IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE CALABAR JUDICIAL DIVISION

HOLDEN AT CALABAR

BEFORE: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANUSI KADO

 

2ND DAY OF JUNE, 2026                                            

SUIT NO. NICN/CA/52/2026

BETWEEN:

Agrinya Julius Agrinya …………………………………………….……………. Applicant

AND

  1. The Nigeria police Force
  2. Inspector General of Police
  3. Commissioner of Police, Cross river state
  4. Government of Cross River State
  5. Governor of Cross River State                                               Respondents
  6. Deputy Governor of Cross River State                                  
  7. Attorney General of Cross River state                                      
  8. Dr. Justin Beshel (Cross River State 

Commissioner for Science, Technology and Innovation

  1. Police service Commission. 

    JUDGMENT

  1. On 28th  day of April, 2026, counsel for the parties in this suit canvassed argument for and against the originating motion and the court fixed 11th day of Judgment. However, I directed the registrar to brought the date forward to today, this is because the judgment is ready.
  2. This deal with originating motion dated 20th October, 2025 and filed on the same date. The motion was brought pursuant to sections 34, 35, 37 and 41 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, order ii rules 1, 2, 3, 4 of the Fundamental rights enforcement procedure) rules, 2009, articles 12 and 18 of the African charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and enforcement) Act Cap. A9, LFN 2004 and under the inherent powers and jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.
  3. The applicant is praying this Honourable court for grant of the following reliefs:
  4. A DECLARATION that the 4th – 8th Respondents have no right in law to use the Police, that is to say, the 1st – 3rd Respondents and or their agents and operatives to invite, chase around, harass, seek to arrest, arrest, detain, humiliate, dehumanize, and oppress the Applicant with respect to the facts of this case which are purely civil matters bothering on labour/employment matters.
  5. A DECLARATION that all the invitation extended to the Applicant by the 3rd Respondent at the instance of the 4th – 8th Respondents in respect of the facts of this case is null and void and in violation of the Applicant’s rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty, privacy, and movement
  6. A DECLARATION that the detention of the Applicant from 28th to 30th of August 2024 by the 3rd Respondent, agent of the 1st. 2nd, and 9th Respondents, at the instance of the 4th – 8th Respondents in respect of the facts of this case are unconstitutional and in violation of the Applicant’s rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty, privacy, and movement.
  7. A DECLARATION that given the circumstances of this case, it will be a contravention of the rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty, privacy, and movement of the Applicants if the 1st – 3rd Respondents use their agents, operatives and servants to invite, chase around, harass, seek to arrest, detain, further detain, humiliate, dehumanize and oppress the Applicant over the facts of this case.
  8. AN ORDER OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT nullifying all the invitations extended to the Applicant by the 1st – 3rd Respondents at the instance of the 4th – 8th Respondents. 
  9. AN    ORDER     OF     PERPETUAL    INJUNCTI0N restraining the Respondents, their agents, servants, privies or successors, howsoever from inviting, arresting, further arresting, chasing around, detaining, dehumanizing, oppressing or in anyway, violating the fundamental rights of the Applicant in connection with the facts of this case.
  10. AN ORDER directing the Respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the Applicant the sum of N5,OOO,OOO,OOO.00 (Five Billion Naira) as general damages.
  11. AN ORDER directing the Respondents, jointly and severally, to pay the Applicant the sum of N50,000,000’00 (Fifty Million Naira) assessed as cost of litigation.
  12. ANY OTHER applicable reliefs as may be just and applicable in the circumstances.
  13. The grounds for seeking the above reliefs as contained on the face of the motion papers are as follows:-
  14. The Applicant resigned from the civil service of Cross River State since April 2024.
  15. The Applicant is currently the Managing Director of Cross River Smart City Networks Limited (the “Company”), a private company limited by shares incorporated with the Corporate Affairs Commission.
  16. Despite the resignation of the Applicant from the Cross River State civil service, the 4th – 8th Respondents are harassing the Applicant using the 1st – 3rd Respondents.
  17. As the managing Director of the Company, the Applicant is not answerable to the 5th – 8th Respondents.
  18. The Applicant is answerable only to the company, and not anyone else.
  19. If the 4th to 8th Respondents have any grievance against the company, they are expected to channel it directly to the company, not the Applicant’s person.
  20. Despite the knowledge that the background facts bother on labour/employment issues and purely civil, the 1st - 3rd Respondents have allowed themselves to be used by the 4th – 8th Respondents to harass and intimidate the Applicant.
  21. The 8th Respondent instigated the applicant’s detention baselessly from 28th to 30th of August, 2024.
  22. The 1st to 3rd Respondents have no powers under the law to “investigate” civil claims.
  23. Sections 34, 35, 37 and 41 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN 1999) and Articles 6, 12 and 18 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act Cap A9,LFN 2004, guarantee the Applicant rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty, privacy, and freedom of movement.
  24. Unless the Court restrains them, the Respondents will continue to harass and even detain the Applicant in violation of his fundamental rights aforesaid.
  25. The resort to the 1st – 3rd Respondents by the 4th – 8th Respondents is malicious and totally baseless.
  26. The application is supported by a 34 paragraphs affidavit sworn to by the applicant himself. A further and better affidavit of 61 paragraphs was sworn to and filed on 16th April 2026 in response to the counter affidavit of 4th to 8th Respondents.
  27. A written address was filed along with the originating motion and another written address reply on points of law was filed along with the further and better affidavit.
  28. F. Baba Isa, Esq; counsel for the applicant in arguing in support of the originating motion informed the court that he is relying on the affidavit in support, further and better affidavit as well as the exhibits attached to the said affiidavits. Counsel also adopted the written address filed together with the originating motion and the reply on points of law as his argument.
  29. A resume of the facts of the claimant’s case as can be gathered from the affidavits evidence are that, the applicant was the Managing Director of Cross River State Smart City Networks Limited and former Director in the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, now being headed by the 8th respondent. Sometime in April, 2024, the applicant resigned from his position as Director in the Ministry of Cross River State, but continues to occupy his position as Managing Director of Smart City Networks Limited.
  30. The grouse of the applicant is that despite having resigned his position in the civil service, the 8th respondent kept festering him to give him money. At one time the clamant offered to help the 8th respondent with his personal cash and transferred the sum of N700,000.00 (Seven Hundred Thousand Naira) with promise to send more if he had more funds later that day. The applicant could not send more as promised because he fell ill, as a result of which he was hospitalized and was advised by doctor to reduced stressors and his phone was one of the stressors. The applicant stated that was the beginning of his witch-hunt, as he started hearing comments ascribed to 8th respondent stating that claimant did not resign; he will not accept resignation, he will show Julius he has governor’s ears, Julius is making money from Smart City Networks Limited and refusing to remit to the state. The claimant stated further that, he thought it was a joke until when he saw a text from 8th respondent accusing him of vandalism and carting away of cables an incident that was traced to the Ministry’s Task Force in the first quarter.
  31. On 28th August, 2024, the claimant told by 8th respondent that he has submitted petition against the claimant to the Police since he was around they should go to the police. They proceeded to diamond hill Police station where applicant was questioned. Thereafter, they went to his house and conducted search, he was subsequently detained for two days from 28th August, 2024 to 30th august 2024. The applicant stated that he no longer sleeps due to harassment and threats he was being subjected to by the Respondents. As the 8th respondent has vowed to deal with the applicant and is using 1st – 3rd respondents to harass the applicant.
  32. In the further affidavit the claimant insisted that he is not an employee of the 4th respondent, as he had retired successfully and currently on pension. There was also no communication from 8th respondent or Ministry that his retirement was not approved. The applicant has also been receiving his pension.
  33. In the written address a single issue was formulated for resolution, to wit:-

