IN THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COURT OF NIGERIA

IN THE LAGOS JUDICIAL DIVISON

HOLDEN AT LAGOS

BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP: HON. JUSTICE S. A. YELWA…...JUDGE

THIS 29^th  DAY OF APRIL, 2026

 

SUIT NO: NICN/LA/455/2020

BETWEEN:                                                                 

 

mrs. EMELDA AZUKA OKEREKE              -       CLAIMANT

 

AND

 

UNITED BANK FOR AFRICA PLC                    -       DEFENDANT

         

 

ii.                  A DECLARATION that the act and conduct of backdating the letter of advise to resign and Exit from the bank dated 3^rd January 2020 but issued to the claimant on the 9^th of January 2020 is fraudulent and illegal.

 

iii.              A DECLARATION that the resignation letter of the Claimant dated 10^th January 2020 is as a result of advise to resign letter issued to our client on 9^th January 2020 but backdated to 3^rd January 2020 and same amounts to constructive dismissal.

 

iv.              A DECLARATION that the purported termination letter dated 10^th January 2020 and the letter of entitlement issued pursuant to the Termination letter is wrongful, illegal and unlawful.

 

v.                 A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to all benefits, wages salaries, remunerations/allowances and emoluments as contained in the letter of employment dated 7^th June, 2001.

 

vi.              A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to One Month's salary (as stated in the letter of appointment dated 7^th June, 2001) in lieu of notice as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful termination of the Claimant’s employment without notice.

vii.            AN ORDER of this Honourable Court reversing all debits, interest charged on the account since January 2020 and the accrued interest at the rate of 24% per annum, reversal of outstanding UBA consumer loans as the loan was duly insured and the clause was included in the offer letter.

 

viii.         AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N179,277.01 (One Hundred and Seventy Nine Naira, Two Hundred and Seventy-Seven Naira, One Kobo) as payment in lieu of notice as a result of the unlawful and premature termination of the Claimant’s employment.

 

ix.              AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N78,343.26 (Seventy Eight Thousand, Three Hundred and Forty Three Naira, Twenty Six kobo) as Salary for the month of January, 2020.

 

x.                 AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N2,538,000 (Two Million, Five Hundred and Thirty Eight Thousand Naira) as Ex Gratia payment.

 

xi.              AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N2,358,722.99 (Two Million Three Hundred and Fifty Eight Thousand, Seven Hundred and Twenty Two Naira, Ninety Nine kobo) as additional concession.

                                                                                     

xii.            AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N3,322,078.94 (Three Million, Three Hundred and Twenty Two Thousand, Seventy Eight Naira, Ninety Four kobo) as leave encashment for 64 working days.

 

xiii.         AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N24,983.12 (Twenty Four Thousand, Nine Hundred and Eighty Three Naira, Twelve kobo) as leave allowance.

 

xiv.         AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N17,349.39 (Seventeen Thousand, Three Hundred and Forty Nine Naira, Thirty Nine kobo) as 13^th month bonus for 2020.

 

xv.            AN ORDER of this Honourable Court directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N20,000,000.00 (Twenty Million Naira) being General Damages for the breach of the Employment contract by the Defendant and the wrongful, fraudulent and illegal termination of the Claimant’s employment.

xvi.         INTEREST on all the amounts claimed at the rate of 24% per annum before the judgment and at the rate of 10% after the judgment.

xvii.       The Cost of this suit.

 

 

2.     In response to the suit, the defendant filed a memorandum of appearance and statement of defence which was later amended by an amended statement of defence. Claimant filed a reply to the amended statement of defence also, in essence, parties joined issues in the case.

 

CASE OF THE CLAIMANT

3.     The basis of the claimant’s case as can be gleaned from the averments is that she was employed by the Defendant in June 2001 and worked for over 18 years, rising to the position of Branch Manager. After completing her annual leave, the claimant resumed work on 6^th January 2020 but was unable to access her work system. On the same day, she received a credit alert described as “benefits,” which raised concerns.

4.     Following this, the claimant was invited to a meeting where she was informed that her services were no longer required and was advised to resign, which she objected to, insisting on a formal termination if necessary. However, Claimant stated that she was later issued a backdated “Advice to Resign” letter along with details of her terminal benefits, which included deductions she disputed, particularly a consumer loan she claimed was insured.

5.     Claimant contended in her case that under pressure, she submitted her resignation letter on 9^th January 2020, but the Defendant initially refused to acknowledge it. Subsequently, the Defendant issued her a termination letter dated 10^th January 2020. Later, when the Claimant submitted her resignation and work items, the previously credited benefits were reversed and her account was blocked.

6.     The Claimant further complained about unpaid entitlements, including 64 days of unutilized leave, and disputed the calculations provided by the Defendant. Claimant averred that despite repeated communications, the Defendant failed to resolve the issues, prompting the Claimant to initiate this  action.

 

CASE OF THE DEFENDANT

 

7.     The Defendant’s case briefly put, arising from the amended statement of defence dated 28/2/2023, but filed on 3/3/2023 which was amended pursuant to leave of court is that by an offer of employment dated 31^st May, 2001, the Defendant employed the Claimant as a Trainee Analyst Designate (Teller). The Claimant worked with the Defendant and rose to the position of a Branch Manager. The Claimant towards the end of December 2019, proceeded to complete her annual leave with permission of the Defendant. The Claimant contended that when she returned from her annual leave, the Defendant failed to reset her password to enable her resume work. The Claimant claimed that she received credit alert in her salary account titled benefits on 6^th January, 2020. The Claimant further sent an email to defendant’s representative who in turn scheduled a meeting between both parties.

8.     The defendant averred that at the meeting the Defendant informed the Claimant that her services was no longer needed, and advised her to tender her resignation letter. The Defendant issued a letter of advice to resign to the Claimant. Later, the Defendant terminated the employment of the Claimant after the Claimant failed to willingly resign and also the Defendant stated that it paid off all the benefits due to the Claimant. The Claimant not being satisfied by the actions of the Defendant commenced this action against the Defendant.

 

TRIAL

9.     Trial commenced on 18/11/2024, wherein, Mrs Emelda Azuka Okereke testified as CW1. She adopted her written statement on oath deposed to on 12/11/2020, and at the hearing, she tendered the following documents in evidence, which were admitted and marked as the follows:

 

1. Exhibit CW1 - The Claimant’s offer of Employment Letter dated 7^th June 2001.

2. Exhibit CW2 – Claimant’s Statement of Account.

3. Exhibit CW3 – Claimant’s pay slip for the months of November and December 2019.

4. Exhibit CW4 – Email Correspondences between the Claimant and the Defendant.

5. Exhibit CW5 – Advise to resign.

6. Exhibit CW6 – Acknowledgment copy of Claimant’s resignation letter.

7. Exhibit CW7 – Termination Letter dated 10^th January and 11^th February and the document containing entitlement benefits.

8. Exhibit CW8 – Letter of Instruction to LES AVOCATS.

9. Exhibit CW9 – Acknowledgment copy of letter of Claimant’s counsel (LES AVOCATS) dated 9^th March 2020.

10. Exhibit CW10 – Defendants letter dated 23^rd March 20020.

11. Exhibit CW11 – Acknowledgment copy of letter of Claimant’s counsel (LES AVOCATS) dated 10^th March 2020.

12. Exhibit CW12 – Employees Handbook.

13. Exhibit CW13 – Offer of Consumer Loan.

14. Exhibit CW14 – Certificate of compliance.

 

 

CW1 was crossed examined by learned counsel for the defendant, and there was no re-examination. The case of the claimant was then closed on the application of counsel.

10.            The Defendant opened defence and called one witness (Anuoluwapo Adedoja), who testified as DW1 during which, she adopted her witness statement on oath deposed to on 3/3/2023, and subsequently, tendered the following documents in evidence which the court admitted and marked them  as follows:

1. Exhibit DW1 – Defendant’s letter of Employment dated 31^st May 2001.

2. Exhibit DW2 – Defendant’s offer of loan facility to the Claimant dated 30^th September 2019.

3. Exhibit DW3 – Defendant’s letter to the Claimant dated 10^th January 2020.

4. Exhibit DW4 – Defendant’s letter of displeasure to the Claimant.

5. Exhibit DW5 – Certificate of Authentication.

6. Exhibit DW6 – Letter of termination dated 9^th January 2020.

7. Exhibit DW7- Document dated 3^rd January 2020 detailing terminal benefit of the Claimant prepared by the Defendant.

 

 DW1 was then crossed examined by learned counsel for the claimant, and there being no re-examination. The case of the defendant was closed on the application of counsel.

 

 

FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS OF THE DEFENDANT

 Defendant’s final written address is dated 4/8/2025, but filed 5/8/2025, wherein counsel raised the following issues for determination:

 

a)    Whether the termination of the Employment of the Claimant by the Defendant was in accordance with the contract of employment signed by both parties?

b)    Whether the Claimant is entitled to the Ex- gratia payment as claimed?

c)     Whether the Claimant is entitled to and/or proved her claim as to the reliefs sought?

d)    Whether this Honourable Court has the jurisdiction to entertain this suit.

Learned counsel submitted on issue one that a contract of employment is a legally binding agreement, either written or oral, that outlines the terms and conditions of an employer-employee relationship. It defines the rights and responsibilities of both parties, including the employee's work, duties, payment, and working hours, as well as the employer's obligations.

11.            Counsel further submitted that it is pertinent to state that the terms of an employment relationship are generally contained in the service agreement, letter of employment, employee handbook or any other document that may be introduced from time to time during the subsistence of the employer/employee relationship. Where parties have entered into agreement voluntarily and there is nothing to show that such agreement was obtained by fraud, mistake, deception or misrepresentation, they are bound by the terms of the agreement. An employment contract is premised on an agreement between a person or body, “employer” who seeks to retain the services of another, “employee” effectively putting the employee under their payroll. Counsel referred the court to the case of Skye Bank Plc v. Adegun (2024) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1960) 1, Oforishe v. N.G.C. Ltd. (2018) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1602) 35.

12.            Counsel contended that in the instant case, the Defendant stated clearly in paragraph 13 of the Amended Witness Statement on Oath of DW1 dated 3^rd March, 2023, that it terminated the employment of the Claimant in accordance with the terms and conditions as clearly stated in paragraphs 9.4.1 & 9.4.2 of the Employee Handbook that is Exhibit C12. The Defendant paid to the Claimant all the benefits as merited. The termination of the employment of the Claimant by the Defendant was as a result of the refusal of the Claimant to willingly resign, after the Defendant gave her letter advising her to sign as in Exhibit C5. 14. The Defendant’s act of advising the Claimant to resign was out of magnanimity on the part of the Defendant to ease out employees without recourse to formal termination in order to enable them seek jobs elsewhere after disengagement without any difficulty.  Counsel referred the court to Paragraphs 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 of the UBA Employee Handbook which is Exhibit C12 which states;

 

“9.4.1 UBA Group may terminate the employment of an employee, when applicable with termination notice given as defined under resignation above.

