IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE ABUJA JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

 

BEFORE HER LADYSHIP HON. JUSTICE O. A. OBASEKI-OSAGHAE

 

DATE: June 5, 2026 SUIT NO: NICN/ABJ/345/2023

 

BETWEEN:

COMRADE NIYI AKINNIBI.                                                               

(For himself and on behalf of the entire members of National                    

Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian University………………. CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

1.  THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS.

2.  THE HONOURABLE MINISTER OF LABOUR 

     AND EMPLOYMENT.  

3. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION…………………. DEFENDANTS                                                                                                                  

 

REPRESENTATION

 O.O. Ayenakin for the Claimant.

N. Ierkwagh for the 1st and 2nd Defendants.

 

                                           JUDGMENT

Introduction and claims

[1] The Claimants commenced this action against the Defendants by way of Originating Summons filed on 29th November 2023 together with the accompanying processes, praying for the determination of the following questions: 

  1. Whether by virtue of Sections 3 (1) (5) (6) (a) and (b); 5 (1), (2), (3), 5 (a), (b), (6); 6 (3); 8 (a) and (b) of the Trade Unions Act and Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; the refusal and failure of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to register the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions Act is not wrongful. 

 

  1. Whether having regard to the judgment of the National Industrial Court in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/250/2022 between Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) V. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi (Sued as the National President of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS); the continuous refusal of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to register Claimants National Association of Non- Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions Act is not wrongful.

[2] Upon the determination of the above questions in his favour, the Claimant is seeking the following reliefs:

a. A Declaration that the Defendants are bound to register Claimants’: National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities as a Trade Union under the Trade Union Act. 

b. A Declaration that the refusal of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to register Claimants’: National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions Act is wrongful. 

c. A Mandatory Order directing the 1st and 2nd Defendants to register forthwith and or to issue the Claimants forthwith with the certificate of registration of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions Act. 

d. An Order of perpetual injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents, privies, assigns or any other person or authority deriving authority from them from denying Claimants registration as a trade union under the Trade Unions Act. 

[3] The originating summons is supported by 27 paragraphs affidavit sworn to by Comrade Niyi Akinnibi National President, to which is annexed Exhibits marked A-P and a written address dated 28th November, 2023. The 1st and 2nd Defendants filed a 22 paragraphs counter affidavit sworn to by Dr. Falonipe O. Amos on 30th October 2024 together with the written address, and a Notice of Preliminary Objection. They also filed a reply on point of law in respect of the NPO on 16th May 2025. The 3rd Defendant filed a 4 paragraphs counter affidavit sworn to by Thomas Etah, Litigation Officer on 24th January 2024 and a written address dated 23rd January 2024. The Claimants filed a counter affidavit to the 1st and 2nd Defendant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection and a reply on point of law on 21st October 2025. The Claimant filed a further and better affidavit and a reply on point of law to the 3rd Defendant’s processes on 28th June 2024. At the hearing, Counsel adopted their respective addresses and made oral submissions. However, the 3rd Respondent’s counsel was absent. Consequently, the processes filed by the 3rd Respondent were deemed adopted.

Case of the Claimant

[4] The facts upon which the Claimant premised the questions for determination and the reliefs he is seeking are as contained in the supporting affidavit. The Claimant states that he is the National president of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS), and on whose behalf he instituted this action. The National Association of Non-teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS) is an unregistered Trade Union formed for the purpose of promoting and protecting the welfare of non-teaching staff in Nigerian universities. The Claimant states that he and other members of the Association attempted to secure registration as a trade union by an application dated 5th April 2019, submitted with the prescribed forms together with supporting documents, including minutes of meetings and names of proposed officers. The Claimant states that the 1st and 2nd Defendants by a letter dated 7th March 2022 refused the application for registration on the ground that there is an existing association Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions (NASU).

[5] The Claimant states that following the refusal, they exercised their right of appeal by writing several letters to the 1st and 2nd Defendants requesting reconsideration of the decision. Despite these repeated appeals and several correspondences, the 1st and 2nd Defendants refused to reconsider the application or respond positively to the requests for registration. The Claimant states that NASU had earlier instituted a suit against him, Suit No: NICN/ABJ/250/2022 between Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) V. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi (Sued as the National President of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS) challenging whether NANTS could coexist alongside NASU, and whether NANTS could lawfully be recognised and registered as a trade union in Nigeria. The Claimant further states that the judgment delivered on 30th May 2023, resolved all the issues against NASU and held that NANTS could be registered as a trade union, subject to compliance with the registration requirements under the law. The Claimant states that relying on the judgment of the Court, they wrote letters to the 1st and 2nd Defendants to grant the registration but the 1st and 2nd Defendants refused to.

Claimants Submission

[6] The Claimant submitted one issue for determination as follows:

Whether considering the affidavit evidence before this Honourable Court and the Exhibits annexed there to, the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought? 

[7] Learned counsel referred to Sections 133(1) and 134 of the Evidence Act 2011 and submitted that the Claimant had discharged the evidential burden required and is therefore entitled to the reliefs sought under the Trade Unions Act having placed sufficient materials before the Court. He cited Imam v. Sheriff (2005) 4 NWLR 914, 80 CA; Remawa v. NACB Ltd (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt.349)1111 at ,1114.

[8] Learned counsel referred to Sections 5(1)-(7), 6(1)-(5), and 8(a)-(b) of the Trade Unions Act, and submitted that the 1st Defendant, being the Registrar of Trade Unions, has a statutory duty to register a trade union upon compliance with the prescribed conditions, and may only refuse registration on grounds expressly permitted by the Act. He further submitted  that where registration is refused, the applicants possess a statutory right of appeal to the Minister, the 2nd Defendant, who is correspondingly obligated to consider and determine such appeal. He stated that the Claimant duly applied for registration in compliance with the Trade Unions Act, but the 1st Defendant declined registration solely on the basis that another trade union already exists within the proposed operational scope of the Claimants’ association. He argued that this ground of refusal is alien to Section 6(2) of the Trade Unions Act and therefore unlawful. 

[9] Learned counsel argued that the Act provides for referral of disputes concerning registration and trade union names to the Minister for determination in Section 6 (3) and (4) of the Trade Unions Act, and that the refusal by the 1st Defendant and the failure or refusal of the 2nd Defendant to consider the appeal is an infraction of the Trade Unions Act. He submitted that it is the law that where legislation prescribes a procedure for doing an act, no other method is permissible as the statutory procedure prescribed by the Act must be strictly adhered to, citing Atamah v. Ebosele (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt.506) 1925; Malam Abubakar & Ors v. Saidu Nasamu & Ors (2011) LPELR-1831(SC). He argued that the 2nd Defendant’s failure to consider and determine the appeal violated the mandatory provision of Section 6(3) of the Trade Unions Act. That  the language of the provision imposes a duty on the Minister to make a determination once the matter is referred. 

