IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE PORT HARCOURT JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT PORT HARCOURT

 

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE M. A. HAMZA

 

DATE: 7TH JULY, 2026 SUIT NO: NICN/PHC/73/2024

 

BETWEEN

MR. UDOFIA KINGSLEY ----------------------------------------------- CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

STEAM BROADCASTING & COMMUNICATIONS LTD ----- DEFENDANT

 

 

Representation:

Samuel A. Ikpante, Esq. for the Claimant

Rosemary Onos Mba (Mrs.), Esq. for the Defendant

 

JUDGMENT

1.    On the 18th day of October, 2024, the Claimant brought an action against the Defendant by way of Complaint seeking for the following reliefs:

  1. The sum of Seven Hundred Million Naira (?700,000,000.00) being compensated for the injury on the Claimant while working for the Defendant which resulted in the loss of his eyes which resulted into a permanent disability of the Claimant while in the employ of the Defendant.
  2. The sum of One Hundred Million Naira (?100,000,000.00) as general damages.

2.    Other originating processes were filed along with the Complaint in line with the Rules of this Court. In response, the Defendant entered appearance through its Counsel and filed its Statement of Defence together with other processes in compliance with the Rules of this Court.

The Case of the Claimant as Pleaded

3.    The case of the Claimant is that he was employed by the Defendant, initially as a casual worker in about 2009 during the construction of the Defendant’s Port Harcourt office complex and was later confirmed as a permanent employee as a General Maintenance Officer. He confirmed that he was healthy and had no visual impairment. That the nature of his duties exposed him to hazardous conditions, including welding, cutting metals and walls, handling toxic cleaning chemicals, and tile cutting. That despite repeated complaints, the Defendant failed to provide essential protective equipment such as safety goggles, nose masks, and hand gloves, and instead threatened him with dismissal whenever he raised concerns about workplace safety. That the prolonged exposure to welding flashes and other occupational hazards without adequate protection gradually impaired his eyesight, ultimately resulting in total blindness. He states that when his vision began deteriorating, the Defendant approved an eye examination, following which medication was prescribed. That the Defendant procured the medication only once and thereafter left him to bear the medical expenses himself. That despite his worsening condition, the Claimant continued to work until 28th November, 2022, when the Defendant terminated his employment on the grounds that his services were no longer required. That although the Defendant had pad severance benefits and other entitlements to other employees whose appointments were terminated, no severance package, compensation, or outstanding entitlements have been paid to him despite complying with the directive to surrender all company property. That he had repeatedly approached the Defendant, both personally and through his wife, seeking financial assistance and compensation, but has been met with delays and evasive responses. That the loss of his eyesight has caused him serve physical, emotional, psychological, and financial hardship. 

The Case of the Defendant as Pleaded

4.    The Defendant contends that the Claimant was only employed on 21st October, 2016 as a General Maintenance Officer/Foreman and not before that date as alleged. That prior to his employment, the Claimant worked as a bricklayer under Nidaco Nigeria Limited, the construction company that built the Defendant’s Port Harcourt office complex, and merely rendered casual services through that company from 2009 until he was formally employed. That the Claimant was never exposed to hazardous working conditions, toxic chemicals, or welding activities in the course of his employment, as it is a broadcasting and media company, and its operations do not involve such hazards. That the Claimant’s duties were limited to supervising cleaning activities, maintaining the office premises, assisting the Head of Maintenance, liaising with external artisans where necessary, and ensuring the premises were cleaned after repairs. That welding services were carried out by specialist welders and that the Claimant neither possessed welding skills nor performed welding tasks. That it provided the Claimant and other staff with appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and comprehensive medical health insurance, and that the Claimant never requested additional safety materials which were denied. That it is never responsible for the condition of the Claimant, and that the Claimant concealed his deteriorating eyesight from management. That when the severity of his visual impairment became apparent in 2021, it arranged for him to undergo medical examination, which revealed that he suffered from advanced glaucoma. That it paid for the Claimant’s prescribed medication and offered to sponsor a rehabilitation programme aimed at helping him adapt to his vision impairment, but the Claimant declined the offer. That despite the Claimant’s deteriorating health and eventual blindness, it retained him in employment and continued to pay his salary until 28th November, 2022, when his employment was terminated because his condition had allegedly become a safety risk to himself, his colleagues, and the workplace. Following the termination, it computed the Claimant’s terminal benefits and offered to pay same, together with an additional ex-gratia payment, subject to the completion of the standard handover processes.

5. During the hearing of the case, the Claimant testified as CW1, while the Defendant also called 2 witnesses namely; Mr. Simon Ede who testified as DW1 and Ms. Zita Ulu as DW2. The Court subsequently directed Counsel to the parties to file their respective Final Written Addresses in line with the Rules of this Court and they complied with the said direction.

 

Defendant’s Final Written Address

6.    In the Defendant’s Written Address at page 90 of the record, Counsel raised the sole issue for determination:

Whether, having regard to the pleadings and evidence before this HonourableCourt, the Claimant has discharged the burden of proving that his alleged workplace exposure caused his loss of sight, as opposed to a pre-existing or unrelated medical condition?

7.    Arguing the sole issue, on whether, having regards to the pleadings and evidence before this Honourable Court, the Claimant has discharged the burden of proving that his alleged workplace exposure caused his loss of sight, as opposed to a pre-existing or unrelated medical conditions? Counsel submitted that the sole issue ought to be resolved against the Claimant because he failed to establish, by credible, cogent and compelling evidence that his blindness arose out of or in the course of his employment with the Defendant. The Defendant’s case is that the Claimant’s allegations are founded on speculation rather than proof and that the Court cannot impose liability in the absence of evidence establishing a causal nexus between the alleged workplace exposure and the Claimant’s loss of sight.

