IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT CALABAR

BEFORE: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANUSI KADO

 

9^TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026                                            

SUIT NO. NICN/CA/62/2025

BETWEEN:

Professor Johoshaphat Testimony Abraham …………….……………………..…………….…applicant

AND

1. Government of Cross River State
2. The Visitor, University of Cross River State
3. The University pof Cross River State
4. The Vice Chancellor, University of cross River state
5. The governing Council, University of Cross river state
6. The Commissioner of Education, Cross River State
7. The Attorney general and Commissioner for Justice                                            respondents 

Cross River State

University of Cross River State

9. The bursar university of Cross River State
10. The Public Relation Officer 

University of Cross River State

     JUDGMENT.

1. On 28/4/2026, counsel for the parties argued the originating summons commencing this suit and the case was adjourned to the 16^th day of June, 2026, for judgment. Now the judgment is ready, consequently, I directed the registrar to rescheduled the date to today for the judgment to be delivered.
2. Vide originating summons dated 7^th day of November, 2025  and filed on the 3^rd of December, 2025, the claimant submitted five questions for resolution by the court. They are:-
3. Having regard to paragraph 3(1) (a) (b); 3(2) (a) I, ii, iii (b); 3(3);3(5); 3 (6); 3(7); and paragraph 9(1) (b) and 9(2) of the First Schedule to the University of Cross River State Law 2020, juxtaposed with section 36 of the constitution, supra and exhibits JTA 6, JTA 6A, JTA 6B, JTA 6C covered by Certificate of authentication marked exhibit JTA 6CC to show that the Acting Vice Chancellor was throughout the material time of three months stipulated by the law for selection of candidates for the post of Vice Chancellor still prosecuting the functions of Vice Chancellor, whether the ex-cathedra pronouncements by the Hon, Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice in his official correspondence dated 3^rd October, 2025 to the effect that the acting Vice Chancellor and member of the governing Council Prof. Francisca Bassey did not resign and that the law did not require her to resign from her positions as condition precedent to be eligible for selection and re-appointment as Vice Chancellor is the true position of the law governing the selection of candidates to the post of Vice Chancellor.
4. Whether the Independence and Impartiality being the hallmarks of paragraphs 3(1) (a) (b); 3(2) (a) I, ii, iii (b); 3(3); 3(5); 3 (6); 3(7);and paragraph 9(1) (b) and 9(2) of the First Schedule to the University of Cross River State Law 2020, juxtaposed with section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended were guaranteed to the claimant as candidate for selection to the post of Vice Chancellor where Prof. Francisca Bassey, his rival was still by operation of the law a member of the Governing Council to conduct the selection and unjustly excluded the claimant from the selection.
5. Whether having regard to paragraph 3(1) (a) (b); 3(2) (a) i, ii, iii (b); 3(3); 3(5); 3 (6); 3(7); of the First Schedule to the University of Cross River State Law 2020, the insertion of paragraph 9(1) (b), 9(2) by the draftsman, is intentional to create a safe guard for a free and fair selection whereby neither the Acting Vice Chancellor who doubles as Member of the Governing Council nor any member of the Governing Council, can apply for selection for re-appointment or appointment to the post of Vice Chancellor, as the case may be, without first resigning from his/her aforenamed position(s) as condition precedent to being eligible for the said selection.
6. Whether in the light of section 6 of the University of Cross State Law 2020, read in conjunction with paragraph 3(1) (a) (b), I 3(2)(a) I, ii, iii (b); 3(3); 3(5); 3(6);   3(7); 9(1) (b) and 9(2) of the First Schedule thereof, it can be said that the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey who doubled as Member of Governing Council, having not first resigned from her position was anything but eligible for selection process conducted by the Governing Council of which being a member, translates to mean that she simulated herself as a candidate, short listed herself, interviewed herself, and on 15^th July, 2025 being a public holiday forwarded a final list with her name to the visitor for reappointment as Vice Chancellor as against the claimant who applied for the post and was qualified for appointment.
7. Whether the exclusion of the claimant from the selection to frustrate his appointment to the office of Vice Chancellor by the Governing Council and its member Prof. Francisca Bassey the Acting Vice Chancellor was justified having regard to the 5^th Defendant’s own Letter of Promotion referenced CRUTECH/REG/SE/PROM /ACAD/VOL,VI/103 wherein the 5^th Defendant by its letter is the body that computed the Claimant’s promotion to start at step 1 on 1^st January, 2019 which produced the claimant’s pay slip at step 7 on 1^st January, 2025, where 1^st January marks the claimant’s anniversary and each step denoting his seniority on the professorial post.
8. In anticipation of favourable resolution of the questions submitted to the court for resolution, the claimant prays for the following reliefs:-
9. A Declaration that having regard to paragraph 3(1) (a) (b): 3(2)(a) I, ii, iii (b); 3(3); 3(5); 3 (6); 3(7); and paragraph 9(1) (b) and 9(2) of the First Schedule to the University of Cross River State Law 2020, juxtaposed with section 36 of the constitution, supra and exhibits JTA 6, JTA 6A, JTA 6B, JTA 6C covered by Certificate of authentication marked exhibit JTA 6CC to show that the Acting Vice Chancellor was throughout the material time of three months stipulated by the law for selection of candidates for the post of Vice Chancellor still prosecuting the functions of Vice Chancellor, the ex-cathedra pronouncements by the Hon. Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice in his official correspondence dated 3^rd October, 2025 to the effect that the acting Vice Chancellor and member of the governing Council Prof.  Francisca Bassey did  not resign and that the law did not require her to resign from her positions as condition precedent to be eligible for selection and re-appointment as Vice Chancellor is   not the true position of the law governing the selection of candidates to the post of Vice Chancellor. 
10. A Declaration that the Independence and Impartiality being the hallmarks of paragraphs 3(1) (a) (b); 3(2) (a) I, iil iii (b); 3(3); 3(5); 3 (6); 3(7); and paragraph 9(l) (b) and 9(2) of the First Schedule to the University of Cross River State Law 2020, juxtaposed with section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended were not guaranteed to the claimant as candidate for selection to the post of Vice Chancellor where Prof. Francisca  Bassey, his rival was still by operation of the law a member of the Governing Council to conduct the selection and unjustly excluded the claimant from the selection.
11. A declaration that having regard to paragraph 3(1) (a) (b): 3(2)(a) I, ii, iii (b); 3(3); 3(5); 3 (6); 3(1); of the First Schedule to the University of Cross River State Law 2020, the insertion of paragraph 9(1) (b), 9(2) by the draftsman, is intentional to create a safe guard for a free and fair selection whereby neither the Acting Vice Chancellor who doubles as member of the Governing Council nor any member of the Governing Council, can apply for selection for re-appointment or appointment to the post of Vice Chancellor, as the case may be, without first resigning from his/her aforenamed position(s) as condition precedent to being eligible for the said selection.
12. A declaration that in the light of section 6 of the University of Cross River State Law 2020, read in conjunction with paragraph 3(1) (a) (b); 3(2)(a) I, ii. Iii (b); 3(3); 3(5); 3(6); 3(1); 9(1) (b)and 9(2) of the First Schedule thereof, it can be said that the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey who doubled as Member of Governing Council, having not first resigned from her positions was anything but eligible for selection process conducted by the Governing Council of which being a member, translates to mean that she simulated herself as a candidate, short listed herself, interviewed herself, and on 15^th July, 2025 being a public holiday forwarded a final list with her name to the visitor for reappointment as Vice Chancellor as against the claimant who applied for the post and was qualified for appointment.
13. A declaration that the exclusion of the claimant from the selection to frustrate his appointment to the office of Vice Chancellor by the Governing Council and its member Prof. Francisca Bassey the Acting Vice Chancellor was not justified having regard to the 5^th Defendant’s own Letter of Promotion referenced CRUTECH/REG/SE/PROM /ACAD/VOLVI/103 wherein  5^th Defendant by its letter is the body that computed the Claimants promotion to start at step I on 1^st January, 2019 which produced the Claimants pay slip at step 7 on 1^st January, 2025, where 1^st January, marks the Claimant’s anniversary and each step denoting his seniority on the professorial post.
14. An Order nullifying both purported selection of the Acting Vice Chancellor, Prof. Francisca Bassey and her re-appointment as Vice Chancellor of the University of Cross River State having not satisfied the relevant provisions of First Schedule to the University of Cross River State Law, 2020.
15. An  order appointing the claimant,  Professor Jehoshaphat Testimony Abraham as the Vice Chancellor of the University of Cross River State, being at all material time, authentic candidate who applied and met the requirements for selection and appointment as Vice Chancellor but was brazenly robbed by Professor Francisca Bassey the Acting Vice Chancellor who was not a candidate in the eyes of the law let one be qualified for selection.
16. E. M. Ekpenyoung, Esq; counsel for the claimant in adumbration before the court informed the court that in support of his originating summons, claimant in an affidavit in support, deposed to a 46, paragraph affidavit accompanied by exhibits numbered JTA 1, JTA 2  JTA 3,   JTA 4, JTA 4A, JTA 5, JTA 6,JTA 6A, JTA 6B, JTA 6C, JTA 6CC, JTA 6D, JTA 6E, JTA1,  JTA 1A,JTA 7B, JTA 8 and JTA 9. Counsel relied on all the paragraphs of the affidavit in support and the exhibits attached therein.
17. Counsel also adopted the written address filed along with the originating summons as his argument in support of the originating summons. Counsel also adopted the reply on points of law filed in reaction to the defendants counter affidavit and written address filed along with the counter affidavit.
18. The crux of the facts forming nucleus of the claimant’s grouse that necessitated filing of this originating summons are that following advertisement placed in chronicle newspaper exhibit JTA 3, by the  5^th defendant, the claimant vide exhibit JTA 4, dated 15/5/2025, applied for the vacant post of vice Chancellor of University of Cross River State. According to the claimant despite the University being owned by the Cross River State and despite the claimant being an indigene of Cross River State and having so qualified, he was excluded from selection by Professor Fransisca Bassey, who did not resign her position as acting Vice Chancellor and remained in office and performing the function of the Vice Chancellor during the three months period for the selection. Exhibits JTA 6, JTA 6A, JTA 6B, JTA 6C, were relied on by the claimant to establish claimant’s being in office.
19. The claimant is vide this instant suit, seeking interpretation of certain the provisions of the University of Cross River State Law No.2, of 2020 and the provisions of First Schedule to the law as per paragraph 3(2) (a) i, ii, iii (b); 3(3); 3(4); 3(5); 3(6); 3(7) and paragraph 9(1) (b) and (2),  of the University of Cross River State Law, 2020, which relates to the appointment of the Vice Chancellor, (2) appointment of the Acting Vice Chancellor and  (3) re-appointment of the Acting Vice chancellor to the office of the Vice Chancellor University of Cross River State.
20. According to the claimant after submitting his application, he never heard a word from the Governing Council nor was even an acknowledgement of receipt of his application. Rather on 15^th July, 2025, a public holiday, through a tip off,  he was informed that the Governing Council is meeting secretly at Mega Hilton Hotel in State Housing Estate, Calabar, where Professor Francisca Bassey the serving Acting Vice Chancellor, who doubles as Member of the Governing Council was announced as the winner of the selection exercise.
21. There at the said venue the clamant was ordered to leave the premises on the instruction of the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey and he did. On 17^th July, 2025, the Acting Vice Chancellor was announced as the New Substantive Vice Chancellor of the University of Cross River State.
22. The claimant, stated that in deference to the University of Cross River State Law, 2020, to seek local remedy: he first complained to the 1^st defendant through the Secretary to the State Government, the 2^nd defendant, and many others as shown in paragraphs 37, 38 and 39 of the affidavits in support of the originating summons.
23. In a correspondence dated 3^rd day of October 2025, signed by the 7^th defendant, the claimant was advised to shield his sword, on account that the Acting Vice Chancellor was not required by law to resign from her acting appointment before seeking selection to be appointed.
24. The claimant stated that, his right to the post of Vice Chancellor was grossly breached, when he was denied fair hearing contrary to Section 36 of Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended.

