IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT JOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE I. S. GALADIMA

DATE: MONDAY 6 JULY 2026                         CHARGE NO: NICN/JOS/CR/1/2025

BETWEEN

THE PEOPLE OF PLATEAU STATE …………………………………. PROSECUTION

AND

PATRICK NNAMDI ……………………………………………………… DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION:

·        Joel Tahvan, Esq., (Solicitor General); Yop Rwang, Esq., (Permanent Secretary); Sabo Longji, Esq., (Director, Civil Litigation); Shetak Becklang (Director, Legal Drafting); D.H. Williams, Esq., (DPP); P.N. Dashak (Ass. Director Civil Litigation) for the State.

 

·        I.K. Randa, Esq; S.Y. Auta for the defendant.

JUDGMENT

Patrick Nnamdi, the Defendant, was arraigned before this Court on a two-count charge relating to human trafficking, contrary to Section 13(1) and (2)(a), (b), and (c) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015.

The two-count charge brought by the Honourable Attorney General of Plateau State read as follows:

Statement of offence:

Count one:

Assisting or facilitating human trafficking contrary to section 13 (c) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act 2015.

Particulars:

That you, Patrick Nnamdi sometimes in September 2024, in Jos, Plateau State within the jurisdiction of this court, assisted or facilitated one Glory Nwachukwu in deceiving, recruiting, and trafficking (1) one male child – real name unknown and (2) one female child – real name unknown, from Jos, Plateau State to Lagos after paying the sum of N550,000.00 to one Pastor Dayo Bernard who gave out the children, after which you were arrested and you thereby committed the above mentioned offence.

Count Two:

Omitting to present act of human trafficking contrary to section 13 (b) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015.

That you, Patrick Nnamdi, sometime in September 2024 in Jos, Plateau State within the jurisdiction of this court, omitted to prevent one Glory Nwachukwu from deceiving, recruiting, amd trafficking (1) one male child – real name unknown and (2) a female child – real name unknown from Jos, Plateau State to Lagos State after paying the sum of N550,000.00 to one Pastor Dayo Bernard who gave out the children after which you were arrested and you thereby committed the above mentioned offence.

Upon arraignment on the 29th January 2025, the charge was read over to him, and he pleaded Not Guilty to both counts. Trial thereafter commenced.  

The prosecution called two witnesses, PW1 and PW2, and tendered documentary and electronic exhibits marked Exhibits P1, P2, P3 and P4. The Defendant testified for himself alone as DW1 and closed his defence. Thereafter parties filed and adopted their final written addresses.  

FACTS OF THE CASE

The facts of this case, stripped of unnecessary embellishments, are straightforward.

The prosecution’s case is that sometime in September 2024, the Defendant, acting in concert with one Prophetess Glory Nwachukwu, one Victoria Ugwu, and one Pastor Dayo Bernard, participated in the movement and transfer of two children from Plateau State to Lagos State under the false guise of adoption. Evidence revealed that sums of ?550,000 each were paid for the children.

PW1 testified that the Defendant admitted in his written statement that he and Prophetess Glory expressed interest in obtaining children and that arrangements were made through Pastor Dayo Bernard. PW1 further stated that the children were eventually transferred to one Ifeoma Madueke in Lagos.  

PW2 corroborated this account and tendered the Defendant’s confessional statement as Exhibit P2, and the video confessional evidence as Exhibit P4.

The Defendant, in his defence, denied trafficking. His case is that he merely acted on the instructions of Prophetess Glory and believed there was an ongoing lawful adoption process.

That, in simple terms, is the contest before this Court.

Proceedings before the court:

The proceedings in this matter reveal a fairly detailed criminal trial spanning from 29th January 2025 to 29th January 2026, involving arraignment, prosecution’s case, defence, and eventual filing of final written addresses. A chronological summary of the proceedings is set out hereunder.

The matter commenced on 29th January 2025 before this Honourable Court upon the arraignment of the Defendant, Patrick Nnamdi, on a two-count charge of facilitating human trafficking and failing to prevent acts of trafficking contrary to Section 13(1) and (2) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015. At the commencement of proceedings, learned counsel for the Defendant informed the Court that he had only just been served with the charge and sought adjournment. The prosecution opposed, contending that the Defendant himself had long been aware of the allegations and had already been served. The Court, after considering the submissions, held that no undue prejudice would be occasioned and ordered that the charge be read.

Upon the charge being read to the Defendant, he pleaded Not Guilty to both counts. Thereafter, the prosecution applied that the Defendant be remanded in custody pending trial. Defence counsel, however, urged the Court to admit the Defendant to bail on the same terms as the earlier administrative bail granted by the Police. The prosecution objected, arguing that administrative bail had lapsed and that a formal bail application ought to be filed. The Court, in its discretion, admitted the Defendant to bail in the sum of ?5,000,000.00 with one surety who must be a public servant not below Grade Level 14 and must own landed property within jurisdiction. The Court further directed that trial should proceed on a day-to-day basis and adjourned to 30th January 2025 for hearing.  

