IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE E. D. SUBILIM

DATE: 28^TH JULY, 2026                   

SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/361/2023

 

BETWEEN:

AYOOLA JOSHUA IHIMOYAN                    --------------- CLAIMANT

AND

THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF 

CHRISTIAN RURAL AND

URBAN DEVELOMENT ASSOCIATION 

OF NIGERIA (CRUDAN)                                       ------- DEFENDANT

 

REPRESENTATION:

A. A Nyako Esq., for the Claimant.

Caleb N. Ramnap Esq., for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT

1. The Claimant commenced this suit against the defendant by way of a Complaint dated and filed on the 11^th December, 2023, seeking the following reliefs:
   1. A Declaration that the Claimant's termination of employment by the Defendant is unlawful and not in consonance with the law and Labour laws of Nigeria
   2. A Declaration that the Claimant's termination of employment by the Defendant is unlawful and not in consonance with the Human Resource Policy 2022 of the defendant and the constitution of the defendant.
   3. A Declaration that the disciplinary Committee set by the defendant to look into the matter of the Claimant which resulted in the termination of the employment of the claimant was not properly constituted and thus the decision reached is a nullity
   4. A Declaration that the Disciplinary Committee of the defendant in its proceedings did not abide by the principles of natural justice, equity and good conscience, thus the decision reached/arrived at in terminating the claimant's employment is a nullity, having not given him a fair trial
   5. A declaration that the action of the defendant through the disciplinary Committee run contrary to the constitutional provisions of fair trial which arrived at the termination of Claimant's employment
   6. A Declaration that the claimant has suffered undue hardship due to the defendant's act of unlawful termination of his employment from service as an employee
   7. A declaration that the claimant is still a staff of the defendant, his employment, having not being terminated in accordance with the extant laws and the Human Resource policy, 2022 of the Defendant
   8. A Declaration that any employment to replace the vacancy for Finance Manager of the defendant before the hearing and determination this suit is a nullity.
   9. A declaration that the claimant is entitled to damages having suffered greatly as a result of the defendant terminating the employment of the claimant
   10. A declaration that the claimant is entitled to all his salaries and entitlement as a staff of the defendant from the date his employment was terminated
   11. AN ORDER directing the defendant to withdraw the termination letter of the claimant and reinstate him as Finance Manager of the Defendant
   12. AN ORDER compelling the Defendant to pay the claimant all his salaries and entitlement as a staff of the defendant from the date of termination of his employment
   13. ORDER of general damages in the sum of ?25,000,000 (Twenty-Five Million Naira) only for psychological trauma, unwarranted economic pain and undignified treatment of the claimant by the acts of the defendant in unlawfully terminating the employment
   14. ORDER, compelling the defendant to pay to the Claimant the sum of Five Million Naira, only (5000,000) as Punitive damages for the flagrant violation of the law and Human Resource Policy 2022 of the defendant
   15. ORDER compelling the defendant to pay the sum of One Hundred and Twenty Thousand Naira, only (?120,000) as legal fees
   16. COST of this suit as will be assessed by the Honourable court.

 

 

CLAIMANT’S STATEMENT OF FACTS

 

 

DEFENCE STATEMENT OF FACTS

 