Whether this Honourable Court should grant the reliefs sought by the applicant by granting the application’

  1. Counsel started argument by submitting that in an Application of this nature, all that the Applicant need to show is that he has guaranteed fundamental human rights and the said rights have been violated, are being violated or under a threat of violation by the Respondents, as provided by section 46 (1) & (2) in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Counsel in support of his contention placed reliance on the case of Fajemilokuj Vs. C.B. Nig. Ltd (2009) 5 NWLR Part 1135.
  2. Counsel submitted that by sections 34, 35, 37 and 41 of the CFRN, the Applicant has guaranteed fundamental rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty, privacy, and freedom of movement and in case of violation of the said rights, the Applicant, by Section 46(2) of the same CFRN is entitled to an order of injunction restraining the Respondents from violating the fundamental rights,
  3. Counsel further submitted that by the Affidavit setting out the facts upon which the application is brought and the statement in support, the Applicant has established the violations and imminent further violation of these rights.
  4. Counsel submitted that the Applicant was arrested by the 3rd Respondent and detained from 28th  to 30th of August 2024. It was held in IGP & Anor v. Agbinone & Ors (2019) LPELR-46431(CA) that  ‘detention no matter how short can still qualify as a breach of fundamental right, as long as such detention is adjudged unlawful “
  5. According to counsel the Applicant was being harassed for a matter that is purely civil, labour/employment related and internal affairs of a private company limited by shares contrary to the decisions of courts that when a report is made to the Police and it is obvious that it is purely a civil matter, whether the complainant makes a cursory complaint of threat of death just to ensure the involvement of the Police, it is the duty of the Police to make preliminary investigations.   “The writing or presenting of a petition against another does not by itself obviate the requirement and the need for the arresting officer to convince himself that there is a basis to suspect that an offence has been committed or about to be committed,”  on this counsel relied on the case of IGP & Anor V. Agbinone & Ors (supra).
  6. The court warned that the police must not allow itself to be used like this. Time and money, taxpayers’ money will then be expended in helping business men and government officials to settle scores instead of the police devoting itself to investigating cases of real and present danger. It was further argued that this case being a civil matter is dispute is outside the powers of the police and other security agencies. On this section 32(2) of Police Act and section 8(2) of Administration of Criminal Justice Act, 2015, were relied on.
  7. Counsel queried, one then wonders why the 1st to 3rd Respondents are insisting on taking up a purely civil matter even when obviously they lack the power to do so. The law is also settled that public institutions such as the 1st to 3rd Respondents vested with statutory power must take care not to exceed or abuse their powers. They must keep within the limits of the authority committed to them. They must act reasonably.
  8. It was submitted that where a person,   body or authority claims to have acted pursuant to power granted by a statute  such person, body or authority must justify the act, if challenged,  by showing that the statute applied in the circumstances and that he or it was empowered to act under it. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of Amasike v Registrar-General, CAC & Anor (2010) LPELR-456(SC) @ 106. The same position was also emphasized in Planning & Development Board Ministry of Land and Survey, Borno State & Anor v. Bams Investment (Nig) Ltd (2017) LPELR-43290(CA).
  9. Counsel submitted that Appellate Courts have deprecated, several times, the tendency of persons, resorting to the Police to harass citizens over civil disputes and the willingness of the Police to accept to do so, using their coercive powers, wrongly, to violate the fundamental rights of the citizens. In support of the submission reliance was placed on the case of Ibiyeye & Anor vs, Gold &Ors. (2012) ALL FWLR (Pt. 659) 1074 and the case of Abah vs. UBN Plc. & Ors (2015) LPELR-24158 (CA) Mbaba, JCA at pages 97-99 heldl:

“We have stated, repeatedly, that the police (or any Law Enforcement Agency, for that matter, including the Economic and Financial Crimes Commissions (EFCC) is not allowed to dabble into enforcement of civil contracts and agreements, or to engage in recovery of debts, under the pretext of doing lawful duties.”

  1. In Anogwie & Ors v, Odom & Ors (2016) LPELR-40214(CA) it was held thus:

“…the invitation of the police to intervene in a matter that is purely civil in nature cannot be justified under any circumstances. The duties of the Police as provided under Section 4 of the POLICE ACT, Cap 359 LFN 1990 does not include the settlement of civil disputes or the collection of debts or enforcement of civil agreements between parties. See the case of MCIARENCE vs., JENNINGS (2003) 3 NWLR (PT.808) 470. See also the case of AFRIBANK NIG. PLC vs. ONYIMA (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt,858) 654,the mere fact that the police are usually invited into just about every matter under the sun is no justification to get the police involved in the resolution of civil disputes. The police has recently held itself out as a responsible law enforcement organization should be seen to live up to its billings in quickly to turning down matters not statutorily assigned to it so as to avoid embarrassments of matters of this nature, There are usually dire consequences at every turn of event, in the event of things of this nature happening.”