ARGUMENT OF QUESTIONS:

13. In arguing the questions together, counsel submitted that there is a common thread running across all the questions and this thread is the rightness vel non of the Acting Vice Chancellor resigning from her appointments as acting Vice Chancellor and member of the Governing Council as precondition to be eligible for re-appointment to the post of Vice Chancellor and the unjust exclusion of the claimant from selection that robs him of being appointed to the post of Vice Chancellor.
14. Counsel submitted that the provisions of the first schedule to the University of Cross River State Law, 2020, which is the statute submitted by the claimant to the court for interpretation, “have been couched in very simple, plain and unambiguous words and therefore need no aid and or assistance in the interpretation thereof. On the guiding principles when a court exercises its interpretative jurisdiction, counsel refers the court to the Supreme Court Case in support of this contention, A.N.P.P. V GONI (20’12) ALL FWLR (PT, 623) P,1821, ratio 2, where the court held, thus:

In its interpretative jurisdiction a court must abide by certain rules and principles as follows:-

1. The intention of the legislature should be sought,
2. The intention of the legislature is to be ascertained from the words of the statute alone and not from other sources.
3. The words used are to be given their ordinary and unambiguous meaning, that is, the legislature is to be presumed not to have put a special meaning on the words,
4. It is not the court’s province to pronounce on the wisdom or otherwise of the statute but only to determine its meaning.
5. The court must not import into legislation words that were not used by the legislature and which will give a different meaning to the text of the statute as enacted by the legislature.
6. The court must not bring to bear on the provisions of a statute, its prejudice as to what the law should be or the reasonableness or unreasonableness but rather should interpret the law from the clear words used by the legislature.
7. The court must not amend a legislation to achieve a particular object or result – the court is to expound the law and not to expand it.
8. The courts should adhere to the purposes of a provision where the history of the legislation indicates to the court the object of the legislature in enacting the provision.
9. According to counsel from the ex-cathedra pronouncements of the Hon. Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice, Cross River State, contained in exhibit JTA5, there is no place for argument that the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey did not resign from her positions as Acting Vice Chancellor and Member of the Governing Council being the condition precedent to her acquiring the eligibility to seek for a re-appointment to the office of a Vice Chancellor for a new tenure of five years.
10. Counsel submitted that exhibits JTA 6, JTA 6A, JTA 6B, JTA 6C. JTA 6CC, JTA 6D and JTA 6E, contained in paragraphs 20, 21 and 22 of the affidavit in support further corroborated the ex-cathedral pronouncement of the Hon. Attorney general and commissioner for Justice Cross River State that the acting Vice chancellor did not at any time of her appointment for the statutory six months her appointment as acting Vice chancellor lasted, resigned before seeking re-appointment. 
11. According to counsel her action amounted to a subversion of the First Schedule to the Law governing the re-appointment of the Acting Vice Chancellor to the post of Vice Chancellor.
12. Counsel continued his submission that under the First Schedule, it is impossible for any one person to hold the office of Vice Chancellor for an unbroken period of five years and six months, which Professor Francisca now attempts to do or first serving   as Acting Vice Chancellor for six months as fixed by the Law and thereafter transmogrifying to substantive Vice Chancellor, albeit, through subversion of the Law, subterfuge and chicanery, worse than examination malpractice.
13. Counsel argued, on how the First Schedule to the Law operates, is that the law provides that two categories of person can sit in the saddle of Vice Chancellor, These are:

(i) The Substantive Vice Chancellor who under paragraph 3(7) of the First Schedule is appointed for one single term of five years only. In that case he cannot seek for a second term, but he/she can sit with the Governing Council as a member to conduct selection for candidates seeking appointment to post of Vice Chancellor.

(ii)   Under paragraph 3(1) (a) (b) of the First Schedule, the same seat of power can be occupied by the Acting Vice Chancellor for, six months only. This category of appointment occurs when the substantive Vice Chancellor by reason of death, ill-health or misconduct in office cannot complete his five years single tenure.

20. However, notwithstanding their nomenclatures, each of them functions as Vice Chancellor and execute all the functions assigned to the office by the Law. It is instructive to note that every Vice Chancellor or Acting Vice Chancellor is by operation of the Law an automatic Member of the Governing Council. The point made here is unique as it forms the core issue in the re-appointment of the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey to the substantive Vice Chancellor. 
21. And where he/she seeks for re-appointment, the law is mandatory that he/she must resign from the office of the Acting Vice Chancellor as well as Member of the Governing Council to become eligible as candidate for Selection and re-appointment.
22. Counsel submitted that paragraph  3(2) (a) i, ii, iii (b); 3(3); 3(4);3(5); 3(6); 3(7) of the First Schedule  cannot be read in isolation of paragraph 9(1) (b), and   9(2) of the selfsame First Schedule if the import and meaning of the law governing selection of candidates is to be given its due effect as intended by the draftsman. Counsel argued that the court to in the light of paragraph 9(1)(b) and 9(2) of the first Schedule to the University of Cross River state Law, 2020, hold that the intention of the draftsman is not to allow a candidate who is by reason of his/her choice a Member of the Governing Council, to sit in the Governing Council to conduct the selection in the manner the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey did. To do otherwise will certainly give such a candidate, an undue advantage over his/her rival.
23. Counsel submitted that under the First Schedule, the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey as she then was, was not eligible as candidate for selection and in the eyes of the law, she was not qualified ab initio to apply for selection let alone participate in the selection. Consequently, her purported selection that produced her as substantive Vice Chancellor was egregious.
24. In support of his contention counsel submitted that the Supreme Court decision in Universal Properties Ltd. V. Pinnacle Comm. Bank (2022) 12 NWLR (Pt.1845) 523, enjoined courts to give effect to mandatory position, thus:

“Where the law has stipulated in a mandatory provision applicable in specified circumstances, same must be given effect to. It is referred to as a condition precedent’.

“A condition precedent is a provision which makes the existence of a  right dependent on the happening of an event; the right is then conditional as opposed to an absolute right. A true condition where the event on which the existence of the right depends is in the future uncertain. A condition precedent is one that delays the vesting of a right until the happening of an event”.

26. In IBRAHIM V. ALIYU (2000) 3 NSCQR 194, the Supreme Court in considering “the Appointment and deposition of Chief Order 1990 of Plateau State, likened selection to election. Counsel contended that under the Law, supra, the selection of candidates for the post of Vice Chancellor is akin to election where the governing council is the electoral college, sentinel and umpire. Counsel urged the court to so hold.
27. Counsel argued in disagreement with the 7^th defendant as per exhibit JTA 5, concerning the Acting Vice Chancellor that the law did not require her to resign her appointment as Condition Precedent to her seeking re-appointment via selection of candidates. Counsel contended that if that should be the position of the law, then there was no need for enacting the law on selection as the Acting Vice Chancellor can just be re-appointed without any candidate going through the rigors of selection and the governing council declaring the office vacant.
28. Counsel continued his submission that be that as it may, it is without controversy that she only simulated herself as a candidate for selection, and by so doing she acted as a selector with the Governing Council to select candidates, and by so doing excluded the claimant from being selected and appointed thereby robbing the claimant of fair hearing and his legal right to the post of Vice Chancellor.
29. Counsel submitted that the Governing Council having the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey as member and candidate for selection was not just to exclude the claimant who duly applied for the post of Vice Chancellor and who was by his promotion letter and pay slip a professor with seven years’ experience as at 1^st January, 2025, from being selected and appointed as Vice Chancellor.
30. The computation of his years of experience should not be extraneous but from the letter of his promotion to a professor by which the governing council itself was the one who in 1^st January 2019 laid the foundation of the computation of his experience when the 5^th Defendant placed the Claimant on step 1 on 1^st January, 2019. It is the same governing council that directed the 9^th Defendant to adjust the salary of the claimant accordingly to the end that the claimant’s pay slip on step 7 as at 1^st January, 2025 before the selection was announced in April, 2025, was a product of the promotion letter by the governing council and the pay slip was a document of the 9^th Defendant as directed by the governing council. Put differently both the promotion letter and the Claimant’s pay slip are the documents of the Defendants which cannot be denied by them.
31. Counsel submitted that, the exclusion of the Claimant from the selection process on ground as suggested by the 7^th Defendant that Claimant was not a professor of seven years’ experience does not have any basis. In  addition, counsel reiterated his argument above, that the action taken by the Governing Council and the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey to exclude the Claimant from selection process was a glaring case of the claimant being denied of fair hearing contrary to section 36 of Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. 
32. Counsel continued his argument that there was no basis for the exclusion of the claimant from the selection. It is the case of the claimant that the exclusion was done mala fide by the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey who had personal interest in the selection and re-appointment and therefore simulated herself as both candidate and selector while in the Governing Council.
33. Counsel also submitted that the document of the 3^rd defendant speak exhibit JTA 2, is the pay slip of the claimant issued by the 3^rd defendant through the 9^th defendant. As at 1^st January, 2025, it read step 7, with each step denoting a year. The claimant deposes in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of his affidavit that the instructed in exhibit JTA 1, to adjust the claimant’s salary to accord with the claimant’s promotion and he did so on the basis of 1^st January, 2025, the claimant became entitled to salary on step 7 each step denoting a year.
34. The claimant avers in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of his affidavit that his  promotion letter and his pay slip are related to the end that it is the production letter that produces the pay slip. These two documents are from 5^th and 9^th Defendants and are therefore unimpeachable by the defendants. This faults the position taken by the 7^th Defendant in his correspondence dated 5^th October, 2025 that the claimant was excluded because he was not qualified.
35. For counsel for the claimant, the Governing Council and the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey by excluding the claimant from the selection exercise grossly infringed the principle of natural justice against the claimant. To support his contention counsel relies on the case of Wema Bank Plc  V. Olotu (2022) 13 NWLR (Pt.1847) 213. Counsel submitted that on the authority of the Supreme Court decision in Wema Bank Pic V. Olotu, (supra) that the claimant is entitled to a remedy and that remedy finds justification in this honourable court declaring the claimant who was unjustly excluded but who having duly applied for the post of Vice Chancellor and having spent his resources, time and commitment to seek for the appointment to the post of Vice Chancellor and being robbed of his right to the appointment as the rightful  candidate for appointment as Vice Chancellor.  Counsel urged the court to so hold.
36. Counsel urged the court to answers the questions submitted in favour of the claimant and grant the reliefs sought, by grant an order nullifying both the purported selection of the Acting Vice Chancellor and her re-appointment as Vice Chancellor of the University of Cross River State having not satisfied the relevant provisions of First Schedule to the University of Cross River State Law, 2020. And grant an order appointing the claimant, Professor Jehoshaphat Testimony Abraham as the Vice Chancellor of the University of Cross River State, being at all material time, authentic candidate who applied and met the requirements for selection and appointment as Vice Chancellor but was brazenly robbed by Professor Francisca Bassey the Acting Vice Chancellor who was not a candidate in the eyes of the law let alone be qualified for selection. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to grant the prayers of the claimant as prayed.
37. In reaction to the originating summons, the defendants filed counter affidavit of 15 paragraphs in opposition to the originating summons. A written address was also filed along with the counter affidavit.
38. Ededem Ani, Esq; the Honourable Attorney General and Commissioner for Justice, Cross River State, appeared for the defendants leading Udenyi Omaji, Esq; Deputy Director, John O. Odong, Esq; SC1 and Miracle Abong, Esq; Scii.
39. In arguing in opposition to the originating summons, the Learned Attorney General informed the court that he is relying on the depositions contained in the counter affidavit and the exhibits attached therein. The written address filed along with the counter affidavit was also adopted as his argument.
40. In the counter affidavit the salient facts based on which the originating summons is being opposed are to the effect that one of the conditions stated in the advertisement for the post of Vice Chancellor is that the candidate should be ‘’a full professor of not less than seven (7) years at the rank’’. It was also stated that only those shortlisted will be invited for interview’’ though, the claimant has applied, he did not pre-qualify for the position, as he did not meet the requirement for pre selection and as such was not shortlisted or invited for interview. Having not so prequalified, is bereft with the vires to challenge the process, or be appointed in the 4^th Defendant’s stead. There was also nothing in the entire gamut of the UNICROSS LAW that even remotely suggests that a person in acting capacity should first resign from the position before running for the substantive office or position.
41. In view of the facts deposed in the counter affidavit, the defendant formulated three issues for determination. They are:-
42. Whether the Claimant, having not met the pre-qualifying requirements of the University’s advertisement for the office of the Vice Chancellor, is entitled to be shortlisted or invited to the selecting interview thereof.
43. 2, Whether the Claimant has a Statutory Right to an automatic ascension to the “rank” of Vice Chancellor as claimed by the Claimant.
44. Whether the case put forward by the Claimant has any merit, to warrant a grant of any of the reliefs sought.

