IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE R. B. HAASTRUP

1ST JULY 2026                                                                          SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/295/2023

DR JOHN EZEUHWE SABO ………………………………………………………….… CLAIMANT

AND

PATHFINDER INTERNATIONAL …………………………………………………….. DEFENDANT

DR. AMINA AMINU DORAYI ………………………………………………………... DEFENDANT

(Struck out by order of Court of 23rd May 2024)

LEGAL REPRESENTATION:                                                                                                                 

G. A. Idiagboyan Esq., with Jamila Muhammed Vokna Esq. for the Claimant

C. S. Ekeocha Esq. for the Defendant

                                                                JUDGMENT

[1] The Claimant vide a Complaint and other accompanying processes dated and filed 26th October 2023 commenced this action against the instant Defendant and one Dr. Amina Aminu Dorayi as 2nd Defendant. However, upon the application of the Defendants filed on 15th day of December, 2023, the name of the 2nd Defendant was struck out by order made on 23rd May 2024 leaving the present Defendant. Consequently, an Amended Complaint dated 14th June 2024 was filed on 19th June 2024, and deemed properly filed by the order of the Court on 6th November 2024; wherein the Claimant Claimed against the Defendant the following reliefs:

  1. A declaration that by virtue of the Claimant's contract of employment dated 10th June, the Claimant’s contract of employment with the Defendant, with a commencement/start date of Monday, 20th June, 2022 was for the five (5) years life span of the Accelerating Control of the HIV Cluster 2 in Nigeria (ACE2 Project), a USAID funded program. 
  2. A declaration that the notice of termination of the Claimant's contract of employment authored by one Dr. Aminu Aminu Dorayi, the Country Director of the Defendant, dated 26th June, 2023 terminating the Claimant's contract of employment with the Defendant violates and is in breach of the Claimant's contract of employment dated 10th June 2022.
  3. An order of this Hon. Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the total sum of Fifty-Seven Million, one Hundred and Twenty-five Thousand, Five Hundred and Sixty- seven Thousand (sic) Naira, Thirty-Two Kobo (N57,125,567.32) only being the Claimant's total emoluments for the remaining 43 months from 20th June to 28 February 2027 on the basis of the Claimant's contract of employment dated 10th June 2022.
  4. An order of this Hon. (sic) directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of Six Million Naira (N6,000,000.00) being the legal fees paid by the Claimant to the law firm of Yakubu Maikasuwa SAN & Co. to handle this matter.
  5. The sum of Fifty Million Naira (N50,000,000) only being damages for breach of contract.
  6. 10% post judgment interest on the total aforesaid sum from the date of judgment until full liquidation of same by the Defendants.

 

[2] Sequel to Claimant’s Amended Complaint and statement of facts, an Amended Statement of Defence was filed on 2nd December 2024, which was deemed proper by the Order of this Court made on 13th December 2024, to which Claimant filed a Reply on the 11th day of December, 2024, thereby closing pleadings.

 

[3] In prove of his case, Claimant testified as CW1 on 20th May 2025 during which some documents were tendered through him, admitted and marked as Exhibits A-I. A second witness under subpoena by the name Nkem Moghalu, the Human Resource Manager with Georgetown Global Health Nigeria (GGHN), an affiliate and partner of the Defendant on the ACE-2 Project, was called in support of Claimant’s case and Exhibit J was tendered through her and after cross examination, Claimant closed his case on 13th November 2025. The Defendant on 28th January 2026 opened and closed their case after calling a sole witness in person of Emmanuel Eneanya, Head of Human Resource of the Defendant (DW1) through whom Exhibits D1-D6 were tendered before closing their defence.

After closing their cases, Defendant’s counsel filed his Final Written Address dated 9th March 2026 but filed on 18th March 2026, which was equally deemed proper by Court on 29th April 2026; whilst the Claimant’s final written address in reply to Defendant’s is dated 25th March 2026 but filed 26th March 2026. The addresses were all adopted on 29th April 2026.

Claimant’s Case 

[4] The summary of the Claimant’s case is that he was employed by the Defendant as a Senior Technical Advisor–Maternal and Child Health (STA-MCH) under the ACE-2 Project via a contract dated 10th June, 2022.That the employment was tied to a 5-year USAID-funded project, spanning June 2022 to February 2027 and which contract document clearly stipulated the duration and specific grounds for termination. It is Claimant’s assertion that he performed his duties diligently and without any allegation of misconduct or poor performance. However, that barely 14 months into the contract, the Defendant terminated his employment vide a letter dated 26th June, 2023 citing “restructuring” as the reason for so doing which he contends was not contemplated under the contract as a valid ground for termination. The foregoing has formed the fulcrum of his grievances and reliefs sought before the Court.