On 30th January 2025, hearing commenced. The prosecution opened its case and called its first witness, PW1, Inspector Dafor Dashik, an officer attached to the Force Intelligence Department/Intelligence Response Team (IRT), Abuja. PW1 testified that sometime around 4th or 5th December 2024, intelligence reports of child trafficking and criminal conspiracy were referred to his team, leading to the arrest of the Defendant and his associates, including Prophetess Glory Nwachukwu. He narrated that the Defendant was implicated in the purchase of two children from one Pastor Dayo Bernard at the rate of ?550,000.00 each.

PW1 testified that after the Defendant’s arrest, he personally recorded the Defendant’s statement after administering the cautionary words. According to PW1, the Defendant admitted in his statement that one Victoria Ugwu brought a child to their ministry and explained that she had adopted the child through Pastor Dayo Bernard. The Defendant and Prophetess Glory Nwachukwu thereafter expressed interest in adopting children. PW1 stated that the Defendant and Prophetess Glory subsequently paid ?550,000.00 each for two children, who were then taken to one Ifeoma Madueke in Lagos. PW1 further stated that a further advance payment of ?300,000.00 had been made for another child, but the transaction failed when it was discovered the children were twins and could not be separated.

PW1 informed the Court that the rescued children were later handed over to the Plateau State Commissioner for Women Affairs and eventually reunited with their parents. Under cross-examination, PW1 admitted that there was no formal report of missing children prior to the investigation and that much of his understanding of “adoption” came from the Defendant’s statement itself. He also admitted that a lawyer had been involved in the purported adoption process but that no completed adoption documents were ever produced.

During cross-examination, the Defendant’s counsel tendered the frontloaded statement attached to the charge sheet, which was admitted as Exhibit P1. The matter was thereafter adjourned to 27th February 2025 for continuation.  

On 1st July 2025, proceedings resumed. At the outset, the prosecution moved an application filed on 26th February 2025 seeking leave to file additional proof of evidence, amend its list of witnesses, and introduce a flash drive containing the video recording of the Defendant’s interrogation. Defence counsel did not oppose. The Court granted the application.

The prosecution then called PW2, Inspector Abu Isah, another member of the investigative team. PW2 testified that on 2nd December 2024, intelligence information regarding child trafficking activities in Plateau State led to the arrest of one Pontel Nanman with four children suspected to have been stolen. He stated that investigations led to the arrest of Pastor Dayo Bernard, who allegedly confessed to trafficking children and implicated the Defendant and other co-conspirators.

PW2 testified that after the Defendant’s arrest, a written statement was taken from him by the late PW1, Inspector Dafor Dashik. Because PW1 had died before the continuation of trial, PW2 identified the Defendant’s written statement and testified as to its authenticity, having known PW1 professionally for over ten years.

The prosecution tendered the Defendant’s written statement dated 4th December 2024, which was admitted without objection as Exhibit P2. PW2 further testified that the Defendant also made a video confessional statement, which was stored in an 8GB First Eagle Flash Drive. Alongside this, the prosecution tendered an Affidavit of Compliance in respect of the electronic evidence. These were admitted without objection as Exhibit P3 (Affidavit of Compliance) and Exhibit P4 (Flash Drive) respectively. Thereafter, the contents of the flash drive were viewed in open Court.

Under cross-examination, PW2 admitted that the Defendant did not expressly confess to buying children in his written statement, but maintained that the language used in the statement showed that what was called “adoption” was, in effect, a transaction involving payment for children without lawful process. He also admitted that the money could have been represented as legal fees, as suggested by the defence. At the close of PW2’s testimony, the prosecution closed its case and the matter was adjourned to 11th July 2025.  

On 11th July 2025, the prosecution formally closed its case. Defence counsel sought time to prepare and open the defence, and the Court adjourned the matter to 7th November 2025 for defence.

Subsequently, on 29th January 2026, the defence opened its case. The Defendant testified as the sole defence witness (DW1). He identified himself as a clergy and assistant pastor under Prophetess Glory Nwachukwu. He denied any involvement in child trafficking and stated that his role was merely that of an errand runner.

DW1 testified that sometime in November 2024, Prophetess Glory instructed him to meet one Victoria Ugwu at Bukuru concerning a child that had supposedly been adopted for another church member. He stated that upon getting there, he was shown a document described as a “letter of consent for adoption” and that he contacted their lawyer to verify the authenticity of the papers. According to him, Pastor Dayo Bernard informed him that the lawyer was handling the adoption process.

DW1 further testified that he later discovered at the police station that the papers were irregular. He denied ever buying children or participating in trafficking, insisting that he merely acted in obedience to instructions and believed the process was lawful.

Under cross-examination, however, DW1 admitted that no adoption order had been issued at the time he took custody of the child. He also admitted that he neither knew the child’s name nor the identity of the child’s parents. In response to questions from the Court, he confirmed that the child was about three years old, had since been returned to the parents, and that he had never before engaged in such conduct.

At the conclusion of his testimony, the defence closed its case. Both parties then sought time to file and exchange their final written addresses. The Court granted a total of 52 days and adjourned the matter to 15 April 2026 for the adoption of final written addresses. However, the addresses were ultimately adopted on 18 June 2026 whereupon the case was reserved for pronouncement of judgment today.