[10] Learned counsel submitted that statutory provisions must be accorded their ordinary  and grammatical meaning, and construed in accordance with the clear intention of the legislature without importing extraneous interpretations citing Ayodele v. Nigerian Police Council & Ors (1998) 11 NWLR (Pt.572) 105 at 112.  He referred to Section 8(a) and (b) of the Trade Unions Act and submitted that the Court is vested with all powers exercisable by the Registrar of Trade Unions and that by virtue of these provisions, the Court is empowered to act in the stead of the 1st Defendant and exercise the powers which the Registrar ought to have exercised, including the grant of the registration sought. He then urged the Court to invoke its statutory powers and grant the reliefs sought.

 

Case of the 1st and 2nd Defendant

[11] The case of the 1st and 2rd Defendants is as stated in their counter affidavit. They state that the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigeria Universities (NANTS) is an unregistered proposed Trade Union who applied for registration as a trade union, but the application was turned down in line with the Trade Unions Act. That the Non-Academic Staff Union of Education and Associated Institution (NASU) has already been registered as a trade union and its jurisdictional scope covers the persons the proposed association intends   to unionize. The 1st and 2nd Defendants state that the application was turned down as it contravened section 3(2) of Trade Unions Act; and there is NASU covering the scope and interest of the workers or employees the Claimant’s proposed Trade Union seek to protect. The 1st and 2nd Defendants state the applications and was rejected by the Registered of  Trade Union; and the appeal was also rejected on the directive of the Honourable Minister of Labour and Employment. 

[12] The 1st and 2nd Defendants state that they were not parties in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/250/2022 between Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) V. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi (Sued as the National President of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS); neither are they aware of the judgment, and therefore are not bound by the decision. That in avoidance of public disorder, peace and interest justice, this suit should be struck out as it is an attempt to waste the time of this Honourable Court and lacking in merit.

Preliminary objection

[13] The 1st and 2nd Defendants filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection pursuant to section 6 (6) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), section 46(1) of the National Industrial Court (Civil Procedure Rules) 2017, section 5(4) of the Trade Unions Act praying for an order striking out the suit. The grounds are that this is a trade dispute and the Claimant failed to comply with the provisions of Part 1 of the Trade Disputes Act, the mode of commencement by originating summons is wrong the Claimant lacks locus standi not being a trade union. Learned counsel submitted that jurisdiction is fundamental and any proceedings conducted without jurisdiction are nullities. Citing Oloba v. Akereja (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 508, Aremo II v. Adekanye (2004) 11 MJSC 11, and Drexel Energy and Natural Resources Ltd & 2 Ors v. Trans International Bank Ltd (2008) 12 SC (Pt. II) 240;  Melwani v. Five Star Industrial Ltd (2002) 1 SC 120 ; Adesigbin v. Military Governor of Lagos State (2017) LPELR-41666 (SC).

 [14] Learned counsel submitted that the suit is incompetent and premature because the Claimant failed to exhaust the statutory condition precedents prescribed under sections 3, 8–13 of the Trade Disputes Act before approaching the Court. She submitted that the dispute is an inter-union trade dispute concerning jurisdictional scope and registration of trade unions, and squarely within the ambit of Part I of the Trade Disputes Act. Counsel submitted that disputes involving intra-union and inter-union matters have been held by the NICN and Appellate courts to constitute trade disputes requiring prior recourse to conciliation and arbitration mechanisms before judicial intervention citing Uzuaru & Anor v. Dangote Cement Plc & 6 Ors (2023) 31 N.L.L.R. (Pt. 89) 314–315; National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers v. National Union of Air Transport Employees & Anor, Suit No. NICN/ABJ/207/2018; Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria & Ors v. Mr. Olufemi Ajewole & Ors (2016) LPELR- 41271(CA). He submitted that disputes relating to jurisdictional scope of trade unions constitute trade disputes.

[15] Learned counsel submitted that this suit does not qualify as an appeal contemplated under section 5(5) or section 7(3) of the TUA and that the Claimant failed to first invoke the statutory processes before the Registrar and the Industrial Arbitration Panel.  She referred to Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions v. Aniah Jacob & Ors (2020) LPELR- 49951(CA), Nguroje & Anor v. El-Sudi & Ors (2012) LPELR-20865(CA); and stated that where a statute prescribes a particular procedure for seeking a remedy, that procedure must be strictly followed referring to Cousin (Nig.) Ltd v. Inspector-General of Police (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1081) 546; Ekiti State & Anor v. Akinyemi & Ors (2011) LPELR-4218; System Application Products (Nig.) Ltd v. Central Bank of Nigeria (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt. 897) 662 at 687.

[16] Learned counsel submitted that the suit was improperly commenced by originating summons because substantial disputes of fact exist between the parties. That originating summons procedure is inappropriate where facts are contentious, hostile, or likely to require oral evidence citing Etim v. PDP & Ors (2016) LPELR-40129 (CA), PDP v. Akinola (2018) LPELR-43968(CA); Atago v. Nwuche (2013) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1341) 337 at 354. She submitted that where declaratory reliefs are sought and substantial disputes of fact are likely to arise, the action ought to be commenced by writ of summons rather than originating summons and cited Famfa Oil Ltd v. Attorney-General of the Federation at pages 453–467, Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 2 MJSC 1, FGN v. Zebra Energy (Nig.) Ltd (2003) 1 MJSC 3. Counsel submitted that the suit involves factual controversies relating to jurisdictional scope, entitlement to registration, and the legal rights of existing trade unions and it cannot conveniently be resolved solely on affidavit evidence. 

Claimant’s Submissions

[17] In opposing the Objection, learned counsel to the Claimant referred to section 3–8 and 13 of the Trade Disputes Act and submitted that the instant suit is not an employment matter, conditions of service, or intra/inter-union disputes. That it is on the legality of the refusal by the Registrar of Trade Unions to register the Claimant’s association as a trade union. Counsel submitted that jurisdiction is determined by the Claimant’s claims as endorsed on the originating process and not by the defence or objections raised by the Defendants citing Garba v. Sheba International (Nig.) Ltd (2002) 1 NWLR (Pt. 748) 372 at 389 paras. F–H; Oputa v. Ogbeiwi (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 234) 184, Anya v. Iyayi (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 305) 290; Akinfolarin v. Akinnola (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 335) 659. He submitted that disputes between a trade union and the Registrar of Trade Unions do not amount to trade disputes as contemplated under the Trade Disputes Act. He submitted that the cases relied on by the Defendants involve disputes between trade unions over jurisdictional scope and   distinguishable from the present action that concerns the refusal of registration by the Registrar of Trade Unions. He submitted that an authority is only relevant where the facts and issues are substantially similar citing Ngige v. Obi (No. 1) (2012) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1280) 40 at pp. 60–61 paras H–A.  