  1. Counsel urged the court to hold that the involvement of the 1st – 3rd Respondents in the current matter involving civil dispute is an illegality.
  2. It is the submission of counsel that liability for breach of fundamental rights arising from dabbling into civil matters is borne by both the police and the person who invites them. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of Ogbonna vs Ogbonna (2014) LPELR-22308 CA (2014) 23 WRN 48.
  3. Reliance was also placed on the case of Skye Bank v Njoku & Ors (2016) LPELR-40447(CA). Counsel urged the court to hold all the Respondents liable for the breach of the Applicant’s rights.
  4. In concluding his submission counsel argued that by the powers of the Court under section 46 of the constitution of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended)  and the enforcement procedure rules, 2009, and in view of the strength of the Applicant’s Affidavit setting out the facts upon which the application is brought (in Support) and the statement in support, the Applicant has placed convincing legal reasons that would necessitate the invocation of the powers of this Court to grant the Order of enforcing the Applicant’s fundamental rights to dignity of human person, personal liberty, privacy, and freedom of movement as prayed by the Applicant’s in this Application, against the Respondents.
  5. In reaction to the originating motion, the 4th to 8th respondents filed a Counter Affidavit of 35 paragraphs. The said counter affidavit was accompanied by a written address in support of the said Counter Affidavit and against the Applicant’s processes.
  6. The counter affidavit was sworn in by the 8th respondent himself, wherein he stated that the applicant is an employee of the 4th respondent whose retirement status with the 4th respondent has not been determined, the applicant’s application for voluntary retirement having been declined. There have been several communications with the applicant after an attempt to retire but the applicant maintained that he has retired despite the non approval of his retirement. 
  7. The government of Cross River State commenced a project known as Smart City Project whose scope was to provide internet facilities to the Calabar Metropolis, for commercial purpose and for government use. Consequently, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) was established to drive the Smart City Project. The SPV was incorporated as Cross River Smart City Networks Ltd, after which the applicant in this case was transferred from his place of primary assignment CRGI and posted to the information and Technology (ICT) Unit of the Smart City Project domiciled in the Cross River State Ministry of Information Communication and Technology (ICT) now known as Ministry of Science Technology and Innovation, where the 8th respondent is commissioner. It was based on the applicant’s status with 4th respondent that he was posted to head the Smart City Project.
  8. Upon assumption of office by the 8th respondents and upon going through the records presented to him by the applicant, he observed that there was no financial record of the operations of the SPV from its inception till date. When applicant was invited for explanation on the financial component of the project as there was none existing in the document he presented, he claimed that there was no financial component and denied all forms of commercialization of the project. Udenyi Omaji, Esq; Deputy Director, Ministry of Justice, Calabar, in arguing in opposition informed the court that the 4th to 8th respondents have filed a 35 paragraphs counter affidavit sworn to by the 8th respondent. Counsel relied on the averments in the counter affidavit, and adopted written address filed along with the counter affidavit as his argument.
  9. In the written address a single issue was formulated for determination, to wit:

Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case the fundamental rights of the Applicant can be said to had been breached by the 4th – 8th Respondents, to entitle the Applicant to any of the reliefs sought against the 4th – 8th or indeed any. According to counsel, it is on record that an agreement was entered into between the SPV and Macro and Small enterprises (MSE) delivery platform and 10% implementation amount was to be paid to SPV for the services rendered. The applicant instead of making explanations the applicant claimed he was not answerable to the 8th respondent who supervises the Smart City project. The applicant has not also held any statutory meetings mandatorily required by the companies and Allied Matters Act, to be held by a company, wherein issues raised could have been resolved. The applicant rather runs affairs of the SPV like a sole proprietor of a private enterprise or a business name.

  1. In June, 2024, there was report of vandalism of fiber and the vandalization was said to had been carried out by the applicant. Consequently, a petition was written to the police where all the issues involved were catalogued for investigation. The present suit is ploy to stop investigation of the vandalization and malicious destruction of state infrastructure, which are not purely civil matters as claimed but in the realm of allegation of crime hence petition to the police. The 8th respondent merely reported to the police.
  2. Udenyi Omaji, Esq; Deputy Director, in the chambers of the attorney General of Cross River State representing the 4th to 8th respondents relied on the 35 paragraphs counter affidavit sworn to by the 8th respondents and the exhibits attached therein. Counsel also adopted the written address filed along with the counter affidavit as his argument. In the written address a single issue was submitted for resolution to wit:-

Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case the fundamental rights of the applicant can be said to have been breached by the 4th to 8th respondents, to entitle the applicant to any of the reliefs sought against the 4th to 8th or indeed any of the respondents?

  1. In arguing the sole issue the learned Deputy Director submitted that the facts and circumstances of this case catalogued in the counter of the 4th – 8th Respondents demonstrate that there was in existence, grounds for the 8th Respondent’s petition to the Police, via Exhibit MOJ 6 which speaks for itself. Allegations of vandalization, malicious destruction of State Infrastructure, that all point directly to the Applicant. As a law abiding and responsible citizen, after attempts to resolve the dispute amicably, failed, the 8th Respondent on behalf of the 4th – 8th Respondents initiated exhibit MOJ 6, the petition to the Police. Counsel contended that the 8th respondent merely followed the Law in the step and approach adopted.
  2. The Learned Deputy Director continued his submission that the law is settled, that every citizen of Nigeria has a civic duty to report the commission of a crime or someone suspected to have committed a crime to the police or any other law enforcement agency. Compliance with this civic duty cannot in anyway be construed as a Fundamental Right breach. The reporting citizen cannot in anyway be held responsible for the outcome of that report which is entirely the business of the police or law enforcement agency that received and acted upon that report. This position of the law has been stated and reiterated in a plethora of cases and was adopted by the Supreme Court in FAJEMIROKUN v CBN LTD (2009) LPELR-1231(SC), where the court held thus:

“It is the duty of citizens of this country to report cases of commissions of crime to the police for their investigation and what happens after such report is entirely the responsibility of the police. The citizens cannot be held liable for doing their civic duty unless it is shown that it is done mala fide”.

  1. The Court of Appeal reiterated this position in ONAH v OKENWA (2010) 7 NWLR (P.1194) 512 at 517 as follows:

“It is the right of the party as citizen to lay complaint to the Police after he was assaulted. Thereafter, it is a matter for the Police to decide what action they should take on the report or complaint. G’BA10R V OGUNBUREGUI (1961) I ALL NLR, FCMB V ETTE (2008) 22 WNR I referred to.”

  1. Counsel refers to FAWENHIMI V. IGP (2002) 1 NWLR (PT. 167) 606 at 645 the Supreme Court clarified the duty of the police to investigate allegations of crimes against any citizen and said: ’5ection 214 (1) of the 1999 Constitution recognizes one police force for Nigerian and the said police is given a duty under section 4 of the police Act, cap. 359. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990, to:
  2. Prevent crime;
  3. Detect crime;
  4. Apprehend offenders;
  5. Preserve law and order;
  6. Protect life and property and 
  7. Enforce all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged.
  8. The police duty is an important statutory duty which the police owe to the generality of Nigerians and all other persons lawfully living within Nigeria. It follows; therefore. That in their duty to detect crime, the police should normally investigate allegation of crime committed by any person. See BASSEY V AFIA (2009) LPELR-3931(CA), (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt.531) 1477 at 1500-1501, Such discharge of statutory duty is not a breach of fundamental right, See JIMOH v. JIMOH & ORS (2018) LPELR-43793(CA) Pp, 30-32, Paras, B-C.
  9. In the instant case,  upon discovery of the facts catalogued in the 4th – 8th Respondent’s Counter Affidavit above, particularly, the Applicant’s refusal to provide satisfactory explanations on the financial component of the Smart City project; the illegal use of the State’s Fiber Ducts to deploy internet network to the University of Calabar and other businesses without remittance of profits to the State; the Applicant’s attempt to evade the issues by putting up a letter of resignation rather than provide answers to the questions raised, as well as the Applicant’s continuous criminal activities of malicious destruction and vandalization of State Infrastructure and on the project despite the initial questioning by the 8th Respondent, the 8th Respondent in the exercise of his civil rights and obligations as well as his duty to report the commission of a crime, petition the Applicant to the Commissioner of Police, Cross River State Police Command wherein the above issues were catalogued, for investigation as shown in Exhibit MOJ 6.
  10. Counsel submitted that based on the above premise it cannot be argued by any stretch of the imagination that the 4th – 8th Respondents have breached any of the Applicant’s Fundamental Rights as alleged. It is only when the petition was made mala fide that such argument can be countenanced.
  11. Counsel insisted that exhibit MOJ 6, has resolved any questions about bad faith. The Applicant definitely has a case to answer. What is more? The Applicant has not shown anywhere in his processes that the 4th to 8th Respondents acted mala fide when the 8th Respondent petitioned the Applicant’s conduct to the 3rd Respondent.
  12. Counsel argued that the applicant’s suit is a smoke screen calculated to prevent the ongoing investigation that is strictly targeted at protecting the 4th Respondent’s infrastructure and resources.
  13. Counsel further submitted that the rights specified under sections 34, 35, 31 and 41 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) are not blanket or without restrictions. The law allows the restriction of a citizen’s right to personal liberty for the purpose of questioning  or  upon   reasonable  suspicion  that an offence  has   been committed or to such extent as may be reasonably necessary to prevent the committal of an offence. To support this submission counsel placed reliance on the cases of JIM- JAJA v COP (2011) ‘Z NWLR (PT,1231) PAGE 375 AT PAGE 319; ISHENO V. 1ULIUS BERGER (2008) ALL FWLR (PT. 415) 1632, on restriction of liberty.
  14. The Learned Deputy Director, submitted that, it is for people like the Applicant that section 35 (i) (c) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as altered) was enacted.
  15. It is submission of counsel that in an application for the enforcement of fundamental human rights, particularly where an arrest is alleged as in the instant case, the Applicant must prove to the smallest details that the arrest and detention were unlawful and that the laid down procedure was not followed by the person effecting the arrest and detention. It is not a matter for speculation. In support of this contention counsel relied on the case of EZEADUKWA V. MADUKA (1997) 8 NWLR (Pt,578) 635 and OANDO PLC v FARMAT7C BIOLAS WEST AFRICA LTD & ANOR (2018) LPELR-45564 (CA).
  16. According to counsel, in the instant case the Applicant has not shown that his arrest or detention was unlawful or that the procedure for arrest and detention was not followed. All that the Applicant is doing is desperately attempting to evade investigation at all cost including the present attempt to use the courts as a shield, by seeking the instant orders.
  17. Counsel also submitted that for the Applicant and indeed any person to go to Court to be shielded against Criminal investigation and prosecution is an interference with the Constitutional and statutory powers of Law Officers to control criminal investigation. The law is trite that no court of law can issue a judicial fiat or make any order or entertain any proceedings geared towards preventing the law enforcement agencies from the exercise of any of their statutory powers. On this submission reliance was placed on the cases of AG ANAMBRA STATE V. UBA (2005) 15 NWLR (PT.947) 44 at 61; KALU Vi FRN (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt. 201) 479; ATTORNEY GENERAL ANAMBRA STATE v; CHIEF CHRIS UBA (2005) 15 NWLR (PT 947) 44; DOSOMAH v, COMMLSSIONER OF POLICE EDO STATE (2014) LPELR-24497 (CA), OGUEJIOFOR & ORS. V, IBEASUCHI (2017) LPELR-43590 (CA) Pp.30-31, Paras. F-E and HASSAN v; /\l EFCC (2014) 1 NWLR (Pt, 1389) 607.
  18. Counsel further submitted that exhibit MOJ 6 discloses prima facie evidence of a bona fide cause to investigate the Applicant’s activities in the Cross River State Government’s Smart City Project. The exhibit has provided details of the criminality of the Applicant’s actions that was reported to the Police.  
  19. The Learned Deputy Director, posited that any claim that fundamental rights have been breached in the instant case, will be expanding the scope of fundamental right proceedings too far. Counsel also asked, can it be said that because the Applicant like all Nigerians have such rights, the Applicant cannot be invited by the Police for questioning when a petition is made against him or when it is suspected that he has committed a crime? This is preposterous and certainly not what the law intends. The very same Constitution which provides for the protection of the Applicant’s fundamental right to liberty and freedom of movement, also limits the enjoyment of those rights under the circumstances shown in section 35(l) (c) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended. To buttress being made counsel cited and relied on the case of ADEBOYE & ORS v SAHEETO INTERNATIONAL LTD & ORS (2019) LPELR-46752(CA) Pp, 15-17.
  20. It is finally submitted that all the Applicant’s arguments and all the authorities cited to the effect that the 1st to 3rd Respondents have no business  with civil transactions are not applicable in the instant case and as such this court is urged to discountenance them all. A matter is not automatically civil because the acts in dispute were committed in the course of a subsisting employment. 1f the acts are criminal in nature. The hands of the Police whose duty it is to investigate crimes, cannot be tied, so submitted by counsel.
  21. Counsel also urged this court to discountenance every argument that the Applicant is not answerable to the Cross River State Government or that the SPV is a private company Limited by shares, no private company is ever named after a State Government, Section 852 (1) (b) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, 2020 (CAMA) is very clear on this restriction. The said provision of CAMA is to the effect that a company shall not be registered with a name that “contains the name of a State, Local Government or any Government Institution or implies government ownership, patronage or control; unless the consent of the appropriate authority is obtained.
