IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE R.B. HAASTRUP

13TH JULY 2026 

NICN/ABJ/305/2021

 

BETWEEN

 

1. ZAKARI U. ELAYO
 2. BRISKA S. JUGBO
 3. OGBOLE D. OSIKI
 4. AMINA I. BINGILA
 5. DEBORAH M. AMOS
 6. RACHAEL N. DACHOR
 7. SOLOMON YUSUF
 8. SAIDU YUSUF
 9. FIDELIS DANASABE
 10. SAMUEL ATTAH                                         CLAIMANTS
11. MONICA A. ALEKU
 12. GODWIN ABASHIYA
 13. ASOLOKO ALEX
 14. JIBRIN DAUDA
 15. PHILIP S. DIO
 16. DEBORAH S. ATTAH
 17. ZACHARIAH MATHIAS
 18. DANJUMA YAKUBU
 19. HASHIMU MUSA
 20. MARKUS H. TIMOTHY
 21. MONDAY M. BAKO
 22. ABDULLAZIZ MUSA
 23. ZAKARI ILAYASU
 24. BALA YAKUBU
 25. PETER KUDU
 26. SALIHU IDRIS
 27. IBRAHIM OGABO
 28. ALHAJI KWAKIPI
 29. ALHAJI MOHAMMED SANDA
 30. ABDULKARIM IBRAHIM
 31. UMAR MUSA
 32. USMAN ARIKYA
 33. KINGSLEY D. AUDU
 34. JOHN MAIMAI                                   
 35. USMAN SULE
 36. GAMBO ADAMU
 37. MOHAMMED A. ARIKA
 38. KASHMIR U. SHETTIMA
 39. IBRAHIM M. SALLAU

40. HASSAN GODFREY
 41. PAULINA BAWA
 42. HELEN DANLADI M.
 43. YUSUF ADAMU
 44. GAYA B. BELLO
 45. BAKO HAMZA
 46. HUSSEIN YAKUBU
 47. SABO U. AREN
48. OVYE ESLA CLAIMANTS
 49. ABDULLAHI DANAMANA
 50. HAMZA ONUKU
 51. ABDULMALIK USMAN
 52. NATHANIEL AZAKI
 53. DAVID KUJE
 54. ABUBAKAR OSHI
 55. INDA MUSA
 56. VICTOR KADON
 57. ANTHONY ANZAKU
 58. TANKO MOHAMMED      
 59. EHASE ANDOMA
 60. ISA B. MUSA
 61. FRANCIS ATTAH
 62. USMAN KWAZHI
 63. ZAKARI ABARI ODAPU
AND
 1. NASARAWA STATE TRANSPORT
 SERVICES LIMITED                                                             
 2. NASARAWA STATE GOVERNMENT                   DEFENDANTS
 3. ATTORNEY GENERAL, NASARAWA STATE
REPRESENTATION 

Aduojoh Abah Esq. with U. Onoja Esq for Claimants

Isaac Ahmadu Danladi Attorney General of Nasarawa State with J.A. Alu- Director Public Prosecutor Ministry of Justice Nasarawa State, Felix Dza Esq. and S.A. Ugwu Esq, I.B Gyado Esq., S.A. Ogu Esq, I.S. Shugaba, A.A. Olotu for 2nd and 3rd Defendants

No legal representation for 1st Defendant

 

JUDGMENT

 

[1] This suit is commenced by way of a general form of Complaint dated 26th October 2021 and filed 27th October 2021. Sequel to an order of Court dated 20th November 2023 granting leave to amend originating processes, the Claimants filed the extant amended complaint and statement of facts on 28th November 2023 wherein the Claimants as can be seen on paragraph 94 of statement of facts are seeking for the following reliefs:

  1. A declaration that the employment of the Claimants save the 9th & 14th Claimants subsists and can only be determined by compliance with the terms of the employment. 
  2. A declaration that the Defendants are indebted to the Claimants in the total net sum of N7,434, 014.28 (Seven Million, Four Hundred and Thirty-Four Thousand, Fourteen Naira, Twenty-Eight Kobo) being arrears of salaries and allowances from November, 2012 to January, 2013. 
  3. A declaration that the Defendants are indebted to the Claimants in the total net sum of N260, 190, 499.8 (Two Hundred and Sixty Million, One Hundred and Ninety Thousand, Four Hundred and Ninety-Nine Naira, Eight Kobo) being arrears of salaries and allowances from February, 2013 to October, 2021. 
  4. An Order compelling the Defendants to pay forthwith the total net sum of N7,434, 014.28 (Seven Million, Four Hundred and Thirty-Four Thousand, Fourteen Naira, Twenty-Eight Kobo) being arrears of salaries and allowances from November, 2012 to January, 2013 before their lock out on the 26th February, 2013. 
  5. An Order compelling the Defendants to pay forthwith to the Claimants the total net sum of N260, 190, 499.8 (Two Hundred and Sixty Million, One Hundred and Ninety Thousand, Four Hundred and Ninety-Nine Naira, Eight Kobo) being arrears of salaries and allowances from February, 2013 to October, 2021 after their lock out on the 26th February, 2013. 
  6. An order compelling the Defendants to pay the total net sum of N2, 478, 004.76 (Two Million, Four Hundred and Seventy-Eight Thousand, Four Naira, Seventy-Six Kobo) as monthly salary to the Claimants from November, 2021 till lawful determination of their employment 
  7. An order compelling the Defendants to deduct the sum of N3, 802, 288.88 (Three Million, Eight Hundred and Two Thousand, Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Naira, Eighty-Eight Kobo) as check off from salaries of the Claimants from July, 2012 to October, 2021 and remit same to the Claimants' trade union forthwith. 
  8. An order compelling the Defendants to deduct the sum of N35, 066.98 (Thirty-Five Thousand, Sixty-Six Naira, Ninety-Eight Kobo) monthly being check off deduction from the salaries of the Claimants from November, 2021 and remit same to their trade Union till the determination of the Claimants' employment. 
  9. Cost of this action in the sum of N10,000,000

CLAIMANTS’ CASE

[2] As can be deduced from the statement of facts, Sixty-three current and former employees of Nasarawa State Transport Services Ltd are in a legal battle with the Nasarawa State Government over unpaid salaries and allowances since 2012. The dispute traces back to the creation of Nasarawa State in 1996. Most of the Claimants were originally employed by Plateau Express Service Ltd. When Nasarawa State was carved out of the old Plateau State; their employment was transferred to the new state government and they were deployed to the 1st Defendant, a company wholly owned by Nasarawa State to run its public transport policy. Others were employed directly by the company after 1996. The crisis began on 26th February 2013, when the state government directed a lock-out of the workers, shutting offices and motor parks and barring staff from their workplaces. This was done despite a resolution by the Nasarawa State House of Assembly in May 2013 directing that salary arrears be paid without delay. Appeals to the Governor to reopen the offices were rebuffed, and the workers have remained locked out since. 