9.4.2 An employee whose employment has been terminated shall be entitled to receive benefits determined in line with the compensation.”

 

15. Counsel further contended that the Defendant paid the Claimant the terminal benefits which she merited, and which is in line with the terms and condition of the contract of employment and the Employee Handbook being Exhibit C12. The law is stated to be trite that except in employment governed by statute wherein the procedure for employment and discipline including dismissal of employment are clearly spelt out, any other employment outside the statute is governed by the terms under which the parties agreed to be master and servant. Employment with statutory backing must be terminated in the way and manner presented by the relevant statute and any other manner of termination inconsistent therewith is null and void and of no effect. But in some other cases governed only by agreement of the parties and not by statute, removal by way of termination of appointment or dismissal will be in the form agreed to. Any other form connotes any wrong termination or dismissal but not to declare such dismissal null and void. Counsel relied on the case of Regd. Trustees, P.P.F.N. v. Shogbola (2004) 11 NWLR (Pt. 883) 1

16. Learned counsel submitted that the Claimant’s contention in paragraph 37 of her Witness Statement of Oath dated 14^th November, 2020 that the Defendant fraudulently, unconscionably, wrongfully and illegally terminated her employment because of its negligence and unethical act and conduct is illogical and misleading. It is the submission of counsel that DW1 in paragraph 13 of her Amended Statement on Oath dated 3^rd day of March, 2023 stated clearly that the Claimant’s contract of employment with the Defendant was terminated and in line with the terms and condition of the contract, paid the Claimant her terminal benefits. DW1 contended that the Claimant indebtedness was also posted along with her terminal benefits as clearly agreed by parties to the Offer Loan Facility which is as in Exhibit D2.

17. It is the submission of counsel that the Defendant in line with the provisions of Exhibit C12, calculated the benefits the Claimant is entitled to be paid, and subtracted the debt owed by the Claimant to the Defendant in accordance with the terms of the Offer of Loan Facility as in Exhibit D2. The Net balance of the benefit after the subtraction was forwarded to the Claimant via an email correspondence on 12^th February, 2020 as contained in Exhibit C7.  

18. Counsel argued that the Claimant in paragraph 6 of her Reply to the Amended Statement of Defence dated 12^th of October 2023, contended that the said loan is insured, that the insurance covers death, permanent disability and involuntary loss of job. Also, that the Defendant being noted as the first lost payee. Counsel submitted that the Claimant failed to mention the insurance company or even prove if the unpaid balance of the loan has been paid to the bank by the insurance company. This is against the principle of law that he who asserts must prove. Counsel relied on section 131 of the Evidence Act.

              

19. Learned counsel submitted that the subtraction of the balance of the Claimant’s Consumer Personal Loan from the benefits which is to be paid to the Claimant by the Defendant is also in line with the provisions of the UBA Employees Handbook contained in Exhibit C12. Paragraph 9.2.3.8 of the UBA Employees Handbook   states “Upon resignation, employee shall be entitled to certain benefits under UBA Group’s compensation policy, less any unpaid liabilities owed to UBA Group”.

20. Counsel further submitted that it is therefore pertinent to state that the Defendant in line with the contract of employment and UBA Employees Handbook (Exhibit CW12), terminated the employment of the Claimant and paid the benefits owed to Claimant by the Defendant after the subtraction of the unpaid balance of the consumer loan facility owed by the Claimant to the Defendant.

On issue two, counsel submitted that an Ex-gratia payment is a payment made without the payer admitting any legal obligation to do so. It is often a gesture of goodwill or a way to resolve a situation amicably, without setting a precedent for future cases. It is a payment made to an individual by an organization, government, or insurer for damages or claims, but it does not require the admittance of liability by the party making the payment. Counsel referred the court to the case of P.A.N. v. Oje (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt. 530) 625 as “a term applied to anything accorded as a favour; as distinguished from that which may be demanded ex-debito, as a matter of right. It connotes something given out of grace, favour, indulgence, or gratuitous.”

21. Counsel further submitted that from the definition above, it can be fathomed that an Ex-gratia payment is voluntary and it is not a legal obligation owed to anybody. A party cannot be held liable for not making a payment of Ex-gratia. Counsel relied on the case of Union Beverages v. Owolabi (1988) 1 NWLR (Pt. 68) 128. This is clearly the position of the law as regards to the payment of ex-gratia.

22. It is the submission of counsel that the law is trite that he who asserts must prove. Counsel relied on Section 131 of the Evidence Act; NUP v. INEC (2021) LPELR-58407 (SC)

 

23. Learned counsel submitted that in the instant the case, the Letter of Employment that is Exhibit D1 never made mention or include any clause of ex-gratia, also the UBA Employee Handbook marked Exhibit C12 which is the law that regulates the relationship between the Defendant and its employees never made mention of the payment of ex-gratia if/when an employee resigns or the contract of employment is terminated. It is therefore surprising from where the Claimant came to the conclusion in paragraph 42 (ix) of her Statement of facts, that the Defendant owes a total of N2,538,000 (Two Million, Five Hundred and Thirty Eight Thousand Naira) as Ex-ratia payment.

24. It is the contention of counsel for the defendant further that the Claimant also failed to tender any exhibit to prove or show in any contract between her as Claimant and the Defendant, where the clause for payment of ex-gratia was provided for.

 

25. Learned counsel submitted on issue three that the law is trite that he who asserts must prove, as seen in Section 131 (1) of the Evidence Act 2023 (as amended). Section 132 of the Evidence Act went further to state that “The burden proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side”.

 

26. Counsel submitted that the summary of the reliefs sought by the Claimant is for Declaration, Monetary claim and Damages. The Claimant by Relief (iii) seeks the declaration that the purported termination letter dated 10^th January 2020 and the letter of entitlement issued pursuant to Termination letter is wrongful, illegal and unlawful.

Counsel submitted that a declaration claimed must relate to some legal rights or legal interest of which the law will take cognizance. A plaintiff who claims declaratory reliefs must show that he has interest or right which forms a foundation for that declaration. Counsel relied on the case of INTL TEXTILE IND. (NIG) LTD v. ADEREMI & ORS (1999) LPELR-1527 (SC) 

It is the submission of counsel that it is settled law that declaratory reliefs are not granted on admission but based on the evidence adduced. Counsel cited the case of Ndayako v. Dantoro (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 187

27.  Counsel submitted that a Claimant must prove the pleadings and lead evidence for declaratory reliefs sought and must not rely on the weakness of the case of the opponent in satisfying the Court to grant a declaratory relief. In the instant case, the Claimant claimed some reliefs, which should not be granted;

Counsel submitted that on the reliefs i & ii of the Claimants reliefs which are;

“i. A declaration that the act and conduct of backdating the letter of advice to resign and exit from the bank dated 3^rd January 2020 but issued to our client on the 9^th of January 2020 is fraudulent and illegal

         

ii. A declaration that the resignation letter of the Claimant dated 10^th January 2020 is as a result of the advice to resign letter issued to our client on the 9^th of January 2020 but backdated to 3^rd January 2020 and same amounts to constructive termination”

 

28. Counsel maintained that the Claimant failed to prove this declaratory reliefs sought, and that the said letter of advise to resign given to the Claimant was an act of magnanimity on the part of the Defendant to ease out employees without recourse to formal termination in order to enable them seek jobs elsewhere after the disengagement without any difficulty. There was no act of fraud or illegality perpetuated by the Defendant on the said letter. This was clearly stated in paragraph 12 of the Amended Written Statement on Oath of DW1 dated 3^rd March, 2023.

29.  Counsel further contended that the Claimant also failed to prove how the said letter of advise is fraudulent or illegal. Counsel contended that a letter written on 3^rd January can be delivered on 9^th January, and that does not in any way make the content of such letter fraudulent or illegal. Moreover, where the issue of fraud is raised the alleged fraud ought to be specifically pleaded, the particulars of the fraud provided and the allegation strictly proved. Fraud is a very serious offence. It needs to be pleaded with particularity and it must be proved. Failure by the party to furnish such particulars in the pleadings, he would not be taken to have properly raised or relied on such fraud. Counsel cited the case of Obasanya v. Babafemi (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 1; Oboro v. R.S.H.P.D.A (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 521) 425

30. Counsel submitted regarding relief (ii), that the Claimant did not resign from the Bank, the Claimant employment was terminated by the Defendant and the benefits paid to the Claimant as compensation is in accordance with the Letter of Employment and UBA Employee Handbook. The Claimant letter of resignation (Exhibit C6) which the Claimant is relying on was served/sent to the Defendant on the 10^th January, 2020, this was after the Defendant had terminated the employment of Claimant on 9^th January, 2020 see Letter of Termination dated 9^th January 2020 (Exhibit D6). This said letter of termination (Exhibit D6) was issued to the Claimant by the Defendant after the Claimant failed to willingly resign her employment.

 

It is the contention of counsel that an employer has the right to terminate the employment of an employee in accordance with the terms of the contract of employment, if the employer believes that the services of the employee are not needed. Counsel relied on the case of Borishade v. N.B.N. Ltd. (2007) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1015) 217

31.                It is the submission of counsel that in the instant case, the Defendant’s termination of the employment of the Claimant in accordance with the terms of contract of employment is valid and supersedes the Claimant letter of resignation which was sent a day later. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss relief (ii) of the Statement of fact because the letter of resignation is invalid and does not amount to constructive termination.

 

On relief iii, which is “A declaration that the purported termination letter dated 10^th January 2020 and the letter of entitlement issued pursuant to the termination letter is wrongful, illegal and unlawful.”

 

32.                 Counsel submitted that it is important to bring to the notice of the Honourable Court that the letter of termination (Exhibit D6) which terminated the contract of the Claimant was dated 9^th of January 2020 and not 10^th January 2020. Also, the Defendant’s termination of the employment of the Claimant was not illegal, wrongful or unlawful. The Claimant’s employment was terminated in accordance with the terms of employment and the terminal benefits paid to the Claimant as compensation by the Defendant.

 

33.                 It is the submission of counsel that in the instant case, the terms of the contract of employment signed between both parties, prescribed one month notice or one month salary payment in lieu of the notice. The Defendant paid the Claimant one month salary in lieu of the notice as can be seen in the benefits paid to the Claimant. This was clearly stated in paragraphs 13, 19, 21, & 22 of the Amended Written Statement on Oath of the DW1 dated 3^rd March, 2023. counsel therefore urged the Court to dismiss relief iii for being misleading.