In the course of the proceedings, the following exhibits were tendered and admitted:

Exhibit P1 — the Defendant’s frontloaded statement attached to the proof of evidence, tendered through PW1 during cross-examination.

Exhibit P2 — the Defendant’s written confessional statement dated 4th December 2024, tendered through PW2.

Exhibit P3 — the Affidavit of Compliance relating to the admissibility of electronic evidence.

Exhibit P4 — the 8GB First Eagle Flash Drive containing the video recording of the Defendant’s interrogation.

DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL’S FINAL ADDRESS:

In his Final Written Address filed on 23 February 2026, learned counsel for the Defendant mounted a comprehensive attack against the prosecution’s case and urged the Court to discharge and acquit the Defendant. Counsel structured his address around three issues for determination, each directed at challenging the legal and evidential foundation of the prosecution’s case.  

On the first issue, namely whether the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt to warrant conviction, learned counsel submitted emphatically that the answer must be in the negative. Counsel began by restating the constitutional presumption of innocence in favour of the Defendant, contending that by virtue of Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), every person charged with a criminal offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty. In further support, counsel relied on Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2011, arguing that the burden of proof in criminal proceedings lies throughout on the prosecution and never shifts.

In reinforcing this principle, counsel cited Mbang Efoli Mbang v State (2009) 12 SCNJ 232, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that the prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel also referred to Ukatu v FRN (2021) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1785) 525, where the Court explained that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require proof beyond every iota of doubt, but rather proof so cogent and compelling that no reasonable tribunal would hesitate to convict. In addition, counsel cited Stephen v State (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 491) 962 at 974 paras C–D, in support of the same principle.

Flowing from this, counsel submitted that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, particularly PW1 and PW2, was speculative and incapable of grounding a conviction. He argued that speculative evidence has no place in criminal jurisprudence. In support of this argument, he cited Sunday Ani & Anor v State (2009) 6 SCNJ 98, where the Supreme Court emphasized that criminal liability must be established by cogent, complete and unequivocal evidence.

Counsel further submitted that no citizen should be subjected to the rigours of a criminal trial unless there is prima facie evidence linking him with the offence charged. In this regard, counsel relied on Abacha v State (2002) 7 SCNJ 1 and Onagoruwa v State (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 303) 49, arguing that the evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case fell short of establishing any prima facie complicity in trafficking.

Counsel then focused on the evidence itself. He argued that throughout the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, there was no evidence whatsoever that the biological parents of the children did not consent to their adoption. He contended that what is not denied is deemed admitted and therefore the prosecution’s silence on parental consent should operate against it. To support this proposition, counsel cited Omisore v Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1482) 1, Buhari v Obasanjo (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 941) 1, and Ojo v Gbadamosi (2008) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1084) 1.

Counsel then directed the Court to the Defendant’s statement to the Police, arguing that a proper reading of the statement would reveal that the sums of ?550,000 allegedly paid were not purchase money for the children but payments intended for registration and legal processes connected with adoption. He argued that the prosecution had failed to establish any receipt or independent evidence of sale.

In further discrediting PW1’s testimony, counsel reproduced portions of the cross-examination to demonstrate that PW1 admitted there was nowhere in the Defendant’s statement where he expressly stated he “bought” children. Counsel argued that the conclusion drawn by PW1 that the transaction amounted to trafficking was therefore his personal opinion rather than factual evidence.

On this point, counsel submitted that opinion evidence, unless properly grounded, is inadmissible and cannot sustain a conviction. He cited Esangbedo v State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 113) 57, State v Ogbubunjo (2001) LPELR-3223(SC), and Afam Okeke v State (2016) LPELR-40024(CA) for the proposition that speculative or opinion-based evidence must not form the basis of criminal conviction.

Counsel then juxtaposed the Defendant’s testimony with that of PW1 and argued that the totality of the evidence clearly pointed not to trafficking but to an incomplete adoption process. He argued that the Defendant acted merely as an intermediary sent by Prophetess Glory Nwachukwu to collect the children for onward delivery to the intended adoptee.

On this basis, counsel submitted that for the Court to conclude otherwise would amount to conjecture and speculation, which the law strongly abhors. He relied on Romrid Nig Ltd v FRN (2018) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1642) 284 at 304 para-C, where the Supreme Court held that it is not the duty of a Court to speculate. He also cited Nwokoro v Ononeze-Madu (2019) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1672) 422 at 446 para-B, and Mohammed v Wammako (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 573 at 590 paras F-G, to the effect that speculative actions ought not to be entertained and should be dismissed.

On the second issue, namely whether the Defendant committed the offence of human trafficking, counsel submitted that the answer was also in the negative.

Counsel began by setting out the provisions of Section 13(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015, and argued that the prosecution had failed to establish any of the essential ingredients contemplated by the section.

He submitted that there was no evidence that the Defendant recruited, harboured, transported or received any child for the purpose of exploitation, slavery, forced labour, prostitution, or any form of abuse. Counsel argued that the children were not held in bondage and were not subjected to any exploitative condition.