[3] The workers assert they were already owed three months’ salary from November 2012 to January 2013, totalling ?7,434,014.28, (Seven Million, Four Hundred and Thirty-Four Thousand, Fourteen Naira and Twenty-Eight Kobo) before the lock-out. From February 2013 to October 2021, their unpaid salaries and allowances amount to ?260,190,499.80 (Two Hundred and Sixty Million, One Hundred and Ninety Thousand, Four Hundred and Ninety-Nine Naira and Eighty Kobo. They asserted that the total indebtedness claimed is ?267,624,514.08 (Two Hundred and Sixty-Seven Million, Six Hundred and Twenty-Four Thousand, Five Hundred and Fourteen Naira and Eighty Kobo). In addition, monthly check-off dues of ?35,066.98 (Thirty-Five Thousand, Sixty-Six Naira and Ninety-Eight Kobo) that should have been remitted to their union, AUPCTRE, have accrued to ?3,802,288.88 (Three Million, Eight Hundred and Two Thousand, Two Hundred and Eighty-Eight Naira and Eighty –Eight Kobo) over the same period. 

The Claimants maintain that they are public servants of Nasarawa State. The 1st Defendant is state-owned, its expenditures are captured in the state’s annual budgets, and its management is overseen by commissioners appointed by the state government. To prove their employment, they have pleaded and annexed letters of appointment, confirmation, deployment, and promotion for each Claimant. Their cause of action rests on unpaid salaries and allowances, unfair labour practice, and breach of international best labour practices. They argue that the state’s directive to lock them out while withholding pay for over eight years has caused severe hardship, with some workers unable to afford medical care and others dying under “horrifying circumstances.”

DEFENCE

[4] Upon receipt of the originating process and in reaction to facts asserted in the amended statement of facts, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants filed a consequential amended statement of defence on 6th December 2023. The core position of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants; Nasarawa State Government and its Attorney General respectively is that the Claimants were never employees of the state and are not public servants entitled to salaries from the state treasury. First, the state denies the entire transfer narrative. It insists that at no point upon the creation of Nasarawa State in 1996, or at any other time, were the Claimants’ employments transferred from Plateau Express Service Ltd to the Nasarawa State Government. Likewise, it denies ever ordering their deployment to the 1st Defendant. The state further contends that all the letters of appointment, confirmation, deployment, and promotion relied on by the Claimants were never issued by Nasarawa State or any of its agencies or departments. 

[5] On corporate status, the Defendants argue that both Nasarawa State Transport Services Ltd and Nasarawa Express Services Ltd are private limited liability companies, incorporated in 1997 and 2013 respectively. They are not state agencies, their revenues and expenditures are not captured in the state budget, and their staff are governed by the company’s own conditions of service, not by the Public Service Rules of Nasarawa State. They asserted that the Staff of the 1st Defendant were employed by either the former Plateau Express Services Ltd or by the 1st Defendant itself, not by the Nasarawa State Civil Service Commission. 

[6] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants reject the lock-out allegation. According to them, in February 2013 the employees of the 1st Defendant embarked on a demonstration and indefinite strike over three months’ unpaid salaries and refused to resume duty. To prevent damage to government property, including vehicles in the company’s possession, the management of the 1st Defendant shut the company down, not the state government. Following the strike, the state government suspended operation of its vehicles and disengaged about 69 staff on 29th April 2013. 

[7] Financially, the state denies all indebtedness. It rejects the claim of ?260,190,499.80 in post-lock-out salaries, ?7,434,014.28 in pre-lock-out arrears, and ?3,802,288.88 in check-off dues, describing the figures as “manipulated, inflated, and fraudulent.” 

[8] Legally, the Defendants raise two major bars to the suit. First, res judicata: the same union, AUPCTRE, had previously sued on behalf of these Claimants in NICN/ABJ/371/2017. Issues were joined, but the union voluntarily discontinued the case, which was dismissed by Hon. Justice Obaseki-Osaghae on 13th October 2021. The Defendants argue the Claimants are now estopped from relitigating the same issues. Secondly, they plead that the action is statute-barred under the Public Officers (Protection) Law applicable to Nasarawa State.

[9] In conclusion, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants maintain that the Claimants are not state staff, were never transferred to the public service, and cannot claim salaries or union dues from the state while on strike or after disengagement. They urge the Court to dismiss the entire suit with substantial costs. 

REPLY

[10] In response to the consequential amended statement of defence filed by the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, the Claimants filed an amended Reply on 5th January 2024. The Claimants reaffirm that their employment is rooted in the public service of Nasarawa State. They contend that Plateau Express Service Ltd was wholly owned by Plateau State before 1996. Upon the creation of Nasarawa State, the state incorporated the 1st Defendant and deployed to it assets and staff from Plateau Express, particularly Nasarawa indigenes. The 2nd Defendant wholly owns the 1st Defendant, appoints officers to hold shares on its behalf, and employment with the 1st Defendant forms part of Nasarawa State’s public service.

[11] The Claimants further assert state control: the 2nd Defendant directs the 1st Defendant’s operations, expenditures, assets, and liabilities. The state holds the operational vehicles, shut down the company, and appointed a Receiver to audit and take over its assets and liabilities. State budgets for 1998, 2002, and 2003 captured the 1st Defendant’s revenue and expenditure, confirming its public character. 

[12] On quantum, the Claimants deny fraud or inflation. That the sums claimed represent accrued salaries calculated under the Nasarawa State public service minimum wage and salary structure, as shown in the pleaded circular. 

Regarding the lock-out, the Claimants state that workers only protested unpaid arrears, then returned to work. Rather than pay, the 2nd Defendant locked them out of offices, parks, and garages, yet never terminated their employment. Salary arrears therefore continued to accrue.

[13] On the prior suit NICN/ABJ/371/2017, the Claimants argue AUPCTRE lacked locus standi to sue for individual salaries and allowances, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Kogi State Transport Company Ltd v. Amalgamated Union of Public Corporation, Civil Service Technical and Recreational Services Employees Suit CA/A/1047/2018 delivered on 11th August 2020.

[14] Further that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants themselves challenged AUPCTRE’s standing in that case. Thus, the dismissal of that suit does not bar the present action; the Claimants are not re-litigating because the union had no capacity to litigate their personal claims. 

[15] Finally, the Claimants deny that the suit is statute-barred, stating the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply to their reliefs for unpaid salaries. They also clarify that the Receiver appointed in 2015 only assessed and handed over assets and liabilities to the 2nd Defendant through the Ministry of Transportation; the 1st Defendant was never formally wound up. 