 

34.                 On the relief iv which is “A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to all the benefits, wages, salaries, remunerations/allowances and emoluments as contained in the letter of employment dated 7^th June, 2001.”

35.                 Learned counsel submitted that the Defendant paid all the terminal benefits as contained in the letter of employment to the Claimant. The Defendant in line with the provisions of Exhibit C12, calculated the benefits the Claimant was entitled to be paid, and subtracted the indebtedness of the Claimant to the Defendant in accordance with the terms of the Offer of Loan Facility which is Exhibit D2. The Net balance of the benefit after the subtraction was forwarded to the Claimant via an email correspondence on 12^th February, 2020 (Exhibit C7). The subtraction of the balance of the Claimant’s Consumer Personal Loan from the benefits which is to be paid to the Claimant by the Defendant is also in line with the provisions of the UBA Employees Handbook (Exhibit CW12). Paragraph 9.2.3.8 of the UBA Employees Handbook   states “Upon resignation, employee shall be entitled to certain benefits under UBA Group’s compensation policy, less any unpaid liabilities owed to UBA Group”.

 

36.                 On relief v, which is “A declaration that the Claimant is entitled to one month’s salary (as stated in the letter of appointment dated 7^th June, 2020) in lieu of notice as a result of the Defendant’s unlawful termination of the Claimant’s employment without notice.”

 

37.                 Counsel submitted that the Defendant paid the Claimant the month salary in lieu of the one month notice after terminating the employment of the Claimant. Counsel referred the court to Exhibit C7 which is the letter containing entitlement and benefits. In the said letter, every payment and benefits which is to be paid to the Claimant by the Defendant was listed out, and the one month salary in lieu of notice was provided for. It is therefore misleading for the Claimant to continue to claim that the Defendant failed to pay her in lieu of notice, when she is the person that tendered Exhibit C7 in this suit.

 

38.                 It is the submission of counsel that on the Monetary Claim, the Claimant claimed some monetary reliefs and interest in reliefs vi – xiii. This reliefs include;

vii. Payment in lieu of notice

viii. Salary for month of January 2020

ix. Ex gratia payment

x. Payment as additional concession

xi. Payment for leave encashment

xii. Payment for leave allowance

xiv. 13^th Month

 

39.                 Claimant argued these reliefs jointly and submitted that the Defendant paid the terminal benefits owed to the Claimant, and the breakdown of this benefits as can be seen in document detailing the Claimant benefits (Exhibit C7), and this include payment for;

Terminal ex gratia for service rendered

Special payment in lieu of notice

Additional concession

Leave attachment

Salary

13^th Month

Leave allowance

 

40.                 Counsel maintained that the Defendant calculated the total of the payment for benefits listed above and subtracted it with the indebtedness of the Claimant which accrued from the unpaid balance of the Loan facility (Exhibit D2). The Claimant took a Loan Facility from the Defendant during the period she (Claimant) was working with the defendant, which was yet to be paid off. When the Defendant terminated the employment of the Claimant, the Defendant subtracted the unpaid balance of the loan facility from the benefits meant to be paid to the Claimant.  This was in accordance with paragraph 9.2.3.8 of the UBA Employees Handbook which provides  “Upon resignation, employee shall be entitled to certain benefits under UBA Group’s compensation policy, less any unpaid liabilities owed to UBA Group” and paragraphs 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 of the UBA Employee Handbook (Exhibit C12) states;

 

“9.4.1 UBA Group may terminate the employment of an employee, when applicable with termination notice given as defined under resignation above.

 

9.4.2 An employee whose employment has been terminated shall be entitled to receive benefits determined in line with the compensation.”

 

41.                 Counsel submitted that on the award of general damages claimed by the Claimant, the law is trite that general damages need not be specifically proved as it may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the case. Consequently, a court has a discretion to decide what amount it would award as general damages having regard to the sufferings by the claimant or humiliation or injuries suffered. Counsel referred the court to the case of N.N.B. Plc v. Denclag Ltd. (2005) 4 NWLR (Pt. 916) 549;

Shell Pet. Dev. Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Tiebo VII (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 445) 657

42.                 It is the contention of counsel that in the instant case, the Claimant is claiming for general damages for the breach of employment contract by the Defendant and the wrongful, fraudulent and illegal termination of the Claimant’s employment. Counsel relied on the above arguments to state that the Defendant terminated the employment of the Claimant in accordance with the letter of employment (Exhibit D1) and UBA Employees Handbook (Exhibit C12).

43.                 Counsel further contended that the Claimant failed to specifically prove the particulars of fraud in her termination, and relied on Obasanya v. Babafemi (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 689) 1; Oboro v. R.S.H.P.D.A (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 521) 425. It is therefore for this reason that the Claimant has no basis for her claim of damages, and that the Claimant has suffered no injury from the lawful termination of employment by the Defendant. Moreover, the Defendant paid all the benefits which the Claimant is entitled to, to the Claimant.

44.                 On issue four, counsel submitted that the Claimant failed to fulfil the conditions precedent as stated and agreed upon by both the Claimant and the Defendant in paragraph 6.7 of the UBA Employee Handbook dated June, 2010 (Exhibit C12).  Paragraph 6.7 of the UBA Employee Handbook provide thus;

 

“Stage 1

If after leaving the employment of the Group an ex-employee has any claim or grievances against the group, he/she shall be required in the first instance to report the matter to the Head of Human Capital Management for resolution.

 

Stage II

If the matter is not satisfactorily resolved within 90 days, the matter may be referred to mediation at any court connected multi door Courthouse or any other alternative Dispute Resolution Center or forum for resolution.

 

However, if the parties fail to reach agreement on the forum and/or where a Court connected multi door courthouse does not exist in the state where the ex-employee resides, the matter shall be referred to the nearest court connected multi door courthouse.

 

PROVIDED ALWAYS that the procedure for resolution of dispute herein specified shall not preclude the legal right of the employee to resort to litigation in the settlement of a dispute where agreement cannot be reached by mediation. However, the procedure specified above shall first be followed before resorting to litigation.”

 

45.                 It is the submission of counsel that the law is trite that mere fact that a dispute is of a nature eminently suitable for trial in a court, is not a sufficient ground for refusing to give effect to what the parties have, by contract, expressly agreed to. So long as an arbitration clause is retained in a contract that is valid and the dispute is within the contemplation of the clause, the trial court ought to give due regard to the voluntary contract of the parties by enforcing the arbitration clause as agreed to by them. Counsel cited the case of Felak Concept Ltd. v. A.-G., Akwa Ibom State (2019) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1675) 433

46.                 Counsel maintained that when an arbitration clause in a contract provides that any dispute or difference in respect of or in regard to or under the contract shall be referred to arbitration and the parties are at one asserting that they entered into a binding contract the clause will apply and a stay will therefore be granted even if the dispute involves an assertion by one party that circumstances have arisen whether before or after the contract has been partly performed which have the effect of discharging one or both parties from all subsequent liability under the contract. Counsel relied on the case of United World Ltd. Inc. v. M.T.S. Ltd. (1998) 10 NWLR (Pt. 568) 106

47.                 Counsel submitted that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and a court without jurisdiction over a subject matter makes any decision or order affecting it in vain. Counsel cited the case of Ude v. Bassey (1991) 7 NWLR (Pt. 206) 771

48.                 Learned counsel submitted that in the instant where the Claimant failed to follow the arbitration clause provided for in the UBA Employee Handbook, which is the law that regulates the relationship/employment of Claimant to the Defendant. It is right to submit that the failure of the Claimant to adhere to the arbitration clause provided in UBA Employee Handbook has robbed the court of the jurisdiction to entertain this suit. This was clearly stated in paragraph 43 (i-iv) of the Amended Written Statement on Oath of DW1. The Claimant in paragraphs 13 – 15 of her Reply to the Amended Statement of Defence dated 12^th October, 2023 claimed that she sent emails and also wrote letters through her Counsel to the Defendant to resolve the issue of termination of the Claimant’s employment without resorting to litigation. 

 

49.                 Learned counsel submitted that the said emails sent by the Claimant was never about resolving this matter amicably in accordance with the provisions of the Exhibit C12. Counsel referred the Court to Exhibit C4 which contains all the email correspondence between the Claimant and Defendant, none of the Claimant email was directed to the Human Capital Management (HCM) of the Defendant as a report from the Claimant for her unlawful termination. Rather, the Claimant was only making request for her benefits and threatening to take the matter to industrial Court within seven days if the Defendant fails to pay her benefits, likewise, the letters sent by the Claimant Counsel, Exhibits C9 & C11.

 

 

FINAL WRITTEN ADDRESS OF THE CLAIMANT

Claimant filed his final written address on 15th of December 2025, wherein counsel submitted three issues for determination to wit;

 

1.     Whether the Claimant’s employment was constructively or wrongfully terminated.

2.     Whether the Defendant breached the contract of employment and committed unfair labour practices.

3.     Whether the Claimant is entitled to the reliefs sought.

50.                 Counsel on issue one submitted that upon resumption from leave, effectively excluded her from the workplace. The Defendant further locked the Claimant out of her official email account and deprived her of the tools required to perform her duties. These actions made it practically impossible for the Claimant to continue her work and amount, in law, to a constructive and wrongful termination of her employment. Counsel further submitted that the Defendant, created conditions that rendered the continuation of the Claimant’s employment impossible, constructively dismissed her, notwithstanding the fact that she subsequently tendered a resignation letter.

51.                Counsel contended that the alleged resignation came only after the Defendant had already credited the claimant's account with terminal benefits on 6^th January 2020, as shown in Exhibit C4 and after she was issued with a letter of Advise to Resign by the Defendant on 9^th January 2020 but backdated to 3^rd January 2020. This mode of bringing an employment relationship to an end is well recognised in Nigerian labour jurisprudence as constructive dismissal, whereby an employer’s conduct is so fundamentally inconsistent with the subsistence of the employment that the law treats the contract as terminated by the employer.

 

52.                Counsel referred the court to the following cases; Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp (1978) ICR 221, Eze v Spring Bank Plc (NICN/ABJ/58/2015); Alade v FCMB (NICN/LA/411/2013), Onuorah v Access Bank Plc (NICN/LA/593/2016, Ogunleye v Polaris Bank Ltd (NICN/LA/209/2019); and Chukwumah v Shell Petroleum Development Co. (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289)

 

Counsel contended that constructive dismissal arises where, as in the present case, an employer, whether by words or conduct, procures or attempts to procure the compulsory resignation of an employee. It describes a situation where the employer’s behaviour becomes so intolerable, unreasonable, or fundamentally inconsistent with the contract of employment that the employee is left with no real option but to resign. The key element is involuntariness, although the act of leaving may appear voluntary, the law treats the termination as one initiated by the employer, and the employer bears full responsibility for it. Therefore, the Claimant’s exit is not of free will but one necessitated and occasioned by the Defendant as evidenced in Exhibit C5.