Defendant’s Case     

[5] Defendant’s case differs from that of the Claimant materially at the point where it states that its termination of Claimant’s employment on grounds of restructuring was an unforeseen contingency which is covered by the terms of employment. Also, that upon the termination of Claimant’s employment, he was paid the requisite terminal benefits via Exhibits D4-D6; hence, it is not liable to the Claimant in any case.

Claimant’s Counsel Final Written Address and Legal Submissions

[6] The Claimant’s final written address had two (2) issues distilled by counsel for determination to wit;

a. Whether the termination of employment of the Claimant dated 26th June 2023 is in line with the terms of contract of employment.

b.         Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought per his Statement of Claim and the evidence adduced and place(sic) before this Honourable.

Issue One

[7] Claimant’s counsel submitted that parties herein are not in dispute that the contract of employment between the parties is governed by Exhibit “A” of 10th June 2022, which embodies the conditions of service and the terms regulating the employment relationship. That it is trite law that parties are bound by the terms of the contract they freely and voluntarily entered into, relying on the authority of A.I.B. LTD V. I.D.S. LTD (2012) 17 NWLR (PT. 1328) SC, noting that none of the parties can go outside of the contract or import any terms not contained in it. 

It is strongly posited that by virtue of the said Exhibit A, the agreed grounds for termination are limited to: inadequate performance, change in funding availability, and where the employee (the Claimant) elects to terminate the contract. Thus, that both the Claimant        and Defendant are bound by the terms of Exhibit A as held in SKYE BANK PLC V. ADEGUN (2024) 15 NWLR (PT. 1960) 1 SC

[8] What then is the bone of contention between the parties? The Claimant’s counsel argued that the Defendant failed to comply with the procedure laid down in Exhibit A in terminating the Claimant’s employment when they cited ‘restructuring as their reason for termination, which was not in tandem with the grounds contained in the contract document; hence that the termination was unlawful and in violation of the agreed terms in Exhibit A, relying on the case of DANGOTE CEMENT PLC V. AGER (2024) 10 NWLR (PT. 1945) 1 SC.

To further drive home his point, Claimant’s counsel referred the Court to Exhibit A, wherein it was stated that Claimant was employed as a Senior Technical Advisor – Maternal and Child Health (STA-MCH) under the ACE-2 USAID Project and confirmed by the evidence of DWI. Equally, that the said Exhibit A made it clear that his employment was to last the lifespan of the project which is for five years as seen in Exhibit J; specifically, from 23rd February, 2022 to February, 2027.  Thus, he maintained that the Defendant is bound by such terms and only subject to the three grounds earlier enumerated as valid grounds of terminating the contract/employment, stressing that it was not contained in Exhibit B (termination letter). He cited in support the authority of ORIENT BANK (NIG.) PLC V. BILANTE INTERNATIONAL LTD (1997) 8 NWLR (PT. 515) 37.

[9] Additionally, counsel here vehemently argued that no evidence was led by the Defendant to substantiate the claim of restructuring as contained in Exhibit B and upon which DW1 was vigorously cross-examined during trial. He posited that the assertion of restructuring was nothing but a mere afterthought, contrived by the Defendant as a convenient excuse to justify its wrongful termination of the Claimant’s employment.

[10] Reacting specifically to Defendant’s counsel submissions on the issues in their Final Written Address, Claimant’s counsel submitted that Defendant failed to answer the question, whether the reason given for the termination falls within the specific contractual grounds agreed by the parties; it rather sought to reduce the dispute to a mere question of the employer’s general power to terminate employment,  which to Claimant’s counsel misses the point in issue, citing the case of SPDC v. OLANREWAJU (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1118) 1 and ORGAN v. N.L.N.G. LTD (2013) 16 NWLR (PT. 1381) 506, to the effect that there must be justification where reason is given for termination of an employee’s appointment.

[11] Furthermore, it was argued that the Defendant misconstrued the termination clause in paragraph (b) of Exhibit A which stated thus;

“In the event of unforeseen contingencies, including change in funding availability.” 

That contrary to Defendant’s line of submission, the word “restructuring” cannot qualify as an unforeseen contingency relying on the doctrine of ejusdem generis. Claimant counsel argued that where general words follow specific words, the general words are restricted to the same class as the specific words. Referring the Court to the case of OKOTIE-EBOH V. MANAGER (2004) 18 NWLR (PT. 905)      242 and EHUWA V. O.S.I.E.C (2006) 18 NWLR (PT.1012) 544.