[18] Learned counsel submitted that this suit was properly commenced by originating summons because the principal questions before the Court concern the interpretation of judgments, statutory provisions, and documentary instruments. He submitted that originating summons is the most appropriate procedure where the dispute involves substantial questions of law or interpretation and where material facts are not substantially in dispute citing  Governor of Kano State v. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) (2016) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1540) 149 at 167 paras. E–F, Keyamo v. House of Assembly, Lagos State (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 799) 605. He submitted that the burden lies on a party objecting to originating summons procedure to specifically identify disputed facts incapable of resolution by affidavit evidence. That the 1st and 2nd Defendants made bare assertions without demonstrating the existence of substantial factual disputes necessitating oral evidence. Counsel stated that sufficient documentary evidence, including the judgment sought to be interpreted and supporting documents, had been placed before the Court to enable effective adjudication. 

[19] Learned counsel submitted that although the Applicants formulated an issue concerning the legal capacity of the Claimant to institute the suit, no arguments were canvassed in support thereof. Counsel submitted that by settled principles of law, any issue upon which no argument is advanced is deemed abandoned. Counsel urged the court to dismiss the preliminary objection.

Reply 

[20] Learned counsel replying on points of law submitted that the Claimant’s counter-affidavit deposed to by a counsel in the law firm representing the Claimant rendered it hearsay and inadmissible citing Bwacha v. Kente & Ors (2022) LPELR-58989 (CA), Ekpeto v. Wanogho (2004) LPELR-1094(SC), Nweke v. FRN (2019) LPELR-46946 (SC), and Akinlade v. INEC, that such affidavits should be discountenanced. 

Originating Summons

[21] Learned counsel to the 1st and 2nd Defendants submitted three issues for determination:

1. Whether the 1st and 2nd Defendants are precluded from registering a new Trade Union(s) by virtue of Section 3 (2) of the Trade Unions when the interest of such Union is sufficient  covered by any pre-existing Union and there exists a Union is such an area in respect of which an application was received. 

2. Whether the jurisdictional scope of the Proposed Union is indeed covered by   a pre-existing Trade Union to warrant refusal of the Application.

3. Whether the claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought from this Court having regards to the facts that the jurisdiction of this Court is appellate in nature in respect to the claims and reliefs of the Claimant.   

[22] Learned counsel on issue one submitted that Section 3(2) of the Trade Unions Act empowers and indeed obligates the Registrar of Trade Unions to refuse registration where a pre-existing union already covers the same jurisdictional field or category of workers. He submitted that the existence of Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions (NASU) legally precluded registration of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS) and he cited Mr. Ndidi Okoabor (for himself and on behalf of Union of Tipper & Quarry Employers of Nigeria) v. National Union of Road Transport Workers & Anor Suit No: NICN/AKW/25/2018. The 1st and 2nd Defendants contended that NASU complied with all statutory requirements for registration, including publication of notice in the Federal Gazette pursuant to Section 5(2) of the Trade Unions Act, and that the Claimant failed to raise any objection within the prescribed period. He argued that the Claimant’s delayed challenge amounted to indolence and acquiescence citing Attorney-General of Rivers State v. Ude & Ors(2006) LPELR -626 (SC) (Pp. 20 paras C), Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria & 2 Ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & Ors(2008) All FWLR (Pt. 412)1013.

[23] Learned counsel submitted on issue 2 that registration of the proposed union would inevitably create jurisdictional conflict between NANTS and NASU. He submitted that trade union jurisdictional scopes are statutorily prescribed and gazette and that NASU’s jurisdiction clearly encompasses non-academic staff within educational institutions. He referred to Section 4 and the First Schedule to the Trade Unions Act, particularly paragraphs 8 and 9, and submitted that these provisions demonstrated that NASU’s membership and operational scope already lawfully covered the workers whom the Claimant intended to represent.

[24] Learned counsel on issue three referred to Sections 3(2), 7, 8, and 54 of the Trade Unions Act and submitted that that any challenge to refusal of registration must first proceed through the statutory appeal mechanism involving the Minister and the Industrial Arbitration Panel before the National Industrial Court. That the instant proceedings, failed to comply with the mandatory condition precedent prescribed by law citing Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions v. Aniah Jacob & Ors (2020)s LPELR-49951 (CA), Nguroje & Anor v. El-Sudi & Ors (2012) LPELR – 20865, Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 ALL NLR (pt.4) 587. He submitted that where a statute prescribes a specific procedure for seeking a remedy, that procedure must be strictly followed and no alternative procedure is permissible referring to Cunsin (Nig.) Ltd v. Inspector-General of Police (2008) 5 NWLR (Pt.1081) 546; Governor of Ekiti State & Anor v. Akinyemi & Ors (2011) LPELR-4218. He submitted that the Claimant’s protest letter did not constitute a valid statutory appeal and that the institution of the suit before exhaustion of the statutory process deprived the Court of jurisdiction. Counsel submitted that the reliefs sought by the Claimant are declaratory in nature and unsuitable for determination by originating summons where substantial disputes of fact existed. 

Case of the 3rd Defendant

[25] The 3rd Defendant submitted that the constitutional duties of the Attorney-General are confined principally to the institution, undertaking, takeover, and discontinuance of criminal proceedings pursuant to Section 174(1)(a)–(c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). That the Attorney-General of the Federation, as Chief Law Officer of the Federation, bears no statutory responsibility for the registration or refusal of registration of trade unions, nor for acts incidental thereto and no cause of action was disclosed against the Attorney-General of the Federation, who was improperly joined in the suit. Counsel cited Attorney-General of Kano State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2007) 6 MJSC P8; Attorney-General of Rivers State v. Attorney-General of Akwa Ibom State (2011) 8 NWLR (Pt. 148) SC 31 at Para C-E.  

[26] The 3rd Defendant submitted that although an Attorney-General may be sued in civil proceedings involving the Government, such joinder is only proper where the complaint is directly against the Government concerned. The 3rd Defendant contended that since no relief was sought against the Federal Government and no allegation was directly made against it, the joinder of the Attorney-General was misconceived. The 3rd Defendant submitted that there was no evidence showing that the alleged wrongful acts of the 1st and 2nd Defendants were carried out on the express or implied authority of the Attorney-General of the Federation. 