8.    It was further submitted that by virtue of Section 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the burden of proof rests squarely on the Claimant to establish all material facts upon which his claims are predicated. In particular Section 133 (1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides that the burden of first proving the existence of a fact lies on the party against whom judgment would be entered if no evidence were produced by either side. That the Claimant was required to prove that: his blindness arose in the course of his employment with the Defendant; and the blindness resulted from the Defendant’s failure to provide appropriate safety equipment. Citing the case of DIKIBO V. JOHN (2019) 12 NWLR (PT. 1686) 183 @ P. 202, PARAS B-E, where the Court of Appeal held that a Claimant bears the initial burden of establishing his case by credible and probative evidence: ADESINA V. AIR FRANCE (2022) 8 NWLR (pt. 1833) 523 @ P. 549, Paras A-C.   

9.    Counsel argued that the Claimant’s case involves a serious medical allegation requiring expert evidence establishing causation. The Claimant relied on Exhibit C5 the Eye Test Report dated 16th April, 2021. He submitted that Exhibit C5 merely diagnosed glaucoma and did not state that the condition was occupational in nature; it resulted from welding exposure; it was aggravated by workplace activities; or it arose due to the Defendant’s failure to provide productive equipment. That the Claimant neither called the maker of Exhibit C5 nor any ophthalmologist or medical expert to testify as to the cause of his condition. Citing the case of OJO V. GHARORO (2006) 10 NWLR (PT. 987) 173 @ 206-207, PARAS F-E, where the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of expert evidence in cases involving specialized medical questions. That the Court cannot speculate on matters requiring medical expertise.

10.  Counsel submitted that the Claimant pleaded in paragraph 16 of the Statement of Facts that medical examination revealed that his condition resulted from exposure to continuous welding flashes. However, the alleged medical report was never produced, nor was any medical expert called to testify in support of that assertion. That either no such report exists or the report does not support the Claimant’s allegations, and urged the Court to treat the allegation as abandoned. Referring to the case of MOBILE NIGERIA UNLIMITED V. DR. MESHACK UMENWEKE & 3 ORS (2002) 9 NWLR (PT. 773) 3 @ 561-562 PARAS G-A. 

11.  It was contended that placing reliance on the evidence of DW2, the Claimant suffered from advanced glaucoma, a progressive medical condition often depending independently of environmental exposure. That there is no evidence linking glaucoma to the Claimant’s job description; welding exposure; or any alleged failure by the Defendant to provide protective equipment. That the Claimant was employed as a General Maintenance Officer and his duties involved: supervising cleaners; coordinating artisans; and overseeing maintenance activities. That the Defendant is a broadcasting company; it is neither an industrial nor construction company; and welding activities were carried out by independent artisans. That there is no evidence that the Claimant was engaged in hazardous activities capable of causing blindness.

12.  Counsel posited that its evidence regarding the nature of the Claimant’s duties and the diagnosis of glaucoma remained unchallenged and uncontroverted. Citing the case of NNAEMEKA V. I.N.E.C (2026) 1 NWLR (PT. 2024) 1 @ P. 65, PARAS. E, AND YAHAYA V. STATE (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 139 @ PP. 167-168 PARAS. H-D. Counsel also submitted that the Claimant contradicted himself during cross-examination where he admitted that bricklaying is his profession; he is not a welder; he supervised cleaners; artisans were engaged whenever specialized jobs arose; Mr. Segun was the company’s welder; and his role was essentially supervisory. That these admissions are inconsistent with the Claimant’s earlier assertions that he routinely performed welding duties, and these contradictions substantially weaken the Claimant’s credibility. That the Defendant pleaded and led evidence through DW1 that the Claimant was provided with necessary protective equipment, including: coveralls; hand gloves; face masks; and safety boots. He submitted that once this evidence was led, the burden shifted to the Claimant to prove otherwise. Citing the case of ECHI V. NNAMANI (2000) 8 N.WLR (PT. 667) 1 @ 17 PARAS. H, where the Supreme Court held that where issues are joined, the burden lies on the party who would fail if no evidence were adduced. He submitted that the Claimant failed to prove that protective equipment was not supplied.

13.  Counsel further submitted that the Claimant failed to cross-examine DW1 regarding the provision of protective equipment. The Claimant neither cross-examined DW1 on the issue, nor contradicted his evidence. Citing the case of AMADI V. NWOSU (1992) 5 NWLR (PT. 241) 273 @ 284, PARAS. G-H, where the Supreme Court held that failure to challenge a witness on a material fact amounts to acceptance of that evidence. He submitted that the Claimant admitted under cross-examination that his eye condition began around 2014/2015, and Exhibit C1 established that the Claimant commenced employment with the Defendant on 21st October, 2016. He submitted that liability cannot attach to an employer for a condition that predated the employment relationship. Citing Section 7 (1) of the Employee Compensation Act, 2010 which provides that compensation is payable only for injuries or diseases arising out of or in the course of employment.

14.  Counsel posited that it never abandoned the Claimant, and maintained that: the Claimant concealed his deteriorating eyesight; colleagues reported the situation to management; specialist medical attention was promptly arranged; prescribed medication was paid for by the Defendant; rehabilitation opportunities were offered; the Claimant declined rehabilitation; he remained in employment and received salary despite his inability to perform his duties; and his employment was eventually terminated for safety reasons, which DW1 also gave evidence in support of these assertions. He submitted that the Claimant admitted the existence of health insurance; the Defendant’s efforts to obtain treatment; continued salary payments; the rehabilitation offers; and the circumstances surrounding his eventual termination. That failure to reply to new facts may amount to an admission of those facts. Citing the case of IWUOHA V. NIPOST LTD (2003) 8 NWLR (PT. 822) 308 @ 340, PARA H; PARA H; 343, PARAS D-E.

15.  Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s case is founded on the assumption that because he became blind during employment, the Defendant must be liable, that this is legally unsustainable, and Courts must decide cases on evidence rather than speculation, and cannot fill evidential gaps through conjecture or guesswork. Citing the case of EJEZIE V. ANUWU (2008) 12 NWLR (PT. 1101) 446 @ P. 490 PARA C, AND ONUEGBU V. GOV. OF IMO STATE (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1962) 419 @ P. 444, PARAS. D-G. He submitted further that any complaint regarding severance benefits lacks merit, and in line with the Statement of Defence, the Claimant failed to complete handover procedures; and he rejected the severance package offered to him, and did not file Reply to challenge these facts. Citing the case of IWUOHA V. NIPOST LTD (supra).