COMMENCEMENT OF HEARING

[16] Despite the fact that this suit was instituted on 27th October 2021, trial in this suit did not commence until 15th May 2024, due to the several adjournments at the instance of both sides. Trial in this suit commenced on 15th May 2024 when the Claimant called a subpoenaed witness Rikko Danladi Caleb (Staff Nassarawa State House of Assembly) who tendered document dated 14th May 2013 from office of the clerk Nassarawa State House of Assembly Lafia; same was admitted and marked as exhibit C1.

[17] Afterwards, Samuel Attah (the 10th Claimant herein) testified as CW1 and adopted statements on oath dated 28th November 2023 and 5th January 2024. CW1, tendered documents captured as no. 1 -134 in the schedule of documents and were admitted and marked exhibits NSTS 1a- NSTS 63a. CW1 made reference to documents captured as no 141, 142 and 144 of the schedule documents which were admitted and marked as exhibits NSTS 67B – NSTS 74, Document marked as no. 140 in schedule of document was admitted and marked as NSTS 67.

[18] CW1 referred to appointment letters and stated that the original copies got lost in the office of the chairman. The Defendants on their part did not raise any objections to the admission of the documents.

[19] On 29th May 2025, CW1 was cross examined and the defence Counsel through CW1 tendered documents captured as no 139 (letter of appointment of receiver dated 10th September 2015), 143 (Report of December) in Claimant’s schedule of document. Same were admitted and marked as exhibits NSTS 66 and 70.

[20] On 10th July 2025, the Claimant called Briska S. Jugbo (2nd Claimant) who testified as CW2, adopted witness statement on oath filed on 29th November 2023 and 5th January 2024. CW2 tendered two documents admitted and marked as exhibits NSTS 63B and 64

The Claimants closed their case on 10th July 2025.

[21] The 1st Defendant neglected to enter or file defence to this Suit. 

The 2nd and 3rd Defendants jointly opened defence on 15th December 2025 and called one Shuaibu Sidi Saleh as their sole witness. He adopted his witness statement on oath filed 6th December 2023. Under cross examination DW1 testified that the 1st Defendant is supervised by the ministry of works and transport and that the 2nd Defendant appointed a receiver who took over assets and liabilities of the 1st Defendant. Upon close of Defendants’ case, the Court adjourned for adoption of final written addresses.

The 1st Defendant was foreclosed from entering defence.

  1. On 13th May 2026, the 2nd and 3rd Defendants adopted their final address filed 3rd March 2026, and the Claimant adopted final written address filed 1st April 2026; whilst the Defendants adopted their reply on points of law filed 12th May 2026, which was also deemed properly filed and served same day.    

 

2ND AND 3RD DEFENDANTS’ SUBMISSIONS

[23] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ learned Counsel formulated 3 (three) issues for determination to wit:

  1. Whether the Claimants were employees of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants.
  2. Whether the employment of the Claimants is still subsisting.
  3. Whether the Claimants are entitled to the sums claimed as arrears of salary and allowances. 

ISSUE 1

  1. Whether the Claimants were employees of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants.

[24] The Defendants object to the admissibility of Exhibits NSTS1A to NSTS63A on grounds that they offend the provisions of the Evidence Act 2011. It is submitted that the general rule under Section 88 of the Evidence Act 2011 is that documents must be proved by primary evidence. Where secondary evidence is sought to be tendered, Section 89 of the Act mandates that proper foundation be laid. Counsel cited EZENWA ONWUZURUIKE V DAMIAN EDOZIEM & ORS (2016) LPELR-26056 (SC); (2016) 5 NWLR (PT. 1508) 215 AT 233-234 maintaining that a witness must lay foundation where the original is unavailable. Further, it is submitted that Section 89(c) of the Act specifically requires evidence of search where an original is alleged to be lost. In the absence of such testimony, sufficient foundation has not been laid and the document remains inadmissible, irrespective of whether opposing Counsel objects. Counsel made reference to BUHARI V INEC & ORS (2008) LPELR-814, P.124 (PARAS A-B) submitting that where a Court admits evidence without proper foundation, it is bound to expunge it at the stage of judgment or ruling. That an examination of Exhibits NSTS1A–NSTS63A reveals that they are public documents. By virtue of Sections 80, 90 and 104 of the Evidence Act 2011, only Certified True Copies of public documents are receivable in evidence. He further cites JUKOK INT’L LTD V DIAMOND BANK PLC (2016) 6 NWLR (PT 1507) 55, FAGBERO V AROBADI (2006) 7 NWLR (PT 978) 172 AND EZEMBE V IBENEME (2004) 14 NWLR (PT 894) 617. 

Relying on DOE D. GILBERT V ROSS (1840) 7 M.& W. 138; 151 ER 711; ARAKA V EGBUE (2003) 33 WRN 1; (2003) 17 NWLR (PT 848) 1 AT 26 C-G; AND EZENWA ONWUZURUIKE V DAMIAN EDOZIEMA & ORS (2016) LPELR-26056 (SC).  Counsel argued that the Claimants tendered only photocopies of the exhibits. That the documents were neither certified nor were the originals or counterparts produced. No foundation was laid regarding the absence of the originals. Consequently, the Exhibits NSTS1A–NSTS63A are inadmissible and therefore urged the Court to expunge same.

[25] It was further submitted that under Section 7 of the Labour Act 2004, a contract of employment may be established by a letter of employment. The Claimants’ letters of employment, admitted in evidence, show they were employed by either Plateau State Transport Services Ltd or Nasarawa State Transport Services Ltd. The letters state roles, salaries, and terms of employment. During cross examination, CW2 and CW3 admitted their employer, as stated in the letters, was either Plateau State Transport Services Ltd or Nasarawa State Transport Services Ltd, not the Nasarawa State Government. They were interviewed by the transport companies, not the State Civil Service Commission and that an incorporated company is a distinct legal personality capable of suing and being sued. He cited SALOMON V SALOMON & CO (1870) AC 22, UNION BANK OF NIGERIA PLC V ORHARHUGE (2000) 2 NWLR (PT.645) 498, LEE V LEE’S AIR FARMING (1960) 3 ALL ER 420 amongst others.

Further that government participation in a private company does not convert it to a public one. He referred to ORJI V ZARIA IND. LTD 2 NCR PAGE 63, EZEKWERE V GOLDEN GUINEA BREWERIES LTD 3 NCLR PAGE 436. 