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

5. The burden of proof in this action lies on the Claimant, Ayoola Joshua Ihimoyan, who seeks declaratory and monetary reliefs arising from the allegedly unlawful termination of his employment. In line with sections 131 to 134 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the Claimant must establish, on a preponderance of evidence or the balance of probabilities, the terms and conditions of his contract of employment, who has the authority to appoint and terminate, the specific manner in which the termination breached those terms, and his entitlement to the reliefs claimed. Conversely, where the Defendant asserts affirmative defences or alleges that the Claimant was terminated for reasons bordering on criminality, such as forgery or fraud, the burden of proving such assertions rests on the Defendant, and any allegation of crime must be established beyond reasonable doubt in accordance with section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011.
6. The Claimant testified in person as CW1 and adopted his witness statement on oath in which he asserted that he was employed in February 2021 by the Defendant under a contract of employment. He tendered sixteen exhibits, which include Exhibit Ihimoyan 1, a conditional offer letter dated 1st February, 2021; Exhibit Ihimoyan 2, an appointment letter as CRUDAN Finance Manager dated 10th February, 2021; Exhibit Ihimoyan 3, email correspondence from the Claimant dated 8th February, 2021; Exhibit Ihimoyan 4, a response email from the former Managing Director, Mrs. Ruth Dul, dated 12th February, 2021; Exhibit Ihimoyan 5, the Defendant's Human Resource Policy Document 2022; Exhibit Ihimoyan 6, a notice of confirmation of appointment dated 27th January, 2023; Exhibits Ihimoyan 7 and 9, queries dated 25th April, 2023, and 9th June, 2023; Exhibit Ihimoyan 8, his response to the query of 25th April, 2023; Exhibit Ihimoyan 10, a query dated 18th October, 2023; Exhibit Ihimoyan 11, his response to the query dated 20th October, 2023; Exhibit Ihimoyan 12, a letter of suspension dated 20th October, 2023; Exhibit Ihimoyan 13, an invitation to appear before the Disciplinary Committee dated 1st November, 2023; Exhibit Ihimoyan 14, a suspension extension letter dated 3rd November, 2023; Exhibit Ihimoyan 15, a letter of termination of employment dated 8th November, 2023; and Exhibit Ihimoyan 16, a letter of demand and pre-action notice. CW1 testified that his salary reconfigurations were discussed with the former Managing Director, but admitted under cross-examination that no written letter of employment was ever issued to him to reflect any such new salary structure. The Claimant also called CW2, Mr. Tobi Salawu, the Defendant's Director of Programmes, who testified on subpoena. CW2 stated that donor project funds are strictly restricted and that "it is not possible to loan from the project account based on the agreement with the donor", though under cross-examination, he admitted he could not produce a copy of the donor agreement and noted that "it is the Executive Director that is properly placed to say something about the Claimant since he reports to him directly." Timothy Usman testified as CW3 on subpoena, stating that he was an account officer under the Claimant and is now the Finance Manager. CW3 admitted that on 14th September, 2023, while the Claimant was on leave, he requested 1,015,113.33 Naira from the project account as a loan for their cooperative after calling the Claimant. Crucially, under cross-examination, CW3 testified that "the Claimant also bought his official car with money loaned from projects Account" and that "the Claimant reconfigured his allowances such that he earns above what is contained in the Employment Letter or earn double his allowances." Mrs. Ruth Dul, the former Executive Director of the Defendant, testified as CW4 on subpoena. CW4 stated that she worked with the Defendant for ten years as Executive Director and that she did not have issues with the Claimant during her tenure, testifying that "...we employed him because he was qualified and we confirmed him." However, under cross-examination, CW4 "denied giving the Claimant any oral permission to reconfigure his salaries and allowances and that if anything of such exist it should have been conveyed in another letter of employment." Regarding the Claimant's credentials, CW4 testified that "she calls claimant Ayoola but not aware if his credentials do not bear Ayoola." Agbo Boniface Agada, the Director of Projects, testified as CW5 on subpoena, stating that he appeared before the disciplinary committee in November 2023 and the Claimant was not present when he did so. Under cross-examination, CW5 admitted that "he got feedback during management meeting that the Claimant appeared before the Disciplinary Committee." Similarly, CW6, Mr. Tulari Tine, testified on subpoena that he appeared before the Disciplinary Committee when the Claimant was absent, but under cross-examination, he admitted that "he knew the Claimant appeared before the Disciplinary Committee."
7. The Defendant opened its defence by calling five witnesses. DW1, Obilor Godfrey Ndaji, the Defendant's External Auditor, testified on subpoena and tendered Exhibits Ndaji 1 to 16, comprising the Defendant's half-yearly Financial Statements and Management Letters from 2019 to 2023. DW1 testified that since the Claimant was employed in 2021, the firm had difficulties auditing the Defendant's books, which led to the qualification of the Defendant's accounts for four consecutive periods: January to June 2021, January to June 2022, July to December 2022, and January to June 2023. DW1 further testified that the accounts managed by the Claimant's predecessor from 2019 to 2020 were never qualified. Under cross-examination, DW1 admitted that "qualification in a report does not necessarily mean commission of fraud" and that "the reasons for qualification was for his inability to meet up with the funding specified by the donors for filing of Financial report which is 3 months from the end of the accounting period." DW2, Joseph Gyandi, the current Managing Director of the Defendant, adopted his witness statement on oath and tendered three exhibits: Exhibit Gyandi 1, the letter of confirmation of the Claimant's employment; Exhibit Gyandi 2, a loan request; and Exhibit Gyandi 3, the letter of appointment of Timothy Usman as Finance Manager. Under cross-examination, DW2 admitted: "I know I issued the two queries and the said queries to the clamant were signed by me, one from the office of the ED, while the other was from the Board of the Defendant though me." DW2 also testified that "there is no particular pattern for writing an application for loan" and affirmed that he signed the suspension letters on behalf of the Board. DW3, Martins Agbabuokhai, the Defendant's Internal Auditor, adopted his witness statement on oath and tendered three exhibits: Exhibit Martins 1, the Internal Auditor's Report; Exhibit Martins 2, budget documents showing the Claimant's salary manipulations; and Exhibit Martins 3, documentation regarding the loan from the project account to the cooperative account. DW3 testified that while Exhibit Ihimoyan 1 fixed the Claimant's annual gross salary at 2,789,306.00 Naira, "the Claimant collapsed his annual Bonus to his monthly component which he earn throughout the year and at the end of the year still collects his annual bonus fund like any other staff." Dr. Rejoice James Songden, the Registrar of the University of Jos, testified as DW4 on subpoena and tendered Exhibit Songden A, which is the certified true copy of the student record of "Ihimoyan Joshua Sunday" under Registration Number UJ/2004/SS/BMS/0119. DW4 testified that the name "Ayoola Joshua Ihimoyan" used to file this suit does not match the name on the student record. Under cross-examination, DW4 admitted that "it is difficult male student to change name due to the University policy unlike women which is easier" and that "if students change name after university, they don’t need to go back to the University to effect the change." Finally, Barr. Grace Mamswa, the Defendant's Legal Adviser and a member of the Disciplinary Committee, testified as DW5 and tendered several documents, including Exhibit Mamswa A, the report of the Disciplinary Committee; Exhibit Mamswa B, forged receipts; Exhibits Mamswa C and D, correspondence between the parties' solicitors; Exhibit Mamswa E, the Claimant's credentials; and Exhibit Mamswa F, a second Disciplinary Committee report. Under cross-examination, DW5 made a crucial admission regarding the committee's procedure, stating: "I know David Lansibol, Godiya Bulus, Timothy Usman, Boniface Agbo, Tulari Tine all gave evidence in Claimant's absence."
8. A direct confrontation of the competing versions of evidence reveals sharp conflicts on key material issues, which this Court must resolve. First, on the critical issue of whether the Claimant had authorization to adjust or reconfigure his salary and allowances, the Claimant (CW1) claimed that these adjustments were discussed and approved by the former Managing Director, Mrs. Ruth Dul (CW4), pointing to Exhibits Ihimoyan 3 and 4. However, Mrs. Ruth Dul, testifying as CW4, directly contradicted CW1's assertion, stating in clear terms that she "denied giving the Claimant any oral permission to reconfigure his salaries and allowances and that if anything of such exist it should have been conveyed in another letter of employment." In resolving this conflict, the Court finds the testimony of CW4 far more credible than that of CW1. CW4 is a witness subpoenaed by the Claimant himself, yet her testimony completely dismantles the Claimant's claim of authorization. This oral denial is fully aligned with the content of Exhibits Ihimoyan 3 and 4, which contain no written or explicit approval from CW4 permitting the Claimant to restructure his earnings outside of his official employment letters, Exhibit Ihimoyan 1 and Exhibit Ihimoyan 2. Furthermore, the Claimant's own admission under cross-examination that no new contract of employment was ever issued to him to reflect these alleged adjustments is fatal to his case. The Court therefore finds as a fact that the Claimant's unilateral restructuring of his salary, as further detailed by DW3's testimony that "the Claimant collapsed his annual Bonus to his monthly component which he earn throughout the year and at the end of the year still collects his annual bonus fund like any other staff," was unauthorized and constituted gross financial misconduct.
9. The second material conflict centers on whether the Disciplinary Committee's proceedings complied with the rules of fair hearing and natural justice. The Claimant contended that the committee's procedure was fraudulent and biased, particularly because he was not allowed to confront the witnesses who testified against him. The Defendant argued that the Claimant was given adequate opportunity to defend himself through written queries and an oral appearance before the committee. This Court must confront the undisputed fact, admitted by the Defendant's own witness and committee member, DW5, under cross-examination, that "David Lansibol, Godiya Bulus, Timothy Usman, Boniface Agbo, Tulari Tine all gave evidence in Claimant's absence." This is corroborated by the testimonies of CW5 and CW6, who both confirmed they appeared and gave evidence before the committee outside the presence of the Claimant. While the Defendant’s counsel argued that a domestic administrative panel is not bound by strict court-room adversarial procedures, it is an immutable principle of Nigerian labor law and natural justice under section 36 of the Constitution that an employee must be given the opportunity to hear and cross-examine witnesses whose evidence is being used to determine his fate. Taking evidence behind the back of an accused employee and utilizing such evidence to recommend his termination is a flagrant violation of the audi alteram partem rule. The Court finds that although the Claimant was served queries and appeared before the panel, the practice of receiving adverse testimonial evidence in his absence and denying him the opportunity to cross-examine his accusers severely compromised the integrity of the proceedings.
10. The third issue of conflict concerns the discrepancy between the Claimant's name in this suit, "Ayoola Joshua Ihimoyan", and the name on his academic credentials and university records, "Ihimoyan Joshua Sunday". The Defendant contended through DW4, the Registrar of the University of Jos, that the credentials belong to a different person because the University's official student records in Exhibit Songden A bear the name "Ihimoyan Joshua Sunday". However, under cross-examination, DW4 made significant concessions, admitting that "if students change name after university, they don’t need to go back to the University to effect the change." Moreover, CW4, the former Executive Director who hired the Claimant, testified that "we employed him because he was qualified and we confirmed him," adding that the Claimant was commonly known as "Ayoola" during his employment. The Court observes that the names "Ihimoyan" and "Joshua" are identical in both versions, and the Defendant did not provide any evidence showing that the academic credentials submitted by the Claimant actually belong to a different living person who has claimed them. Given DW4's admission regarding post-graduation name changes and the fact that the Defendant happily accepted these credentials, employed the Claimant, and confirmed his appointment after two years of service as seen in Exhibit Ihimoyan 6, the Defendant is estopped from raising this discrepancy as a retroactive justification for summary termination. The Court finds that the Claimant is the same person as the individual named in Exhibit Songden A.
11. In conclusion, the net evidential findings of this Court on the material issues are as follows: First, the contract of employment between the Claimant and the Defendant is one of ordinary master and servant regulated by Exhibits Ihimoyan 1, Ihimoyan 2, and the Human Resource Policy Document 2022 (Exhibit Ihimoyan 5). Second, the Claimant's unilateral reconfiguration of his salary and allowances, as established by the credible testimonies of CW4 and DW3, was entirely unauthorized and constituted a serious breach of his employment terms and professional duties. Third, the Defendant's Disciplinary Committee violated the principles of natural justice and fair hearing by taking the testimonies of key witnesses behind the Claimant’s back and denying him the right of confrontation and cross-examination. Fourth, the allegations of forgery and criminal misconduct made against the Claimant in the letter of termination (Exhibit Ihimoyan 15) were not proved beyond reasonable doubt, as DW1 admitted that the qualification of accounts "does not necessarily mean commission of fraud" and no criminal conviction was produced. Consequently, while the Claimant was indeed guilty of serious workplace infractions regarding his salary reconfiguration, the procedure adopted by the Defendant in terminating his employment was procedurally flawed due to the breach of fair hearing, rendering the termination wrongful in law but not null and void, since in a master-servant relationship, the court cannot foist a willing employee on an unwilling employer.