16.  Counsel posited that the Claimant is not entitled to the sum of Seven Hundred Million Naira (?700,000,000.00) claimed as compensation, as he failed to establish that the alleged disability arose out of or in the course of the employment as required under Section 7(1) of the Employee Compensation Act, 2010. Also, that the claim for One Hundred Million Naira (?100,000,000.00) as general damages cannot succeed because liability has not been established. He submitted further that the Claimant failed to comply with the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Filing of Applications/Motions in Trade Union Matters and Marking of Exhibits) Practice Direction No. 1 of 2022, particularly on paragraphs 2(c), 2(d), and 3(b)(i) thereof. That the Claimant failed to indicate whether originals of the frontloaded documents would be available at trial; and whether foundations would be required before admissibility, and urges the Court to strike out the Claimant’s processes as incompetent; or discountenance the affected documents.

17.  Counsel submitted finally, that the Claimant failed to establish his claims because he produced no expert evidence linking glaucoma to workplace exposure, failed to tender the alleged medical report attributing his condition to welding flashes, contradicted himself under cross-examination, admitted that he was not a welder and that his condition predated his employment, failed to challenge material aspects of the Defendant’s evidence, failed to file a Reply to new facts pleaded in the Statement of Defence, and failed to prove any nexus between his blindness and his employment. He urged the Court to hold that the claimant failed to discharge the burden imposed by Section 131, 132, and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011, resolve the issue for determination in favour of the Defendant, dismiss the claims for compensation and general damages, and strike our or dismiss the suit in its entirety for being speculative, unproven, and lacking in merit.

Claimant’s Final written Address

18.  In the Claimant’s Final Written Address at page 132 of the record, Counsel also raised the sole issue for determination:

Whether from the entire evidence and circumstances of this case, the Claimant has made out a case as to be entitled to judgment as per the reliefs sought against the Defendant.

19.  Arguing the sole issue on, whether from the entire evidence and circumstances of this case, the Claimant has made out a case as to be entitled to judgment as per the reliefs sought against the Defendant. Counsel submitted that the burden rests on him to establish his entitlement to the reliefs claimed. That the person who asserts a fact bears the burden of proving it by credible evidence. Citing the case of MOGAJI V. CADBURY NIGERIA LTD (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 7) 395, 429, where the Supreme Court emphasized that civil cases are decided on the preponderance and quality of evidence adduced. He submitted that he has discharged this burden by presenting credible, coherent and unchallenged evidence showing that he permanently loss his sight in the course of carrying out his duties for the Defendant. He added that evidence is not evaluated by the number of witnesses called but by the credibility and probative value of the evidence presented. Citing the case of AMADI V. AMADI (2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 626) 559.

20.  Counsel submitted that the Claimant testified that he commenced work with the Defendant in 2009 as a casual employee during the construction of the Defendant’s Port Harcourt office complex and remained in that capacity until his conversion to permanent employment in October, 2016. That prior to his engagement and throughout the early years of his employment, he was fit and healthy and had no visual impairment whatsoever, which the Defendant’s witnesses corroborated this fact. Under cross-examination, DW1 testified that the Defendant had never employed a disabled person to his knowledge. Likewise, the DW2 admitted that the Claimant worked as a casual staff before his formal employment as General Maintenance Officer; and there was no record showing that the Claimant had visual impairment when he was formally employed. He submitted that the evidence of both parties established that he entered the Defendant’s employment with normal eyesight.

21.  Counsel further submitted that the evidence clearly showed that the Claimant lost his sight while performing his duties for the Defendant. That the Claimant stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 in  his Witness Statement on Oath, that his duties exposed him to hazardous conditions without protective equipment, and his duties included: welding metal surfaces; masonry works; cutting walls using cutting machines; cutting iron rods; handling highly toxic tile-cleaning chemicals; cutting tiles; and other maintenance-related assignments. That despite the dangerous nature of these tasks, the Defendant failed to provide safety equipment such as protective goggles; nose masks; hand gloves; and other protective gear, and was compelled to improvise by covering his nose with his clothes. He submitted that under cross-examination, the Claimant testified that his eye problem commenced around 2014/2015 when he was using a cutting machine and an object flew into his eyes. That this evidence was never challenged by the Defence Counsel and remained uncontroverted throughout the proceedings, and urged the Court to act upon this uncontroverted evidence. Citing the case KOPEK CONSTRUCTION LTD V. EKISOLA (2010) 40 WRN 1; AND BELLO V. KARIMA (2012) 35 WRN 18.

22.  Counsel contended that the Claimant was responsible for general maintenance duties within the Defendant’s establishment, and that although the Defendant once had a retained welder known as Mr. Segun, the said welder left around 2010/2011 and never returned, and that no replacement of welder was engaged by the Defendant. That the Claimant personally undertook maintenance duties involving welding and cutting operations, which the Defendant deliberately failed to disclose the true nature of the Claimant’s duties because such evidence would support the Claimant’s case. He submitted that the Defendant owed him a duty of care as his employer and which duty included obligations to provide safe equipment; safe working conditions; safe systems of work; and competent co-workers, which the Defendant breached this duty by failing to provide protective equipment necessary for the safe execution of his duties. Citing the case of HANSEATIC INTERNATIONAL LTD V. MARTIN USANG (2003) FWLR (PT. 149) 563.

23.  Counsel submitted that the Claimant repeatedly complained to the Defendant’s management concerning the absence of safety materials, but these complaints were either ignored or met with threats of dismissal which demonstrated the Defendant’s negligence. He submitted that to succeed in negligence, he must prove: that the Defendant owed him a duty of care; that the Defendant breached that duty; and that the breach caused his injury, and that all the ingredients of negligence had been established by the evidence before the Court. Citing the case of SILAS OSIGWE V. UNIPETROL (2005) ALL FWLR (PT. 267) 1525; NIGER MILLS PLC V. AGUBE (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 427) 86; AND IYERE V. BENDEL FEED AND FLOUR MILL LTD (2008) LPELR-1578 (SC).

