The People of Plateau State -VS- Victoria Ugwu- National Industrial Court of Nigeria

IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT JOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE I.S. GALADIMA

DATE: 6 July 2026 CHARGE NO: NICN/JOS/CR/2/2025

BETWEEN:

THE PEOPLE OF PLATEAU STATE ………………………………COMPLAINANT

AND

VICTORIA UGWU ……………………………………………………. DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION:

· JOEL TAHVAN FOR THE COMPLAINANT.

· I.K. RANDA; M.Y. AUTA FOR THE DEFENDANT.

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

This criminal charge filed before this court on 23 January 2025, concerns allegations of deception, recruitment and trafficking of children brought against the Defendant, Victoria Ugwu, under Section 13(1) and 2(a)(b)(c) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the TIPPEA Act). The defendant was charged by the State’s Honorable Attorney General on the following particulars of offence:

That you, Victoria Ugwu sometime between the year 2023 and 2024 in Jos, Plateau State within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court deceived, recruited, and trafficked (1) Emmanuel, (2) Gift, a female child (name unknown) and Nelson, from Jos, Plateau State to Abia State, Enugu State, and Lagos State respectively, after paying money to one Pastor Dayo Bernard who gave out the children, based upon which you were arrested in Jos, Plateau State and you thereby committed the above mentioned offence.

On 29 January 2025, the Defendant was arraigned on one count of human trafficking and she pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution called two witnesses and tendered Exhibits P1, P2 and P3. The Defendant testified in her own defence. At the close of evidence, learned counsel on both sides filed and adopted their final written addresses.

THE CHARGE

The substance of the charge against the Defendant is that sometime between 2023 and 2024, she procured and transferred four children (minors), namely Emmanuel, Gift, Nelson and another unnamed child, from Plateau State to Abia, Enugu and Lagos States after making monetary payments to one Pastor Dayo Bernard, allegedly under the pretext of adoption.

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS, TESTIMONIES AND EXHIBITS

This charge commenced on 29th November 2025 when the Defendant, Victoria Ugwu, was arraigned before this Honourable Court on a one-count charge of human trafficking contrary to section 13(1) and (2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015. Upon the charge being read and explained to her in English, she pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the prosecution applied for a trial date and requested that the Defendant remain in custody pending trial. Defence counsel did not oppose the adjournment but applied orally for bail. The Court admitted the Defendant to bail in the sum of ?5,000,000.00 with one surety in like sum, being a public servant not below Grade Level 14 with landed property. The matter was then adjourned to 30th January 2025 for hearing.

Proceedings of 30th January 2025 — Prosecution opens case

On 30th January 2025, the prosecution opened its case and called its first witness, PW1, Inspector Dafor Dashik, an officer attached to the Force Intelligence Department/IRT, Force Headquarters, Abuja.

PW1 testified that on 5th December 2024, his investigative team received intelligence concerning criminal conspiracy and child trafficking involving the Defendant. Acting on the report, they arrested her at Anglo D, Jos South Local Government Area. According to him, during investigation, he personally recorded the Defendant’s statement after administering the usual caution. He stated that although the Defendant initially wished to write by herself, she later requested that he record the statement on her behalf while she narrated. After recording, he read it back to her in a language she understood, and she signed voluntarily.

PW1 narrated the contents of the Defendant’s statement. According to him:

In June 2024, the Defendant attended prayers at End Time Army Ministry run by one Pastor Dayo Bernard.
She met children there and expressed interest in adopting one for her childless sister.
Pastor Dayo informed her there was an adoption arrangement requiring ?50,000.00 registration.
Thereafter, Dayo brought two children to her and demanded ?700,000.00 (?350,000 each).
She took custody of the two children and later transported them to Nnena Kalu in Abia State.
Subsequently, she obtained another child for ?550,000.00 and sent that child to Mr. and Mrs. Peter Ukwani in Enugu State.
Later, she obtained another child for ?550,000.00 and sent the child to Mrs. Harmony Okwu in Lagos State.
During investigation, police recovered all four children and handed them to the Plateau State Commissioner for Women Affairs before reuniting them with their biological parents.