[26] On whether the employment of the Claimants is still subsisting; it is submitted that the Claimants’ employment ended when Nasarawa State Transport Services Ltd was liquidated. DW1 testified that Nasarawa State Transport Services Ltd became bankrupt in 2013 and could not pay salaries or meet financial obligations as a self-sustaining company. This led the Nasarawa State Government to close the company and appoint a Receiver in September 2015. Exhibit 66 shows that upon discovering the company was insolvent, the Nasarawa State Government appointed a Receiver. The Receiver completed its assignment, submitted its Report to the Government, and made recommendations on sharing of assets, debts and other liabilities. With the dissolution of the Company, all staff were disengaged. Counsel argued that it is an elementary principle of law that the employment of all staff of a company automatically ends upon its liquidation. 

[27] On whether the Claimants are entitled to the sums claimed as arrears of salary and allowances, Counsel submits that the Claimants seek an order compelling Defendants to pay arrears of salaries and allowances based on Government Circulars on Minimum Wage and relativity applicable to public servants of Nasarawa State, admitted as Exhibit 65A. Conditions of service for staff of state-owned corporations differ from those of core civil servants. Claimants were employed by the Board of the companies, while civil servants are employed by the Civil Service Commission. During cross examination, CW2 and CW3 admitted that Claimants deployed to Nasarawa State in 1996 reported to the General Manager of Nasarawa State Transport Services Ltd, not the Chairman, Civil Service Commission. Claimants employed after Nasarawa State’s creation were interviewed by the Board of Nasarawa State Transport Services Ltd, not the Civil Service Commission. Employees of public corporations have distinct conditions of service. The salary structure stated in Claimants’ appointment letters was NTSS. Exhibit 65A is Consolidated Public Service Salary Structure CONPSS, not NTSS. The Circular was also not addressed to the General Manager of the Claimants’ Company. At disengagement, Claimants were owed arrears of salary and allowances as stated on page XV of the Executive Summary of the Receiver’s Report in the sum of Eighty-Five Million, One Hundred and Thirty-One Thousand, Eight Hundred and Sixty-Seven Naira, Ninety-Six Kobo N85,131,867.96 only. The Receiver’s Report at page 21 stated that 69 staff disengaged on 29th April 2013 were not paid their entitlements by the company. Under AUPCTRE, Claimants formally wrote to the Receiver demanding arrears of salary and allowances in the sum of N85,131,867.96 only. It is submitted that the Court is not a Father Christmas and cannot grant a relief not sought. Counsel cited METAL CONSTRUCTION W.A LTD V ABODERIN (1998) LPELR 1868 (SC) AT PAGES 26, PARAS C-E. Also that Claimants cannot claim arrears of salaries and allowances after the company was disbanded by Nasarawa State Government and workers were laid off.

CLAIMANTS’ SUBMISSIONS

Learned Counsel to the Claimants raised two issues for determination to wit:

  1. Whether having regard to the state of pleadings and the evidence led in this case, the Claimants have sufficiently proved their case to be entitled to the reliefs claimed in this suit?
  2. Whether having regard to the circumstance of this case, the 1st and 2nd Defendants are jointly liable to pay the arrears of salaries owed the Claimants and as set out in the Claimants' reliefs? 

ISSUE I

Whether having regard to the state of pleadings and the evidence led in this case, the Claimants have sufficiently proved their case to be entitled to the reliefs claimed in this suit?

[28] It is submitted by learned Counsel to the Claimants that the 1st Defendant was served all originating processes and hearing notices but did not enter appearance, file defence, or appearance by Counsel. The 1st Defendant elected not to defend and is deemed to have admitted Claimants’ case. He consequently urged the Court to enter judgment against 1st Defendant.

It is submitted that Claimants proved employment via letters of appointment, confirmation and promotion, admitted as Exhibits NSTS1a to NSTS63a. CW2 and CW3 testified for all Claimants and that it is the law that a party need not testify personally; any person with knowledge may testify. Counsel cited ENOSEGBE V ENIZODE-AIWIZE & ORS (2021) LPELR-54200 (CA) PP. 90-91 PARAS. F. 

[29] Further that CW2 laid proper foundation for photocopies after originals were lost and that the Defendants did not object during trial and cannot object at final address. Parties cannot approbate and reprobate. Counsel cited GLOBE MOTORS HOLDINGS NIG LTD V IBRAHEEM (2021) LPELR-54550(CA), PP. 45-46 PARAS. F. It is submitted that Exhibits NSTS1a to NSTS63a in evidence, are written contracts between Claimants and 1st Defendant, and by extension 2nd Defendant. Parties are bound by terms freely entered and the Court must give effect thereto. KENTUS CHEMICALS AND ALLIED PROJECTS LTD V UBA PLC (2012) LPELR-9836(CA) PP. 8-9 PARAS. D. Counsel submitted that Claimants were locked out on 26th February 2013 without termination letters and that a written contract require written termination so much so that a suspension letter will not suffice. Counsel cited UKOHA & ANOR V OSILAMA (2016) LPELR-42936 (CA) PP. 26-30, PARAS. F-A. That in the absence of dismissal, employment subsists and arrears accrue. 

[29] It is also submitted that 1st Defendant was never declared bankrupt or liquidated. No winding up petition or Court order exists. Section 408 CAMA requires judicial process. Voluntary winding up by shareholders was not proved. Receiver was not lawfully appointed under Section 552(1) CAMA. Exhibit NSTS 66 shows appointment as Auditor, not Receiver. It is submitted that 1st Defendant is wholly owned by 2nd Defendant. DW1 admitted 2nd Defendant wholly owns and supervises 1st Defendant. 

[30] Claimant’s’ Counsel maintains that Employment in 1st Defendant is public service of Nasarawa State under Section 318(1)(g) Constitution 1999 as amended to which CONPSS salary structure is applicable. Counsel also referred to Unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/56/2021- AUGUSTINE TOKULA & 106 ORS. V KOGI STATE TRANSPORT COMPANY LIMITED & 2 ORS, delivered 9th July 2024, Coram, Hon. Justice O.Y. Anuwe at page 35, paragraph 3, Lines 19 to 26. To this end, Counsel submits that Claimants’ computation of N267,624,514.08 arrears to October 2021 is based on it and is unchallenged. Unchallenged evidence must be acted upon. Counsel cited BIBIAN NGOZI ONYIA V OBIORA MBIKO & ANOR (2014) LPELR-23028 (CA) P. 41, PARAS. C-D. In conclusion, it is submitted that Claimants led credible evidence, proved employment, subsisting contract, lock out without termination, and entitlement under CONPSS. Therefore, they are entitled to reliefs. Court is urged to resolve issue 1 in favour of Claimants and dismiss Defendants’ case.

 ISSUE II

Whether having regard to the circumstance of this case, the 1st and 2nd Defendants are jointly liable to pay the arrears of salaries owed the Claimants and as set out in the Claimants' reliefs?