Also, that the use of the phrase “including change in funding availability” clearly limits “unforeseen contingencies” to financial or funding-related occurrences, which is not internal administrative actions such as restructuring employed by the Defendant.

[12] That assuming without conceding, that the Claimant’s contract of employment was terminated on account of the purported restructuring of the USAID ACE-2 Project, he opined that the subsequent advertisement of the very same position previously occupied by the Claimant as per Exhibit C discredits the Defendant’s claim of restructuring.

[13] Responding to Defendant’s assertion that Claimant admitted to the occurrence of restructuring, Claimant counsel posited that such was just to mislead the Court as he did not only challenge the veracity of the alleged restructuring; he denied its existence and urged the Court to give a community reading of the pleadings of the Claimant and the evidence adduced during trial to get the truth of same and to reject Defendant’s position in its entirety.

In conclusion, Claimant counsel urged the Court to hold that the termination of the Claimant’s employment by the Defendant was in clear breach of t[P1] he terms of the contract of employment dated 10th June 2022. He further urged the Court to resolve this issue in his favour.

 

Issue Two

[14] The Claimant adopted submissions made in respect of issue one above and further submits that he has proven his entitlement to the reliefs sought in his Amended Statement of Claim, noting that he has established that the Defendant is in breach of the Contract of Employment dated 10th June, 2022; which entitles the Claimant to damages and specific performance,  citing KOREA NAT. OIL CORP. V. O.P.S. (NIG.) LTD (2018) 2 NWLR (PT. 1604) 394; OMEGA BANK (NIG.) PLC. V. O.B.C. LTD (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 928) 547 at 576, PARA. H and ENWELU V. GIUMEX INVESTMENT (LCN/10512) (CA), in support of his stance. Counsel emphasized that since Claimant’s employment was for a fixed term linked to the project lifespan, it is not a master-servant relationship terminable at will. Thus, that where an employment is for a fixed term, wrongful termination entitles the employee to earnings for the unexpired period as held in NIGERIAN PRODUCE MARKETING BOARD V. ADEWUNMI (1972) All NLR 870 and OSISANYA v. AFRIBANK (NIG.) PLC (2007) 6 NWLR (PT. 1031) 565.

 

Relating the above to the instant case, Claimant counsel posited that because the total project duration was 57 months and that Claimant worked for 14 months, leaving 43 months outstanding, thus he is entitled to the sum of ?57,125,567.32, representing salary, allowances, pension contributions, and other contractual benefits, which he sated constitutes special damages already specifically pleaded and strictly proved.

[15] In addition, he seeks from the Court general damages in the sum of ?50,000,000.00 which he posits flowed from the abrupt termination of Claimant’s high-level professional engagement, causing him reputational and financial harm. He relied on the case of CHUKWUMAH v. SHELL PETROLEUM (NIG.) LTD (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512, in urging the court to award substantial damages.

[16] With respect to the claim for legal fees, it was argued that solicitor’s fees are claimable when pleaded as special damages and supported by evidence, as held in AJIBOLA V. ANISERE (2019) LEPLR-48204. That having pleaded and led evidence of legal fees totaling ?6,000,000.00 paid to Yakubu Maikasuwa, SAN & Co., to prosecute this matter, this Court by virtue of its equitable jurisdiction can award cost in that regard, relying on GUINNESS NIGERIA PLC v. NWOKE (2000) 15 NWLR (PT. 689) 135. He equally prayed the Court to grant a 10% post-judgment interest and all the reliefs sought by the Claimant.

Defendant’s Counsel Final Written Address 

[17] Defendant’s counsel distilled a sole issue for the determination of the Court to wit:

Whether in the light of the state of the pleadings and evidence before this Honourable Court, the Claimant can be adjudged to have proved his case by credible evidence in order to be entitled to the reliefs sought before this Honourable Court?

Defendant’s Counsel Legal Submission on Sole Issue

[18] Defendant’s counsel submitted that the Claimant’s case is hinged on the assertion that his employment was unlawfully terminated by the Defendant contrary to the terms of his employment letter (Exhibit A). He opined that from the pleadings and evidence before this Honourable Court, the issue in contention is limited to the construction of the contents of Exhibits A and Exhibit B (letter of termination) in order to ascertain whether the Claimant has proved his case before this Honourable Court.