  22. The Applicant has brought nothing before this court to show that he sought and obtained the consent of the State to incorporate a private company in the name of Cross River State, the reason the applicant has brought nothing is because, none exists. The Applicant, an employee of Cross River State Government, is only trying to be smart by half, and his audacity in dragging his employers up and down in different courts in a desperate attempt to evade questioning, is shocking to say the least. The only nexus between the Applicant and Cross River Smart City Networks Ltd., is the Applicant’s employee status with the 4th Respondent, as borne out by the Applicant’s Appointment as a Director in the Cross River State Geographic Information Agency (CRGIA) and his subsequent posting from CRGIA to the ICT unit of the Cross River State Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation where the Smart City Project and the SPV are domiciled. See Exhibits MOJ 2 and 3. See also the depositions in the  4th – 8th Respondents Counter Affidavit. Cross River Smart City Netvvorks Ltd., is thus not a random company owned by random shareholders for random purposes but is a government regulated SPV established to drive the ’State’s Smart City Project.
  23. The Applicant is further answerable to the 4th Respondent because his employee status with the 4th respondent has not yet been determined. Having not cleared himself in the ongoing investigation, his resignation was not approved, several official communications have been directed to the Applicant after the Said refusal of his application for voluntary retirement, but the Applicant has continued to maintain that he has retired. See Exhibits MOJ 1B and MOJ 1C.
  24. The Applicant’s attempt to voluntarily retire is apart from being to evade investigations but also to evade any recommendation for a dismissal which is a probable outcome if he goes through any disciplinary process and is found guilty, under what circumstance does a civil servant, drag his employer to court and insist that he cannot answer questions regarding his job description because his job description is the management of a State related Company? None whatsoever. 
  25. For all the reasons given above, the Learned deputy Director, urged the court to dismiss the Applicant’s claims.
  26. On the Applicant’s more specific reliefs, it is submitted that reliefs 1 to 4 are declaratory in nature. The law is trite that for a declaratory relief to be granted by the court the person claiming the relief must establish his entitlement to the relief based on the strength of his case and not on the weakness if any, of the case of the Defendants. On this submission reliance was placed on the cases of A. G. RIVERS STATE V A. G. BAYELSA STATE & ANOR.(2012) LPELR-9336(SC), NYESOM v PETERSIDE (2016) LPELR-‘40036 (SC) p. 82, PARAS, B-D.
  27. It is also the submission of counsel that in civil cases, the burden of proof lies on the party whose case would fail if no evidence was adduced on either side. Counsel cited and relied on section 132 of the Evidence Act 2011; and cases of MANNI v: SHANONO (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt, 969) 132 @  156-151 H.1, ARCHIBONG v. ITA (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt. 858) 590 @ 646-641  in support of this contention.
  28. On relief 5, counsel submitted that it is not grantable in law as the court cannot be used as a tool to interfere with legitimate police investigation. Relief 6 on the other hand is unwarranted, a right to same having not been established,  The Applicant is also not entitled to an injunction of any appellation, whether perpetual or not. Perpetual injunction like any other species of injunction is only granted to support and protect; a legal interest or right. The court has no power to grant an injunction where the applicant has not established a cognizable legal right. In support of this argument reliance was placed on the cases of COMMISSIONER FOR WORKS BENUE STATE V. DEVCON LTD. (1988) 3 NWLR (PT. 83)407; AKAPO V. HAKEEM HABEEB (1992) NWLR (Pt.247) 266 AT 289.
  29. Counsel continued his submission that relief 7, is also not grantable as damages are not awarded as a matter of course, damages are rather granted to put the Applicant in the position where the! Applicant would have been, but for the conduct of the Respondents. The law on this is settled. The Applicant has not suffered any loss or detriment, by virtue of any actions of the Respondents that would warrant the award of the requested Five Billion Naira or any other sum at all.
  30. For relief 8, counsel submitted that it has been held by the courts to be unconscionable; the Applicant cannot place the burden of instituting a frivolous suit or pass on the burden of payment of his solicitor’s fees to the Respondents. To support this proposition counsel relied on the case of GUINESS NIG PLC V, EMMANUEL NWOKE (2000) 15 NWLR (PT,689) P,135, per IBIYEYE J.C.A. counsel also argued that the Supreme Court has made it clear that solicitors fees cannot be recovered whether as general or other damages against a defendant, in CHRISTOPHER NWANJI V. COASTAL SERVICS (NIG,) LTD (2004) LPELR -2106 (SC), where the grant of claim for solicitor’s fees by the lower court was held to be untenable.
  31. Counsel submitted further that in the instant case, although relief 8 has not been couched as a type of damages, the principle is the same: The cost of litigation is not to be passed to the Respondent. Counsel urged this honourable court to find and so hold.
  32. It is finally submitted that, the law remains that a relief claimed must be proven before the court can grant it, no matter how strongly the court is persuaded to do so. To support his contention  counsel relied on the case of ODINKEMERE V. IMPRESIT BAKALORI (NIG) LTD. (1995) 8 NWLR (PT,411) 52. T
  33. counsel insisted that the Applicant has failed to establish entitlement to any of the reliefs sought, by credible evidence, this honourable court is urged to dismiss the Applicant’s suit with cost of N500,000,000.00 (Five-Hundred Million Naira) only, in favour of the 4th – 8th Respondents, as the instant suit is a nuisance, a waste of precious judicial time and waste of Respondent’s time particularly, time that would have be dissipated in representing the State in actual or real claims.  The instant suit is gold digging and unmeritorious, wanting in bona fide and this Honourable court is urged to dismiss same.
  34. In concluding his submission counsel urged the court to resolve the single issue for determination in favour of the 4th – 8th Respondent’s and against the Applicant and also dismiss this suit with substantive cost of N500,000,000.00 (Five-Hundred Million Naira), for lacking in merit and wanting in bona fide.
  35. The applicant in reaction to the counter affidavit and counter affidavit filed a further and better affidavit and reply on points of law as pointed out earlier counsel for the applicant relied on the further affidavit and adopted the reply on points of law as his argument.
  36. On 28/4/2026, in oral adumbration in reply to submission of counsel for the applicant respecting the 61 paragraphs further and affidavit and reply on points of law, counsel for the 4th to 8th respondents objected to the admissibility of some the exhibits on the ground that they are public documents and only certified true copies are admissible in law and not photocopies. 
  37. On exhibit AJE 8 and AJE 15, counsel submitted there is no evidence that they were submitted to the 8th respondents but to Commission.
  38. On exhibit AJE 6 & BC paragraphs 20 & 23, is claim that claimant has been extorted but, no evidence of   demand and what the monies were meant for were not stated. 
  39. On exhibit AJE 7B, of paragraph 21, of the further affidavit no evidence it was received by 8th respondent.
  40. Vide paragraph 28 of further affidavit and exhibit AJE8, is not response to petition as demanded by 8th respondent.
  41. On exhibit AJE 17 paragraph 39, it is a document made on 11/3/2021, being report send to end SARS this report was not sent to 8th respondent.
  42. It was submission of Learned Deputy Director, that the crux of the claimant’s case has nothing to do with pension and retirement. The claim cannot be determined in this case as it cannot be anchored on any reliefs.
  43. On affidavit in support in support, counsel drew the attention of the court to signature on oath of verifying affidavit made in 20/10/2025 as well as signature of same applicant of 16/4/2026. The signatures are different by same applicant. For authentic signature of applicant court refers to exhibit AJE3 and exhibit of verifying affidavit. According to counsel non-of the document can be relied on  as they will not have any evidential value. Counsel urged court to dismiss the applicant’s case.
  44. Counsel for the applicant in response to argument of the Learned Deputy director, refers to case law and submitted there is nothing wrong in having two signatures. The cases cited and relied on are; Odeyson & Anor v Ogunsanya & Ors (2018) LPELR-5064(CA) Amubi v Ezewu & Ors (2025) LPELR-82651(CA); British America Tobacco Nig. Ltd v Int’l Tobacco Plc (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt.1339) 293 @ 420 – 421; Arije v Arije & Ors (2018) LPELR-44193(SC).

COURT’S DECISION:

  1. I have considered the originating motion commencing this suit, the counter affidavit filed by counsel for the 4th to 8th respondents, the further and better affidavit, the written addresses filed along with the processes filed by the parties as well as having attentively listened to oral submissions of counsel for the parties in adumbration of the respective position of their clients.
  2. The 1st to 3rd respondent as well as the 9th respondent did not deem it fit to enter appearances or filed counter affidavit in opposition to the originating motion. This is despite having been served.
  3. The oral submission of counsel for the 4th to 8th respondents has raised a very fundamental issue that need to be determined before dealing with the originating motion. 
  4. On 28/4/2026, when the originating motion was argued by counsel for the parties, the Learned Deputy Director, appearing for the 4th to 8th respondents in reply to the further affidavit and reply on points of law by the applicant, has made some far-reaching argument bordering on admissibility of exhibits attached to the further affidavit, the authenticity of signatures on the affidavits of the applicant. The Learned Deputy Director has also argued that the crux of the claimant’s case has nothing to do with pension and retirement. The claim of the applicant cannot be determined in this case as it cannot be anchored on any reliefs.
  5. The reply by counsel for the applicant in response to the oral submission of counsel for the 4th to 8th respondent, centers on the argument on authenticity of signatures on the affidavits of the applicant, counsel for the applicant insisted while relying on case law that there is nothing wrong in a party having two signatures, consequently, counsel urged the court to discountenance submission of counsel for the 4th to 8th defendants on authenticity of signatures.
  6. However, there is no reply by counsel for the applicant on the submission to the effect that the applicant’s case has nothing to do with pension and retirement and that the claim of the applicant cannot be determined in this suit. This submission to my mind clearly challenged the competence of the case as it is presently constituted. The underpinning challenge being thrown up by submission of counsel for the 4th to 8th respondents is that this court does not have the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is presently constituted. Even if I am wrong in my conclusion on the submission of counsel for the 4th to 8th respondents, the law has adequately endowed and quipped this court with the power to determine issue of jurisdiction suo motu, though, not  raised by any of the parties.
  7. After careful perusal of originating motion and all the processes filed by the parties as well as oral submissions of counsel what agitate my mind is ‘whether the applicant’s case as it is presently constituted is properly before the court. In other words, the fundamental question that need probing first is whether this court has the requisite jurisdiction to hear and determine this suit.
  8. The term jurisdiction is varied and ubiquitous, thus why it has been variously described as the livewire of any case, the authority of a court to determine any dispute tabled before it by contending parties. Hence, the law compels a court to treat first an issue of jurisdiction where it is raised in any proceeding or suo motu by the court. In essence, jurisdiction denotes a court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree. See R.S.H.A. v. Govt., Rivers State (2025) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1990) 591. The issue of jurisdiction is very vital and fundamental in Nigerian jurisprudence and a judgment or an order of court given where such a court lacks jurisdiction is a nullity. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; U.B.A. Plc v. Trident Consulting Ltd. (2023) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1903) 95.
  9. One important realization is that the jurisdiction of a court is not a matter of conjecture or convenience; it is a strict question of law that must be properly established. The question of jurisdiction is never a mere technicality. It is a substantive issue that strikes at the core of adjudication. Thus, the jurisdiction of a court being a hard matter of law it can only be determined in the light of the enabling statute or constitutional provisions conferring jurisdiction on the court in question. In any event, a court of law cannot add to or subtract from the provisions of a statute or constitution. As a matter of law, a court must blindly follow and apply the jurisdictional limits and limitations as contained or provided in a statute or constitution. In that and other situations, the constitution or statute is the master and all that a court of law can do is to interpret the provisions of the constitution or a statute to obtain or achieve the clear intentions of the lawmaker. A court cannot do more than that. See Anibi v. Shotimehin (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 282) 461; Elelu-Habeeb v. A.-G., Fed. (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1318) 423; Madumere v. Okwara (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1368) 303; Opara v. Amadi (2013) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1369) 512; Standard Alliance Ins. Co. Ltd. v. F.C.M.B. Ltd. (2025) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1998) 133.
  10. In order to establish that a court has jurisdiction over a matter, it must be shown that it is properly constituted with respect to the (a) number and qualification of its members; the subject matter of the action is within its (b) jurisdiction; (c) the action was initiated by due process; and any condition precedent to the exercise of its (d) jurisdiction has been fulfilled. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; A.-G., Lagos State v. Eko Hotels Ltd. (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt.1619) 518; Leedo Presidential Motel Ltd v. Bank of the North Ltd. (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 570) 353; Afribank (Nig.) Plc v. C.B.N. (2025) 13 NWLR (Pt. 2002) 255.
  11. Before, proceeding with determination of jurisdiction of this court to hear and determine this suit, if it is taken that none of the parties has raised the issue of jurisdiction of this court, the well settled principle of law is that generally, no court possesses the power to raise an issue suo motu and thereafter proceed to determine it without first inviting learned counsel for the parties to address it on the issue as that would amount to denial of fair hearing. However, there are circumstances recognized by our law in which a court can effectively raise an issue suo motu and determine the same without hearing the parties, particularly if the issue borders on the jurisdiction of court and on law, as in this case, the court can take judicial notice of the same. See Omokuwajo v. FRN (2013) 9 NWLR (Pt.1359) 300; Aderibigbe v. Abidoye (2009) 10 NWLR (Pt.1150) 592; Effiom v. C.R.S.I.E.C. (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt.1213) 106; Gbagbarigha v. Toruemi (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt.1350) 289; INEC v. Ogbadibo LG (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt.1498) 167; Gwede v. INEC (2014) 18 NWLR (Pt.1438) 56; Egbuchu v. C.C.M.B. Plc (2016) 8 NWLR (Pt.1513) 192; Odedo v. Oguebego (2015) 13 NWLR (Pt.1476) 229; Mainstreet Bank Ltd. v. Binna (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt.1526) 316; Mabamije v. Otto (2016) 13 NWLR (Pt.1529) 171; C.D.O., Tudun-Maliki Quarters v. Mohammed (2015) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1465) 585; S.C.C. Ltd v. Kingston (2016) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1501) 172.