At that point, the prosecution tendered the Defendant’s extra-judicial statement. There was no objection from defence counsel and it was admitted as Exhibit P1.

Cross-examination of PW1

Under cross-examination, PW1 confirmed:

He personally wrote the statement while the Defendant narrated.
His oral evidence was only a summary of the written statement.
The statement indicated that money was paid in connection with a lawyer’s services, although he maintained it related to adoption.
He admitted that part of their findings was that the money was paid for adoption.
He confirmed that the children were eventually reconciled with their parents.
He acknowledged that there was initially no formal missing persons report before the investigation commenced.
He also admitted not knowing whether the Defendant’s motive was to assist her barren sister.

Upon re-examination, PW1 clarified that the parents later made formal complaints. The matter was adjourned to 27th February 2025 for continuation of hearing.

Proceedings of 1st July 2025 — Second prosecution witness

The matter resumed on 1st July 2025. The prosecution first moved an application earlier filed on 26th February 2025, which was granted without objection. Thereafter, the prosecution called PW2, Inspector Abu Isah, also a member of the investigative team.

PW2 corroborated PW1’s evidence. He testified that:

The Defendant was arrested in connection with criminal conspiracy, forgery and child trafficking.
She was implicated by Pastor Dayo Bernard.
Investigation revealed she bought children from Pastor Dayo and Rita Abueze for amounts ranging from ?300,000.00 to ?500,000.00.
She transported the children to Lagos and other states for relatives.
Upon her arrest, she disclosed the identities of the recipients.
Before the police could complete the Lagos trip, her relations had already caused the children to be returned to Jos through her lawyer and son.

PW2 further testified that apart from the written statement, a video recording of the Defendant’s statement was made using his Redmi Note 13 phone, transferred into an 8GB blue flash drive through his HP laptop. He also deposed to an affidavit of compliance that same morning.

The prosecution tendered:

Affidavit of Compliance — admitted as Exhibit P2
Flash Drive containing video statement — admitted as Exhibit P3

without objection from defence counsel. The Court viewed the video in open court and reserved the weight to be attached to it in judgment.

Cross-examination of PW2

Under cross-examination, PW2 admitted:

Pastor Dayo was operating what appeared to be an orphanage.
The Defendant came into contact with the children through Pastor Dayo.
The written statement was taken immediately after arrest.
The Defendant was detained under a court order from 4th December 2024 to 9th January 2025.
The video statement was recorded after her release from detention.
The children were returned voluntarily and were not under threat.
The Defendant claimed she adopted, rather than bought, the children.
Police investigated whether the money paid was intended for legal adoption processing.
No receipts were issued for the monies.
One lawyer was involved in forging adoption papers.
There was no formal missing child complaint; rather, the police acted on intelligence reports.

In re-examination, PW2 reaffirmed that monies of ?300,000.00 and ?500,000.00 were transferred between the Defendant and Pastor Dayo. The matter was adjourned to 11th July 2025.

Proceedings of 11th July 2025 — Close of prosecution’s case

On 11th July 2025, the prosecution formally closed its case after calling two witnesses and tendering three exhibits. Defence counsel applied for time to open defence. The matter was adjourned to 7th November 2025.

Proceedings of 29th January 2026 — Defence opens case

The matter resumed on 29th January 2026 for defence. The Defendant testified as DW1 and was the sole defence witness.

DW1 denied trafficking the children. She testified that she is a trader in foodstuffs and knew Pastor Dayo through church programmes. She explained that in June 2023, she visited his church and saw two children there. Pastor Dayo informed her he ran an adoption ministry and cared for children. She said she later inquired about adoption for her childless sister. Pastor Dayo informed her of the procedure and said a lawyer would handle documentation after payment of ?50,000 registration fee.