Claimant’s reply

[27] Learned counsel to the Claimant submitted that the 3rd Defendant is a proper and necessary party having regard to the nature of the claims and the constitutional and statutory position of the office. The Claimant referred to  Sections 2 and 3 of the Petitions of Right Act and submitted that actions against the Government or any Department are properly instituted against the Attorney-General. That Section 150(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the  (as amended), designates the Attorney-General of the Federation as the Chief Law Officer of the Federation, with the responsibility of representing the Federal Government, its ministries, and agencies in legal proceedings. That whenever a cause of action arises against any Federal Government ministry or agency, the Attorney-General becomes the proper party to sue citing Governor of Ekiti  State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2019) LPELR-47114 (SC); Attorney-General of the Federation v. All Nigeria Peoples Party & 2 Ors(2003) LPELR – 3013 (SC); Elelu-Habeeb & Anor v. Attorney-General of the Federation & Ors(2012) 2 S.C (Pt. 1). 

[28] Learned counsel submitted that the relevant consideration is not whether the Attorney-General personally exercised the powers complained of, but whether the Attorney-General is a proper party by virtue of his constitutional office and representative capacity. Citing Federal Government of Nigeria v. Interstella Communications Ltd (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1463). That the Attorney-General of the Federation may be sued in civil matters involving acts or omissions of the Federal Government or its authorized agencies, citing Attorney-General of Anambra State v. Attorney-General of the Federation (2007) 12, NWLR (Pt. 1047) 1.

COURT’S DECISION

 Preliminary Objection

[29] I have carefully considered the Originating Summons, the affidavit evidence of the parties, arguments, submissions and authorities cited by counsel and the objection raised by the 1st and 2nd Defendants. The issue of jurisdiction is a fundamental and threshold issue raised by the Defendants. No matter how well conducted the proceedings and judgments of a Court are, they become a nullity where it is shown that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the action. The jurisdiction of the Court is challenged by the Defendants on the grounds of failure to exhaust the statutory dispute resolution processes of the TDA, mode of commencement by originating summons, and locus standi/legal capacity of the Claimants.

[30] I will begin with the meaning of a trade dispute. Section 48 of the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) states  “trade dispute means any dispute between employers and workers or between workers and workers, which is connected with the employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment and physical conditions of work of any person.” The questions submitted for determination do not fall within the meaning of a trade dispute as provided in the Act; neither does the affidavit evidence reveal a trade dispute. The Claimant’s case is one challenging the refusal of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to perform their statutory duty to register NANTS as a trade union. This is not a trade dispute. The appellate jurisdiction of this Court is activated only when there is a trade dispute, see National Union Of Hotel And Personal Services Workers Vs. National Union Of Food, Beverage And Tobacco Employees (2004) 1 NLLR (Pt. 2) Page 286 at 302-303 Paras H-F; Non-Academic Staff Union Of Educational And Associated Institutions (NASU) Vs. Aniah Jacob & Ors (2020) LPELR 49951 CA. The jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this matter is original; and I so rule. 

 

[31] The 1st and 2nd Defendants submit that the mode of commencement is wrong, as it ought to have been commenced by a writ of summons. In the NICN, there is no mode of commencement by writ of summons in the Rules of Court. Therefore that submission is rejected. The modes of commencement are clearly stated in the Rules of Court and originating summons is one of the modes. I will now reproduce Order 3 Rules 2 (2), 3, and 17 which make provisions for actions that may be commenced by way of originating summons:

Order 3 

2 - (2) Where a matter relating to Section 254C (1) (d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) is to be filed before the Court, such matter, if –

(a) it relates only to the interpretation, shall be by way of originating summons

(b) it relates to interpretation and application shall be by way of complaint.: 

  3 Civil proceedings that may be commenced by way of Originating Summons include matters relating principally to the interpretation of any constitution, enactment, agreements or any other instrument relating to employment, labour and industrial relations in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction by virtue of the provisions of section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) or by any Act or law in force in Nigeria.  

[32] I have carefully looked at the originating summons and the supporting affidavit. The questions for determination seek the interpretation of the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), and the Judgement of this Court in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/250/2022. Order 3 Rule 2 (2) (a) and Rule 3 provides that matters to be commenced by originating summons should principally be in respect of interpretation. In other words, originating summons is best suited in actions where there are no substantial disputes of facts, or likelihood of dispute of facts, see Pali v Abdy (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt 1665) 320 at 331 Paras A-C SC, Sani v Kogi State HA (2019) 4 NWLR (Pt 1661) 172 SC Asogwa v PDP (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt 1353) 207 SC, Famfa Oil Ltd v AG Federation (2003) 18NWLR (Pt 852) 453. There is no substantial dispute of facts between the parties. This suit has been properly commenced by way of the originating summons procedure as provided in the Rules of Court; and I so rule.

[33] On  locus standi, and legal capacity of the Claimant, this action is instituted by Comrade Niyi Akinnibi in a representative capacity. He is a juristic person, a natural person that can sue and be sued. He describes himself as the National President National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities in the supporting affidavit, and states that he has the consent, authority and permission of the entire members of the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities to initiate this suit in respect of their registration status. The Claimant and those he represents allege a constitutional infraction of Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) that gives them the right to freely associate and belong to a registered trade union. There has been a paradigm shift on the technicality of locus standi in suits founded on constitutional issues. It is now settled that the technical requirement of locus standi is unnecessary where a suit is brought to challenge a violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. 

 

[34] The Claimant, and those he represents, are members of the unregistered association NANTS, and they have shown sufficient interest to be accorded a hearing. Consequently, locus standi automatically inures in their favour, see Regd. Trustees, A.S.O.&M.D.A. vs. John  (2020) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1753) 189 at 230E-F CA, Nyame vs. FRN (2010) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1193) 344 at 400F-H SC, B.B Apugo & Sons Ltd. v OHMB (2016) LPELR – 40598 (SC) 85, Pacers Multi Dynamics Ltd v. M.V. Dancing Sister (2012) 1 SC (Pt. 1) p.75. I rule that this Court is not deprived of jurisdiction to entertain and determine this action. I therefore assume jurisdiction in this matter. The Notice of Preliminary Objection is dismissed.