 

Counsel further contended that it is now settled law in Nigeria that for the termination of a private employment to be valid, an employer must:

 

i.                    Strictly comply with the procedure stipulated in the contract of employment, including the requirement and length of notice; and

ii.                 Provide a valid and justifiable reason for the termination, in line with modern labour law standards and the jurisprudence of this Honourable Court.

 

Counsel submitted that breach of the contractual procedure for termination of employment amounts to wrongful dismissal whilst failure to provide a valid and justifiable reason for termination amounts to unfair dismissal. Both infractions no doubt, expose employers to liability in damages to private employees. This is an international best practice which has been developed and adopted by the Honourable Courts (National Industrial Court of Nigeria (NICN) pursuant to section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. In applying this constitutional provision, the NICN has adopted the principles enshrined in article 4 of the ILO Convention No. 158 of 1982 (which came into force on November 3, 1985 and replaced ILO Recommendation 119 of 1963, dealing with termination of employment at the initiative of the employer) (the “ILO Convention”) as the applicable international best practice on the point. It provides as follows:

 

“The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment, or service.”

 

Counsel cited the Supreme Court in C.B.N v. Aribo (2018) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1608)130 at 172 paragraphs C-E, Per Eko JSC whilst noting that the Respondent in that case did not voluntarily resign stated that a forced or compulsory resignation by an employee amount to constructive dismissal associated with misconduct.

 

Counsel maintained that based on the settled position of the law on constructive termination of employment, the next question which must be answered at this point with respect is, "whether the unchallenged and enumerated acts of the Defendants as contained in the Claimant's statement of fact constituted constructive dismissal of the Claimant's employment so as to entitle the Claimant to judgment?".

 

Counsel submitted that the answer is positive. First, the standard of proof required for the Claimant to be entitled to judgment is simply put; on the balance of probability. Therefore, this presupposes that this Honourable Court will only pronounce judgment in the light of evidence presented and proved before it by both sides. Counsel relied on the case of Nnamani JSC in Woluchem v. Gudi (1981) LPELR-3501 (SC) at Page 23 paras. F-F.

 

Counsel further submitted that it is settled law that Constructive dismissal arises where the employer’s conduct fundamentally breaches the contract, leaving the employee no option but to resign. The Premature Payment of Terminal Benefits to the Claimant on 6^th January 2020 see Exhibit CW 2) without communication whatsoever (Resignation or Termination letter) with the Claimant prior to her account been credited is fatal to the Defendant’s Case.

 

It is the submission of counsel that the Defendant did not deny the fact that it credited the Claimant with sums of money described as terminal benefits on 6^th January 2020, and the Defendant maintained that it terminated the employment of the Claimant on 10^th January 2020. The evidence shows that the Defendant credited the Claimant’s terminal benefits four days before the purported termination of the employment of the Claimant. This is conclusive proof that termination had already occurred before the purported termination letter. It is standard practice that Employers do not pay terminal benefits before termination. The act of paying benefits signifies completion of the exit process. Counsel referred the court to Section 5.5 of the Employee Handbook (Exhibit CW 12), titled Exits, the Defendant clearly states that “Poor performers shall be advised to resign at the end of the mid-year and cumulative year end appraisals. This shall occur after a remedial coaching and counselling intervention has been unsuccessful”.

 

Counsel contended that from the above it goes without saying that the Defendant acted unlawfully in violation of its handbook (Exhibit CW12), which further gives credence to the Claimant’s position that the termination of her employment was unlawful. It is therefore evident that the purported resignation of the Claimant was not voluntary. As the Defendant locked out the Claimant from the system upon resumption, issuance of backdated Advice to Resign dated 3^rd January 2020 (but delivered 9 January), Pre termination credit of benefits, reversal of the entitlements, termination letter issued after the Claimant submitted a resignation letter (Exhibit C6), Backdated document, letters carrying same reference letter but written on different days, reversal of entitlements all constitute bad faith.

 

Counsel further maintained that contrary to the argument of the Defendant in its Address, the Defendant wrongfully terminated the employment of the Claimant as it did not follow the laid down procedure as contained in Exhibit CW12. The Defendant did not give Notice to the Claimant of its intention to terminate her employment nor did the Defendant pay in lieu of Notice.

 

Learned counsel submitted on issue two that the Defendant asserts that it paid the Claimant one month’s salary in lieu of notice. The facts before the Court show that this assertion is false and unsupported by evidence. The Claimant’s bank records and testimony establish the following:

(a)   The Defendant credited the Claimant’s terminal benefits on 6^th January 2020  four days before the purported termination date of 10^th January 2020.

 

This appears clearly from the terminal-benefits credit entry in the Claimant’s bank statement and Statement of Account tendered in evidence as Exhibit CW2.

(b) The Defendant then reversed the same payment; this shows that it was not a genuine payment in lieu of Notice nor a severance package.

The reversal entries are shown in the same bank statement and the Claimant’s schedule of entitlements.

(c) No written notice of termination was ever issued before the Claimant’s removal from access and work tools.

Counsel submitted that under cross-examination, DW1 admitted there was no query, no notice, no disciplinary process, and no letter preceding the system lockout.  DW1 mentioned specifically that there are no disciplinary complaints or actions against the Claimant since 2012. These facts fatally undermine the Defendant’s position. Under Nigerian Labour  law, a payment in lieu of notice is only valid if made simultaneously with or after a lawful termination and in strict compliance with the terms of employment. It cannot precede termination or operate retroactively to validate an otherwise defective dismissal.

Counsel referred the court to the following cases; Oforishe v Nigerian Gas Co. Ltd (2017) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1559)172; Chukwumah v Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 289) 512

Learned counsel submitted that the Defendant’s witness upon cross examination admitted that payment of terminal benefits generally follows exit processing and signifies that the employee is no longer in employment. This admission aligns with the evidence on record. From evidence before the Court, the Defendant issued 3 different termination letters with different terminal benefits. The Defendant first issued an Advise to resign letter dated 3^rd January 2020 but issued on 9^th January and attached to it a terminal benefit calculation/table dated 3^rd January (Exhibit DW7- RE:EXIT FROM THE BANK) with reference No. UBA/GSS-HCM/TAP/TI/AO/0006; Letter dated 10^th January 2020 (Exhibit CW7) with Reference No UBA/GSS-HCM/TAP/TI/AO/0006, (same as that dated 3^rd January 2020); letter dated 11^th February 2020 (Exhibit CW7) with Reference No. UBA/GSS-HCM/TAP/TI/AO/003.

All the documents are all termination letters with different figures, this shows inconsistency and bad faith.

 

Learned counsel submitted from the above that it is clear that the Defendant having realised its wrong doing went about raising documents by falsification to justify its wrong doing of unlawfully terminating the employment of the Claimant. This can be seen clearly from  Letter dated 10^th January 202o and that dated 3^rd January 2020 carrying same Reference No, with different dates and different content. A careful look at the documents reveals that the Defendant presented conflicting figures in the calculation of terminal benefits of the Claimant. This is only suggestive of fraud and an attempt to manipulate figures, a claim that was never rebutted by the Defendant.

 

Counsel further submitted that the reversal of the credited amount confirms that there was no legitimate notice, nor payment in lieu of Notice, but an internal action taken without regard for procedure. The reversal of a purported payment in lieu of Notice negates the existence of such payment. Assuming the Defendant intended to rely on a payment in lieu, the law is clear that a procedurally defective termination cannot be cured by a later payment. 

 

It is the submission of counsel that Exhibit DW6 is a fabricated document which never existed at the material time. In paragraph 4 of the Claimant’s Reply to the Amended Statement of Defence, the Claimant emphatically denied ever receiving any Notice of Disengagement from the Defendant. That denial remains uncontroverted. Throughout trial, the Defendant failed to produce even the most basic proof of service, no email record, no dispatch slip, no acknowledgment copy, and no internal delivery log was tendered before the Honourable Court. The absence of such evidence is fatal. Counsel contended that where a party alleges service but fails to prove it, the law presumes that no such service occurred. The Defendant cannot rely on a document that was neither communicated nor proven to have been issued at the material time.

 

Counsel submitted further that the law is settled that where documentary evidence is inconsistent, contradictory, or appears to have been manufactured to cure procedural defects, the Court is entitled to reject such documents and draw the strongest adverse inference against the party tendering them. Counsel referred the court to the case of Farah v. Shell Petroleum (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt.382) 148 and Aiki v. Idowu (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt.984) 47.

 

Learned counsel submitted that on the unlawful deduction of an insured staff loan, the Claimant’s loan (Exhibit CW13) was insurance-backed and it expressly covered involuntary loss of employment, as shown in the loan offer letter and facility documentation tendered in evidence.

 

Counsel submitted that the Defendant nevertheless deducted the outstanding loan balance from the Claimant’s entitlements, claiming a contractual right of set-off. This deduction is unlawful for two reasons:

(a)    The Claimant’s exit was involuntary and therefore covered by the insurance policy.

The surrounding facts around the termination of the Claimant all point to constructive dismissal, not voluntary resignation. Where termination is involuntary, the insurer not the employee bears the liability.

(b) The employer, not the employee has the obligation to notify the insurer.

Counsel further submitted that in banking practice and according to NICN precedents, the employer controls the insurance arrangement, forwards the employee’s details, and submits claims upon involuntary termination. DW1 produced no evidence of such notification.

Counsel contended that Exhibit CW13 shows that there is an insurance coverage up to the full amount of the facility on the Consumer Loan and the Defendant is named as first Loss Payee. The Claimant protested the deduction via correspondence and solicitor’s letters as contained in Exhibit CW9.

Counsel submitted that the Defendant argued it was the Claimant’s duty to identify the insurer and prove whether the insurance payment was made to the Defendant. It is not in dispute that the Consumer Loan was insured. Yet, in paragraphs 4.8 and 4.9 of its address, the Defendant contended that the Claimant should have named the insurer and shown that the Defendant did not receive the insurance pay-out after the Claimant’s employment was terminated. This position is misplaced. The Defendant selected and contracted the insurer, and it deducted the insurance premium at source before the loan was disbursed.

Counsel referred the court to provision No. 5 of CW13, which states: “At the point of voluntary retirement (where staff wilfully resigns) the terminal benefit, where applicable, will be used to reduce the staff exposure under this facility.” This makes the position clear. The Defendant had no authority to apply the Claimant’s terminal benefits to the loan, as the Claimant did not resign voluntarily. Her employment was terminated by the Defendant, and unlawfully so.