24.  It was also submitted that the Defendant neither contradicted nor challenged the evidence relating to how the accident occurred, the Defendant’s witnesses allegedly failed to deny the occurrence of the accident in their depositions, and Defence Counsel did not attack the Claimant’s account during cross examination, and such evidence should be deemed admitted, as where evidence goes one way and remains unchallenged, the standard of proof becomes minimal. Citing the case of KENNETH IGHOSEWE V. DELTA STEEL COMPANY LTD (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 410) 741; AND ALHAJI ISIYAKU YAKUBU V. PHCN (2012) ALL FWLR (PT. 616) 529.

25.  Counsel further submitted that the Claimant is entitled to compensation under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010. See Section 1 (a) of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010, which provides for an open and fair system of compensation for employees who suffer injuries, disabilities, diseases or death arising out of employment. That the Claimant’s permanent blindness falls squarely within the scope of the Act. He submitted that by virtue of Section 73 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010, which defines an employee as including persons employed on: casual basis, temporary basis, part-time basis, apprenticeship basis, and oral contracts of employment, evidencing that the Claimant was an employee when the injury occurred as opposed to the argument of the Defendant, because he was a casual worker, and casual employees are fully protected under the Act. Counsel submitted further that by the provisions of Section 12(1) & (2) of the Employees’ Compensation Act, the Defendant was liable because the injury occurred in the course of employment.

26.  Counsel posited that medical evidence is not mandatory in every personal injury claim. Citing the following cases: OJO V. GHARORO (2006) 10 NWLR (PT. 987) 173; ISHOLA V. UBN LTD (2005) 6 NWLR (PT. 922) 422; OKHAI V. C& C CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD (2005) 6 NWLR (PT. 920) 160; AND KOPEK CONSTRUCTION LTD V. EKISOLA (2010) LPELR- 1703 (SC). That the Claimant’s blindness was obvious, permanent, and established by direct evidence which remained unchallenged. He submitted that the injury occurred within the workplace while he was performing assigned duties. Citing Section 73 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, which defines “workplace” and “work-related disability”, and that the statutory requirements had been fully satisfied. He further submitted that even if his continued employment was intended to compensate him, such arrangement could not deprive him of his statutory rights. Citing Section 13 (1) & (2) of the Employees’ Compensation Act.

27.  Counsel submitted that permanent blindness has significantly diminished his ability to enjoy the ordinary pleasures and conveniences of life. Citing the case of KENNETH IGHOSEWE V. DELTA STEEL COMPANY LTD (supra), where the Court recognized separate awards for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life, and urged the Court to award damages for loss of amenities of life arising from his permanent blindness. He submitted that evidence of continuous pain and dependence on medication justified an award under this head. Citing the case of C & C CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD V. SAMUEL TUNDE OKHAI (2023) 18 NWLR (PT. 852) 79, where the Supreme Court held that once personal injury is established, damages for pain and suffering should be considered.

28.  Counsel further posited that the loss of both eyes had irreparably diminished his future earning capacity and career prospects, and sought damages for prospective loss of future earnings arising from his permanent disability. Citing the case of UBA PLC V. MRS. VICTORIA FUNMILAYO OGUNDOKUN (2010) ALL FWLR (PT. 504) 1521.ALSO, IN NPA V. TAHMAN BROTHERS LTD (2010) 17 NWLR (PT. 1221) 103, the Court of Appeal held that negligence requires proof of duty, breach and resulting injury, and that Courts must determine whose conduct substantially caused the event. Counsel submitted that the Defendant’s failure to provide protective equipment and maintain a safe working environment substantially caused the injury that led to his permanent blindness.

29.  Counsel finally submitted that the Claimant entered the Defendant’s employment with normal eyesight; sustained eye injuries in the course of his employment; the Defendant failed to provide protective equipment and a safe system of work; the Defendant breached the duty of care owed to him; the evidence relating to the cause of the injury remained unchallenged; the Employees’ Compensation Act applies notwithstanding his status as a casual employee; the absence of a medical report is not fatal to his claim; and is entitled to compensation and damages for permanent disability, pain and suffering, loss of amenities of life and future loss of earning capacity, and prayed the Court to enter judgment in his favour and award adequate compensation to ameliorate the consequences of his permanent disability and enable him live a meaningful and worthwhile life despite the loss of his sight.

Defendant’s Reply on Points of Law

30.  Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s Final Written Address failed to comply with the provisions of the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2017 which is Order 45 Rule 2(2) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure) requiring numbered paragraphs in Final Written Addresses; and Order 45 Rule 3(1) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure)requiring a list of authorities relied upon, and left the legal consequences of the non-compliance to the discretion of the Court. Counsel submitted the Claimant wrongly characterized his evidence as “unchallenged.” That once a Defendant joins issues through its Statement of Defence and adduced evidence consistent with its pleadings, the Claimant’s evidence cannot be regarded as unchallenged.  The pleadings and evidence of the Defendant clearly disputed the material allegations made by the Claimant. Citing the case of AKPOTI V. INEC (2022) 9 NWLR (PT. 1836) 403 @ 423; AND AMAKEZE V. NZE PETROLEUM CO. (NIG.) LTD (2021) 1 NWLR (PT. 1754) 107 @ 122.

31.  Counsel submitted that without conceding, that parts of the Claimant’s evidence were unchallenged, the Defendant Contended that such evidence must still satisfy the threshold of credibility and sufficiency before the Court can rely upon it. Citing the case of M. I. N. LTD V. M.F.K.W.A LTD (2005) 10 NWLR (PT. 934) 645; AND DIBIA V. TUBONIMIA (2024) 11 NWLR (PT. 1950) 433 @ 457. He further submitted that the central issue in this suit concerns medical causation, namely whether the Claimant’s glaucoma and blindness resulted from workplace exposure. That since this issue involves medical science, expert evidence was indispensable. That the Claimant cannot rely on medical reports while simultaneously contending that medical evidence is unnecessary. He submitted that such conduct amounts to approbating and reprobating, which the law prohibits. Citing the case B.B. APUGO & SONS LTD V. ORTHOPAEDIC HOSPITALS MANAGEMENT BOARD (2016) 13 NWLR (PT. 1529) 206@ 254.