It was posited that the Claimant failed to prove by any shred of credible evidence that his contract of employment was terminated in breach of the termination clause expressly set out in Exhibit A. That the Claimant’s position fell short of the settled position of law that the burden of proof in a suit lies on that person who would fail, if no evidence at all were given on either side as provided in section 132 of the Evidence Act, 2011 (As Amended); and that Claimant’s reliefs being declaratory in nature, must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court, since the Claimant must succeed or fail on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of the defence. He relied on the cases of OMISORE V. AREGBESOLA (2015) 15 NWLR (PT. 1482) 205 AT 297-298 PARAS.F- A; UCHA V. ELECHI (2012) 13 NWLR (PT. 1317) 330 AT 365 PARAS.F-H and DUMEZ NIG. LTD. V. NWAKHOBA (2008) 18 NWLR (PT. 1119) 361 AT 373 – 374 PARAS. H – B

[19] Counsel reiterated that though Claimant alleges that his contract of employment is for a fixed term of 5 years, in line with the life span of the Accelerating Control of the HIV Epidemic in Nigeria (ACE) - Cluster 2 programme, he conceded that Defendant is empowered under Exhibit A to terminate the said employment. But that Claimant’s only grievance is that the reason given for the termination in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Exhibit B do not fall within the circumstances contemplated in termination clause in Exhibit A. 

Further to the above, Defendant’s counsel asserted that Claimant did not dispute the facts stated in paragraph 1 of Exhibit B that Defendant had discussed the issue regarding the elimination of his position/role in the Defendant, as a result of re-structuring embarked upon by the Defendant, which facts the Defence alluded were contained in Claimant’s paragraph 3(h) of his Reply to the Amended Statement of Defence and paragraph 9 of the Claimant's Reply. Thus, that facts admitted, need no further proof, relying on the cases of OKOEBOR V. POLICE COUNCIL (2003) 12 NWLR (PT. 834) 444 AT 471, PARAS C; 472 PARA A; 483 PARAS A-E; ASAFA FOOD FACTORY V. ALRAINE (NIG) LTD. (2002) 12 NWLR (PT. 781) 353 AT 380 PARAS B-F.

[20] Notwithstanding the above, Defendant counsel submitted that the Defendant still gave evidence to substantiate the claims of restructuring it went through resulting in the elimination of some positions/roles, including that of the Senior Technical Advisor, Maternal and Health, held by the Claimant. He relied on paragraphs 14-22 and 25-27 of the witness statement on oath of the DW1.

Additionally, Defendant’s counsel posited that the reason given for the elimination of positions/roles in the Defendant which arose from the said restructuring falls under paragraph b in Exhibit A, which is “in the event of unforeseen contingencies, including change in funding availability”. He argued that both their pleadings and evidence reveal that the need to restructure the Defendant arose in February 2023 after Claimant’s employment in June 2022, hence Defendant was on good footing to have terminated his employment in the given circumstances.

[21] Counsel also relied on definition of the word ‘unforeseen’ as stated in the Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 1530 to be: ‘Not seen, not expected.’ While the word "Contingency" was defined at page 320 thereof as: ‘Something that may or may not happen….’

It was thus argued that Claimant cannot limit the scope of the definition of unforeseen contingency to only change in funding availability, since the word ‘including’ was used before such description. He maintained that Claimant by settled law cannot add to or subtract from the content of a document citing in support the cases of LAYADE V. PANALPINA WORLD TRANS. NIG. LTD. (1996) 6 NWLR (PT. 456) 544 @ 558 PARAS. B-C; ASHAKACEM PLC V. A.M. INV. LTD. (2019) 5 NWLR (PT. 1666) 447 @ 460, PARAS. B-C.

[22] Defendant’s counsel further contended that Claimant has led contradictory evidence as the oral evidence of CW1 and CW2 are at variance with the Claimant’s pleadings in his Amended Statement of Claim and Reply, as well as the contents of Exhibits A and B relied upon by him. also, that Claimant failed to prove his claims and neither did the evidential burden of proof shift to the Defendant, as no credible evidence was led by the Claimant.

[23] In another vein, Defendant counsel posited that the law is settled that the termination of an employment cannot be held to be unlawful when it is established to have been done in accordance with the terms of the Claimant's employment as decided in U.T.C NIG. LTD V. PETERS (2022) 18 NWLR (PT.1862) 297 at 319 PARAS. C-D. Likewise, that Claimant’s assertion through his testimony that the termination of his employment was premeditated as same was orchestrated by the country director of the Defendant whom he alleged misinformed and misguided the Defendant, is of no moment and not unhelpful to the Claimant’s case as motive cannot vitiate the validity of the exercise of a right of an employer.