 

Counsel further stated that the Defendant did not mention or tender in evidence any insurer repudiation or evidence of claim submission which was denied. It is important to state that the Defendant already took benefit of the insurance whose premium was paid by the Claimant and also wants to terminate the employment of the Claimant unlawfully. And deprive her of her terminal benefits. We therefore urge this Honourable Court to order the reversal of the benefits credited to the Claimant on 6^th January 2020.

Counsel maintained that the law is settled that parties are bound by the terms of their contracts. Where there is a contract regulating any arrangement between the parties, the main duty of the court is to interpret that contract to give effect to the wishes of the parties as expressed in the contact document. Counsel referred the court to the case of Aouad v Kesswurawani (1956) NSCC page 33, Amada v Thomas Aphon Company Ltd (1972) 7 NSCC page 262, Oduye v N A Ltd (1987) 2 NWLR Part 55 page 125.

 

It is the submission of counsel that the Defendant argued that the Claimant failed to exhaust internal grievance procedures. This argument has no legal foundation. It is important to state that this Honourable Court has exclusive jurisdiction over employment and labour related matters under Section 254C of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999) as amended.

 

Counsel cited Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. v Nwawka (2011) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1266) 421 where it was held that internal grievance mechanisms do not bar access to Court.

 

Learned counsel submitted that the Defendant clearly chose to go against the provision of the Employee Handbook on resolution of grievances internally by first taking unlawful acts of terminating the employment of the Claimant without following due process and its failure to respond or treat all the complaints and issues raised by the Claimant.   Counsel contended that the Claimant did attempt internal resolution, as shown by Her emails of 6^th and 17^th January 2020 requesting clarification and correction of her entitlements; her Solicitors’ letters dated 9^th March (Exhibit CW9 & 10^th June 2020 (Exhibit CW11) demanding rectification and resolution.

 

On issue three, counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to declaratory reliefs because she has proven, through credible documentary and oral evidence, that her employment was wrongfully and constructively terminated. Documentary evidence revealed: Premature payment of terminal benefits, Backdating of documents, Spurious and inconsistent calculations of terminal benefits (CW7 and DW7) Reversal of benefits, Coercion into resignation, Unlawful loan deductions. Counsel relied in the case of MUBARAK & ANOR V. INEC & ANOR (2022) LPELR-58964(CA) Pp. 25 paras. D)

Counsel further submitted that the question that begs for answer is whether the Claimant has pleaded facts and led evidence to support her claims. Counsel contended that the Claimant has placed credible, unchallenged and unrebutted evidence before the Honourable Court that she was issued a letter titled “Advice to Resign” which she received on 9^th January 2020, but which the Defendant backdated to 3 January 2020. The Defendant did not deny issuing this letter, nor did it challenge the Claimant’s assertion that the document was backdated. Silence, where a fact is directly asserted, amounts to admission. It is evident from the sequence of events that the Defendant backdated the letter in an attempt to conceal its earlier unlawful conduct of terminating the Claimant’s employment without notice and crediting her account with terminal benefits on 6^th January 2020, before any formal communication of disengagement.

Counsel maintained that both Exhibit DW7(benefit breakdown attached to the advise to resign) and Exhibit CW7, particularly the Benefit Breakdown dated 11^th February 2020, bear the exact same reference number. During cross-examination, DW1 confirmed unequivocally that documents issued by the Defendant carry distinct reference numbers. This makes it clear that the document dated 11^th February 2020 was not an original contemporaneous record, but rather a document created subsequently to regularise or justify the Defendant’s earlier improper actions. The only reasonable inference, consistent with the evidence, is that the Defendant engaged in retrospective document creation and backdating in order to give the appearance of procedural compliance. The Court is entitled to reject such after-the-fact documentation as contrivances intended to mask an earlier unlawful termination. Accordingly, the Claimant is entitled to Relief i).

 

RELIEF (ii) is Declaration that the resignation of 10 January 2020 constitutes constructive dismissal

Counsel contended that the Claimant showed that the resignation letter was tendered only because she was instructed to resign via the backdated “Advise to Resign” letter delivered on 9^th January 2020. The Defendant did not present evidence of voluntary resignation, but chose to say it terminated the employment of the Claimant because the claimant did not resign as requested to, but failed to deny Exhibit CW6. A resignation obtained through pressure or coercion is not a resignation in law, but constructive dismissal.  Counsel cited the case of Okonkwo v. CCB (2003) 8 NWLR (Pt.822) 347; it was held that a coerced resignation amounts to dismissal; also Lodibia v. NCC (2023) LPELR-60880(CA) held that a resignation must be free, voluntary, and properly communicated.

 

RELIEF (iii): Declaration that the purported termination letter of 10 January 2020 is wrongful and unlawful

Counsel contended that the Claimant established that she never received a valid termination letter. The Defendant issued multiple contradictory disengagement documents. The Defendant credited terminal benefits on 6^th January 2020, before any termination letter or discussion around termination. Termination in law becomes effective only upon communication to the employee. Counsel relied on the case of WAEC v. Oshionebo (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt.994) 258 and Udegbunam v. FCDA (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt.829) 487. No acknowledgement, email, dispatch record, or evidence of service was tendered. The alleged termination is therefore ineffective, unlawful, and void, which supports relief iii of the Claimant.

 

RELIEF (iv): Declaration that the Claimant is entitled to all her employment benefits

Counsel maintained that the Claimant having shown that there was no lawful termination, the Claimant remains entitled to all her contractual benefits under the letter of employment and her last payslip (Exhibit C3) until a valid termination takes effect.

Counsel submitted that the law is settled that an employee whose employment is not properly terminated continues to earn her contractual entitlements. Counsel referred the court to the case of Oloruntoba-Oju v. Dopamu (2008) 7 NWLR (Pt.1085) 1. Thus, this declaratory relief is justified.

 

RELIEF (v): One month salary in lieu of notice

Counsel contended that the Claimant’s employment contract expressly provides for one month’s salary in lieu of notice. From the evidence adduced the Defendant failed to give such notice. Where an employer terminates without the requisite notice, damages equal to the notice period become immediately due. Counsel cited Chukwuma v. Shell Petroleum (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.289) 512, Oforishe v. NGC Ltd (2017) LPELR-42786(SC). Since termination was abrupt and unlawful, the Claimant is entitled to the contractual sum of ?179,277.01.

 

 

RELIEF (vi): Reversal of debits, interest, and insured loan obligations

 

Counsel maintained that evidence led in trial shows that the Defendant credited the Claimant with terminal benefits on 6^th January 2020, immediately blocked the Claimant’s account hereby restricting the Claimant from accessing her account; reversed credited terminal benefits on 15^th January and then threw the account into debit, and then claimed it was to enforce an insured consumer loan. Counsel submitted that the law is that banks cannot debit or manipulate accounts without lawful authority: Counsel cited the case of GTB V. Adedeji (2021) LPELR-55629(CA) and Diamond Bank v. PIC (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt.1172) 67

Counsel further contended that where a loan is insured and the employee loses her job involuntarily, the bank must apply insurance before pursuing repayment. Counsel referred the court to the case of Union Bank v. Nwaokolo (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt.400) 127 and Fidelity Bank v. M.T (Nig) Ltd (2022).

 

Counsel maintained that the Claimant is entitled to total reversal of the wrongful debits and interest on same.

 

RELIEF (vii): Order for payment of Salary in lieu of notice

Counsel submitted that this flows directly from the employment contract between the parties. The Defendant in this case failed to give notice of termination in line with the contract of employment. The evidence before the Court clearly shows that Notice was never given, therefore the purported termination is unlawful. The law is trite that payment in lieu of Notice is automatic once valid notice is not given.

 

RELIEF (viii): Payment of ?78,343.26 as January 2020 salary

Counsel contended that since the Claimant remained an employee until valid communication of termination which never occurred, she is entitled to her full January salary. Counsel cited the case of WAEC v. Oshionebo (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 994) 258, 271, where the Court of Appeal held that Salary continues until valid termination is communicated.

 

RELIEF (ix): Payment of ?2,538,000 as Ex Gratia

Learned counsel submitted that the Claimant tendered evidence of the Defendant’s ex gratia policy and prior benefit computations as contained in Exhibit DW7. The Defendant did not rebut this. In labour matters, where a benefit forms part of established company practice or is reflected in internal documents, the Court will enforce it.

 

Counsel relied on the case of Organ v. NLNG (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt.1381) 506 where it was established workplace practices form part of employment conditions. The Claimant is therefore entitled to this sum.

 

RELIEF (x): Payment of ?2,358,722.99 as additional concession

 

Counsel submitted that the Claimant is entitled to payment of additional concession as it forms part of her terminal benefit. This is contained in Exhibit DW7 (benefit computation document dated 3^rd January 2020) and forms part of payment made to the Claimant on 6^th January 2020. The Defendant did not dispute the figures or produce alternative calculations.

 

RELIEF (xi): Payment for 64 days leave encashment

Counsel contended that the Claimant’s entitlement to leave encashment was shown in her employment document and also in the computation contained in Exhibit DW7. Also Exhibit CW4 shows email correspondences between the Claimant and the Defendant especially that of Wednesday 12^th February 2020 from Olawunmi Akinniranye where he attached a document showing an “updated terminal advise that has taken into consideration your unutilised leave”. The Defendant presented no contrary evidence and did not tender any leave schedule or record to show that the Claimant had exhausted her leave. The law is that leave is earned and must be paid out if not taken at termination. See Nigerian Ports Authority v. Oseni (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 397.

 

RELIEF (xii): ?24,983.12 as leave allowance

Counsel submitted that this is a derivative entitlement under the Claimant’s employment terms and remains payable in the absence of lawful termination. This is contained in Exhibit DW7.

 

RELIEF (xiii): ?17,349.39 as 13th month bonus

Counsel contended that the Defendant has continuously maintained a practice of payment of 13^th Month bonuses and same is contained in Exhibit DW7 therefore the Claimant acquires a legitimate expectation enforceable by this Court. The Defendant did not rebut this entitlement.

 

 

RELIEF (xiv): ?20,000,000 as General Damages

Counsel submitted that the Claimant was wrongfully pushed and forced out of work by the Defendant, not only was she wrongfully pushed out of work, and her financial dignity was assaulted. The Defendant engaged in financial harassment. The Claimant’s pleadings, was unshaken under cross-examination, and it shows that her account was blocked without lawful order, terminal benefits earlier credited were reversed, and the account was thrown into debit. This is not mere administrative error; it is financial intimidation.