 

CLAIMANT'S SUBMISSIONS

12. Learned Counsel to the Claimant, A.A. Nyako, Esq., submitted that the termination of the Claimant's employment was unlawful, procedurally flawed, and a flagrant violation of both the Defendant's Human Resource Policy 2022 and the constitutional guarantees of fair hearing. Counsel argued that the entire disciplinary process leading up to the termination was a sham, designed to push out the Claimant without regard for natural justice or the rules governing the employment relationship.
    1. Whether the Disciplinary Committee was properly constituted considering that the ED (Executive Director) who queried the Claimant was present as a member of the Disciplinary Committee whose decision led to the termination of the employment of the Claimant and the decision should not be set aside?
13. Learned Counsel to the Claimant contended that anyone facing civil or criminal liability must be afforded a fair hearing, the true test of which is the impression of a reasonable and impartial observer present at the trial. Counsel relied on the Supreme Court decision in Iyomon v. L.P.D.C. (2025) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1984) 123 SC for the proposition that fair hearing involves conducting proceedings in a manner that ensures justice is manifestly seen to be done. Counsel pointed out that DW2, the Executive Director, who issued the queries (Exhibits 8 and 11) and signed the suspension and termination letters, actively sat as a member of the Disciplinary Committee that investigated the Claimant and recommended his dismissal. Counsel submitted that this dual role of DW2 as the accuser, investigator, and judge fatally compromised the integrity of the committee and created a reasonable apprehension of bias. To support this position, Counsel relied on the case of Abalaka v. Min. of Health (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt. 963) 105 and the case of Ani v. Otu (2023) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1886) 301 SC on the strict application of the Latin maxim nemo judex in causa sua, which prohibits any individual from being a judge in their own cause or in a matter where they hold a personal interest. Counsel noted that prior to the appointment of DW2, the Claimant had never been queried and had been diligent in his duties, a fact corroborated by the former Executive Director, CW4, who testified that she had no cause to query the Claimant during her tenure. Counsel therefore urged the Court to hold that the Disciplinary Committee was improperly constituted and that its recommendations are a complete nullity.
    2. Whether the Disciplinary Committee did not breach the rights of the Claimant when witnesses called did not testify in his presence of the Claimant which the decision reached resulted in the termination of the employment of the Claimant?
14. Learned Counsel to the Claimant argued that the right to a fair hearing requires that a party be given the opportunity to confront, hear, and cross-examine any witnesses brought to establish their guilt. Counsel relied on Okon v. Adigwe (2011) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1270) 350 for the proposition that a court or domestic tribunal must give parties an opportunity to cross-examine or otherwise confront and contradict all witnesses testifying against them. Counsel highlighted the testimonies of CW1, CW6, and DW5, which concurrently established that key witnesses, including David Lansibol, Godiya Bulus, Timothy Usman, Boniface Agbo, and Tulari Tine, gave their testimonies before the committee entirely in the absence of the Claimant. Counsel submitted that receiving evidence behind the back of an accused person constitutes a severe moral and legal infraction that vitiates the proceedings. In support of this contention, Counsel cited Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun (2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1960) 1 and N.E.P.A. v. Ango (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 737) 627, arguing that domestic and administrative tribunals are strictly bound to observe these essential tenets of fair hearing. Counsel also referred to Olufeagba v. Abdul-Raheem (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1173) 384 SC to show that where a party's employment is terminated in breach of natural justice, the issue of fair hearing forms a crucial part of the pleadings and must be upheld by the court. Counsel concluded that by shutting the Claimant out of the room while adverse evidence was being received, the Defendant violated the mandatory provisions of Section 36(6)(d) of the 1999 Constitution.
    100. Whether adequate time and facility was availed to the Claimant to prepare?
15. Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the Defendant violated Section 36(1) of the 1999 Constitution by failing to accord the Claimant adequate time and facilities to prepare his defense before the Disciplinary Committee. Counsel pointed out that Exhibit 14, which was the letter of invitation to appear before the panel, was dated 1st November, 2023, and was only served on the Claimant at approximately 3:00 PM on that very day, directing him to appear the following morning, 2nd November, 2023, at 12:00 noon. Counsel argued that giving an employee less than twenty-four hours' notice to prepare for a career-determining disciplinary hearing is procedurally oppressive. Furthermore, Counsel argued that Exhibit 14 was completely silent on the specific allegations or charges the Claimant was expected to answer, instructing him only to bring his original credentials and certificates. Counsel submitted that the Claimant was effectively ambushed, as he was deprived of the opportunity to know the case against him in advance and prepare his response accordingly.
    500. Whether the termination of the employment of the claimant was lawful the Defendant having not abiding by the Human Resource Policy 2022 of the Defendant and Contract of employment and termination being in a wrong section?
16. Learned Counsel to the Claimant argued that the termination of the Claimant's employment was unlawful because the Defendant failed to comply with the express terms of the contract of service. Counsel relied on Ladipo v. Chevron (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt. 907) 277 and N.R.C. v. Umera (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1008) 265 for the proposition that where multiple documents contain the terms of an employment relationship, they must be construed jointly to ascertain the true intent and rights of the parties. Counsel pointed out that the termination letter (Exhibit 16) terminated the Claimant's appointment by invoking Section 19(b)(iv) of Exhibit 5 (the CRUDAN Human Resource Policy 2022). Counsel submitted that Section 19 of the policy document is strictly headed "Absence from Duty" and has absolutely nothing to do with termination of employment for financial infractions or performance issues. Counsel argued that because the Claimant was never accused, queried, or investigated for being absent from work, the Defendant could not validly terminate his employment under that section. Relying on Daodu v. U.B.A. Plc (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt. 878) 276, Counsel argued that while an employer may terminate an employment for no reason, where it chooses to give a reason, such a reason must fall squarely within the terms of the contract and be justifiable. Consequently, Counsel urged the Court to hold that terminating the Claimant under an inapplicable policy section rendered the termination ultra vires and unlawful.
    5. Whether the termination of Claimant's employment for an allegation of a criminal offence without being convicted by a Court of law or Tribunal was lawful?
17. Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that since the Defendant based the termination of the Claimant's employment on allegations of a criminal nature, specifically "forgery", it was legally bound to subject the Claimant to a proper criminal prosecution and obtain a conviction before taking disciplinary action. Counsel relied on the landmark case of Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550 and Igwilo v. Central Bank of Nigeria (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 302 for the proposition that where an employee is accused of a crime, their guilt or innocence must first be established through the criminal justice process before a court or competent tribunal. While acknowledging the decision in Lasisi v. Allied Bank (Nig.) Plc (2002) 7 NWLR (Pt. 767) 542, which allows termination if other non-criminal acts of misconduct are proved, Counsel argued that the Defendant failed to prove any other lawful grounds. Counsel analyzed the evidence of DW1 and the financial statements in Exhibits Ndaji 1 to 16, pointing out that the "qualification of accounts" relied upon by the Defendant is not a crime under Nigerian law. Counsel noted that DW1 himself admitted under cross-examination that a qualified audit report does not necessarily equate to the commission of fraud. Furthermore, Counsel argued that DW1's credibility was completely destroyed when he falsely claimed in his examination-in-chief that he did not audit the Defendant's accounts for 2018, only for the Claimant's counsel to confront him with Exhibit Ndaji 16, which a 2018 financial report was prepared by his firm. Counsel argued that the entire testimony of DW1 should be discountenanced as unreliable.
    6.  Whether the claimant was rightly employed having the requisite qualifications?
18. Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that the Claimant was fully qualified, lawfully employed, and subsequently confirmed by the Defendant's board. Counsel referenced Exhibits 1, 2, and 7, and highlighted the oral testimony of CW4, the former Executive Director, who stated that the Claimant was hired because he possessed the necessary qualifications and was confirmed after showing competence. Addressing the name discrepancy raised by the Defendant—comparing "Ayoola Joshua Ihimoyan" used in this suit with "Ihimoyan Joshua Sunday" found in the University of Jos records (Exhibit Songden A)—Counsel submitted that the two names refer to one and the same person. Counsel pointed out that the photograph on the university student record matches the photograph attached to the Claimant's witness statement on oath. Counsel also noted that DW4, under cross-examination, admitted that when male students graduate and change names, they do not return to the university to alter their records. Counsel argued that, in any event, the Claimant is a certified Chartered Accountant with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), which was his primary professional qualification. Counsel further submitted that by confirming the Claimant's appointment via Exhibit 6, the Defendant is estopped from questioning his initial qualifications, relying on the equitable maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt and the case of Chiekweilo v. Nwali (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 560) 114 CA to argue that equity will not assist an employer who sleeps on its rights only to raise pre-employment complaints years later.
    7.  Whether the Claimant is entitled to damages?
19. Learned Counsel to the Claimant submitted that because the Claimant has successfully established that his employment was terminated in a manner that violated both contract and natural justice, he is entitled to the reliefs sought, including reinstatement, outstanding salaries, and general damages. Counsel argued that the termination was further invalidated by the Defendant's failure to pay the Claimant one month's salary in lieu of notice concurrently with the termination letter as required by the contract. Counsel contended that since the termination was a nullity, the Claimant's employment is legally subsisting, and he is entitled to all his salaries and allowances from the date of the unlawful termination till judgment is delivered.

DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSIONS

 

1.  Whether or not the relationship between the defendant and the claimant is that of master and servant
2. Defendant and the Claimant is purely that of master and servant, as the Defendant is a non-governmental association and not a body created by statute with employment enjoying statutory flavor. Counsel cited Central Bank of Nigeria v. Igwilo (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 379) 1401, Bamisile v. NJC (2013) All FWLR (Pt. 678) 911, Chukwuma v. Shell Petroleum (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, and Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig) Plc (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 565 for the proposition that an employment only has statutory flavor when it is directly governed by statute or regulations made under a statute. Counsel argued that a look at Exhibit Ihimoyan 1 (the letter of employment) and Exhibit Ihimoyan 5 (the CRUDAN Human Resource Policy Document 2022) confirms that the contract is a private master-servant agreement. Counsel relied on Ojiabor v. Hon. Minister of Communications & Ors (2018) LPELR-44257 CA to urge the Court to hold that the relationship between the parties is that of an ordinary master and servant.

 

 

 

100. Whether or not an employee must be convicted by court before his employment can be terminated in instances where the allegations against him borders on crime.
101. Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted that there is no absolute requirement in law for an employer to prosecute and secure a criminal conviction against an employee before terminating their employment, even where the underlying allegations involve criminal conduct such as forgery. Counsel relied on Arinze v. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd (2000) N.W.L.R (Pt. 639) 78 and Yusuf v. Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd (1996) 39 L.R.C.N 11 for the proposition that an employer is only required to confront the employee with the allegations and afford them an opportunity to respond. Counsel argued that the Defendant fully complied with this requirement by issuing queries and convening a Disciplinary Committee. Counsel pointed out that the Claimant admitted to altering and reconfiguring his salary components to earn more than what was stipulated in his employment letter, but attempted to justify this by claiming he had oral permission from the former Executive Director (CW4). Counsel noted that CW4, under cross-examination, flatly denied giving any such permission, and the email exchanges (Exhibits 3 and 4) did not show any approval. Relying on Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd v. Amadi (2011) All FWLR (Pt. 604) 80, Counsel argued that the trial court must test every piece of admitted evidence for credibility, weight, and cogency, and urged the Court to find that the Claimant's emails had no probative value because he admitted under cross-examination that no new letter of employment was ever issued to reflect the alleged salary adjustments.