  12. In situations relating to the jurisdictional competence of court to entertain a matter, it has been an established principle of law that a court can suo motu raise the issue of jurisdiction and deliberate on it without first calling on counsel to the parties to address it on that. The rationale behind this principle is routed in the fact that a   court must have jurisdiction over any proceedings before it, otherwise it labours in vain and all it does amounts to a nullity. In other words, the issue of jurisdiction is very paramount and crucial. It can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal before the Supreme Court. As a result, where at any stage sufficient facts or materials are available to raise the issue of jurisdiction, or it has become apparent to any party to the action that it can be canvassed, there is no reason why there should be any delay in raising it. Furthermore, the issue of jurisdiction can be raised in any form by any of the parties or suo motu by the court. See Shelim v. Gobang (2017) 1 NWLR (Pt.1546) 210; Elabanjo v. Dawodu(2006) 15 NWLR (Pt.1001) 76; Jeric Nigeria Ltd. v. UBN Plc (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt.691) 447; Labour Party v. INEC (2009) 6 NWLR (Pt.1137) 315; APGA v. Anyanwu (2014) 7 NWLR (Pt.1407) 541; NDIC v. C.B.N. (2002) 7NWLR (Pt.766) 271.
  13. Having establish the vires of this court to embark on the voyage of determining whether the present suit is competently before the court, I shall proceed to examine the issue of jurisdiction in respect of the present suit.
  14. As pointed out earlier in this judgment a court of law is said to have and possess the requisite jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate over a cause or matter when: it is properly constituted as to the number (a) and qualifications of its members; and any condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction has been fulfilled or satisfied; (b) and the subject matter of and parties to the (c) action are within its jurisdiction; and the cause or matter has been brought to the court by due processes of the law as provided for in the Constitution or the (d) relevant statute. In essence, a court is seized of requisite jurisdiction where the subject matter and parties to the action are within its jurisdiction. In a civil matter, what determines the jurisdiction of the court is the claim of the claimant. In a case to be decided on affidavit evidence, like in this case, what the court considers is the claimant’s affidavit in support together with the reliefs being sought. See SCC (Nig.) Ltd. v. George (2024) 18 NWLR (Pt.1971) 421; SCC (Nig.) Ltd. v. Joseph (2026) 1 NWLR (Pt.2025) 227; ELEGBE & ANOR V. HP INTL SCHOOLS LTD & ORS (2026) LPELR-83245(SC).
  15. When court is to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain a matter,  the court is being called upon to look the law vis-à-vis the pleadings, in this case, the affidavit evidence which stands for the pleadings and the reliefs sought to see if the dispute submitted for resolution comes within the ambit of its jurisdiction as provided for by the constitution or statute establishing it as the case may be.
  16. In the instant case, the reliefs sought by the applicant and the facts deposed to in the affidavits clearly shows that the applicant is contesting the validity of his arrest and detention by the police from 28th to 30th August, 2024, which he asserted was at the prompting of the 8th respondent’s petition to the police. The affidavit evidence has also disclosed that the claimant has resigned his appointment with the respondents consequently, they have no power over him or questioned him or instigate the police to arrest and detained him under the pretext of investigation of vandalism which was linked to the Ministry. Vide this originating motion, the applicant is alleging violation of his fundamental rights as enshrined in chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, in that he was illegally arrested, detained, harassed and his right to dignity of human person violated, because he was unable to meet with the demand for money by the 8th respondent, when the applicant is no longer in service.
  17. The original jurisdiction of a court in fundamental rights proceedings is donated by section 46 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). By virtue of section 46(1) and (2), any person who alleges that any of the provisions of Chapter IV has been, is being or likely to be contravened in any state in relation to him may apply to a High Court in the State for redress. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, a High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made to it in pursuance of the provisions of the section and may make such orders, issue such writ and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement within that State of any right to which the person who makes the application may be entitled under the Chapter. The provisions of section 46(1) and of the Constitution grant prospective or actual victims of fundamental rights abuse unfettered access to a High Court for redress. The High Court in this context means State High Court, the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory and the Federal High Court. See SCC (Nig.) Ltd v. George (2024) 18 NWLR (Pt.1971) 421.
  18. It is clear from the above provisions of the Constitution as interpreted by the apex court that in an application for enforcement of fundamental rights irrespective of the subject matter and parties before the court, the Federal High Court, the State High Courts and High Court of the Federal Capital Territory have concurrent jurisdiction on enforcement of fundamental rights. This is because section 46(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) refers to “a High Court of a State” without any restriction. In other words, the provision ensures access to any High Court as long as it is within the State in which the alleged infraction occurred. What is important is that the real grievance of the applicant is the breach of a fundamental right protected under Chapter IV of the Constitution and not a veiled attempt to seek redress for other generic civil rights such as employment, property, trafficking etc. under the guise of enforcement of fundamental right. The rationale behind the approach is that, because of the essential nature of the fundamental rights which must be jealously guarded, and no clog is put on the way of a citizen seeking to enforce his fundamental rights. There is no ambiguity in the provisions of the Constitution or of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules regarding which court has jurisdiction to entertain any application for the enforcement of fundamental rights. See SCC (Nig.) Ltd v. George (2024) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1971) 421;.E.F.C.C. v. Reinl (2020) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1730) 489;.F.U.T., Minna v. Olutayo (2018) 7 NWLR (Pt. 1617) 176.
  19. Generally, fundamental human rights are provided for under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). Section 46(1) thereof provides that any person who alleges that any of the provisions of Chapter IV has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in any State in relation to him, may apply to a High Court in that State for redress. The Constitution created both the High Court and Federal High Court. The courts enjoy unlimited jurisdiction subject only to the provisions of section 251 of the Constitution and any other provision thereof and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon them by the Act of the National Assembly.
  20. It is against the above background, I now, consider the jurisdiction of this court to entertain matter bordering on violation of provisions of chapter IV of the Constitution, as amended, as in this case.
  21. Section 254C(1), provides:-

“254C(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of sections251, 257, 272 and anything contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the National Industrial Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters:-

(d) relating to or connected with any dispute over the interpretation and application of the provisions of Chapter IV of this Constitution as it relates to any employment, labour, industrial relations, trade unionism, employer’s association or any other matter which the Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine.”

  1. The above provisions of section 254(C)(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), has clearly and unambiguously delineated the extent of jurisdiction of this court as it relates to enforcement of fundamental rights as contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution, as amended. The first part means that the National Industrial Court can entertain any suit in which any provision of Chapter IV (sections 33 to 46) of the Constitution will be interpreted or applied. On the second part which reads “as it relates to any employment”, the operative phrase is “as it relates to” and the relevant question to ask is whether the claim before the court in this case as adumbrated by the reliefs being sought relates to the claimant’s employment with the defendant. Consequently, section 254C(1) (d) of the Constitution confers jurisdiction on this Court to the exclusion of other courts of coordinate jurisdiction on disputes calling for interpretation or application of fundamental rights provisions in relation to employment and labour matters. See SCC (Nig.) Ltd. v. George (2024) 18 NWLR (Pt.1971) 421.
  2. I have scrutinized the nine reliefs being sought by the applicant in this case they do not   seems to be within the purview of the exclusive jurisdiction of this court under section 254C (1) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended or within section 7(1) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006. The reason being that the reliefs are for violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights simpliciter as enshrined in sections 34 and 35 of the Constitution, as amended.
  3. It is to be noted that the mere fact that an allegation of violation of fundamental rights were ordinarily made in the context of employment, does not without more transmute such a claim into a labour or employment dispute within the contemplation of Section 254C of the Constitution. The only way such an allegation can be accommodated is if the alleged violation of rights comes as an ancillary claim to labour or employment matters and the Court from the facts assesses it to be inextricably tied or bound up with the main claims before the Court, the Court can accommodate it under Section 254C1(d) as a cause or claim connected with labour matters. See Egbuonu v. Bornu Radio Television Corporation (1997) LPELR - 1040 (SC), where Iguh, JSC, (as he then was of blessed memory) held thus:

"The law is now settled that where ancillary or incidental claim or claims are so inextricably tied to or bound up with the main claims before the Court in a suit, a Court of law cannot adjudicate over them where it has no jurisdiction to entertain the main claims if such incidental or ancillary claims cannot be determined without a determination at the same time of the main claims or where the determination of such incidental or ancillary claims must necessarily involve a consideration or determination of the main claims. See Alhaji Umaru Abba Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) 517 at 548; Alhaji Umaru Tukur v. The Government of Taraba State and Others (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) at 549" 

  1. The apex court has settled the jurisdiction of this court on fundamental rights as encapsulated in Chapter IV of the Constitution in the cases of SCC (nig.) Ltd v George (supra; SCC (Nig.) Ltd v Joseph (supra) and in the recent decision in the case of ELEGBE & ANOR V. HP INTL SCHOOLS LTD & ORS (2026) LPELR-83245(SC). What these authorities established is that for this court to have jurisdiction over fundamental rights in chapter IV of the Constitution, the dispute must be labour-centered or employment-related in substance, in such cases jurisdiction is exclusively reserved for the National Industrial Court of Nigeria, irrespective of how the claim is framed. No other Court may validly assume jurisdiction over such matters, and any proceedings commenced elsewhere are constitutionally incompetent. The jurisdiction conferred is both substantive and expansive, covering not only disputes strictly arising from labour or employment, but also all matters relating to, connected with, incidental to, or arising from employment relationship and workplace. The law does not allow any interpretation that would introduce ambiguity and distort the careful constitutional allocation of judicial powers, with the attendant risk of undermining the clearly demarcated jurisdictions of the superior Courts of record. Such an approach would also engender doctrinal uncertainty, as litigants may deliberately camouflage ordinary civil claims with the veneer of employment relations in order to improperly invoke the jurisdiction of this court.
  2. For avoidance of doubt, the matters intended by the legislature to be vested within the exclusive jurisdiction of this court are labour and employment disputes strictly so called, and any civil violation causes of action merely arising in an employment setting. 
  3. In the instant case, a careful examination of the originating motion and its supporting affidavit reveals that the applicant's cause of action is founded on alleged violation of applicant’s rights to personal liberty, and dignity of human person, which are fundamental rights contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution. The reliefs are neither predicated on any contract of employment nor on the enforcement of any condition of service. The mere fact that in the alleged violation of rights the applicant made reference to his resignation/retirement and receiving pension in respect of his employment does not, without more, transmute the claim into a labour or employment dispute. What is decisive in the determination of jurisdiction is the substance of the claim and the nature of the reliefs sought, and not any attempt by a party to colour a purely enforcement of fundamental rights with employment-related considerations, when there was no relief on conditions of service or on payment or non-payment of salary or terminal benefits such as gratuity, pension or any other benefits.
  4. The applicant has not proved any basis for invoking the jurisdiction of this court in respect of a claim on fundamental rights which is wholly unconnected with labour or employment relations. Accordingly, the claimant’s cause of action, being one in fundamental rights violation, falls outside the purview of jurisdiction of this court. Therefore, this court lacks requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit as it is presently constituted.
  5. From all I have been saying above, the applicant has not properly commenced this action, as he approached a wrong court for redress. The subject matter having not been within the purview of subject matter of jurisdiction of this court, this court lacked the requisite jurisdiction to entertain this suit. 
  6. By the provision of section 24(2) of the National Industrial Court act, prohibit striking out of a matter where the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain same. This sub-section has statutorily empower this court with vires to order transfer of a cause or matter to appropriate court where this court does not have jurisdiction to entertain the matter brought before it.
  7.   Having regards to the parties, reliefs sought the appropriate court vested with jurisdiction to deal with the dispute in this case is by virtue of section 251 of the Constitution as amended, the Federal High Court. Therefore, I hereby order transfer of this suit to Federal High Court Calabar Division for hearing and determination.
  8. The Registrar this court is hereby directed to act accordingly.
  9. Judgment is hereby entered accordingly.

 

 

Sanusi Kado,

Judge.

REPRESENTATION:

F. Baba Isa, Esq; for the applicant

Udenyi Omaji, Esq; Deputy Director, Ministry of Justice, for the 4th to 8th respondents.