 

[35] The 3rd Defendant is the Attorney-General of the Federation. The question is whether any cause of action is disclosed against the Attorney-General having examined the Originating Summons. A cause of action is defined as the aggregate of facts which the law will recognize as giving the Claimant a substantive right to make a claim against the relief or remedy being sought. It is a factual situation on which the Claimant relies to support his claim which must be recognized by law as giving rise to a substantive right capable of being claimed or enforced against the defendant. See Military Administrator of Benue State & Ors v Captain Clement Abayilo (2001) FWLR (Pt 45) 602 at 615, Ohakim v Agbaso (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt 1226) 172.

 

[36] There are no facts in the Claimants supporting affidavit that disclose an infringement of their rights by the 3rd Defendant; and there are no reliefs sought against him. This suit does not disclose a cause of action against the 3rd Defendant to have warranted his joinder. The purpose of joinder of a person as a party to an action is that he should be bound by the outcome of the action, see Uku v Okumagba (1974) 3 SC 24 at 42. The issue to be settled in this action can be effectually and completely settled without the 3rd Defendant being made a party, see Green v. Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 480; Ige v Farinde (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt 354) 42, Azubuike v. PDP & Ors (2014) LPELR- 22258 (SC) 26.  Where a claim discloses no cause of action, it will be struck out and the suit dismissed against the Defendant, see NBC Plc v Ezeifo [2001] 12 NWLR (Pt 726) 11, Panache Communications Ltd. v. Aikhomu (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt. 317) 420 at 420. In the circumstances this suit against the 3rd Defendant is dismissed.

 

Originating Summons

 

[37] The Claimant and those he represents want their association National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS) registered as a trade union. They have applied to the 1st and 2nd Defendants, and have also sent reminders and an appeal (Exhibits A to E). The 1st and 2nd Defendants have refused the application to register NANTS, and this was communicated via Exhibit F in March 2022 on the basis of section 3(2) of the Trade Union Act, and that the jurisdictional scope of the Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational and Associated Institutions (NASU) covers this category of workers. Furthermore, the Claimants were advised to align with the existing trade union NASU. The Defendants admit their refusal in paragraph 17 of the Defendant’s counter affidavit. 

[38] The Claimants have stated in paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23 of the supporting affidavit as follows:

20. That on or about 22nd August 2022, the said Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU); instituted a suit against the claimant wherein four questions were submitted for determination amongst which was whether Claimant's association can exist side by side with Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) and whether the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities of NANTS of Claimant can be recognised and registered as a trade union in Nigeria. 

21. Further to the paragraph above, on 30th May 2023; this Court delivered a well-considered judgment wherein all the questions in the case were resolved against NASU and this Court held that the Claimant can be duly registered as a trade union subject to the association applying for registration. The judgment is attached as EXHIBIT N. 

22. Consequent upon the judgment; the Claimant wrote the letters of 13th June 2023 and 7th August 2023 to the 1st and 2nd Defendants requesting to be so registered in line with the judgment and in line with the provision of the Trade Union Act. The Claimant forwarded its application letter, its constitution and all the required documents to the Defendants. The said letter is attached as EXHIBIT O and P. 

23. The Defendants refused to reply the letters of the Claimant for appeal let alone register the Claimant.

[39] The 1st and 2nd Defendants in paragraph 19 of their counter affidavit state as follows:

The 1st and 2nd Defendants deny Paragraph 20, 21 and 22, and state clearly that the Defendants were not parties in the alleged case; neither were they aware of its existence and cannot be bound by any decision thereof.

[40] At this juncture, recourse will be to the Judgment of this Court in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/250/2022 between Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) V. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi (sued as the National President of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (Exhibit N). The Judgment was delivered on 30 May 2023 by the Hon President of the Court, Hon Justice B. B. Kanyip PhD, OFR. It is correct that the 1st and 2nd Defendants were not parties in that action. Therefore, I will begin by reproducing the questions submitted for the determination of the Court by NASU, the Claimant in the referenced Judgment (Exhibit N) as follows:

(1) Whether by the provision of Section 2(1) of the Trade Union Act CAP. T14 LFN 2004, the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff Of Nigerian Universities being coordinated and represented by the Defendant can operate and perform the fu41nctions of a Trade Union when same has not been dully registered under the Trade Unions Act or any other known law in Nigeria.

 

(2) Whether by the Provision of Section 3(2) of the Trade Unions Act, Cap. T14, LFN 2004, the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities being Coordinated and represented by the Defendant can be registered as a Trade Union to represent the Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities where there already exists a Trade Union such as the Claimant.

 

(3) Whether by the Provision of Section 25 of the Trade Unions Act, Cap. T14, LFN 2004, the Nigerian Universities and other publicly and privately owned institution are bound under the provisions of this law to recognize and continue with the recognition of the Claimant as a registered Trade Union specified in Part A & B of the Third Schedule to the Trade Unions Act for as long as the Claimant remain a registered Trade Union conferred with the jurisdictional scope of unionizing all eligible Non-Academic Staff workers employed in publicly and privately owned education, research and associated institutions including University Teaching Hospital...

 

(4) Whether by the Provisions of Section 2 and 25 of the Trade Unions Act Cap. T14, LFN 2004, the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigeria Universities (NANTS) Coordinated and represented by the Defendant qualified to be recognized as a Trade Union under Trade Union Act by any University in Nigeria.

 

[41] The above questions submitted have captured all the issues submitted by the Claimants and the 1st and 2nd Defendant in this instant suit. Therefore, I will reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the Judgment in light of the claim by the 1st and 2nd Defendants that they are not aware of its existence. Paragraphs 35 and 36, as well as Paragraphs 41 to 69 have answered the issues and misgivings raised by the 1st and 2nd Defendants. The paragraphs are reproduced as follows:

 

35. The complaint of the claimant is that the defendant is President of, and hence leading, an unregistered body known as the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS). That an earlier association, “Nigeria University Admin and Technical Staff Union” (NUATSU) of Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU) had earlier been held by this Court in NASU v. O. A. Ajagbe & 2 ors unreported Suit No. NICN/LA/407/2017, the judgment of which was delivered on 14 February 2019 as “not qualified to be recognized as a Trade Union under the law by the 3rd defendant”.

 

  1. It is thus the contention of the claimant that NANTS is arrogating the functions of a registered trade union to itself as if same is registered. That the defendant together with its faceless Executive Body of NANTS are involved in running an unregistered union. That by issuing Exhibit B duly signed by the defendant, NANTS is competing with the claimant’s members in all Nigerian Universities when it was not known as a trade union under the Trade Unions Act (TUA) Cap 14 LFN 2004. Exhibit B, dated 30 June 2022, is a Circular Ref. No. NANTS/UV/C/VOL.I/1 signed by the defendant as President of NANTS to “All NANTS Members in the Nigerian Universities and Inter-Universities Centres”. In it, the defendant complained of the overbearing nature of the claimant and its leadership, its membership drawn from institutions that go well beyond the Universities, and then called for, like is the case with Polytechnics, a union specifically tailored for Universities. It is thus the issuing of Exhibit B that the claimant concludes is evidence of the defendant embarking on trade unionism.