 

500. Whether or not claimant was accorded -fair –hearing.
501. Learned Counsel to the Defendant argued that the Claimant was afforded a fair hearing throughout the disciplinary process. Counsel submitted that the complaints against the Claimant were not new to him, as they had been raised in detailed queries dated 25th April, 2023 (Exhibit 7) and 18th October, 2023 (Exhibit 10), and were also referenced in his suspension letter (Exhibit 12). Counsel argued that these queries clearly outlined complaints regarding qualified audit reports and unauthorized salary manipulations. Counsel dismissed the Claimant's objection to the short notice of the Disciplinary Committee invitation, arguing that the Claimant was already aware of the substantive case against him. Addressing the Claimant's complaint that witnesses testified in his absence, Counsel submitted that a domestic disciplinary panel is an investigative and inquisitorial body rather than an adversarial court of law, and is not bound by strict judicial procedures. Furthermore, Counsel argued that the Claimant, in paragraph 1 of his Reply to the Statement of Defence, expressly admitted paragraph 9 of the Statement of Defence which alleged fraudulent salary adjustments. Counsel submitted that since the Claimant admitted to altering his salary, no further witness testimonies were required to prove the infraction, rendering the Claimant's complaints about the absence of other witnesses during their testimony academic and irrelevant. Counsel also submitted that the Claimant failed to lead any evidence showing what the proper composition of the committee should have been under the Defendant's constitution, and urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant's claims of fair-hearing violations.

 

5. Whether or not the claimant has been able to prove that his employment was wrongfully terminated.
6. Learned Counsel to the Defendant argued that the Claimant failed to discharge the burden of proving that his termination was wrongful. Counsel cited Eze v. Spring Bank Plc (2011) LPELR-2892 and Oloruntobi Oju v. Abdul-Raheem (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83 for the proposition that in an action for wrongful termination, the plaintiff must place before the court the terms of the contract, who can appoint and remove them, and the specific terms breached by the employer. Counsel also cited Western Nigeria Development Corporation v. Abimbola (1966) 4 NSCC 88 and Oak Pensions Limited & Ors v. Mr. Michael Oladipo Olayinka (2017) LPELR-43207(CA) to emphasize that the court will not look outside the written agreement of the parties. Counsel pointed out that Article 17C of Exhibit 5 provides that an employee's services may be terminated for gross misconduct (including stealing and financial embezzlement) or consistent below-average performance. Counsel argued that the repeated qualification of the Defendant's financial statements by external auditors (DW1), as shown in Exhibits Ndaji 9, 11, 12, and 13, constituted consistent below-average performance because the Claimant was hired specifically to manage and secure the organization's accounts. Counsel further argued that the Claimant's unauthorized salary manipulation constituted gross misconduct and fraud, which was proved through the testimony of the Internal Auditor (DW3) and Exhibit Martins 2. Counsel submitted that the termination was therefore lawful and justified under the terms of Exhibit 5.

 

6. Whether the claimant is entitled to salaries and damages in the circumstances of this case.
7. Learned Counsel to the Defendant submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed, including salaries, general damages, punitive damages, and legal fees. Counsel argued that the Claimant cannot simultaneously claim that the contract of employment is subsisting (and seek salaries) while also claiming damages for its wrongful termination, as these claims are mutually exclusive. Counsel cited Ativie v. Kabelmetal Nig. Limited (2008) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1094) 399 for the settled rule that in ordinary master-servant employments, the only remedy available for wrongful termination is the payment of salary in lieu of notice and any other earned entitlements due at the time of termination, and that general damages are inappropriate. Counsel cited Spring Bank Plc v. Babatunde (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1292) 83 CA, Okeme v. Civil Service Commission, Edo State (2000) 14 NWLR (Pt. 688) CA, and CCB Nig Ltd v. Nwankwo (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 266) 159 to submit that a servant cannot claim wages for services not actually rendered to the employer. Regarding the claim for N120,000 as legal fees, Counsel cited Naude v. Simon (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 753) 1898 to argue that solicitor's fees must be specifically pleaded and proved as special damages, which the Claimant failed to do. Finally, Counsel highlighted the name discrepancy and the testimony of DW4, the Registrar of the University of Jos, who stated that the Claimant's name did not match their student records (Exhibit Songden A), arguing that the Claimant's unexplained identity issues and professional infractions demonstrate that he is not entitled to any equitable award of damages. Counsel concluded by urging the Court to dismiss the suit in its entirety.

 

COURT’S DECISION

1. Whether the termination of the Claimant's employment was lawful, having regard to the terms of his employment, the Defendant's Human Resource Policy 2022, and the principles of fair hearing.

2. Whether the Claimant is entitled to reinstatement, outstanding salaries, and damages in the circumstances of this case.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE ONE

 