[24] Regarding the question asked by Claimant’s counsel to DW1 as per signing his witness statement on oath in the office of the counsel to the Defendant, to which DW1 answered in the affirmative, it is Defendant’s counsel submission that same does not in any way affect the credibility of evidence of DW1 before this Honourable Court, relying on the provisions of  Section 4(2)(C)  and 4 (3) of the Oaths Act which does not admit of irregularity in the form of an oath or affirmation as affecting admissibility of evidence nor the failure to take an oath or make an affirmation or any of such should be construed to affect the liability of a witness to state the truth.

In addition, that there is nothing to show the oath adopted by DW1 was not filed before the commissioner for oaths of this Honourable Court; and as such that the witness is competent and his evidence is credible, relying on the Supreme Court decision in the case of KATAGUM v. UMAR & ANOR (2026) LPELR-83085(SC).

On the whole, counsel here urged the Court to dismiss Claimant’s case for lacking in merit.

 

 

DECISION

[25] The crux of the Claimant’s case herein is that the termination of his employment by the Defendant was wrongful for failing to comply with any of the grounds stipulated in his contract of employment letter (Exhibit A) and that because the employment was for a fixed term of five years, he is entitled to be paid salaries and entitlements he would have earned for the unexpired period of 43 months of the said contract. The Defendant on its part have strenuously denied the Claimant’s assertion stating that Claimant’s employment was properly terminated in accordance with the terms of contract i.e. under paragraph b of Exhibit A captured as ‘in the event of unforeseen contingencies’ which they argue restructuring falls thereunder.

[26] In consideration of the processes filed by the parties and supporting documents, as well as written submissions of learned Counsel, this Court has distilled a sole issue for determination of this case to wit:

“Whether the term restructuring used by the Defendant in the termination of Claimant’s employment can validly stand in the circumstances of the contract of employment between the parties?”

Resolution of sole Issue 

[27] The law is trite that civil cases are decided on the preponderance of evidence and as such in arriving at a just decision, the Court will consider the various pieces of credible evidence adduced by each party and weigh same on its imaginary scale as guided by law to determine which way the judgment will go. It is in this light that the Claimant in a case must succeed only on the strength of his case and not because of the weakness in the case of the defence. See HEALTH CARE PRODUCTS (NIG) LTD V. BAZZA (2004) 3 NWLR (PT. 861) 582 @ 605-606 and JIKANTORO & ORS. V. DANTORO & ORS (2004) 5 SC (PT.11) 1 @ 15.

In addition, by reason of Section 131 (1) of the Evidence Act 2011 and the case of NDUUL V. WAYO & ORS. (2018) 7 SC (PT.111) 164 @ 212, the law is certain that he who asserts the law must prove, while as provided under Section 132 of the Evidence Act, the burden lies on the Claimant to prove the facts he has asserted first, before it can shift to the Defendant. However, where the Claimant fails in his duty, then there is nothing to defend.

[28] In the instant case, Claimant has asserted that his appointment was wrongfully terminated by the Defendant by relying on a purported restructuring which he contends does not come within any of the grounds contained in his contract of employment, which is binding on the parties having mutually agreed to same.

There is no gainsaying that the already concretized position of the law regarding contracts freely entered into by parties, is that they are bound by such terms and neither the parties nor the Court is allowed to read non-existent terms into the contract. See the decision of the Supreme Court in UNITY BANK PLC V. RHOUR & LUE (NIG) LTD (2025) 9 NWLR (PT.1994) 1 @ 61, PARA. A, where it relied on the authorities of OVIVIE V. DELTA STEEL CO. LTD. (2023) 14 NWLR (PT.1904) 203 and NNPC V. FUNGTAI ENGINEERING CO. LTD (2023) 15 NWLR (PT.1906) 117.

[29] I should as a matter of fact point out that Claimant is not contending that his employer-the Defendant does not have the power to terminate his employment; rather, he is challenging the validity of such termination for want of compliance with the grounds binding on the parties in Exhibit A. 

[30] The foregoing makes it imperative for this Court to x-ray the contents of Exhibit A, especially the clause or paragraphs bothering on termination of the contract, which is at page 2 paragraph 6 under the sub-head “Termination of contract’. It provides thus:

              Termination of Contract:

“Prior to the scheduled termination date, this Agreement may be terminated by either party with one month’s notice given for any of the reasons below:
 

(a) Pathfinder may decide to terminate for inadequate performance for the good of the project;

(b) In the event of unforeseen contingencies, including change in funding availability; 

(c) In the event that the employee desires to terminate the contract.”