Counsel further submitted that the Defendant’s conduct lacked the necessary criminal intent (mens rea). He argued that the Defendant’s sole intention was lawful adoption and that he acted on the understanding that a lawyer had been engaged to facilitate the process. Counsel submitted that the involvement of a lawyer was itself evidence of good faith, because no rational trafficker would involve legal counsel if his intention was criminal.

On the issue of criminal intent, counsel relied on Sanusi v State (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 288) 99, where the Supreme Court affirmed that criminal liability requires proof of both the prohibited act (actus reus) and the guilty mind (mens rea), and that absence of either element is fatal to conviction.

Counsel pointed to portions of Exhibit P1 where it was stated that one Barrister Ogbole Ogancha had been arrested for forging consent letters and affidavits. He argued that this demonstrated that if any illegality occurred, it arose from the lawyer’s conduct and not from the Defendant’s intention. Thus, according to counsel, the Defendant acted in the honest belief that the adoption was being regularized.

He therefore urged the Court to hold that the Defendant’s conduct lacked criminal intent and could not amount to trafficking.

On the third issue, counsel challenged the competence of the prosecution itself, contending that the Plateau State Ministry of Justice lacked locus standi to prosecute offences under the Trafficking in Persons Act.

Counsel argued that by virtue of Section 12(2) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015, the Legal and Prosecution Department of the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) is specifically empowered to prosecute offences under the Act.

He further referred to Section 6(c) of the same Act, submitting that the Agency is vested with powers to arrest, detain and prosecute offenders.

Counsel also relied on Section 36(1) of the Act, which provides that the High Court shall have jurisdiction to try offences under the Act. On that basis, counsel contended that the National Industrial Court and the Plateau State Ministry of Justice were both improperly involved in the prosecution.

It was counsel’s final submission on this issue that the proceedings were fundamentally incompetent and liable to be struck out.

In conclusion, learned counsel urged the Court to hold that the prosecution failed to establish the offences charged beyond reasonable doubt; that the evidence was speculative and insufficient; that the Defendant’s conduct was part of an incomplete adoption arrangement and not trafficking; that there was no criminal intent; and that the prosecution itself lacked legal competence. Counsel accordingly urged the Court to discharge and acquit the Defendant on all counts.

PROSECUTION’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS:

In the Prosecution’s Final Written Address, learned counsel for the prosecution formulated a sole issue for determination, namely: whether, having regard to the totality of the evidence adduced before the Court, the prosecution had proved the offences charged against the Defendant beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel answered this issue in the affirmative and urged the Court to convict the Defendant accordingly.  

In opening his arguments, learned prosecution counsel began by restating the settled principle of criminal law that where the commission of a crime is directly in issue, the burden lies on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel relied on Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011, which places the burden of proof squarely upon the prosecution.

To expound the standard of proof required, counsel cited the Supreme Court decision in Mohammed v State (2025) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1997) 441 at 488–489, where the apex Court held that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all shadow of doubt, but rather proof by compelling and conclusive evidence consistent with a high degree of probability. Counsel submitted that the evidence led in this case met that threshold.

Counsel further relied on Omokaro v State (2026) 2 NWLR (Pt. 2027) 125 at 174–175, where the Court of Appeal reiterated that proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof to moral certainty and that where evidence points irresistibly to the guilt of the accused, the standard is satisfied. Counsel emphasized the Court’s pronouncement that the trial judge must not allow whimsical considerations to cloud his sense of justice.

Proceeding to the substantive offence, learned counsel turned to the definition of human trafficking under Section 13(2) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015, and reproduced the provision before the Court. Counsel submitted that the section criminalizes recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by means of threat, coercion, fraud, deception, abuse of power or payment for exploitative purposes.

In aid of interpreting the concept of deceit within the context of trafficking, counsel referred to Mariam Mohammed v Attorney-General of the Federation (2021) NWLR (Pt. 1764) 397, wherein the Supreme Court defined deceit as fraudulent or deceptive misrepresentation employed to induce or mislead another person to their prejudice. Counsel argued that the Defendant’s conduct squarely fell within this understanding.

Learned counsel then submitted on the recognized modes of proving criminal offences, namely by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, and argued that the prosecution in this case had successfully established its case through both forms.

To further identify the ingredients necessary to secure a conviction for trafficking, counsel relied on Mohammed v Attorney-General of the Federation (2021) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1764) 397 at 421 para F, where the Supreme Court identified the essential ingredients of human trafficking as including participation in procurement of the victim, arrangement of transportation, and deceitful inducement.

Applying these principles to the facts, counsel submitted that the testimonies of PW1 and PW2, together with the Defendant’s confessional statement and video evidence, established that the Defendant actively participated in the procurement and transfer of the children.

Counsel referred specifically to the confessional statement of the Defendant, tendered and admitted as Exhibit P2, and argued that the statement showed clearly that the Defendant, together with Prophetess Glory Nwachukwu and Pastor Dayo Bernard, arranged for the procurement of the two children. Counsel submitted that the Defendant admitted that the sum of ?550,000.00 was paid for each child and that he participated in the chain of delivery of the children.