32.  Counsel submitted that the Claimant misconstrued the decision in OJO V. GHARORO (2006) 10 NWLR (PT. 987) 173, that the Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of expert medical evidence where medical causation is in issue; that the Court faulted the Appellant for failing to call relevant medical experts; and that hearsay accounts of what doctors allegedly said cannot substitute for expert testimony, and urged that the decision supports the requirement for medical evidence in the present case.

33.  Counsel also submitted that the Claimant misrepresented both the Court and the ratio decidendi in the case of ISHOLA V. U.B.N LTD (2005) 6 NWLR (PT. 922) 422. He submitted that the case is a Supreme Court decision, not a Court of Appeal decision; the case did not establish that oral evidence alone suffices to prove medically complex injuries; the Supreme Court emphasized that evidence must be credible and cogent; and that the case involved commercial transactions and medical causation. He further relied on the Court’s observation at page 441 that speculative evidence cannot be relied upon, and that the decision is distinguishable from the instant case.

34.  Counsel further submitted that despite diligent efforts, it could not verify the authority cited by the Claimant as OKHAI V. C & C CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD (2005) 6 NWLR (PT. 920) 160, and urged the Court to exercise caution before relying on the authority, particularly since the relevant extracts were not supplied by the Claimant. He submitted that the Claimant’s claim for ?700,000,000.00 (Seven Hundred Million Naira) as compensation for workplace injury, and ?100,000,000.00 (One Hundred Million Naira) as general damages are essentially claims for the same injury and loss. That granting both reliefs would therefore result in double compensation, which the law prohibits. Citing the case of TSOKWA MOTORS (NIG.) LTD. V. U. B. A PLC (2008) 2 NWLR (PT. 1071) 347 @ 366; AND KOPEK CONSTRUCTION LTD V. EKISOLA (2010) 3 NWLR (PT. 1182) 618 @ 643-644.

35.  Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s Counsel attempted to alter the Claimant’s evidence during final address. That the Claimant testified that his blindness resulted from exposure to welding flashes, but Claimant’s Counsel later argued that the injury occurred because “something flew into the Claimant’s eyes.” He submitted that these are materially different versions of events, and that since Counsel’s address cannot substitute evidence, the Court should disregard such submissions. Citing the case of C. B.N V. DINNEH (2021) 15 NWLR (PT. 1798) 91 @ 126-127; AND TERVER V. STATE (2026) 1 NWLR (PT. 2026) 521 @ 549.

36.  Counsel posited that the Claimant relied on Section 73 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 to argue that casual employees fall within the definition of “employee.” He submitted that he did not dispute the Statutory definition but that the argument was irrelevant, that the real issue is whether the Claimant was in fact employed by the Defendant before 21st October, 2016, when he revealed a formal letter of employment. That the meaning of “casual employee” under the Act does not resolve the factual dispute before the Court.

37.  Counsel finally submitted that the Court should hold that the Claimant’s evidence was not challenged; even if unchallenged, the evidence lacked the credibility and sufficiency required by law; expert medical evidence was necessary to establish causation in a medically complex claim involving glaucoma and blindness; the authorities relied upon by the Claimant were either misconstrued, distinguishable, or unverified; the claim for compensation and general damages constitute impermissible double compensation; Counsel cannot alter or expand the evidence already on record through final address; and the Claimant’s reliance on the Employees’ Compensation Act does not address the actual dispute regarding the existence of an employment relationship prior to 21st October, 2016, and prayed the Honourable Court to reject the legal arguments advanced by the Claimant and dismiss the Claimant’s suit in its entirety.

 

COURT’S DECISION

38.  I have carefully considered the pleadings filed by the parties, the evidence adduced by the witnesses, the documentary exhibits tendered and admitted, as well as the submissions of learned Counsel in their respective Final Written Addresses and the Defendant’s Reply on Points of Law. From all of these, I am of the considered view that the following issues need to be resolved as they are the thrust of action. Other ancillary issue(s) may be subsumed in the determination of these issues to wit:

  1. Whether the Defendant breached its duty of care by failing to provide a safe system of work and necessary protective equipment.
  2. Whether there is a causal nexus between the Claimant’s workplace activities and his loss of sight.
  3. Whether the Claimant has discharged the burden of proof required to the reliefs sought.

 

What is the Nature of the Employment Relationship Between the Parties

39. Before proceeding further, it is pertinent to determine the nature of employment relationship existing between the parties, as the rights and obligations flowing from the relationship are dependent upon its character. The law is firmly settled that contracts of employment generally fall into three (3) broad categories, namely: employment governed by Statute or possessing statutory flavour; pure master and servant employment; and employment held at the pleasure of the employer. See NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY LIMITED V. CLIFCO NIGERIA LTD (2011) 10 NWLR (PT. 1255) 209; C.B.N V. IGWILLO (2007) 14 NWLR (PT. 1054) 393; AND KATTO V. CBN (1999) 6 NWLR (PT. 607) 390.

40.  In determining whether an employment enjoys Statutory flavour, the Court must ascertain whether the conditions of service are governed directly by statute or regulations made pursuant to statue. See OLORUNTOBA-OJU V. ADBUL-RAHEEM (2009) 13 NWLR (PT. 1157) 83; AND BEY V. FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION (1981) 1 SC 40. In the instant case, the Defendant is a private broadcasting and media company. There is no evidence before the Court that the employment of the Claimant was regulated by any statute or subsidiary legislation. Exhibit C1, being the Claimant’s letter of employment dated 21st October, 2016, reveals that the relationship between the parties was founded purely on contract. Accordingly, the employment relationship between the Claimant and the Defendant was one of master and servant, regulated by the terms and conditions mutually agreed upon by the parties.

Whether the Claimant’s Engagement from 2009 Constituted Continuous Employment and Whether the Defendant was the True Employer

41.  The Defendant contended that the Claimant only became its employee on 21st October, 2016 upon the issuance of Exhibit C1 and that prior to that date, the Claimant merely rendered services through Nidaco Nigeria Limited, the company engaged in the construction of the Defendant’s Port Harcourt office complex. The Claimant on the other hand, maintained that he had worked continuously for the Defendant since about 2009, initially as a casual employee and later as a permanent staff. 