She testified that:

Her sister Nnenna Kalu in Abia sent ?700,000.00 into her Access Bank account for adoption processing.
She transferred the money to Pastor Dayo.
She took custody of the first two children and later sent them to her sister in Abia.
Another child was sent to her husband’s sister in Enugu.
Another child (Nelson) was sent to her cousin in Lagos.
The recipients in Enugu and Lagos also sent ?500,000.00 each, which she transferred to Pastor Dayo.
No receipts were issued.
She maintained that all payments were for adoption and not purchase.
She was unaware of the details of adoption documentation because she was arrested before completion.
She is illiterate, having stopped at Primary 3 level.
She has four children of her own and had no prior criminal record.

Cross-examination of DW1

Under cross-examination:

She admitted not knowing the biological parents of most of the children.
She did not know the legal process of adoption.
No receipts existed for any money paid.
She received no official approval papers for adoption.
She confirmed Pastor Dayo was not a government official.
She admitted she was not tortured into making her police statement.

After the defence closed its case, defence counsel applied for 21 days to file final written address.

The Court ordered parties to file and exchange final written addresses and replies on or before 15th April 2026, and adjourned for adoption.

Exhibits tendered and admitted

The prosecution tendered and the Court admitted:

1. Exhibit P1 – Defendant’s extra-judicial written statement.

2. Exhibit P2 – Affidavit of Compliance relating to the electronic evidence.

3. Exhibit P3 – Flash drive containing video recording of Defendant’s statement.

The defence tendered no documentary exhibits.

At the close of trial on 29 January 2026, the court directed counsel for both parties to address it. On 16 June 2026, counsel adopted their respective final written addresses, after which the court reserved judgment until today.

DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

In his written address filed on 23 February 2026, counsel for the Defendant raised three issues for determination: whether the prosecution proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt; whether the Defendant committed the offence of human trafficking; and whether the Plateau State Ministry of Justice had the locus standi to prosecute.

On proof beyond reasonable doubt

Defence counsel submitted that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden imposed by law. Counsel relied on the constitutional presumption of innocence under section 36(5) of the Constitution and section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, arguing that the burden remained throughout on the prosecution and never shifted. Counsel cited Mbang Efoli Mbang v State (2009) 12 SCNJ 232 and Ukatu v FRN (2021) 10 NWLR (PT. 1785) 525 for the proposition that proof beyond reasonable doubt requires cogent, credible and compelling evidence.

It was argued that where evidence raises reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to discharge. Counsel referred to the dictum in Ukatu v FRN that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all doubt, but evidence must exclude every reasonable inference inconsistent with guilt. Counsel also cited Stephen v State (2009) ALL FWLR (PT. 491) 962 at 974 paras C – D.

Defence further contended that the prosecution’s evidence was speculative and that a conviction cannot be founded on speculation. Reliance was placed on Sunday Ani & Anor v State (2009) 6 SCNJ 98, where the Supreme Court emphasized that evidence must be complete, cogent and unequivocal.

Counsel argued that none of the prosecution witnesses testified that the biological parents of the children withheld consent for adoption. It was emphasized that PW1 admitted under examination-in-chief that Pastor Dayo requested the Defendant to register for adoption upon payment of ?50,000. Under cross-examination, PW1 admitted ignorance as to whether the money was for legal processing. Defence argued that this showed poor investigation, particularly as the Investigating Police Officer failed to verify whether the sums paid were indeed legal fees for adoption facilitation.

The Defendant urged the Court to resolve this issue in her favour.

On whether the Defendant committed human trafficking

On the second issue, counsel argued that the Defendant’s conduct did not amount to human trafficking under section 13(2) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015. Counsel reproduced the statutory definition and submitted that the Defendant’s acts did not fall within its scope.

Defence contended that the Defendant neither harboured any child for forced labour, slavery nor bondage. Counsel stressed that trafficking presupposes exploitation, and there was no evidence that the children were held in bondage or that their liberty was under the Defendant’s absolute control.