 

  1. Section 3(2) of the TUA on its part provides thus:

No combination of workers or employers shall be registered as a trade union save with the approval of the Minister on his being satisfied that it is expedient to register the union either by regrouping existing trade unions, registering a new trade union or otherwise howsoever, but no trade union shall be registered to represent workers or employers in a place where there already exists a trade union.

 

  1. To the claimant, the word “shall” as used in section 3(2) of the TUA is intended to forbid the defendant from proceeding with the registration of the said association where the claimant is still in existence and representing the class of interests NANTS sought to represent. The claimant placed great reliance on a number of case law authorities especially Osawe v. Registrar of Trade Unions [1985] 1 NWLR (Pt. 4) 755; [2004] 1 NLLR (Pt. 1) 34 SC as well as Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 87, which provides as follows:

Workers and employers without distinction whatsoever shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organization of their own choosing without previous authorization.

 

  1. The claimant proceeded that this freedom is not absolute just as section 40 of the 1999 Constitution was made subject to section 45 of the Constitution. That by Article 8(1) of the ILO Convention No. 87: “In exercising the rights provided for in this convention workers and employers and their respective organizations like other persons or organized collectivities shall respect the law of the land”. Accordingly, that the defendant cannot be deemed to be exercising his constitutional rights under the ILO Convention (No. 87) 1948 by floating an illegal and unregistered union or association and be collecting check-off dues from the claimant’s eligible members due to his acts of indiscipline in breaching the claimant’s rules and constitution.

 

  1. In citing Article 8(1), the claimant cleverly left out Article 8(2) of same Convention, which qualifies Article 8(1) in these words: “The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees provided for in this Convention”. So while, as argued by the claimant, the law of the land is to be respected, this must not be at the expense of the guarantees provided by the Convention itself. What then are these guarantees provided by Convention No. 87? This remains the question. None of the parties, however, told me what these guarantees are. To be able to ascertain what these guarantees are, only a closer look at the ILO jurisprudence regarding Convention No. 87 will reveal them. In this regard, reference will be to ILO’s Freedom of Association: Compilation of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association (International Labour Office: Geneva), 2018, 6th Edition.

 

  1. Before taking a closer look at Convention No. 87, I need to point out that the claimant had stressed in its reply on points of law that even with section 40 of the 1999 Constitution, the freedom to choose which union to belong to is a qualified right that is severely limited to the unions empowered to operate within a clearly defined jurisdictional scope. That is to say, voluntarism must exist within and not outside all existing relevant laws and regulations, citing Osawe v. Registrar of Trade Unions (supra), Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria (RTNA) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & ors (MHWUN) [2008] LPELR-3196(SC); [2008] 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 575 and Sea Trucks (Nig.) Ltd v. Pyne [1999] 6 NWLR (Pt. 607) 514.

 

  1. I am aware that Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria (RTNA) & ors v. Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria & ors (MHWUN) [2008] LPELR-3196(SC) affirmed Osawe & ors v. Registrar of Trade Unions. However, both cases are distinguishable to the case at hand. They were all decided before the coming into effect of section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution.

 

  1. The Court of Appeal decision in Nasarawa State Specialist Hospital Management Board & ors v. Mohammed [2018] LPELR-44551(CA) recognized the necessity to treat/apply older case law authorities with caution, especially case law authorities that pre-date the Third Alteration. For instance, on the Supreme Court case of Osoh v. Unity Bank Plc [2013] 9 NWLR (Pt. 1358) 1, this is what the Court of Appeal said:

Osoh v. Unity Bank Plc supra, which the lower Court relied on is inapplicable to the instant matter as it was decided on the basis of the Trade Dispute Act and the 1979 Constitution which did not give jurisdiction on matters relating to employment to the National Industrial Court. The Supreme Court was not called upon to consider sections 6(1)(5)(cc) and 254C(1)(a) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.

 

  1. This Court has quoted and applied this reasoning of Nasarawa State Specialist Hospital Management Board & ors v. Mohammed in National Union of Hotels and Personal Services Workers (NUHPSW) v. National Union of Air Transport Employees (NUATE) & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/207/2018, the judgment of which was delivered on 4 July 2019 and Road Transport Employers’ Association of Nigeria (RTEAN) v. Comr. Celestine Afam Anere & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/269/2021, the judgment of which was delivered on 28 April 2022, at paragraph 81.

 

  1. NASU v. O. A. Ajagbe & 2 ors Suit No. NICN/LA/407/2017 (supra), equally relied on by the claimant, is also distinguishable on the ground that the ambit of the guarantees under Convention No 87 were not considered. In fact, ILO Convention 87 was neither referred to nor canvassed by any of the parties in that case.

 

  1. Section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 permits this Court to, when adjudicating, apply international best practices in labour and the Treaties, Conventions, Recommendations and Protocols on labour ratified by Nigeria. The claimant did not address its mind to this point. The Supreme Court had as far back as 2000 in two concurring judgments of Achike, JSC and Uwaifo, JSC in Abacha & ors v. Fawehinmi [2000] LPELR-14(SC); [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228 respectively held that “conventions and treaties create rights and obligations not only between Member States themselves but also between citizens and Member States and between ordinary citizens”; and that “the spirit of a convention or a treaty demands that the interpretation and application of its provisions should meet international and civilized legal concepts… concepts which are widely acceptable and at the same time of clear certainty in application”. Additionally, by section 19(d) of the 1999 Constitution, the foreign policy objectives of Government include the respect for international law and treaty obligations. Accordingly, section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 merely keep faith with section 19(d) of the 1999 Constitution.

 

  1. By 2020, His Lordship Ogakwu, JCA in Sahara Energy Resources Ltd v. Mrs Olawunmi Oyebola [2020] LPELR-51806(CA) would read section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution as imposing an “obligation on [the National Industrial Court of Nigeria - NICN] to now apply good or international best practices in adjudication”. His Lordship proceeded to hold thus:

…I am mindful of the fact that it may appear that international best practices, like public policy, may be an unruly horse and might be difficult to apply. Alluding to a similar situation as it relates to public policy in ENDERBY TOWN FC vs. FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION (1971) 1 CH 591 at 606-6077, Lord Denning, MR asseverated that public policy is an unruly horse. So obstreperous is the horse that no judge should ever try to mount it lest it runs away with him. I disagree. With a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump over obstacles. It can leap the fences put up by fictions and come down on the side of justice. Now, on my part, I ask if a judge is such a good man (jockey)? I would think so. If the Judge of the lower Court, that specialized Court in employment and labour related matters, be that intrepid man of great learning, then the application of international best practices would not be difficult, abstruse or arcane in its application and would always end up on the side of justice…

 

  1. In an earlier case, Ferdinand Dapaah & anor v. Stella Ayam Odey [2018] LPELR-46151(CA); [2019] 16 ACELR 154, His Lordship Nimpar, JCA held that this Court “was also empowered by the Constitution to rely and apply international conventions which have close bearing to claims related to workplace, employment and labour matters… ([2019] ACELR at 181).