42.  There is no dispute that the Claimant rendered services from 2009. Indeed, the evidence of DW2 under cross-examination substantially acknowledged that the Claimant worked as a casual staff before his formal confirmation in 2016. DW2 further admitted that there was no record indicating that the Claimant suffered any visual impairment at the time of his formal employment. Thus, the dispute is not whether the Claimant rendered services prior to 2016, but whether such service can, in law, be attributed to the Defendant.

43.  The law has moved considerably from the traditional rigid conception of employment relations. Modern labour jurisprudence, particularly as developed by this Court pursuant to Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), Section 7 (6) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 and Article 4 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention, 1982, (NO. 158), permits the Court to look beyond the form of an arrangement to its substance in determining the true employer. In AERO CONTRACTORS CO. OF NIGERIA LTD V. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AIRCRAFT PILOTS AND ENGINEERS (2014) 47 NLLR (PT. 154) 1 NIC, this Court emphasized that labour jurisprudence now recognized the need to ascertain the real nature of an employment relationship and to prevent disguised arrangements from defeating the rights of workers.

44.  Similarly, in PENGASSAN V. MOBIL PRODUCING NIGERIA UNLIMITED (2013) 32 NLLR (PT. 92) 243 NIC, the Court held that labour rights are not to be defeated by the mere interposition of intermediaries where the realities of the relationship disclose otherwise. Again, in Mr. Patrick Obiora Modilim V. United Bank for Africa Plc (unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/353/2012, judgment delivered on 19th June 2014), this Court held that it possesses the jurisdiction to pierce the veil of employment arrangements and identify the true employer by considering the totality of the facts. Section 91 of the Labour Act, Cap. L1, laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004 recognizes both oral and written contracts of employment, while Section 73 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 defines an employee to include persons employed on temporary, casual and part-time basis.

45.  Having carefully considered the evidence before this Court, I find that the Claimant continuously rendered services in respect of the Defendant’s premises from about 2009. However, the evidence falls short of establishing that Nidaco Nigeria Limited was a mere façade or sham arrangement designed to conceal the Defendant’s identity as the true employer. No contract between the Defendant and Nidaco Nigeria Limited was tendered. No representative of Nidaco Nigeria Limited was called. There is no evidence showing who paid the Claimant’s wages between 2009 and 2016. There is equally no evidence showing who exercised disciplinary control over him during that period. Neither is there evidence establishing who possessed the power of engagement and dismissal before the issuance of Exhibit C1. These factors are material in determining the identity of the true employer. See the case of SHENA SECURITY CO. LTD V. AFROPAK (NIG.) LTD & ORS. (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1118) 77 @ 128-129, where the Supreme Court identified payment of wages, control, supervision and power of dismissal as important indicia in determining the existence of an employment relationship.

46.  In the absence of such evidence, this Court is unable to conclude that the Defendant was the Claimant’s employer before 21st October 2016. Accordingly, while I accept that the Claimant rendered services connected with the Defendant’s premises from 2009, I am unable to hold, on the evidence before me, that there existed a continuous contract of employment between the parties throughout that period. I therefore hold that the legally recognizable contract of employment between the Claimant and the Defendant commenced on 21st October, 2016 upon the issuance of Exhibit C1. Consequently, the employment relationship existing between the parties was one of master and servant founded on contract and devoid of Statutory flavour. 

47.  This finding, however, does not derogate from the broad definition of “employee” under Section 73 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010. It merely reflects the insufficiency of evidence connecting the Defendant to the Claimant’s pre-2016 engagement. Indeed, had satisfactory evidence been led showing that the Defendant exercised effective control over the Claimant, paid his wages, supervised his work and retained disciplinary authority notwithstanding the involvement of Nidaco Nigeria Limited, this Court would have not hesitated, in line with modern labour jurisprudence and international best practices, to hold that the Claimant’s employment relationship with the Defendant commenced from 2009. However, the evidence before the Court supports the conclusion that the Claimant became an employee of the Defendant in law form 21st October, 2016. 

48.  Having earlier determined that the legally recognizable contract of employment between the parties commenced on 21st October, 2016 and that the relationship was one of ordinary master and servant founded on contract, the next question is whether the Claimant has established that the permanent loss of his eyesight was occasioned by occupational exposure arising from the Defendant’s breach of its duty to provide a safe workplace and a safe system of work.

49.  At the foundation of every civil action lies the burden of proof. By virtue of Section 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act, 2011, the burden of proving the existence of facts upon which a party relies rests on the party asserting those facts. The law is equally settled that he who asserts must prove and that the strength of a Claimant’s case cannot be founded upon the weakness of the defence except where such weakness itself supports the Claimant’s case. See SKYE BANK PLC V. AKINPELU (2010) 9 NWLR (PT. 1198) 179 SC; AYENI V. ADESINA (2007) 7 NWLR (PT. 1033) 233 SC; AND FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA LTD V. MAIWADA (2013) 5 NWLR (PT. 1348) 444 SC.

50.  Furthermore, in NITEL PLC V. AKWA (2006) 2 NWLR (PT. 964) 391 SC, the Supreme Court reiterated that in an action founded on negligence, the burden lies on the Claimant to establish by credible evidence that: the Defendant owed him a duty of care; the Defendant breached that duty; and the breach occasioned the injury complained of. See also SPDC NIG. V. IKONTIA (2010) 12 NWLR (PT. 1207) 1 SC; AND GTB PLC V. ADEDAMOLA (2019) 5 NWLR (PT. 1664) 30 SC.

51.  The essence of a duty of care in an employment relationship admits of no controversy. An employer owes his employee the common law duty to provide competent fellow employees, adequate plant and equipment, a safe place of work and a safe system of work. See IYERE V. BENDEL FEED AND FLOUR MILL LTD (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1119) 300 SC; AND NIGERIAN BOTTLING CO. PLC V. NGONADI (1985) 1 NWLR (PT. 4) 739. The existence of the duty is therefore not in dispute. The real controversy is whether the Defendant breached that duty and whether such breach caused the blindness suffered by the Claimant.