Counsel maintained that what occurred was merely a failed adoption process. It was argued that the Defendant believed she was following lawful adoption procedures through a lawyer engaged for that purpose. According to counsel, if the Defendant truly intended trafficking, she would not have involved a legal practitioner, and if trafficking had indeed occurred, the lawyer ought to have been charged as a co-defendant.

It was further submitted that the prosecution failed to establish any of the essential elements of trafficking—namely threat, coercion, fraud, deception or exploitation. Counsel emphasized that no prosecution witness testified that the children were exploited or subjected to any trafficking indicators. It was also argued that no evidence was led showing that the parents did not consent.

Defence strongly argued absence of mens rea, asserting that the Defendant’s intention was adoption, not trafficking. Counsel relied on the prosecution’s own Exhibit 1, where PW1 stated that one Barrister Ogbole Ogancha was arrested for forging consent letters and affidavits to facilitate illegal adoption. Defence argued this supported the Defendant’s bona fide belief in a lawful adoption process.

Counsel submitted that criminal liability requires both actus reus and mens rea, relying on Sanusi v State (1993) 4NWLR (PT. 288) 99, and argued that since guilty intention was absent, conviction could not stand.

Defendant urged acquittal.

On locus standi of Plateau State Ministry of Justice

On the third issue, defence challenged the competence of the prosecution. Counsel argued that under section 12(2) of the Trafficking in Persons Act, prosecution of offenders under the Act lies with the Legal and Prosecution Department of the Agency (NAPTIP), not the Plateau State Ministry of Justice.

Counsel submitted that the Act specifically establishes NAPTIP as the body empowered to arrest, detain and prosecute offenders under section 6(c), and the Plateau State Ministry of Justice lacked any statutory authority to prosecute.

Further, counsel referred to section 36(1) of the Act, arguing that jurisdiction over offences under the Act is vested in the High Court, implying that the prosecution’s initiation before the present Court was improper. Counsel therefore submitted that the absence of prosecutorial competence robbed the Court of jurisdiction.

Defence urged dismissal of the charge and discharge/acquittal.

PROSECUTION’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

The prosecution formulated a sole issue: whether it proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

On standard of proof

The prosecution submitted that it successfully discharged the burden of proof under section 135 of the Evidence Act. Counsel relied on Mohammed v State (2025) 10 NWLR (PT. 1997) 441 at 488 to 489 and Omokaro v State (2026) 2 NWLR (PT. 2027) 125 at 174 to 175 to argue that proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof to moral certainty and not beyond every shadow of doubt.

Counsel maintained that the evidence adduced was compelling, convincing and sufficient to establish guilt.

On ingredients of trafficking

The prosecution reproduced section 13(1) and (2) of the Act and argued that trafficking encompasses recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt by deception or abuse of vulnerability for exploitation.

Relying on Mohammed v AG Federation (2021) 3 NWLR (PT. 1764) 397 at 421, counsel argued that the prosecution established the essential ingredients. It was submitted that the Defendant participated in procuring the victims through Pastor Dayo and moved them to Abia, Lagos and Enugu without parental consent.

Prosecution argued that the Defendant personally arranged transportation of the children, induced and deceived them, and abused their vulnerability. It was further submitted that she paid sums ranging from ?50,000 to ?700,000 to Pastor Dayo in furtherance of the arrangement.

Counsel maintained that these payments were not adoption fees but consideration in furtherance of trafficking.

On adoption argument

The prosecution countered the Defendant’s “failed adoption” defence by explaining the legal process of adoption. Counsel relied on Ibiam v Ibiam (2017) LPELR 42028 (CA) and argued that adoption is only effective by a court order creating a parent-child relationship and severing ties with biological parents.

Counsel argued that under section 128 of the Child Rights Act, adoption applies to abandoned, abused or neglected children, which was not the case here. Instead, the children’s parents were deceived into believing their children would remain in an NGO with rights of visitation, whereas the Defendant moved them to other states. This, it was argued, constituted trafficking.

Further, prosecution argued that before adoption can occur, all required consents must be obtained and the Family Court must grant the order under section 138 of the Child Rights Act. Since none of these steps occurred, the Defendant’s adoption claim was legally untenable.