ARGUMENT: 

42. Issue: Whether the Claimant, having not met the pre-qualifying requirements of the University’s advertisement for the office of the Vice Chancellor, is entitled to be shortlisted or invited to the selecting interview thereof.
43. In arguing issue 1, it was submitted that, exhibit MOJ1, which is claimant’s exhibit JTA 3, i.e. advertisement calling for suitably qualified candidates to apply for post of Vice Chancellor, the claimant ab initio, did not prequalify for the position he applied for, because he has not been a professor for seven years at that rank. It was submitted going by exhibit MOJ 3, claimant’s letter of promotion. The claimant’s promotion was with effect from 1^st January, 2019 to the rank of professor and exhibit MOJ 2, his application for the position and by exhibit MOJ 2, he applied on 15^th May, 2025. A simple mathematical computation of the period between 1/1/2019 and 15/5/2025, calculation will show that a period of seven years had mot elapsed at the time of the application for the position. Even by 17/7/2025, when the successful vice chancellor was announced, the claimant was still less than seven years at that rank.  This means claimant has not met the condition or requirement stated in the advertisement for the position of Vice-Chancellor. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the cases of MOORE V, FLOUR MILLS (NIG.) PLC (2022) 11 NWLR (PT. 1841) 365 (SC); YAKUSU V. FRN (2023) 1 NWLR (PT.1864) 97 (SC), where the stated provision of the Interpretation Act and its limitations (none of which applies to the instant case, was approved).
44. It was also argued that the Claimant’s contention that his steps should be used to compute the period is not only unhelpful but absurd. In any case, the University having refused to accept the Claimant’s step computation argument, cannot be compelled to do so. The advertisement clearly stated that years at the rank, which automatically excludes step. Where the words used in document are clear and unambiguous, the court must confine itself to the plain and ordinary meaning of the document in construing the contents of the said document. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of MOBIL PRODUCING UNLTD v JOHNSON (2018) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1639) @ 329, p,376 Para B. (SC).
45. Counsel also argued that Courts have consistently held that non-compliance with clearly stated mandatory requirements in regulations often ends in disqualification. Where a requirement is mandatory, failure to comply leads to disqualification. Counsel submitted that the Defendants were within their powers to not contact the Claimant further, having earlier stated that “only those shortlisted will be invited for interview”. And the Claimant, having not qualified was not shortlisted.
46. The other preconditions stated in the advertisement were the exclusive preserve of the Governing Council to determine. The claimant cannot say that amongst all the competing applicants, he was the applicant with the most extensive international repute and linkage or the applicant with the highest scholastic and academic credential, with the most outstanding accomplishments in academic and public life in general, nor the applicant most likely to command the respect and loyalty of Members of Staff, Students and Community Neighbours of the University. While the Claimant may hold that opinion of himself, it was not his place to make that call.
47. In view of all the arguments above, this honourable court is most respectfully urged to find and hold that the claimant lacks the competency to challenge the election process having not prequalified, by virtue of the pre-conditions in the Advertisement.
48. Issue two Whether the claimant has a Statutory Right to an automatic ascension to the “rank” of Vice Chancellor as claimed by the Claimant.
49. In arguing issue two, counsel submitted that all rights enforceable by the courts must flow from the Constitution. In ABUBAKAR UMARU ABBA TUKUR Y, THE GOVERNMENT OF TARABA STATE & ORS (1997) 6 NWLR (PT.510) 549, the court held that chieftaincy questions regarding the deposition of the Emir of Muri could not be enforced under the Fundamental Right Enforcement Procedure Rules because there was no Fundamental Right in that regard in the Constitution.
50. Again, in EDEDE V. A. G. FEDERATION (2025) 18 NWLR (PT. 2026)1, the Supreme Court held that:

‘Participation in the domestic primaries of political parties is not an  enforceable constitutional right or an enforceable right under any statute or at common law. The conduct of political party primaries does not donate any enforceable right to the general public”.

51. Counsel urged the court in the light of the above decisions hold that there is no right to the office of Vice-Chancellor of the 3^rd Defendant or any other University at all.
52. It is also submitted that the office of the Vice-Chancellor is not a ‘rank’ which every person on the rank of Professor is entitled to ascend, after a given period. It is a special office regarded as one of the principal officers of the University or any University. Its powers and functions are specially provided for by statute as well as the appointment to the office. The provisions of the UNICROSS LAW specifically vests the power of appointment of the Vice-Chancellor on the Visitor, i.e., the Governor, albeit upon recommendations from the Governing Council. On this, counsel refers to paragraph 3(5) & (6) of the First Schedule to the UNICROSS LAW, which states thus:

“3(5)  The Council shall select three candidates from among the candidates recommended to it under sub-paragraph (3) of this paragraph and may indicate its order of merit stating the reasons therefore and forwards the names to the Visitor.

(6) The  Visitor may appoint as Vice-Chancellor any one of the candidates recommended in accordance with the provisions of such sub-paragraph (5) of this paragraph. 

53. According to counsel the direct implication of the above provisions is that the Visitor is not bound by the order of merit in the recommendation by the Governing Council and is at liberty to appoint either of the three recommended to him, Sub-paragraph (6) takes away the power of decision on whom becomes the Vice-Chancellor of the University from the Governing Council and vests it solely on the Governor. The resultant effect is that, assuming but not conceding that the Claimant prequalified for the position by virtue of rank, there were other pre-conditions in the advertisement that lead to the shortlisting of successful/candidates purely at the discretion of the Governing Council and the appointment was left solely at the discretion of the Visitor. The Defendants were therefore not under any duty to appoint the Claimant as the Vice-Chancellor of the University, in the midst of other equally or better qualified and competing candidates.
54. Issue 3; Whether the case put forward by the Claimant has any merit, to warrant a grant of any of the reliefs sought. 
55. Counsel submitted that the claimant has anchored his claims on Paragraphs 3 (1) (a) (b); 3 (2) (a) i, ii, iii, (b); 3 (3); 3(5); 3 (6); 3 (7); 9 (1) (b) and 9 (2) of the First Schedule to the UNICROSS LAW and is strongly relying on the said provisions to argue that it is a requirement of the law for a person in acting capacity to first resign before aspiring to or vying for the position of Vice-Chancellor.
56. Counsel submitted that there is nothing in the stated paragraphs or anywhere else in the entire gamut of the UNICROSS LAW that even remotely suggests or affirms this position. Counsel recommended to the court the UNICROSS LAW annexed hereto as exhibit MOJ 5, for the law to speak for itself. All the provisions in paragraph 3 (1) (a) and (b) are in relation to the appointment of an acting Vice-Chancellor where the substantive Vice-Chancellor’s tenure is short-lived, while those in paragraphs 3 (2) (a)-(b),(3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) are in relation to the procedure for appointment of a substantive Vice-Chancellor when the tenure of an incumbent is about to end as well as the tenure of office.
57. The only place where resignation is mentioned is in paragraph 9 (1). The said paragraph clearly does not require a person in acting position to first resign her position before vying for the substantive office. The said paragraph 9 (1), is reproduced hereunder for ease of reference:

“9 (1) Any officer mentioned in the foregoing provisions of this Schedule May resign his office.

(a) In the case of the Chancellor or Pro-Chancellor, by notice to the Governor; and

(b)   In any other case, by notice to the Council and the Council Shall in the case of the Vice-Chancellor, immediately notify the Commissioner.

(2) Without prejudice to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Schedule  a person who has ceased to hold office so mentioned, otherwise than by removal for misconduct, shall be eligible for re-appointment to the office.

58. Counsel submitted that the possible meaning of the clear and unambiguous provisions above is very simple. And it is that, any of the previously stated officers including a Vice-Chancellor may resign. Simply you must not die in office because you were appointed, you can be tired and resign or resign for any reason whatsoever 9 (1). If the Vice-Chancellor or any one not mentioned in (a) is the person resigning, the notice of resignation is to be made to the Council and if the Council receives a notice of resignation from the Vice-Chancellor, the Council shall immediately notify the Commissioner of Education. (9 (1)(a).
59. Resignation also means ceasing to hold office, if a person ceases to hold office, that person is eligible for reappointment to the same office except the reason for ceasing to hold office is removal for misconduct, in which case, the person is ineligible for reappointment to that office (9 (2).
60. Counsel submitted that there is no possible interpretation of the above plain, clear and unambiguous provisions that would lead to the inference that the Law intended that the Acting Vice-Chancellor must first resign her position before vying for the substantive position of Vice-Chancellor. If the law intended to say so. It would have said so very clearly and not left such a significant provision open to conjecture or inferences like those of the Claimant. And because the law has not said so, it cannot be imported into it by the claimant or this court.
61. All other sections and paragraphs of the entire UNICROSS LAW cited or not are unrelated to and inapplicable to the instant case. Counsel also urged the court to hold that the authorities cited in this regard, are also inapplicable.
62. Finally, on this, counsel posited that the only document where there is such a requirement for a person in acting capacity to first resign, is not applicable to State Universities like the 3^rd Defendant. The preamble of exhibit MOJ 6 speaks loudly on this. The letter forwarding the said POLICY, dated 3^rd.April, 2025, exhibit MOJ 6A, is also very dear on this. Counsel continued his submission that  exhibit MOJ 6, is a policy document of the Federal Ministry of Education and it is the State Ministry of Education that regulates the affairs of the 3^rd Defendant, not the Federal Ministry. The policy is therefore totally inapplicable to the affairs of the 3^rd Defendant.
63. Furthermore, the concerns occasioned by the said Federal POLICY may be so because of the State of the Laws of the Federal Universities. In the 3^rd Defendant’s University, the concern is of no moment because paragraph 3 (4) of the first schedule to the UNICROSS LAW has already empowered a Vice Chancellor of an approved public university to serve as the resource person during the selection interview for Vice-Chancellor, so the issue of bias does not arise.
64. Counsel submitted that Court cannot read into the UNICROSS LAW what is not there. The case of A.N,P.P V, GONI (2012) ALL FWLR (PT.623) P. 1821 (SC) cited by counsel to support this contention. Counsel urged the court to take the advice in paragraphs d, e and g very seriously in interpreting the provisions of the UNICROS5 LAW. The said paragraphs are herein reproduced for full reliance and emphasis.

“(d)   It is not the courts province to pronounce on the wisdom or otherwise of the statute, but only to determine its meaning.

(e) The court must not import into legislation, words that were not used by the legislature and which will give a different meaning to the text of the Statute as enacted by the legislature.

The court must not amend a legislation to achieve a particular object or result, the court is to expound the law and not to expand it. 

“In Interpreting the provisions of a statute,  it would be wrong to read into those provisions  what they do not contain’.  See MILITARY GOV. ONDO V. ADEWUNM1(1988) 3 NWLR (PT, 82) 280 (SC).

“The court and counsel are not entitled to read into a statutory provision  what it does not contain nor interpret a statutory provision in such a  way as to conform with the courts or counsel view of what they consider the law should be”. See TUMSAH V FRN (2018)17NWLR (PT.   1648) 238 (SC).