29. Before embarking upon the resolution of this threshold issue, it is procedurally imperative to address the earlier interlocutory proceedings in this suit. This Court, in its ruling delivered on 15 April 2024, dismissed the Claimant’s application for an interlocutory injunction. In doing so, this Court refrained from making any definitive pronouncements on the validity of the termination or the allegations of financial impropriety, as doing so would have compromised the fair trial of the substantive action. The law is firmly settled that a court must not allow the hearing and determination of interlocutory applications to affect the trial of the substantive issues, nor should it determine at an interlocutory stage those issues which form the main bone of contention between the parties in a substantive suit. As Idris, J.C.A. observed in Nyorkson v. Nasarawa (2022) LPELR-57012 (CA) at page 20, paragraph B, the Court must refrain from determining at an interlocutory stage, issues which would form the bone of contention between the parties in a substantive suit. Furthermore, as Fabiyi, J.C.A. remarked in Maduike v. Madubuike (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 719) 698 and as adopted by Augie, J.C.A. in NIDB & Ors v. Awojugbagbe Light Industries Ltd (2005) LPELR-45746(CA) at pages 10 to 11, paragraph E, "Live issues in the case must be left for the substantive trial of the suit. If live issues are tried at the interlocutory stage, there will be nothing left for the trial at the substantive hearing of the suit." Interlocutory applications, as Banjoko, J.C.A. explained in In Re: Keystone Bank Limited & Anor (2022) LCN/16855 (CA) at pages 14 to 15, paragraph E, are temporary or interim measures that do not constitute a final resolution of the controversy, and the court must not say anything at that stage of the proceedings that would jeopardize the just and proper determination of the suit after the trial. Having preserved the res and left the live issues untouched, this Court is now fully positioned to resolve the substantive controversy upon the complete evidence adduced at the trial.
30. The jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this suit is a fundamental threshold question that must be resolved. In considering whether a Court has jurisdiction to entertain a matter, it must be borne in mind that the jurisdiction of a Court is statutory and cannot be assumed or expanded by judicial craft or innovation. As Ogakwu, J.C.A. expounded in Denca Services Ltd v. Azunna (2018) LPELR-46043(CA) at pages 11 to 20, the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the National Industrial Court by Section 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, revolves entirely around the existence of an employment relationship between the parties. His Lordship iterated that 

"Unless there is an employment relationship between the parties as the linchpin on which the action is founded, the cause of action will not be cognizable under the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the lower Court under Section 254C (1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended." 

"Does not include matters that are purely on negligence or breach of contract which has nothing to do with employee/employer relationship." 

32. In the instant case, the Claimant’s claims are founded directly on his contract of employment as the Finance Manager of the Defendant, a position he held pursuant to Exhibit Ihimoyan 1, Exhibit Ihimoyan 2, and Exhibit Ihimoyan 6. There is an undisputed, subsisting employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant. Consequently, the substantive dispute falls squarely within the exclusive jurisdictional province of this Court under Section 254C(1)(a) of the Constitution.
33. The legal relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant is that of an ordinary master and servant, as the Defendant is a private registered non-governmental organization and not a statutory body whose employment enjoys statutory flavour. An employment enjoys statutory flavour only when the contract of service is governed directly by an enabling statute or where the conditions of service are contained in regulations derived from statutory provisions. Where the employment enjoys statutory flavour, the terms and conditions of the contract are as provided for by the statute creating the employer, and the procedure for discipline, including termination, must be strictly complied with; otherwise, any other manner of termination inconsistent with the relevant statute is of no effect, as established in Ikem Chiejina Victor v. Comptroller General of Prisons & 3 Ors (NICN/AWK/32/2019 delivered July 23, 2025) and Rector Kwara Poly v. Adefila [2024] 9 NWLR 537. However, while private master-servant contracts are determinable by the agreement of the parties simpliciter, the modern labour jurisprudence of this Court has undergone a significant transformation under the Third Alteration to the 1999 Constitution. In National Union of Hotel & Personnel Services Workers (NUHPSW) v. Outsourcing Services Ltd [2023] LPELR-60683(CA), Sirajo, J.C.A. remarked that "The advent of the Alteration Act, of the 1999 Constitution, could be validly likened to a game changer when the hitherto unenforceable agreement becomes justiciable." Under this new paradigm, the terms and conditions set out in an employer's internal policy documents, such as the Defendant's Human Resource Policy 2022 (Exhibit Ihimoyan 5), are not mere unilateral guidelines but are justiciable covenants that bind the employer. The Defendant is strictly bound to adhere to the procedural and substantive safeguards it enacted in Exhibit Ihimoyan 5 when disciplining or terminating its employees.
34. The Defendant terminated the Claimant's employment by a letter dated 8 November 2023, marked as Exhibit Ihimoyan 15, on grounds of professional misconduct, insubordination, and alleged salary manipulation, explicitly invoking Section 19(b)(iv) of Exhibit Ihimoyan 5. It is an elementary principle of interpretation that when the words used in a document are clear and unambiguous, the court must give them their ordinary, natural meaning, and no party or court possesses the power to add to or subtract from the clear content of a document, as re-echoed in Incorp Trustees of United Visionary Youth of Nigeria v. Sukubo (2021) LPELR-52916(CA) and Apochi v. Akor (2023) LPELR-60849(CA). A literal and clinical examination of Exhibit Ihimoyan 5 reveals that Section 19 is strictly headed "Absence from Duty" and contains provisions dealing with absenteeism and unauthorized absence from work. This Court has searchingly examined the record of this trial and finds that the detailed queries issued to the Claimant, marked as Exhibit Ihimoyan 7 and Exhibit Ihimoyan 10, as well as his suspension letter, marked as Exhibit Ihimoyan 12, made absolutely no mention of unauthorized absence from work. Instead, the queries and allegations focused exclusively on qualified audit reports and unauthorized salary reconfigurations. By terminating the Claimant's employment under an inapplicable section of the Human Resource Policy which governs an entirely different species of workplace infraction, the Defendant acted in clear breach of the contractually agreed terms. Where an employer chooses to terminate an employment for a specific reason or under a specific provision of its rules, it must prove that the reason or provision is applicable, failing which the termination will be declared wrongful in law, in line with Ovivie & Anor v. Delta Steel Co. Ltd (2023) LPELR-60460(SC) and Katto v. CBN (1999) LPELR-1677(SC).
35. While the Defendant's counsel sought to argue that terminating the Claimant under a wrong section is a mere technical irregularity, and compared it to the legal principle that an action is not ruined merely because it was commenced under a wrong law or rules of court, this Court must draw a sharp distinction. In judicial proceedings, as established in Falobi v. Falobi (1976) NSCC Vol. 10, 576 and re-echoed by Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. in Mike Omhenke Obomhense v. Richard Erhahon (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 303) 22 at 40, a remedy will not be denied merely because a litigant proceeded under a wrong law or rule of court, provided the facts support the correct law to be applied. This principle is founded on substantive justice and common sense. However, this rule of procedural flexibility does not apply to the private, consensual terms of a contract of service. An employer cannot unilaterally substitute or misapply the clear, written covenants of its human resource policy and then claim shelter under the judicial attitude of ignoring wrong laws. The Human Resource Policy is a binding contract, and terminating an employee under an inapplicable section meant for "Absence from Duty" when the true allegations concern financial reconfiguration is a fundamental breach of the contract itself.
36. The Defendant placed the Claimant on suspension on 20 October 2023 via Exhibit Ihimoyan 12. The right to suspend an employee pending investigation is a recognized administrative tool available to an employer to ensure proper investigation and stable administration. As Muntaka-Coomassie, J.C.A. expounded in Akinyanju v. Unilorin & Ors (2004) LPELR-6054(CA) at pages 33 to 36, "suspension" only means to defer, lay aside, or hold in abeyance; it is an administrative act that does not terminate the employment contract. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court held in Longe v. First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2010) LPELR-1793(SC), suspension is a state of affairs where the contract remains in force but duties and remuneration are held in abeyance, and an employee is not entitled to a fair hearing before a suspension is implemented, particularly where the urgency of the situation demands swift action to protect the employer’s business. However, where an employer proceeds from suspension to formal disciplinary proceedings that result in termination, the requirements of fair hearing and natural justice become absolute and non-negotiable. The right to a fair hearing is enshrined in Section 36(1) of the Constitution and constitutes a cornerstone of our adjudicatory system. In the context of domestic disciplinary panels, the employee must be afforded the opportunity to hear, confront, and cross-examine any witnesses whose evidence is being used to determine his guilt. 