Counsel contended that Banks do not possess the unilateral right to freeze, block and debit accounts at whim. The law has prohibited such conduct. The law is emphatically against arbitrary debits. Counsel referred the court to the case of Access Bank v. Akinniyi (2021) LPELR-54147(CA) where the Court of Appeal declared Account freezing without due process as unlawful. Also, Diamond Bank PIC V Partnership Investment Co. Ltd (2009) 18 NWLR (Pt.1172) 67, The Supreme Court made it clear that debits must be backed by mandate. Therefore, Unauthorized debits constitute compensable injury.

Learned counsel submitted that the Claimant suffered sudden loss of income, reputational injury, emotional distress, account harassment, and procedural injustice. These are the exact kinds of injuries general damages are meant to cure. The actions of the Defendant amount to Aggravated damages. Aggravated damages apply where the Defendant’s behaviour is high-handed, malicious, oppressive, and intended to injure. Counsel cited the case of GTB v. V.I.P Petroleum (2022) LPELR-58178(CA). In this case, the Defendant predetermined the Claimant’s exit, manipulated her finances, issued contradictory disengagement letters, turned around to blame her for an ADR process it refused to pursue, did not present disciplinary documents because they never existed, and then try to shift liability for an insured loan.

 

RELIEF (xv): Pre- and post-judgment interest

 

Counsel submitted that Interest serves to compensate for the time-value of money wrongfully withheld. The Court has discretion to grant both pre and post judgment interest. The Defendant after unlawfully terminating the employment of the Claimant, has withheld her terminal benefits for over 5years and has also thrown the account of the Claimant into negative status. This action is reprehensible and must be duly compensated, considering inflationary trends and the current value of the money today.

 

RELIEF (xvi): Costs of the action

It is the submission of counsel that It is trite law that Costs follows event. The Defendant’s conduct necessitated litigation. The Claimant was forced to engage a solicitor to engage the Defendant in a bid to resolve the issue without resulting to litigation. The Defendant forced the Claimant to litigation thereby expending huge cost. The Claimant is hereby entitled to cost. Counsel cited the case of Nwokedi v. R.T.C.N. (2022) LPELR-57436(CA)

 

DEFENDANT’S REPLY ON POINTS OF LAW

Defendant’s counsel filed their reply on points of law on 16/1/2026, and adopts the submissions contained in its Final Written Address as its response to the arguments canvassed in the Claimant’s Final Written Address, and further submitted that the Claimant argued in her Final Written Address that the termination of her employment was wrongful and constituted constructive dismissal.

Learned counsel submitted that it is settled law that an employment can only be said to have been wrongfully terminated where such termination is carried out in breach of the terms governing the contract of service or in a manner not contemplated by the conditions of service. Counsel referred the court to the case of U.B.N. v. Chinyere (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1203) 453 at 472 paras. F–G; Ezekwere v. Golden Guinea Breweries Ltd. (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt. 670) 648.

                       

Counsel submitted that in the instant case, the Defendant terminated the Claimant’s employment strictly in accordance with the terms of her Contract of Employment (Exhibit DW1) and the UBA Employees’ Handbook (Exhibit CW12). The Defendant duly calculated and paid the Claimant her terminal benefits as provided under the said documents. The breakdown of these benefits was tendered as Exhibit DW7 during trial.

 

Counsel contended that the settled position of law is that in a pure master–servant relationship, such as the one between the Claimant and the Defendant, the court will not inquire into the motive behind the termination of employment once it is established that the termination was carried out in accordance with the governing contract. What the court is enjoined to examine is strict compliance with the contractual terms and not the reason for the termination. Counsel relied on the case of Oloruntoba-Oju v. Abdul-Raheem (2009) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1157) 83.

Learned counsel submitted that in the instant case, the Claimant’s contract of employment, as evidenced by Exhibit DW1 and regulated by the UBA Employees’ Handbook (Exhibit CW12), clearly grants the Defendant the right to terminate the employment upon issuance of notice or payment in lieu of notice. The Defendant exercised this right strictly within the contemplation of the contract. Consequently, the Claimant cannot, in law, convert a lawful termination into a wrongful one merely because she feels aggrieved by the Defendant’s decision.

Counsel further submitted that once the Defendant complied with the contractual provisions relating to termination and paid the Claimant her terminal benefits, the employment relationship was legally and conclusively brought to an end. The Claimant’s remedy, if any, lies only in damages strictly limited to what she would have earned during the notice period, which has already been paid.

Counsel argued that constructive dismissal is not presumed; it must be strictly proved by cogent and credible evidence. The burden lies squarely on the employee alleging same to establish that the employer deliberately made the working environment so unbearable as to leave the employee with no reasonable option but to resign. Mere dissatisfaction, disagreement, or advice to resign does not amount to constructive dismissal. Counsel referred the court to Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation v. Quiñanola (G.R. No. 83239, 8 March 1989).

Counsel submitted that in the present case, the Claimant did not resign her employment. Rather, she remained in the Defendant’s employment until the Defendant exercised its contractual right of termination. This fact alone completely destroys the Claimant’s allegation of constructive dismissal, as constructive dismissal necessarily presupposes a voluntary resignation induced by the employer’s conduct.

Furthermore, counsel submitted that there is no evidence before the Honourable Court of demotion, reduction in salary, discrimination, hostility, or intolerable working conditions imposed on the Claimant by the Defendant. In the absence of such evidence, the allegation of constructive dismissal remains speculative and legally unsustainable.

Counsel contended that the Claimant’s submissions under issue (1) of her Final Written Address are therefore misleading and should be discountenanced, as the termination of her employment was carried out strictly in line with the contract of employment and the Employees’ Handbook governing the parties.

Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s contention in paragraph 4.25 of her Final Written Address that there was no valid notice or payment in lieu of notice is false and misleading. Exhibit DW7, which details the Claimant’s terminal benefits, clearly shows payment in lieu of notice as one of the benefits paid to the Claimant in accordance with her contract of employment.

Counsel maintained that payment in lieu of notice is a well-recognized and lawful mode of terminating employment under Nigerian labour jurisprudence. Once payment in lieu of notice is made, the termination becomes immediately effective and legally valid, irrespective of whether the employee acknowledges or accepts the payment. The law is settled that documentary evidence is the best form of evidence and speaks for itself.

Counsel therefore submitted that the Defendant fully discharged its obligation under the contract of employment by making payment in lieu of notice, thereby foreclosing any claim of wrongful termination on this ground. Pursuant to Exhibit CW12, the Defendant computed the Claimant’s entitlements and lawfully deducted the outstanding loan owed by the Claimant in accordance with the Offer of Loan Facility (Exhibit D2). The net balance was communicated to the Claimant via email dated 12th February, 2020 (Exhibit C7).

Learned counsel submitted that an employer is entitled under the terms of a valid contract of employment and staff handbook, to deduct outstanding liabilities owed by an employee from terminal benefits payable upon cessation of employment. Such deductions do not constitute a breach of contract where they are expressly authorised by the governing documents.

In the instant case, the Claimant’s indebtedness to the Defendant arose from a duly executed Offer of Loan Facility (Exhibit D2), the terms of which expressly permit recovery from the Claimant’s entitlements. This contractual right is further reinforced by Paragraph 9.2.3.8 of the UBA Employees’ Handbook (Exhibit CW12).

Counsel further submitted that the Defendant’s action in deducting the outstanding loan balance before remitting the net terminal benefits was therefore lawful, contractual, and equitable. The Claimant cannot approbate and reprobate by enjoying the benefits of the loan facility while resisting lawful recovery.

Counsel contended that the Claimant’s allegation in paragraph 4.26 of her Final Written Address that the Defendant presented conflicting figures suggestive of fraud is unfounded, misleading, and illogical. The Defendant never attempted to manipulate or falsify any figures. The Claimant did not, at any point in her pleadings, dispute the computation of her terminal benefits nor plead any particulars of fraud.

Counsel submitted that the law is settled that allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded. Counsel relied on the case of R.E.A.N. Ltd. v. Aswani Textiles Ind. Ltd. (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt. 176) 639, Akpunonu v. Bekaert Overseas (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 393) 42.

Counsel contended that it is settled law that addresses of counsel, however brilliant, cannot substitute for pleadings or evidence. An allegation of fraud raised for the first time in a Final Written Address is incompetent and liable to be discountenanced, as parties are bound by their pleadings. The Claimant neither pleaded fraud nor led evidence establishing any fraudulent intent or act on the part of the Defendant. The law does not permit a party to ambush the opposing party with allegations of fraud at the address stage, as doing so offends the principles of fair hearing.

Counsel further contended that the Claimant’s submission in paragraph 4.31 of her Final Written Address that the reversal of credited funds negates notice is false and misleading. Counsel submitted that the reversal occurred solely to enable the lawful deduction of the Claimant’s outstanding loan obligations in line with Exhibits D2 and CW12.

Counsel submitted that the Claimant’s allegation in paragraph 4.32 of her Final Written Address that Exhibit DW6 is a fabricated document is equally false. Exhibit DW6 is the Letter of Termination dated 9th January, 2020, physically handed to the Claimant during a meeting. It is the submission of counsel that the Defendant had no alternative but to terminate the Claimant’s employment after she declined to resign. The termination was carried out strictly in accordance with the governing contractual documents.

Counsel maintained that the Claimant’s allegation that Exhibit DW6 is fabricated is a serious allegation bordering on criminality, yet it is unsupported by pleadings or evidence. The law is clear that such an allegation must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. The Defendant tendered Exhibit DW6 through a competent witness, and same was admitted in evidence without objection.it is the submission of counsel that the Claimant failed to challenge the authenticity of the document during cross-examination. Having failed to do so, the Claimant cannot now turn around at the address stage to impugn the document. Counsel therefore submitted that Exhibit DW6 remains valid, credible, and binding evidence of the lawful termination of the Claimant’s employment.

Learned counsel submitted that in response to Issue 3 of the Claimant’s Final Written Address, counsel relied entirely on the submissions under Issue 3 of the Defendant’s Final Written Address. The Defendant duly paid all terminal benefits due to the Claimant after deducting her indebtedness as permitted under the contract and handbook. The Paragraph 9.2.3.8 of the UBA Employees’ Handbook (Exhibit CW12) expressly provides that:

“Upon resignation, an employee shall be entitled to certain benefits under UBA Group’s compensation policy, less any unpaid liabilities owed to UBA Group.”

Counsel submitted that this position was clearly pleaded and testified to in paragraph 13 of the Amended Written Statement on Oath of DW1 dated 3rd March, 2023. It is therefore misleading for the Claimant to seek declaratory and monetary reliefs in respect of benefits already paid. Counsel urged the Court to dismiss the Claimant’s claims in their entirety.

It is the submission of counsel that declaratory reliefs are granted only on the strength of credible evidence and not on the weakness of the defence. In the instant case, the Claimant failed to establish any entitlement to the declarations and monetary reliefs sought, having been duly paid her contractual entitlements. Counsel contended that granting the Claimant’s reliefs would amount to unjust enrichment and would unjustly penalise the Defendant for exercising a lawful contractual right.