It was argued that the Defendant’s own testimony as DW1 did not materially displace this evidence. Rather, according to counsel, the Defendant confirmed his active involvement by admitting under oath that he physically collected the children and transferred them onward to another person.

Counsel argued that this amounted to participation in the transportation and transfer of the children, thereby satisfying the statutory ingredients of trafficking.

On the defence that the transaction was merely an adoption arrangement, learned prosecution counsel submitted that such argument was untenable and unsupported by law. Counsel contended that adoption in Nigeria is a formal judicial process that can only be completed by an order of a competent court.

In support of this proposition, counsel relied on Ibiam v Ibiam & Anor (2017) LPELR-42028(CA), where the Court of Appeal defined adoption as a judicial process which creates a legal parent-child relationship and extinguishes the legal rights of the biological parents. Counsel argued that until such an order is made, no lawful adoption exists.

Counsel further referred to Section 128(a) and (b) of the Child Rights Act, 2003, arguing that adoption is restricted to children who are abandoned, neglected or in similar irreversible situations, and only after the Court has been satisfied that all statutory requirements have been complied with.

He submitted that in the instant case, none of those legal conditions were shown to exist. There was no evidence of a Family Court order, no valid adoption papers, and no evidence of parental consent lawfully verified.

Learned counsel argued that the so-called “consent letter” relied upon by the defence was legally worthless, and that the Defendant himself admitted in his statement that the adoption process had not been concluded. Yet despite this knowledge, he proceeded to take custody of the children and transfer them.

Counsel submitted that this conduct showed conscious and knowing participation in an unlawful transfer of children.

On this point, counsel strongly attacked paragraphs 3.18 and 3.19 of the defence address, where it was argued that the money paid represented registration and legal processing fees. Counsel argued that this was an afterthought, because lawful adoption does not involve private monetary exchange for custody of children before court approval.

He submitted that if indeed the Defendant knew the process was incomplete, his decision to proceed regardless amounted to facilitation of trafficking.

Counsel also submitted that the Defendant’s argument that the prosecution’s case was speculative was without merit. He argued that the Defendant’s own admissions corroborated the evidence of PW1 and PW2 and therefore removed the matter from the realm of speculation.

On evidential value, learned counsel emphasized that the Defendant’s confessional statement (Exhibit P2), the video recording (Exhibit P4) and the affidavit of compliance (Exhibit P3) were all admitted without objection and therefore stood as credible and admissible evidence.

In this regard, counsel cited Suberu v State (2010) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1176) 494 at 501, where the Court held that where evidence remains unchallenged and unshaken under cross-examination, and is otherwise admissible, the Court is bound to accept it.

Counsel argued that the prosecution’s witnesses were neither discredited nor materially contradicted and that their evidence remained intact.

Turning to the issue of prosecutorial competence raised by the defence, learned counsel argued that the Plateau State Ministry of Justice was properly clothed with authority to prosecute the Defendant.

Counsel submitted that the Attorney-General of Plateau State acted pursuant to a fiat delegated by the Attorney-General of the Federation dated 3rd January 2017, authorizing the prosecution of offences within the purview of the Federal Attorney-General.

In support, counsel relied on Section 174 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), which vests the Attorney-General of the Federation with broad powers to institute, take over, continue or discontinue criminal proceedings.

Counsel cited Ezekiel v Attorney-General of the Federation (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1578) 1 at 28 paras D–E, where the Supreme Court affirmed the overarching constitutional control of the Attorney-General over criminal prosecutions.

He also relied on Attorney-General of the Federation v Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1, to support the proposition that the Attorney-General retains overriding authority in criminal matters, notwithstanding statutory powers granted to specific agencies.

Counsel therefore submitted that the argument that only NAPTIP could prosecute was misconceived and contrary to constitutional law.

In conclusion, learned prosecution counsel submitted that the prosecution had established by credible oral, documentary and electronic evidence that the Defendant knowingly participated in the unlawful transfer of trafficked children under the guise of adoption. Counsel argued that the defence was merely an afterthought intended to divert attention from the overwhelming evidence. He urged the Court to resolve the sole issue in favour of the prosecution, hold that the offences had been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and convict the Defendant accordingly.

DEFENDANT’S COUNSEL’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW:

In the Defendant’s Reply on Points of Law dated 16 June 2026, in response to the Prosecution’s Final Written Address, learned defence counsel confined his submission largely to a single central issue: the competence of the Plateau State Ministry of Justice to initiate and prosecute the charge. Unlike the substantive Final Written Address, in which counsel had attacked both the facts and the law, this reply was directed at what he regarded as a fundamental flaw in the prosecution’s capacity to appear before the Court.

Learned counsel began by reiterating his earlier position that the Plateau State Ministry of Justice lacks statutory authority to prosecute offences under the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015. Counsel maintained that no provision of the Act confers prosecutorial powers on the State Ministry of Justice and insisted that the prosecution remained incompetent ab initio.