On evidential value of exhibits

The prosecution submitted that Exhibits P1 (statement), P2 (affidavit of compliance), and P3 (video recording) were admitted without objection and therefore required no further proof.

Counsel cited Suberu v State (2010) 1 NWLR (PT. 1176) 494 at 501, arguing that unchallenged evidence must be accepted as correct where it remains unshaken under cross-examination.

On prosecutorial competence

Responding to the jurisdictional objection, the prosecution submitted that the Plateau State Ministry of Justice had authority to prosecute by virtue of a fiat granted by the Attorney-General of the Federation by letter in 2017 authorizing the Plateau State Attorney-General to prosecute federal offences.

Counsel relied on section 174(1)(a) of the Constitution and Ezekiel v AG Federation (2017) 12 NWLR (PT. 1578) 1 at 28 to argue that the Attorney-General of the Federation controls all criminal prosecutions under federal laws and can delegate such authority.

It was argued that the fiat empowered Plateau State to prosecute this matter, and counsel cited State v Ughanwa (2020) 3 nwlr (pt. 1710) 22 at 36 for the proposition that fiat authorizes the holder to act fully on behalf of the grantor.

The prosecution urged conviction.

DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW

In their reply brief filed on 21 April 2026, defence maintained its objection to the competence of the prosecution. Counsel reiterated that the Plateau State Ministry of Justice lacked statutory power to prosecute offences under the Trafficking in Persons Act.

Defence attacked the prosecution’s reliance on an alleged fiat, arguing that no such fiat was tendered in evidence. Counsel submitted that even assuming such fiat existed, it was dated 3 January 2017 and was not shown to relate specifically to the present charge instituted in 2025.

Counsel further argued that section 174 of the Constitution was misconceived by the prosecution because it only concerns the Attorney-General of the Federation and not the Attorney-General of a State. Defence conceded that the Attorney-General of the Federation may prosecute federal offences but insisted that this constitutional power does not automatically vest in a State Attorney-General without proof of valid delegation.

Defence emphasized that the prosecution cited no law directly empowering the Plateau State Attorney-General to prosecute the present matter and failed to produce documentary proof of any valid fiat.

Counsel therefore urged the Court to hold that the prosecution lacked locus standi and to discharge and acquit the Defendant.

COURT’S DECISION:

I have carefully considered all the evidence before this Court, both oral and documentary, together with the submissions of learned counsel and the relevant statutory provisions and judicial authorities cited.

Before delving into the court’s findings, it is necessary to define trafficking and the legislative intention behind the Act.

Under section 82 of the TIPPEA Act 2015, trafficking in persons, in its ordinary legal sense, means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons by threat, force, coercion, deception, abuse of power, or payment, with the aim of exploitation. The Act adopts a deliberately wide definition, especially in cases involving children, because it recognises their vulnerability and the risk that they may be moved or handed over through deceptive arrangements presented as care, guardianship, or adoption.

The intention of the Act is clear: to prohibit all forms of human trafficking, protect the dignity and welfare of persons—especially children—and criminalise any arrangement where human beings are treated as commodities outside lawful processes. The Act seeks not only to punish overt exploitation such as forced labour, slavery, and prostitution, but also to prevent unlawful transfers of children under the guise of adoption or welfare arrangements where due legal safeguards are absent.

The facts presented before this Court disclose a troubling pattern of movement of children under the guise of adoption, and the Court is called upon to determine, upon full consideration of the evidence, whether the acts complained of amount to trafficking within the contemplation of the law.

The undisputed facts show that the Defendant fraudulently took custody of the children on the pretext that they would be cared for, money was paid to Pastor Dayo, the children were taken across state borders, and no valid adoption order was ever secured.

The main issues for determination are whether this Court has the jurisdiction to hear this matter and whether the prosecution has proved the offence of human trafficking beyond reasonable doubt.