DECISION OF THE COURT

I have carefully read through the processes filed and also listened to the witnesses while giving evidence, as well as arguments canvassed on the issues raised by counsel for determination in the final written addresses of both parties.

The Defendant raised a preliminary issue on jurisdiction and argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the Claimant failed to exhaust the internal grievance and mediation procedures outlined in paragraph 6.7 of the UBA Employee Handbook (Exhibit CW12).

I have carefully examined clause 6.7 of Exhibit CW12. This clause indeed provides for, and encourages internal mediation and resolution, and also preserves the right of an ex-employee to litigation where agreement cannot be reached.

Paragraph 6.7 of Exhibit C12 of the UBA Employee Handbook is hereby reproduced hereunder:

 

“Stage 1

If after leaving the employment of the Group an ex-employee has any claim or grievances against the group, he/she shall be required in the first instance to report the matter to the Head of Human Capital Management for resolution.

 

Stage II

If the matter is not satisfactorily resolved within 90 days, the matter may be referred to mediation at any court connected multi door Courthouse or any other alternative Dispute Resolution Centre or forum for resolution.

 

However, if the parties fail to reach agreement on the forum and/or where a Court connected to multi door courthouse does not exist in the state where the ex-employee resides, the matter shall be referred to the nearest court connected multi door courthouse.

 

PROVIDED ALWAYS that the procedure for resolution of dispute herein specified shall not preclude the legal right of the employee to resort to litigation in the settlement of a dispute where agreement cannot be reached by mediation. However, the procedure specified above shall first be followed before resorting to litigation.”

 

A close review or understanding of this paragraph 6.7 of  exhibit CW12, would reveal that it tends to compel the ex-employee to first return to the employer with complaints and then exhaust an uncertain procedure of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) within and outside the employers’ setting before exercising right to resort to court to litigate the dispute.

I however, take the view that a major hallmark of ADR is its voluntary posture and as a dispute resolution mechanism, an ADR clause should provide a clear and ascertainable road map to effective resolution of the matter between disputing parties. Where an ADR Clause rather provides an uncertain procedure inhibiting effective dispute resolution, it has failed in its primary mission to provide alternative to litigation.

It is fundamental to know that parties cannot on their accord confer jurisdiction on the court. It is plain, from this provision that it is the parties who can decide when and how the court can respond to their dispute.  Jurisdiction is the threshold of judicial power and judicial activism, and by extension, it is extrinsic to adjudication. Our principles of laws about jurisdiction which has long been settled is it is the backbone of any adjudication. Parties cannot by their convenience, connivance, acquiescence, or collusion confer jurisdiction on a court. Where a court lacks jurisdiction, parties in the litigation cannot confer jurisdiction on the court. As a matter of law, lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by one or both parties. It is a hard matter of law clearly beyond the compromise of the parties. This is because parties cannot conspire to vest jurisdiction in a court where there is none. Any proceedings conducted without jurisdiction would certainly become an exercise in futility, for such proceedings are null and void. See APC v ENUGU STATE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION & ORS (2021) LPELR-5337, SC per Kekere Ekun JSC (now CJN) When held: -

“Jurisdiction is the lifeblood of any adjudication. It is the foundation of every cause or matter before a court of law. It is a matter of strict law donated by the constitution and statutes. It can also be described as the authority of a court to entertain a matter brought before it”

 

It is for this reason that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of proceedings, even for the first time on appeal: see the case of A. G. RIVERS STATE V. A. G. FED (2019) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1652) 53.

 

Therefore, my humble but sustained view which I hold that such an uncertain and clumsy clause of ADR is certainly not an effective dispute resolution clause as envisaged by the promoters of ADR providing a panacea for congested and often distasteful outcome of litigation.

 

The rationale for compelling the Ex-employee to return to the Defendant’s Staff as to the Head of Human Capital Management in the instant case to make complaint and seek resolution upon being aggrieved, is in my view, is of course, of doubtful efficacy, as it tends to restrict an Ex-employee who has become an external aggrieved party from litigating an issue against the Defendant organization being the former employer. Accordingly, to insist that an Ex-employee must submit to this kind of forum even fraught with an uncertain dispute resolution procedure, will unwittingly shackle and constitute clog in the Claimant’s constitutional right to gain access to court in order to ventilate his grievance against his Ex-employer, (in the instant case, the Defendant). Moreso, courts all over the world guard their jurisdictions jealously, particularly in Nigeria, where the access to court is a guaranteed right under Sections 6(6) and 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as Amended). Thus, a provision in any enactment which tends to restrict or limit the easy access of aggrieved person to court to ventilate the grievance at the appropriate time, is usually construed strictly by courts.

 

 In Amadi v. N.N.P.C (2000) 10 NWLR (Pt.674) (SC)76, the Supreme Court held that:

 

“Regulations of the right to access to the court abound in the rules of procedure and are legitimate. It seems to be accepted that where an enactment regulates the right of access to the court in a manner to constitute an improper obstacle to access the court, such enactment could be appropriately regarded as an infringement of section 36(1) rather than an infringement of section 6 of the constitution”.

 

Such unwarranted restrictive provision is liable to be struck down. Accordingly, I find and hold that the provisions of Paragraph 6.7 of the U.B.A Group Staff Handbook constitutes an improper obstacle in the way of the Claimant, being an Ex-employee of the Defendant, to accessing the court to ventilate and litigate his dispute with the Defendant, who is his Ex-employer before this court and as such, I hereby affirm the competency of this suit and hasten to invoke the jurisdiction of the court to entertain same. In other words, this court assumes jurisdiction in the suit.

 

Section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) expressly confers exclusive jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court over all labour, employment, and industrial relation matters. Internal dispute resolution mechanisms, however well-intentioned, cannot oust the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Internal procedures do not bar direct access to the Court, especially where, as here, the employer’s actions demonstrate that further internal engagement would be futile. This objection is  therefore, without substance, it is hereby overruled.

 

Now, let me turn to the substantive suit. It is the case of the claimant that she was employed by the Defendant from 7^th June 2001 until her disengagement in January 2020 and in the course of her employment, she rose to the position of a Branch Manager. On 6^th January 2020, upon resumption from leave, the Claimant’s system access was blocked, and her salary account was credited with “benefits” – a clear precursor to exit. On 9^th January 2020, the Defendant issued a letter titled “Advise to Resign” which is Exhibit CW5 dated 3^rd January 2020 said to have been backdated. The Claimant tendered a resignation letter on 10^th January 2020, referencing the said “Advise to Resign” marked as Exhibit CW6, of which the Defendant refused to accept the resignation, but rather issued a Termination Letter dated 10^th January 2020 being Exhibit CW7. The Defendant also claimed a prior termination letter dated 9^th January 2020 as in Exhibit DW6 but failed to prove service. It is contended that the Defendant paid, then reversed the payment of the Claimant’s terminal benefits and blocked her account. The Defendant issued multiple, inconsistent entitlement letters with the same reference number but different dates and figures. Claimant contended that the Defendant deducted the outstanding balance of the Claimant’s insured consumer loan from her terminal benefits without first claiming from the insurer. All these alongside the Exhibits form the factual basis of this case before this court.

 

 

This Court therefore from the nature and circumstances of this case, formulates the following issues for determination:

1. Whether the Claimant’s employment was wrongfully or constructively terminated.

2. Whether the Claimant has proved entitlement to the reliefs sought.

 

On issue one, it is settled law that in a master–servant relationship, the employer has the right to terminate employment for any reason or no reason at all, provided the termination is done in accordance with the terms of the contract as the law is trite that parties are bound by the terms and conditions of a contract they voluntarily entered. See JFS INVESTMENTS Ltd v  BAWAL LINE Ltd, (2010) 18 NWLR pt 1225 p.495, SC.

 

However, by virtue of Section 254C(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), the Court may also examine whether the conduct of the employer amounts to unfair labour practice or constructive dismissal.

 

The issue of unfair labour practice is beyond imagination within the context of the labour matters in Nigeria. Although there is no statutory definition of unfair labour practice as a concept or term, it has been generally accepted to mean practices that do not confirm to the best practice in labour circles as may be enjoined by the local and international experiences. See MIX & BAKE v NUFBTE (2004) 1 NLLR pt 49 p.69. It consists of an act or omission in employment relationship that are seen unjust, inequitable, oppressive and highly unconscionable, including grave breaches of employees’ rights. Instances of unfair labour practice are; where one person or group is favoured over another on the basis of irrelevance, where one or people are treated arbitrarily that is to say the treatment being not in accordance with the laid down rules, where one or people treated irrationally and on basis of unproven or untested views and suppositions and where people are penalised or denied an advantage without being able to state their case. See EJEKE MADUKA v MICROSOFT NIG, Ltd (2014) 41 NLLR pt.125 p.67. However, a constructive dismissal occurs when an employee does not resign voluntarily but because the employer has created a hostile or intolerable environment, or deliberately made the workplace unfavourable for the employee. This Court in Miss Ebere Ukoji v Standard Alliance Life Assurance Co. Ltd [2014] 47 NLLR (Pt. 154) 531 held inter alia:

 

 “Globally, and in labour/employment law, constructive dismissal, also referred to as constructive discharge, occurs when an employee resigns because his/her employer’s behaviour has become intolerable or heinous or made life difficult that the employee has no choice but to resign. Given that the resignation was not truly voluntary, it is in effect a termination. In an alternative sense, constructive dismissal or constructive discharge is a situation where an employer creates such working conditions (or so changes the terms of employment) that the affected employee has little or no choice but to resign. Thus, where an employer makes life extremely difficult for an employee, to attempt to have the employee resign, rather than outright firing the employee, the employer is trying to create a constructive discharge. The exact legal consequences differ from country to country but generally, a constructive dismissal leads to the employee’s obligations ending and the employee acquiring the right to seek legal compensation against the employer. The employee may resign over a single serious incident or a pattern of incidents, generally, the employee must have resigned soon after the incident.”

 

From the evidence before the Court, the following facts are not in dispute that (a.) the Claimant was credited with terminal benefits on 6^th January 2020, before any formal communication of termination, (b.) that the Defendant issued a letter of advice to resign dated 3^rd January 2020 but delivered on 9^th January 2020; (c.) that there exists multiple and inconsistent disengagement documents with varying dates and figures; (d.) that the Claimant was locked out of her work system upon resumption from her leave, and (e.) that the purported payment of benefits was subsequently reversed.

These facts, taken together with the evidence adduced clearly show that the Defendant had predetermined the exit of the Claimant before complying with the contractual procedure for termination.