In direct response to paragraphs 4.22 and 4.23 of the Prosecution’s Final Written Address, where the prosecution had argued that the Attorney-General of Plateau State was acting pursuant to a fiat delegated by the Attorney-General of the Federation, defence counsel challenged the factual and evidential basis of that assertion.

Counsel submitted that no fiat whatsoever was produced before the Court. He argued that the prosecution merely made a bare assertion that such fiat existed, without tendering the alleged instrument. Counsel contended that this omission was fatal because, in law, a party who asserts the existence of a fact bears the burden of proving it.

He further argued that even if, assuming without conceding, such a fiat was issued on 3rd January 2017 as alleged by the prosecution, there was no proof that it covered the present case instituted in 2025, nor was there any evidence showing that the fiat was broad enough to encompass prosecution under the Trafficking in Persons Act.

Counsel therefore contended that the prosecution’s reliance on an unproduced fiat amounted to speculation and could not confer competence.

On the constitutional point, learned counsel attacked the prosecution’s reliance on Section 174 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Counsel argued that the prosecution misconceived the purport of the section. He reproduced the entire provisions of Section 174(1)(a), (b), and (c), emphasizing that the powers conferred therein belong exclusively to the Attorney-General of the Federation, and not to the Attorney-General of a State.

Counsel’s argument was that the constitutional powers cited by the prosecution are personal to the Attorney-General of the Federation and cannot simply be presumed to have been exercised or delegated without proof.

Interestingly, counsel expressly conceded one aspect of the prosecution’s argument. In paragraph 3.1 of the Reply, counsel acknowledged that under Section 174(1)(a) of the Constitution, the Attorney-General of the Federation indeed possesses the power to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court of law in Nigeria. However, counsel was quick to distinguish that power from the authority of the Attorney-General of Plateau State.

Counsel argued that the prosecution failed to cite any legal authority—constitutional, statutory, or judicial—which specifically empowers the Attorney-General of Plateau State to prosecute offences under the Trafficking in Persons Act in the absence of a valid and proven fiat.

In further reply to paragraph 4.23 of the Prosecution’s Address, counsel contended that the prosecution had woefully failed to establish delegation of authority. He argued that mere assertion from the Bar that a fiat existed was insufficient. Counsel insisted that delegation of prosecutorial authority is a matter of evidence, not assumption.

According to counsel, until the alleged fiat is produced before the Court, the Court cannot presume its existence or validity.

Counsel therefore submitted that the effect of this omission is that the Attorney-General of the Federation had not delegated prosecutorial authority to the Attorney-General of Plateau State in this matter.

From this premise, counsel argued that the prosecution lacked locus standi, and that any proceedings conducted without such authority were incompetent and liable to be nullified.

In conclusion, learned defence counsel urged the Court to discountenance all the arguments canvassed by the prosecution in its Final Written Address. He maintained that the prosecution’s failure to establish lawful authority to prosecute was a fundamental jurisdictional defect which struck at the root of the case. Counsel therefore urged the Court to hold that the prosecution had no locus standi, and consequently to discharge and acquit the Defendant.  

COURT’S DECISION:

I have carefully and painstakingly considered the totality of the evidence led at the trial, the record of proceedings, the exhibits tendered, the written addresses of learned counsel on either side, the authorities cited, and the oral submissions made in amplification thereof. I have also evaluated the demeanour evidence as reflected in the record, the burden and standard of proof applicable in criminal trials, the ingredients of the offences charged, and the jurisdictional objection raised by the defendant.

The law places on the prosecution the duty to prove the guilt of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt. See section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011. The proof required in criminal matters is not proof beyond all shadow of doubt, but it is certainly more than suspicion, conjecture, inference built upon inference, or moral outrage no matter how strong. The settled position of the law is that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of legal proof. See Ozaki v. The State (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) 92; Lori v. The State (1980) 8-11 SC 81; and Utteh v. The State (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 222) 566.

The charge against the defendant is predicated on section 13(1) and (2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015. It is therefore necessary, before any analysis of the evidence, to reproduce the provision as relied upon. Section 13 of the TIPPEA Act, 2015 provides as follows:

“13.—(1) All acts of human trafficking are prohibited in Nigeria.

(2) Any person who recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives another person by means of­

(a) threat or use of force or other forms of coercion?

(b) abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or position of vulnerability? or

(c) giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control of another person, for the purpose of exploitation of that person, commits an offence and is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of not less than 2 years and a fine of not less than N250,000.00.

The charge before this Court, as framed, is grounded on the allegation that the defendant assisted or facilitated human trafficking and failed to prevent trafficking of two children from Jos to Lagos after payment of ?550,000 to Pastor Dayo Bernard. The law, however, does not criminalise mere omission to report suspected trafficking under section 13. A person is only criminally liable under the section if the prosecution proves, by admissible and credible evidence, one or more of the positive acts set out therein, namely recruiting, transporting, transferring, harbouring, receiving, buying, selling, hiring, using, obtaining possession, encouraging, inducing, promoting, facilitating, abetting, or conspiring. The mere failure to raise alarm, standing alone, is not one of the ingredients of the offences charged. If the Legislature intended to punish omission to report trafficking under section 13, it would have said so in clear terms. Courts are bound by the words of the statute and cannot enlarge the scope of a criminal provision by judicial embellishment. See Abacha v. The State (2002) 11 NWLR (Pt. 779) 437; FRN v. Aliyu (2010) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1174) 1.

I now turn to the issue of jurisdiction, which was argued with some force by learned defence counsel. The defendant’s submission, in substance, was that the Plateau State Ministry of Justice lacked competence to prosecute offences under the TIPPEA Act, the argument being that only NAPTIP, as a federal agency, may prosecute such matters. I do not accept that proposition.

It is trite that the power to institute and undertake criminal proceedings is not exclusively reserved for one agency unless the statute creating the offence expressly so provides. Section 174 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) vests in the Attorney-General of the Federation the power to institute, undertake and discontinue criminal proceedings against any person in respect of any offence created by or under an Act of the National Assembly. Equally, section 211 of the Constitution vests in the Attorney-General of a State similar powers in relation to offences created by law of the House of Assembly of the State. The question, therefore, is whether, for a federal offence, a State Ministry may prosecute where such power has been validly delegated or where the Attorney-General of the Federation has granted fiat.

The law is settled that prosecution is a function that may be exercised by the Attorney-General personally or through officers in his ministry and, where statutorily or administratively authorised, by counsel acting under his authority. See FRN v. Osahon (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 973) 361; AG Federation v. Abubakar (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1041) 1. The competence of counsel appearing in the name of a Ministry of Justice is not defeated merely because the prosecution is not conducted by NAPTIP. So long as the person conducting the prosecution is lawfully authorised by the appropriate Attorney-General, the prosecution remains valid. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the prosecutorial powers of the Attorney-General are broad and may be delegated. In this regard, I accept the prosecution’s position that the Plateau State prosecution is not rendered incompetent on the bare assertion that NAPTIP alone can prosecute. NAPTIP is an enforcement agency; it does not, by that fact alone, monopolise prosecution to the exclusion of the constitutional powers of the Attorneys-General. The objection is therefore discountenanced.

That said, the failure of the jurisdictional objection does not carry the day for the prosecution on the substantive charge. Jurisdiction is one thing; proof of guilt is another. A court may be properly seized of a matter and still be bound to acquit if the ingredients of the offence are not established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, a trial may be valid and yet end in an acquittal where the evidence does not meet the threshold fixed by law. That is precisely the position here.

The prosecution called two witnesses, PW1 and PW2. The documentary and electronic exhibits tendered include Exhibit P1, the defendant’s earlier statement; Exhibit P2, the statement dated 4 December 2024 said to be confessional; Exhibit P3, affidavit of compliance; and Exhibit P4, a flash drive containing a video purportedly recording the defendant’s confession. The defendant testified in his own defence and called no witness. His case, in summary, was that he acted merely as an errand man for Prophetess Glory Nwachukwu, that he believed he was helping with a lawful adoption process, and that he only discovered irregularities later. He denied trafficking, denied buying children, denied recruiting children, and denied any intention to facilitate trafficking.

The prosecution’s case, as I understand it, was that the defendant participated with Glory Nwachukwu, Victoria Ugwu and Pastor Dayo Bernard in moving two children from Plateau State to Lagos under the guise of adoption; that ?550,000 changed hands; and that the defendant’s statements and video amounted to admissions of complicity in an unlawful child transaction. Learned counsel argued that the facts disclose trafficking, because lawful adoption is only valid through a court order, which was absent. Counsel also contended that the defendant’s story of errand-running was unbelievable in light of his admissions under cross-examination that he did not know the children’s parents, did not know the child’s name, and had never before engaged in such an arrangement.

I have carefully examined the evidence. The issue is not whether something irregular, suspicious, or even morally reprehensible happened. It clearly did. The issue is whether the prosecution proved, in the strict sense demanded by criminal law, that this defendant recruited, bought, received, encouraged, promoted, induced, facilitated, abetted, or conspired in the trafficking of the children, within the meaning of section 13. That question must be answered from the evidence, not from emotion.

The authorities are clear that in a criminal trial, the prosecution may rely on direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, confessional statements, or a combination of all three. See Sule v. The State (2009) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1169) 33; Nwachukwu v. The State (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt. 782) 543. But where the prosecution relies on a confessional statement, the confession must be positive, direct, unequivocal, and duly linked to the offence charged. A statement which is merely explanatory, equivocal, or suggestive of association with other persons, without a clear admission of the essential elements of the offence, cannot, without more, sustain a conviction. See State v. Ahmed (2020) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1742) 1; Igbikis v. The State (2017) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1574) 1.

Exhibit P2, as presented to this Court, does not, in my view, amount to the kind of confession that dispenses with further proof of the elements of the offence. It may raise suspicion. It may suggest involvement in an irregular transaction. It may even reveal poor judgment and a willingness to accompany others in a process that ought to have been more transparent. But suspicion is not proof. The statement does not, with the clarity the law demands, establish that the defendant recruited the children, bought them, transported them, received them, or encouraged trafficking within the meaning of section 13. At best, it shows that he was present and involved in some manner in an arrangement orchestrated by others, particularly Glory Nwachukwu. That is not the same thing as proof that he was the principal actor or a culpable participant in trafficking.