 

  1. Now, Nigeria is a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and in virtue of its membership is bound by the ILO Convention No. 87, a core Convention, which Nigeria ratified o n 1 7 O c t o b e r 1 9 6 0 . S e e https://www .ilo.or g/dyn/normlex/en/f?  p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:103259 as accessed on 2 May 2023.

The key provisions of Convention No. 87 are Articles 2, 3, 8 and 11, which provide thus: 

Article 2

Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorisation.

 

Article 3

  1. Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes.
  2. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof.

 

Article 8

  1. In exercising the rights provided for in this Convention workers and employers and their respective organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall respect the law of the land.
  2. The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees provided for in this Convention.

 

Article 11

Each Member of the International Labour Organisation for which this Convention is in force undertakes to take all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to organise.

 

  1. Since this Court is now obliged to apply this ratified Convention No. 87, I will proceed to consider the ILO jurisprudence relating to it in order to ascertain how it is understood and how it is understood and applied by the ILO, something that the claimant, even when he relied on Articles 2 and 8 the Convention, did not in greater details delve into.

 

  1. The ILO jurisprudence regarding Article 2 of Convention No. 87 dictates that workers and employers have the right, without distinction whatsoever, to establish and join organisations of their own choosing without previous authorization. This accords with section 40 of the 1999 Constitution. Paragraph 336 at page 63 of ILO’s Freedom of Association: Compilation of Decisions of the Committee on Freedom of Association (International Labour Office: Geneva), 2018, 6th Edition is emphatic in stating that public servants, like all other workers, without distinction whatsoever, have the right to establish and join organisations of their choosing, without previous authorization, for promotion and defence of their occupational interests. But in paragraph 340, it is acknowledged that there are no grounds for challenging the validity of special legal regulations which govern public servants’ right to organise in so far as such regulations comply with the provision of Convention No. 87.

 

  1. Paragraph 419 under Chapter 4 dealing with the right of workers and employers to establish organizations without previous authorization, in elaborating on the requirement of previous authorization, explains that the principle of freedom of association would often remain a dead letter if workers and employers were required to obtain any kind of previous authorization to enable them establish an organization. That in cases where registration is optional, the fact that the competent authority to effect registration has discretionary power to refuse this formality is not very different from cases in which previous authorization is required.

 

  1. By paragraph 421, a law providing that the right of association is subject to authorization granted by a government department purely in its discretion is incompatible with the principle of freedom of association.

 

  1. Chapter 5 deals with the right of workers and employers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing. By paragraph 475, “the right of workers to establish organizations of their own choosing implies, in particular, the effective possibility of forming…organizations independent both of those which exist already and of any political party”. Accordingly, “the right of workers to establish organizations of their own choosing implies, in particular, the effective possibility to create — if the workers so choose — more than one workers’ organizations per enterprise” (paragraph 479). And by paragraph 477, “the existence of an organization in a specific occupation should not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of another organisation, if the workers so wish”. As can be seen, these principles, which provide guarantees under Convention No. 87, are far beyond what the claimant envisages in terms of sections 2(1) and 3(2) of the TUA; or even section 5(4) of the TUA, which provides that:

The Registrar shall not register the trade union if it appears to him that any existing trade union is sufficiently representative of the interests of the class of persons whose interest the union is intended to represent.

 

  1. From all of this, the generally accepted principle by ILO is trade union plurality. But if the workers or employers so wish, the decision being theirs, they can settle for trade union monopoly. Paragraphs 478 to 501 then go on to espouse on this principle of trade union plurality relative to the principle of trade union monopoly. And so statutory (including constitutional) provisions prohibiting the creation of more than one trade union for a given occupation or economic category (paragraph 478) or a law which does not authorise the establishment of a second union in an enterprise (paragraph 481) or require a singe union for each enterprise, trade or occupation (paragraph 482), the prevention of two enterprise trade union coexisting (paragraph 480), all fail to comply with Article 2 of Convention No. 87.

 

  1. So, “while it may generally be to the advantage of workers to avoid a multiplicity of trade union organizations, unification of the trade union movement imposed through state intervention by legislative means runs counter to the principle embodied in Articles 2 and 11 of Convention No. 87…” (paragraph 485). Additionally, “while it is generally to the advantage of workers and employers to avoid the proliferation of competing organizations, a monopoly situation imposed by law is at variance with the principle of free choice of workers’ and employers’ organizations”. (paragraph 486). By paragraph 487, “unity within trade union movement should not be imposed by the State through legislation because this would be contrary to the principles of freedom of association”. Trade union unity voluntarily achieved should not be prohibited and should instead be respected by public authorities (paragraph 498).

 

  1. ILO feels strongly about trade union pluralism that in paragraph 492, it is stated thus:

The Committee has suggested that a State should amend its legislation so as to make it clear that when a trade union already exists for same employees as those whom a new trade union seeking registration is organizing or is proposing to organize, or the fact that the existing union holds a bargaining certificate in respect of such class of employees, this cannot give rise to objections of sufficient substance to justify the registrar in refusing to register the new union.

 


 

 

  1. This is the labour jurisprudence that should today guide the adjudication of labour and employment disputes such as the instant case. Already, this Court, in Tricycle Owners Association of Nigeria v. Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment & anor unreported Suit No. NICN/ABJ/216/2022, the judgment of which was delivered on 17 January 2023, had started applying the said labour jurisprudence. This is because the power and jurisdiction (and hence obligation) of this Court under section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the National Industrial Court (NIC) Act 2006 to, when adjudicating, apply international best practices in labour and the Treaties, Conventions, Recommendations and Protocols on labour ratified by Nigeria, inures “notwithstanding…anything contained in this Constitution”. And section 45 of the 1999 Constitution is one of such “anything contained in this Constitution” that must be read subject to section 254C(1)(f) and (h) of the 1999 Constitution. All of this signifies that sections 2(1), 3(2) and 5(4) of the TUA, and section 45 of the 1999 Constitution cannot be used to thwart or frustrate the application of ILO Convention No. 87 in the manner canvassed by the claimant in this case.