On the issue of jurisdiction, the objection of the defence is wholly misconceived and unsustainable. Jurisdiction is the lifeblood of adjudication, and once properly vested by the Constitution, no party can derogate from it. By virtue of Section 254C(1)(i), (5), and 254(D) 1 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN) has exclusive jurisdiction in civil and criminal causes and matters relating to or connected with labour, employment, child labour, child abuse, human trafficking and matters incidental thereto and shall exercise all the powers granted to a high court. Human trafficking, particularly where children are involved, falls squarely within the constitutional remit of this Court.

This position is further strengthened by the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015 (as amended), which criminalises trafficking in persons, including children, and contemplates enforcement by competent courts exercising jurisdiction over such offences. Since the Constitution expressly vests the NICN with jurisdiction over human trafficking, proceedings under the NAPTIP Act involving child trafficking are properly entertainable before this Court.

The Court’s jurisdiction is also reinforced by the Child Rights Act, 2003, which prohibits the sale, trafficking, abduction, and exploitative transfer of children. Particularly relevant are the provisions safeguarding children from all forms of abuse, exploitation, and unlawful removal. Where a charge concerns the trafficking or unlawful transfer of a child, the matter is one touching directly on child abuse, child labour, and human trafficking, all of which are within the constitutional competence of this Court under section 254C.

The same principle is reflected in the judicial authorities. In Coca-Cola Nigeria © v. Akinsanya (2017) 17 NWLR (©. 1593) 74, the Court of Appeal held that the jurisdiction of the NICN under section 254C must be given a broad and purposive interpretation. Likewise, in Skye Bank Plc v. Iwu (2017) LPELR-42595(CA), the Court affirmed that where the subject matter falls within the constitutional heads under section 254C, the NICN is the proper forum.

Further support is found in the National Industrial Court Act, 2006, particularly section 7(6), which preserves and gives effect to the Court’s constitutional jurisdiction, and in the general constitutional principle that where the Constitution has expressly conferred jurisdiction, statutes and procedural objections cannot whittle it down. In the same vein, the Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015 supports the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by courts empowered by law to try offences within their subject-matter competence.

Accordingly, because the present charge relates to child trafficking—an offence closely connected with child abuse and human trafficking—and because such matters are expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the NICN by section 254C(1)(i), (5), and 254D (1), the defence’s objection is without merit and is hereby overruled. See, however, the decision in AGF v. Joy Chioma (unreported), Suit No. NICN/OW/04/2015, delivered on 19/3/2015 per Anuwe, J., where the court took a contrary position, although the charge there was kidnapping under section 19 of TIPPEA 2003.

Section 174(1)(a)–(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) empowers the Attorney-General of the Federation to institute, continue, take over, and discontinue criminal proceedings, whether personally or through officers in his office or other persons duly authorised by him. Likewise, a purposive construction of section 12(2) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015 reveals that the Act contemplates cooperation between NAPTIP and the Office of the Attorney-General of the Federation in the prosecution of trafficking-related offences. The statute therefore does not support the proposition that NAPTIP alone possesses exclusive prosecutorial authority – see EZEKIEL V. A.G. FEDERATION (2017) LPELR 41908 (SC) PAGES 9 to 11.

This interpretation is further reinforced by Nigeria’s international obligations under the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 2000, commonly referred to as the Palermo Protocol, which Nigeria has ratified and domesticated through the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015. The Palermo Protocol emphasizes a coordinated and collaborative approach among States Parties, law enforcement agencies, prosecutorial authorities, immigration authorities, and other relevant institutions in order to prevent trafficking, protect victims, and prosecute offenders effectively. It does not envisage a monopoly of enforcement by a single agency; rather, it encourages inter-agency cooperation and information sharing as essential tools in combating trafficking in persons.

Accordingly, the Act should be read in harmony with the Palermo Protocol as imposing a collaborative enforcement framework, under which NAPTIP functions as the specialized lead agency but not as the sole authority competent to initiate or conduct prosecutions. Sections 5(g), (l), and (s), as well as section 12(2)(d) of the TIPPEA Act, adopt permissive and cooperative language consistent with such a framework. Therefore, unless the defence can point to a clear and express statutory provision excluding other duly authorised prosecuting authorities, the prosecution in this matter remains properly instituted and valid.