[31] Equally, I find it pertinent to reproduce relevant portions of the termination letter (Exhibit B) which reads thus;

"This letter is to confirm the previous conversation held with you on Friday, June 23, 2023 in respect of your position as the Senior Technical Advisor on ACE 2 project. 

Over the last several months, Pathfinder Nigeria's role on the Accelerating Control of the HIV Epidemic in Nigeria Cluster 2 (ACE 2) project has been through restructuring to enable Pathfinder provide more targeted technical assistance support. To operationalize this, it has become imperative for us to eliminate and re-align some roles.

It is with the deepest regret that I write to inform you that your position as the Senior Technical Advisor, Maternal and Child Health (MCH) is one that will be eliminated, and your employment contract will terminate effective Wednesday July 26, 2023, in line with the month notice required to terminate your contract.”

From the above excerpts, the particular ground in contention is ground B bothering on unforeseen contingency for which Defendant had used the word restructuring to be the reason for terminating Claimant’s employment. Claimant insists that restructuring cannot be classified as unforeseen contingency to validate the termination of his appointment. 

[32] The surrounding circumstances of the bone of contention calls for interpretation of the above Exhibits. A cardinal principle of interpretation is that where the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous, the Courts should give them the ordinary natural and literal meaning in order to establish the intention of the lawmaker. It is only where the ordinary or literal meaning of the clear and unambiguous words fail to bring out the intention of the lawmaker or leads to absurdity that resort is had to constructive interpretation. See DICKSON V. SYLVA (2017) 8 NWLR (PT.1567) PG.167 @ 233, PARA. D. 

The word unforeseen was defined in the Cambridge Dictionary as “not expected or planned”; it has also been referred to as something not reasonably anticipated or predicted. While contingency in the same Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 320 was defined as:

"Something that may or may not happen. Quality of being contingent, or casual; the possibility of coming to pass; an event which may occur; a possibility; a casualty. A fortuitous event, which comes without design, foresight or expectation."

A juxtaposition of the two words translates as an unexpected or unplanned event which may or may not happen.

[33] Restructuring has also been defined as “the act of reorganizing a business or corporation, typically to reduce debt, cut costs and increase efficiency or adapt to a crisis”

[34] There is evidence before me, to show that Defendant alluded at paragraphs 14-22 and 25-27 of its witness statement on oath of DW1 to undergoing internal restructuring from February 2023, which process resulted in the elimination of Claimant’s position among that of others and the reason given for the said restructuring was to properly position the Defendant to offer effective technical service. I have in addition observed that Claimant even though stated at paragraphs 3(h) and (9) of his Amended Reply, that there was a restructuring, he claimed that it was a kangaroo restructuring carried out by the Country Director of the Defendant Mrs. Amina Dorayi with a view to truncating his employment having failed to do so by other means. He also subsequently alluded that Defendant sought to replace him after the termination of his employment by re-advertising for his position vide Exhibit I.

[35] I have given a holistic view of the pleadings and evidence presented before me and noted that from the Defendant’s standpoint, as at the time Claimant was employed in June 2022, there was no issue of restructuring in sight or planned. That the flow of events reveal that it was not until sometime in February 2023 that the restructuring issue came up and same did not just affect the Claimant alone to show any specific bias. More so, the assertion by Claimant that his position was readvertised by the Defendant after exiting him from the organization was discredited by Defendant under cross examination when it was established that the readvertised position was made by Georgetown Global Health Nigeria, a distinct organization from the Defendant who only worked in partnership on the USAID programme for which Claimant was employed. Hence, I do not see any proof that Claimant was targeted specifically to have his appointment terminated, I so hold. 

[36] Flowing from my evaluation above, it is my finding that the restructuring carried out by the Defendant which resulted in the termination of Claimant’s employment was not expected and falls squarely under the ground of an unforeseen contingency as contained in paragraph B of his contract of employment (Exhibit A). The necessary implication is that the termination of Claimant’s employment by Defendant on grounds of restructuring as stated in Exhibit B was validly done in accordance with the terms of the contract, I so hold.

[37] Consequently, the entire case of the Claimant fails for lacking in merit and same is dismissed accordingly. 

 

[38] Judgment is hereby entered.

 

                                                        ……………..…………………………

         Hon. Justice R. B. Haastrup

                                                                             JUDGE

 [P1]