52.  The Claimant’s case is that he was exposed over the years to welding flashes, cutting machines, tile-cutting chemicals and allied hazards without protective equipment and that such exposure gradually impaired his eyesight until he eventually became blind. The Defendant, on the other hand, contended that the Claimant merely supervised maintenance activities, that welding operations were performed by specialist artisan, that protective equipment was made available, and that medical examination revealed advanced glaucoma unrelated to occupational exposure. I have painstakingly reviewed the evidence adduced by both parties. The Claimant tendered Exhibit C5, the eye examination report dated 16th April, 2021. A careful examination of the said exhibit revealed that it diagnosed glaucoma. Significantly, nowhere in the report is there any indication that the condition resulted from welding flashes, cutting machines, chemicals, or any occupational hazard connected with the Claimant’s work.

53.  Indeed, the entire submission of the Claimant’s case rests upon paragraph 16 of the Statement of Facts and his oral testimony that doctors allegedly informed him that the condition arose from prolonged exposure to welding light. However, no such report attributing the condition to occupational exposure was tendered before this Court. Equally, no ophthalmologist or medical practitioner who treated the Claimant was called to testify. The law is elementary that where a matter involves scientific or medical causation which falls outside the ordinary experience of the Court, expert evidence becomes indispensable. See Section 68 of the Evidence Act, 2011; AKEREDOLU V. MIMIKO (2014) 1 NWLR (PT. 1388) 402 SC; AND OMISORE V. AREGBESOLA (2015) 15 NWLR (PT. 1482) 1 SC.

54.  Medical causation is not a matter to be established by conjecture, sympathy or speculation. Courts are not medical laboratories and judges are not ophthalmologists. I agree with learned Counsel for the Defendant that the mere diagnosis of glaucoma does not automatically establish that the disease was occupational in origin. It is noteworthy that DW2 testified that the Claimant suffered from advanced glaucoma. This evidence remained substantially unshaken even under cross-examination. More importantly, no contrary medical opinion was produced. The Court cannot speculate that glaucoma was caused by welding exposure merely because the Claimant eventually became blind while in employment. In SA’EED V. YAKOWA (2013) 7 NWLR (PT. 1352) 124 SC, the Court held that speculation, however plausible, cannot replace legal proof. See also, ANPP V. USMAN (2008) 12 NWLR (PT. 1100) 1 SC; AND ADELEKE V. IYANDA (2001) 13 NWLR (PT. 729) 1 SC.

55.  I have also considered the evidence relating to the nature of the Claimant’s duties. Under cross-examination, the Claimant admitted that he is a bricklayer by profession, that he is not a trained welder, that artisans were brought in whenever specialized jobs arose, and that one Mr. Segun performed welding operations for the Defendant. These admissions considerably weaken the assertion that he was continuously exposed to welding activities in a manner capable of causing blindness. Equally significant is the fact that the Claimant himself admitted that his eye problem commenced around 2014/2015. This admission assumes considerable importance because this Court has already held that the legally recognizable employment relationship between the parties commenced on 21st October, 2016. Even assuming, without conceding, that the eye condition began in 2014/2015, liability cannot be imposed on the Defendant for a medical condition that predated the contractual relationship between the parties.

56. Section 7 and 9 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010 contemplate injuries and occupational diseases arising out of and in the course of employment. The phrase “arising out of and in the course of employment” imports a causal nexus between the employment of the injury complained of. See NIGERIA SOCIAL INSURANCE TRUST FUND MANAGEMENT BOARD V. KLIFCO NIG. LTD (2010) 13 NWLR (PT. 1211) 307 CA, where the Court emphasized the necessity of establishing a connection between employment and the injury suffered. I am not unmindful of the benevolent philosophy underpinning the Employees’ Compensation Act, 2010. The Act is social welfare legislation intended to provide an open and fair system of compensation for employees who sustain occupational injuries and diseases. This Court has repeatedly adopted a liberal approach in construing labour and social welfare statutes. However, notwithstanding its beneficial character, the Act does not dispense with the necessity of proving that the injury complained of is work-related. Compensation cannot substitute proof. The law remains that sympathy has no place in judicial adjudication. See CHUKWU V. INEC (2014) 10 NWLR (PT. 1415) 385 SC, where the Supreme Court held that the decisions of Courts must be founded on law and evidence and not on sentiments or emotions.

57.  I have equally considered the contention of the Claimant that expert medical evidence is unnecessary because blindness is visible and obvious. With profound respect, the issue before the Court is not whether the Claimant is blind. There is abundant evidence that he has unfortunately lost his eyesight. Indeed, the Defendant itself does not dispute that fact. the issue is whether the blindness was caused by occupational exposure attributable to the Defendant’s negligence. That question is essentially one of medical causation requiring scientific evidence. Visibility of the injury is distinct from proof of its cause. The fact that blindness is apparent does not obviate the need to establish its etiology. See AGBI V. OGBEH (2006) 11 NWLR (PT. 990) 65 SC, where the Supreme Court held that the existence of an injury does not by itself establish liability.

58.  I have also considered the allegation that the Defendant failed to provide personal protective equipment, even though DW1 admitted under cross examination that the Claimant does most of the minor welding jobs in the Company as rightly stated by the Claimant. While the same DW1 testified that coveralls, hand gloves, face masks and safety boots were provided. Thus, if an employee denies receiving the PPE, the onus shifts to the employer to prove that the supply was indeed made. See CHRISTIAN VS. UMARA & ANOR (2021) LPELR- 53242 (CA).

59.  Flowing from the above, an employer can only discharge this burden by producing before the Court records such as PPE issuance logs; inventory register; or individual employee PPE records and the like. See the case STFM CO. LTD VS. ESSIEN (2019) LPELR- 47475 (CA). Similarly, an oral testimony of issuing personnel such as the Store Keeper; Safety Officer; or any personnel directly responsible for the procurement, storage can testify in Court. See OLUMIDE VS. EJIBO (2025) LPELR- 82643. In the instant case, Defendant neither produce such documents as indicated above nor called any of the listed personnel. 