[31] Arguing in the affirmative, learned Counsel to the Claimants submitted that 1st and 2nd Defendants are jointly and severally liable to pay arrears of salaries to Claimants due to the special relationship and control the 2nd Defendant exercises over the 1st Defendant. That 1st Defendant is liable to pay salaries to the Claimants. However, 1st Defendant is incapacitated by control exerted by 2nd Defendant, which affects its capacity to meet obligations. That exhibit NSTS 67b, Memorandum and Articles of Association and CAC Form 2, shows 1st Defendant has share capital of 5,000,000. Names of Engr. Daniel Anjugu and Mrs. Bilhat Kotso on incorporation documents indicate shares and ownership vest in 2nd Defendant. 1st Defendant is supervised by Ministry of Works, Housing and Transport of 2nd Defendant and DW1 admitted this under cross examination. 2nd Defendant established and incorporated 1st Defendant as a special purpose vehicle to implement transportation policies of Nasarawa State and wholly owns the shares. Therefore, employment in 1st Defendant forms part of the public service of Nasarawa State by Section 318(1)(g) Constitution 1999 as amended. It was further submitted that the 1st Defendant’s income and expenditure form part of 2nd Defendant’s annual budget per Exhibit NSTS 63b for 1998, 2002 and 2003. 2nd Defendant directed closure of 1st Defendant via Exhibit NSTS 64, causing lock out of Claimants since February 2013. 2nd Defendant appointed Alhaji Adamu Garba to receive/audit assets and liabilities of 1st Defendant. Upon completion per Exhibit NSTS 66, he handed over assets and liabilities to 2nd Defendant which includes outstanding salaries and allowances of Claimants. 

REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW BY 2ND & 3RD DEFENDANTS

[32] In the 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ reply on points of law in reaction to the Claimants’ final address, it was submitted that Counsel to 2nd and 3rd Defendants informed the Court on 15th May 2024 during cross examination of CW2 that although Defendants opposed admissibility of all exhibits, the objection would be taken at Final Written Address stage. Further that Claimants failed to respond to the objection taken to admissibility of all exhibits and therefore urged Court to uphold the objection to Claimants’ documents, thereby rendering same legally non-existent for proving facts in this proceeding. He cited AFOLABI V ALAREMU (2011) LPELR-8894 CA.

[33] Assuming without conceding that Exhibit NSTS1a–NSTS63a are private documents, Counsel submits that the same cannot be said of Exhibit NSTS65a, which is a Government Circular on salaries of public servants in Nasarawa State and forms the basis of Claimants’ claims. That the said exhibit falls short of requirement of Section 104 of the Evidence Act 2011 for certified copies of public documents. 

[34] With regard to procedure for Bankruptcy, Liquidation and Receivership, 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ Counsel submits that under Section 401 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020, liquidation can also be carried out voluntarily by shareholders. DW1 testified that Nasarawa State Government, the largest shareholder of 1st Defendant, decided to wind up the company when it discovered inability to pay staff salaries and meet operational needs. This led to appointment of a Receiver. This was a voluntary decision that did not require a Court Order. Further, a Receiver does not always need to be Court appointed in Nigeria. Under Section 209 of CAMA 2020, a receiver can be appointed out of Court when a secured debenture, e.g. a bank, is privately appointed to act as Receiver as agent of the person or company. He cited UWA KWE & ORS V ODOGWU & ORS (1989) LPELR 3446 (SC).

[35] On Termination of Contract of Employment in Writing, Counsel submitted that under SECTION 422(1), 464(2), 473(2) OF CAMA AND ABEDU & ORS V ITIE (2020) 3 NWLR PT (1710), once a decision is taken to wind up a company, powers of Directors cease and vest in the appointed Liquidator, in this case the Receiver, and all employees are dismissed. The decision to wind up operates as automatic dismissal of employees and terminates their employment. Moreover, the Letters of employment given to Claimants stated that the Company which employed them was a self-sustaining agency. 

On Implementation of Nasarawa State Consolidated Public Service Salary Structure CONPSS, it was submitted that by Section 132(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 as amended, oral evidence is not allowed to add or subtract from what is contained in a written document and that Exhibits NSTS1a–NSTS63a clearly states that Claimants’ salary structure is NTSS and not CONPSS. Counsel cited MR. QUADRY WAHAB ADENRELE V LAGOS STATE GOVT & 9 ORS; ALHAJI MOROUPHAI OBAORI KADIRI V ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL CRIMES COMMISSION, EFCC SUIT NO CA/L/2019/16. 

[35] On Whether 1st and 2nd Defendants Are Jointly and Severally Liable, it was submitted that by Section 37 of CAMA 2020, once a company is incorporated by registration of its Memorandum and Articles of Association, the incorporated body becomes a distinct legal personality to sue and be sued. Consequently, 1st and 2nd Defendants cannot be liable jointly and severally for payment of salaries and arrears. Besides, employment letters in Exhibit NSTS61a–NSTS63a stipulated employment was by a Self-Sustaining Agency.

[36] Defendants’ Counsel then urged the Court to dismiss this suit in favour of Defendants as the Claimants did not prove their case to be entitled to the reliefs sought.

DECISION

[37] It is noteworthy that this suit stands undefended by the 1st Defendant as it failed or neglected to enter appearance nor filed defence in this suit. The law is that when a Defendant fails to file a statement of defence, he is deemed to have admitted all material averments set out in the Claimant’s statement of facts. In such circumstance, the trial Court is empowered to enter judgment in favour of the Claimant. It is a settled principle of law that pleadings not specifically traversed are deemed admitted. Accordingly, since the 1st Defendant neither entered appearance nor filed a statement of defence to the Claimant’s suit, the 1st Defendant herein is deemed to have admitted the factual allegations pleaded against it.

[38] The natural consequence of the default of the 1st Defendant is that provided the statement of fact discloses a reasonable cause of action, the Claimant is entitled to judgment as a matter of course, without being required to strictly prove his case. This general rule however admits one exception, which is where the Claimant seeks a declaratory relief. In such circumstance, the Court would not grant the Claimant’s declaratory relief solely upon default of defence. The Claimant remains under a duty to adduce credible evidence in proof of entitlement of the declaration sought. Thus, seeing that the Claimants seek for declaratory reliefs, they are bound to prove their case against the 1st Defendant notwithstanding its default of defence. See UNIABUJA V. AMCON (2025) 2 NWLR (PT. 1975) 179 @ 199 PARAS G-H, ADERONPE V. ELERON (2019) 4 NWLR (PT. 1661) 141 @ 170 PARAS D-E, OLADIPO V. MOBA L.G.A. (2010) 5 NWLR (PT. 1186) 117.

[39] I have also observed that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants (who will be referred to as Defendants for ease of reference) have in their statement of defence raised the issue of res judicata, (paragraph 29-31) statute bar (paragraph 33) of statement of defence.

[40] On res judicata, the Defendants through DW1 averred that in Suit No. NICN/ABJ/371/2017, Amalgamated Union of Public Corporations, Civil Service Technical Recreational Services Employees (AUPCTRE) sued the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on behalf of the Claimants. In the said suit AUPCTRE who sued on behalf of the Claimants filed for discontinuance after the Defendants had joined issues, thereby leading to the consequent dismissal. To the Defendants, the suit having been dismissed bars the Claimants herein from relitigating the same issues.

[41] In response to this averment, the Claimants in paragraphs 9-10 of Reply, asserted that AUPCTRE lacked the locus standi to institute the suit in the first place and the Defendant also held this stance as can be seen in counter affidavit and written address.

[42] The doctrine of res judicata encapsulates the rule that once a competent Court has rendered a final determination on a cause of action or an issue, the same parties and their privies are precluded from re-litigating that matter in any subsequent proceeding. See AMINU V. HASSAN (2014) 5 NWLR (PT. 1400) 287 @ 308 PARA F, ADEYEMI-BERO V. L.S.P.D.C. (2013) 8 NWLR (PT. 1356) 238 @ 305, PARAS B-C. The doctrine functions as a plea in bar and is invoked by a Defendant to resist a claim that has already been judicially determined. See ABIOLA & SONS B. CO. LTD V. SEVEN UP BOTTLING CO. LTD (2012) 15 NWLR (PT. 1322) 184 @ 196, PARA. A. The juridical foundation of res judicata lies in public policy. The law favours finality in litigation and seeks to prevent the oppression of individuals through repeated suits on the same dispute. For the doctrine to apply, the following cumulative conditions must be satisfied:

  1. Identity of parties or their privies in both proceedings;
  2. Identity of subject matter;
  3.  Identity of issues
  4. The previous decision must be final and rendered on the merits by a Court of competent jurisdiction

[43] Where any of these elements is absent, the plea of res judicata cannot be sustained. See AJIBOYE V. ISHOLA (2006) 13 NWLR (PT. 998) 628 @ 644-645, PARAS G-A.

[44] In determining whether a matter constitutes res judicata, the Court is required to examine the pleadings, the proceedings, and the judgment in the earlier suit, and to compare them with the issues arising in the subsequent action. The decisive inquiry is whether the same question has already been judicially determined between the same parties. 

[45] In this instant case, the Defendants failed to tender any Court process in support of their plea of res judicata. The legal burden of establishing res judicata rests squarely on the party who relies on it, typically the Defendant. The Defendant must plead the defence with particularity and discharge the evidential burden by placing sufficient and credible material before the Court to enable it determine that the conditions for the doctrine are satisfied. The Defendants herein have failed to produce the pleadings in the previous suit, proceedings or the judgment or final order to enable this Court decipher whether or not the plea meets the conditions.

[46] These documents constitute primary evidence. In the absence of which the Court is handicapped and unable to undertake the necessary comparison of parties, subject matter and issues between the two actions. I observe that DW1 under cross examination asserted that the CTC of the Ruling dismissing the previous suit is missing. This however is not a tenable reason as the Ruling is a public document of which certified true copy can be obtained upon application.

Where a Defendant who is contending that a present action is barred by res judicata omits to tender the judgment or final order or a certified true copy of the proceedings from the previous suit, the plea remains unproven. Courts do not decide matters on conjecture or speculation, neither is it the duty of the Court to conduct an independent investigation into the existence or tenor of the prior decision.

Accordingly, the plea must fail at the threshold. I therefore discountenance the plea of res judicata.

[47] The Defendants have also raised the plea of statute bar by virtue of Section 2a of the Public Officers (Protection) Law of Northern Nigeria. Section 2a of POPA provides that any action commenced against a public officer must be brought within three months after the cause of action accrued.

[48] A plea by a Defendant that an action is statute barred constitutes a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court. The competence of the Court to entertain the suit is thereby called into question. The determinant of such a plea lies in the originating processes filed by the Claimant, specifically the complaint and statement of facts. Whenever the defence of limitation is raised at the trial, it becomes incumbent upon the Court to ascertain two fundamental dates: the date on which the cause of action accrued and the date on which the suit was instituted. See EZE V. UMAHI (2023) 6 NWLR (PT. 1880) 383, ABI V. CBN (2012) 3 NWLR (PT. 1286) 1 @ 45 PARAS C, OLORUNKUNLE V. ADIGUN (2012) 6 NWLR (PT. 1297) 407.

[49] In the instant case, as deducible from the Claimants’ amended statement of facts, the gravamen of the action is that the 2nd Defendant directed that the Claimants be locked out of their offices at Nasarawa State Transport Services Limited and has, since that date, prevented them from discharging their duties, notwithstanding interventions by the Nasarawa State House of Assembly. This averment is contained in paragraph 73 of the statement of facts. It is further pleaded that the said lock out occurred on 26th February 2013.

Consequently, the cause of action accrued on 26th   February 2013. Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act prescribes that any action against a public officer in respect of an act done in execution of public duty shall be instituted within three months of the accrual of the cause of action. Prima facie, therefore, the limitation period expired on 26th May 2013, and any action instituted thereafter would be statute barred.

[50] This general rule, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is the doctrine of continuing damage or injury. It is pertinent that the Claimants’ pleadings do not disclose that their employment was formally terminated. The question thus arises whether the facts as pleaded bring the case within the exception.

In HON. RUNYI KANU (JP) & ORS V. THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL & COMMISSIONER FOR JUSTICE, CROSS RIVER STATE & ORS 32 NLLR (PT. 91) 63 NIC,  the National Industrial Court rationalised the applicability of exception of continuing injury in employment relationship thus: where an entitlement that accrues periodically, such as salary and allowances payable to an employee, is withheld, the deprivation constitutes a continuing damage or injury to which the limitation period in the Public Officers Protection Act does not apply. Implicit in this principle is that the employment relationship must be subsisting; for if the employment has determined, the basis for asserting a continuing deprivation of periodic entitlements cannot stand.

[51] Applying this principle to the facts of the present case, it is necessary to determine whether the Claimants remained in employment after 26th February 2013. Where the employment relationship has not been lawfully terminated and the Claimants are merely prevented from performing their duties while their entitlements continue to accrue, the injury may properly be characterised as continuing. In such circumstances, time would not begin to run for the purpose of Section 2(a) of the Public Officers Protection Act, and the defence of limitation would not avail the Defendants. The amended statement of facts suggest that the employment of the Claimants was not terminated. Hence, I find that the exception of continuing injury is applicable in this instance. The defence of statute bar therefore fails. I shall proceed to the substantive matter.

[52] I have carefully considered the processes filed in this suit, alongside the evidence adduced and final written submissions of learned Counsel to respective parties. Accordingly, I have distilled the following issues for the just determination of this suit to wit:

  1. Whether the Claimants’ employment is still subsisting;
  2. Whether the Claimants are entitled to salaries, allowances and check off dues sought in their claims;
  3. Whether the Claimants have proved the quantum of their claim; and
  4. Whether the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are jointly liable.

ISSUE 1

Whether the Claimants’ employment is still subsisting

[53] The law is trite that the burden of proof lies on he who asserts. See NITEL LTD V. OKEKE (2017) 9 NWLR (PT. 1571) 439 AT 462, OMISORE V. AREGBESOLA (2015) NWLR (PT. 1482) 1 AT 273, SECTIONS 131, 132, and 133 of the EVIDENCE ACT 2011. The Claimants tendered Exhibits NSTS 1A – NSTS 63A as proof of employment. The Defendants objected on grounds that proper foundation was not laid under Section 89 of the Evidence Act, 2011. CW1 testified that the originals were lost in the office of the Chairman. I find this to be proper foundation under Section 89(c) of the Evidence Act. The exhibits are admitted. I must state clearly that during the proceedings the Defendant had opted not to object to the admissibility of the documents. Notwithstanding, it is the duty of the Court to expunge inadmissible evidence inadvertently admitted. See I.N.E.C. V. RAY (2004) 14 NWLR (PT. 892) 92 @ 136, PARAS C-D. A perusal of exhibits NSTS 1A – 63A reveal that they are private documents by virtue of Section 102 and 103 of the Evidence Act and according to Section 85 of Evidence act content of a document may be proved by primary or secondary evidence. Section 89 (c) of the Evidence Act permits secondary evidence of private document where proper foundation is laid. The CW1 during examination stated that the original copies were lost in the office of the chairman (page 37 record of proceedings) and I find to be proper foundation in compliance with requirement of Section 89(c) of the Evidence Act. Objection to the admissibility of exhibits NSTS 1A-63A is hereby discountenanced.
[54] A perusal of Exhibits NSTS 1A – NSTS 63A reveals that some Claimants were employed by Plateau Express Service Ltd and transferred to the 1st Defendant, whilst others were directly employed by the 1st Defendant. None were employed by the Civil Service Commission.
[55] Exhibit NSTS 67B shows that the Director General, Ministry of Works, Nasarawa State and Project Manager, both civil servants, subscribed to 2,500 ordinary shares each on behalf of the 2nd Defendant, totalling the 5,000 allotted shares. The 1st Defendant is thus wholly owned by the 2nd Defendant.
Exhibits NSTS 63B the Approved Budgets of Nasarawa State for 1998, 2002 and 2003 show budgetary allocation to the 1st Defendant by the 2nd Defendant, contrary to Defendants’ averment.
[56] By Section 318(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), staff of any company or enterprise in which the government of a State or its agency holds controlling shares or interest are recognised as employees in the public service of that State. The Claimants are employees of the 1st Defendant, and by constitutional definition, their employment is in the public service of the 2nd Defendant. I so hold.
However, this should not be construed to mean the employment enjoys statutory flavour. Exhibits NSTS 1A – 63A show the employment is governed by Conditions of Service and Regulations, not by statute. See OLANIYAN V. UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 9) 599.
 [57] The Defendants averred in paragraph 19 of DW1’s Statement on Oath that 69 staff were “disengaged” on 29th April 2013 when the 1st Defendant was shut down. I have painstakingly gone through the evidence and find no letter of termination, dismissal, or redundancy.
[58] The Defendants further contend that the 1st  Defendant was shut down by management. Exhibit NSTS 64 dated 26th February 2013 states:
“CLOSURE OF NASARAWA STATE TRANSPORT COMPANY LIMITED

Government is aware of the on-going strike action embarked upon by the staff of the Nasarawa State Transport Services Limited [NTS], which has brought operations of the company to a halt. Sadly, all entreaties to resolve the problem have been turned down by the striking workers. 

Government view this recalcitrance as a gross misconduct on the part of the staff of the company.

In the light of this development, the State Government is left with no option but to take all necessary measures to prevent the situation from worsening with consequent adverse effect on the company. Accordingly, His Excellency, the Governor has directed for the immediate closure of the Nasarawa State Transport Services Ltd. The management of the Company is, by this circular, directed to retrieve all properties of the Company, including keys of vehicles from the striking staff. In line with the intention of Government to reposition the Company following its closure, the arrears of salaries of the striking workers are being computed for payment.”

[59] This constitutes a “lock out” within Section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act, Cap T8 LFN 2004, being closure of a place of employment in consequence of a dispute with a view to compelling workers to accept terms. A lock out does not terminate the contract of employment. 

[60] I am not unmindful of the fact that the Defendant claims that the 1st Defendant was shut down by its management (paragraph 18 of Defendants’ witness statement on oath). Now, the process of liquidation or winding up of a company or body corporate in Nigeria is governed by the Companies and Allied Matter Act Cap C20 LFN 2004 (CAMA). In Section 401 of the CAMA only three types of winding ups are recognized. These are:

  1. Court ordered;
  2. voluntary;
  3. Court supervised.

[61] In all three, a liquidator is appointed. The Defendants produced no Special Resolution under Section 401(1) (b) CAMA, no Form CAC 6 under Section 464(2), no Gazette or newspaper publication under Section 403(1), no Declaration of Solvency under Section 462, and no Certificate of Dissolution.

[62] It is settled that commencement of voluntary winding up operates as notice of discharge to employees, except those retained by the liquidator. However, mere “closure”, “lock out”, or “suspension of business” by directors or shareholders without a Section 401 resolution is not winding up. Even appointment of a receiver does not put an end to existing employment unless the receiver terminates such employments. See UWAKWE V. ODOGWU (1989) 5 NWLR (PT. 123) 562. More so, there is no evidence led of termination by any receiver.

[63] Voluntary winding up requires strict proof. Oral evidence of “bankruptcy” or “closure” is insufficient. Section 401 Companies and Allied Matters Act Cap C20 LFN 2004 (subsequently referred to as CAMA) permits voluntary winding up by effluxion of time or special resolution of members, not by executive fiat. Even appointment of a receiver cannot put an end to existing employment unless the receiver terminates such employments. In this instant case there is no evidence of termination of the employment of the Claimants herein. The minimum evidence to establish that the 1st Defendant was wound up is (a) CTC of resolution, Section 457 CAMA (b) CTC of notice of appointment of liquidator, Section 464 (1) CAMA, (c) federal gazette and newspaper advert of resolution, Section 458 CAMA, (d) declaration of solvency, Section 462 CAMA and (e) CTC of status report showing dissolution. 

[64] The bottom line is that voluntary winding up equals automatic termination of employment from date of special resolution but you must prove the winding up complied with CAMA. Oral evidence of “bankruptcy” or “closure” is insufficient. Section 457 CAMA permits voluntary winding up by effluxion of time or special resolution of members, not by executive fiat. I therefore find that the Claimants’ employment was never terminated. Same subsists save for the 9th and 14th Claimants who are deceased. Issue 1 is therefore resolved in favour of the Claimants.

ISSUES 2 & 3

Whether the Claimants are entitled to salaries, allowances and check off dues sought in their claims

And 

Whether the Claimants have proved the quantum of their claim

[65] The Claimants have based the computation of their salaries and arrears on Nasarawa state consolidated public service salary structure evidenced by exhibit NSTS 65A with details of computation extensively provided in paragraph 81 and 85 of statement of facts. The rationale behind relying on CONPSS according to the Claimants is that they are employees in the public service of the 2nd Defendant. I have to state here that the Defendants have objected to the admissibility of NSTS 65A on the grounds that the circular is a public document and that the Claimants failed to comply with the Evidence Act which provides that the copy tendered must either be primary evidence of certified true copies. See TABIK INVESTMENT LTD V. GTB PLC (2011) 17 NWLR (PT. 1276) 240, ENILOBO V. N.P.D.C. LTD (2019) 18 NWLR (PT. 1703) 168 @ 192 PARAS A-C
[66] I find this argument to be correct by virtue of provision of Section 102 of the Evidence Act 2011, this exhibit is a public document and it is settled that public documents must be proved by primary evidence except in certain circumstances as provided in Section 89 of the Evidence Act wherein it was stipulated that secondary evidence may be admitted where:

  1. The original appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person legally bound to produce it and does not produce it despite being served with notice as stated in Section 91 of the Evidence Act, or 
  2. The original is a public document within the meaning of Section 102 of the Evidence Act, in which case the secondary evidence admissible is the certified true copy.

[67] Consequently, exhibit NSTS 65A being an uncertified copy of a public document is hereby discountenanced and expunged. I so hold.

In addition, even if the Court were to hold otherwise and maintain the admissibility of NSTS 65A, I must say that although the Claimants have been found to be in the employ of the public service of the 2nd Defendant, my perusal of exhibits NSTS 1A -63A reveal that their employment is not governed by the Public Service Rules of the 2nd Defendant, rather it has its own peculiar condition of service and regulations. Similarly, the salary structure of the Claimants is operated under NTSS as clearly stated in exhibits NSTS 1A-63A. No NTSS structure was tendered. 

[68] However, the Receiver’s report exhibit NSTS 70 tendered by the Counsel to the Defendants, admits indebtedness of N85,131,867.96 as at April 2013 as the sum owed as at disengagement date of the Claimants.  The Claimants are therefore entitled to arrears of salaries as sought in reliefs 2 and 4 as the Court has no power to grant more than what is claimed. See TILLEY GYADO AND CO. (NIG.) LTD V. ACCESS BANK PLC (2019) 6 NWLR (PT. 1669) 399. I so hold.
For the period after April 2013 to October 2021, the Claimants’ employment having not been terminated are entitled to accrued salaries. However, as earlier observed, the Claimants have computed their entitlement under the CONPSS which the Court finds to be erroneous as it is clearly stated in employment letter that the salary structure is NTSS. Thus despite finding that that the Claimants’ employment subsists, the claim for arrears of salaries cannot be granted under CONPSS as sought by the Claimant. A Court cannot grant what is not proved, see STABILLINI VISIONI LTD. V. METALUM LTD (2008) 9 NWLR (PT. 1092) 416. The reliefs in that regard are consequently hereby refused. I so hold.

[69] With regard to relief 6 for accrued salary from 2021 to date of judgment, having held that the Claimants erred by relying on CONPSS salary scale and failing to tender the NTSS scale, there is no evidence to support the claim of N2,478.004.76 as monthly salary. The Claimants ought to have tendered the NTSS salary structure and compute each Claimant’s grade/level in proof of this claim or rely on pay slips, payroll or statement of accounts in proof thereof. This relief fails for want of proof. I so hold

[70] With regard to claims of check off dues, this relief is in the realm of special damages which must be specially and strictly proven. See UNION BANK OF NIG. PLC V. CHIMAZE (2014) 4 SC (PT. III) V. 110, CAMEROON AIRLINES V. OTUTUIZU (2011) 4 NWLR (PT. 1238) 512. Once again, the Claimants have not pleaded facts or led evidence to show the amount due to AUCPTRE or how they arrived at the quantum of dues claimed. This relief is hereby refused.

ISSUE 4

Whether the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are jointly liable

[71] The 3rd Defendant is a nominal Defendant pursuant to Section 195 of the Constitution. Judgment in this instance is therefore not enforced against it personally but against the State he represents.

[72] With regard to the 2nd Defendant, the general rule is that a company is distinct from its shareholders. See SALOMON V. SALOMON & CO LTD [1897] AC 22. However, the corporate veil will be lifted where the company is a mere agent or sham, or where statute imposes liability. Here, Section 318(1) of the Constitution makes service in a government-owned company part of the public service of the State. The 2nd Defendant wholly owns the 1st Defendant, captured it in its budget, directed its closure, took over its assets and liabilities including staff salaries per Exhibit NSTS70. The 2nd Defendant is therefore the alter ego of the 1st Defendant and liable. I so hold.

[73] Consequently, this Suit succeeds partially and determined as follows:

Reliefs 1,2,4 and 9 succeed

Reliefs 3,5,6,7, and 8 fail

[74] It is hereby declared and/or ordered as follows:

  1. It is declared that the employment of the Claimants save the 9th & 14th Claimants subsists and can only be determined by compliance with the terms of the employment. 
  2. It is hereby declared that the Defendants are indebted to the Claimants in the total net sum of N7,434, 014.28 (Seven Million, Four Hundred and Thirty-Four Thousand, Fourteen Naira, Twenty-Eight Kobo) being arrears of salaries and allowances from November, 2012 to January, 2013. 
  3. It is hereby ordered that the 2nd Defendant pay forthwith the total net sum of N7,434, 014.28 (Seven Million, Four Hundred and Thirty-Four Thousand, Fourteen Naira, Twenty-Eight Kobo) being arrears of salaries and allowances from November, 2012 to January, 2013 before the lock out of the Claimants on the 26th February, 2013. The 3rd Defendant as chief law officer of the 2nd Defendant, shall ensure compliance by the 2nd Defendant. 
  4. Cost of this action is in the sum of N1,000,000 (One Million Naira only)

[75] Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

…………………………………………….

HON. JUSTICE R.B. HAASTRUP

Judge