“The Court should not read into a section of a statute a meaning which cannot be described as the intention of the legislature” See Eguamwense   v. Amaghizemwen (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt. 315) 1,(sc).

“Courts of law, in interpreting  the constitution or a statute have no jurisdiction to read into the constitution or statute what the legislators did not provide for and afotiori read out of the constitution or statute what is provided for by the legislators. In either way, the courts are abandoning their constitutional function and straying into those of the legislature by interfering or interloping with them. As that will make nonsense of the separation of powers provided for in section 4 and 6 of the constitution courts of law will not do such a thing’’. See Buhari v. INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246 (SC).

66. In the light of the above authorities, this honourable court is most respectfully urged to refrain from reading into the UNICROSS LAW, what it did not say.
67. In furtherance of the above, counsel submitted that the law is very clear that:

‘It is [only]  when a law or statute has laid down a procedure for doing anything that   compliance  with  that procedure becomes a condition precedent for doing that thing”. See IKUMONIHAN V, STATE (201.4) 2 NWLR (PT. 1392) 564 (P,600, PARA. D)19.

“The literal rule of statutory interpretation is the first rule applied by  Judges.   Here   Judges rely on the exact wording of a statute for the case.  They will be read literally and the  judges will take the Ordinary and natural meaning of a   word and apply it,  even if doing so creates an absurd result”.

69. Also, in I.N.E.C., v. YUSUF (2020) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1714) 374 (SC), Courts are enjoined to interpret the words in their ordinary and natural meanings.  KASSIM V. ADESEMOWO (2021) 18 NWLR (PT.1807) 67, 96, PARA. C) (SC). 
70. Counsel queried, could the 4^th defendant be an applicant for the position of Vice-Chancellor and an arbiter at the Selection Interview or Governing Council at the time? In answer to this poser counsel submitted that contrary to the Claimant’s accusations, the 4^th defendant was not and could not be an applicant and arbiter at the same time and also did not select and appoint herself as Vice Chancellor of the University as the Applicant is insisting. Apart from the fact that no evidence has been brought to establish this malicious accusation, the state of the UNICROSS Law makes the accusation both unnecessary and also a statutory impossibility.
71. Counsel refers to paragraph 3 (4) of the 1^st Schedule thereto, where it requires a Vice Chancellor of an approved University to serve as a resource person during the selecting interview for the Vice Chancellor. Furthermore, by Section 6 (a) of the UNICROSS LAW, the Governing Council is statutorily chaired by the Pro-Chancellor, and by Section 9 (1), the Pro-Chancellor, takes precedence over the Vice-Chancellor of the University when acting as Chairman of the Council. According to counsel these fine provisions of the Law were created to remove all the questions of bias and impartiality, now raised by the Claimant.
72. Counsel further argued that the claimant who was absent from the selecting interview is automatically not in a position to say that anything but the law was followed. The claimant’s vituperations in this regard are to be totally disregarded, they are not borne out by Law or evidence but by the fact that because the Claimant was not appointed as Vice-Chancellor and by own admission, he cannot be Vice-Chancellor when the present tenure terminates, he would not enjoy his non-existent right to be Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cross River State.
73. On the ex-cathedral pronouncement, counsel submitted for the avoidance of doubt, paragraph 18 of the Claimant’s affidavit is not true.  The 7^th Defendant’s response did not say that it was from comments received from the University alone, as dishonourably portrayed by the Claimant. counsel refers the court to the Defendants exhibit MOJ 4, particularly the underlined portions, where the 7^th Defendant’s actual response can be seen and submit that the document can speak for itself. The underlined portions of the Exhibit MOJ 4 without further amplification is as follows:

“I have received comments from the University in this regard, to afford the University the opportunity to tell its side of the story. I note that the University is a creation of statute and its affairs are ultimately regulated by same. I have therefore consulted the University of Cross River State Law No. 2, of 2020 (UNICROSS LAW), specifically as regards the appointment of the Vice Chancellor. You may find these provisions in section 3(2) and the first schedule to the said Law. I have also consulted the Policy on eligibility for substantive appointment of Vice Chancellors, Rectors and Provosts (THE POLICY). And have made the observations below’’. 

74. Counsel also argued that having reproduced the 7^th Defendant’s response above, this Court should note how the Claimant and his counsel decided to focus only on the half of the first line of a three-page letter, and ignore everything else that was said in the letter which has now been ridiculously titled “Ex-cathedra pronouncement’’, whatever that means. As much as the Defendants are not in a habit of name calling and have struggled to refrain from name calling despite the provocation, it is safe to say without fear that, it is either that the Claimant and his Counsel cannot read or that they just enjoy looking for trouble and disrupting peace. Counsel urged the court to require the Claimant and his counsel to refrain from misleading the court in this or any other manner.
75. Counsel urged the court to dismiss this suit with punitive cost of N500,000,000.00 Five Hundred Million Naira), against the Claimant for filing a frivolous and vexatious suit, the claimant should be ordered to lay his grievance aside, respect the process that has produced the Vice Chancellor, to afford the Vice-Chancellor and the rest of the Defendants, the ambience required to peacefully navigate the affairs of the University without distractions of this or any sort.
76. In concluding his submission counsel on the strength of the above arguments, urged the Court to find that the Claimant did not meet the qualifications requirement in the first instance to afford him the right to apply for the position of the office of the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cross River State. Having not qualified for the interview and not participating, the Claimant further lacks the competency to challenge the selection process. Counsel pray this Court to discountenance all the reliefs sought by the Claimant and order that the Claimant lay his grievance aside, respect the process that has produced the Vice Chancellor, to afford the Vice-Chancellor and the rest of the Defendants, the ambience required to peacefully navigate the affairs of the University without distractions of this or any sort.
77. In reply on points of law counsel for the claimant contended that the defendants grossly misunderstood the true interpretation of the First Schedule to the University of Cross River State Law No. 2, 2020, when it was argued there is nothing in the law that even remotely suggests that an aspirant or contender for the position of Vice Chancellor, must first resign his acting before vying for the substantive position of Vice Chancellor. Counsel for the claimant faulted this submission on the ground that they did not discern properly the Law.
78. Counsel submitted that section 3(2) of the University of Cross river state clearly stated that the first schedule should have effect of principal officers of the 3^rd defendant and the 4^th defendant is one of the principal officers of the University.
79. Counsel submitted that the first schedule did not stop there, but makes no pretense about who has power to appoint or remove a Principal Officer in each case.
80. 1n the case of: The Vice Chancellor, the First Schedule stipulates the selection processes that will lead to a person’s appointment to the substantive position of Vice Chancellor. He/she will serve for only one term of five (5) years and cannot be re-appointed.
81. But where the tenure of the Vice Chancellor is scuttled by removal by the Visitor, or ill-health or death, An Acting Vice Chancellor is appointed by the Visitor to serve as a child of necessity in the stead of the substantive Vice Chancellor whose tenure was cut short by the aforesaid vicissitudes, And he/she serves for six months only.
82. Thereafter comes the process of selection of candidates for appointment to the post of a new substantive Vice Chancellor and it is the Governing Council that announces open the race for selection. This, the Council does three months to the expiration of the tenure of either the substantive Vice Chancellor or the Acting Vice Chancellor depending on who is on the, saddle at the material time.
83. If it is during the tenure of the substantive Vice Chancellor, he/she will not and cannot participate in the selection process. But if it is during the tenure of the Acting Vice Chancellor, he/she can participate upon his or her acquiring eligibility to partake in the race as prescribed in paragraph 9(1) and 9(2) of the First Scheduled. The option to complete his/her tenure as Acting Vice Chancellor is entirely his or hers.
84. And where he or she chooses to take part in the selection and she succeeds, he or she shall be re-appointed as substantive. Vice Chancellor for five (5) years of one single term. Again, this can only happen if she first acquires eligibility to run the race.
85. Then comes the vexed issues, “Resignation” and “Re-appointment” which is resolved under Paragraph 9(1) and 9(2) of the First Schedule, States:-

“9(1) Any officer mentioned in the foregoing provisions of this schedule may resign his office”.

86. Taking it step by step, the paragraph 9(1) by stipulating, “Any officer” means what it says and this includes without exception, the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor, the Acting Vice Chancellor, the two Deputy Vice Chancellors, the Registrar, the Bursar and the University Librarian.
87. The sub paragraph (1) of paragraph 9 did not stop there. It stipulates that Any of these officers “MAY” resign his office. Counsel argued in Law, “may” is interpreted by the Courts as something permissive or optional. Applying it to the respective Principal Officers, it means that, the Chancellor, the Pro-Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor, the Acting Vice Chancellor, the Deputy Vice Chancellors, the Registrar, the Bursar and the University Librarian may feel free to resign.
88. The sub paragraph(l) now prescribes the mode by which such resignation will follow:-

“(a). In the case of the Chancellor or Pro-Chancellor, by notice to the Governor; and

(b) In any other case by notice to the Council and the Council shall in the case of the Vice-Chancellor, immediately notify the Commissioner.”

“9(2) Without prejudice to paragraph 4 and 5 of this Schedule, a person who has ceased to hold office so mentioned otherwise than by removal for misconduct shall be eligible for re-appointment to the office”.

90. Now with regard to the vexed issue of resignation, the question to ask concerning the office of Acting Vice Chancellor is that office listed in the First Schedule? The answer is yes, Is the office among the Principal Officers listed? Again, the answer is in the affirmative. Is anything stopping the occupier of that office from completing her tenure of six(6) months? The answer is No. Can the occupier participate in the Selection? Yes but on condition, What is the condition? The occupier must first resign in order to acquire “eligibility” to participate in the race for selection.
91. On eligibility? Counsel submitted that; The Advanced Learners Dictionary of Contemporary English (New Edition) at page 549 defines the word “eligible” as an adjective, used to mean: “someone who is allowed to do something or someone who is able to do something”. Put differently, eligibility can only be acquired; it is not automatic. Under the First Schedule, eligibility is acquired upon resignation to pave way for re-appointment.
92. According to counsel, in the case of Acting Vice Chancellor, Professor Francisca Bassey as she then was, she will acquire the eligibility to run the race, when she has resigned. For counsel, the Acting Vice Chancellor having not resigned, was not eligible to run or participate in the selection exercise and indeed was not a candidate in the first place who in the eyes of the Law, did not participate at all in the selection exercise.
93. Counsel submitted that the possible interpretation of the above plain clear, unambiguous provisions derived from First Schedule joined together with Section 3(2) of the Law, supra that would lead to the true intendment is that the Law intended that the Acting Vice Chancellor must first resign her position before vying for the substantive position of Vice Chancellor. The law intended to say so and did say so by insisting that the First Schedule when being considered must go along with section 3(2) of the law to the end that, that law has effect on the Acting Vice Chancellor when seeking to contest for the post of substantive Vice Chancellor.
94. Still on eligibility counsel, submitted that it is trite Law, in a suit commenced by originating summons as in the instant case, the supporting affidavit and counter affidavit constitute the evidence in the case. See C.B.N. V. ADEDEJI (2022) B N.W.L.R. (Pt.1847) 361 RATIO 14 (SC). Counsel further submitted that, in an action decided upon affidavit evidence, as in the instant case, the affidavit of the parties plays dual roles. It serves the purpose of pleadings in actions commenced by Writ of Summons. It also serves as the evidence, which the parties rely on to prove their case. Therefore, it is the affidavit that defines the areas where issues are joined in the claim of the parties and it is the same affidavit that will be evaluated to determine the preponderance of evidence on the imaginary scale of justice in the process of resolving the dispute in the case. To support this contention counsel relied on the case of SSC (NIG) LTD, V. GEORGE (2024) 18 NWLR (Pt.1971) PAGE 421 RATIO 15, (SC).
95. Counsel submitted that the legal principles herein above, governs parties’ affidavit and counter affidavit, which the parties rely on as their evidence to prove their respective case, counsel reproduce ipsissima verba, the claimant’s averment in paragraph 34 of his affidavit to demonstrate the point that the Defendants averred no scintilla of evidence to counter Claimant’s averment.
96. The said paragraph 34 states thus:

“ That from the facts rehearsed hereinabove the selection was worse than examination malpractice where the ineligible excluded the eligible to hijack the process”.

97. Counsel submitted that nowhere in the Defendants’ 15 paragraph Counter affidavit have the Defendants denied or challenged the said averment.
98. Counsel invited the court to note Defendants’ averments in paragraphs 4 and 5 of their counter affidavit, where it was stated as follows:-

“4. The averments in paragraph 1 to paragraph 6 of the claimant’s affidavit are not in dispute.”

“5 All other averments in the Claimant’s affidavit are vehemently denied”.

“Any evidence not challenged or contradicted ought to be accepted as there is nothing on the other side of the balance”.

“a deposition in a counter affidavit requiring the applicant of strict proof of a paragraph of the affidavit in support of an application”, or as in the instant case, where it is stated without more, “all other averments in the claimant’s affidavit are vehemently denied”.

101. Counsel refers to the case of YESUFU V. CO-OPERATIVE BANK (1989) 3 NWLR (PARTI10)PAGE 483 RATIO 8, where the Supreme Court held that such a deposition in a Counter affidavit is not a contradiction of the deposition. It is a half-hearted attempt to question the correctness of the deposition without actually doing so. It does not raise any issue.
102. Counsel submitted that the University of Cross River State Law 2020, which serves as the beacon light to guide in the selection exercise stipulates under paragraph 3(2) (a) that the council shall advertise the vacancy, specifying; (a) the qualifications of the persons who may apply for the post; Under paragraph 3(2) (b) it stipulates that the advert should last for six weeks.
103. Counsel argued that it is common ground held by both the Claimant and the defendants that the advert was carried out by the Governing Council in the Nigerian Chronicle. Counsel is also of the view that it is common ground by both parties that the Claimant fulfilled this condition.
104. Counsel submitted that a candidate’s application is an overt act. It is further submitted it is an application that denotes the candidate’s eligibility at the point of entry into the selection race and this the Acting Vice Chancellor Professor Francisca Bassey as she then was did not fulfill.
105. In one word she did not even apply at all let alone to applied within the 6 weeks period stipulated for application. If she did, she would have not only denied Claimant’s averment that she was not eligible but would have gone further to demonstrate her eligibility by an overt act that is to exhibit her application made within the six weeks period stipulated for the making of application just the same way the Claimant did in his paragraphs 11, 12,13, 14, 15 and especially in paragraph 16 of his Affidavit. Counsel submitted that it is by demonstrating her eligibility through her application before the court the arbiter, which was not part of the selection exercise, that she can dislodge Claimant’s allegation that she was not eligible.
106. Counsel argued that the then Acting Vice Chancellor could not show to the court her application because it is impossible for her to show or give what she did not have.
107. Counsel submitted that the Defendants turned blind eye and deaf ears to the Claimant’s allegation that the Acting Vice Chancellor, Professor Francisca Bassey simulated herself as a candidate when she was not one.
108. Counsel submitted that by her not exhibiting to her affidavit her application containing the host of requirements spelt out in the Advert, is a strong indication that the Claimant’s allegation against her is true and admitted. In one word, she was not a candidate at the point of entry into the selection exercise and no amount of simulation can change her position to a candidate.
109. On the Defendant’s Counsel’s submission that the Claimant did not pre-qualify for the post of Vice Chancellor having not met the requirement of full Professor of not less than Seven (7) years. Counsel in reply argued that mathematical computation based on interpretation Act is not sustainable.
110. According to counsel, the heart of the instant suit orbits around the Interpretation of the First Schedule to the University of Cross River State Law and no more.
111. The Defendants’ Counsel have submitted that the Claimant by inserting Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended in his originating summons is seeking right under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Law. In response counsel submitted that the defence counsel’s position is erroneous and it is trite law that every enactment or statute must be in sync with the provisions of the Constitution, supra and not otherwise
112. It is claimant’s complaint that he was robbed of his right to fair hearing and by extension denied his right to the post of Vice Chancellor. Fair hearing under Section 36 forms the corner stone for actions by Government and its agencies and the court is entitled to nullify any selection exercise that does not conform to Section 36 of the Constitution. Counsel contended that section 36 of the Constitution, supra has a universal application whenever a body or tribunal or Court is dealing with a matter that affects a persons right, it is mandatory on the body whether acting quasi-judicially to apply Section 36 of the Constitution, supra to protect the rights of such a person and do natural justice which was lacking in the selection process.
113. Counsel further argued that in the instant case, it is apparent that while 4^th   Defendant did not even apply for the post of Vice Chancellor and the claimant did, it translates to mean that there was no level Playing ground for the two contestants. This indeed is a breach of fair hearing under Section 36 of the Constitution, Supra,
114. According to counsel, it is unfortunate that the defendants did not counter the claimant’s averment concerning public holiday on which it purportedly held the selection. By not challenging it, Claimant’s averment on this and the consequences are deemed admitted.
115. In Conclusion, counsel urged this Honorable Court to uphold the Claimant’s case as having merits and declare the claimant as the substantive Vice Chancellor of the University of Cross River State who as between the two candidates was eligible at the point of entry into the selection race as opposed to the Acting Vice Chancellor who was not eligible but simulated herself  as candidate to exclude the Claimant who was eligible.

COURT’S DECIOSION:

116. I have considered the originating summons commencing this suit wherein the claimant is seeking for interpretation of certain provisions of the University of Cross River Law No. 2 of 2020 and the provision of section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended.
117. The claimant submitted five questions seeking for answers, based on which he sought of seven reliefs. I have in the earlier part of  this judgment reproduced the questions and reliefs being sought by the claimant.
118. The defendants in opposition to the originating summons have filed counter affidavit of 15 paragraphs and written address. In the written address three issues were formulated for determination.
119. A careful perusal of   the counter affidavit in opposition and the three issues formulated by the defendants, it reveals that the defendants are challenging the competency of the claimant to maintain this suit i.e. his locus standi to institute this suit. This also means the defendants are challenging the competence of the suit itself.
120. It behooves on me to first and foremost deal with the issue of locus standi of the claimant to commence this suit before delving into resolution of the five questions submitted   by the claimant for resolution. The reason being that courts are enjoined to always deal with issue bordering on competency of action before delving into the substantive suit.
121. In their opposition to the claimant’s suit, the defendants have stated that the claimant did not pre-qualify for the position of Vice Chancellor, nor meet the mandatory requirements for selection and as such was not shortlisted or invited for interview, and having not so qualified, is bereft with the vires to challenge the process, or be appointed in the 4^th defendant’s stead.
122. The law is settled that for a claimant to properly commence and maintain an action, the claimant must possess the legal capacity i.e. locus standi to institute his action before a court. The term locus standi has been defined to mean the legal capacity of a party to maintain an action in a court of competent jurisdiction. A person is said to have locus standi when he is able to demonstrate satisfactorily to the court that his civil rights and obligations have been or are likely to be infringed. This is guaranteed by section 6(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Stated differently, a person aggrieved must disclose sufficient interest in the subject matter of an action in court. Adesanya
123. In law the resultant consequence of failure to have or possess locus standi is that it renders the suit incompetent and robs the court of jurisdiction to entertain the same. Locus standi and jurisdiction are interconnected. Where a party lacks locus standi in a matter, the court by implication will lack jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter. See Mohammed v. N.D.I.C. (2024) 14 NWLR (Pt.1957) 67; Ogheneovo v. Gov., Delta State (2023) 2 NWLR (Pt.1868) 275; Aguma v. APC (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt.1796) 351; Council of Legal Education v. Dange (2024) 13 NWLR (Pt.1955) 307; President, F.R.N. v. Fawehinmi (2025) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1988) 61.
124. Locus standi is an issue of jurisdiction and so can be raised at any stage or level of the proceedings in a suit even on appeal at the Court of Appeal or at the Supreme Court by any of the parties without leave of court or by the court itself suo motu. The issue can be raised by a motion after the claimant has duly filed his pleadings and or in a statement of defence (in this case in the affidavit). In this case the defendants’ counter affidavit has raised the issue of claimant’s competence to institute this suit as it was alleged that he did not pre-qualify for selection. See Council of Legal Education v. Dange (2024) 13 NWLR (Pt.1955) 307; President, F.R.N. v. Fawehinmi (2025) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1988) 61. 
125. Locus standi to institute proceedings in a court is not dependent on the success or merits of a case. It is a condition precedent to the determination of a case on the merits. See Council of Legal Education v. Dange (2024) 13 NWLR (Pt.1955) 307.
126. The issue of locus standi is central to the determination of whether a party (in this case claimant) has the legal right to institute an action. Locus standi requires that ? claimant in an action must demonstrate ? sufficient interest in the subject matter of the suit and that such interest is one that the law recognizes and protects. There is no gainsaying the fact that no court has the requisite jurisdiction to adjudicate on or to provide ? remedy for ? claim in which the claimant or plaintiff only has ? remote, hypothetical or no interest. ? party instituting an action in court must have ? locus standi, he must not only have the legal capacity to invoke the judicial power entrenched in section 6(6) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), he must show that he has real stakes in the subject matter, and must be able to establish that he suffered or is likely to suffer from the defendant’s act or conduct. For ? person to have locus standi, he must have sufficient interest in the set of facts that constitute the cause of action, such person must be directly affected by the facts or series of facts in issue. ? cursory examination of the supporting affidavit filed by the claimant in support of his originating summons clearly reveals that vide exhibit JTA 3, the governing council of the 3^rd defendant invited application from suitably qualified candidates with experience in university administration for the position of Vice Chancellor of the 3^rd defendant. exhibit JTA 3, has elaborated the conditions based on which applicants would qualify to apply. 
127. One of the conditions for the qualification is that the candidate should be a full professor of not less than seven 7 years at that rank in a recognized university with ability to provide academic and administrative leadership in the university.
128. The claimant has stated that he was promoted to the rank of professor vide letter dated 18^th day of 2021, exhibit JTA 1. The promotion was notionally from 1^st January, 2019, but with financial benefits from 1^st January, 2021. The claimant has tendered his pay slip marked as exhibit JTA 2, showing as at 1^st January, 2025, he was on salary grade level 7 step 7.
129. Vide exhibit JTA 4, the claimant applied for the position of Vice chancellor of the 3^rd defendant. the claimant stated that after he had applied for the post of Vice Chancellor, he did not hear or receive an acknowledgement of his application from the 5^th defendant. Consequently, his right to ascend to the post of Vice Chancellor was violated by the 5^th defendant in the selection of candidates for the post, as it compromised its functions as an umpire allowing the acting Vice Chancellor who is one of them as candidate for selection to sit with the council and select herself to be appointed as against the claimant’s candidature.
130. The defendants are opposing the claimant’s competence to maintain this action on the ground that as at the time he applied for the post of Vice Chancellor in May, 2025, he has not had seven years at the post of professor since his promotion was 1^st of January, 2019. From January, 2019 to May, 2025 is a period of less than seven years, thus why he was not selected or invited for interview as exhibit JTA 3, the advertisement for the post clearly stated that only shortlisted candidates would be invited for interview, the claimant having not been a professor for 7 years is not qualified to be selected for not fulfilling condition precedent. They also stated that even at the time the appointment of substantive Vice Chancellor was made in July, 2025, the claimant has not fulfilled the condition of being a professor for seven years. The counsel for the defendants insisted that the Claimant did not pre-qualify for the post of Vice Chancellor having not met the requirement of full Professor of not less than Seven (7) years.
131. In reaction to the position of the defendants on pre-qualification, counsel for the claimant submitted that the mathematical computation premised on the Interpretation Act is not sustainable. As according to counsel, the mathematical prescription by counsel for the defendants is alien to the Interpretation Act. Besides, the Interpretation Act is never used in the computation of salary or promotion of workers in the public service.
132. Counsel further argued that the Defendant’s Counsel in their mathematical calculation will still fail on account that it does not lie in the mouth of the Defendants, to ascribe that mathematical computation to the Defendants Letter of Promotion of the Claimant to the rank of a professor and the 9^th Defendant’s pay slip when neither the 3^rd, nor 5^th nor 9^th Defendants have devalued their own documents in the manner conceived by the Defendants’ Counsel. Counsel urged the court to hold that the defendant’s Counsel mathematical calculation which tends to devalue the 5^th Defendant’s Letter of Promotion of the Claimant to the rank of Professor as well as the 9^th Defendant’s pay slip which placed the Claimant on salary step 7, each step denoting a year is not the law and therefore should be discountenanced. 
133. Let me say that for the claimant to be able to maintain this suit, he must show that he has fulfilled all the conditions stipulated in exhibit JTA 3, the advertisement placed in the newspaper calling for suitably qualified candidates to apply for the position of Vice Chancellor of the 3^rd defendant.
134. The claimant has heavily relied on exhibits JTA 1, JTA 2 JTA 3 and JTA 4, as what qualify him to ascend to the position of the Vice Chancellor as advertised by the 5^th defendant. The counsel for the claimant has urged this court to discountenance the computation of seven years by the defendants as according to him is alien to interpretation Act. Counsel urged the court to use the date of promotion and step 7 as shown on exhibits JTA1 and JTA 2, and come to the conclusion that he has fulfilled the requirement of being a professor for 7 years.
135. In computation of time courts adhered strictly to principles of statutory provisions on computation of time or specific terms of employment contract, staff handbook, or collective agreement. Generally, time is computed chronologically, day by day, from the effective date of the event. This means apart from using the principles of computation as contained in interpretation law, courts compute time based on objective calendar calculation.
136. In the case at hand, the parties being subject to state law, this court is bound to use the state interpretation law on computation to see whether the claimant has been a professor at that position for a period of seven years or not. The use of state law in computation is necessitated by the fact that interpretation Act, which is Federal enactment is not applicable in this case, it cannot be employed in interpreting state law.
137. Section 3 of Interpretation Law, Cap 16, Laws of Cross River State, 2004, becomes apt, it provides:
138. In computing time for the purposes of any Law, unless the contrary intention appears:-
     1. a period reckoned by days from the happening of an event or the doing of any act or thing shall be deemed to be exclusive of the day in which the event happens or the act or thing is done;
     2. if the last day of the period is Sunday or a public holiday (which days are in this section referred to as excluded days), the period shall include the next following day not being an excluded day;
     3. when any act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken on a certain day, then, if that day happens to be an excluded day, the act or proceeding shall be considered as done or taken in due time if it is done or taken on the day next after-wards not being an excluded day;
     4. when an act or proceeding is directed or allowed to be done or taken within any time not exceeding six days, excluded days shall not be reckoned in the computation of the time.
139. The provisions of section 3 of Interpretation Law of Cross River State clearly sanctioned the use of calendar arithmetical doctrine in computation of time. This has debunked the position of counsel for the claimant that this kind of computation is alien. It is not alien, it is the method prescribed by law for computation of time and not computation based of step on which employee is/was placed.
140. The argument of counsel that "each step represents a year" is usually flawed, this is because, salary steps (increments) and rank (promotion) are distinct concepts in employment law. Salary steps usually reflect annual increments within a grade, whereas promotion involves moving to a higher grade/post. It was a total misconception for the claimant to rely on exhibit JTA 2, to assert that his being on step 7, as at January, 2025, means he has been a professor for seven years and he qualify for shortlisting and selection. The reason being that step only show date of salary increment which is the progression from one salary point to the next highest salary point, it does not in any way show or prove that the claimant has served on that post for another year.
141. An employee can be placed on a higher salary step immediately upon appointment or via a backdated notional promotion to match a pay grade, as it was done in case of the claimant. But tenure on a post is strictly measured by the calendar. The court will look at the date step on salary slip was stated as the date of actual service. Therefore, holding or being on "Step 7" is not synonymous with serving seven 7 calendar years."
142. Using the calendar computation which is the generally recognized method of computation, and sanctioned by law, the Starting Day (Dies a Quo): the date the notional promotion takes effect i.e. 1^st January, 2019, is excluded from the count, meaning the calculation starts on 2^nd January, 2019. The Ending Day (Dies ad Quem): the last day of the calculated period 15^th May, 2025, is included.
143. Going by this computation from 1^st January, 2019 to 15^th May, 2025, the claimant had only served 6 years, 4 months and 14 days on the post as a professor. This means that as at the time claimant has offered himself to the 5^th defendant for appointment as Vice Chancellor of the 3^rd defendant he had not qualified for consideration for the post advertised as per exhibit JTA 3. It was made very clear that the candidate to apply must had been a professor for not less than seven years at the position of a professor. Having not been a professor for seven years as at 15/5/2025, when exhibit JTA 4, was submitted to the 5^th defendant the claimant was not qualified to be shortlisted or invited for interview. This goes to show that the claimant lacked locus standi to bring this action to challenge his exclusion from the process that led to appointment of a substantive Vice Chancellor as advertised in exhibit JTA 3.
144. The failure to meet the seven years mandatory rule/condition as a professor as provided for in exhibit JTA 3, is a fatal defect to claimant’s competence to bring this action. The claimant, having not meet the foundational requirement of being a professor for seven days for him to qualify to vie for the post of Vice Chancellor of the 3^rd defendant, he cannot be considered to be an aggrieved person with requisite locus to approach court for redress. A person cannot seek an order from the court to enforce a right they do not legally possess.
145. The law is trite that a claimant must show a legal right or interest that has been directly infringed. If an academic fails to meet the basic, objective prerequisites for a post (such as a minimum number of years as a professor), his case will not be competent before the court for lack of standing without evaluating the core merits. Adesanya v President of FRN & Anor (1981) LPELR-147(SC).
146. With the challenge of the competence of the claimant to institute this action, the claimant must first prove that he has validly qualified to contest. To do this, he must show that he had been a professor for seven years as at the time of making application. From the claimant’s exhibits JTA 1 and JTA 2, there is no doubt that the claimant has not been a professor for seven good years to qualify to apply for the post of Vice chancellor for the 3^rd defendant. The inability to show that claimant at the time of application he had been a professor for seven years, is an insurmountable barrier that deprives claimant of the locus standi (legal standing) to challenge the process that culminated in the appointment of the 4^th defendant as substantive Vice Chancellor of the 3^rd defendant.
147. I am of the firmed view that in employment-related administrative actions a candidate who is fundamentally unqualified for a post lacks the requisite standing to challenge the eventual appointment made to the post or position in question. The Claimant's lack of the mandatory 7 years as a professor is a significant barrier to his and qualifying for selection. This means he does not have legal standing to sue.
148. Furthermore, section 131(1) of the Evidence Act 2011 places the burden of proof on the Claimant to establish that he met the eligibility criteria. This section applies because the Claimant's right to be shortlisted depends on the existence of facts that he is a professor for seven 7 good years which he has failed to prove; indeed, his own evidence exhibit JTA 3, contradicts his claim. Additionally, Section 133 of the Evidence Act 2011 dictates that the burden of proof in civil cases rests on the party who would fail if no evidence were led. Since the mathematical calculation of the Claimant's tenure as a professor clearly falls below the seven-year mandate, he has failed to discharge the burden of proving his eligibility. The court cannot grant an equitable remedy where the legal requirement of a condition precedent has not been met.
149. The concept of locus standi focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint heard by the court not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. In the case at hand the claimant has not fulfilled a condition for making an application for consideration for the post, this means that the claimant is not a suitably qualified candidate directly affected. This is because only candidates that have been professors for seven years that are qualified to apply, claimant not being one has no locus to initiate this suit as he had no recognize right to apply for the post. See Adesanya v. President, F.R.N. (1981) 2 NCLR 358; Thomas v. Olufosoye (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 669; A.G., Kaduna State v. Hassan (1985) NWLR (Pt.8) 483. 
150. The finding that the claimant lacked locus standi to institute this action, has brought the life span of this suit to come to an abrupt end. However, this court being court of first instance has a duty to consider the substantive suit as contained in the originating summons. The reason being that it is thus, a statutory responsibility of all Courts to consider adequately and properly all issues placed before them. Failure to do so will lead to denial of fair hearing which is capable of rendering any proceedings a nullity. See Ada V. NYSC (2004)13 NWLR (Pt. 891) 639.
151. In the originating summons the claimant submitted five questions for resolution and based on which he seeks seven reliefs from the court. The questions and reliefs sought have hereinbefore been reproduced.
152. By his originating summons the claimant is seeking for interpretation of certain provisions of University of Cross river State Law no. 2 of 2020. The claimant is seeking for interpretation of paragraphs 3 (1) (a) (b); 3 (2) (a) i, ii, iii, (b); 3 (3); 3(5); 3 (6); 3 (7); 9 (1) (b) and 9 (2) of the First Schedule to the UNICROSS LAW and section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended.
153. The purpose of invoking the interpretative jurisdiction of the court via originating summons is to discover the intention of the legislature, which intention is usually deduced from the language used in the statute. See KATAH PROPERTIES & INVESTMENT LTD V CHAIRMAN EFCC (2023) LPELR-59736(CA). Therefore, the basic function of every court called upon to interpret a piece of legislation is to seek out the intention of the legislator, as can be gathered from the four corners of the statute itself. See UHUNMWANGHO V OKOJIE (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 471. The fundamental duty of the court is to expound the law and not to expand it. The court must decide what the law is and not what it might be. Where the words used in couching the provisions are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning and no more. Thus, the duty of the court is to interpret the statutes in accordance with the intentions of the lawmakers. It does not allow for, or elicit sentiments and morality but must convey the true intent and purpose of the legislature as expressed in the relevant statute. See UZOUKWU V IDIKA (2022) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1818) 403.
154. It is also the duty of the court to ensure in the interpretation of the provisions of a statute that anything which does not appear ex facie in the provisions should not be imported into them. See Ogunmade v. Fadayiro (1972) 8-9 SC 1; Musa v. State (2025) 20 NWLR (Pt. 2022) 119. As it is only the words of a statute that can properly convey the intention of the legislature and it is an act of violence to read into a statute the words that are absent from its provisions. See Awolowo v. Shagari (1979) 6-9 S.C. 51; (1979) N.S.C.C. 87; A-G., Bendel v. A-G., Federation (1982) 3 N.C.L.R. 1; (1981) 10 S.C 1; (1981) N.S.C.C. 314; Salami v. Chairman, L.E.D.B. (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 123) 539.
155. In any given case, where words in a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, as the words themselves in such case best declare the intention of the legislature. See Asuquo v. State (1967) 1 All NLR 123; Adejumo v. Gov. Lagos State (1972) 3 SC 45; Lawal v. G.B. Ollivant (1972) 3 SC 124; Aya v. Henshaw (1972) 5 SC 87; Estate of Soule v. Johnson (1974) 12 SC 121; Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 1 SCNLR 427; Awolowo v. Shagari (1979)6 - 9SC51; Toriola v. Williams (1982)7 SC 27; IBWA v. Imaro (Nig.) Ltd (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt 85 ) 633; NBN Ltd. v. Weide & Co. (Nig.) Ltd (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt. 465) 150; Obeta v. Okpe (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt.473) 401; Rhein Mass Und See GMBH v. Rivway Lines Ltd (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 549) 265.
156. In any event a court is not permitted to ascribe meaning to a statute in order to make it conform with the Judge's own views of sound social policy. As one of the cardinal principles of interpretation is to give the words of a statute, when clear and unambiguous, their grammatical and ordinary meaning. See Egbe v. Alhaji (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 128) 546; A.-G. Lagos State v. Dosunmu (1989) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt.111) 552; A.G. (Fed.) v. Sode (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 128) 500.
157. In order to enable a clear picture of the purport of a statute to emerge, all the sections of the statute have to be read as a whole. See Salami v. Chairman, L.E.D.B. (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 123) 539. Therefore, it is not the function of the court or Judge when interpreting a statutory provision to import words which will do violence to the intent and meaning of the statutory provision. See Egbe v. Alhaji (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 128) 546.
158. Having at the back of the mind the above settled principles governing interpretation of statutes that I shall consider the provisions of the University of Cross River State Law no. 2, of 2020 and section 36 of the constitution submitted by the claimant to be interpreted by the court. 
159. The provisions the claimant submitted to be interpreted as encapsulated in the originating summons borders on appointment, tenure, removal and resignation.
160. I have perused the entire provisions of the University of Cross river State law no. 2 of 2020, the Schedule thereto as well as the provisions of section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, which the claimant call for interpretation.
161. The grouse of the claimant that made him to institute this suit for intervention of the court are that sequel to an advertisement in the Nigerian Chronicle Newspaper, exhibit JTA 3, the claimant vide exhibit JTA 4, applied for the advertised post of Vice Chancellor of the 3^rd defendant. however, the claimant was not invited for any interview despite having been qualified for the post. But, the Acting Vice Chancellor who was not qualified as she remained in office for the duration of the exercise nominated herself for the post and she was appointed by the visitor. The claimant is of the view that the for the Acting Vice Chancellor to qualify to vie for the substantive office of the Vice Chancellor she must resigned her appointment as acting Vice chancellor which she did not and that was confirmed by the 7^th defend ant in exhibit JTA 5, dated 3/10/2025 in reply to protest complaint by the claimant. The claimant urged the court to nullify the appointment of the 4^th defendant as it did not follow due process. It was made in violation of the provisions of the first schedule to the University of Cross River State Law No. 2 of 2020 and section 36 of the Constitution as claimant’s right to fair hearing was violated in the course of the exercise.
162. It is clear, the provisions submitted for interpretation deals with appointment, tenure, removal and resignation of principal officers of the 3^rd defendant. Section 3(2) of the law stated that the first schedule to the law shall have effect with respect to the principal officers of the university. In the case at hand, we are only concerned with the office of the Vice chancellor, who is one of the principal officers of the University.
163. Respecting question 1, the claimant maintained that the throughout the material time of three months stipulated by law for selection of candidates for vice chancellor the acting vice chancellor was still prosecuting the function the vice chancellor. According to counsel the claimant does not agree with the letter from the 7^th defendant that stated that the law did not require the acting vice chancellor  to resign before contesting for the substantive post of vice chancellor. 
164. The provisions of paragraph 3(1) (a) (b) of the First schedule deal with appointment of acting Vice Chancellor where vacay occurs due to sudden death, incapacitation or misconduct resulting to his removal from office. In such situation, the visitor appoints the acting Vice Chancellor on the recommendation of the senate. And the tenure of acting vice chancellor shall not exceed six months.
165. I note, there is no challenge to the appointment of acting Vice Chancellor in this suit.
166. On appointment of substantive Vice Chancellor which necessitated filing of this suit, sub-paragraphs (2) (a), I, ii, iii and (b); (3); (4); (5); (6) and (7) of paragraph 3, has stated the method and procedure to be followed in making the appointment. The appointment being statutory must be done in strict compliance with the law. Failure to adhere to the provisions of the law will render any appointment made null and void. The law is settled that where a procedure is laid down for the attainment of a legal right or thing, that procedure and none other should be followed: See ADESANOYE vs. ADEWOLE (2006) LPELR (143) 1 at 22-23; (2006) 14 NWLR (PART 1000) 242; LPELR-143 SC 1 AT 21-22; and INC. TRUSTEES OF NIGERIAN GOVERNORS FORUM vs. RIOK NIGERIA LTD (2018) LPELR (44915) 1 at 92; LADY CARE HAIR PRODUCTS LTD V NWAKWELU & ANOR. (2021) LPELR-56043(CA) (Pp. 18 paras. A); Oni v. Gov., Ekiti State (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1664) 1. 
167. Where a statute has provided for the method of doing anything, it must be done in accordance with the express provision of the statute. It is trite law that when law provides a particular way/method of doing a thing, and unless such a law is altered or amended by a legitimate authority, then whatever is done in contravention of those provisions amounts to a nullity and of no effect whatsoever. See Ude v. Nwara & Anor (1993) 2 NHILR (Pt. 278) 638, (1993) LPELR-3289 (SC); M.P.P.P. v. I.N.E.C. & Ors (2015) LPELR-25706 (SC), (2015) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1491) 251; Federal Republic of Nigeria v. Wabara Ors (2013) LPELR-20083 (SC), (2013) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1347) 331; Nnonye v. Anyichie (2005) 2 FWLR (Pt. 268) 121, (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) 623; Ntiero v. NPA (2008) 1 0 NWLR (Pt. 1094) 129. CBN v. TRIPPLE C. ACQUISITION LTD & ORS (2022) LPER-57441(CA). In the case at hand, University of Cross River State Law No. 2 of 2020, has provided the procedure and method for appointment of Vice Chancellor, this means it is only the procedure as prescribed by the law that must be followed in making appointment of Vice chancellor.
168. It is also the law that where an office is governed by statute, the procedures and qualifications must be strictly adhered to. The court cannot waive a mandatory requirement for appointment to such office or post. From the provisions of paragraph 3, of First schedule, for an appointment to the office/post of Vice chancellor to be made the appointment must be made in strict compliance with the provisions of law. There must be advertisement which has been done. See exhibit JTA 3, which is same with MOJ 3.
169. The advertisement in compliance with the law contained the qualifications of the persons who may apply for the post. The terms and conditions of service applicable to the post has been stated. Thereafter, draw up a short list of suitable candidates for the post. The advert should last for six weeks.
170. After shortlisting a committee of the council shall interview the shortlisted candidates. A vice chancellor of an approved university shall serve as a resource person during the selecting interview for the Vice chancellor. The council 5^th defendant is to recommend three from among the candidates recommended by the committee of the whole council and may indicate order or merit and forward the names to the visitor.
171. Upon receipt of the three candidates forwarded to him, the visitor may appoint as Vice Chancellor any one of the candidates recommended to him in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph 5 of the law. Upon appointment the tenure of the vice chancellor shall be five years only on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the letter of appointment. See paragraph 3(2) (a), i, ii, iii, (b), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7), of the First Schedule to University of Cross River State Law. 
172. At the risk of being repetitive, from the originating summons the claimant’s quarrel with the exercise conducted by the 5^th defendant which culminated in the appointment of the Acting Vice Chancellor of the 3^rd defendant as the substantive Vice chancellor is predicated on the acting Vice Chancellor not resigning from her acting appointment before contesting for the office of Vice Chancellor, as according to the claimant resignation is sine quo non for eligibility to vie for the post. According to the claimant non-resignation of the claimant from acting appointment means she selected herself and recommended her self to the visitor. It was also the case of the claimant that the independence and impartiality being hallmark of the provisions of paragraphs 3, 9(1) (b) and 9(2) of the First schedule to the University of Cross River State Law 2020, juxtaposed with section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, were not guaranteed to the claimant as candidate for selection to the post of Vice chancellor where the acting vice chancellor his rival was still by operation of law a member of the governing council to conduct the selection and unjustly excluded the claimant from selection.
173. In the earlier part of this judgment, I have dealt with issue of eligibility of the claimant to be considered as a substantive Vice chancellor of 3^rd defendant as per the law governing such appointment. It was found that claimant having not satisfied the requirement of being a professor for 7 years was not qualified for selection or invited for interview by the council.
174. Now the issue of qualification of the acting vice Chancellor due non-resignation from acting appointment.
175. I have thoroughly examined all the provisions of the University of Cross River State Law No. 2 of 2020, I could not locate any section or paragraph of the schedule to the law that make provision requiring an Acting Vice Chancellor to resign from their position or from the Governing Council as a condition precedent for applying for the substantive office of Vice Chancellor. The University of Cross River State Law 2020 is silent on any such mandatory resignation. Our jurisprudence is clear that rights are not taken away except by express provision of the law. The role of an 'Acting' officer is fundamentally one of administrative necessity to prevent a vacuum in leadership. To disqualify an acting officer from seeking a substantive appointment unless they resign would be to read into the statute a restrictive provision that the legislature did not see fit to include. Therefore, Professor Francisca Bassey was legally entitled to offer herself as a candidate for the substantive position while maintaining her acting status, as no provision of the UNICROSS Law or the 1999 Constitution (as amended) prohibits such an action.
176. The law is trite in interpretation of statute courts are enjoined to employ the 'Literal Rule' of statutory interpretation. See Okorie & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) LPELR-62967(CA), where it was held that where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Also, in the interpretation of statutes, what is not expressed is excluded. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius - the express mention of one thing is the exclusion of the other not mentioned; what is not included in a statute is not to be read into it. See Commissioner for Local Govt & Chieftaincy Affairs & Anor v. Onakade (2016) LPELR-41133(CA)  (Pp. 16 paras. A). A review of the University of Cross River State Law 2020 reveals no express provision mandating the resignation of an 'Acting' officer before applying for the substantive version of that same office. The Claimant's attempt to read such a requirement into the law, it constitutes an invitation for the court to perform a legislative function, which is prohibited under the doctrine of separation of powers. Furthermore, the position of 'Acting Vice Chancellor' is by nature temporary and intended to ensure continuity. Barring such an individual from applying for the substantive role without resignation, unless explicitly stated by law would impose a burden not contemplated by the draftsman. The Attorney General's interpretation aligns with the standard practice where 'acting' status is a bridge to, rather than a disqualification from, substantive appointment. Therefore, in the absence of a specific statutory prohibition, the Acting Vice Chancellor was not legally required to resign as a condition precedent for eligibility. Furthermore, the court in Okorie & Anor v. INEC & Ors (2024) LPELR-62967(CA), it was affirmed that courts cannot supplement the words of a statute. Since the University of Cross River State Law 2020 does not explicitly list 'resignation of acting capacity' as a prerequisite for eligibility, the court cannot impose such a burden. The Attorney General’s opinion, while not binding on the court, correctly identifies the absence of this statutory requirement. Consequently, the Acting Vice Chancellor's failure to resign does not invalidate her candidacy.
177. The counsel for the claimant has made reference to paragraph 9(1) of the First Schedule of the UNICROSS LAW as the provision the require resignation in order to acquire eligibility.  I have taken a hard look at the entire provisions of paragraph 9 of the schedule, as well as the entire provisions of the schedule which by section 3(2) are applicable to principal officers of the 3^rd to which 4^th defendant is one. I shall at this juncture reproduce the provisions of paragraph 9, for proper appreciation:- 