 

The law is that constructive dismissal occurs where an employer, by conduct, makes continued employment intolerable, thereby forcing the employee to resign. This Court finds that the backdating of the “Advice to Resign” letter, the pre-termination payment of benefits, the denial of access to work system, and the subsequent reversal of benefits, cconstitute acts inconsistent with good faith and fair labour practice.

 

Furthermore, the Defendant has failed to establish otherwise, a valid termination letter was properly communicated to the Claimant prior to disengagement. The law is trite that termination takes effect only upon communication of the mode to the party concerned. Consequently, the purported termination of the claimant revealed by the facts and evidence before the court could be, and it is wrongful and unlawful. Consequently, this Court finds that the Claimant’s resignation was not voluntary, but was induced by the Defendant’s conduct, which therefore amounts to constructive dismissal. I so hold.

 

On issue two, the backdating of the resignation advice was improper, (which her resignation amounted to constructive dismissal). The termination was therefore wrongful. Having said so, the court will now consider the determination of the reliefs in this suit in the context, whether the claimant has proved her reliefs and so entitled to them. On Reliefs i & ii; the Court finds that the Defendant’s conduct amounted to constructive dismissal. The key elements as revealed by evidence are established that the Defendant locked the Claimant out of her work system, paid terminal benefits before any formal termination or resignation and issued a backdated “Advise to Resign” letter. These acts made the working environment intolerable and left the Claimant with no real option but to resign. Reliefs i &ii grantable and same are hereby granted in favour of the Claimant.

 

On Relief iii; I hold the view that there was neither notice of termination that was given, nor was payment in lieu of notice made simultaneously with or after a lawful termination. Payment in lieu of notices, cannot precede termination as was clearly done by the defendant. The Defendant has failed to follow its own disciplinary and exit procedure under the Employee Handbook that is Exhibit CW12, which requires remedial coaching and counselling for poor performance; none was seemed to have been done in the case of the claimant. The alleged termination letter dated 9^th January 2020 which is Exhibit DW6 was not proved to have been served on the Claimant. A letter not communicated to the recipient is worthless and no letter at all. It has no effect. The issuance of multiple contradictory disengagement documents with the same reference number indicates bad faith and an attempt by the defendant to retroactively justify an unlawful act.

 Relief viii (Salary for January 2020 – N78,343.26) is granted. The Claimant has remained an employee of the defendant, until the unlawful termination; I find that she is entitled to her salary for the month of January 2020.

 

Since termination was found not properly effected, it is pertinent to state here that the Claimant remained in the employment of the defendant until disengagement became effective. The termination since was found wrongful, illegal, and unlawful, relief (iii) is without hesitation granted in favour of the claimant.

 

On Reliefs iv, v, vii, viii, xi, xii, and xiii; all taken together, the Claimant is entitled to all benefits accruing under her employment contract, stipulated in Exhibit CW1 and the Employee Handbook, subject to lawful deductions. In essence, it follows that relief iv is for the claimant be declared to be entitled to all benefits, wages, salaries, remunerations/allowances and emoluments as contained in the letter of employment dated 7/6/2001. Thus, in view of the grant of relief 3, herein above, this relief is consequently granted as well.

 

Relief v & vii for emphasis purpose, (One month’s salary in lieu of notice – N179,277.01 is on the same basis granted since it is clear that the Defendant failed to give valid notice or a lawful payment in lieu thereof.

 

Relief xi (Leave encashment for 64 working days in the sum of N3,322,078.94 as shown in the Defendant’s own email of 12^th February 2020 which is Exhibit CW4 and benefit computation as in Exhibit DW7 which is admitted unutilised leave. To this, the Defendant provided no leave record to rebut this claim, and so in this context, the claimant has established her entitlement thereto and accordingly, this relief is hereby granted.

Relief xii which is for Leave allowance is for the amount of N24,983.12 and consequent upon the foregoing grants, this is also granted in favour of the claimant.

Relief xiii is one of the 13^th month bonus for 2020 at the sum of N17,349.39 which formed part of the Defendant’s established practice and was listed in Exhibit DW7 before this court is as well, granted.

 

On Ex-gratia and Additional Concession as in (Reliefs ix & x) this court declines to grant to the claimant because ex-gratia means “as a favour” and is not a legal right unless the parties made it a contractual term or through established practice. While the Claimant relied on Exhibit DW7, the Court finds that the Defendant’s inconsistent conduct and the absence of any clear and binding policy in the Employee Handbook render these claims unenforceable against the defendant. A party cannot be compelled to make an ex-gratia payment to another without an established commitment in place. The law is that ex-gratia is not a right unless contractually provided or established as practice. The claimant failed to show her entitlement. These reliefs failed.

On Insured Loan and Reversal of Debits as in Relief vi, the loan offer letter as in Exhibit CW13 explicitly provided for insurance covering involuntary loss of employment. It is in evidence before the court that the loan was insured, the Claimant’s exit was involuntary, the Defendant failed to prove that it invoked the insurance, and the unilateral deduction and account manipulation are unlawful. The Court has found the termination was constructive/involuntary one. The Defendant, as the first loss payee, had a duty to claim from the insurer before deducting from the Claimant’s terminal benefits. Its failure to do so is a breach of contract. The arbitrary debiting and blocking of the Claimant’s account without a court order or lawful mandate is unlawful. This relief is granted in favour of the Claimant. For the avoidance of doubt, this Court hereby orders the reversal of all debits, interest charges at 24% per annum, and other deductions made on the Claimant’s account from January 2020.

 

On General Damages (Relief xiv), the measure of damages for wrongful dismissal has been guided by two regimes of legal principles for award of damages in employment claims; one limiting the entitlement to the period of notice not complied with as in Olatunbosun v. N.I.S.R Council (1988) 1NSCC (1025)188) and the other, that recognizes the sensitivity of the sector of the economy involved and the stigma attached to the dismissed employee (as in British Airways v. Makanjuola [1993] 8 NWLR (Pt.309)276).

 

Given the circumstances of this instant case, I find that it is suitable for application of the principles in Makanjuola’s case, (Supra) @P.289 Paras. C-D, it was held that:

 

“The quantum of damages recoverable by a party for wrongful termination of his employment will largely depend on whether the wrongful termination of employment was as a result of the failure to give the required notice or as a result of the alleged malpractice. If wrongful termination of employment is as a result of the former, the quantum of damages recoverable may be the employee’s salary for the period of required notice. But if it is due to the later i.e malpractice, then such a termination carries with it some stigma on the character of the employee for which he shall be entitled to substantial damages far beyond his salary for the period the notice was required”.

 

Having held that the termination of the Claimant’s employment was wrongful, the Claimant is entitled to damages. The Defendant’s conduct was high-handed, oppressive, and caused the Claimant severe emotional distress, financial harassment, and reputational injury. The evidence of arbitrary reversal of benefits, backdating of documents, and issuance of contradictory letters are aggravating factors in this instant case. The Defendant’s conduct particularly forced exit, financial reversals, blocking of account, and procedural irregularities amounts to oppressive and unfair labour practice.  I am persuaded to award the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) damages in favour of the Claimant against the Defendant for the wrongful dismissal. I so hold.

 

On Interest and Costs (Reliefs xv & xvi), Pre-judgment interest is granted at 10% per annum on all judgment sums from 10^th January 2020 which is the date of termination of the claimant until the date of this judgment, while post-judgment interest is granted at 10% per annum from the date of this judgment until final liquidation. Accordingly, this court grants 10% pre and post judgment interest which both parties should work out the amount with certainty, payable to the claimant.

 

On cost, it is trite that a successful party is entitled to cost which should not be denied except for good reason. See MAYA v OSHONTOKUN (2001) 11 NWLR pt 723 p.62 @ 85 paras F (CA). Similarly, by the provision of Order 55 (1)-(5) of the Rules of this Court, this court may as a matter of exercise of its discretion award cost. See the cases of CAPPA & DALBERTO NIG. LTD v NDIC (2021) 9 NWLR pt.1780 p.1 @ 14 paras G-H and MEKWUNYE v EMIRATE AIRLINES (2019) LPELR-46553 (SC) @ pp 67-73 paras E where the court held that:

 

“Cost is granted at the discretion of the court once empowered by its rules. Cost is therefore, a discretionary relief granted by the court”.

 

More so, in law, a successful party in an action unless misconducts himself is entitled to cost as of a right. This position of law is premised on the principles that costs follow event and that a successful party in a litigation is entitled to be indemnified for all the reasonable expences incurred in the prosecution of the matter up to judgment. See EZENNAKA v COP CROSS-RIVERS STATE (2022) 18 NWLR pt.1862 p.369 @ 420 paras D-F (SC) I hereby award the sum of N500,000.00 (Five Hundred Thousand Naira) as cost of this suit in favour of the Claimant against the Defendant.

 

For the avoidance of doubt, I hereby make the following declarations and orders;

 

1.     A DECLARATION that the act of backdating the “Advise to Resign” letter dated 3^rd January 2020 but issued on 9^th January 2020 is fraudulent and illegal.

2.     A DECLARATION that the Claimant’s resignation of 10^th January 2020 was a direct result of the said “Advise to Resign” letter and amounts to constructive dismissal.

3.     A DECLARATION that the termination letter dated 10^th January 2020 and the associated entitlement letters are wrongful, illegal, and unlawful.

4.     A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to all benefits, salaries, remunerations, and emoluments under her letter of employment dated 7^th June 2001, subject to lawful deductions however, the former deductions made are found not lawful.

5.     A DECLARATION that the Claimant is entitled to one month’s salary in lieu of notice.

6.     AN ORDER reversing all debits, interest charges, and the outstanding UBA consumer loan deducted from the Claimant’s account, as the loan was insured for involuntary loss of job.

7.     AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N179,277.01 as payment in lieu of notice.

8.     AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N78,343.26 as salary for January 2020.

9.     AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N3,322,078.94 as leave encashment for 64 days.

10.                        AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N24,983.12 as leave allowance.

11.                        AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N17,349.39 as 13^th month bonus for 2020.

12.                        AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay the Claimant the sum of N5,000,000.00 (Five Million Naira) as general damages.

13.                        AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay interest at 10% per annum pre-judgment on all sums from 10^th January 2020 until judgment, and 10% per annum post-judgment until full payment.

14.                        AN ORDER directing the Defendant to pay costs of N500,000.00 to the Claimant.

 

The ex-gratia and additional concession reliefs fail and are hereby dismissed.

Judgment is hereby entered in favour of the Claimant against the Defendant.

 

 

 

….………………………………

HON. JUSTICE S. A. YELWA

                                                                     (JUDGE)

 

APPEARANCES

 

1.   Olabamiji Adeyeye for the Claimant

2.  Vitus Nwokediaso for the Defendant