The Supreme Court in FRN v. Osahon (2006) 5 NWLR (Pt. 973) 361 settled that prosecution by a police officer who is a legal practitioner or other authorised person is valid where authorised by law. The Court rejected the notion that only legal practitioners in the Attorney-General’s office may prosecute criminal offences. Similarly, in Fawehinmi v. Akilu (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt. 67) 797, the Supreme Court recognised the propriety of criminal prosecution by authorised persons, subject to constitutional and statutory backing. Accordingly, the issuance of a fiat by the Attorney-General of the Federation in favour of the Plateau State Attorney-General in 2017 validly empowered the latter to prosecute the instant charge. There was no need for the fiat to be produced, contrary to the defendant’s counsel’s submission. The question of whether such prosecutorial authority was validly conferred is one that only the Attorney-General may raise, not the court. The court is therefore not expected to embark on an inquiry into the Attorney-General’s authority. This principle was applied in Comptroller of Nigeria Prisons Service v. Adekanye (No. 1) (2002) 15 NWLR (Pt. 780) 318. The apex court has also affirmed that there is a presumption of authority, even where a fiat or letter of instruction exists to prosecute a criminal matter. See Owie v. Elaho (2026) LPELR-83139 (CA). Accordingly, the argument that only NAPTIP has the power to prosecute offences under the Act is contrary to both the Constitution and the enabling statute and is without merit. Consequently, the competence of the prosecution and the jurisdiction of this Court are clearly established. This conclusion is grounded in constitutional and statutory provisions and cannot be faulted.

On the substantive charge, the law is settled that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the Defendant beyond reasonable doubt. See Section 135 of the Evidence Act. This standard does not require proof beyond every shadow of doubt but proof sufficient to establish the ingredients of the offence. In Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947) 2 All ER 372, adopted in Bakare v State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 52) 579, the Court held that proof beyond reasonable doubt means proof that carries a high degree of probability.

Under Section 13 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, the prosecution must establish that there was recruitment, transfer, transportation, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of deception, abuse of power, or payment, for the purpose of exploitation.

The essence of this provision is to criminalise not merely the movement of persons, but the unlawful process by which human beings are procured and transferred as though they were objects of trade – see section 1 of TIPPEA where the objectives for the Act are clearly outlined. In the case of children, the law is even stricter because by virtue of Section 82 of the TIPPEA Act and Article 3(c) of the Palermo Protocol (ratified by Nigeria), the consent of a child or intermediary is immaterial where the act of transfer for exploitative purpose is established.

From the evidence before the Court, it is undisputed that the Defendant received and transported the children. She admitted this in both her written and video statements, as well as in open court. Accordingly, the transfer of the children from Plateau State to Abia, Enugu, and Lagos States has been clearly established.

It is equally established that substantial sums of money exchanged hands. The Defendant admitted making payments of ?700,000 and additional sums of ?500,000 each. Although she insists these were adoption-related payments, there is no documentary evidence of any lawful adoption process. No receipts were issued, no court proceedings were commenced, and no adoption order was obtained.

The Child Rights Act clearly regulates adoption and places the process under judicial supervision. Sections 128 to 141 of the Act make it clear that adoption is not a private arrangement to be brokered by individuals or religious institutions. The law requires transparency, investigation, and judicial approval. In Ibiam v Ibiam (2017) LPELR-42028 (CA), the Court of appeal emphasised that adoption outside statutory procedure is null and incapable of conferring lawful custody.

The explanation offered by the Defendant that she believed Pastor Dayo operated an adoption ministry does not cure the illegality of the process. Even if a lawyer was involved, no evidence of any legal process was produced before this Court by the Defendant.

