that his termination is wrongful to prove and not an employer who is the Defendant in this suit to prove. This simply means that the onus of proof has not shifted, is still on the Claimant. To this end, it is settled law that a Claimant seeking for a declaratory relief must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of defence. See the cases of A.G. OF THE FEDERATION v. A.G. OF ABIA STATE & ORS (supra); AMODI v. OGADI UNION NIGERIA (2023) 1 NWLR (pt. 1804) 153(SC). 79. At this juncture, it should be noted that it is not the business of the Court to inquire or dig into the reason why an employer terminate and/or dismissed his employee but what the Court is interested is whether in terminating the employment and/or dismissing an employee, the terms and conditions of the contract of employment are strictly comply with. After all, an employer has a right to terminate the employment and/or dismiss his employee with or without reasons. See the cases of OBANYE v. UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2018) LPELR-44702(SC); ODIBO v. FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC (2018) LPELR-46628(CA). 80. Consequently, it is my considered opinion in view of the above analysis that the Claimant has failed to adduce credible, cogent and admissible evidence in prove of his entitlement to relief (1) sought herein. Therefore, the declaration sought in relief (1) will not see the light of the day for the reasons stated above. I so hold. 81. That takes me to the second declaratory relief sought which bothers on violation of the Claimant’s fundamental rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty, freedom of movement and right to property. The Claimant averred in the statement of facts particularly at paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 inter alia that Defendant wrote a petition to the police and alleged that he defrauded the Bank and stole a car belonging to the Bank and also described the Claimant as an ex-staff of the Defendant. That the police invited the Claimant and after spending over 3 hours with them, he was granted administrative bail upon presenting a credible surety. That the content of the petition injured his credit and reputation in the eyes of right thinking members of the Nigeria police force and the society. In other words, the Claimant alleged that the said petition has injured his character and has brought same into disrespect. 82. However, the Defendant in defence of this case, filed its statement of defence and counterclaim. Therefore, the Defendant stated in the said statement of defence particularly at paragraph 18, 26, 29, 30, and 31 amongst other things that the Defendant being a reasonable corporate entity, it is its responsibility and civil obligation to report commission of crime to the police, and same was made in good faith not malice or bad faith as the police had the constitutional right to invite and investigate anyone whom it reasonable suspected of committing crime. 83. At this juncture, let me pause a bit to take a critical look at Exhibit M, which is the petition written by the Defendant to the police. From the content of the said Exhibit M, it is apparently clear that the Defendant reported to the police what they described as case of car theft and fraud against the Claimant and requested the police to investigate it. That is all the Defendant did. From Exhibit E, which is letter of invitation, the Claimant was invited by the police for fact finding as stated in Exhibit E. Also from Exhibit O, it shows that the Claimant honoured the invitation of the police and gave his statements as contained in Exhibit O. The Claimant was released on administrative bail as stated in his pleading and under cross-examination as follows: “Q - The police did not arrest you when they came to your house at Ilesha. A - I was not arrested. Q - When you went to volunteer statement to the police, you were granted bail that same day by the police. A - I was granted bail that same day.” 84. Furthermore, the police did their investigation and came up with a report as contained in Exhibit Q. From the facts and evidence before this Honourable Court, the police did investigate and came up with a report as contained in Exhibit O. Therefore, from the foregoing, the onus is still on the Claimant to prove that the petition written by the Defendant to the police and the subsequent invitation and investigation by the police amount to violation of his fundamental right to entitled him to the declaration sought in the second relief. 85. It should be noted that citizens have civil duty to report alleged commission of crime to the police and/or any security agencies. This position was reinstated in the case of ADESANYA v. AL HAYAT MICRO-FINANCE BANK LTD & ANOR (2024) LPELR-62877 per UCHECHUKWU ONYEMENANN, JCA, at pages 19-20, paras. A-E, which it was held thus: “Generally, it is the right and civic duty of every citizen and certainly every resident in Nigeria to report cases of commission of crime to the appropriate law enforcement agency for their investigation and what happens after such report is entirely the responsibility of the law enforcement agency as the case may be. Thus, the mere report of a crime or commission of a crime to a law enforcement agency is a civic duty and does not to attract punishment unless it is found that the person was acting malafide. See CHUKWUEMEKA v. PAUL UNIVERSITY (2024) 2 NWLR (PT 1923) 453 (SC); FBN v. RUFUS & ORS (2024) LPELR-(CA); ECOBANK v. MADUFORO & & ORS (2021) LPELR-55402 (CA) ORS (2021) LPELR-52716 (CA); KEYAMO v. DIRECTOR-GENERAL SSS (2020) 14 NWLR (PT 1744) 306. Therefore, for the 1st Respondent to be rightly held to have violated the Appellant's fundamental rights, it has to be shown that he did more than lodge a formal report with the Police. It is rudimentary law that if a person instigates a Policeman to arrest another unlawfully, both the instigator and the police will be liable for the breach of the fundamental human right of the person illegally arrested. They are joint tortfeasors and their conduct can ground an action in unlawful arrest and detention. However, the mere making of a report to a Policeman who on his official responsibility takes the person into custody is no arrest or detention by the person who made the report. Therefore someone who merely gives information without more, which information leads to the arrest of a suspect by the Police acting within their mandate and responsibility, cannot be liable in an action for unlawful arrest or detention. See IMAM & ANOR v. USMAN & ANOR (2023) LPELR-(CA). Once a party reports a case to a law enforcement agency, such a party has no control on how the agency will carry out its investigation. He can only be faulted if the complaint was ill-motivated and founded on dishonesty.” Similarly, it was held in the case of SEEPCO & ORS v. GODWIN per ABIMBOLA OSARUGUE OBASEKI-ADEJUMO, JCA at page 21-21, paras. C-D, where it was held thus: “The Appellants have the civic right to report a suspect without more and allow the appropriate authority to do the needful under the law but where he exceeds the boundaries of that right then he is certainly aiding the breach of any fundamental rights alleged.” 86. From the authorities cited above, it is now clear that the Claimant has responsibility or duty to show to this Honourable Court that the Defendant, aside for writing Exhibit M, did something else or acted in bad faith in reporting to the police. Consequently, from the totality of the evidence of the Claimant before the Court, the Claimant did not adduce any credible evidence to prove that the Defendant’s petition police as contained in Exhibit M was malicious and constitute violation of his fundamental right to entitle him to the grant of relief 2 sought in this suit. To this extent, relief 2 sought by the Claimant in this suit will share the same fate with relief 1 considered above, that is, it will also not fly. I so hold. 87. That takes me to the other reliefs that is reliefs 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Claimant. These reliefs are auxiliary reliefs and their survival is dependent on the first two reliefs being the principal or main reliefs considered above and since the principal or main reliefs have failed to fly for lack of evidence, the fate of these auxiliary reliefs are not different. In this respect, I refer to the case of GULF AZOV SHIPPING CO. LTD & ANOR v. LONESTAR DRILLING (NIG) LTD & ORS (2026) LPELR-83264 per ONYEKACHI AJA OTISI, JCA, at page 58-58, paras. B-E where it was held thus: “A settled principle of law is, sublato principali, tollitur adjunctum, that is, once the principal is taken away, its adjunct or accessory will also be taken away. Where the main relief fails, all ancillary or consequential reliefs must equally fail, there being nothing upon which they can properly stand.” It was equally held in the case of ADEDEJI v. AIRTEL NETWORK LTD (2025) LPELR-81716 per ABBA BELLO MOHAMMED, JCA, at pages 27-28, paras. F-A thus: “The settled law is that ancillary relief cannot be granted where the principal relief has failed. In other words, the failure of the principal relief automatically fails all ancillary reliefs to it.” See also FGN & ANOR v. OSHIOMHOLE & ANOR (2004) LPELR-7363(CA) at p. 18; ABINOGUN & ANOR v. SPDC & ORS (2016) LPELR-45206(CA) at p.65 para. B; JANKADA v. OLORUNTOBA (2022) LPELR-57058(CA) at p. 18-19 paras. E-E; OTEKE v. DADA (2023) LPELR-61579(CA) at p. 30-31 para. F. 88. Therefore, without much ado and for all the reasons stated above, it is my considered opinion that, from the totality of the evidence before this Honourable Court, the Claimant has failed to prove his case as required by law to warrant the grant of the reliefs sought. I so hold. Accordingly, I resolve issue one in favour of the Defendant and against the Claimant. 89. I move to issue two which is whether the Defendant/Counter-Claimant has proved its Counterclaim as require by law to be entitled to grant of same. 90. It is on record that the Defendant Counter claimed against the Claimant as follows: 1) The sum of N8,164,521.07 (Eight Million, One Hundred and Sixty Four Thousand, Five Hundred and Twenty One Naira, Seven Kobo) only being the outstanding balance as at 11th November, 2020 on all the banking facilities granted to the Defendant by the Counter-claimant on both principal and interest. 2) An order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to refund the sum of N3,398,468.99 (Three Million, Three Hundred Nine Eight Thousand, Four Hundred and Sixty Eight Naira, Ninety-Nine Kobo) only being the sum that was inadvertently paid to the Defendant by the Counter Claimant as benefit upon his dismissal from the Counter-Claimant’s employment. 3) Interest on the aforesaid sum in (a & b) above at the rate of 10% per annum from the 11th day of November, 2020 and thereafter at the rate of 10% per annum until the final liquidation of the judgment sum. 4) Interest on 10% on the judgment sum until the whole judgment sum is fully liquidated. 5) N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) only as general damages. 91. It should be noted that a Counterclaim by its nature is a separate and independent suit being maintained by the Defendant in the main or original suit. Be that as it may, the burden of proof is on the Counter-Claimant to prove just like the Claimant in the main or original suit. In this respect, I refer to the case of TOURIST CO. OF (NIG) LTD v. NEOVISTA PROPERTIES LTD & ORS (2022) LPELR-58910 per MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JSC, at pages 50-52, para. B-B where the Supreme Court held thus: “The law is now beyond argument that a counterclaim made in a suit or action is a separate and independent action from the main action in which it was made and for the purposes of determination, the counter-claimant becomes the Plaintiff whilst the party against whom the counterclaim is made becomes the Defendant. The initial burden of proof of a counterclaim, just like in the main claim, lies on the party against whom judgment will be given if no evidence at all was called in the case and desires that judgment be entered in his favour on the basis of assertions he makes in the counterclaim. A counter-claimant therefore bears the burden of proof imposed by the provisions of Sections 131, 132 and 133 (l) of the Evidence Act; in respect of the counterclaims he makes in the main action and unless he satisfactorily discharges that burden, the counterclaim will be liable to be dismissed.” See also the cases of OYEKAN & ORS v. ABERUAGBA & ORS (2023) LPELR-62196(SC); IBE & ANOR v. IBE (2024) LPELR-80164(SC). 92. The first relief sought in Counterclaim is the sum of N8,164,521.07 (Eight Million, One Hundred and Sixty Four Thousand, Five Hundred and Twenty One Naira, Seven Kobo) only being the outstanding balance as at 11th November, 2020 on all the banking facilities granted to the Defendant by the Counter-claimant on both principal and interest. 93. From the totality of Defendant witnesses’ depositions before this Honourable Court, it was stated that the Claimant/Defendant to Counter-claim applied and was granted facilities by the Defendant and he is still indebted to the Defendant/Counter-Claimant. Let me reproduce the depositions of DW1 under oath particularly paragraphs 37, 38, and 39, which I will reproduce hereunder for ease of reference. Paragraph 37 reads thus: “That the Claimant applied and was granted the under listed facilities from the Defendant with the outstanding balance as follows: l. Unearned 2020 Housing Allowance ........... N394,825.86 m. Unearned 2020 furniture Allowance ........ N190,503.34 n. Unearned 2020 leave Allowance .................. N64,963.99 o. Unearned 2020 per Diem ............................ N440,583.71 p. Short term Loan ....................................... N2,426,880.29 q. Car Loan .................................................. N2,796,136.39 r. Personal Loan ............................................. N846,424.71 s. STEP Loan .................................................. N874,532.27 t. Visa Credit Card .......................................... N799,793.30 u. Balance in staff Account ............................ N151,178.91 Total ........................................................... N11,562,990.06” Paragraph 38 reads thus: “That the Defendant net off Claimant's entitlement of N3,398,468.99 from the above indebtedness of the Defendant leaving a balance of N8,164,521.07 (Eight Million, One Hundred and Sixty Four Thousand, Five Hundred and Twenty One Naira, Seven Kobo) as the Claimant's indebtedness to the Defendant as at 11th November, 2020.” Paragraph 39 reads thus: “That the Claimant is still indebted to the Defendant to the tune of N8,164,521.07 (Eight Million, One Hundred and Sixty Four Thousand, Five Hundred and Twenty One Naira, Seven Kobo) being his outstanding indebtedness to the Defendant with respect to all the facilities granted to the Claimant.” The Defendant/Counter-Claimant tendered in evidence Exhibit T. 94. However, the Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim in his evidence before the Court admitted taking loans from the Defendant as a staff of the Defendant but dispute the amount claimed by the Defendant and also that the loan is subject to job loss insurance for which the Defendant deducted premiums from the Claimant’s account. Let me for clarity and ease of reference, reproduce hereunder paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of CW2 further written statement on oath. Paragraph 2 reads thus: “That I took some loans from the Defendant as a staff of the Defendant, however I cannot ascertain the exact liability owed to the Defendant as documents relating to the loans are in possession of the Defendant as I was not given access to my drawer where my copies of the documents are kept.” Paragraph 3 reads thus: “That I dispute the sum claimed by the Defendant as liability owed to it by me and put the Defendant to the strictest prove of same.” Paragraph 4 reads thus: “That I now know as a fact that the liability owed to the Defendant premised on the loans is subject to job loss insurance for which the Defendant deducted premiums from my account and as such the Defendant could approach the Insurance Brokerage Company for the settlement of the liability. Documents evidencing the said Job loss Insurance are hereby attached and shall be relied upon at trial.” Paragraph 5 reads thus: “That the Defendant ought not to have approached me for the settlement of the loans and that the Counterclaim brought by the Defendant is in bad-faith since the loans referred to therein are subject to job loss insurance which is within the knowledge of the Defendant/Counter-Claimant.” Paragraph 6 reads thus: “That it was the Defendant that engaged the Insurance Brokerage Company who handles the said insurance but premiums were been deducted from my own personal account.” The Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim tendered in evidence exhibit K. 95. Furthermore, the Defendant/Counter-Claimant’s witness i.e. DW1 stated in his further statement on oath inter alia that the job loss insurance do not cover the indebtedness of an employee. 96. At this juncture, it is my considered opinion that the burden of proof has shifted from the Defendant/Counter-Claimant to the Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim to prove to this Honourable Court satisfactorily that the job loss insurance do cover his indebtedness to the Counter-Claimant. Whether he was able to discharge this burden that shifted to him, I will know as I proceed. 97. The Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim testified under cross examination inter alia thus: “Q - During the course of your employment with the Bank, you enjoyed several facilities from the Bank. A - Yes, I did enjoy. Q - Those facilities include car loan and visa credit card loan. A - Is correct. Q - And these loans were all given in different terms and conditions. They are not given at the same time. A - Yes. Q - The car loan was registered in your name and Bank's name. A - Yes sir, is a joint ownership. Q - By that reason, or joint ownership the Bank has a stake in the car until full repayment of that car loan. A - Yes, the car form part of the collateral that under lined the facility. Q - As at the time of your dismissal, all the loans were not fully liquidated. A - Yes, there was a balance, after my due benefits were deducted. Meaning that am still owing Bank now.” 98. From the above, it is apparently clear that the Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim admitted being indebted to the Defendant/Counterclaim. Therefore, the law is trite that fact admitted needs no further proof. In this respect, I refer to the case of AUDU v. FRN (2024) LPELR-62977 per JUMMAI HANNATU SANKEY, JSC at pages 24-24, paras. B-D, where the Supreme Court held thus: “The law is certain that what is admitted needs no further proof. The Appellant cannot therefore seek to resile form his serial viva voce admissions as to his status in relation to the Project, at this stage of the proceedings on appeal. It is an admitted and established fact that as an Assistant Director in the office of the Accountant General of the Federation, he was also the Procurement Officer in charge of signing the letters of award of contracts in respect of the World Bank Project domiciled in that office on behalf of the Accountant General.” See also the case of OKOLIE v. ELUMELU & ORS (2023) LPELR-61110(CA). 99. It should be pointed out that, although the Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim disputed the amount claimed by the Defendant/Counter-Claimant but he did not present before this Honourable Court any contrary amount. As such, having not presented any contrary amount to that of the Defendant/Counter-Claimant, this Honourable Court cannot speculate but rely on the evidence presented before it. In this regard, see the case of KATAGUM v. UMAR & ANOR (2026) LPELR-83085, per MOORE ASEIMO ABRAHAM ADUMEIN, JSC at pages 13-14, paras. C-D, where Supreme Court held thus: “A Court of law has a duty not to speculate on anything. See the cases of Raphael Ejezie v. Christopher Anuwu (2008) 12 NWLR (Pt.1101) 446 and Ikenta Best (Nig.) Ltd. v. Attorney-General of Rivers State (2008) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 612. In the circumstances of this case, it was safer for the Court of Appeal to have acted on the documents and exhibits duly admitted by the consent of the parties at the trial Court, that Court. The principle of law is as expressed in the Latin maxim... “In dibio sequendum quod tutius est” –“In a doubtful case, one must follow the safer course.” See also the case of DAVID v. PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2025) LPELR-80373(SC). 100. In addition, the Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim only tendered Exhibit K but did not relate same or tie it to his case. Consequently, the law is trite that party are not allowed to dump document to Court. This position was reinstated in the case of TUNBIDO v. INEC & ORS (2023) LPELR-6004 per ADAMU JAURO, JSC, at pages 43-43, paras. C-F, where the Supreme Court held thus: “The practice of dumping documents on the Court without speaking to them has been deprecated by this Court on numerous occasions. No Court is entitled to conduct inquisitorial investigations into the contents of a document or purport thereof in its Chambers. The Appellant ought to have called a witness to speak to the photographs and video recording before the Court…” Similarly, Court of Appeal in a more recent case of ETOP & ORS v. DIYA & ORS (2025) LPELR-82483 per JOSEPH EYO EKANEM, JCA at pages 28-28, paras A-E held that: “The law is that counsel should not dump document before the Court, it must relate the documents to the evidence, this was actually done but as stated above the witness statement is not in evidence. A Court of law is established to do justice and where as in the instant case, the evidence is before the Court, the Court should not overlook them. The Court was left with no choice but to do the calculation itself...” Having found that the documents were dumped on the Court, it was not the duty of the trial Court to “help” the 1st and 2nd respondents to embark on its calculation. In doing so and as rightly argued by appellants’ counsel, the trial Court left its position as an arbiter in the adversarial system that governs or underlines the adjudicatory system of this country and descended into the arena of conflict…” 101. Consequently and in the light of the foregoing, it is my considered opinion that the Defendant/Counter-Claimant has proved its entitlement to first relief sought in the Counterclaim. I so hold. 102. On the second relief sought in the Counterclaim which is an order of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to refund the sum of N3,398,468.99 (Three Million, Three Hundred Nine Eight Thousand, Four Hundred and Sixty Eight Naira, Ninety-Nine Kobo) only being the sum that was inadvertently paid to the Defendant by the Counter Claimant as benefit upon his dismissal from the Counter-Claimant’s employment. I note that the Defendant/Counterclaim merely made an assertion without leading cogent, credible and admissible evidence in proof of this relief. There is no any documentary evidence showing that the Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim was paid the sum in this second relief. In fact, the Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim testified under cross examination inter alia thus: “Q - You were paid three Million after your dismissal erroneously. A - That is new to me.” 103. To this end, it is my considered opinion that this second relief sought in the Counterclaim has failed for lack of credible, cogent and admissible evidence. I so hold. 104. On the other reliefs sought in the Counterclaim, that is, claim for pre-judgment and post judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum as well as N10,000,000.00 (Ten Million Naira) as general damages are hereby refused. 105. On the whole and in the final analysis, it is my considered opinion that the Defendant/Counter-Claimant has proved its Counterclaim and same has succeed in part. On that note, I hereby resolve issue two in favour of the Defendant/Counter-Claimant and against the Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim. 106. Finally, for the avoidance of doubt and for all the reasons as contained in this judgment, the case of the Claimant has failed and is hereby dismissed in its entirety. The Counterclaim of the Defendant/Counter-Claimant has succeeds in part and I order as follows: 1) The Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim is ordered to pay to the Defendant/Counter-Claimant the sum of N8,164,521.07 (Eight Million, One Hundred and Sixty Four Thousand, Five Hundred and Twenty One Naira, Seven Kobo) only being the outstanding balance as at 11th November, 2020 on all the banking facilities granted to the Claimant/Defendant to Counterclaim by the Counter-Claimant on both principal and interest. 2) Reliefs 2, 3, 4, and 5 are hereby refused and dismissed. 107. No order as to cost. 108. Judgment is entered accordingly. _____________________________ Hon. Justice Y. M. Hassan Presiding Judge.