“9 (1) Any officer mentioned in the foregoing provisions of this Schedule May resign his office.

(a) In the case of the Chancellor or Pro-Chancellor, by notice to the Governor; and

(b)   In any other case, by notice to the Council and the Council Shall in the case of the Vice-Chancellor, immediately notify the Commissioner.

(2) Without prejudice to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Schedule  a person who has ceased to hold office so mentioned, otherwise than by removal for misconduct, shall be eligible for re-appointment to the office.

178. It is clear from the above lucid transparent, unambiguous provision of paragraph 9 that, the resignation mentioned therein is not for an acting Vice Chancellor wishing to participate in the process for appointment of substantive vice Chancellor. The resignation is a allowing/permitting any of the principal officers of the 3^rd defendant to resign his appointment at his own volition. It is in that context that any officer that resigned his appointment not on account of removal for misconduct can participate in process for re-appointment. The paragraph does not make any provision requiring an acting Vice Chancellor to resign in order to acquire eligibility, as the claimant want the court to believe. To accept the interpretation of the claimant, it will amount to inserting words into the statute that were not there or not inserted by the legislature, which in law is not permitted, as such act will amount to usurpation of the function of legislature. 
179. Therefore, from the above clear and unambiguous provisions the Acting Vice-Chancellor is not by law required to first resign from the said position to be eligible to vie for the post of Vice Chancellor as there is nothing in the law to that effect. 
180. On the alleged participation of the Acting Vice Chancellor in the selection process while remaining a member of the Governing Council violates the principle of fair hearing and impartiality.
181. The claimant has accused the acting Vice chancellor of participation in the selection process while remaining an active member of the Governing Council, which he alleged has undermine independence of the council and resulted in a breach of the principles of natural justice and fair hearing. As pointed out earlier in this judgment, the acting Vice chancellor is not legally required to resign her office. However, the principle of impartiality required her to recuse herself entirely from all Governing Council meetings and decisions related to the Vice Chancellor selection process from the moment she became a candidate. Her dual status as both a candidate and a member of the body overseeing the selection creates a 'real likelihood of bias,' which is sufficient to undermine the integrity of the process. Under the doctrine of natural justice, as anybody charged with the determination of rights must be constituted in a manner that ensures its independence and impartiality. If the acting Vice chancellor participated in the meetings of the council that deliberated on the appointment of substantive Vice Chancellor, she would have been part and parcel of the body judging her own application thereby violating the rule on bias.
182. The principle of ‘nemo judex in causa sua’ (no one should be a judge in their own cause) is a cornerstone of the doctrine of natural justice. In administrative law, the 'real likelihood of bias' test is applied to determine if a reasonable person, knowing the facts, would perceive the process as unfair. The Claimant's argument rests on the fact that Professor Bassey's dual role as a candidate and a Council member inherently tainted the independence of the selection. However, the court must also consider whether the Claimant has the standing to raise this constitutional grievance. If the Claimant was disqualified ‘ab initio’ for failing the 7-year professor rank requirement, as found earlier in this judgment, the alleged bias in the selection of others might not have caused him a direct legal injury. Nevertheless, the principle of impartiality in university governance is vital. As seen in Ndili v. Akinsumade & Ors (2000) LPELR-6910(CA), the internal processes of a university must adhere to natural justice. While the law might not require resignation, the Governing Council must ensure that a candidate-member recuses themselves from all deliberations and decisions regarding the selection to maintain the hallmark of independence. If recusal occurred, the constitutional requirement of fair hearing would be satisfied despite the lack of formal resignation.
183. However, for this court to make a finding on breach of the rules of natural justice ‘nemo judex in causa sua’ the claimant is required to discharge onus of proof as required by the evidence Act. By virtue of sections 131, 132 and 133 of the Evidence Act 2011, the burden of proof lies on the party who would fail if no evidence is given on either side. In the instant case, the claimant contended that the acting Vice chancellor excluded him because she was part of the council that did selection, interview and made recommendation to the Visitor, therefore, she selected herself to his detriment thereby breaching his right to ascension to the position of Vice chancellor to the 3^rd defendant.  in the circumstance, the claimant is required to adduce concrete credible admissible evidence in proof of his allegation. The attempt by the claimant to shift burden of proof on the acting Vice Chancellor is against the law for such to happened he must first adduced evidence in discharge of his burden. To make assumption because the acting Vice Chancellor is a statutory member of council cannot hold water, there must be concrete evidence of actual participation of the acting Vice Chancellor in the proceedings of council regarding the alleged participation and nomination or exclusion. See Dasuki v. F.R.N. (2018) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1627) 320; Jimoh v. Hon. Minister F.C.T. (2019) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1664) 45; Dematic (Nig.) Ltd. v. Utuk (2022) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1831) 71.
184. The onus of proof becomes more onerous on the claimant considering the facts that he is seeking for declaratory reliefs. In law for him to succeed he must rely on the strength of his case and not on weakness or absence of defence or admission due to alleged absence of proper traverse.
185. In a claim for declaratory reliefs, as in the case at hand the claimant must prove his entitlement thereto, by cogent and credible evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence, if any. Indeed, a declaratory relief will not be granted on the basis of an admission by the adverse party. In the instant case, the alleged failure of the defendants to traverse could not enure in the claimant’s favour either on admissions or default of pleading. See Bello v. Eweka (1981) 1 SC 63 (Reprint); Sorungbe v. Motunwase (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt.92) 90; (1988) 19 NSCC (Pt.111) 252, 262, Kwajaffa v. B.O.N. Ltd. (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 146; Dumez Nig. Ltd. v. Nwakhoba (2008) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1119) 361; Emenike v. P.D.P. (2012) 12 NWLR (Pt.1315) 556; Matonmi v. Dada (2013) 7 NWLR (Pt.1323) 319; Mohammed v. Wammako (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1619) 573.
186. For whatever, it is the claimant having not established that he so qualified to participate in the exercise as contained in exhibit JTA 3, he has no standing to complain as he has not established his right to be considered due to non-fulfilment of condition precedent.
187. I agree with Learned Counsel for the defendants that it is patently clear that there are no averments in the affidavits of the claimant cataloguing the facts establishing that the acting vice chancellor participated in the deliberation of the council that culminated in her recommendation to the visitor for appointment as a substantive Vice Chancellor of the 3^rd defendant. There is no any minutes of the meetings tendered in evidence. The exhibits attached to the affidavit only shows that the acting vice chancellor has performed one official function or the other. Exhibit JTA 6, shows visit of police commissioner. Exhibit JTA 6B, was for interactive session held with the staff of the Department of Estate and Works. Exhibit JTA C, is on expression of concern by the acting Vice Chancellor on damage caused by rainstorm to the university structures. Exhibit JTA 6D, is 2^nd anniversary Goodwill message  to the executive governor of Cross River State. Exhibit JTA 6E, was on backing of the acting vice chancellor by the Alumni Association of the university. 
188. While exhibits JTA 7, JTA 7A, JTA 7B and JTA 9, are letters of complaint they are not capable of establishing any of the reliefs sought, all they can do is to show claimant has protested the appointment of acting Vice Chancellor as a substantive Vice Chancellor.
189. In the circumstance and in the absence of evidence, I am unable to come to the conclusion that the acting Vice Chancellor participated in the process that produced her as the substantive Vice chancellor of the 3^rd defendants. The court cannot rely on assumption and guess, without evidence in support. The claimant’s averments that he got a tip off, of meeting of council at a hotel in State Housing Estate cannot be proper deposition as he has not told the court his source of information and whether he believe the information or not. The averment is in violation of section 115 (3) of the Evidence Act that require that when a person deposes to his belief in any matter of fact, and the belief is derived from any source other than his own personal knowledge, he shall set forth explicitly the facts and circumstances forming the ground of his belief. He should state the name of his informant, date and circumstance in which the information was made and also state that he believes the statement to be true. In the instant case, the claimant did not state his informant or source of his belief. In the circumstances his deposition amount to hearsay evidence which is in law not admissible. See Aladum v. Ogbu (2023) 9 NWLR (Pt.1888) 57.
190. On section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended it guarantees the right to a fair hearing before a court or tribunal. However, its application to domestic, academic, and administrative selection processes is frequently misunderstood. The primarily targets judicial, quasi-judicial, or disciplinary tribunals where a person's civil rights and obligations are being determined or adjudicated. A competitive selection process for an executive position (like a Vice Chancellor appointment) is an administrative exercise, not a trial or a disciplinary hearing. In the case of Rev. Prof. Paul Emeka v. Rev. Dr. Chidi Okoroafor, (2017) LPELR-41738(SC), the Supreme Court has clarified that administrative processes are governed by common law rules of natural justice rather than the strict constitutional mechanisms of Section 36. While nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in their own case) is an arm of natural justice, it does not apply where a statute explicitly places an official on a council. Because the acting Vice Chancellor’s seat on the Governing Council is a statutory requirement, it does not amount to a constitutional infraction under Section 36 unless as earlier stated actual, malicious bias or manipulation of votes can be proven. And in this case claimant has not adduced evidence in proof. Rather than relying on the mere presence of the acting Vice Chancellor in the council, the claimant must provide concrete evidence that the acting Vice Chancellor actively sat on, voted in, or directly manipulated the selection or the panel that interviewed the candidates, thereby destroying the process's impartiality. For the claimant to succeed he must prove that the irregularities were so severe that the entire outcome was corrupted, rendering a fair selection impossible.
191. On order directing appointment of claimant as the VC, this court will not order the claimant to be appointed as the Vice Chancellor. The reason being that appointment of a Vice Chancellor is a purely administrative and executive function vested in the University Governing Council and the Visitor (the Governor), not the judiciary. To accede to the request of the claimant is to usurp the function of the executive which by the doctrine of separation of power is highly deprecated and frowns at. This court will resist any call or invitation to stray from its duty to delve into usurping the powers of executive and administrative bodies. If a court finds a selection process fundamentally flawed or irregular, the standard judicial remedy is to nullify the flawed process and order a fresh, compliant selection process not to appoint the claimant directly. However, such finding has no place of abode in this case.
192. The claimant has strenuously argued that the appointment of acting Vice Chancellor to the substantive post of Vice chancellor means the 4^th defendant will serve for five years six months having served as acting, this according to counsel will be contrary to five years single term for Vice chancellor as provided in the law. It is apparent, the submission of counsel is based on misconception in that, it ignored the fact that the two positions are distinct and mutually exclusive. Each tenure is separate from the other, the substantive appointment takes effect from date of appoint for the specific term of five years as provided in the law. Likewise acting appointment is for a period of six months.
193. It is to be noted that substantive Appointment confers on the appointee a permanent status, subject to statutory provisions regarding tenure, removal, or resignation. It implies a right to the office and its emoluments, and the holder generally enjoys greater job security. An individual in a substantive appointment typically has gone through a formal appointment process i.e. shortlisting, interview and recommendation.
194. While acting appointment is a temporary assignment to perform the duties of an office. It is a stop-gap measure designed to prevent an administrative vacuum. It does not confer permanent status, nor does it merge with a subsequent permanent position. The appointee does not acquire a permanent right to the office itself, nor does it necessarily confer the full benefits and security of a substantive appointment. An acting appointment is often made when the substantive holder is absent, or when a vacancy exists and the process for a substantive appointment is ongoing. The powers and authority exercised in an acting capacity are usually derived from the substantive holder or the appointing authority, and the appointment is subject to termination upon the return of the substantive holder or the making of a substantive appointment.
195. From the analysis above, the answers to the five questions posed are:-
     1. Question 1; the answer is that there is no law requiring acting vice chancellor to resign as a condition for eligibility for selection for appointment or re-appointment as vice chancellor of the 3^rd defendant.
     2. On question 2; the membership of the governing council being statutory can not operate without more to affect the independence and impartiality of the decision of the 5^th defendant on selection and recommendation of candidates for appointment as vice chancellor of the 3^rd defendant.
     3. On question 3; there is no law in force making resignation of acting vice chancellor as a condition precedent to being eligible for selection or invitation for consideration for appointment as a Vice Chancellor.
     4. On question 4; there are no facts or evidence showing alleged simulation by 4^th defendant as candidate, shortlisted herself, interview herself, and on 15/7/2025 being public holiday forwarded a final list with her name to the visitor for reappointment as vice chancellor as the claimant has not even qualified for appointment to the post of vice chancellor. 
     5. The answer to question 5; is that the 5^th defendant was right in excluding the claimant from selection due to claimant’s inability to fulfil condition precedent for selection i.e. being a professor for seven years on that rank.
196. Having resolved all the five questions against the claimant, he is not entitled to any of the seven reliefs sought. In the circumstance, the claimant has woefully failed to convince the court of his entitlement to the reliefs sought, this suit is hereby dismissed on merit as well due to lack of proof.
197. I make no order as to cost. Parties to bear their respective costs.
198. Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

 

 

 

 

Sanusi Kado,

Judge.

REPRESENTATION:

E. M. Ekpennyoung, Esq; for the claimant

Udenyi Omaji, Esq; Deputy Director, for the defendants.