The Court has also considered the video confession of the Defendant, admitted as Exhibit P3, and has diligently evaluated its contents in line with Sections 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act. In that video confession, the Defendant clearly acknowledged the payments made, the transfer of the children, and the absence of any judicial adoption order. More significantly, the tenor of Exhibit P3 reveals that the Defendant was aware, or at the very least ought reasonably to have known, that the process she engaged in was outside the lawful framework and therefore an offence. By virtue of the Evidence Act, a confession is direct and compelling evidence against its maker once shown to be voluntary, and this Court finds Exhibit P3 credible, voluntary, and consistent with the surrounding facts.

The Court has also considered the argument of the defence that exploitation was not proved because there was no evidence of forced labour, prostitution or slavery. However, exploitation under trafficking law is broader than those examples. In the final written addresses, learned defence counsel first submitted that the prosecution failed to prove any exploitative purpose and argued that the Defendant merely facilitated what she believed to be adoption arrangements. In response, learned prosecution counsel maintained that the exchange of money, the transfer of the children, and the complete absence of lawful adoption procedures amounted to commodification of the children and therefore exploitation under the Act. Prosecution counsel further contended that the law does not require proof of actual forced labour or prostitution where the facts disclose unlawful transfer of children for consideration, and urged the Court to treat the transaction itself as sufficient evidence of exploitation.

Where children are transferred from one person to another upon payment of money, without lawful authority, parental verification or judicial oversight, the Court cannot ignore the exploitative character of such conduct. The dignity and welfare of the children are placed at risk.

The Court has also considered the issue of mens rea. The Defendant claims ignorance of the law and insists she believed the process was lawful. However, ignorance of the law is not a defence. More importantly, the surrounding circumstances reveal sufficient knowledge to infer criminal intent. The repeated payments, the absence of any court process, the lack of inquiry into the children’s origins, the interstate distribution of the children, and the admissions contained in Exhibit P3 all point to conscious participation in an unlawful arrangement.

In Lori v State (1980) 8–11 SC 81, the Supreme Court held that criminal intention may be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances. Applying that principle here, and having diligently evaluated the Defendant’s video confession in Exhibit P3, I find that the Defendant’s conduct supports the inference of knowledge and intention, particularly that she ought to have known that what she did constituted an offence.

After considering all the facts, evidence, exhibits, counsel’s arguments, and the relevant precedents and laws, I am satisfied that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly took part in the unlawful transfer of children under the pretence of adoption. The Court finds that the alleged adoption arrangement was not lawful, and that the payments made formed part of an illegal scheme for moving and transferring children outside the bounds of the law. Protecting children is among the law’s highest duties, and this Court must remain alert to attempts to disguise trafficking as charity or adoption. The Constitution, the TIPPEA Act, the Child Rights Act, and Nigeria’s binding international obligations all clearly forbid such conduct.

Accordingly, I hold that the prosecution has proved the offence of human trafficking contrary to Section 13(1) and 2(a)(b)(c) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015.

The Defendant, is hereby found GUILTY as charged.

ALLOCUTUS

The defendant is a first offender. She does not have any criminal records. She is remorseful. Her intention was propelled by emotions. She wanted to help her sister adopt a child. Her sister has lost her marriage due to childlessness and even succumbed to stroke. The defendant is a victim of circumstance. This court needs to be sympathetic to her plight. She need to be shielded from further hardened life.

COMPLAINANT – the defendant has no record of previous convictions.

SENTENCING

Having found the Defendant guilty as charged and having considered her allocutus, including the fact that she is a first-time offender and her expression of remorse, the Convict is hereby sentenced to two (2) years’ imprisonment and a fine of ?250,000.00, pursuant to Section 13(2)(b) and (c) of the TIPPEA Act, 2015. The sentence shall include the period already spent in detention up to the time she was granted bail by this Court, that is minus two months.

The Defendant’s name and photo shall also be entered into the national trafficking offenders register and be placed under correctional monitoring upon release in accordance with the law.

Delivered in Jos this 6th day of July 2026.

HON. JUSTICE I.S. GALADIMA
Judge
National Industrial Court of Nigeria