 

 

 

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE TWO

39. WHETHER THE CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT, OUTSTANDING SALARIES, AND DAMAGES IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
40. The Claimant has prayed for an order of reinstatement to his former position as Finance Manager. However, the law is firmly established that in an ordinary master and servant relationship, the court cannot order the reinstatement of an employee whose services have been terminated, because the court will not force a willing servant on an unwilling master. As held in Osisanya v. Afribank (Nig) Plc (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1031) 565 and Odibo v. First Bank Plc (2018) LPELR-46628 (CA), employment founded on a master-servant relationship for personal service without statutory flavour does not enjoy the relief of reinstatement. Reinstatement is a remedy reserved strictly for employments with statutory flavour. Since the Defendant is a private registered non-governmental organization, the Claimant's employment is a simple contract of service. Consequently, the Claimant's prayers for reinstatement, a declaration that his employment is still subsisting, and that his replacement is a nullity must be, and are hereby, refused.
41. Similarly, the Claimant's claim for outstanding salaries from the date of his termination on 8 November 2023 to the date of judgment must fail. A servant is not entitled to salaries for services not actually rendered to the employer. Because the contract was terminated, the Claimant did not perform any services for the Defendant after 8 November 2023, and he cannot claim wages for that period. However, the Claimant is entitled to any outstanding salaries and allowances actually earned and accrued up to the date of his termination. In Petroleum Training Institute v. Iyeke Matthew & Ors (2012) FWLR (Pt. 623) 1949, the Court held that 

"The situation is so clear-cut that even if the employee’s claim for wrongful dismissal, termination or retirement from service is successful or dismissed, his claim for benefits or entitlements which had accrued, before his dismissal or termination, or retirement are always paid. This is because the entitlement accruing to the respondent in the instance are personal to him and is akin to savings." 

 

"The new labour jurisprudence with the 3rd Alteration to the 1999 Constitution and the provisions of the law in that regard, particularly Section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court Act mandates that every Court in the land shall have recourse to good or international best practices in labour or industrial relations. I do not think the Courts should continue to use the former settled position of the law which is that no matter how hurtful, unreasonable or wrongful the termination of appointment is, the employee is only entitled to one month's salary in lieu of notice to determine the quantum of damages. Every case must be determined on its facts." 

 

 

 

"In exercise of discretion, no case is a precedent to the order; for every case is treated in its own peculiarity based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The guiding principle is that the discretion must be exercised judicially and judiciously." 

 

 

 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:

1. It is declared that the termination of the Claimant's employment as Finance Manager by the Defendant via the letter of termination dated 8 November 2023 was wrongful.

2. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant his outstanding earned salaries and allowances from 1 October 2023 up to 8 November 2023, being the date of his termination, calculated on the basis of his official annual gross salary of ?2,789,306.00 Naira.

3. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of ?232,442.17 Naira, being one month's salary in lieu of notice for the wrongful termination of his employment.

4. The Defendant is ordered to pay to the Claimant the sum of ?3,000,000.00 Naira as general damages for the wrongful, procedurally defective, and stigmatizing termination of his employment in breach of fair hearing and natural justice.

5. The Claimant's claims for reinstatement, declarations of subsisting employment, punitive damages, and legal fees are hereby dismissed.

6. Costs of this action are awarded to the Claimant against the Defendant, assessed at ?50,000.00 Naira.

 

51. Judgment is hereby entered.

 

 

…………………

Hon. Justice E. D. Subilim

JUDGE