 

  1. With all this in mind, I shall proceed to answer the questions posed by the claimant. On question (1) i.e. whether by the provision of section 2(1) of the TUA, NANTS being coordinated and represented by the defendant can operate and perform the functions of a trade union when same has not been dully registered under the TUA or any other known law in Nigeria, the answer is: pending formal registration as a trade union, NANTS can take any step “(including the collection of subscriptions or dues) which may be necessary for the purpose of getting the union registered”. Exhibit B issued by the defendant was in this direction.

 

  1. On question (2) i.e. whether by section 3(2) of the TUA, NANTS being coordinated and represented by the defendant can be registered as a trade union to represent the Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities where there already exists a trade union such as the claimant, the answer is in the affirmative given ILO Convention No. 87, which is now applicable in virtue of section 254C(1)(f) and (h), and (2) of the 1999 Constitution and section 7(6) of the NIC Act 2006.

 

  1. On question (3) i.e. whether by section 25 of the TUA, the Nigerian Universities and other publicly and privately owned institutions are bound under the provisions of this law to recognize and continue with the recognition of the claimant as a registered trade union specified in Parts A & B of the Third Schedule to the TUA for as long as the claimant remains a registered trade union conferred with the jurisdictional scope of unionizing all eligible non-academic staff workers employed in publicly and privately owned education, research and associated institutions including University Teaching Hospitals, the answer is in the affirmative but subject to the right of other associations like NANTS to also be registered as trade unions once they apply to be so registered.

 

  1. Section 25 of the TUA itself makes provision as to the obligatory nature of the recognition of registered trade unions in these words:
  2. For the purposes of collective bargaining all registered unions in the employment of an employer shall constitute an electoral college to elect members who will represent them in negotiations with the employer.
  3. For the purposes of representation at Tripartite Bodies or any other body the registered Federations of Trade Unions shall constitute an electoral college taking into account the size of each registered Federation, for the purpose of electing members who will represent them.

 

  1. As can be seen, section 25 talks of “all registered trade unions in the employment of an employer”. This intuits that there can be more than one trade union in an employment. For purposes of collective bargaining, these registered trade unions in an employment shall constitute an electoral college to elect members who will represent them in negotiation with the employer. Section 25 does not intuit trade union monopoly. It intuits trade union plurality.

 

  1. On question (4) i.e. whether by sections 2 and 25 of the TUA, NANTS coordinated and represented by the defendant is qualified to be recognized as a trade union under the TUA by any University in Nigeria, the answer is in the affirmative subject to it applying for registration as a trade union and it being so registered under the TUA and in accordance with the precepts just enunciated in this judgment.

 

  1. Having answered all the questions posed by the claimant against the claimant, the reliefs prayed for by the claimant are not grantable. They must fail. All the reliefs are accordingly dismissed. I so order.

 

[41] The Judgment speaks for itself. It is unambiguous. I have no reason whatsoever to depart from the sound and logical reasoning in the Judgment; and also the decisions reached therein. There is a presumption of correctness in favour of a Court’s judgment. Unless, and until that presumption is rebutted on appeal, and the Judgment is set aside, it subsists and the persons affected by it must obey it, see Babatunde v Olatunji (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt 646) 557 SC, Purification Technique Nig Ltd v Rufai Jubril (2012) 18 NWLR (Pt 1331) 109 at 139 Para G, PDP v Okorocha (2012) 15 NWLR (Pt 1323) 205 at 256 Para D. It is therefore not a matter of debate that an order of any Court should be respected and not disobeyed. 

 

[42] By paragraph 68 of the Judgment, the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS), represented by the Claimant in this suit is qualified to be recognized as a trade union under the Trade Unions Act, on the condition that it applies for registration as a trade union. NANTS has applied to the 1st and 2nd Defendants for registration. They have no reason whatsoever to have refused to register it as a trade union in light of a valid and subsisting Judgment of this Court. The 1st and 2nd Defendants are completely in error in refusing to register NANTS as a trade union. They can no longer claim ignorance of the Judgment, or not being parties and therefore not bound by the Judgment as an excuse not to register the NANTS. The 1st and 2nd Defendants are bound by the decision in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/250/2022 Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) V. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi (sued as the National President of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS), as they are persons affected by the decision; and I so hold. 

 

[43] For avoidance of doubt, the Judgment in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/250/2022 is  incorporated in this Judgment, and this Judgment binds the Registrar of Trade Unions and the Minister. The Defendants are referred to the decisions of this Court in Academic Staff Union of Universities v Minister of Labour and Employment & Ors (unreported) Suit No: NICN/ABJ/336/2022 judgment delivered on 25 July 2023; and Yusuf Abdullahi Abdulkadir & Ors v Minister of Labour & Employment &Ors (unreported) Suit No: NICN/AK/04/2022 judgment delivered on 16th May 2023 as a guide to international best practices in trade union plurality. It must be stated that the law and society are not static; they continue to evolve locally and internationally. Nigeria has a duty to comply with international law, conventions, treaties, and protocols it has signed up to in respect of Labour issues. The 1st Defendant who is the Registrar of Trade Unions must ensure compliance with regards to trade union issues within his ambit so as to avoid Nigeria being queried at the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

 

[44] I answer the questions submitted for determination as follows:

Question 1: Yes; the refusal and failure of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to register the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions Act is wrongful. 

 

Question 2: Yes; having regard to the judgment in Suit No: NICN/ABJ/250/2022 Non-Academic Staff Union of Educational & Associated Institutions (NASU) V. Comrade Niyi Akinnibi (sued as the National President of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS); the continuous refusal of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to register Claimant's National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions Act is wrongful.

 

[45] Consequently, I hereby Declare and make the following Orders:

1. It is declared that the 1st and 2nd Defendants are bound to register the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS) as a Trade Union under the Trade Union Act. 

2. It is declared that the refusal of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to register the National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities (NANTS) as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions Act is wrongful. 

3. The 1st and 2nd Defendants are Ordered to register forthwith, and/or to issue the Claimants forthwith with the certificate of registration of National Association of Non-Teaching Staff of Nigerian Universities as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions Act. 

4. An Order of perpetual injunction is granted restraining the Defendants, their agents, privies, assigns or any other person or authority deriving authority from them, from denying the Claimants registration as a trade union under the Trade Unions Act. 

            5. Each party is to bear its own costs.

[46] Judgment is entered accordingly.

                                                ______________________________

                                                Hon Justice O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae