IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA
IN THE JOS JUDICIAL DIVISION
HOLDEN AT JOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE I.S. GALADIMA

DATE: Monday 6 JULY 2026                             CHARGE NO: NICN/JOS/CR/5/2025

BETWEEN

THE PEOPLE OF PLATEAU STATE ……………………………………. COMPLAINANT

AND

RITA AGBOEZE (SATTY) …………………………………………….. DEFENDANT

REPRESENTATION:

·        Joel Tahvan Esq. (Solicitor General of Plateau State) and team — for the Prosecution.

 

·        E.D. James Esq. — for the Defendant.

JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

This criminal charge filed on 29th January 2025 concerns allegations of child trafficking and selling of human beings brought against the Defendant, Rita Agboeze (also called Satty), pursuant to Sections 13(1), 13(2)(a)(b)(c), and Section 21 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015 (“TIPPEA Act”).

The charge alleges that sometime in 2024, the Defendant deceptively procured and transferred six children from Kanke and Bokkos Local Government Areas of Plateau State to one Pastor Dayo Bernard and other persons for financial consideration, under the false representation that the children would be educated and properly cared for.

The children involved include:

1.     Emmanuel Ziggla

2.     Esther Gift

3.     Nelson

4.     Clara

5.     Adela

6.     Samantha

Upon arraignment on 29 January 2025, the Defendant pleaded not guilty to both counts.

The prosecution called three witnesses and tendered four exhibits, while the defence called two witnesses including the Defendant herself.

At the close of trial, final written addresses were filed and adopted on 16 June 2026.

THE CHARGES:

Count One:

Human Trafficking contrary and punishable under section 13 (1) and (2) (a), (b), and (c) of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administrative Act 2015.

Particulars of offence:

That you, Rita Agboeze, in February 2024 in Jos, Plateau State, within the jurisdiction of this court, deceived, recruited, and trafficked children (1) Emmanuel Ziggla (8 years); (2) Esther Gift (5 years); (3) Nelson (4 years); (4) Clara (3 years) and (5) Adela (10 years) old among others from Kanke and Bokkos Local Government Areas of the State to Jos for the purpose of selling them to intending buyers before you were intercepted and arrested at Fellowship of the End Time Army Ministry, Bukuru Lowcost, Jos South LGA of the State and you thereby committed an offence.  

Count Two:

Selling of Human being contrary and punishable under section 13 (1) and 21 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administrative Act 2015.

Particulars of offence:

That you, Rita Agboeze, between the period of February to December, 2024 at Jos within the jurisdiction of this honourable court, sold (1) Emmanuel Ziggla (8 years), (2) Esther Gift (5 years), (3) Nelson (4 years), (4) Clara (3 years) and (5) Adela (10 years) old among others of Kanke and Bokkos Local Government Area of Plateau State to one Pastor Dayo Bernard before you were intercepted and arrested at Fellowship and the End Time Army Ministry, Bukuru Lowcost, Jos South LGA of the State and you thereby committed an offence.

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS, TESTIMONIES AND EXHIBITS

Proceedings of 29 January 2025 — Arraignment

The Defendant was arraigned on a two-count charge. She pleaded not guilty. Bail was granted in the sum of ?5,000,000.00 with one surety in like sum.

Matter adjourned to 31 January 2025.

Proceedings of 31 January 2025 — PW1

PW1, Inspector Dafor Dashik, testified that the Defendant was arrested in Abuja in connection with child trafficking. He further stated that, after being cautioned, she made a written statement in which she confessed to taking six children from her village and admitted that she had received money from Pastor Dayo. According to PW1, two of the children fetched ?150,000, while others fetched ?20,000 and ?50,000 respectively, and some of the children had already been moved for onward distribution. PW1 also tendered the Defendant’s statement, which was admitted in evidence as Exhibit P1.

During cross-examination, PW1 admitted that some of the children were relatives of the Defendant, that no lawyer was present when the statement was taken, that some parents voluntarily released the children, and that there were no direct receipts evidencing payment.

Proceedings of 1 July 2025 — PW2

PW2, Inspector Abu Isah, testified that he recorded the Defendant’s video confession. He stated that the Defendant conspired with Pastor Dayo, that six children were trafficked, and that the Defendant deceived relatives into surrendering the children. He also testified that some of the children were meant for relocation to other states, while one child, Nelson, was allegedly being processed for international travel. PW2 tendered Exhibit P2, the Affidavit of Compliance, and Exhibit P3, the flash drive containing the video confession. The Court viewed the video in evidence.

Under cross-examination, PW2 admitted that there were no receipts, that no formal missing persons complaint was initially made, and that some of the children were biological relations of the Defendant.

Proceedings of 11 July 2025 – PW3

On 11 July 2025, PW3, Felix Rotshak, who is the Defendant’s elder brother, testified that the Defendant had previously taken two of his children and raised them, which made him trust her. He stated that he later gave her six children on the belief that she would educate them, but was shocked when the police informed him that the children had been sold.

During cross-examination, PW3 admitted that he had willingly released the children to the Defendant and that he never reported them missing.

Proceedings of 29 January 2026 — Defence Opens

DW1 — Hadiza Nenzar

She testified that the Defendant did not steal or sell any child, but that the parents willingly released the children. She also stated that the Defendant had a history of helping children within the family.

During cross-examination, she stated that the Defendant is her niece. She testified that the Defendant had previously taken her daughter and another girl. She denied knowing that the Defendant sold any child. She said she knew all the children involved—Emmanuel Ziggla, Esther Gift, Nelson, and Clara—and that she was aware the Defendant took them from their parents in the village. She also said she knew the children were taken to Pastor Dayo. However, she denied any knowledge that money was exchanged for the children and denied knowing anything about any adoption procedures.

DW2 — Defendant herself

The Defendant testified that the children were members of her family and belonged to her elder brother, PW3. According to her, he had requested that she care for the children and provide for their needs, with the intention that they would be trained and educated. She stated that Pastor Dayo later told her that some church members wanted to adopt the children, and on that basis, she handed some of them over. She admitted that she gave Emmanuel Ziggla and Esther Gift to Pastor Dayo in January 2024 and, in March 2024, visited again because Emmanuel was ill and was still in Pastor Dayo’s care. She then met Victoria Ugwu, who agreed to take custody of the children. She denied deceiving her brother into releasing his children for sale. She maintained that she only received money for transportation, denied selling any child, and alleged that she was tortured, thereby challenging the voluntariness of Exhibit P1.

Under cross-examination, she repeated that the children were her relatives. She explained that they were given to her solely so that third parties could care for them. She said that since her brother had many children, she believed she was helping him by ensuring that some of them were trained and better cared for. She added that her brother knew the children would be safe with her. She stated that, although she is a graduate, she does not know the legal process for child adoption in Nigeria. She also said she kept the children in Pastor Dayo’s custody. She reiterated that she was given only transport fare to take the children to Pastor Dayo and that the total amount she received was ?200,000. She denied committing any offence.

The defence thereafter closed its case.

EXHIBITS

1.     Exhibit P1 — Written statement of Defendant

2.     Exhibit P2 — Summary of investigation / affidavit

3.     Exhibit P3 — Certificate of compliance

4.     Exhibit P4 — Video confession

SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL - DEFENDANT’S FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS

At the close of trial, learned counsel for the Defendant filed a Final Written Address dated albeit out of time but with the court’s leave, on 16 June 2026, wherein three issues were formulated for determination by this Court. The issues are: whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt to warrant the conviction of the Defendant; whether the Defendant committed the offences of human trafficking and selling of human beings as charged; and whether the Plateau State Ministry of Justice possesses the requisite locus standi to prosecute this matter.

On the first issue, learned counsel for the Defendant submitted that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proof imposed upon it by law. Counsel contended that by virtue of Section 36(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), every person charged with a criminal offence is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Counsel further relied on Section 135(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, 2011, submitting that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused person remains throughout on the prosecution and never shifts.

In support of this proposition, learned counsel referred the Court to the authorities of Mbang Efoli Mbang v. State (2009) 12 SCNJ 232 and Ukatu v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2021) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1785) 525, wherein the appellate courts reiterated that proof beyond reasonable doubt requires evidence that is cogent, compelling, credible and complete. Counsel submitted that where evidence raises doubt, such doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused person.

It was further submitted that the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses was speculative and insufficient to sustain a conviction. Counsel placed reliance on Sunday Ani & Anor v. State (2009) 6 SCNJ 98 for the principle that speculation cannot ground criminal liability and that the prosecution must establish the ingredients of the offence by complete and unequivocal evidence.

Learned defence counsel further argued that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses disclosed that none of the parents of the children reported them missing or complained of abduction, thereby casting doubt on the allegation of unlawful procurement. Counsel maintained that the evidence before the Court showed that the parents voluntarily released the children to the Defendant, and that such voluntary release negates the allegation of force, coercion, or abduction.

Counsel also submitted that the monies allegedly received by the Defendant were not proved to be proceeds of sale of the children but were merely transportation expenses or incidental payments connected to the movement of the children. It was argued that no documentary receipts or independent evidence of purchase or sale were tendered by the prosecution, and that the Court ought not to infer sale merely from the exchange of money.

On the admissibility and evidential value of Exhibit P1, the Defendant’s extra-judicial statement, learned counsel raised a specific objection, contending that the statement was improperly obtained in contravention of Section 38(2) and (4) of the Administration of Criminal Justice Law of Plateau State, 2018. Counsel argued that the said provisions mandatorily require that where a suspect volunteers a confessional statement, such statement must be video recorded or, in the alternative, made in the presence of counsel or another authorised person.

Counsel submitted that in the present case, although the prosecution sought to rely on a video recording, the video tendered as Exhibit P4 was an afterthought and did not represent compliance with the mandatory statutory provisions. It was argued that no legal practitioner was present at the time the written statement was recorded and that the failure to comply with the statutory safeguards rendered the statement inadmissible and of no evidential value.

In support of this argument, learned counsel relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in FRN v. Nnajiofor (2024) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1947) 443 and FRN v. Akaeze (2024) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1951) 1, where the apex Court emphasized the mandatory nature of electronic recording or legal representation in confessional statements under the ACJA.

On the second issue, namely whether the Defendant committed the offences charged, learned counsel submitted that the essential ingredients of human trafficking under Section 13(2)(a)(b)(c) of the TIPPEA Act were not established. Counsel argued that the prosecution failed to prove the presence of force, coercion, fraud, deception, abuse of vulnerability, or exploitation.

It was submitted that trafficking, by its statutory and ordinary meaning, necessarily connotes exploitation, such as forced labour, slavery, bondage, prostitution, or related abuse. Counsel contended that none of the prosecution witnesses gave evidence that the children were subjected to any exploitative conditions. According to counsel, there was no evidence that the children were enslaved, confined, abused, or exploited in any way.

Learned counsel maintained that what transpired was merely an adoption process that did not come to fruition. It was argued that the Defendant acted in the bona fide belief that lawful adoption arrangements were being facilitated through one Pastor Dayo Bernard and a legal practitioner. Counsel stressed that the Defendant’s intention was not criminal, but to assist in securing better care and educational opportunities for the children.

Counsel further submitted that the absence of mens rea was fatal to the prosecution’s case. In this regard, reliance was placed on Sanusi v. State (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 288) 99 for the settled principle that criminal liability requires proof of both the guilty act (actus reus) and guilty intention (mens rea). Counsel argued that the Defendant’s conduct, viewed in context, was devoid of criminal intention and that the prosecution failed to prove otherwise.

It was also contended that if the alleged adoption process involved illegality, particularly the forging of adoption documents by a legal practitioner as revealed during trial, then the said legal practitioner ought to have been charged as a co-defendant. Counsel argued that the omission to do so undermined the credibility of the prosecution’s theory.

On the third issue, learned defence counsel challenged the competence of the prosecution, submitting that under Section 12(2) of the TIPPEA Act, the power to prosecute offences under the Act lies with the Legal and Prosecution Department of NAPTIP. Counsel argued that the Plateau State Ministry of Justice lacked statutory authority to initiate the present proceedings.

It was further argued that although the prosecution made reference to a fiat allegedly issued by the Attorney-General of the Federation, no such fiat was tendered in evidence before the Court. Counsel submitted that in the absence of proof of delegation, the prosecution lacked the locus standi to prosecute the Defendant and the proceedings were thereby incompetent. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the charge and discharge and acquit the Defendant.

PROSECUTIONS’ FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS:

In response, learned counsel for the prosecution filed a Final Written Address on 27 April 2026 but deemed as duly filed and served on 16 June 2026 wherein a sole issue was distilled for determination, namely whether the prosecution had proved the charges against the Defendant beyond reasonable doubt.

On the standard of proof, learned prosecution counsel submitted that the burden imposed by Section 135 of the Evidence Act had been fully discharged. Counsel referred to Mohammed v. State (2023) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1866) 512 and Ilouno v. State (2023) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1893) 491, submitting that the law recognises three methods of proving a criminal offence, namely through confessional statement, circumstantial evidence, and direct oral testimony.

Counsel argued that in the instant case, the prosecution successfully relied on all three methods. It was submitted that the Defendant’s written statement and video confession constituted direct confessional evidence. Counsel maintained that in those statements, the Defendant admitted procuring the children, transferring them to Pastor Dayo and other persons, and receiving money in the process.

Learned counsel further submitted that the oral testimonies of PW1, PW2 and PW3 corroborated the Defendant’s confessional statements. It was argued that PW3, who is the Defendant’s biological brother and father of some of the children, testified that he released the children to the Defendant on the understanding that they would be educated and cared for, and not sold or transferred to third parties.

Counsel argued that this evidence established the element of deceit, which is one of the statutory ingredients of trafficking. Reliance was placed on Mariam Mohammed v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2021) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1764) 397, where the Supreme Court defined deceit under trafficking law as a fraudulent misrepresentation used to induce consent.

It was submitted that the Defendant misrepresented to the parents that she was taking the children for proper upbringing and education, whereas she transferred them to Pastor Dayo and other recipients for money. Counsel argued that the consent of the parents, having been procured by deception, was vitiated and incapable of exculpating the Defendant.

On the issue of sale of human beings under Section 21 of the TIPPEA Act, learned prosecution counsel argued that the evidence clearly showed that the Defendant received monetary consideration for the transfer of the children. It was submitted that the total sum of ?220,000.00 was received by the Defendant in exchange for the children and that such payments constituted the proceeds of sale.

Counsel urged the Court to hold that the absence of receipts does not defeat the charge where there is credible oral evidence and a confessional statement establishing payment. Counsel further argued that trafficking and sale of children often occur in informal and clandestine circumstances, making documentary receipts improbable.

On the admissibility of the evidence of the Investigating Police Officers, learned prosecution counsel submitted that the testimonies of PW1 and PW2 were direct evidence and not hearsay. Reliance was placed on Anyasodor v. State (2018) 2 SCNJ 217 and Arogundade v. State (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 469) 423, where the Supreme Court held that the evidence of an Investigating Police Officer concerning findings made during investigation constitutes admissible direct evidence.

Counsel therefore urged the Court to find that the prosecution had proved the offences of human trafficking and selling of human beings beyond reasonable doubt and to convict the Defendant accordingly.

COURT’S DECISION:

This is a criminal trial in which the Defendant, Rita Agboeze, also known as Satty, was charged before this Court on a two-count charge bordering on child trafficking and selling of children, contrary to the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015, hereinafter referred to as “the TIPPEA Act”.

The charge was filed on 29 January 2025. The gravamen of the allegation is that in 2024 the Defendant, by deception and monetary inducement, procured and transferred six children from Kanke and Bokkos Local Government Areas of Plateau State to one Pastor Dayo Bernard and other persons, while representing to the children’s parents or relatives that the children were being taken for proper care and education.

The children involved were Emmanuel Ziggla, Esther Gift, Nelson, Clara, Adela and Samantha – all minors.

Upon arraignment, the Defendant pleaded not guilty to both counts. The prosecution called three witnesses and tendered documentary and electronic exhibits. The defence also called two witnesses, including the Defendant herself. Final written addresses were adopted, and the case was thereafter reserved for judgment.

I have carefully reviewed the charge, the oral evidence of all the witnesses, their demeanour insofar as it can be discerned from the record, the exhibits tendered and admitted in evidence, and the final written addresses of learned counsel for both parties.

Before I proceed to the issues in this case, I think it is necessary to restate a basic principle of criminal justice that is often forgotten when a case carries emotional weight. A court is not a rallying ground for sympathy, nor is it a place for storytelling without proof. The prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The law does not ask for proof beyond all shadow of doubt, but it does require proof that leaves the Court firmly satisfied of guilt. See Section 135 of the Evidence Act, 2011. That is the standard. Not suspicion. Not conjecture. Not “it looks bad.” The evidence must establish the offence.

The defence raised an objection to the admissibility of Exhibit P1, the Defendant’s written statement, on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the applicable procedure for recording confessional statements. The prosecution, however, relied not only on Exhibit P1 but also on the video confession, Exhibit P4, and the oral evidence of the witnesses.

Although learned defence counsel made robust submissions on the admissibility of Exhibit P1, I take the view that the more important question in this case is whether, even leaving Exhibit P1 aside, the remaining evidence proves the charges beyond reasonable doubt. Where a case can be resolved on clearer and firmer grounds, a court should not travel unnecessarily into a side road. I therefore propose to determine this matter principally on the substance of the evidence, and only where necessary on the issue of the statement.

The issues that arise for determination are, in my view, the following: whether the prosecution proved the offence of human trafficking under Section 13 of the TIPPEA Act; whether the prosecution proved the offence of selling of human beings under Section 21 of the TIPPEA Act; and whether the evidence of the Defendant’s statement and video confession supports the case against her.

On the first issue, the prosecution’s case is that the Defendant deceptively procured and transferred six children, and that the means adopted was a mixture of false representation, abuse of trust and monetary inducement. Section 13 of the TIPPEA Act criminalises trafficking in persons through recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons for the purpose of exploitation, and it includes procurement by deception, coercion, abuse of vulnerability and related means. The statute is designed to protect the vulnerable, especially children, from being moved about as though they were commodities.

Now, what did the evidence show?

PW3, Felix Rotshak, the Defendant’s elder brother, testified that he trusted the Defendant because she had previously taken and raised two of his children. He stated that he later gave her six children because he believed she would educate and care for them. He was shocked to learn that the children had been sold. Under cross-examination, he admitted that he willingly released the children and did not report them missing. That evidence is important. It shows that the initial release of the children was not by force. But that does not end the matter. In law, consent obtained by deception is not the kind of consent that can sanitize a fraudulent act. One may voluntarily hand over a child based on a lie; the voluntariness of the physical transfer does not immunize the deceiver from liability.

PW1 testified that the Defendant was arrested in Abuja and, after caution, made a written statement admitting that she took the children from her village and received money from Pastor Dayo. He said some of the children fetched ?150,000, while others fetched ?20,000 and ?50,000. Although he acknowledged under cross-examination that some of the children were relatives and that no lawyer was present when the statement was taken, his evidence remains relevant as to the investigation and the Defendant’s own admissions.

PW2 testified that he recorded the Defendant’s video confession. He said the Defendant conspired with Pastor Dayo and trafficked six children. He tendered the compliance affidavit and the flash drive containing the video. The Court viewed the video both in open court and while preparing this judgment. The significance of a video confession in a matter such as this cannot be overstated. It is one thing to deny on paper what the mouth has already admitted on camera. A court is entitled to weigh the directness of such evidence.

The testimony of DW1 does not, in my view, inspire any confidence whatsoever. Her evidence is not only self-serving, but also riddled with improbabilities that make it difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to attach any probative value to it. This is moreso because DW1 claimed to be related to the Defendant and therefore testified from a position that ought, in the ordinary course of human experience, to call for candour and fidelity to the truth. Instead, what emerged from her testimony was a deliberate attempt to shield the Defendant from the inevitable consequences of her own conduct.

What the Court finds particularly unbelievable is DW1’s assertion that the children were willingly handed over, with no suspicion, no concern, and no objection, on the mere assurance that the Defendant would care for them. That explanation is simply too convenient. It stretches credulity beyond acceptable limits to suggest that children could be moved from their parents or relatives, then handed to the Defendant, and thereafter transferred to third parties, all without any form of formal arrangement, without the involvement of any child welfare authority, and without the least inquiry as to what legal basis existed for such a transfer. The story presented by DW1 asks this Court to suspend reason.

More troubling still is her attempt to portray the transactions as harmless acts of family trust while ignoring the obvious inference that money changed hands in a manner inconsistent with any genuine caregiving arrangement. Her evidence seeks to sanitise conduct that, when examined against the totality of the surrounding facts, bears all the hallmarks of deception and exploitation. The Court is not persuaded. A witness may be related to a party, but kinship does not confer credibility; if anything, it may demand greater scrutiny. In the present case, DW1’s testimony reads less like independent evidence and more like an after-the-fact effort to manufacture innocence.

Accordingly, the Court rejects the testimony of DW1 in its entirety. It is not believable, it is not trustworthy, and it is not supported by the objective facts before the Court. On the contrary, it stands in direct conflict with the prosecution’s evidence and the Defendant’s own admissions. The Court therefore accords it no weight.

The Defendant herself did not seriously dispute that she collected the children and took them to Pastor Dayo. Her own testimony was that Pastor Dayo said church members wanted to adopt the children, that she handed some of the children over, that she later met Victoria Ugwu who took custody of them, and that she received transport money. She admitted that she knew nothing about the legal process of adoption in Nigeria. That admission matters. It means she knew she was dealing with children and arranging their movement to third parties, yet she had no lawful framework in place for what she claimed was an adoption arrangement. That is not a small detail. That is the whole point. Child transfer is not a casual village errand. It is not a matter one improvises at will and then later dresses up as “helping.”

This Court does not believe the Defendant’s self-serving assertion that the children were merely handed over to third parties for “better care.” That explanation is not only implausible on the evidence before the Court, it is also profoundly inconsistent with the manner in which the children were obtained, transferred, and monetized. A Court of law is not a shrine for sentimental cover stories. It is a place of truth, tested against facts, conduct, and consequence. Where a person says, “I was helping,” but the evidence says, “you were handing over children for money,” the Court is bound to prefer reality over rhetoric.

The Defendant’s narrative falls apart under scrutiny. The evidence before this Court showed that vulnerable children were removed from their familiar environment, moved across locations, and placed in the custody of persons not shown to have any lawful adoption or welfare authority. The so-called “care arrangement” was never reduced to any legal process, never supervised by any competent child-protection institution, and never supported by any documentary trace of lawful guardianship, adoption, or social welfare approval. In such circumstances, the Court cannot accept the Defendant’s explanation as innocent conduct. Good intentions are not proved by slogans; they are proved by lawful process.

This Court is equally mindful of the deeply troubling prevalence of children being taken from rural and peri-rural communities to urban centres under the guise of assistance, apprenticeship, domestic help, education, or foster care, only for them to end up in exploitative labour, domestic servitude, or hidden trafficking arrangements. This trend is not merely unfortunate; it is a social evil that preys on poverty, ignorance, trust, and parental vulnerability. The law does not permit a child to be turned into a commodity because an adult found an opportunity to disguise exploitation in the language of benevolence.

It must be said plainly: a child is not a domestic asset, not a labour supply, and certainly not a tradable object for adult convenience. The recurring pattern whereby children are collected from communities and sent to urban homes as house helps, errand workers, or “wards” is often the first step in a chain of abuse. Many children so removed are denied education, freedom, proper care, and identity, and are instead absorbed into hidden systems of labour exploitation. This is precisely the kind of conduct that anti-trafficking laws are designed to prevent. The Court will not sit idly while the language of care is used to conceal child labour and trafficking.

The statutory framework is clear. Under the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015, trafficking includes recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons by means of deception, abuse of vulnerability, or for the purpose of exploitation. The law is not concerned only with brute force; it also captures deception, inducement, abuse of trust, and exploitative transfer. A child cannot be lawfully “handed over” in a manner that strips the child of protection and converts the child into a burden-laden placement outside legal safeguards.

The Court further notes that the National Industrial Court of Nigeria is vested, by the Constitution and enabling statutes, with jurisdiction over matters arising from labour, employment, and allied questions involving forced labour, compulsory labour, and exploitation-related labour abuses. Where child trafficking is deployed as a method of recruiting labour, domestic service, or hidden exploitation, the Court’s jurisdiction is not excluded by camouflage. A court of justice will not permit a litigant to evade accountability by dressing up forced labour as family assistance or “care placement.” In substance, such conduct may fall within the ambit of labour exploitation, and the Court is entitled to look beyond labels to the true character of the transaction.

As has long been stated in our jurisprudence, the law must look at substance, not form. See generally the principle in cases such as A.G. Lagos State v. Eko Hotels Ltd. (2017) LPELR – 43713 (SC) and Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) LPELR – 24023(SC), that jurisdiction and legal consequence depend on the real nature of the complaint and the competence of the proceedings. In matters of trafficking and exploitation, the court must examine the reality of the conduct, not the deceptive packaging. A child moved under false pretences for hidden benefit remains a victim regardless of the vocabulary used to describe the transaction.

This is why the collaborative machinery of the Court and the broader justice system is indispensable. The fight against child trafficking cannot be won by one institution alone. It requires the coordinated strength of the courts, law enforcement, social welfare agencies, prosecutors, correctional services, and child-protection institutions. The Court’s role is not merely punitive; it is protective, declaratory, and deterrent. It must send a message that the law will not tolerate the sale, transfer, exploitation, or commodification of children under any euphemism whatsoever.

Punishment in such cases serves three vital purposes:

1.     Retribution, because offenders must answer for the damage done;

2.     Deterrence, because others must be warned that the marketplace of child exploitation is closed; and

3.     Protection of society, because children are entitled to the highest legal shield the State can provide.

This Court therefore views the Defendant’s conduct not as an innocent domestic arrangement, but as a serious breach of trust and a grave interference with the dignity and welfare of vulnerable children. In a society governed by law, children are not to be passed from hand to hand like goods in transit. The Court must intervene, not out of cruelty, but out of justice. Justice for the child is not optional; it is the very reason the law exists.

Accordingly, let it be recorded that this Court rejects the Defendant’s explanation in its entirety. The evidence discloses deception, transfer, and exploitation, not benevolence. The prevalence of child removal for urban labour and domestic servitude is a menace that must be stopped at the point of law. Courts must continue to act decisively, collaboratively, and courageously to uphold the child-trafficking regime, punish offenders, and deter all who would profit from the vulnerability of children.

As this Court says without hesitation: if you take a child under the promise of care and deliver the child into exploitation, do not come before the Court and ask to be called kind. The law does not reward false compassion. It punishes concealed cruelty.

I have therefore examined the evidence carefully and I find that the prosecution proved that the Defendant procured, transferred and handed over the children to third parties under a false narrative of education and care. The defence version that this was merely an adoption arrangement is not supported by any credible lawful process. No adoption documents were produced. No competent adoption authority was shown to be involved. No lawful court-sanctioned adoption procedure was established. No documents even establish that the children were enrolled in better schools and all that was done was for their welfare albeit illegally. The Court was not shown any framework under which the Defendant could have legitimately handed over the children to Pastor Dayo or to any other person for private custody. That is not adoption. That is a story told after the fact.

Counsel for the defence argued that there was no proof of exploitation. With respect, that submission does not help the Defendant in the circumstances of this case. The offence as charged is not dependent on proving completed exploitation in the sense of physical abuse, confinement or labour. The law criminalises the trafficking conduct itself, especially where the means employed include deception and the transaction is for value. Where the evidence shows that children were procured and transferred by misleading relatives and guardians and money changed hands, the Court is entitled to infer trafficking in the statutory sense. The law does not wait until the harm matures into slavery before it acts. By then, the child may already be irretrievably lost.

On the evidence before me, deception is established. The parents and relatives were told the children would be educated and cared for. Instead, the children were transferred to Pastor Dayo and others in circumstances that were concealed from the true guardians. That is not a mere misunderstanding. That is not a failed family arrangement. That is deception by conduct and by concealment. The law has no patience for such conduct.

The prosecution relied on the Defendant’s admissions, both written and video, and on the oral evidence of PW3, who trusted the Defendant and gave her the children on that basis. The evidence fits together. It is not a fractured case built on guesswork. It is a coherent chain: trust was reposed in the Defendant; the Defendant used that trust to obtain the children; she transferred them to Pastor Dayo and others; and she received money in the process. That is precisely the kind of conduct the trafficking law is meant to punish.

The defence argued that the money received was merely transport money. I do not accept that explanation. The evidence of PW1 was that amounts were attributed to individual children, including ?150,000, ?50,000 and ?20,000. The Defendant herself admitted receiving ?200,000. The amounts were not shown to be mere reimbursement for transport in any credible or documented sense. No receipts were produced, but the absence of receipts does not help the Defendant where the oral and confessional evidence is clear. Clandestine transactions seldom leave neat paper trails; that is exactly why the law permits proof by credible oral and confessional evidence.

I now turn to the question of selling of human beings under Section 21 of the TIPPEA Act. This is an especially grave count. It is one thing to unlawfully move a child. It is another to treat a child as a commodity for value. Human beings are not cargo. They are not livestock. They are not items for bargaining in a private market. The offence under Section 21 is intended to stamp out the very notion that a person, especially a child, can be disposed of for money.

The Defendant admitted that she received money in connection with the transfer of the children. She also admitted giving Emmanuel Ziggla and Esther Gift to Pastor Dayo and later encountering another woman, Victoria Ugwu, who took custody of the children. Again, the Court is not persuaded by the attempt to recast these acts as a benign adoption process. There was no evidence of compliance with any lawful adoption procedure. There was no evidence of approval by any court or competent child welfare authority. There was no evidence that the children were transferred in a regulated, lawful, and transparent manner. What the Court saw was a private transfer of children, facilitated by false pretences, and linked to financial consideration.

The prosecution does not need a formal receipt stamped and signed in a marketplace to prove sale in such a case. The law recognises that offences of this nature are often concealed. The Court is entitled to infer a sale from the totality of the conduct, the admission of receipt of money, and the transfer of the children to third parties outside any lawful adoption framework. The moment the Defendant took the children, moved them on, and received money, all while concealing the true nature of the transaction, the transaction crossed from improper conduct into criminality.

In this matter, the Court is invited to determine a fundamental question: whether this Court, the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, has jurisdiction to entertain and determine Count Two of the Charge, which alleges the offence of selling human beings contrary to section 21 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015.

Jurisdiction, is the life-wire of adjudication. It is the first matter that a court must be satisfied of before embarking upon the hearing of a cause or matter. Where a court lacks jurisdiction, the proceedings, however well conducted and however meritorious the outcome may appear, remain a nullity. The Supreme Court stated the principle with lasting authority in Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 at 348, where Bairamian, FJ held that a court is competent when, among other things, “the subject matter of the case is within its jurisdiction” and “the case comes before the court initiated by due process of law.”

The question, therefore, is whether the subject matter of Count Two is within the jurisdiction of this Court.

The jurisdiction of the National Industrial Court is constitutionally defined. Section 254C(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) provides in clear terms that:

“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters...”

The provision then proceeds to list matters relating to labour, employment, trade unions, industrial relations, workplace conditions, welfare of workers, and allied civil disputes. The emphasis throughout section 254C is unmistakably on civil causes and matters within the labour and industrial relations field. The Constitution does not, in any of its paragraphs, confer general criminal jurisdiction on this Court to try and convict for offences such as selling human beings.

Indeed, the phrase “civil causes and matters” is not a surplusage. It is a constitutional limitation. It defines the nature of the disputes over which this Court may exercise authority. It does not extend the Court into the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution unless such jurisdiction is expressly and validly provided by the Constitution itself or by legislation consistent with the Constitution.

The charge in Count Two is brought under section 21 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015. The provision is penal in nature. It creates an offence and prescribes punishment. It is therefore a criminal offence, and not merely a civil wrong with incidental penal consequences. The prosecution of such an offence entails a criminal trial: plea, proof beyond reasonable doubt, evaluation of confession, conviction or discharge, and sentencing. This is the ordinary province of a court with criminal jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that jurisdiction must be clearly conferred and cannot be assumed. In A.G. Lagos State v. A.G. Federation (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt. 833) 1, the Court reaffirmed that the Constitution is supreme and that any law inconsistent with it is void to the extent of the inconsistency. It follows that no statute can enlarge the jurisdiction of a court beyond what the Constitution permits. The jurisdiction of this Court cannot therefore be stretched by implication to cover a substantive criminal charge merely because the underlying facts concern vulnerable children or exploitative conduct.

I have considered the Trafficking in Persons Act itself. The Act creates offences and contemplates investigation and prosecution of those offences. It does not, however, by any clear or express provision, confer criminal trial jurisdiction over some of the offences upon the National Industrial Court. The Act is not a jurisdiction-conferring statute for this Court. Where the legislature intends to confer a special jurisdiction, it does so in clear and unmistakable terms. No such language appears here.

The jurisdiction of this Court, as already stated, is a special jurisdiction. It is designed for labour, employment, industrial relations, enslavement, trafficking in children, and related matters. The offence of selling human beings under section 21 of TIPPEA is not a labour dispute, not an employment cause, not an industrial relations matter, and not an ancillary civil issue within the contemplation of section 254C. It is a standalone criminal offence of a serious and grave nature. To hold that this Court may exercise jurisdiction over such a charge would be to rewrite the Constitution by judicial speculation, which the Court cannot do.

I therefore hold, and so find, that this Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain Count Two of the charge against the Defendant under section 21 of the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015.

The proceedings on Count Two are consequently a nullity for want of jurisdiction. In law, any purported conviction on that count cannot stand. It is hereby set aside.

This conclusion is not made lightly. The Court is not unmindful of the gravity of the conduct alleged and the social evil which trafficking in children represents. However, sympathy, outrage, or the perceived merits of the case cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists. The law must be obeyed, especially in matters touching on the power of the court itself.

Accordingly, Count Two is struck out for want of jurisdiction.

I have carefully considered the peculiar position of the two counts as framed in this case, and the distinction between them is neither cosmetic nor merely semantic. It goes to the very root of this Court’s competence. The point to be made is that the Court’s criminal jurisdiction was properly invoked in respect of Count One, but not in respect of Count Two. The two counts, though both founded on the Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, 2015, do not stand on the same jurisdictional footing. Count One is anchored on trafficking conduct which, in the circumstances pleaded and proved, was presented as conduct occurring in the course of a broader exploitation matrix leading to forced or child labour and as an incident of the trafficking narrative before the Court. Count Two, however, is a standalone allegation of the sale of human beings, a distinct criminal offence which calls for the exercise of original criminal jurisdiction in a manner the National Industrial Court of Nigeria does not possess.

The court cannot arrogate to itself powers not donated by the Constitution or by statute. In the instant matter, the criminal jurisdiction of this Court was invoked in respect of Count One because the facts disclosed a trafficking transaction capable of being examined as part of the Court’s competence in relation to the subject matter laid before it, and the prosecution led evidence to show deception, transfer, and exploitation of vulnerable children within that trafficking framework. The count, as presented, was treated as arising from the same operative facts which formed the foundation of the charge and which the Court was called upon to examine.

In consequence, I hold that the criminal jurisdiction of this Court was competently invoked in respect of Count One because the facts and evidence placed before the Court brought that count within the scope of the proceedings as constituted. Count Two, however, was an independent criminal charge for which this Court had no subject-matter jurisdiction. The prosecution may have proven facts that are reprehensible and deeply troubling, but proof of facts does not cure want of jurisdiction. The Court may validly proceed where the law permits it to do so; it must decline where the law withholds competence. Count One is therefore maintainable against the defendant.

On the admissibility of Exhibit P1, I note the objection raised by the defence that the statement was obtained without legal representation and in breach of the Plateau State ACJL 2018. However, the Defendant’s own video confession, Exhibit P4, independently captures the same material admissions. In any event, the Court viewed the video and considered the statement alongside the oral evidence. The issue, therefore, is not merely whether a written statement was technically challenged. The issue is whether the Defendant’s own account, captured on video and supported by surrounding evidence, implicates her in the offences charged. It does.

I am mindful of the principle that a confessional statement, to ground a conviction, must be voluntary, positive and direct. The Court must be satisfied that it is reliable. In this case, the confession was not standing alone. It was supported by the testimony of PW3, by the investigative evidence of PW1 and PW2, and by the Defendant’s own admissions under oath. The internal consistency of the prosecution’s case gives it weight. The defence did not present a credible alternative explanation. Merely saying “I only helped them” does not answer the difficult question: why were the children handed to Pastor Dayo and why was money received for each child?

On mens rea, the Defendant’s conduct speaks for itself. Mens rea is often proved by inference because the mind does not leave fingerprints. The Court may infer intention from conduct, surrounding circumstances and the natural consequences of the act. Here, the repeated sourcing of children, the concealment of the true destination, the transfer to third parties, the absence of lawful adoption, and the receipt of money all point in one direction: deliberate conduct, not innocent mistake. This was not a confused good deed gone wrong. It was a calculated misuse of trust.

The defence also raised the issue of locus standi and argued that the Plateau State Ministry of Justice lacked authority to prosecute. On the record before me, I am not persuaded that this point defeats the charge. Criminal prosecutions are ordinarily undertaken by the relevant prosecuting authority in the public interest, and unless the Defendant demonstrates a real and fatal defect in competence, the Court should not entertain a purely technical escape route where the substance of the matter has been fully tried. In any event, the trial proceeded to completion, and the Defendant was not shown to have suffered any miscarriage of justice on that ground. I therefore reject that objection.

After considering the totality of the evidence, I am satisfied that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Defendant deceptively procured, transferred and trafficked six children and that she received money in connection with the transfer.

Accordingly, the Defendant is hereby found guilty on Count One for human trafficking of children contrary to Section 13 of the TIPPEA Act.

Count Two is however struck out for the reasons earlier stated in this judgment.  

Allocutus:

The matter now proceeds to allocutus. Defendant’s counsel applies to the court to tamper justice with mercy. She is a mother of three children who is estranged from her husband. The Defendant is a first offender, and the Court has taken note that the children were recovered. However, the Court must also weigh the seriousness of the breach of trust involved, the vulnerability of the victims, and the need for deterrence. Children are not property. They are not trophies for private deals. Any adult who plays fast and loose with the fate of children in exchange for money must understand that the law will not clap for her courage; it will punish the wrongdoing.

Sentence:

The sentence of this Court is as follows:

On Count One contrary to section 13 (2) (c) of TIPPEA Act 2015, the Defendant is sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of ?250,000.00. The sentence shall take into account the period already spent in custody up to the date the Defendant was granted bail by this Court.

The Defendant shall also be entered into the national trafficking offenders register and be placed under correctional monitoring upon release in accordance with the law.

This shall be the judgment of this Court.

Delivered at Jos this 29th day of June 2026.

 

HON. JUSTICE I.S. GALADIMA
Judge