The video evidence in Exhibit P4 does not improve the prosecution’s case. A video confession, like any other electronic evidence, is admissible if properly founded and linked to the case, but admissibility is not the same as probative weight. Even where admitted, the Court must scrutinise whether the contents are sufficiently clear, voluntary, reliable, and capable of sustaining the charge. The flash drive here did not, in my assessment, establish an unequivocal admission to the specific criminal acts alleged in the information. It showed, at most, that the defendant was speaking in a context of investigation about a transaction he was involved in. The video, like the written statement, leaves open the possibility that he was acting on the instructions of another person and did not himself conceive, organise, or execute the transaction as a trafficker.

It is important to note that the defendant, under cross-examination, admitted that no adoption order had been issued. That admission is significant, but significance does not equal guilt. The absence of a court order for adoption may show that the process was irregular or unlawful in a family-law sense. It does not automatically prove trafficking under section 13. Criminal liability does not arise from every civil irregularity or administrative shortcut. The prosecution still had to prove the specific mental and physical elements of the trafficking offence.

The defence argued, and correctly in my view, that the prosecution did not call the biological parents of the children, did not tender any report of missing children, did not produce any evidence directly showing that the children were taken against the will of their parents, and did not sufficiently prove that the money exchanged was intended for purchase rather than lawful adoption expenses or was paid directly by the defendant. I agree. Where a criminal allegation of trafficking is made, the evidential burden is substantial. The Court must be satisfied by credible proof of the prohibited conduct, not by assumptions drawn from the mere fact of payment or movement of children.

I have also considered the evidence in the context of the role of Glory Nwachukwu. On the materials before me, and particularly in the light of the separate finding made in respect of her own conduct, I am satisfied that she was the person who gave the money used in the transaction and who orchestrated the process. The defendant’s role, as emerges from the evidence, was that of an errand man, a messenger, a go-between acting at the direction of Glory Nwachukwu. That is materially different from being the person who recruited, bought, sold, or trafficked the children. The law punishes the principal acts and, where properly established, the accessories. But the accessory role must still be proved. It cannot be presumed merely because the accused was present in the chain of events.

Learned counsel for the prosecution submitted that the defendant’s conduct amounted to facilitation or encouragement under section 13(2)(a) and (b). I am unable to accept that submission on the evidence. Facilitation within the meaning of the Act requires proof of some act that actually aided the procurement of a person for exploitation. Abetment requires intentional assistance or encouragement. Conspiracy requires an agreement to commit the offence. None of these was proved to the standard required in a criminal trial. The prosecution’s evidence, even if accepted at its highest, establishes participation in an irregular child handover arrangement. It does not establish beyond reasonable doubt the criminal mens rea and actus reus required by the statute.

The law in Nigeria is firm that where two interpretations of the evidence are reasonably possible, the one favourable to the accused must prevail. See Chungwom Kim v. The State (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 233) 17; Igabele v. The State (2006) 6 NWLR (Pt. 975) 100. This principle is especially relevant where the evidence is circumstantial or where the so-called confession is not fully unequivocal. In the instant case, the defendant’s explanation that he believed he was involved in adoption, though not entirely persuasive on a moral level, is not so implausible as to be dismissed out of hand. The prosecution had the duty to dislodge that explanation with cogent evidence. It did not do so.

I should also address the argument that because lawful adoption requires a court order, the absence of such an order necessarily proves trafficking. That is a non sequitur. The fact that an adoption process was defective, incomplete, or unlawful does not automatically convert every participant into a trafficker under section 13. The charge must still be proven in accordance with the statutory definition. Courts must resist the temptation to criminalise conduct simply because it appears dubious. Criminal guilt is not founded on suspicion that “something was not right.” It is founded on proof that the accused committed the offence charged.

On the whole of the evidence, I am not satisfied that the prosecution has proved that this defendant recruited the children, bought them, encouraged their trafficking, or in any other manner committed the offences set out in section 13(1) and (2)(a), (b), and (c) of the TIPPEA Act, 2015. The evidence strongly suggests that he was involved at the behest of Glory Nwachukwu, who, on the evidence accepted in the separate proceedings, was the person responsible for supplying the funds and steering the transaction. The defendant may have acted foolishly. He may have acted irresponsibly. He may have been careless in failing to inquire deeper. But criminal liability is not built on foolishness or carelessness alone. The offences charged do not state, in the terms of the law, that a person who omits to report suspected child trafficking is guilty. I cannot create such an offence by judicial fiat.

Accordingly, while I overrule the objection touching on jurisdiction, I resolve the substantive issue in favour of the defendant. The prosecution has failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offences charged beyond reasonable doubt. The defendant is hereby discharged and acquitted of the charges preferred against him.

It is so ordered.

 

Delivered in Jos this 6 July 2026.

 

Hon. Justice I.S. Galadima

Judge.