60.  Consequently, the Defendant is found to have breached its non-delegable duty of care to provide a safe system of work and necessary protective equipment. The nature of the Claimant’s duties, specifically welding and handling toxic chemicals, is inherently hazardous and carries a high risk of ocular and respiratory injury. Under our law, an employer is under a strict obligation to provide PPE such as goggles, gloves and mask when the nature of the work demands it. The admission by the Defendant’s witnesses that there were no records of safety compliance or the provision of PPE, coupled with the Claimant’s testimony, established a failure to meet the standard of a reasonable employer. Consequently, the Defendant’s failure to ensure Claimant used protective gear while performing dangerous tasks constitutes a clear breach of duty of care owed to the employee, as the employer failed to mitigate foreseeable risks associated with the job description performed by the Claimant. More importantly, assuming there was failure to provide protective equipment, there still remains no credible evidence establishing that such failure caused glaucoma or the subsequent blindness. The missing link in the Claimant’s case remains causation. It is causation that bridges negligence and liability. Without proof of causation, negligence remains incomplete. See SPDC NIG. LTD V. FARAH (1995) 3 NWLR (PT. 382) 148 SC; AND CHERVON NIG. LTD V. IMO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY (2016) 8 NWLR (PT. 1515) 300 SC.

61.  Another aspect deserving attention is the conduct of the Defendant after the Claimant’s condition became manifest. The evidence before the Court discloses that the Defendant arranged medical examination, paid for medication, retained the Claimant in employment notwithstanding his deteriorating vision, continued paying his salaries, and proposed rehabilitation measures. It further offered terminal benefits and additional ex gratia payments. While these acts do not exonerate an employer from liability where negligence is established, they are relevant in evaluating whether the Defendant abandoned the Claimant or acted with complete indifference to his condition. However, despite the above position, the records of this Court showed two (2) contradicting statements by the Defendants witnesses. While DW1 responded under cross examination that the Claimant ‘was taken to the hospital because of the eyes problem, but was taken only once. On the other hand, DW2 stated under cross examination that “the Claimant was to go back to the hospital in two weeks time. We sponsored the Claimant back to the hospital in two weeks time, but I don’t have record to that effect.”

62.  This is a case of clear contradiction. Whose statement is to be given a favourable consideration in the circumstance? Similarly, it has never been shown by the Defendant that “Gutt latanoprost 1 nocte x 2/52” was prescribed to the Claimant by the Doctors as contained in Exhibit C5 was really provided by the Defendant. It is imperative to say that the Defendant’s assertion pertaining to this issue is very weak. So, I hold.

63.  There is no doubt that the Claimant has served the Defendant officially from 21st day of October, 2016 to 28th day of November, 2022 as contained in Exhibits C1 & C2. If that is settled, is he then not entitled to his terminal benefits? It was the contention of the Claimant that while his colleagues from the same Company whose appointments were terminated over the same period received their terminal benefits in accordance with their condition of employment. Whereas, the Claimant was not given any to that effect up to this moment.

64.  On what terminal benefits are and their importance to labour law, My Noble Lord Abba- Aji, JSC in the case of ABDURRAHMAN VS. NATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY (2021) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1791) 405 said on pages 419 to 420 as follows: A terminal benefit is a lump sum of money awarded at the expiration employment. It is accruable to an employee when his service is no longer required. A terminal benefit is readily and easily assessed as it is calculable from the agreement between parties on terms and conditions of employment. See KOMOLAFE VS. NNPC (2021) LPELR- 55792 (CA). Furthermore, this terminal benefit include gratuity. See JULIUS BERGER NIG. PLC. VS. NWAGWU (2006) 12 NLR (Pt. 995)518: MAINSTREET BANK REGISTRARS LTD VS. OLUGBOSOLA (2017) LPELR- 50998 (CA).

65.  Flowing from the above, DW2 under cross examination stated that the terminal benefit of the Claimant was computed and is one month salary in lieu of notice. The question that called for determination at this juncture is whether by virtue of the decisions in the cited judicial authorities, one month salary in lieu of notice reflect the total terminal benefit of the Claimant who worked diligently for the Defendant over the period of 6 years? This question remained unanswered by the Defendant who is saddled with the said duty. It is my considered opinion that failure of the Defendant compute appropriately the terminal benefit of the Claimant 6 years his disengagement from service is an unfair labour practice and therefore attract penalty. See PILGRIMS AFRICA LTD VS. BOYSON (2025).

66.  On the issue of damages, it is my considered opinion that the Claimant is not entitled to the special damages sought for the permanent loss of sight, although he is entitled to general damages for the Defendant’s breach of the duty of care and unfair labour practice. In Nigerian personal injury law, for Claimant to recover substantial compensatory damages for a specific injury, they must prove both the breach of duty and that the breach caused the injury. The Claimant in the instant case having failed to prove the causal link between the lack of PPE and the glaucoma, the claim or special and general damages predicated on blindness must fail. See SPDC NIG. LTD. VS. FARAH (1995) 3 NWLR (PT.341) 142 SC: CHEVRON NIG. LTD VS. IMO STATE HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY (2011) 8 NWLR (PT.1515 )302 SC.

67.  However, the Court recognizes the Defendant’s failure to provide a safe system of work and refusal to pay the Claimant his terminal benefit having terminated his appointment for over six (6) years period as independent wrongs. Therefore, the Court awards general damages to reflect the Defendant’s negligence in failing to provide a safe workplace and for the risk the Claimant was exposed to, as well as the hardship he undergoes due to non-payment of his entitlement promptly, though these are significantly lower than the sums claimed for total blindness. 

On the whole, it is hereby ordered as follows:

  1. I hold that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of N5,000,000.00 ( Five Million Naira) only as general damages which shall be paid within 30 days from the date of this judgment failing which same shall attract interest at the rate of 10% per annum until final liquidation.
  2. I ordered that the Defendant shall compute and pay the Claimant his terminal benefit forthwith.
  3. Parties shall bear their respective costs.

 

Judgment is entered accordingly.

 

 

 ------------------------------------------

       Hon. Justice M. A Hamza

Judge